



ASIA MAIOR

Vol. XXXVI / 2025

**Asia in 2025:
Great power rivalry, contested politics,
and global disorder**

viella



CENTRO STUDI PER I POPOLI EXTRA-EUROPEI “CESARE BONACOSSA” - UNIVERSITÀ DI PAVIA

ASIA MAIOR

The Journal of the Italian think tank on Asia founded by Giorgio Borsa in 1989
Vol. XXXVI / 2025

Asia in 2025: Great power rivalry, contested polities, and global disorder

viella

Asia Maior. The Journal of the Italian Think Tank on Asia founded by Giorgio Borsa in 1989.

Copyright © 2026 - Viella s.r.l. & Associazione Asia Maior

ISBN 979-12-5701-257-1 (Paper) 979-12-5701-258-8 (Online)

ISSN 2385-2526 (Paper) ISSN 2612-6680 (Online)

Annual journal - Vol. XXXVI, 2025

This journal is published jointly by the think tank Asia Maior (Associazione Asia Maior) & the CSPE - Centro Studi per i Popoli Extra-europei "Cesare Bonacossa", University of Pavia

Asia Maior: The Journal of the Italian Think Tank on Asia founded by Giorgio Borsa in 1989 is an open-access journal, whose issues and single articles can be freely downloaded from the think tank webpage: www.asiamaior.org.

The reference year is the one on which the analyses of the volume are focused. Each *Asia Maior* volume is always published in the year following the one indicated on the cover.

Paper version	Italy	€ 50.00	Abroad	€ 65.00
Subscription	abbonamenti@viella.it www.viella.it			

EDITORIAL BOARD

Editor-in-chief (direttore responsabile):

Michलगuglielmo Torri, University of Turin.

Co-editors:

Axel Berkofsky, University of Pavia;

Filippo Boni, The Open University;

Diego Maiorano, The University of Naples «L'Orientale»;

Marco Pinfari, University of Pavia;

Elena Valdameri, ETH Zürich;

Consulting editors:

Elisabetta Basile, University of Rome «Sapienza»; Kerry Brown, King's College London;

Peter Brian Ramsay Carey, Oxford University;

Rosa Caroli, University of Venice;

Jaewoo Choo, Kyung Hee University (Seoul, South Korea);

Jamie Seth Davidson, National University of Singapore;

Ritu Dewan, Indian Association for Women Studies;

Laura De Giorgi, University of Venice;

Hewison, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill;

Lucia Husenicova, University Matej Bel (Banská Bystrica, Slovakia);

David C. Kang, Maria Crutcher Professor of International Relations,
University of Southern California;
Rohit Karki, Kathmandu School of Law;
Jeff Kingston, Temple University – Japan Campus;
Mirjam Künkler, Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study – Uppsala;
Noemi Lanna, University of Naples «L'Orientale»;
James Manor, School of Advanced Studies – University of London;
Aditya Mukherjee, Jawaharlal Nehru University;
Mridula Mukherjee, Jawaharlal Nehru University;
Giulio Pugliese, European University Institute, Fiesole;
Parimala Rao, University of Delhi;
Guido Samarani, University of Venice;
Marisa Siddivò, University of Naples «L'Orientale»;
Eswaran Sridharan, Institute for the Advanced Study of India, University of
Pennsylvania;
Arun Swamy, University of Guam;
Akio Takahara, University of Tokyo;
Edsel Tupaz, Harvard University alumnus, Ateneo de Manila University and
Far Eastern University;
Pierluigi Valsecchi, University of Pavia;
Sten Widmalm, Uppsala University;
Ather Zia, University of Northern Colorado.

Book reviews editors:

Elena Valdameri, ETH Zurich (Review-editor- in-chief);
Teuku Reza Fadeli, Universitas Indonesia (UI), Jakarta.

Graphic project:

Nicola Mocchi, University of Florence.

Before being published in *Asia Maior*, all articles, whether commissioned or unsolicited, after being first evaluated by the Journal's editors, are then submitted to a double-blind peer review involving up to three anonymous referees. Coherently with the spirit of the double-blind peer review process, *Asia Maior* does not make public the name of the reviewers. However, the reviewers' names – and, if need be, the whole correspondence between the Journal's editors and the reviewer/s – can be disclosed to interested institutions, upon a formal request made directly to the Editor in Chief of the journal.

Articles meant for publication should be sent to Michelguglielmo Torri (mg.torri@gmail.com), Filippo Boni (filippo.boni@open.ac.uk), Diego Maiorano (dmaiorano@unior.it); book reviews should be sent to Elena Valdameri (elena.valdameri@gess.ethz.ch).



ASSOCIAZIONE ASIA MAIOR

Steering Committee: Filippo Boni, Marzia Casolari, Matteo Fumagalli, Michelguglielmo Torri (President).

Scientific Board: Guido Abbattista (Università di Trieste), Domenico Amirante (Università «Federico II», Napoli), Elisabetta Basile (Università «La Sapienza», Roma), Luigi Bonanate (Università di Torino), Claudio Cecchi (Università «La Sapienza», Roma), Alessandro Colombo (Università di Milano), Anton Giulio Maria de Robertis (Università di Bari), Thierry Di Costanzo (Université de Strasbourg), Max Guderzo (Università di Siena), Giorgio Milanetti (Università «La Sapienza», Roma), Paolo Puddinu (Università di Sassari), Adriano Rossi (Università «L'Orientale», Napoli), Giuseppe Sacco (Università «Roma Tre», Roma), Guido Samarani (Università «Ca' Foscari», Venezia), Filippo Sabetti (McGill University, Montréal), Gianni Vaggi (Università di Pavia).



CSPE - Centro Studi per i Popoli extra-europei
"Cesare Bonacossa" - Università di Pavia

Steering Committee: Axel Berkofsky, Alfredo Ferrante, Marco Gardini, Marco Pinfari, Maria Sassi, Pierluigi Valsecchi, Massimo Zaccaria (President)



viella

libreria editrice

via delle Alpi, 32

I-00198 ROMA

tel. 06 84 17 758

fax 06 85 35 39 60

www.viella.it

CONTENTS

IX Foreword

MICHEL GUGLIELMO TORRI, *Asia in 2025: The unravelling of the Asian order in the pincer of great power pressure and domestic strain*

Articles

- 1 FLORA SAPIO, *China 2025: «Focus our energies on doing our own things well»*
- 25 VERONICA STRINA, *China's 2025: Forging a new global role*
- 53 MARCO MILANI & ANTONIO FIORI, *Korean peninsula 2025: Political transition and strategic consolidation*
- 87 RAYMOND YAMAMOTO & MARCO ZAPPA, *Japan 2025: External shocks, domestic turbulence and the rise of Takaichi Sanae*
- 131 STEFANO PELAGGI, *Taiwan 2024-2025: Constraint, adaptation, and the cross-strait equilibrium*
- 155 THAN KIÜ, *Hong Kong 2025: Conditioned continuity under National Security*
- 173 ENRICO GLORIA, *The Philippines 2024-2025: Feuding families, weak institutions, and the limits of Philippine democracy*
- 193 EMANUELA MANGIAROTTI & NÜR RAFEEDA DAUT, *Malaysia 2025: ASEAN chairmanship under the Madani framework*
- 209 TEUKU REZA FADELI, *Indonesia 2025: The «Red-and-White» project and the consolidation of executive dominance*
- 267 CHRISTINE CABASSET, *Timor-Leste 2025: The 11th ASEAN member and new challenges*
- 285 FABIO FIGIACONI, *Vietnam 2025: Tô Lâm's powerplay and the limits of bamboo diplomacy*
- 299 CAROLINE BENNETT, *Cambodia 2025: Resilience in the face of economic and geopolitical insecurity*
- 319 PAUL CHAMBERS, *Thailand 2025: A year of insecurity and transition*
- 341 MATTEO FUMAGALLI, *Myanmar 2025: The military eschews off-ramping and fights back, as the polycrisis carries on*
- 361 AMIT RANJAN, *Bangladesh in 2025: Under the shadow of «Monsoon Revolution»*
- 389 DIEGO MAIORANO & RAGHAW KHATTRI, *India 2025: Economic paradoxes, political recovery, and the battle for electoral integrity*
- 411 IAN HALL, *India 2025: Turbulence and turmoil in foreign policy*
- 431 PUSPA SHARMA, *Nepal 2024-2025: Political upheaval, economic challenges and mixed foreign relations*
- 453 GULBIN SULTANA, *Sri Lanka 2025: Maiden year of the NPP administration*

477	MARCO CORSI, <i>Pakistan 2025: Internal governance challenges, security perils and foreign policy crosswinds</i>
499	ANAHITA MOTAZED RAD, <i>Iran 2024-2025: Strategic retrenchment amid regional setbacks and systemic pressures</i>
521	CARLO FRAPPI, <i>Azerbaijan 2025: Foreign policy behaviour in a fragmenting Eurasian order</i>
	<i>Special articles</i>
543	DAVID SCOTT, <i>Naval Hegemony and Deterrence: Aircraft carrier strategies and power projection in Asian waters</i>
559	SARA BERLOTO & NICOLÒ FASOLA, <i>From Monopoly to Dual Patronage: The evolution of Russian and Chinese influence in Central Asia (1991-2025)</i>
585	HAMIDEH SABERI, «We did not make a revolution to go backwards»: <i>The Iranian women's uprising of march 1979 and its systematic erasure from historical memory</i>
601	ENRICO BARTOLOMEI, «Colonialism of a Dual Nature»: <i>Fayez A. Sayegh, the Palestine Research Center and a Palestinian genealogy of the settler colonial paradigm</i>
625	<i>Reviews</i>
653	<i>Appendix</i>

THAILAND 2025: A YEAR OF INSECURITY AND TRANSITION

Paul Chambers

University of Oklahoma;
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies – Yusof Ishak Institute
Paul.W.Chambers-1@ou.edu

2025 began in Thailand with the Thaksin Shinawatra-influenced Pheu Thai party leading a coalition government headed by his daughter Paetongtarn. But in June, amidst growing border tensions with Cambodia, revelations of an audio clip between her and Cambodia's ex-Premier caused the judiciary to temporarily suspend Paetongtarn from office (while deciding whether she had violated ethics rules) and she was replaced by acting-PM Phumtham Wechayachai. In July Thailand's military engaged in violent border altercations with Cambodia. These frontier security problems gave the military a pretext to increasingly act independent of civilian control. In August the judiciary ruled that Paetongtarn had broken the law: she and her government were forced from office, replaced by Bhumjai Thai party leader Anutin Charnvirakul and his coalition. Though close to the military and monarch, Anutin was supported by the progressive People's Party because he promised to dissolve the Lower House in four months and support constitutional reform. Meanwhile, tensions increased along the Thai-Cambodian border, Anutin was criticized for mishandling a severe flooding fiasco, and reports emerged that Bhumjai Thai-aligned cabinet ministers had been involved with crime syndicates. The year ended with Thailand's economy still weak, Anutin dissolving the Lower House, and a new December Thai-Cambodian peace deal in place.

KEYWORDS – Pheu Thai; Thaksin Shinawatra; Paetongtarn Shinawatra; Anutin Charnvirakul; Phumtham Wechayachai; General Phana Klaeoplodtuk; King Maha Vajiralongkorn; Thai-Cambodian relations; Thai-Myanmar relations; Thai-U.S. relations; Thai-China relations; Thailand economy.

1. Introduction

This essay chronologically examines the year 2025 in Thailand with regard to domestic politics, foreign relations and the economy. It argues that in 2025 elite suspicions of Pheu Thai combined with border security issues led the military to disregard civilian control while the archroyalist judiciary forced Pheu Thai from office. Meanwhile, by the end of 2025, Thailand was continuing a hedging policy between the United States and China, though increasingly tilting toward China. Following this Introduction (Section One), the essay is organized into seven sections. Section Two looks at the government under Paetongtarn Shinawatra during January-May. Sec-

tion Three investigates Thai-Cambodian relations and their effect on Thai civil-military relations until August 2025. Section Four scrutinizes the fall of the Pheu Thai-led government and its replacement with a Bhumjai Thai-led coalition. Section Five examines the Anutin Charnvirakul government until December 2025. Section Six looks at Thailand's relations with Myanmar, the United States, and China. Section Seven investigates Thailand's economy in 2025. Section Eight is the conclusion.

2. *The Paetongtarn government: January-May 2025*

Paetongtarn Shinawatra, Prime Minister since August 2024 (after her predecessor Pheu Thai's Settha Thavisin had been removed from office by the Constitutional Court) early on appeared as an inexperienced leader with her father Thaksin indirectly dominating the Pheu Thai-led coalition government [*Thai PBS World* 2024, 2 December].

In January 2025 her government implemented the second phase of a digital cash transfer scheme which was to provide payments to senior citizens by April. In this second phase, the government provided 10,000 baht per person to three million elderly persons. The entire digital wallet scheme had been one of Pheu Thai's promises during the 2023 election. Besides helping the poor, Pheu Thai had also stated that the initiative would inject funding to spark economic growth. However, significant post-2023 criticism from numerous economists and opposition political parties compelled the government to adjust the cash dispersal (*Thai PBS World* 2025, 17 February). In May 2025 the government indefinitely postponed phase three of the digital wallet program until the economy improved but also because of pressures from increased tariffs of the US Trump administration on Thailand [Liang 2025, 26 May].

Also in January, the cabinet approved a bill to legalize casinos inside of entertainment complexes in Thailand as a tool to encourage tourism and boost the economy. A modified second draft was approved in March following advice from the Council of State. The bill then moved forward where it was expected to sail through votes in the Lower House and Senate, followed by an endorsement from the King. Yet the bill hit numerous delays. Ultimately, it was withdrawn in July at the request of the Finance Minister, following criticism and protests from social conservatives [*Thai PBS World* 2025, 8 July].

Early 2025 moreover saw Thailand deploy heightened anti-scam center operations along border areas with Myanmar and Cambodia – following pressure from China. Indeed, Thailand suspended electricity, fuel and the internet to Myanmar border areas in February 2025 to combat massive cyber scam centers, often run by Chinese syndicates, that were dam-

aging Thailand's image and economy, though some centers continued using generators [Olarn and Adkin 2025, 5 February]. Meanwhile, along the Thai-Cambodian border, over 100 Thais were arrested in a raid on scam centres in border regions there [Reuters 2025, 4 March].

Then, in May, plans were laid to restrict cannabis production – though coalition member Bhumjai Thai had championed cannabis since 2019. Indeed, the action seemed directed at Bhumjai Thai, which had recently seemed to be criticizing coalition leader Pheu Thai.

Thus, by late June 2025, Thailand engaged in a significant regulatory shift, transitioning from a loosely regulated framework to a strictly medical model. This reform impacted every part of the cannabis supply chain – from cultivation to retail [Cannavigia.com 2025, 25 September].

3. Thai-Cambodian relations and the Thai military: January-August 2025

Though post-Cold War Thai-Cambodian relations might be characterized as at times edgy amidst a more general state of peace, in 2025, the two countries engaged in violent border hostilities and almost entered into war. One would have thought that peace would have been preserved given longtime close ties between Thaksin and Cambodian's ex-Premier Hun Sen. But by early 2025 the two were increasingly on the outs. It has been speculated that this perhaps owed to the Paetongtarn government's decision to support legalized gambling, which allegedly threatened Cambodia's own casino industry or Thailand's intense crackdown on scam centres located along the Thai-Cambodian border: profits from such centres have been funnelled to Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party. Yet another possibility is that Hun Sen might have felt that Thaksin had lost influence in Thailand and it was time to drum up Cambodian nationalism [Head 2025, 24 July; Jackson 2024, 13 September]. Whatever the truth regarding their split, it played into the hands of the Thai military which, since the 2023 election had been seeking to repopularize its image and emancipate itself from civilian control.

Late 2024 had already witnessed Thailand and Cambodia disputing their marine border line and the sovereignty of Koh Kood island. Then, in February 2025, a group of Cambodians appeared at an ancient Khmer temple administered by Thailand along the vaguely demarcated boundary and sang nationalist songs. Instead of consulting the government for direction, Thai Second Army Region Commander Lieutenant-General Boonsin Padklang launched a formal protest against the event [The Nation 2025, 17 February]. General Boonsin is close to Army Commander General Pana Klacoplodtuk [Matichon 2025, 4 February].

Then, on 28 May, following a Thai-Cambodian border skirmish that killed a Cambodian soldier, Paetongtarn immediately urged calm and

de-escalation [Pimuk 2025]. But on 3 June, General Boonsin broke ranks with his prime minister and further undermined civilian control. He announced that he would only recognize a Royal Thai Survey Department border map (which is more favourable to Thailand) [Facebook Nation Story 2025, 3 June] and not the one used by the Thai-Cambodia Joint Boundary Commission.

On 5 June, the Thai Army defied the government's de-escalation attempts by launching a militaristic rhetoric dissemination campaign, entitled «Thais are peace-loving but not cowards when at war» [Thai PBS 2025, 6 June]. The media campaign appeared designed to encourage public support for the military, so that it would have a freer rein in its actions against Cambodia.

The next day, Paetongtarn held a National Security Council meeting, afterwards stating, «The military has confirmed readiness for any scenario ... but clashes will cause damage, so we will pursue peaceful means (adding that) the government and military (will) work together» [Juarawee and Panu, 2025, 6 June]. At any rate, Paetongtarn's entreaties appeared to fall on deaf ears, with the Army's subsequent announcement of upping readiness «for a high-level military» [Ibid.].

Civilian control was again thwarted on 7 June when Thailand's army began limiting the opening times of several Thai-Cambodian border posts [Visapra 2025, 7 June]. Amidst the army's growing assertiveness, Paetongtarn reaffirmed her peace and dialogue commitment between Thailand and Cambodia [VOV5, 2025, 17 June].

Then, on 15 June, she engaged in a phone conversation with Hun Sen. The call, which was recorded by the Cambodian government, revealed increasing difficulties in Thai civil-military relations. She told Hun Sen, referring to him as «Uncle», that «people from the opposite side» such as General Boonsin might have made comments that might make Hun Sen «angry», but stressed that the Thai general wanted to «look cool». Paetongtarn told Hun Sen that all she wanted was «peace» [Plewissara 2025, 22 June].

Paetongtarn's comments were considered traitorous by Thai military and right-wing elements [The Nation 2025, 29 June]. Before the clip was revealed, a royal entourage (including a Privy Councillor) delivered gifts to border-based Thai soldiers and met with General Boonsin in mid-June [The Nation 2025, 15 June]. The message seemed clear: the palace supported the military hard line rather than civilian control. On 18 June, the Bhumjaithai Party resigned from the coalition. Regarding the phone call, on 1 July, the powerful and interventionist Constitutional Court, which had often interceded in Thailand's political process, ousting the pro-Thaksin Prime Minister, now opened an ethics investigation of Paetongtarn, temporarily forcing her from office until it made a decision. She was replaced tempo-

rarily by Pheu Thai caretaker Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai, who was close to Thaksin.

Thailand's military, riding a wave of anti-Cambodian nationalism, had now shaken off any civilian controls. When Thai soldiers were injured by landmines along the border on 16 July, General Boonsin threatened military retaliation, stating, «There is no need to wait for orders from the government». Army Commander Pana supported General Boonsin, stating that the current state of play justified retaliation [*Thai PBS World* 2025, 19 July]. After five more soldiers were injured by mines on 23 July, General Boonsin ordered further closures of border crossings [*The Nation*, 2025, 7 July]. For Thailand, the July 23 landmine injuries and Cambodia's firing of rockets into Thai civilian areas triggered a sustained frontier conflict. Cambodia, on the other hand, alleged that the prolonged borderlands combat had begun after Thai soldiers fired at Cambodian soldiers at a temple claimed by both countries [Nierenberg and Wee 2025, 30 July]. Each side claimed to possess evidence supporting its opposing nationalistic narrative about the other. Regardless, on 24 July, hostilities erupted and Thailand's army proactively assumed effective control over directing the conflict for Thailand, while civilian leaders became passive. Thereupon Army Commander Pana readied a war plan against Cambodia [PPTV 2025, 23 July] and, on 25 July, the Thai army instituted martial law in parts of Chanthaburi and Trat provinces [Thai PBS 2025, 25 July]. Though civilians negotiated a 28 July ceasefire [Al Jazeera 2025, 29 July], gunfire only ceased following a meeting of Thai and Cambodian senior military on 29 July [*Associated Press* 2025, 29 July]. Clearly, this meant that the Thai military must give its approval before any ceasefire would hold. And even that armistice proved to be flimsy. By August Thailand and Cambodia remained in a very tenuous ceasefire.

4. *Enter new Prime Minister Anutin*

On August 29, the Constitutional Court ruled 6-3 that Paetongtarn in her controversial phone call had violated ethics rules and she was officially removed from office. The court added that she «lacks the qualifications and possesses prohibited characteristics» under the Thai constitution, and «lacked demonstrable honesty and integrity, and seriously violated or failed to comply with ethical standards» [Regan and Olarn 2025, 29 August]. Though she served as Prime Minister for approximately one year, the ruling made her ineligible to ever serve as Prime Minister again [Wee 2025, 28 August]. Indeed, the ruling demonstrated the enormous power of Thailand's arch royalist judiciary.

TABLE 1 PARTIES/FACIONS/DEFECTORS IN THE ANUTIN CHARNVIRAKUL COALITION	
PARTIES	MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT
Bhumjai Thai	68
Kla Tham	31
Palang Pracharat	17
United Thai Nation (Suchart Chomklin faction)	16
Pheu Thai defectors	8
Thai Sang Thai	3
Democrat defectors	3
Chart Thai Pattana	10
Fair Party	1
Total	157
People's Party (pledged support)	143
Source: <i>Bangkok Post</i> , 23 November 2025; author's calculations	

Pheu Thai immediately tried to install Chaikasem Nitisiri, its sole remaining prime ministerial candidate (the 2017 Thai constitution requires all parties to name such candidates prior to a general election), but he was defeated by Bhumjai Thai party leader Anutin Charnvirakul: Chaikasem received 152 votes, Anutin 311 votes [*Al Jazeera* 2025, 5 September]. Anutin's victory owed to his ability to cobble together multiple small parties, factions, and Pheu Thai defectors, as well as secure backing from the 153-MP Progressive Party, the largest political party. Over time, the number of MPs in Anutin's coalition came to 157 (see Table 1). Still, this number is fluid as Anutin continues to try and attract more MPs to his side. The Progressive Party refused to join Anutin's coalition, but conditioned its support on a promise by Anutin to dissolve the Lower House in four months and also begin the process of redrafting a new constitution [*The Nation* 2025, 2 September]. The decision, controversial even within the Progressive Party, would return to haunt the party in December when Anutin prevented the referendum reform the former had expected. Left in the Opposition was Thaksin's Pheu Thai with 140 MPs.

Meanwhile, just after Anutin's 5 September elevation as Prime Minister, Thailand's Supreme Court, on 8 September, ruled that Thaksin had not properly served a previous prison sentence and must be imprisoned for one year. Thereupon, the following day, he began serving his sentence (Ratcliffe 2025, 9 September). The ruling partly besmirched Thaksin's political name and also meant that he would not be able to directly involve himself in the 2026 general election.

5. Anutin as prime minister: September–December 2025

Born into a wealthy Sino-Thai business family and entering politics in the 1990s, Anutin had earlier served under Thaksin before becoming leader of centrist-conservative Bhumjai in 2012 [Reuters 5 September 2025]. Anutin entered the prime ministership with support from different ideological sides. He was backed by the progressive People's Party because of his promises of fast-paced constitutional reform and the People's Party's greater distrust of Pheu Thai. This was despite his ties to the palace and military, characteristics which appealed to conservatives.

Regarding the palace, Anutin had already long been a «close associate of Thailand's current king» [Wikileaks 2009, 23 November], and, upon the 24 October death of Queen Mother Sirikit, Anutin became the head of her year-long funeral mourning committee [Bangkok Post 2025, 25 October].

As for the military, unlike his predecessor Paetongtarn, Anutin enjoyed a harmonious relationship after taking office. Indeed, with the military eagerly cheering on, Anutin “greenlighted” the army's control over all Thai-Cambodian border issues [*Thai PBS World* 2025, 29 September]. He also directed the Army-led Internal Security Operations Command to combat transnational crime and scam-centers [Bangkok Post 2025b, 4 December]. Finally, he allowed the army a «free hand» over counterinsurgency policy in Thailand's Deep South [Pathan 2025, 28 October].

Finally, Anutin was backed by combination of 1) conservative technocrats; 2) retired military officials; and 3) several regional political strongmen who saw support for him as a way to accrue more wealth and/or political clout. From these three groups he assembled a cabinet [Thitinan 2025, 25 September].

Throughout Anutin's first months in office, the People's Party seemed to be moving forward successfully with its quest for charter changes, to which Anutin continued to give his backing. In October, parliament passed the first reading of the People's Party-favored constitutional amendments [*Thai PBS World* 2025, 16 October] and it appeared that this most progressive version would be passed in all three required readings by December.

However, the new government was immediately confronted with various challenges. Specifically, Anutin began to encounter negative popularity regarding Cambodia, flooding and corruption.

Regarding Cambodia, despite a formal peace declaration in late October, Thai soldiers had continued to be injured by land mines placed by Cambodia along the frontier. Cambodian land mines had been an issue for Thailand's border-based troops since July. Because of this, Anutin, in November, announced that Thailand no longer observed any peace accord with Cambodia [*The Nation* 2025, 12 September]. The US then pressured Anutin, threatening higher tariffs, and Anutin softened his stance [*Thai PBS World* 2025, 26 November]. He was then criticized by moderates for earlier

threatening to relocate Thai exports away from the US market and then later by ultra-nationalists for caving in to Washington. By December, intense fighting between Thailand and Cambodia along their border had started again. Though a precarious peace deal was negotiated on December 27, the situation was still tense in January 2026 (Supalak 2026, 7 January).

Meanwhile, Thailand was hit by massive flooding in November, with greatest damage centered upon Had Yai city in the South, but also in central and some northern provinces. The government's slow reaction to it was followed by a Suan Dusit poll showing slippage in popular support for Anutin from 48% to 23%, ominous political news for Bhumjai Thai given Anutin's promised early election expected in March or April 2026 [Panarat et al. 2025, 1 December].

Finally, in October-November, reports surfaced that some of Anutin's cabinet ministers were themselves linked to cyber-crimes and scam centers – which the government claimed to be cracking down on [*Thai Enquirer* 2025, 30 October]. The Prince Group, a cyber-criminal network, had even rented office space from Anutin's family [*The Nation* 2025a, 17 October] while a photograph was discovered of Anutin with Benjamin Mauerberger, a money launderer and the point man of several such criminal networks [*Bangkok Post* 2025a, 4 December]. Based on these revelations, Pheu Thai promised to file an ethics complaint and a censure motion against the government when it reconvened sometime in December [Jiji Press 2025, 7 December]. But Pheu Thai stated that it would first wait for the parliamentary votes to launch the activation of a new constitutional drafting committee.

6. *Relations with Myanmar, China, and the United States*

Though relations with Cambodia were Thailand's preeminent foreign relations issue in 2025, relations with other countries were also important. Most significant were ties with Myanmar, China, and the United States. These are examined below.

In 2025, Thai-Myanmar relations specifically focused upon border issues, economic interests, and Thailand's support for Myanmar's 2025 election, as well as continuing rosy relations between the Myanmar and Thai militaries. In terms of border issues, scam compounds, crypto fraud hubs, and cyber-slavery operations became the focus of attention. In February, under pressure from China, Thailand cut electricity supplies to frontier areas which were the sites of the scam industry [Olarn and Adkin 2025, 5 February]. By November, Myanmar's troops were raiding and cracking down on the scam centers, though evidence showed that the raids were mostly just for show given that only a small area of the compounds were actually destroyed [Wee 2025, 28 November]. In addition, since the 2021 Myanmar coup, Thailand has continued to facilitate the

forced pushback of Burmese war refugees back to Myanmar [*Fortify Rights* 2025, 17 May].

Thailand has significant interests in Myanmar. Indeed, Thailand is the third largest foreign investor in Myanmar. In 2024, Thailand's PTT became the largest shareholder (63.0 per cent) in Myanmar's Yadana natural gas project. Other Thai ventures in Myanmar include Northern Gulf Petroleum, Osotspa Glass, CP, Siam Cement, ThaiBev, Boonrawd, Bangkok Bank, and Siam Commercial Bank [Chambers and Chotisut 2024]. Meanwhile, in August 2024, Thailand offered assistance, including potentially financial or technical support, to Myanmar's military junta for its controversial population census in preparation for planned elections at the end of 2025 [*The Irrawaddy* 2025, 8 August]. Finally, though Thailand's elected civilian government continuously cautioned the post-2021 Burmese government to move toward democracy, Thailand's military has long maintained close, pragmatic, and often surreptitious linkages built upon personal and economic ties. Indeed, leading officers from each country often hold regular meetings, fostering military-to-military bonds [Radio Free Asia 2023, 19 January].

Regarding Thai-China relations in 2025, they must be seen through the prism of a balance of power politics. This is because Thailand has, since at least 2001, sought to follow a realist hedging policy toward China and the United States in which Bangkok seeks to create equilibrium in its ties with both Beijing and Washington.

The relationship in 2025 marked 50 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1975. It was dubbed the Golden Jubilee of Thailand-China Friendship [Zhang 2025, 13 November]. As part of this event, then-Prime Minister Paetongtarn visited Beijing in February, an event which paralleled the signing of 14 Memorandums of Understanding in areas such as digital economy, artificial intelligence, space technology, green energy, and agriculture. This was followed by a Thailand-China Cooperation Expo in September, and the initiation of a new Five-Year (2025-2031) Trade and Economic Cooperation Plan. The two countries also stepped up collaboration against transnational crime such as illegal call centres based along the Thai-Myanmar border [*Khaosod* 2025, 28 January]. In November, Thailand's King Maha Vajiralongkorn visited Beijing [*Al Jazeera* 2025, 14 November].

Also in 2025, joint military exercises continued between the armies, navies, and air forces of Thailand and China. These exercises included the annual «Falcon Strike 2025» (air forces), in September and the annual «Blue Strike 2025» (navies), in March-April [*Global Defense News* 2025, 17 September]. Regarding the annual «Strike Series» armies exercise, it had still not been held as of December. Such defense diplomacy marked a pivotal growth in relations between the two countries. Thailand has also increased its purchases of Chinese military hardware. Indeed, Thailand's cabinet finalized

the purchase of a Yuan Class S26T submarine from China using Chinese engines in August [*Khaosod* 2025, 5 August].

Moreover, Chinese economic activity in Thailand surged in 2025. In November, China ranked fourth in terms of investments in Thailand, with 116 businesses (13%) and investment totalling THB 25.404 billion. Hong Kong, under Beijing's control, ranked fifth, with 93 businesses (11%) and THB 13.198 billion [*The Nation* 2025, 30 November]. Meanwhile China has been Thailand's number one trading partner since 2013 [*The Nation* 2025b, 17 October]. Finally China is a leading provider of economic assistance to Thailand, mostly via the former's Belt and Road Initiative program, though since 2021 Thailand has begun to reduce its reliance on Beijing [Lowy Institute 2025].

Finally, the 2025 Thai-Cambodian imbroglio affected Thai relations with China. This is because the hostilities reflected two China «friends» at odds against each other, producing heightened Chinese efforts in December to seek a ceasefire.

As for Thai-US relations, Bangkok, once a very close Cold War ally of Washington, after 2001, slightly distanced itself from Washington as part of its aforementioned realist hedging strategy of creating a balance between the US and China. However, in 2025, except for security ties, there was a souring of US-Thai relations.

Thai-US security relations seemed generally amicable in 2025 with the Trump administration pushing for defense deals. The US is ahead of other countries (including China) in joint exercises with Thailand. Indeed, though Thailand is involved in joint military drills with other countries, the US remains its principal partner because Washington can provide larger-scale and more complex exercise scenarios, which appeal to senior Thai military officers. Still, China is catching up rapidly [Soto and Rahman 2023, 2 December]. In 2025, principal Thai-US exercises included Operation Cobra Gold in March (involving troops from 30 countries), Hanuman Guardian, an army exercise also held in March, Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training, a Navy exercise held in July, COPE Tiger (including Singapore) held in March, and Enduring Partners, an Army exercise held in August [Facebook Royal Thai Government 2025]. Meanwhile the Trump administration has cut most funding for military education of foreign troops, including for Thai soldiers/officers [Rand 2025, 28 January]. Finally, though Thailand has continued to purchase some US military hardware, US military assistance to Thailand in the form of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) has diminished since 2023 [*USA Facts* 2024].

As for Thai-US economic relations, the United States ranked second in terms of investments in Thailand with 127 businesses (15%) and an investment of THB 4.83 billion [*The Nation* 2025, 30 November]. Washington has also been a leading provider of economic assistance to Thailand. Meanwhile, in 2025, the US is Thailand's second largest trading partner

after China. Still, trade became a source of Thai-US friction in 2025. The US trade deficit with Thailand was estimated at US\$ 45.6 billion in 2024 as the US was Thailand's largest export market in that year, representing 18.3 per cent of shipments [*Reuters* 2025, 28 July]. The Trump administration saw Thailand as benefiting from low US import tariffs while engaging in unfair trade practices. Thus, in April, Trump announced an initial tariff rate of 36 per cent on Thailand before negotiating that down to 19 per cent on 1 August.

When fighting broke out between Thailand and Cambodia in July, Washington played a major role (along with Malaysia and China) in bringing the two sides to the table to negotiate a 28 July ceasefire. Hours after the truce, Trump claimed to have brokered it:

I said to Thailand, «We're doing a trading deal and I'm not going to do a deal if you're going to be killing each other», and I spoke to Cambodia and said essentially the same thing ... Within less than a day, we had it settled [*Financial Express* 2025, 29 July].

Hun Sen's son, Prime Minister Hun Manet, thereupon nominated Trump for a Nobel Peace Prize [de Guzman 2025, 11 August], to which the White House spokesperson enthusiastically agreed (Trump did not end up receiving one). An enhanced ceasefire agreement was signed between the two countries (following US pressure) on 26 October. However in November, as fighting between the two countries flared up again and Prime Minister Anutin threatened to walk away from the agreement, Trump threatened to halt trade talks with Thailand if Bangkok did so [Holmes 2025, 15 November]. However, fighting between the two countries intensified anyway.

Finally, human rights proved to be a significant part of Thai-US relations in 2025. This may have surprised the Thai government because it might have assumed that Trump prioritized only business. However, Trump's concern for human rights appeared to be a function of whether the issue related to China – a geopolitical rival, unless the human rights victim was American.

Washington's concerns were seen most clearly following the Pactongtarn administration's 27 February deportation of 40 Uyghurs to China despite warnings that they could face torture or death back home. Thailand had detained them for 10 years in a Bangkok detention center. Even though Canada and the US had offered to resettle all 43 ethnic Uyghurs held in detention in Thailand, Bangkok feared infuriating China [*The Guardian* 2025, 5 March]. The Trump administration immediately denounced the Thai government [Kunnawut and Pimuk 2025, 27 February]. Washington also refused to issue any future visas to any Thai officials who had been involved in the Uyghur return, including government ministers [Wee 2025, 15 March].

A second human-rights-related bone-of-contention between Thailand and the US was the detention of Thailand-based academic Paul Chambers

(author of this article). On 30 March, a regional sub-commander of Thailand's army charged Chambers with violating Section 112 (lèse majesté) of Thailand's Criminal Code and the Computer Crimes Act. On 8 April, when Thai authorities imprisoned Chambers, Washington publicly expressed «alarm» and stated that it was closely monitoring the situation [United States Department of State 2025, 8 April]. He was released from prison on bail late the following evening but was forced to wear an electronic ankle bracelet. According to anonymous Thai and US sources, the tariff talks (which were soon to be negotiated) gave the United States added weight vis-à-vis Thailand regarding the Chambers case. This resulted in charges being dropped against him in late May and his hurried departure from Thailand on 29 May [Faulder 2025, 11 June]. Though the Trump administration stated that the Chambers case «highlighted [its] longstanding concerns about the use of lèse majesté laws in Thailand» [United States Department of State 2025, 8 April], other than the Chambers case, the Trump administration has said little about Thailand's lèse majesté law, which carries a penalty of up to 15 years in prison per charge. Nor has it mentioned Thailand's repressive Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation (SLAPPs).

Tariffs, the breakdown of a Thai-Cambodia peace accord, Thailand's return of the Uyghur to China, and the Chambers case created perhaps temporary discord in the Thai-US relationship in 2025. Nevertheless, economic and security ties remained strong. Relations with China in terms of security and economic relations were also robust. As such, one could argue that the varied problems in US-Thai relations in 2025 strengthened those Thais who continued to call for a hedging relationship with China and the US, given that both superpowers could exert pressure, and already overshadowed Bangkok. As for Thailand's foreign policy toward Cambodia and Myanmar, Thailand (especially Thailand's military) in 2025 was increasingly unwilling to follow the preferences of the US or China, implementing instead policies which it felt best served Thai national interests.

7. Thailand's economy in 2025

At the beginning of 2025, indicators suggested that economic performance in Thailand would be positive. In fact, the economy was expected to grow at an optimistic 3-3.5 percent [Kitipong and Orathai 2025, 27 January]. But by the end of the year the country was still stuck in economic malaise.

Both internal and external factors created problems for the economy. First, household debt had risen to a four-year high – close to a 90 percent ratio. This debt was driven by consumption loans (from credit card debt, personal loans, loan shark loans, and lack of savings), exacerbated by stagnant incomes [Phusadee 2025, 25 September]. Second, increased US tariffs on Thai goods (though these were reduced from the initial 36 percent

to 19 percent) shocked the economy [Head 2025, 31 July]. Third, a drop in foreign tourist arrivals diminished the amount of hard currency for the Thai economy. According to Thailand's Ministry of Tourism and Sports, in December 2025, foreign tourist arrivals reached a total of 30,273,872 foreign visitors. However, this cumulative figure represented a 7.19 percent decrease compared to the same period the previous year [*The Nation* 2025, 9 December]. Fourth, sustained Thai-Cambodian border hostilities created a near total collapse of Thai-Cambodian border trade, extreme labor shortages (especially of Cambodian workers), and negative effects on tourism and investor confidence [*Bangkok Post* 2025, 14 November]. Fifth, the sudden change in government in Thailand in September intensified uncertainty [International Monetary Fund 2025, 13 November].

One bit of bright economic news was inflation. In October, Thailand's inflation rate had dipped by 0.76 percent and the government targeted a 0 percent inflation rate for the year. The rate represented the seventh consecutive month of inflation decline, sixth lowest among 140 countries and lowest in ASEAN [*The Nation* 2025, 5 November]. Also, unemployment decreased from 0.88 percent in 2024 to 0.76 percent in 2025 [*The Nation* 2025, 16 November].

Yet positive indicators were few. According to the International Monetary Fund, despite the expected economic expansion rate of over 3 percent in Thailand at the beginning of 2025, economic growth was now projected to slow to 2.1 and 1.6 percent in late 2025 and 2026 [International Monetary Fund 2025, 13 November]. Already, by late 2025, Thailand's economy demonstrated that it was still in a dismal state. Indeed, the economy had contracted by 0.6 percent in the third quarter of 2025 from the previous quarter, with growth slowing to 1.2 percent year-on-year from 2.8 percent in the second quarter [*The Nation* 2025, 16 November].

Finally, despite any indicators of economic progress in Thailand, poverty is continuing to grow there. According to the World Inequality Report 2026, «inequality [is] continuing to intensify [with] the income gap between the top 10 percent and the bottom 50 percent widen[ing] between 2014 and 2024, indicating growing disparities» [UNDP 2025, 193]. 2014 is significant as the year of the most recent military coup which put an end to many welfare programs of the previous government.

8. Conclusion

In sum, Thailand, a façade democracy overshadowed by monarchy and military, encountered insecurity and transition in 2025. Regarding insecurity, Thailand became embroiled in war with Cambodia. A brief border clash in July, it had mushroomed into a prolonged border conflict by December. In terms of transition, the country was led by the Thaksin-dominated Pheu

Thai at the beginning of the year only to be replaced by a conservative, Bhumjai Thai-led government in September. A Lower House dissolution had been expected in late January 2026.

Regarding international relations, Thailand sought to balance off China against the United States in a realist hedging foreign policy in order to best achieve Thailand's national interests. However, the Trump administration's high tariff policy toward Thailand damaged Thai-US relations. Also, when the United States pressured Thailand into a peace accord with Cambodia in July and when Thailand backed away from that ceasefire in October, Washington threatened higher tariffs. Finally, Thailand's deportation of Uyghur refugees to China and detention of a US academic deeply disappointed Washington. As a result, Thai-US relations soured in 2025. Meanwhile, following the end of the Chambers case, Thailand's international human rights reputation did not improve: on September 29, Thai police arrested Australian journalist and academic Murray Hunter on charges of criminal defamation – defaming the Malaysian government because Hunter had written media articles about alleged corruption in the Malaysian government. Hunter was briefly imprisoned and his trial began in December. A conviction could mean eight years for Hunter in a Thai prison as well as a fine of 800,000 baht [EU Sec 2025, 3 December]. The cases of Chambers and Hunter demonstrate that Thailand in 2025 is willing to instill harsh punishments against anyone, including foreigners, who might seek to enlighten the world about state authoritarianism and impunity within Thailand as well as in its allies abroad.

On December 11, during a vote on the second reading of the People's Party amendment to call a drafting committee for a new constitution, Bhumjai Thai suddenly refused to go along with a promise it had made to the People's Party to allow a new charter to be considered with only 51 per cent of the combined House-Senate vote. Bhumjai Thai now declared that the bill must pass scrutiny of one-third of the Senate (Bhumjai Thai controls at least half of the Senators) before it could be put to a referendum [*The Nation* 2025, 11 December]. As such, the People's Party moved for a no-confidence vote against Anutin that was certain to pass given that a majority of MPs belonging to either the People's Party or Pheu Thai were sure to support it. Before the vote could occur, however, Anutin, on 12 December, suddenly and unexpectedly (he had earlier said he would dissolve parliament in January 2026) dissolved the Lower House and called for a new general election. The election was ultimately held on 8 February, 2026 [*Al Jazeera* 2025, 11 December].

By the very end of 2025, the insecurity and transition which had begun to intensify six months previously had morphed into outright instability for Thailand. Indeed, the country's border skirmishes with Cambodia had moved closer to an outright war. At the same time, the Anutin administration had become only a caretaker government existing in preparation for an

election. The situation paved the way for the military to take a greater role in leading the country. As a result, authoritarianism looked likely to grow, relations with neighbours (and even great powers) seemed on the verge of becoming increasingly chaotic, and the country appeared headed for worsening economic times. At the dawn of 2026, amidst Thailand's sideshow of faux democracy, the country continues to be dominated by vested elites, an arch royalist military, and a conservative judiciary, all oscillating around monarchy. Such a situation represents a difficult obstacle for Thais seeking greater democracy in the future.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Al Jazeera*, 2025, 29 July, 'Thailand Accuses Cambodia of Ceasefire violations but Ceasefire Still Holding', <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/29/thai-army-accuses-cambodia-of-ceasefire-violations#>
- Al Jazeera*, 2025, 5 September, 'Thai Parliament Elects Anutin Charnvirakul as Prime Minister', <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/5/thai-parliament-elects-anutin-charnvirakul-as-prime-minister-2#>
- Al Jazeera*, 2025, 14 November, 'Xi Jinping Pledges Deeper Ties During Thai King's First China Visit', <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/14/xi-jinping-pledges-deeper-ties-during-thai-kings-first-china-visit>
- Al Jazeera*, 2025, 11 December, 'Thailand PM Moves to Dissolve Parliament, Paving Way for Election', <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/11/thailand-pm-moves-to-dissolve-parliament-paving-way-for-election>
- Associated Press*, 29 July, 'Thailand and Cambodia Ceasefire Holds Despite Reports of Skirmishes', <https://apnews.com/article/thailand-cambodia-border-clash-ceasefire-36da6c2ba1a1c33a16ca6ddf1cb82bda>
- Bangkok Post*, 2025, 25 October, 'National Mourning Periods Announced', <https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/3126280/national-mourning-periods-announced>.
- Bangkok Post*, 2025, 14 November, 'Economic Warning as Thai and Cambodian Troops Clash', <https://www.bangkokpost.com/business/general/3136941/economic-warning-as-thai-and-cambodian-troops-clash>
- Bangkok Post*, 2025, 23 November, 'PM Anutin's Bhumjai Thai Welcomes 14 MPs from other Parties', <https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/politics/3142860/pm-anutins-bhumjai-thai-welcomes-14-mps-from-other-parties>
- Bangkok Post*, 2025a, 4 December, 'Old «Ben Smith» Photos Come Back to Haunt Thai VIPs', <https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/3150070/old-ben-smith-photos-come-back-to-haunt-thai-vips>.
- Bangkok Post*, 2025b, 4 December, 'PM Directs Security Body to Step Up Scam Fight', <https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/3149670/pm-directs-security-body-to-step-up-scam-fight>.
- Cannavigia.com, 2025, 'Thailand's Medical-Only Cannabis Shift: What It Means for Cultivators and Dispensaries in 2025', <https://www.cannavigia.com/blog-posts/>

- thailands-medical-only-cannabis-shift-what-it-means-for-cultivators-and-dispensaries-in-2025
- Chambers, Paul, and Kridsana Chotisut, 2024, 'Neighbour to Civil War: Thailand's Relations with Myanmar in 2024', ISEAS Fulcrum, <https://fulcrum.sg/neighbour-to-civil-war-thailands-relations-with-myanmar-in-2024/>
- de Guzman, Chad, 2025, 11 August, 'Cambodia Nominated Trump for a Nobel: It Has its Eyes on Another Prize', *Time Magazine*, August 11, 2025, <https://time.com/7308770/cambodia-us-relations-trump-hun-manet-nobel-peace-prize-nomination/>
- EU See*, 2025, 3 December, 'Australian Journalist Faces up to Eight Years in Prison in a Transnational SLAPP Case in Thailand for Reporting on the Malaysian Government', <https://eusee.hivos.org/alert/australian-journalist-faces-up-to-8-years-in-prison-in-a-transnational-slapp-case-in-thailand-for-reporting-on-the-malaysian-government/>
- Facebook Nation Story*, 2025, 3 June, แม่ทัพภาคที่ 2 ยืนยันเป็นหน้าที่ของทัพปกป้องอธิปไตย ยึดเส้นเขตแดนแดนที่ 1:50,000 ลั่น' [The Second Army Commander confirmed that it is the army's duty to protect sovereignty and adhere to the 1:50,000 scale border line], <https://www.instagram.com/reel/DKcMc71BvUZ/>
- Facebook Royal Thai Government, 2025, 'Royal Thai Armed Forces Joint Exercises in 2025', <https://www.facebook.com/groups/755356672026696/posts/1855716668657352/>
- Faulder, Dominic, 2025, 11 June, 'Deported US Academic Paul Chambers Fears Return to Thailand', *Nikkei Asia*, <https://asia.nikkei.com/politics/turbulent-thailand/deported-us-academic-paul-chambers-fears-return-to-thailand>
- Financial Express*, 2025, 29 July, '«President of peace»: Trump claims he ended Cambodia-Thailand conflict «within less than a day»', <https://www.financialexpress.com/world-news/president-of-peace-trump-claims-he-ended-cambodia-thailand-conflict-within-less-than-a-day/3929939/>
- Fortify Rights*, 2025, 17 May, 'Thailand: Prevent Forced Returns of Myanmar Refugees, Provide Legal Status', <https://www.fortifyrights.org/tha-inv-2024-05-17/#:~:text=Returns%20of%20Myanmar%20Refugees%2C%20Provide%20Legal%20Status.>
- Global Defense News*, 2025, 17 September, 'China and Thailand deepen military ties with Falcon Strike 2025 joint air force exercise', <https://armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2025/china-and-thailand-deepen-military-ties-with-falcon-strike-2025-joint-air-force-exercise>
- Government of Thailand, 2025, 7 September, 'นายกรัฐมนตรีคนที่ 32 [Prime Minister Number 32] <https://www.thaigov.go.th/th/cabinet/prime-minister#:~:text=นายกรัฐมนตรีคนที่%2032.>
- Head, Jonathan, 2025, 24 July, 'The fractured friendship behind the fight at the Thailand-Cambodia border', BBC, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg1g-dgy2pyo>
- Head, Jonathan, 2025, 31 July, 'Shock, chaos and a hollow win: What it's like to do a tariff deal with Trump', <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cger99z0yp9o>
- Holmes, Oliver, 2025, 15 November, 'Trump pressures Thailand to recommit to Cambodia ceasefire with 'threat of tariffs' *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/nov/15/us-pressure-thailand-to-recommit-to-cambodia-ceasefire-with-threat-of-tariffs>

- International Monetary Fund*, 2025, 13 November, 'IMF Staff Completes 2025 Article IV Mission to Thailand', <https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2025/11/13/pr25367-thailand-imf-staff-completes-2025-article-iv-mission>
- Jackson, Will, 2025, 13 September, 'US Sanctions Powerful Cambodian Tycoon Over Alleged Human Rights Abuses in Scam Operations', *ABC News*, <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-09-13/us-sanctions-ly-yong-phat-human-rights-abuses-online-scams/104348430>
- Jiji Press*, 2025, 7 December, 'Pheu Thai to File Ethical Complaint against Anutin and Ministers', https://jen.jiji.com/jc/eng_agt?g=nation&k=20251207NATION-40059352
- Juarawee Kittisilpa, and Panu Wongcha-um, 2025, 6 June, 'Thai Military prepared high-level operation if Cambodia border row escalates', *Reuters*, <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/thai-military-prepared-high-level-operation-if-cambodia-border-row-escalates-2025-06-06/>
- Khaosod*, 2025, 28 January, 'Thailand, China Intensify Cooperation to Combat Scam Networks', <https://www.khaosodenglish.com/featured/2025/01/28/thailand-china-intensify-cooperation-to-combat-scam-networks/>
- Khaosod*, 2025, 5 August, 'Thailand Approves Major Military Purchases Amid Regional Tensions', <https://www.khaosodenglish.com/politics/2025/08/05/thailand-approves-major-military-purchases-amid-regional-tensions/>
- Kitipong Thaichareon, and Orathai Sriring, 2025, 27 January, 'Thailand sees economy growing up to 3.5% this year on stimulus, foreign investment', *Reuters*, <https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/thai-economy-grow-more-than-3-this-year-finance-minister-says-2025-01-27/>
- Kunnawut Boonreak, and Pimuk Rakkanam, 2025, 27 February, 'US condemns Thailand's deportation of 40 Uyghurs to China', *Radio Free Asia*, <https://www.rfa.org/english/uyghur/2025/02/27/thailand-china-deported/>
- Liang, Lu-Hai, 2025, 26 May, 'Thailand pauses digital wallet cash handout as US tariffs bite', *Biometric Update*, <https://www.biometricupdate.com/202505/thailand-pauses-digital-wallet-cash-handout-as-us-tariffs-bite>
- Lowy Institute, 2025, 'Southeast Asia Aid Map – Thailand', <https://seamap.lowyinstitute.org/country/thailand/#:~:text=Thailand>
- Matichon*, 2025, 4 February, มองเกมอำนาจ ตท.26-27-28 ในยุค ผบ.ทบ.อำนาจเต็ม ประภาสิต 'บิ๊กป' วอน นิ่ง จับตา 'รองถ้ำเสือ' ในวงล้อม ตท.26 ซึ่ง แม่ทัพอีสาน ('Looking at the power game of Class 26-27-28 of the Royal Thai Army during the era of the Army Commander-in-Chief with full authority, the announcement of «Big Pu» is a warning. Keep an eye on «Rong Nat» in the encirclement of Class 26 of the Royal Thai Army, competing for the position of Northeastern Army Commander'), https://www.matichon.co.th/weekly/column/article_825962
- Nierenberg, Amelia, and Wee Sui-Lee, 2025, 30 July, 'What to Know about the Conflict between Thailand and Cambodia', *The New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/24/world/asia/thailand-cambodia-border-fight.html>
- Olarn, Kocha, and Ross Adkin, 2025, 5 February 'Power cut to site of global, billion-dollar scam industry. But will it halt the swindling?' *CNN*, <https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/05/asia/myanmar-thailand-scam-power-cuts-intl-hnk>
- Panarat Thepgumpanat, and Chaikut Setboonsarng, 2025, 1 December, 'Thailand Floods Hit PM Anutin's Popularity Ahead of Snap Polls', *Reuters*, <https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/thailand-floods-hit-pm-anutins-popularity-ahead-snap-polls-2025-12-01/>

- Pathan, Don, 2025, 28 October, 'New Thai Appointments for the Deep South', *Prachatai*, <https://prachataienglish.com/node/11630#:~:text=Thai%20appointments%20fo-r%20the%20Deep%20South>
- Phontham Visapra, 2025, 7 June, 'Thailand Tightens Border Checkpoint Controls Amid Cambodian Incursions, Gov Denies Closure', *Laotian Times*, <https://laotiantimes.com/2025/06/07/thailand-tightens-border-checkpoint-controls-amid-cambodian-incursions/>
- Phusadee Arunmas, 2025, 25 September, 'Thai Household Debt Surges to Four-Year High', *Bangkok Post*, <https://www.bangkokpost.com/business/general/3110736/thai-household-debt-surges-to-fouryear-high>
- Pimuk Rakkanam, 2025, 28 May, 'Thai Prime Minister Urges Calm after Cambodian Soldier Killed in Border Clash', <https://www.rfa.org/english/cambodia/2025/05/28/cambodia-thailand-border-clash/>
- Plewissara, Nattan Casey, 2025, 22 June, 'The Leaked Call Shaking Thai Politics Translated', *The Asian Cable*, <https://www.theasiacable.com/p/the-leaked-call-shaking-thai-politics>.
- PPTV, 2025, 23 July, 'กองทัพบกเตรียม «แผนจักรพงษ์ภูวนารถ» รับมือสถานการณ์ชายแดนไทย-กัมพูชา' [The army is preparing the «Chakraphong Phuwanat Plan» to deal with the situation on the Thai-Cambodian border], <https://www.pptvhd36.com/news/สังคม/253273>.
- Radio Free Asia*, 2023, 19 January, 'Myanmar's junta chief meets Thai counterpart at beach resort to discuss military ties', <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/meeting-01192023154946.html>
- Rand, Dafna, 2025, 28 January, 'Stopped Security Assistance: From Counter-Narcotics to Combating Human Trafficking Programs', *Just Security*, <https://www.justsecurity.org/106919/stopped-security-assistance/>
- Ratcliffe, Rebecca, 2025, 9 September, 'Thaksin Shinawatra jailed by Thailand supreme court for one year in major blow to former prime minister', *Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/09/thaksin-shinawatra-former-prime-minister-jailed-by-thailand-supreme-court-for-one-year-ntwnfb>
- Regan, Helen, and Olarn Kocha, 2025, 29 August, 'Thailand's prime minister removed from office over leaked phone call scandal with Cambodian strongman', *CNN*, <https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/29/asia/thailand-paetongtarn-shinawatra-court-hnk-intl>
- Reuters*, 2025, 4 March, 'Thailand arrests 100 people for operating in border scam center', <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/thailand-arrests-100-people-operating-border-scam-centre-2025-03-05/>
- Reuters*, 2025, 28 July, 'Thailand-U.S. trade talks should be concluded before August 1, Minister says', <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/thailand-us-trade-talks-should-be-concluded-before-august-1-minister-says-2025-07-29/>
- Reuters*, 2025, 5 September, 'What to Know about Anutin Charnvirakul, Thailand's New Prime Minister', *Dallas Morning News*, <https://www.dallasnews.com/news/world/2025/09/05/what-to-know-about-anutin-charnvirakul-thailands-new-prime-minister/>
- Soto, Jack, and Rahman Yaacob, 2023, 2 December, 'Is China Replacing the US as Thailand's Main Security Partner?' Lowy Institute, <https://www.loyyinstitute.org/publications/china-replacing-us-thailand-s-main-security-partner>
- Supalak Kanjanakhundee, 2025, 7 March, 'สันติภาพถาวร ความไร้เสถียรภาพที่ขัดเคือง หรือเปิดศึกรอบใหม่เรื่อยไป? หากต่อไปในประเด็นชายแดน ไทย-กัมพูชาจะเป็นอย่างไร?' [Permanent peace, pro-

- longed instability, or keep opening a new round of war? What will be the next scene on the Thai-Cambodian border issue?] *ThaiRath*, <https://plus.thairath.co.th/topic/politics&society/105939>
- Thai Enquirer*, 2025, 30 October, 'Deputy PM Thammanat and Ex-Deputy Finance Minister Vorapak Skip Committee Meeting on Scam Network Links', <http://www.thaienquirer.com/62010/deputy-pm-thammanat-and-ex-deputy-finance-minister-vorapak-skip-committee-meeting-on-scam-network-links/>
- Thai PBS*, 2025, 6 June, 'ไทยนิรักสงบ แต่ถึงรบไม่ขลาด ส่องแนวรบ กองทัพ-รัฐบาล-การเมือง' [Thais love peace, but are not afraid to fight. Look at the battle lines: the army, the government, and politics], <https://www.thaipbs.or.th/news/content/352942#:~:text=สงบ%20แต่ถึงรบไม่ขลาด%20ส่องแนวรบ%20กองทัพ%20รัฐบาล%20E0%B8%81การเมือง.>
- Thai PBS*, 2025 25 July, 'ประกาศศกฏอัยการ' ตึก 8 อำเภอ '«ฉันทบุรีและตราด» มีผลทันที' [«Martial law» declared in 8 districts of «Chanthaburi and Trat» effective immediately], <https://www.thaipbs.or.th/news/content/354666#:~:text=ประกาศศกฏอัยการศึก%25208%20อำเภอ%20%22ฉันทบุรี%20ตราด%22%20มีผลทันที.>
- Thai PBS World*, 2025, 17 February, 'Cash handouts fail to provide Thai economy the expected thrust', <https://world.thaipbs.or.th/detail/cash-handouts-fail-to-provide-thai-economy-the-expected-thrust/56559>
- Thai PBS World*, 2025, 8 July, 'Game Over: Casino Bill Withdrawn', <https://world.thaipbs.or.th/detail/game-over-casino-bill-withdrawn/58138>
- Thai PBS World*, 2024, 2 December, 'Paetongtarn's Maturity Under Spotlight', <https://world.thaipbs.or.th/detail/paetongtarns-maturity-under-spotlight/55673>
- Thai PBS World*, 2025, 19 July, 'Retaliation against Cambodia over landmines is justified – Thai army chief', <https://world.thaipbs.or.th/detail/retaliation-against-cambodia-over-landmines-is-justified-thai-army-chief/58247>
- Thai PBS World*, 2025, 29 September, 'Anutin Gives Green Light to Army to Respond to Rising Border Tensions', <https://world.thaipbs.or.th/detail/anutin-gives-greenlight-to-army-to-respond-to-rising-border-tensions/59001>
- Thai PBS World*, 2025, 16 October 'Parliament Votes in Favour of People's Party's Charter Amendment Bill', <https://world.thaipbs.or.th/detail/parliament-votes-in-favour-of-peoples-partys-charter-amendments-bill/59218>
- Thai PBS World*, 2025, 26 November, 'Trump's Tariff Sword Hangs over Thai Economy', <https://world.thaipbs.or.th/detail/trumps-tariff-sword-hangs-over-thai-economy/59671>
- Thai PBS World*, 2024, 26 December, '2024 in Thai Politics: The Return of Shinawatra Rule', <https://world.thaipbs.or.th/detail/2024-in-thai-politics-the-return-of-shinawatra-rule/55949>
- The Irrawaddy*, 2025, 8 August, 'Thailand Pledges to Help Myanmar Junta With Controversial Poll Plan', <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/myanmars-crisis-the-world/thailand-pledges-to-help-myanmar-junta-with-controversial-poll-plan.html>
- The Guardian*, 2025, 5 March, 'US offered to resettle Uyghurs that Thailand deported to China, sources say', March 5, 2025, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/05/us-offered-to-resettle-uyghurs-that-thailand-deported-to-china-sources-say>
- The Nation*, 2025, 17 February, 'Second Army Area protests against provocative incident by Cambodian troops in Surin', <https://www.nationthailand.com/news/asean/40046376>

- The Nation*, 2025, 7 June, 'Army Chief authorizes border closure measures in response to Cambodian incursions', <https://www.nationthailand.com/news/general/40050934>
- The Nation*, 2025, 15 June, 'King Sends Royal Gifts to Troops Guarding Thai-Cambodian border', <https://www.nationthailand.com/news/general/40051302>
- The Nation*, 2025, 29 June, 'International Media Spotlight Thai protests over Hun Sen phone call scandal', <https://www.nationthailand.com/blogs/news/politics/40051902>
- The Nation*, 2025, 2 September, 'People's Party Decides to Support Anutin Charnvirakul for PM with Conditions', <https://www.nationthailand.com/news/politics/40054898>
- The Nation*, 2025, 12 September, 'Anutin Vows No More Peace Talks with Cambodia, Unafraid of US Tariff Threat', <https://www.nationthailand.com/news/asean/40058131>
- The Nation*, 2025a, 17 October, 'STEC denies wrongdoing, says Sino-Thai Tower operates legally and transparently', <https://www.nationthailand.com/news/politics/40056947>
- The Nation*, 2025b, 17 October, 'Thai commerce minister meets Chinese ambassador to boost agricultural exports', <https://www.nationthailand.com/news/general/40056918>
- The Nation*, 2025, 5 November, 'Inflation drops 0.76% in October, with «Let's Go Halves Plus» scheme set to boost spending', <https://www.nationthailand.com/business/economy/40057787>
- The Nation*, 2025, 16 November, 'Thai GDP drops 0.6% in Q3, NESDC keeps 2025 growth forecast at 2%', <https://www.nationthailand.com/business/economy/40058348>
- The Nation*, 2025, 30 November, 'Foreign investment in Thailand hits to THB276 billion in 10 months', <https://www.nationthailand.com/blogs/business/investment/40059056>
- The Nation*, 2025, 9 December, 'Thailand Breaks 30 Million Tourist Mark Despite Yearly Dip', <https://www.nationthailand.com/news/tourism/40059479>
- The Nation*, 2025, 11 December, 'People's Party Presses Bhumjai Thai Over «Broken» Pact on Senate Veto', <https://www.nationthailand.com/news/politics/40059636>
- Thitinan Pongsudhirak, 2025, 25 September, 'Thailand's New Cabinet Reflects an Eclectic Group of Technocrats and Party Stalwarts', *Bower Group Asia*, <https://bowergroupasia.com/thailands-new-cabinet-reflects-eclectic-mix-of-technocrats-and-party-stalwarts/>
- UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), 2025, *World Inequality Report 2026*, <https://wir2026.wid.world/>
- United States Department of State, 2025, 8 April, 'On the Thai Authorities' Arrest of Paul Chambers', <https://th.usembassy.gov/on-the-thai-authorities-arrest-of-paul-chambers/>
- USA Facts*, 2024, 'How Much Foreign Aid Does the US Provide to Thailand?' <https://usafacts.org/answers/how-much-foreign-aid-does-the-us-provide/countries/thailand/>
- VOV5 (Voice of Vietnam 5), 2025, 17 June, 'Thai PM Affirms to Maintain Peace and Dialogue with Cambodia', <https://vovworld.vn/en-US/news/thai-pm-affirms-to-maintain-peace-and-dialogue-with-cambodia-1400778.vov>

- Wee, Sui-Lee, 2025, 15 March, 'U.S. Punishes Thai Officials Over Deportation of Uyghurs to China', *New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/15/world/asia/us-sanctions-thai-uyghurs-china.html>
- Wee, Sui-Lee, 2025, 28 August, 'Thai Court Ousts Prime Minister in Major Blow to the Shinawatra Family', *New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/28/world/asia/thailand-paetongtarn-shinawatra-verdict.html>
- Wee, Sui-Lee, 2025, 28 November, 'These Scam Centers Were Blown Up. Was It All for Show?' *New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/28/world/asia/myanmar-scam-centers-junta.html>
- Wikileaks, 2009, 23 November, 'Thailand: Circles of Influence Inside the Institution of the Monarchy in King Bhumipol's Twilight', https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BANGKOK2967_a.html
- Zhang, Jianwei (Chinese Ambassador to Thailand), 2025, 13 November. *Thai PBS World*, 'Writing a New Chapter in China-Thailand Friendship', <https://world.thaipbs.or.th/detail/writing-a-new-chapter-in-chinathailand-friendship/59521#>

