ISSN 2385-2526

The Armistice that the belligerent forces negotiated to end the Korean War was finalized on 27 July 1953, over seven decades ago. However, there has been no serious discussion since then among the signees – the United States (which signed on behalf of the UN Command), the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and China (The Republic of Korea refused to sign the cease-fire agreement) – to formally conclude this war with a peace treaty. Over this time, however, researchers of this war have engaged in debates over its origins that far surpassed those related to other wars both in time spent and pages published. These debates have centred on issues such as the nature of this war (whether it was civil or international, or a combination of both) and the instigator of the belligerence (the Korea that first crossed the thirty-eighth parallel to start the war). The discussions have been driven by early Cold War interpretations of the Soviet Union and United States interests in the Northeast Asian region, interpretations that others later challenged as limited. The immediate post-Cold War period momentarily opened previously closed archives in China and the Soviet Union making available a large cache of documents that further clarified these issues. These documents included important correspondence exchanged between the three communist capitals – Moscow, Beijing, and P’yŏngyang – in the months prior to and after the fighting began. This initiated yet another round of discussions on the war’s origins. This review aims to critically evaluate the historiography focussed on the attempt to uncover the true origins of the Korean War. By focusing on the strengths and limitations of the historiographical contributions dealing with the origins of the war, this review article hopes to add to our general knowledge of the war, and, in doing so, to that of the Cold War period, as the Korean war was the first major military confrontation of that period.

Keywords – Korean War; Soviet Union; United States; ROK; DPRK; Japan; textbooks; telegrams; origins; 25 June 1950; post-war; Ongjin Peninsula

1. Introduction

Visitors to the Korean War Memorial in Seoul, Republic of Korea (ROK), are greeted at the entrance by the Clock Tower, a statue designed to hold three clocks: one clock with the present time, a second one reserved for the time when the two Koreas reunite, and a third clock frozen at 4 A.M. on the morning of 25 June 1950, the exact moment when according to the ROK historiography the Korean War, or the «625 War» (Yugio tongnam), began with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) forces suddenly streaming across the thirty-eighth parallel to initiate the war. The DPRK has long accepted the late June 1950 starting date of the war but insists that its belligerent action was a «counterattack» as it was the ROK who initiated the fighting by first crossing to the north. These historical narratives have endured a number of challenges to their validity over the seven decades since the start of the war. Indeed, the roots of this «forgotten war», as it has come to be known, are arguably debated to a far greater extent than other wars of the recent past1. This review aims to trace the major contributions of this debate over the Korean War’s origins2.

2. «Textbook» arguments

The narrative that has stood the test of time in the official history of the ROK, primarily in school textbooks, monuments, and museum displays, centres on three components: The Soviet Union planned and directed the attack; the DPRK carried it out; and they did so suddenly without warning. In the United States and elsewhere this narrative understands the Soviet’s ambition as using the DPRK attack as a first step toward a larger plan to spread communism throughout the region. This justified U.S. participation in a war that others argue to have been a civil conflict. In other words, the U.S. participation was equated with its military intervention in the Second World War, its purpose being to save the «free democratic» world from evil ideology – fascism then, and communism now. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson emphasized the probable Soviet role in his memoires on the war:

It seemed close to certain that the attack had been mounted, supplied, and instigated by the Soviet Union and that it would not be stopped by anything short of force. If Korean force proved unequal to the job, as seemed probable, only American military intervention could do it. […] Plainly, this attack did not amount to a casus belli against the Soviet Union. Equally plainly it was an open, undisguised challenge to our internationally accepted position as the protector of South Korea, an area of great importance to the security of American-occupied Japan. To back away from this challenge, in view of our capacity for meeting it, would be highly destructive of the power and prestige of the United States [Acheson 1969, p. 20].

Soon after receiving the news of the attack, Acheson contacted President Harry S. Truman before arranging an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council. This met the next day to demand that the DPRK «cease hostilities and …withdraw their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel» [Ibid., pp. 18-19]. A UN command was formed one week later on 7 July to assist the ROK3.

Japan, still under occupation control by the United States and prohibited by its Pacific War surrender terms, and limited by its 1947 constitution from engaging in military aggression, could not officially join the UN Command. Its participation in the war, however, was immeasurable; in his memoirs, the then U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Robert D. Murphy, described Japan’s role as having been «indispensable» to the forces who confronted the communist challenge [Nishimura 2004, p. 151]. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, who also interpreted the DPRK attack in international terms, took measures in the days following the attack to ensure that the UN Command would receive Japan’s full cooperation. This, in Yoshida’s view, was necessary to protect Japan’s self-defence: The attack was, he argued, more than simply a Soviet effort to liberate the ROK and would threaten Japan next should it succeed in Korea4. Japan’s recently promulgated post-war constitution, drafted primarily by the United States, prohibited in Article 9 the country from «maintaining [any kind of] land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential». The Japanese, however, interpreted this Article as not inhibiting its ability to act in its self-defence5.

The ROK government described the attack orchestrated by the DPRK military as sudden and unexpected, one that also caught the U.S. by complete surprise. The DPRK armies enjoyed early success. Within a matter of days, they had occupied the ROK capital, Seoul, and driven the ROK military and government back to the Pusan perimeter in the southern-most region of the country, where the ROK relocated its capital and where a large number of its citizens took refuge. It took a daring September landing by U.S. General Douglas MacArthur at In’chŏn to drive out the DPRK forces. Within two months, the UN Command forces had retaken Seoul, crossed the thirty-eighth parallel into the DPRK, and advanced to the Yalu River, the enemy’s northernmost border with China and the Soviet Union. One photograph shows U.S. forces enjoying Thanksgiving dinner in late November on the river banks6. Chinese armies, who in October 1950 had stealthily crossed into northern Korea, eventually drove the UN Command out of the DPRK territory and back to below the thirty-eighth parallel.

The DPRK, which refers to the war as the «Fatherland Liberation War» (Choguk haebang chŏnjaeng), scripted a version of the war’s origin that mirrors that of the ROK in one respect, but revises it in another. Fighting did break out between the two Koreas from 25 June, but it was the ROK, rather than the DPRK, that attacked first. Korean War historian Bruce Cumings notes that the DPRK had long insisted that its 25 June attack was an effort to repel an ROK invasion that had taken place two days earlier [Cumings 1990, p. 569]. A 1996 Japanese translation of the DPRK history of Korea maintains that it acted in self-defence. The war began, it argues, after ROK President Syngman Rhee rejected overtures by the DPRK to peacefully unify the peninsula. Rhee then teamed with the imperialist U.S. to send hundreds of thousand soldiers north at different points along the thirty-eighth parallel on 25 June. The ROK then widened the battles while ignoring DPRK warnings to halt the fighting. In an emergency cabinet meeting that Kim Il Sung convened on the day of the attack, the DPRK leader announced that «American imperialists have abandoned the Korean people. The wolf has to answer with a club (ōkami ha konbō ashiraubekida). We have to show those who belittle and challenge the Korean people their grit». Kim continued by demanding that his armies launch a counterattack to «sweep [the invaders] away» (sōtō)7 [CSTS 3 1996, p. 80].

The Soviet Union/Russian version of the war has varied in accordance with the revolutionary and diplomatic changes that the country has experienced over the decades since the war. It has, however, remained committed to the idea that the war’s beginning was «sudden». While during the Cold War the Soviet Union supported the DPRK version of the war’s origins, it shifted its views from the 1990s, when it opened its archives on the war. An article on the Korean War published by the Ministry of Defence in «Voennoe obozrenie» (Military Review) addresses the war’s origins in passive form: «the war broke out», without blaming either side for the initial attack [Samsonov 2012, online]. Soviet noncommittal on this issue reflects its stance that both sides wanted to unify the peninsula on their own terms.8

Chinese history textbooks offer a slightly different angle to the war. Like some Russian accounts, the narrative it tells avoids the question of initial attack – the Korean civil war broke out (Chōsen no naisen ga bohhatsu – and continued with the UN Command, led by the U.S., entering the conflict. These enemy forces threatened China, it contends, by intervening in its politics, and by crossing the thirty-eighth parallel to advance across the Chinese border. The textbook provided evidence of this intrusion by including a picture of a Chinese village that had sustained damage by U.S. aerial bombing. It further explained that the «oppressive imperialist Americans» did not even imagine that the Chinese would enter the war. MacArthur’s predictions that the war would end soon, before Christmas, were frustrated by the Chinese Volunteer Army crossing the Yalu River to fight in Korea, thus prolonging the battles. It was a foreign enemy threat to its national sovereignty that drew China into the war9.

There were no third-party forces at the thirty-eighth parallel at the time the two Korea’s engaged in the battles that would ignite the Korean War. Thus, the only first-hand accounts available are those left by the ROK and the DPRK. Among the immediate reactions by the relatively small number of U.S. military advisors who remained on the peninsula after the majority of forces had retreated from Korea, after the ROK state had been formed, were those that initially assumed that it had been the ROK who had initiated the war. Previous to its outbreak, President Rhee had threatened to attack north on numerous occasions; the ROK had been responsible for initiating many of the battles that broke out along the thirty-eighth parallel in the summer of 1949. Yet, accounts written soon after the 25 June 1950 attack attribute responsibility to one Korea or the other, depending on the side of the parallel the narrative belongs to as well as on which international partner assisted in their war efforts. Soon, alternative views would question these «textbook» narratives of the war’s origins.

3. Challenges to the «textbook» narrative

That war might erupt across the peninsula had been anticipated almost as soon as the guns of the Pacific War fell silent. At around this time rumours circulated in the area that World War III was imminent, this time with the Japanese fighting alongside the U.S. against the Soviet Union10. Concerns that the Soviets were preparing a Korean military unit that would enter Korea as soon as Japan surrendered had surfaced in U.S. official circles even before the Pacific War had ended. Such fears intensified soon after the two occupations had commenced their operations in Korea to predict that the Soviets, attracted by their historic desire for an ice-free port in East Asia, coveted control over the entire peninsula. The first «Conditions of Korea» report that the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) issued after its arrival on 8 September 1945 warned that the peninsula was a «powder keg ready to explode upon application of a spark» [United States Department of State 1969, p. 1049]. Similar statements frequently appeared throughout the five years that preceded the Korean War.

The first formal challenge to «textbook» narratives on the Korean War’s origins appeared while the war was in progress, in 1952. At this time the journalist, I. F. Stone, published his The Hidden History of the Korean War [Stone 1952]. This, challenging the claim that the invasion had been a surprise, argued that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the U.S. could not have been caught off guard. For example, he informed that the U.S. Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter had admitted as much at a press conference held soon after the fighting had begun. On this occasion he said that U.S. intelligence had felt that «conditions existed in Korea that could have meant an invasion this week or next» [Ibid., p. 2]. Stone then traced how both sides had been preparing for military confrontation months prior to June 1950. Indeed, it would have taken the DPRK months to assemble a force large enough to launch the invasion that the ROK and the U.S. accused them of making. How could the ROK and the U.S. have not noticed this? Reports drafted over this period, Stone argues, suggested that they had.

Stone also cited a number of occasions when the ROK government, as well, demonstrated knowledge of the DPRK’s impending attack [Ibid., p. 13]. Over the months prior to June 1950, ROK officials had been begging the U.S. for weapons to counter a possible invasion. Fears that Rhee would use the weapons to launch an attack north prevented the U.S. from obliging him. The U.S. had, however, provided the ROK with assurances of assistance, should it become necessary. This assurance was something that President Rhee had long sought and received from MacArthur during the Korean president’s visits to Tokyo in early October 1948, and most probably in February 1950, as well as on other occasions. The following March, Rhee vowed at a March First Movement commemorative rally that he would «recover North Korea» [Chungan ilbo 1950, March 1, p. 238]. Just days before the start of the war, on 19 June, John Foster Dulles, then advisor to the U.S. Secretary of State, had declared before the Korean National Assembly that Korea «was not alone» in its struggles against communism [Ibid., p. 17]11.

Stone notes that from Seoul Dulles flew to Tokyo where, upon landing, he told reporters that he expected something «positive» from his scheduled talks with MacArthur. He predicted that «positive action» would be taken to preserve the peace of the Far East. Stone suggests that the «positive action» to which Dulles referred could have meant the U.S. sending warning to the communist bloc against committing any belligerent acts. However, given that the war broke out soon after Dulles’ statement, according to Stone the «action» that Dulles had in mind was something more concrete, such as a large-scale U.S. intervention against communism in the region [Ibid., p. 27]. Stone concludes that, like the Spanish-American War of 1898, mysteries remain as to who started the belligerence, as well as whether the United States had been drawn into it [Ibid., p. 345]12.

Two decades later, Jon Halliday, writing in the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, drew attention to Stone’s work. While acknowledging the importance of his efforts, Halliday considered Stone to have been «rather apolitical», and, thus, his work required a «rigorous reexamination». In particular Halliday objected to Stone’s use of the word «satellite» to describe the DPRK relationship with the Soviet Union, as well as the rather favourable treatment that he had given President Truman at the time, a man the journalist had described as one who would not do deliberate harm, a man who was a «victim of both the circumstances and forces stronger than himself». Halliday argued the need for a «Marxist history of the Korean War», one that would tell the story more from the Korean people’s perspective, one that would see the war’s beginning with the arrival of the American military in 1945 as well as the DPRK’s attempt to liberate the people of the south [Halliday 1973, p. 36]. Halliday does point out a contradiction in the DPRK’s claim that it had responded to an initial ROK attack but then emphasizes that it fought to liberate the south. He then also details the support that southern communists had given once the peninsula became engulfed in war, as former southern communist leader, Pak Hon-yong, gave to Kim Il Sung prior to the war [Ibid., p. 39]. Halliday in 1988 then teamed with Bruce Cumings, who at the time was completing his own history on the war, to produce a six-part documentary on the war titled Korea: The Unknown War [Halliday and Cumings 1988]. The content was then published in a book [Halliday and Cumings 1990].

Soon after, Bruce Cumings published the second of his two-volume history titled the Origins of the Korean War that further challenged the textbook origins of the war. The depth and breathe of his study continue to influence scholars of this war, even to those who disagree with his arguments13. To properly understand the war, Cumings argued, scholars had to understand the indigenous origins of the war rather than seeing it as a part of a more global cause. He did so by tracing indigenous activities in Korea over the five years leading up to all-out war in 1950, that is, from at least the point of Korea’s liberation, if not earlier [Cumings 1981, p. xx]. He explains:

The basic issues over which the war in 1950 was fought were apparent immediately after liberation, within a three-month period, and led to open fighting that eventually claimed more than one hundred thousand lives in peasant rebellion, labor strife, guerrilla warfare, and open fighting along the thirty-eighth parallel—all this before the ostensible Korean War began. In other words, the conflict was civil and revolutionary in character, beginning just after 1945 and proceeding through a dialectic of revolution and reaction. The opening of conventional battles in June 1950 only continued this war by other means [Ibid., p. xxi].

Cumings devotes a full chapter in his second volume to Dean Acheson’s January 1950 Press Club speech. Here, Cumings suggests, the Secretary of State purposely excluded the U.S. responsibility to defend Korea in an effort to lure the DPRK into attacking south. The speech outlined the area to which the U.S. was committed to defending in East Asia by drawing a defence perimeter that extended from the Aleutian Islands off of Alaska to the Philippine Islands and passing through Japan. His leaving out the Korean Peninsula, Cumings argues, gave the DPRK a «green light» to advance south of the thirty-eighth parallel. Acheson did not entirely erase Korea from U.S. interests but stated that, should the ROK be attacked, «the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it» [Cumings 1990, p. 421-22]14. Cumings reconstructs peasant rebellions that broke out in southern Korea from 1945, which were followed by guerrilla warfare15. and many of which drew on labour issues between peasants and the landed classes, as well as between those who espoused extreme leftist versus extreme rightist thinking. These battles then expanded into border insurrections between the ROK and the DPRK that began soon after the two Koreas formed sovereign states in August (ROK) and in September (DPRK) 1948. Many of these advances, which Cumings argues provided the «setting for June 1950», resulted from ROK’s initiatives. One particular attack in mid-July worried U.S. authorities that it might trigger an all-out war. Cumings concluded that this July attack and other such incidents did not result in war because the DPRK was not yet ready to engage the ROK in such an extended confrontation at the time; by June 1950, however, it was [Ibid., p. 388-98].

The Japanese have been relatively quiet in researching such questions; their histories generally reflect the idea that the attack came suddenly from the north. With an interest in separating the war from their colonial history of Korea and having more immediate concerns following their devastating defeat in the Pacific War, perhaps this is not entirely surprising. One important exception, however is research conducted by University of Tokyo professor Wada Haruki whose efforts took him to examine the Soviet connections to the war. Originally trained in Russian studies, his interests gravitated toward post-war Soviet-DPRK relations. Some of Wada’s conclusions regarding the Korean War concur with those of Cumings; others do not. Where Cumings emphasizes the indigenous elements in the war’s origins, Wada focuses on the regional elements in terming the conflict the «Northeast Asian War». Like Cumings, his research briefly touches on the pre-June 1950 fighting in which the two Koreas engaged, such as the 1949 border insurrections [Wada 2014, pp. 21-25], and traces DPRK initiatives for war, rather than citing the war as a Soviet Union initiative. Using DPRK documents captured by the United States during the war he traces the northern plan to attack ROK forces along the thirty-eighth parallel from 4:40 A.M. on 25 June. He carries the translation of a lengthy telegram sent on 26 June by the Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK, Terentii Shtykov, to the First Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff Matvei Vasil’evich Zakharov in Moscow. The telegram outlined the DPRK «preparation and progress» over the days leading up to the attack [Ibid., pp. 76-77].

Wada sees this telegram as the «smoking gun» that demonstrates the DPRK culpability for the fighting that broke out on 25 June, even though he cites Kim Il Sung as describing the attack the following day as a «counterattack» against the «puppet forces of the traitor Syngman Rhee» [Ibid., p. 78]. While Wada’s study expands the war’s narrative to a wider degree than the limited discussion of the «textbook» narratives, his focus is mostly directed toward the war itself, rather than to discussions on the events that led to the 25 June start of conventional war.

Another challenge to Cumings work is that by William Stueck who focuses on the international side of the war. Like Cumings and Wada, he briefly traces the war from Korea’s post-liberation history, but cites the DPRK as the force that triggered the war. The attack, he argues should not have come as a surprise to the ROK or United States forces; there had been plenty of warnings of this possibility beforehand [Stueck 1995, p. 10]. Stueck acknowledges that the war may have started out as a civil conflict, but within a week it turned international. Thus, it is this aspect of the war that requires our attention. He explains:

What had begun as a conflict between Koreans aimed at eradicating the division of their country soon became a struggle of broad international proportions, one that threatened to escalate into a direct confrontation between the West and the Soviet bloc [Ibid., p. 13].

Stueck questions whether the war could have been fought without international participation. In this sense the difference between Cumings and Stueck is the former placing more emphasis on the indigenous elements of the war, and the latter on the international elements. It is not that Cumings ignores the role of the two Koreas’ international partners, but he claims that without the local Korean elements the possibilities of a Korean War outbreak were nil – basically the opposite of what Stueck argues.

Most recently, British author A. B. Abrams has advanced the idea that the U.S. had more to gain than either the Soviet Union and China in war erupting on the Korean Peninsula and thus the possibility of a war being initiated by the ROK was greater than that by the DPRK. He argues as follows:

While the outbreak of war in Korea was key to ensuring the survival of the Rhee government in the south, and had considerable strategic and economic benefits for the United States, the conflict created immense difficulties for both Moscow and Beijing [Abrams 2020, p. 53].

Abrams’ study, which offers a unique perspective on the war, fails to consider evidence made available with the brief opening of Russian and Chinese archives from the 1990s, as well as the secondary research that has emerged since.

4. Documents from the Soviet and Chinese archives

A third major wave of rethinking the Korean War was initiated by the release of telegraphs and other documents from the Soviet and Chinese archives from the early 1990s, just around the time the Cold War drew to a close. Prior to this time, memoires left by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev published in 1970 as Khrushchev Remembersserved as the most important source for understanding Soviet, Chinese, and DPRK connections prior to the war. Russian President Boris Yeltsin initiated these efforts to unseal relevant documents when he brought to Seoul while on a state visit in 1994 a box of telegrams that had been exchanged between Moscow, Beijing, and P’yŏngyang in the days before and after 25 June16. since this time a large number of telegrams and official documents have also been released. Kathryn Weathersby, who assumed a lion’s share of the Russian to English translations of the telegram collection, explains that since that time «documentary evidence on the Korean War has been enriched even more by the release of virtually the entire collection of high-level documents on the war declassified by the Presidential Archive in Moscow, which numbers approximately 1,200 pages» [Weathersby 1995/1996, p. 30]. This new evidence has been exploited by scholars who have written on Korean and Chinese issues, as well as on Eastern European countries, and whose research has been collected into a series of «working papers» published by the Cold War International History Project, organized by the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C.

Professor Chen Jian, from Cornell University, is one of these scholars. His research completely revised our knowledge of China’s decision to enter the Korean War. Prior to this time, Allen S. Whiting’s 1960 study titled China Crosses the Yalu had been the most authoritative work on this critical angle of the war. Whiting noted that certain factors, such as China’s more important interest in absorbing Taiwan and a shortage of resources due to its having had to fight two wars, first against the Japanese and then against the Nationalist Chinese, made fighting another war difficult. Whiting lamented that the absence of documentation needed to determine why the Chinese communists had crossed the Yalu River to fight in Korea limited him to raising hypotheses rather than arriving at conclusive answers to this question. He posed that a strong possible reason for the Chinese decision to intervene was perhaps linked to their dependence on the Soviet Union’s assistance should the U.S. continue its ambitions to rollback communism from the Chinese mainland. In this case, their participation in the war was secondary to their relations with their Korean communist ally [Whiting 1960, pp. 152-53]. Another possible concern was that if anti-DPRK forces succeeded in unifying the Korean Peninsula it would have placed U.S. and ROK forces at the Chinese border, something unacceptable to Beijing. According to Whiting, though, Mao’s government did not participate in the war’s planning and may not have known of the DPRK’s plans beforehand. China’s concerns at the time were more directed toward Taiwan and Tibet, rather than the Korean Peninsula [Ibid., p. 45].

In 1994, Chen collected his findings into a monograph titled China’s Road to the Korean War, where he concluded that China was more involved in the war’s planning than previously imagined. Chen contends that not only did China know of the DPRK’s plans, but also that Mao had approved of them, perhaps reluctantly, in advance. Stalin had directed Kim to seek Mao’s approval for the attack and his willingness to come to its assistance if necessary as a prerequisite of the DPRK leader gaining Soviet assistance. Kim visited Mao in Beijing in May 1950 when the Chinese leader promised Kim the support he needed to get Stalin’s approval and assistance. Unbeknown to Kim at this time, Stalin had most likely been holding discussions with Mao on the Korean issue and on the concrete possibility of war. One question of controversy appears to have been the two leaders’ thoughts on whether the U.S. would intervene. Reports on whether Mao feared this or not are mixed, but by January 1950, and particularly after the aforementioned Acheson Press Club speech, he had become convinced that the U.S. would not interfere should the two Koreas go to war against each other. Chen suggests that, at the time, the Soviets and the Chinese had been developing close relations and thus had become dependent on each other in their struggles with the U.S. [Chen 1994, pp. 85-91]. The two leaders continued to communicate up through, and after, the start of the war.

Another angle to understand the Chinese participation in the war is its connection to the Stalin-Mao relationship. The Chinese Communist victory in October 1949 suddenly challenged Stalin’s monopoly on control over the Asian communist movement. Kim Il Sung suggested as much in December 1949 when he threatened to turn to the Chinese for help if the Soviets refused to assist him [Torcov 2001, p. 89]. Could this have influenced Stalin’s positive response to Kim at this time? According to Chen Jian, it was only after Mao’s visit to Moscow in December 194917, and only after the two communist giants signed a treaty of alliance and friendship, that Stalin agreed to talk with Kim regarding a possible invasion of the ROK. Their new partnership, the Chinese leader felt, could serve as a deterrent to a possible U.S. aggression [Chen 1994, p. 90-91]. Chen further claims that the exchanges between Beijing and Moscow occurred at a time when the roots of their divergences perhaps began to sprout. He writes:

In addition to the usual troubles between any partners (such as the differences in each other’s strategic emphasis, and the gap between one’s need for support and the other’s ability to offer aid), an important source of differences between Beijing and Moscow lay in the conflicting personalities of Mao and Stalin. The reality created by the [Chinese] lean-to-one-side policy became particularly uneasy for Mao when he had to play the role as Stalin’s junior in direct exchanges with the Soviets, especially in face-to-face discussions with Stalin himself. One finds here the early clues of the divergence between Beijing and Moscow during the Korean crisis and, in the long-run, of the process leading to a Sino-Soviet split [Ibid., p. 91].

In addition to new revelations on China’s participation in the war, these documents have also afforded a clearer picture of Soviet concerns as well. Kathryn Weathersby has written a number of papers that draw on the telegrams as well as on the documents that she found in the Russian archives and that together have enriched our understanding of the Soviet position regarding the war at this time. At the same time, they expose holes in the «textbook» narratives of the war that the U.S. advanced, and Japan adopted.

While the documents strengthen arguments that the DPRK attacked first, they also show quite persuasively that it was Kim Il Sung who made initial attempts to convince a reluctant Stalin to support his ambitions to attack the ROK. Kim first attempted this in March 1949, just around the time when the U.S. and the Soviet militaries were scheduled to retreat from the Korean Peninsula. At that time Stalin, through his ambassador to the DPRK, Terentii Shtykov, responded by saying that the timing was not yet right: the ROK military remained superior; Kim should wait for the ROK to make the first move [Weathersby 1995, pp. 1, 2-9].

As mentioned above, Kim tried a second time in December 1949. By this time the situation had changed dramatically. The Soviet Union had joined the U.S. as a nuclear power in September, and the Chinese civil war had ended with the communist victory in October. The three leaders felt that these developments would lessen the chances of the U.S. entering a war in the region. Stalin gave Kim a positive response to his request in January 1950 and in late February he dispatched Lieutenant-General Vasiliev to take over the responsibility of main advisor of the DPRK army [Ibid., p. 17]. Kim travelled to Moscow to meet Stalin in late March of that year. However, only summaries, rather than a complete transcript, of the meeting have survived. Stalin confirmed to Kim that changes in the international environment had worked in their favour, specifically the Chinese Communist victory and the recently forged Sino-Soviet Treaty. Still, he raised two problematic issues: The possibility of the U.S. joining the war and the Chinese supporting the DPRK’s efforts. Kim responded first in the negative – the U.S. would not join if it knew that the DPRK had Soviet and Chinese support, and then in the positive – Comrade Mao had long supported the DPRK’s desire to unify the peninsula.

Stalin then turned to two prerequisites for DPRK’s success: sufficient preparation and planning. Kim could count on Soviet support in these two areas but Moscow would not directly dispatch its armies to the battlefield. Stalin further cautioned Kim that Soviet support would be curtailed if the United States came to the ROK’s rescue. Kim, however, assured the Soviet leader that this would not be possible as the war would not last long. Long-time southern communist leader, Pak Hon-yong, who had fled to north after being harassed by USAMGIK, accompanied Kim to Moscow, and later to Beijing. He had assured Kim that 200,000 southern guerrilla forces were ready to join the northern communists once the war started. Kim passed this information on to Stalin. Stalin urged Kim to discuss this operation with Mao to obtain his support. The report of this meeting ended with the two sides agreeing that concrete plans for the invasion would be finalized by the following summer [Weathersby 2002, pp. 9-11].

Stalin’s thinking was that the operation would be an Asian affair, with the Chinese assisting the DPRK and the Japanese possibly assisting the ROK. The Soviets and the U.S. would assist the two Koreas from behind by providing them with military hardware and advice, but they would remain in the background rather than directly joining in the battles and risking provoking a larger world war. Even though the Soviet Union in 1949 had succeeded in becoming the second nuclear power it still remained an inferior one in terms of device numbers18.

In May 1950, Kim and Pak travelled to Beijing to meet with Mao Zedong as Stalin had directed. The Chinese leader raised the possibility that the Japanese would join the war: Would such a development affect the DPRK’s plans in any way? Kim responded that it would: The Japanese coming to the ROK’s assistance would motivate his armies to fight harder. Mao also voiced concern over the possibility of the U.S. entering the war, to which Kim responded that «the Americans do not show any inclination to engage themselves militarily in the Far East», as seen in their reluctance to enter the China civil war [Ibid., p. 12]. Mao emphasized to the DPRK leaders that the Chinese would come to their assistance only if necessary, that is, if the U.S. joined the battles. Later, after the U.S. had entered the war, Kim initially declined Mao’s offer to send Chinese troops [Wada 2014, p. 61], at least until the U.S. advanced into DPRK territory in late September 1950. Mao’s commitment was perhaps driven by the debt that he felt toward the DPRK who had sent forces to fight for China in its recent battles against Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces [Ibid.]. Overall, from these discussions between Kim, Stalin, and Mao emerges the three communist leaders’ serious misreading of the United States’ intentions regarding war breaking out in Korea.

The original plan that Kim presented to Stalin did not necessarily involve the DPRK seeking to control the entire Korean Peninsula, but simply fighting to secure a modest adjustment in the ROK-DPRK line of division. This was important because the initial territory that the DPRK hoped to acquire, the Ongjin Peninsula, was the scene of much of the border disputes that the country fought with the ROK. Capturing this territory would also drastically reduce the DPRK’S border that it shared with the ROK and thus cut the area that it needed to protect.

Kim Kwang-soo of the Korean Military Academy argues against Cumings’ claim that the gunfire exchanged by the two Koreas prior to 25 June constituted a part of the Korean War. He does, however, quote Stalin commenting that initiating battles at Ongjin would be useful as it would «help to disguise who initiated the combat activities» [Kim 2001, p. 14]. The scholar lays out the DPRK’s four-stage plan that had its armies attacking and then swiftly moving to occupy the capital, Seoul, before advancing south toward Pusan [Ibid., p. 18].

Kim draws from two documents that at the time had not been considered as they had just recently been made public from the Soviet archives. The information they carried convinced him beyond doubt that the initial attack on 25 June came from the north, and Kim Il Sung’s «counterattack» was in fact the aggressive action by the DPRK military that started the war. One document was authored by a Lieutenant-General Vladimir Razuvaev, Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces in P’yŏngyang. The general’s report outlined attack plans drawn primarily by the Soviet Union. The second document was a war narrative from the day of attack through May 1951 compiled by the Soviet General Staff [Kim 2001, p. 13]. Here Kim found that the initial war plan had the DPRK military attacking south, representing the attack as a response to a ROK attack, and halting operations after occupying Seoul to leave the task of completing the invasion to the southern communists [Ibid., pp. 16-17]. The Razuvaev report in particular, if accurate, presents valuable evidence detailing the initial origins of the June 1950 fighting.

On June 25, units of the 3rd Border Security Brigade in the Ongjin peninsula stopped enemy attacks on the north of the 38th parallel by previously organized fires and, after executing preparatory artillery fires for 30 minutes, began to attack the enemy which had switched to defense. The Brigade advanced 2-2.5 km on the axis of the main attack around 6 o’clock [Ibid., p. 20].

Kim strengthens his arguments by comparing information contained in these newly-obtained documents against that of other documents previously made available, including DPRK documents that the U.S. captured during the war. His research demonstrates that the war was initiated for the sole purpose of peninsular unification; although the Soviets played a major role in helping the Koreans develop the war plans, Stalin appears to have had no further ambitions to extending the war beyond the Korean Peninsula. He is also critical of those such as Cumings who have argued that the war’s roots had been sowed years earlier, from the time of Korea’s liberation. He admits that definitive knowledge of the actual events can only be based on indirect reports rather than those from direct witnesses. Like others looking at Soviet and Chinese documents, Kim fails to consider an equally important side of the Korean War narrative: the ambitions and actions of the ROK over this time.

There is also hard evidence showing that Kim Il Sung had learned that the ROK knew of his plans to attack and thus he had to quickly revise this initial plan. This adds question to the ROK claim that the DPRK attack was sudden, a surprise. As John Foster Dulles peered across the thirty-eighth into the DPRK, Shtykov cabled Moscow to report to Stalin that a frantic Kim Il Sung was ranting that the ROK had uncovered his plans of attack. He had, therefore, to change the plan to extend the attack across the entire width of the Peninsula. The Soviet Ambassador explained:

The Southerners have learned the details of the forthcoming advance of the [Korean People’s Army]. As a result, they are taking measures to strengthen the combat of their troops. Defence lines are reinforced and additional units are concentrated in the Ongjin direction… Instead of a local operation at Ongjin peninsula as a prelude to a general offensive, Kim Il Sung suggests an overall attack on 25 June along the whole front line [Torcov 2001, p. 119; Weathersby 2002, p. 15].

That the ROK was on to the DPRK’s plans and believed by the north to be preparing an attack is verified in a lengthy two-volume history of the war by ROK scholar Pak Myŏng-rim [Pak 2003, p. 388-89]. This piece of information obscures our understanding on who fired the initial shot. Both sides had their guns readied to fire across the parallel om the morning of 25 June.

Pak’s massive study is perhaps the most complete account of the war in Korean historiography. As with other scholars whose research has benefited from the new findings from newly released documents, Pak clearly states at the onset of his study that there can no longer be any doubt that it was the DPRK that first launched the attack on June 1950 [Ibid., p. 34]. Yet, the origins of the war, he argues, run deeper. His study also argues that the social ideological changes occurring on either side during the years prior to the war to be relevant to the war’s origins, primarily from the time of the 1948 order (48 nyŏn chilsŏ) over which time the DPRK and the ROK developed into separate states. Pak claims that this point differs from those who approach the war from a foreign diplomatic perspective [Ibid., p. 42].

5. The ROK ambitions up through June 1950

Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis, after sifting through research produced from the new information that briefly poured out of the Chinese and Russian archives, titled his revised history of this period We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. Concerning the Korean War origins, he writes that «after repeated attempts, Kim got the green light from Stalin early in 1950, while all Rhee received from Washington were yellow lights shading over into red» [Gaddis 1998, p. 71]. True, this is the general narrative of the war’s origins, and it does correctly reveal that Rhee (unsuccessfully) tried to engage the United States in a war previous to June 1950. However, from this new evidence we have learned far more on the DPRK ambitions than those of the ROK. With the important exception of few, such as Bruce Cumings and A. B. Abrams, the actions of Syngman Rhee and other ROK officials leading up to the Korean War have been neglected. As there are many unanswered (perhaps unanswerable) holes regarding this side of the story, we are limited to addressed them as questions, rather than facts [Caprio 2011].

What is known is that Korean President Syngman Rhee was just as eager, if not more so, to initiate battles to unite the two halves of the Korean Peninsula; he also refused to join the DPRK, China, and the UN Command in signing the July 1953 Armistice, a cease fire that ended the fighting but not the war. Rather, Rhee tried to prolong the war. By the time the Korean War erupted Rhee had caused a number of disturbances that contributed to the peninsula’s division. Indeed, it seemed that division followed the time he left Korea to live what would amount to close to four decades overseas from the 1910s. The divisions that he caused as the first president of the Korean Provisional Government (KPG), formed by overseas Koreans in Shanghai, China in 1919, forced a number of important cabinet members to leave the political body in the early 1920s Rhee was eventually driven from office but would serve as the KPG’s representative in Washington, D.C. during the Pacific War. With General MacArthur’s assistance, he returned to southern Korea in October 1945, earlier than other overseas Korean leaders. Perhaps calculating that he could not win an election with the entire peninsula voting, he became one of the first, if not the first, to advance the idea of a separate southern Korean state. His role in the anti-trusteeship movement from early 1946 was a prime factor for the breakup of the United States-Soviet Union Joint Commission that was to consult with peninsular democratic groups to form a united Korean government19. Rhee and other Korean politicians objected to the idea that a weak Korean state would be subjected to up to five years of trusteeship tutelage in responsible political governance and economic policy to ensure that it would not become the centre of regional power efforts to control the peninsula as had been the case in the decades leading up to its annexation by Japan in 1910. A plan to place the peninsula under trusteeship that would last up to five years prior to Korea gaining its sovereignty was drawn up in December 1945 by the foreign ministers of the U.S., the Soviet Union, and Great Britain who met in Moscow to resolve lingering World War II issues. The U.S.-Soviet Commission that was formed soon after met for two years to enact this plan, but even before the Commission disbanded in October 1947, the U.S. petitioned the United Nation’s Security Council to address the Korean issue. The Soviet Union refusal to cooperate with the Council’s efforts led to both states holding separate elections, which led to the formation of the ROK (August) and the DPRK (September). Rhee refused to recognize eleventh-hour efforts by his two major rivals, Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sic, to negotiate with the northern Koreans a plan to unify the Korean state. This occurred just before the May 1948 elections, which caused the two Kims to boycott the elections and thus handing Rhee the presidency virtually unopposed.

Over the two years between the formation of the ROK and the beginning of the Korean War, Rhee initiated numerous discussions with U.S. officials, and planned and carried out numerous attempts to invade the north. One such discussion that the president held with U.S. Ambassador John Muccio took place in February 1949, just before the U.S. withdrew most of its military personnel from the ROK. At this time Rhee put forth his arguments as to why the ROK forces were ready for battle: The ROK could increase its armed forces by 100,000 if they enlisted Korean soldiers who had fought against the Japanese in the Pacific War and against the Chinese Communists in China’s yet unfinished civil war. The ROK army’s morale, he estimated, was stronger than that of DPRK soldiers; should the ROK attack first it could expect to benefit from mass enemy defections. Muccio’s response left open the possibility of an ROK attack, but only after the U.S. forces had withdrawn. He warned Rhee against initiating such an operation while U.S. troops remained on Korean soil [United States Department of State 1976, 956-958]. The ROK president, honoured this warning only partially. The ROK’s attempts to engage the DPRK in battle by initiating border insurrections began from May 1949, a month before the U.S. withdrew the majority of its troops from southern Korea in June. Cumings writes that these battles took «hundreds of lives and embroil[ed] thousands of troops». He argues that the ROK engaged in these battles to prolong the presence of U.S. troops, on which, according to an Army G-2 study, «their own positions, fortunes, and perhaps even their lives depended» [Cumings 1990, p. 388].

A second question revolves around Rhee’s February 1950 visit to Tokyo to meet with General Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur served as commander of the U.S. forces in the Northeast Asian region and oversaw the U.S. occupation administrations in Japan directly, and in southern Korea indirectly. Upon arrival, Rhee indicated at a press conference that his intention for visiting Tokyo at this time was to improve relations with the Japanese in an effort to strengthen the frontline against the communist threat. The ROK president, who enjoyed close relations with MacArthur – he was given use of the general’s private plane, the Bataan, on multiple occasions – met often with the general during his visit. Transcripts of their discussions, however, do not exist. Wada Haruki cites MacArthur as mentioning the possibility of the U.S. using nuclear weapons should China or Russia enter the war [Wada 2002, p. 127]. Rhee did include hints of these discussions in a letter to Robert Oliver, a long-time close friend and confident who would author a number of biographies on Rhee. In a letter that Rhee titled «military problems», he included the following paragraph that summarized in part his discussions with MacArthur.

When I was in Tokyo I made the statement [to MacArthur] that Russia is supplying the Northern forces and that Russia is pressing them to invade the South as soon as “the dust settles in China”. You know that there was nothing new in that statement because the Soviets have continually supplied the North. However, at the present moment the Soviets do not wish to be accused of this complicity, and that is exactly why I made the statement. As a result, the order has been given from Moscow to withdraw all forces from the North during the next two months [Rhee to Oliver, March 1950].

Unfortunately, Rhee does not offer any hints as to MacArthur’s reaction. But this short excerpt of a rather lengthy letter clearly demonstrates that the two discussed the possibility of the United States assisting the ROK in the case of war. It also suggests, with less clarity, that Rhee and MacArthur had direct information on Soviet-DPRK discussions20. It is important to note that Rhee visited Tokyo after Stalin had agreed to support Kim in January 1950, but before the two communist leaders actually got together in Moscow later that year. Unfortunately, the little information available on the Kim-Stalin meeting is still more than that available on the Rhee-MacArthur discussions. Soon after returning to the ROK, on 1 March and on other occasions, Rhee again urged his country to attack the north [Cumings 1990, p. 481; Abrams 2020, pp. 43-47]. The various hints of Rhee’s intentions in the years prior to June 1950 strongly suggest the need for a more complete account of the war from ROK sources. A number of the telegrams, for example, describe Kim Il Sung as acting hysterical while he requested Stalin’s assistance. Whether these outbursts by Kim can be linked to DPRK military encounters with the ROK military requires consideration.

6. Japan’s role in the Korean war

Another angle of the Korean War’s origins that has received more attention as of recent is the role played by Japan. The pacifist terms of Japan’s surrender in 1945, as well as its 1947 post-war «peace» constitution that forbade the Japanese from forming a military, on paper prohibited Japan from participating in this war. Yet, as we have seen, both the Soviets and the Chinese not only anticipated the possibility of Japan’s intervention, but during the war Moscow even brought before the United Nations the accusation that Japan was participating in the war21. It is fair to question the degree to which the United States would have engaged its militaries in the war had it not been able to enlist Japanese assistance as, to use a Korean scholar’s words, a «base-state» [kichi kukka] [Nam 2018]. Yet, Japan’s proximity to the Korean Peninsula, as well as the dismal condition of its economy, presented the islands as an ideal case for what University of Chicago professor Paul Poast termed the «Iron Law of War» – «the idea that war produces economic booms» [Poast 2005]. Japan’s underuse of resources, both human and material, were problems that the Korean War helped resolve. Indeed, the one point emphasized in Japanese and Korean textbooks regarding Japan’s participation in the war was the war’s role in driving the initial stage of Japan’s post-war economic recovery [ARKS 2000, p. 298; Kim et al 2014, p. 381].

The explanation of Japan’s participation in the Korean War goes beyond the economic gains that the war brought to the archipelago. It also can be seen as the beginning of the rejuvenation of the Japanese military. With the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, Japan created a 75,000-man National Police Reserve and dramatically increased the size of its coast guard, both at the United States insistence22. Japan also contributed to the U.S.’s September landing at In’chŏn and elsewhere by sending minesweepers to the harbours to clear the mines to allow for the landings. This caused a number of Japanese deaths as a Landing Ship Tank [LST] exploded after it contacted mines during these operations. Japanese who had been employed at Japan-based U.S. military bases followed U.S. units to the peninsula and were even given weapons to use during DPRK attacks. Funerals for the deceased Japanese were held often in secret; families were also kept in the dark over the circumstances that the deceased had experienced in Korea.

The U.S. bases in Japan increased both in size and number during the war, thus offering unemployed Japanese work at higher-than-average wages. U.S. aircraft left from Japanese bases to fly aerial bombing raids on Korean cities, mostly in the DPRK but also in the ROK. Finally, Japan created or expanded facilities to entertain soldiers granted Rest and Recuperation (R & R) leave from the war. This alone added hundreds of millions of dollars every year of the war to a Japanese economy that graciously welcomed the hard currency that the soldiers payed for the services provided by Japan’s «water industry» (bars, hotels, and brothels and the like) [Norma 2020, p. 370]. On the one hand, Japan, still under U.S. occupation for most of the war, had no choice but to submit to U.S. demands at this time. On the other hand, as indicated by Yoshida’s call for Japan’s full cooperation noted above, it also did so most willingly, and benefitted quite handsomely in the process23.

7. Conclusion: Unanswered questions to the Korean war’s origins

Barbara F. Walter [2022], in her study on civil wars, argues that they tend to break out when a society finds itself in-between autocracy and democracy, when a people have gained a sense of the benefits of a democratic society but are blocked from attaining this society by rival forces. She argues that such conflicts, which gradually evolve rather than suddenly break out, result from the conflicting sides hardening their views, instead of compromising. Walter’s arguments can be useful to explain the situation that the Korean people faced just after their liberation from colonial rule. Over the years that followed Japan’s defeat and Korea’s liberation and occupation, the Soviet Union and the U.S. quickly threw their support behind extremist politics that displayed no interest in negotiating, much less compromising, to reunite the peninsula. Not only did the two occupiers fail to deliver in their promise to guide Koreans in the mechanics of responsible politics and economics. Their administrations soon supported leaders who mirrored their respective interests, too: the U.S. to contain the spread of communism and the Soviet Union to form a buffer zone against possible attacks in Asia. Both superpowers appear to have been satisfied with the status quo; it was the Koreas who aimed to reunify the peninsula through war after peaceful means had failed.

The two Koreas could not have contemplated initiating belligerence against their rival without the help of their patron superpower. Documentary evidence shows that in the end a reluctant Stalin agreed to work with Kim Il Sung to launch such an attack. Yet, Stalin also insisted that the Soviet Army would not enter the fighting, and he predicted that the U.S. would not, as well. The Soviet leader did not want to go down in history as the instigator of World War III. Thus, both the U.S. and the Soviets errored in their assumptions about each other: the U.S. in placing the total blame on the Soviets’ shoulders for using the attack as an initial step in a wider effort, and the Soviets in assuming that the U.S. would stay out of this Asian war as it had the civil war in China. Documents released in the 1990s have increased our knowledge of the Soviet-DPRK-China triangle, none more importantly perhaps than the content of the meetings that Kim held with Stalin and then with Mao in early 1950. This increases the importance that the February 1950 MacArthur-Rhee talks, as well as those that may have included Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, may bring to our understanding of the war’s origins.

This review suggests that discussions on the origins of the war, for the most part, remain fixated on the events of the last weekend of June 195024. Thus, the emphasis remains on the surrounding international community rather than on the two Korean states, which had been engaged in battles along the thirty-eighth parallel for at least one year in advance. Both sides had had to deal with «domestic» insurrections from the time of the U.S. and Soviet arrivals in 1945. Both halves entertained suspicions that the other had plans to attack in the near future. The leaders of both Koreas had voiced on numerous occasions their willingness to attack the other ever since the states had been created in mid-1948. And both leaders sought the support of their former occupier to carry out an attack. Perhaps, the best conclusions to draw is that first, we will never know who initiated the fighting on 25 June 1950, and second, determining this may be of secondary importance to our understanding of this rivalry in a broader perspective, from Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule onwards. The legacy of the Korean War lives through the division of the peninsula and the present DPRK nuclear potential, the former initiated by the U.S. in the closing days of the Pacific War and the latter the communist state’s answer to U.S. threats to use nuclear weapons both during the war and its aftermath.

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ISSN 2385-2526

In 2022, the Republic of Armenia struggled with a complex set of challenges and opportunities; a by-product of the precarious path towards a peace agreement with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, following the 2020 escalation, and from the reverberations of the war in Ukraine. Yerevan faced Baku’s coercive bargaining strategies coupled with Russia’s partial yet significant misalignment from a bilateral alliance that dictates Armenia’s national security. As a result, security considerations were front and centre of Armenia’s strategic thinking. However, the rapidly changing parameters of regional politics and the re-engagement of Euro-Atlantic actors in the Southern Caucasus have also widened Yerevan’s diplomatic leeway and led the way to a new understanding of security policy. Hence Yerevan’s more pragmatic approach to conflict resolution and its more realistic assessment of the limitations of the Armenian-Russian alliance. Accordingly, Armenia pursued its own security interests through diplomatic engagement with multiple partners. It was consistent with the country’s Armenia-centred foreign policy vision, which focuses on its developmental prospects rather than existential threats coming from irreconcilable enemies. Looking for a way out of the Nagorno-Karabakh impasse seems to have led Yerevan to a foreign policy paradigm shift based upon a new conception of national interest.

Keywords – Armenian Foreign Policy; Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; Southern Caucasus; Russia; European Union.

1. Introduction

Over the last two years, the pillars of Armenia’s post-Soviet foreign policy were shaken to their core. This was primarily as a result of the country’s defeat at the hands of Azerbaijan following the September-November 2020 war over Nagorno-Karabakh. In a matter of 44 days, Yerevan lost a great part of the territory conquered in the 1992-94 conflict, when the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh had been established. That same conflict had resulted in Yerevan’s sense of strategic advantage over Baku and in unquestioned trust in its main ally and security provider, Russia.

It is hard to overstate the magnitude of change that the 2020 defeat brought to Armenia’s post-independence strategy. The conflict with Azerbaijan over the Armenian-populated enclave in Azerbaijani territory may well be seen as the single factor which exerted the highest impact on the evolution of the country’s foreign and domestic policy. The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh started in 1988 when the Soviet Union still existed, thereby turning into an inter-state war following the latter’s collapse. The conflict impinged not only upon Yerevan’s threats-opportunities assessment and foreign policy choices, but also on complex and interconnected nation- and state-building processes. Moreover, the decades-long conflict – at an impasse before an inconclusive OSCE-led mediation effort – has sustained the relevance of the Nagorno-Karabakh question over time. The latter has become the main intervening variable between the external environment and Armenia’s foreign policy making. Consequently, in the last two years Yerevan has been struggling to re-adapt its new posture against the backdrop of a regional context made all the more volatile by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The conflict has indeed emboldened Azerbaijan’s attempt to impose by force the terms of peace and further eroded Moscow’s security guarantees. At the same time, however, it provided Armenia with new diplomatic leeway as Euro-Atlantic stakeholders have re-engaged, attempting to promote a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh question.

The aim of this article is to analyze Armenian policies in and around Nagorno-Karabakh in order to assess the magnitude of the foreign policy paradigm shift that occurred in 2022 and the current drive toward and Armenia-centered foreign policy.

The article proceeds as follows. The first part frames the post-Soviet evolution of Armenian politics, with its challenges and opportunities. As such, the article enquires into the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict’s impact on Armenia’s state- and nation-building processes, along with an analysis of the repercussions of the decades-long «no peace, no war» condition on Yerevan’s policy-making. The second part of the article is dedicated to the main trends of Armenia’s foreign policy in 2022. By looking at the repercussions of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the Janus-faced regional context is analysed to find the main drivers of Yerevan’s foreign policy change.

2. Armenian state- and nation-building processes through the lenses of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute

The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has contributed uniquely to the creation of Armenia’s modern notions of statehood and national identity. In fact, the struggle for the region’s self-determination not only overlapped timewise with the country’s state- and nation-building process, but it also intertwined to a great extent with both, making the Armenian case unique in the post-Soviet space. Said uniqueness is largely due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict role on the country’s path to independence as well as on the formation and legitimation of its elite. Ignited as internal self-determination issue within the federal Soviet structure, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue turned into an independentist struggle vis-à-vis Baku’s unwillingness to question its sovereignty over the oblast. This happened against a backdrop shaped by Moscow’s inability to manage the emergence of «mirroring nationalisms» [Cornell 2001: 32-39] out of the Soviet Union’s multi-ethnic matrix. Thus, contrary to what has happened in similar instances of ethno-territorial conflicts in the former Soviet Union, Armenia’s irredentist cause preceded – rather than followed – the «Parade of Sovereignties» [Kahn 2000] that shook the foundations of the federal Soviet structure between 1989 and 1990, ultimately causing its collapse.1 The uniqueness of the Armenian case also results from the role the struggle for Nagorno-Karabakh played in re-uniting the geographically dispersed Armenian communities, providing a unity of purpose to a quintessentially diaspora nation.

Never dormant under decades-long Soviet rule [Papazian 2001], irredentism over Nagorno-Karabakh rapidly attracted wide popular support and triggered mass mobilization in Armenia proper. This, in turn, helps to understand the impact exerted by the conflict on the country’s institution-building and elite-formation processes. As the USSR’s administrative crisis laid the groundwork for the affirmation of power centres alternative to the Communist Party, the emergence of mass nationalist movements «burst the very bounds of the old politics […] and rapidly undermined the power of local communist parties» [Suny 1993: 128]. As such, the Karabakh cause rapidly became the main catalyst for discontent and dissent. The «Karabakh Committee», established in 1988 in support of the annexationist cause, ended up championing all the socio-political grievances and instances advanced by the oppositions. It almost naturally evolved into the Pan-Armenian National Movement (ANM), which won the mid-1990 elections to the Supreme Soviet and saw its leader, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, elected as Chairman of the Supreme Council of Armenia. The transition from the leadership of the SSR to that of independent Armenia was a swift one. In October 1991, a month after the declaration of independence, Ter-Petrosyan was elected as the first President of the newly independent Republic. Moreover, the Nagorno-Karabakh’s legitimizing role continued over time and was further strengthened by the lack of a peace agreement between the warring factions. Ter-Petrosyan was replaced by Robert Kocharyan (1998-2008), who – like his successor, Serzh Sargsyan (2008-2018) – was a native of Nagorno-Karabakh and a war veteran. The so-called «Karabakh Party» would eventually hold the reins of government until the 2018 «Velvet Revolution». Hence, Armenia became the only nation in the post-Soviet Caucasus and Central Asia area where the nationalist opposition grown at the dawn of independence held onto power for the ensuing twenty-five years.

The extraordinary potential for aggregation of the Karabakh cause was due to the central role it had already played in the development of Armenian nationalism during Soviet era. It was also the result of its close association with some of the most important elements of Armenian identity. According to Razmik Panossian [2002], Armenia’s modern national identity is built around three different – yet not mutually exclusive – narratives, based upon as many national discourses and eposes. The first narrative, building upon the conversion to Christianity in 301, conceives «Armenian-ness» as rooted in the notion that Armenia was the world’s first Christian nation, highlighting religion’s role in perpetuating distinctive national features against successive assimilation attempts. The second narrative, building upon the myth of the genesis of the Armenians in 2492 BC, argues that the Armenian nation is rooted in its race and language, representing a continuum since pre-Christian times. The third narrative, particularly preeminent in the Diaspora, argues that being an Armenian means being a survivor – or a descendent of survivors – of the 1915 Genocide at the hands of the Ottoman Empire’s Young Turk regime. This narrative of survival represents a founding element of Armenia’s contemporary national identity, deeply ingrained in the previous two narratives, too.

As in mid-1998 inter-communal violence followed what had started as a merely administrative fight, animosity vis-à-vis the Azerbaijani-Turks2 over the Armenian-populated enclave resonated with the diverse national narratives. It set off each narrative’s «exposed nerves» – as a conflict between Christianity and Islam, as a primordial struggle for sovereignty over the homeland, or as yet another episode in a decades-long struggle against extermination attempts perpetrated by the Turks [Panossian 2002: 139]. Looking at the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict through the 1915 Genocide lenses3 became common practice across all components of the nation, whether they were Armenian citizens, Karabakh Armenians, or Armenians from the Diaspora. This happened not only because the underlaying epos of «survival» and «victimhood» is deeply ingrained in the notion of Armenian-ness,4 but also because, since the mid-1960s, the memory and commemoration of the Metz Yerghen (the «Great Evil») has emerged as the cornerstone of national cohesiveness both in the USSR and among diasporic communities. Moreover, since the 1970s, the Genocide also became a vector for the Diaspora’s political mobilization in the struggle for recognition by hosts countries.

Reignited by the self-determination cause, survival and victimhood eposes grew preeminent in the nation-building process as a result of the first violent clashes and, particularly, of the pogroms and ethnic cleansing against Armenians between 1988 and 1990 in Sumgait, Kirovabad, and Baku. The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh became only the last episode of an historical struggle for survival against the risk of annihilation at Turkish hands, starting from the mid-1890s Hamidian massacres in Anatolia, transiting through the 1905-07 Armenian-Tatar war in the Southern Caucasus, and culminating in the Genocide. As Marina Kurkchiyan [2005: 154] put it, «in the Armenian perception, the identification of Soviet Azerbaijan with Ottoman Turkey was quickly made».5 This, in turn, had a direct effect on the creation of the national identity paradigm. Indeed, the reactivation of the collective memory around the Genocide paved the way for the creation of the notion of Armenian-ness built essentially on the «othering» of the Turks. This resulted in an ethnic and holistic understanding of the nation that would include all its components, both within and outside of its newly-conquered statehood.

This understanding of nationhood had a number of significant consequences when applied to the promotion of national interests and the protection of national security.6 Othering the Turks entailed an ethno-nationalistic understanding of nationhood which empowered the radical fringes of the Armenian political spectrum, both at home and in the Diaspora. This happened at the expense of the more pragmatic segments of the ANM leadership, guided by Ter-Petrosyan. During the Republic’s formative years, the national(ist) narrative built around the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was a decisive factor in empowering the promoters of Armenian «exceptionalism» in their confrontation with the advocates of a «normal state». The former group, building upon the uniqueness of a universal nation, entrusted Armenia with a «special mission», including «the rectification of all historical injustices [and] the reward for all martyrdoms» [Libaridian 1999: 81]. The advocates of a «normal state», instead, promoted the view of a state «subscribing to a civic definition of nationhood and rejecting the notion that Armenians living all over the world should somehow be integrated into a single polity» [Grigoryan 2018: 848]. They also pursued an «‘Armenia first’ strategy» [Broers 2019: 96], striving to build normal relations with neighbours, including Turkey.7

While the war over Nagorno-Karabakh had a decisive influence in the formative years of the post-Soviet Armenian state and nation, its sine-die protraction after the 1994 ceasefire agreement had pertinacious effects on the independent path walked thenceforth. On the one hand, the «no-war, no-peace» condition crystallized both the power structure defined at the dawn of independence and the national paradigm built around the conflict with the Azerbaijani Turks. On the other, as the military victory and de facto secession of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan was not sanctioned de jure either by a peace treaty or an international recognition of the self-proclaimed Republic,8 the protraction of the conflict left both state- and nation-building essentially incomplete, feeding into what Steele [2008] calls «ontological insecurity». As a result, a «mutilated sovereignty syndrome» took roots in Armenia, reinvigorating the traditional «survival» narrative and fostering a security-based understanding of national interests. This, in turn, had pernicious repercussions on the country’s foreign and domestic policies.

2.1. Nagorno-Karabakh and the security-first approach to foreign and security policy

Fostered by the perception of an existential threat coming from the «Turks», «ontological insecurity» generated a security-first approach to foreign policy, easily identifiable in the successive National Security Doctrines [Ceccorulli et al., 2017]. In other words, the protracted conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh became the main perceptual filter through which national elites came to interpret regional politics. Moreover, «ontological insecurity», built upon a powerful and binding national narrative, strengthened a deterministic view of the human and physical factors of Armenian geopolitics. Accordingly, the national threat assessment was shaped first and foremost by the perception of an immanent menace resulting from both history and geography, whereby Armenia is squeezed in-between irreconcilable enemies who pose an existential threat to both nation and state.

Going beyond such a perception proved impossible and politically counterproductive, as demonstrated by the 1998 ousting of Ter-Petrosyan. He had strived to find a compromise solution on Nagorno-Karabakh for the sake of normalizing relations with both Azerbaijan and Turkey, consistently with the peace plan proposed by the OSCE. His policy, nonetheless, had been met with fierce resistance – and betrayal accusations – on the home front, in the Diaspora, and in Karabakh itself, triggering an alignment among nationalist oppositions which ultimately led to Ter-Petrosyan’s resignation. His replacement with a representative of the so-called Karabakh Party, Robert Kocharyan, drew clear red lines for the future of Armenian foreign policy and negotiating positions on Nagorno-Karabakh. A new maximalist position was thereby introduced, marking the transition from a «compliant» to an «augmented» Armenia [Broers 2019]; in other words, from a flexible attitude open to the restitution of the occupied territories around the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave to an uncompromising way of thinking which envisioned these territories as an integral and inalienable part of the self-proclaimed Republic.

As a consequence, Yerevan’s foreign and security policies were shaped according to a «balance of threat» logic – whereby states enter alliances primarily to balance against threats [Walt 1990]. In the perpetual struggle for survival, Russia resumed the traditional role of saviour, not only for the «hidden hand» [Goltz 1993] extended to Armenians during the 1988-1994 war, but also for the subsequent role played by the Russian-Armenian alliance9 in deterring the perceived joint Turkish-Azerbaijani threat. Deterrence potential, in turn, became the rationale for Yerevan’s approach to the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, built primarily upon the pursuit of military and technical parity against the enemy.10 It was a strategy aimed at the preservation of the status quo, and the «conversion of the time factor into a power resource in the political struggle» [Minasyan 2008: 71].

According to the balance of threat theory, the scope of alliances depends upon the scale of threat perception – and particularly upon the enemies’ offensive capabilities and aggressive intentions [Walt 1990: 24-6]. This theory helps explain not only Armenian-Russia alliance formation, but also its progressive widening as a result of the strengthening of the Turkish-Azerbaijani axis. The latter, sealed during the 1992-94 Nagorno-Karabakh war, when Ankara closed the border and froze diplomatic relations with Armenia, has steadily widened and deepened ever since. Moreover, since the mid-2000s, energy rents allowed Baku to significantly increase investments in defence procurement,11 which grew alongside a revanchist rhetoric – as Baku never hid its resolve to revert to military means to restore sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh, should the negotiation prove useless. Finally, in the second decade of this century, Armenia’s threat perception increased due to the «abandonment risk» implicit in the Russian-Azerbaijani rapprochement which, in turn, emboldened Baku’s coercive approach to the issue.12

The progressive deepening of the Armenian-Russian military alliance resulted into two contradictory trends in Yerevan’s foreign and security policies. On the one hand, paradoxically, the alliance with Moscow has engendered a vicious circle, whereby the «abandonment risk» made Russia both the main guarantor of and the highest threat to Armenian national security [Shirinyan 2019]. On the other hand, the primacy of security in Yerevan’s strategic thinking and the resulting tendency to bandwagon with Moscow were the main obstacles to the effective pursuit of a multi-vectorial diplomatic course, consistent with the doctrine of «complementarity». In fact, the principle of «complementarity» has been effectively replaced in foreign policy by an opposite practice of «supplementarity», whereby «Armenia’s foreign policy commitments need to be synchronized with Russian preferences» [Vasilyan 2016: 41].13

The assumption whereby the primacy of security leads Yerevan to draw «a red line that no leader can cross, regardless of pro-Western orientation» [Iskandaryan 2019: 3] in its relations with the Kremlin was confirmed by Nikol Pashinyan, current Prime Minister and the leader of the 2018 «Velvet Revolution», which opened a new chapter in the country’s post-Soviet history and transition towards democracy. Pashinyan, despite its previous anti-Russian rhetoric, once in power was rather quick in reassuring Moscow of his administration’s loyalty to the alliance. He emphasized the eminently internal nature and origin of the Armenian Revolution, thereby distancing his government from the previous «Colour revolutions» in the post-Soviet area [Terzyan 2020: 7-10]. Arguably, reassuring Moscow of Armenian loyalty14 was instrumental in pushing domestic reforms, which represented the main reason behind the Revolution.

2.2. Nagorno-Karabakh as an obstacle on Armenia’s post-Soviet transition and economic development

Notwithstanding international stakeholders’ high expectations around transition toward democracy and the free market in the aftermath of independence, especially under Kocharyan and Sargsyan, Armenia grew into a «competitive authoritarian» system combining a democratic guise with authoritarian practices and informal rules [Levitsky & Way 2010: 207-13] plagued by deep socio-economic problems. The direct and indirect influence of Nagorno-Karabakh and of the resulting primacy of security over these trends may be assessed from four different although connected perspectives.

First and foremost, the struggle for self-determination and the following need to protect the military victory were critical in determining not only the leaderships’ legitimation but also the results of the intra-elite power struggle – as demonstrated by the complete economic and political takeover of the country by the ‘Karabakh Party’ after 1998. The war resulted in the emergence of commodity-based cartels closely associated with the military, which benefitted from a favourable tax system. These cartels eventually became the pillar of resilient clientelist networks in a kleptocratic economy shaped by the primacies of oligarchies [Broers 2021a; Grigoryan 2018]. Moreover, even at a time when the Nagorno-Karabakh issue lost its mass mobilization potential, it nonetheless helped the regime’s consolidation and durability. Elites in power, especially in the face of a declining electoral legitimacy, used the conflict as a political resource to reinforce their position against competitors [Cheterian 2012] and as a «‘go-to’ reason for justifying the continued and mounting socioeconomic problems and political problems» [Ghaplanyan 2017: 122].

All in all, during Kocharyan and Sargsyan’s tenures, the Nagorno-Karabakh’s legitimation role receded – along with the regime’s overall legitimacy– and authoritarian stability came to rest primarily over co-optation and repression strategies [Broers 2019; Shubladze & Khundadze 2017]. Nonetheless, it retained its potential and came back to the centre of national discourse after the Velvet Revolution. As a matter of fact, until the 2020 war Pashinyan reverted to a strong Karabakh-based nationalist rhetoric, consistent with his populist profile and aimed at strengthening his government’s legitimation [Sahakyan 2022].

Second, the primacy bestowed upon security triggered a convergence of interests between the elites in power and the Diaspora in the West, which may also explain the regime’s longevity. Chiefly concerned with foreign and security policy, the Diaspora took a favorable position vis-à-vis the regime, ultimately gave it both legitimacy and financial support [Cavoukian 2019].

Third, in a vicious circle between the external and internal domain of Armenian politics, Russia’s security guarantor role also took on a domestic dimension, as Moscow came to play the role of democracy’s «black knight» [Natalizia 2019] and promoter of «authoritarian stability» [Cameron & Orenstein 2012]. This trend was particularly visible during the Kocharyan administration, when the alliance helped shield the country from the risk of contagion coming from the Colour Revolutions occurring in the post-Soviet space.15 Moreover, besides providing the regime with a source of external legitimacy, Russia was also called to contribute to domestic stability and security through economic means [Ghaplanyan 2017: 52].

This consideration helps introduce the fourth and last way whereby the Nagorno-Karabakh issue has influenced Armenia’s post-Soviet transition. Ever since the ousting of Ter-Petrosyan and the failure to elevate economic opportunities over security needs, security took precedence over economic development in the pursuit of national interest. As a result, since the debt-for-equity agreement of 2002, Russian public and private companies have assumed substantial control of the Armenian economy’s main strategic sectors – from energy to transport, from telecommunications to mining, finance, and insurance. Combined with Russia’s lion share in Armenian foreign trade, investments, and remittance inflows, this further widened the power asymmetry between Russia and Armenia, with their relations coming to resemble a patron-client dynamic. Kocharyan’s recipe for economic development ended up decidedly pushing «Armenia into Russia’s embrace» [Iskyan 2004, 24 March], thereby compromising the sustainability of the nation’s growth model. As a matter of fact, not only did the Armenian economy become closely linked to – and dependent upon – Russia’s, but also economic growth in Armenia did not alleviate, but rather increased, the population’s economic hardship and the disparities in income and regional development [Ghaplanyan 2017: 52-3]. Moreover, Yerevan’s growth strategy favoured the strategic polarization unfolding in the Southern Caucasus, characterized by the Azerbaijani energy rents reinvestment strategy, aimed at chocking Armenia, isolating it from regional infrastructure development [PRA 2019] and worsening Yerevan’s structural vulnerability resulting from Armenia’s land-locked condition.

3. The Russian-Ukrainian War: Setting the stage for current social, political and economic challenges

Due to the relevance that Nagorno-Karabakh has had over Armenian politics since independence, the 2020 military debacle came as a national trauma and exposed the contradiction of the security-first approach in the country’s policy-making. However, the stage for current socio-political, economic, and diplomatic challenge was set by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, started on 24 February 2022. The war came with muted repercussions on Armenia: on the one hand, it exacerbated challenges and risks resulting from the 44 Days War while, on the other, it also opened an unexpected window of diplomatic opportunities to solve the contradictions in Yerevan’s traditional approach to the solution of the conflict.

The war between Russia and Ukraine erupted in a domestic and regional context shaped by three main trends unfolding since the 2020 war. Domestically, the 44 Days War exacerbated political and institutional polarization resulting from the 2018 Revolution. Pashinyan, accused of having lost Karabakh and betrayed the national cause, came under fierce criticism by the nationalist opposition and segments of national institutions close to the former regime. Yet, despite the military debacle, the Prime Minister was able to retain a significant consensus and, somehow unexpectantly [Poghosyan 2021], the ruling Civil Contract party won the majority of votes in a June 2021 snap parliamentary election, called under the opposition’s pressure. The elections not only renovated the mandate for change behind the Velvet Revolution, but also confirmed the overall improvement of the electoral process unfolding since 2018.16

Secondly, the 44 Days War tipped the balance of power between Armenia and Azerbaijan to the benefit of the latter, reversing their bargaining leverage and approach to the negotiations. The war exposed the fallacy in Armenia’s main assumptions about the conflict resolution, including the idea that the conservation of the status quo would ensure a strategic advantage as well as the trust in the deterrence potential of the alliance with Russia. Moreover, along with the districts surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, after the war Yerevan lost its main bargaining chip to further the region’s self-determination principle. As a result, the previous grounds for conflict resolution put forward by the OSCE Minsk Group and Russia lost their raison d’être. Furthermore, Azerbaijan took on a maximalist approach, withdrawing from any compromise solutions regarding the enclave’s final status.

Finally, at a regional level, the war confirmed Moscow’s regional primacy, reinforced by the deployment of a peace-keeping unit to Nagorno-Karabakh, which represents the last security guarantee for Karabakh Armenians and a significant leverage in relations with Baku. Russia’s primacy was also emboldened by the paralysis of the Minsk Group and by the relative disengagement of the Euro-Atlantic powers, which kept the conflict at arm’s length. Moreover, Russian’s leverage was not eroded, but rather fostered, by the largely symbolic deployment of a Turkish contingent in a joint monitoring mission. Indeed, the Turkish-Russian initiative brought to the Southern Caucasus a common understanding and practice of conflict management that had already been tested in other battlefields. While bearing different strategic goals, Moscow and Ankara came together in a tactical assertion of a «regional ownership principle» [Frappi 2018], which entails the marginalization of extra-regional powers and international mediation mechanisms from conflict management.

While the first two above-mentioned trends were either confirmed or fostered by the war in Ukraine, Russian regional primacy was instead manifestly eroded by the invasion, with significant repercussions on Armenia’s foreign and domestic policies.

3.1 The Janus-faced post-conflict landscape

Ever since the signing of the cease-fire declaration in November 2020, the post-conflict landscape is manifestly Janus-faced. It is both shaped by encouraging trends towards the resolution of the conflict and by concrete risks of renewed escalation that could drag Armenia and Azerbaijan in open inter-state confrontation. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its diminished leverage have made the landscape all the more volatile. This, in turn, has emboldened the search for dialogue but also aggravated bilateral tensions. This trend was detectable, in 2022, in the constant swinging between negotiation rounds and military clashes. During the year, five meetings were held between Pashinyan and Azerbaijan’s President, Ilham Aliyev: three in Brussels, hosted by the European Council’s President, Charles Michel, on April 6, May 22, and August 31. Another one took place in Prague on October 6 on the sidelines of the European Political Community Summit and at a joint EU-French initiative. Finally, the last one occurred in Sochi, under Russian mediation, on the 31st of October.17 At the same time, however, violent clashes occurred on three different occasions. The first two, in March and at the beginning of August, came as a result of Azerbaijani military operations against strategic locations in the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. The third, the deadliest confrontation since the 2020 war, took place from the 13th to the 15th of September along the border between the two countries. It was a clear escalation of the conflict, with Azerbaijani military operations conducted along a 200km front that led to the occupation of strategic positions inside Armenian territory.18

The Janus-faced post-conflict landscape is primarily the result of Azerbaijan’s «coercive bargaining strategy» [Broers 2021b]. Accordingly, coercive pressures are applied on Armenia, along with a revanchist narrative, to advance Baku’s maximalist view to the conflict resolution agenda and outcome. Thus, taking control of strategically advantageous positions through «surgical» military actions in Nagorno-Karabakh or Armenia proper ensures Baku’s upper-hand at the negotiating table as well as military advantages in a war scenario. Moreover, Azerbaijan’s coercive tactics also took on a hybrid nature, as Baku began targeting lifeline communication lines between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. On top of interrupting gas transits along a pipeline that crosses Azerbaijani-controlled territory in March and December 2022, on the 12th of December the sole road connecting the two territories along the so-called Lachin Corridor was blocked (and remained such at the time of writing) by Azerbaijani environmental activists with national authorities’ blessing.

Baku’s coercive bargaining strategy grew stronger throughout 2022 due to the erosion of Moscow’s leverage over the parties – as evidenced by the collapse of a Russian-mediated cease-fire during the September clashes – as well as to the overall weakening of its deterrence potential. First, the Nagorno-Karabakh-based Russian peacekeepers failed to deter Baku from applying military and hybrid pressures over the enclave. Second, Russia has refrained to act, both directly and through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), following Azerbaijan’s offensive into Armenian territory despite Yerevan’s requests for help [RFE 2022b]. This, in turn, led to a crisis of confidence between Moscow and Yerevan. Armenia grew increasingly critical of both Russia and CSTO in 2022, as exemplified by its refusal to sign– the final declaration of the CSTO’s November Summit [Mejlumyan 2022] and to host the Organization’s annual flagship exercises [Kucera 2023].

Faced with Baku’s coercive bargaining strategy, reduced bargaining power, and weakened Russian deterrence potential, the Armenian government took a seemingly constructive approach to the negotiations. Coupled with the abandonment of a nationalistic rhetoric, this marked the return to a «compliant Armenia», keen to reach a compromise solution at the detriment of previously drawn red lines. This refers, in particular, to the attempt to simultaneously safeguard the Karabakh Armenians’ right to self-determination and Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, through an internal understanding of the right to self-determination rather than an external one. Indeed, the government’s basic understanding of the negotiation process, clarified by Pashinyan in an April speech to the Parliament, revolves around the de-territorialization of the issue as the Karabakh dispute is «not a matter of territory but of rights» [PMRA 2022]. This naturally entails the need to «lower the benchmark» on the status of the region, consistently with the international community’s expectations and requests. Interestingly, the resolution of the conflict was framed within the Government wider resolve to pursue good relations with all neighboring countries – including Turkey – through a «maximally balanced foreign policy […] in the state interests of the Republic of Armenia». The reference – added to a January 2022 interview where Pashinyan refused the pursue of the «Armenian Cause» [‘Armenia has never pursued’ 2022] – seemingly linked the Prime Minister’s understanding of national interest to the post-independence dichotomy and debate between the ‘normal state’ vision versus exceptionalism, embracing the former at the expense of the latter.

Pashinyan’s speech – praised by EU representatives as «important and far-sighted» [JAMnews 2022a] yet strongly criticized by the nationalist opposition at home, by the diaspora, and by Stepanakert de facto authorities – confirmed Yerevan’s relinquishment of maximalist positions as well as its abandonment of a nationalist rhetoric. This marked a significant realignment between rhetoric and diplomatic initiatives, as the Prime Minister broke with his predecessors’ habit to capitalise on a stubborn and uncompromising nationalist rhetoric for domestic consumption while pursuing a more compromising stance at the negotiating table. This, in turn, has often led to the government becoming hostage «to the nationalist slogan and sentiments» [Abasov & Khachatrian 2005: 17].

The issue of the enclave’s future status was officially put on the negotiation table in a six-point peace proposal addressed in May 2022 to Azerbaijan, in response to Baku’s five-point proposal received two months prior. Yerevan accepted it in principle as for the recognition of respective sovereignty and territorial integrity, the demarcation of the border, and the unblocking of transport links [TRT Azərbaycan 2022]. However, Armenia also added that «guaranteeing the security of Karabakh Armenians, respecting their rights and freedoms, and determining the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh are fundamental for the Armenian side» [Dovich 2022]. The future status of the enclave remains the main contention point between Yerevan and Baku, as the latter firmly opposes any self-determination right – not only external, but also internal.19

The second bone of contention regards the delimitation and demarcation of the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, contributing to extreme volatility on the ground.20 In 2022, the EU effectively took the lead of that process, which had started in the aftermath of the war under Russian auspices [Arka 2021]. After facilitating the long-awaited launch of a joint Armenian-Azerbaijani commission for this purpose last May,21 the EU achieved in Prague what could be considered the most important agreement of the year. Breaking the stalemate over reference maps, under the joint EU-French mediation, Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed upon border delimitation based on documents of the Commonwealth of Independent States [European Council 2022b] and, therefore, to the Soviet administrative divisions. For the first time, during the Prague negotiations both Azerbaijan and Armenia explicitly recognised their respective borders, marking a breakthrough in the negotiation process and overhauling Yerevan’s previous ambiguities on the issue.22 However, the process of demarcation still presents significant sources of friction. Since the beginning of the negotiations, Armenia insisted that preliminary security measures across the border were a precondition to start the delimitation and demarcation process. In Sochi, at the end of October, Pashinyan put forward this principle again, proposing the establishment of a demilitarized zone under international guarantees around Nagorno-Karabakh and along the border between the two countries as well as the withdrawal of Azerbaijani units from the Armenian territories that fell under Baku’s control after the 2020 ceasefire [RFE 2022c]. The proposal is hardly acceptable to Baku, which insists that no precondition shall be put before the process.

The border issue, in turn, is strictly connected to the third main bone of contention, resulting from the 2020 cease-fire provision whereby all transport links in the region shall be unblocked, including between Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan exclave through Armenian territory [PMRA 2020]. As a confirmation of the Janus-faced post-conflict landscape, the provision simultaneously stands as the main incentive for the belligerents to solve the dispute and as the most concrete threat to the peace process itself. Indeed, the opening of communications may reverse the polarization trend in regional infrastructure politics to the benefit of all the stakeholders. However, at the same time, the lack of agreement on their status prompted Azerbaijan to repeatedly threaten to occupy the southern strip of the country, where infrastructure is supposed to go through to reach Nakhichevan and further to Turkey.23 The contention point results from the status that is to be granted to the communication line. Yerevan maintains that the latter shall be «under its full control and operated in accordance with the legislation of Armenia» [JAMnews 2022b]. Azerbaijan, in turn, proposed an extraterritorial status for the communication line – with the use of the term ‘corridor’, strongly rebuked by Yerevan – which would be under Russian control and would have the same status as the Lachin Corridor, linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh.

Armenian-Azerbaijan negotiations are taking place in a mediation framework that grew increasingly fragmented and competitive in 2022. The presumption of compatibility of the European and Russian mediation activities built in 2021 before European Council’s President Michel’s first initiatives fell victim of growing strategic polarization. As a result, Moscow came to understand Brussels’ mediation as a «geopolitical game» at the Kremlin’s expense [News.am 2022a]. The fault line in Moscow-West relations marked a definitive crisis of the Russia-US-France jointly co-chaired OSCE Minsk Group, which for all intents and purposes is still the only multilateral mechanism de jure in charge of mediation between the parties. While not unwelcomed by Baku – maintaining that the mechanism is no longer requested as Nagorno-Karabakh has already been reincorporated into Azerbaijani territory [PRA 2022a] – the Group’s crisis delivered a blow to Armenia, which explicitly referred to the desire to negotiate under its mediation in its six-point peace plan [Dovich 2022].

Without a multilateral mechanism entrusted to mediate between the parties and defuse tensions on the ground, the EU progressively raised the profile of its contribution to conflict management. Having broken Russia’s de facto monopoly over peace negotiations,24 after the September clashes Brussels also took on the burden of de-escalation. In Prague, an agreement was reached for the deployment of a temporary civilian EU mission on the Armenian side of the border, tasked with analyzing and reporting « the situation in the region around the international border […], with a view to contributing to the restoration of peace and security in the area, to the building of confidence and to the delimitation of the international border between the two States» [OJEU 2022]. Moreover, following the ‘European Monitoring Capacity in Armenia’ two-months mission, in mid-December the European Council decided, at Armenia’s request, to deploy a transitional planning assistance team with a view to plan and prepare a possible long-term civilian mission. The latter was eventually established, by decision of the EU Foreign Affairs Council, on the 23rd of January 2023.

3.3 Pursuing an «Armenia-centered» foreign policy

While security considerations remained paramount for Armenia in 2022, the year marked a significant departure from the responses previously given to the national security dilemma. The weakening of Russia’s security guarantee forced Armenia to protect itself though diplomacy rather than by military means, making deterrence dependent upon third parties’ diplomatic pressures over Azerbaijan and thereby pursuing what Nerses Kopalyan [2022] called the «diplomatization of security».

Armenia’s drive towards diplomatic coalition-building was, in turn, favored by the trends unfolding at system-level as a result of the war in Ukraine. Despite fears running high in the country [ICG 2022: 3], the main Western stakeholders proved to be not as distracted by the war as to turn a blind eye to the Southern Caucasus. On the contrary, both France and the US came to view the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict through the lenses of the ongoing struggle against Russia’s destabilization in Europe scenario, stepping up their diplomatic efforts toward conflict resolution and de-escalation. Both countries openly support the EU’s mediation initiative and have been acting as facilitators. Moreover, both countries reacted promptly and resolutely after Azerbaijan’s escalation in September, validating the Armenian deterrence-through-diplomacy logic. Washington played a decisive role in brokering the ceasefire and, although it didn’t go as far as to condemn the Azerbaijani aggression – as Paris did [France24 2022] – nonetheless it resolutely asked Baku to move its troops to previously-held positions and reaffirmed the inadmissibility of the use of force to solve the issue [U.S. Department of State 2022a]. Amid repeated gestures of solidarity to Armenia, France’s main contribution to Yerevan’s diplomatization of security came from Paris’ attempt to bring the Nagorno-Karabakh issue at the UN Security Council, with a view to re-engage the latter in the Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute [AFA 2022]. France activated the Council twice, in September and December, after hostilities were ignited again on the border and before the blockade of the Lachin Corridor. The Lachin crisis, in turn, resulted in a new wave of outspoken denunciations of Azerbaijani coercive tactics from the US, the EU, and France, reinforcing Armenia’s perception that the main international players have abandoned the traditional ‘both-sidism’, leaning towards Yerevan.25

Armenia’s ‘soft’ approach towards deterrence also presided over the strengthening of its partnership with Iran, a traditional key asset for Yerevan to escape its geographical and infrastructural isolation. As Teheran grew increasingly uneasy about the Azerbaijani-Turkish upper-hand in regional politics and about the resurgence of Azerbaijani irredentism over the Azeri-populated northern part of the country, it came to share Armenian anxieties about Baku’s coercive initiatives. In particular, as regards the risk of a military occupation of the corridor linking Azerbaijan and Nackhchivan through Southern Armenia, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan that Iran would oppose any attempt to block the Iranian-Armenian border [RFE 2022a] while President Ebrahim Raisi told Aliyev that any change in either borders or south-north transit routes would be intolerable for Teheran [Al Mayadeen 2022]. Furthermore, in a concrete demonstration of support, after the September clashes, Armenia and Iran agreed upon the opening of a Consulate general in the town of Kapan, on the border with Azerbaijan in the southern region of Syunik, where the lines of communication foreseen by the 2020 ceasefire should transit.

Besides responding to the deterrence-through-diplomacy logic, diplomatic coalition-building and maximally balanced foreign policy also serve arms procurement and diversification in foreign trade. Both have grown urgent due to systemic shifts and the need to reduce Yerevan’s dependency on Russia. The latter proved to be particularly counterproductive in terms of arms procurement, as Moscow not only didn’t refurnish an Armenian weapons stockpile severely depleted by the 2020 war, but also froze arm supplies to its ally [Kopalyan 2022]. Furthermore, arms procurement has been made all the more complicated by Yerevan’s Western partners’ constrains. Inhibited by a 1992 OSCE request for a voluntary embargo «on arms deliveries to forces engaged in combat in the Nagorno-Karabakh area» [SIPRI 2018], they also indirectly hinder security cooperation with Iran, which was recently labelled by the White House as a «threat to the [Southern Caucasus] region», where it exerts a «destabilizing influence» [U.S. Department of State 2022b]. This, in turn, pushes Yerevan into Asian powers’ embrace – namely China and India –to refill and modernize its weapons stockpile. Discussions with Beijing around deepened cooperation in the defense sector indeed started in November [Armenpress 2022], while the partnership with New Delhi significantly improved throughout the year. Following visits to India in June and October by representatives of the Ministry of Defense, Armenia signed two arms and ammunition purchase deals worth $400 million [Wion 2022; Bhan 2022]. Remarkably, under deterrence-through-diplomacy logic, India was the only country along with Armenia to explicitly refer to Azerbaijan as the «aggressor side» [United Nations 2022] in the UNSC meeting that occurred after the September escalation.

Diversification of foreign trade partners is a pressing matter both for Armenia and the government consensus, which – still strong in fall 202226 – mainly rests on domestic performances. Though Armenia may have benefited from the turmoil in Russia in the short-term,27 the mid- and long-term risks associated with it are not insignificant. This is because Yerevan’s high exposure to trade and investments with Moscow makes the country particularly vulnerable, especially since the unexpected resilience shown by the Russian economy in 2022 is not estimated to last long. Moreover, a diversified export strategy is, along with the widening of the export base, the pillar of the government’s economic development strategy, which envisions exports as a key driver for economic growth and sustainability [Akepanidtaworn et al. 2022]. This has led to a push towards sustained economic diplomacy, which has also been suggested by the International Monetary Fund as a tool to tackle the risks Armenia faces at the external, domestic, and structural levels [International Monetary Fund 2022: 36,38].

Building upon the Armenia-EU Comprehensive Extended Partnership Agreement (CEPA) entered into force in March 2021, the EU emerged as Yerevan’s key partner as regards economic diplomacy. Albeit not a free-trade agreement – as a consequence of Armenia’s EEU membership – the CEPA nonetheless facilitates trade. Moreover, it bears the potential to increase bilateral economic exchanges with relevant margins for growth and to foster Yerevan’s diversification prospects.28 Besides trade, the connectivity and energy cooperation tracks established under the CEPA are particularly relevant to Armenia,29 especially around sustainable growth and efforts to limit Armenia’s vulnerability vis-à-vis over-dependence on Russia. All in all, the economic dimension of the EU’s regional projection adds up to its enhanced role as mediator and still-in-the-making security provider, confirming Brussels’ resolve and capability to pursue a comprehensive approach to the Nagorno-Karabakh.

The most significant step taken by the government in the direction of an Armenia-centred foreign policy is arguably the renewed normalization attempt with Turkey. As a matter of fact, the process’ significance results not only from the material benefits it may ensure to Armenia, but also from its symbolic scope, as it affects the main pillars of the Republic’s state- and nation-building. Following up from the 2021 bilateral contacts, the normalization process was officially launched in Moscow in January 2022 and followed by three other meetings that occurred throughout the year by special national envoys. Pashinyan’s pragmatic approach to normalization resembles the logic followed – and the means put forward – almost twenty years ago by Ter-Petrosyan. Similarly, it starts from Armenia’s developmental needs, which require a reopening of borders and trade with neighbouring Turkey [Business media 2022]. Furthermore, the resolve to pursue the normalization process «without preconditions» [ROTMFA 2022] recalls Ter-Petrosyan’s attempt to side-line the divisive Genocide issue, over which – in his own words [2018: 74] – «the only possible approach is to agree to disagree». At the same time, building upon previous failures – and, particularly, the derailment of the process initiated in 2008 with the Zurich Protocols– it follows a ‘small steps’ approach to normalization, which avoids complex package solutions requiring slippery parliamentary pronouncements. Therefore, though the process has slowly proceeded and led to limited results thus far,30 the latter are nonetheless significant in bringing about a breakthrough in the bilateral relations. This is epitomized by the Armenian minister of foreign affairs’ first visit in over a decade to Turkey and by the bilateral meeting between Pashinyan and Erdoğan that took place last October on the sideline of the Prague Summit.

Removing the formal motivation behind the closure of the border and the lack of bilateral relations – i.e., Armenia’s occupation of the Azerbaijani districts around the Karabakh enclave – the 44 Days War (27 September – 10 November 2020) set the context for the rapprochement between Yerevan and Ankara. However, Nagorno-Karabakh was also the main deterrent for the normalization of relations, as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan maintained that the solution to the dispute represents a precondition for full rapprochement [TRT Haber 2022], while Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, in turn, complained that Ankara was «synchronizing» the normalization process with Armenian-Azerbaijani peace talks [News.am 2022b].

4. Conclusions

Under different perspectives, Armenian politics has long been held captive of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, as the need to protect the 1992-94 military victory shaped the threats-opportunity perceptions and the resulting decision-making in both the domestic and foreign policy arenas. In particular, the country’s ontological sense of insecurity triggered by a mutilated victory reignited Armenian geopolitical determinism along with a «besieged fortress syndrome» that progressively pushed the country into Russia’s choking embrace. As a matter of fact, a complex strategic trilemma has emerged along Armenian foreign policy’s three pillars: the need to support Karabakh independence, the need to ensure security to the Republic, and the attempt to pursue a multi-vectorial foreign policy. It was a trilemma which was eventually solved by pursuing the first two aims to the detriment of the latter. Moreover, an interpretation of national interests that privileged security over development undermined the transition and favoured the development of a competitive authoritarian system.

The 2020 war and the repercussions of the Russo-Ukrainian war have profoundly changed the regional context and the parameters for Armenian foreign and security policies. The Western powers’ re-engagement in the region and, particularly, the EU’s breaking of the de facto monopoly hitherto exercised over the conflict-resolution process by Moscow together with Brussels’ comprehensive approach to the dispute have led the way to new and somehow unexpected opportunities for foreign policy change. Opportunities that the government seems determined to seize, pursuing an Armenia-first agenda to the detriment of previously drawn red lines.

Forced by the weakened credibility of the Armenian-Russian alliance, a new understanding of security and deterrence has unfolded. It is an understanding built upon international engagement and coalition-building rather than on military means. Conjunctural security strategies do not appear to have been abandoned; nonetheless they are seemingly pursued along with a more pragmatic long-term vision and approach to foreign policy. This is grounded on an Armenian-centred course which entails the return to a multi-vectorial and inclusive practice of foreign relations, which may lead Yerevan out of its «besieged fortress» mentality. Moreover, foreign policy change, albeit strictly subject to the pursuit of the national interest, seems to also be driven by the resolve to strike a balance between security and development that favours the latter.

Taking a wider look, Pashinyan’s drive for a foreign policy change seems to resurrect the dated yet relevant exceptionalism versus normalism dispute. Overcoming long-standing inertia, the vision of Armenia as a «normal state» seems to grow commonplace, fostered and legitimized by the majority of Armenian citizens, who have entrusted the government with a clear and exceptionally resilient mandate for change.

Chronology

1988, February. The Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) authorities appeals to the USSR Supreme Soviet to transfer the Oblast to Armenia SSR. In Yerevan, hundred thousand take to the streets in support of the request, while the Karabakh Committee is formed.

1988, February-March. A cycle of intercommunal violence starts in the Nagorno-Karabakh area (Askeran) with the killing of two Azerbaijani. It soon expands to Azerbaijan proper, where the first anti-Armenian pogrom is held in Sumgait. Intercommunal violence results in the flow of refugees from Azerbaijan to Armenia and vice versa (including from NKAO proper).

1988, July. USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium rejects NKAO’s request of transfer to Armenia SSR, after its Soviet had voted for secession. Yerevan’s Supreme Soviet had endorsed Stepanakert’s request in June, voting in favor of the annexation; a resolution of Azerbaijan’s Supreme Soviet, in turn, rejected the request as unacceptable and condemned Armenian interference in the SSR’s domestic affairs.

1989, November. The first congress of the Pan-Armenian National Movement (ANM) is held in Yerevan. Levon Ter-Petrosyan is elected as chairman.

1990, May. The ANM secures about 35% of the seats in the first multiparty election for the Supreme Soviet. ANM leads the majority of the Assembly while in August Ter-Petrosyan is elected as its president, and hence as head of State, ending Communist rule.

1990, August. Armenian parliament issues a declaration of sovereignty. Nagorno-Karabakh is hereby considered as an integral part of the Republic.

1991, March. Having boycotted Gorbachev’s referendum on a new Union Treaty, Armenian Supreme Soviet announces its own referendum on independence, to be held in September. 94.4% would vote in favour of independence.

1991, October. Ter-Petrosyan wins 83% of the votes in the presidential elections and becomes the first President of independent Armenia.

1991, December. As the USSR brakes up, Armenia joins the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). On December 10th Nagorno-Karabakh holds a referendum on independence, with 99,9% of the voters supporting the secession from Azerbaijan. In November, Azerbaijan had revoked the autonomous status of the region.

1992, May. In Tashkent, Armenia signs the CIS Treaty on Collective Security along with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

1992, August-September. Yerevan and Moscow sign two treaties providing the legal basis for the Russian military presence in Armenia and for the deployment of Russian border guards along the borders with Turkey and Iran.

1992, February-May. Armenians gain the upper hand in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, now turned into an open inter-state war. Most of the enclave is conquered, while the control of the Lachin corridor is secured.

1992, June. Consistently with a mandate approved in March by the Council of Ministers of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), formal negotiations open in Rome under the auspices of the CSCE Minsk Group.

1993, March. Armenian forces launch an offensive resulting, by the end of the Summer, in the capture of large portions of Azerbaijani territory around Nagorno-Karabakh. As a retaliation, in April Turkey closes the border with Armenia. Between April and November, the UN Security Council adopts four resolutions condemning the «invasion» and asking the unilateral withdrawal from «recently occupied» territories, reaffirming the respect for the principles of territorial integrity, inviolability of international borders, and inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory.

1994, May. Following Minsk Group’s fruitless efforts to maintain cease-fires and to bring the parties together for peace talks, a cease-fire agreement is signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh representatives, under Russian auspices. At that time, Armenian forces controlled around 15% of Azerbaijan’s territory. The conflict had claimed more than 20,000 lives and resulted in the internal displacement of around 600,000 Azerbaijanis.

1994, August. In a trip to the US, Ter-Petrosyan outlines his understanding of the peace process. Building upon the need to pursue a realist and prudent foreign policy course, he maintains that a comprehensive peace plan would require compromises, including Armenian withdraw from the territories captured outside Nagorno-Karabakh proper.

1994, December. Robert Kocharyan is elected President of Nagorno-Karabakh de facto Republic. He will be re-elected by popular vote in November 1996 and will hold the position until his appointment as Armenian Prime Minister, in March 1997.

1995, July. A national referendum adopts a new constitution establishing a semi-presidential system.

1996, September. In a disputed presidential election, Ter-Petrosyan secures 51% of the votes and is elected for a second term.

1996, December. At the OSCE Lisbon Summit, the chairman-in-office issues a statement on the principles for conflict resolution, entrusting Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and the «highest degree of self-rule within Azerbaijan» for Nagorno-Karabakh.

1997, February. A tripartite Co-chairmanship of the Minsk Group is established including Russia, France, and United States.

1998, February. Ter-Petrosyan resigns, after endorsing a Minsk Group «step-by-step» peace proposal opposed by Nagorno-Karabakh authorities and rejected by Armenia’s National Security Council. In March, Kocharyan is elected President.

1999, April. Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents meet for the first time since 1993 in Washington. The meeting marks the beginning of negotiations culminating in the inconclusive 2001 peace talks hosted by the US President in Key West, Florida.

2002, October. Armenia joins Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan in signing the CSTO Charter, transforming the military alliance established under the Collective Security Treaty into an international organization.

2003, March. Kocharyan wins contested presidential elections, while a pro-presidential coalition including nationalist parties secures the majority of the seats in the May parliamentary elections.

2004, July. The Minsk Group announces it will not put forward any new peace proposals to Armenia and Azerbaijan, which bear the primary responsibility for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. A series of high-level meetings between the parties will follow in the coming years.

2007, November. On the sideline of the Madrid OSCE Ministerial Council, the Minsk Group Co-chairs present a preliminary version of the Basic Principles for a settlement of the conflict. The so-called «Madrid Principles» call for inter alia: (a) the return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan; (b) an interim status for the enclave pending a future determination of its final status through a referendum; (c) a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh; (d) the right of IDPs and refugees to return to their former places of residence; (e) international security guarantees, including a peacekeeping operation.

2008, February. In a disputed election resulting in widespread anti-government riots, the Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan – born in Nagorno-Karabakh and former head of the de facto Republic’s Defence Army – is elected President of Armenia.

2009, July. At the L’Aquila Summit of the Eight, US, French and Russian presidents endorse an updated version of the «Madrid Principles». Despite lack of progresses on implementation, the Principles would thereby remain the most advanced proposal put forward by the Minsk Group.

2009, October. Armenian and Turkish foreign ministers sign the Zurich Protocols aimed at normalizing relations between the countries. The Protocols will face staunch opposition in both countries as well as in Azerbaijan – for side-lining the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. They will never reach respective parliaments for ratification.

2010, August. Yerevan and Moscow reach an agreement over the extension to 2044 of the 1994 treaty providing the legal base for the use of the Russian Gyumri military base in Armenia.

2013, February. Sargsyan is elected for his second and by law last term as President of the Republic.

2013, September. After a meeting in Moscow with Vladimir Putin, President Sargsyan announces the decision to join the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and to be part of the nascent Eurasian Economic Union. The decision interrupts the process of signing a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area agreement with the EU, whose negotiations had been concluded in July.

2015, December. A new Constitution establishing a parliamentary system is approved by referendum.

2016, April. The largest flare-up of the conflict since 1994 occurs along the southern part of the line of contact. After four days of military confrontation, a ceasefire is reached on the 5th of in Moscow. For the first time, Azerbaijan gains control over strategic hilltops in the enclave.

2018, April-May. A series of anti-government protests start in Armenia in response to the possibility of Sargsyan running for the prime minister’ post, notwithstanding a previous commitment on the contrary. The so-called Velvet Revolution leads to the parliamentary election of Nikol Pashinyan as Prime Minister on May the 8th. In snap parliamentary elections held in December, Pashinyan’s My Step Alliance will secure 70% of the vote.

2019, August. Notwithstanding the expectations raised by the reopening of Yerevan-Baku dialogue in the aftermath of the Velvet revolution, Pashinyan pays a visit to Stepanakert and calls for unification between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.

2020, September. As a reaction to an alleged Armenian offensive, on the 27th Azerbaijan initiates a full-scale offensive along the entire line of contact. The war will last 44 days and will end on November 9th with a cease-fire declaration mediated by Moscow. Baku gains control of the districts around Nagorno-Karabakh while making significant inroads in the enclave itself. A Russian peacekeeping force is deployed for a (renewable) five years term along the line of contact and the Lachin corridor.

2021, January. The first post-war meeting between Pashinyan and Aliyev is hosted by Putin in Moscow, with Russia taking the lead of the mediation process.

2021, June. Snap parliamentary elections are held after Pashinyan’s resignation amid widespread critics over the conduct of the 44 Days war. Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party secures 54% of the vote and 71 out of 107 seats in the National Assembly.

2021, September. Armenian-Turkish dialogue over normalization process resumes. In mid-December Ankara and Yerevan announce the appointment of special envoys to negotiate the normalization, who will meet four times in 2022.

2021, December. The trilateral meeting of the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev and Pashinyan marks the beginning of EU involvement in mediation over Nagorno-Karabakh.

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ISSN 2385-2526

The Islamic Republic of Iran has faced severe domestic and international challenges that have progressively brought the country to the brink of global isolation. The ongoing impasse over nuclear negotiations, due largely to contentious demands from the Iranian side, has only served to exacerbate the negative effects of international sanctions on ordinary Iranian citizens. Likewise, Iran’s controversial position in regard to the Russian war in Ukraine has increased its isolation on the international stage and resulted in greater domestic economic hardship. Against this background, significant popular protests, led predominantly by Iranian youths, erupted in the autumn of 2022 and continued for over three months. The nature of these protests offers valuable insights into the weakening legitimacy of the country’s establishment, in which prominent political slogans and new forms of societal mobilization have revealed the profound gap that exists between the state’s historic institutions and the younger segments of Iran’s population.

Keywords – Popular protests; women’s rights; nuclear impasse; international isolation; Iran-Russia alignment

1. Introduction

August 2022 marked a full calendar year since President Ebrahim Raisi assumed executive power in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this time, Raisi has failed to fulfil the promises of economic relief and to win the fight against poverty, which were cornerstones of his electoral campaign. Prolonged economic difficulties and intersectional social grievances are symptoms of the progressively worsening crisis of state legitimacy in Iran, which can be traced back to as early as 2009. The Iranian population has faced severe financial difficulties, such as rising prices on basic goods, economic stagnation, and high levels of inflation. The poverty rate has also risen significantly across different sections of society, impoverishing both the middle classes and low-income households. As a consequence, waves of popular protests led by workers from various sectors erupted in many parts of the country throughout the year, in response to economic mismanagement and low or delayed salaries.

However, following the suspicious death of a twenty-two-year-old Kurdish woman, Masha Jina Amini, widespread political demonstrations soon replaced these economically driven rallies. Young girls, high-school pupils, and university students vocally criticized the Islamic Republic (and the very foundations upon which it stands), and physically attacked and vandalized its symbols and political icons. The resulting violence and heavy-handed response by Iranian police forces, which resulted in a massive number of arrests, did not manage to weaken the momentum behind these protests, but did underline the state’s uncompromising attitude toward this popular outcry.

Meanwhile, the outbreak of the Russian war in Ukraine imposed further hardship on Iran’s already suffering economy while simultaneously altering Iran’s relationship with both Moscow and the West. Though declaring itself to be a neutral spectator to the conflict, Iran has controversially supported the Russian military effort by manufacturing and supplying drones to Moscow. These actions have only contributed to the country’s increasing isolation on the global stage, and further protracted the enduring standoff over nuclear negotiations. In both March and August, all parties appeared close to reaching a new deal; but this prospect has diminished due to internal tensions in Iran, the worsening human rights situation involving the protestors within the country, and the support given by the Iranian military to Russia in the on-going conflict with Ukraine.

Of the above, this article focuses predominantly on the popular protests that broke out in the autumn of 2022, examining their roots and developments, as well as their significance in terms of socio-political stability. It also investigates the enduring effects of international sanctions together with the outbreak of the war in Ukraine on the Iranian economy. Finally, it looks at the long-standing impasse over the nuclear agreement through an exploration of its different phases and general development, while also highlighting the «look to the East» policy that has led to a realignment of Iran-Russia relations in order to offset Western sanctions and international isolation.

2. Domestic policy

The most important socio-political development of this year has undoubtedly been the spread of a new wave of popular protests that have served to highlight wider societal disenchantment with the Iranian system. In contrast to the last three years, during which financial difficulties and criticism over economic mismanagement were the predominant drivers of public dissatisfaction and worker-led demonstrations, older, long-standing complaints have been given fresh voice in new forms of activism, which emerged with the 2022 streets protests. Anti-government rallies spread all throughout the country, in both urban centres and peripheral provinces, while the political elite’s block response was to put down the protests by use of extreme force. Though there have been a few dissenting voices from the reformist movement criticizing the brutal crackdown on protestors, this does not yet appear to have triggered a substantial rethink on how best to deal with these demonstrations. The eslahtalaban (reformists) represent a political movement that since its foundation in the mid-Nineties has been inclined to liberalize social spaces, foster a gradual democratization of the political system, and reduce autocratic deviancies of political power. Leading and prominent figures are the former President of the republic Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005), ousted from political debate but still influent behind the scene, Mostafa Tajzadeh, Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, Hassan Khomeini, Abolfazl Shakouri-Rad, and Azar Mansouri. Firstly, what is clearly evident from these protests is the growing gap between established state institutions and wider Iranian society, especially in regard to the younger segments of its population, who are no longer willing to tolerate restrictions on individual liberties. Secondly, as of end of December, there does not appear to be any political group capable of engaging with or delivering upon the demands of the general population. In particular, reformists are no longer perceived as agents of gradual change within the country, nor as representatives of different segments of Iranian society, particularly when it comes to the youth, women, and ethnic minorities. The reformist front – or what remains of it after decades of marginalization by the judiciary and other nonelective bodies – sits outside of any decisive political institutions capable of enacting change. Only 20 out of 270 seats in the parliament were allocated to reformists in the 2020 elections. As the reformist front currently appears vulnerable, unstructured, and incapable of offering any real opposition within the system or stimulating political debate, the Islamic Republic has effectively lost its only main interlocutor with the country’s bright and educated youth.

2.1. Waves of popular protests: roots and significance

During his eighteen months in office, President Ebrahim Raisi has not been able to quiet societal discontent, and over the course of the last year Iran has witnessed several waves of major popular protests. Although public spaces for peaceful dissent have been consistently reduced over the past three years [‘Iran events of 2021’ 2022], several groups within Iranian society have continued to express their dissatisfaction: on the one hand, due to economic mismanagement, the high cost of living, low and/or delayed salaries; and, on the other, because of the constant restrictions on social and individual liberties. From January to May, economic problems were the major trigger for sporadic and uncoordinated demonstrations, which resulted not only in workers, teachers, industry labourers, and health personal taking to the street, but also pensioners, members of low-income households, unemployed youths, and ethically marginalised groups. Major demonstrations broke out in the urban centres of Ahwaz, Arak, Kermanshah, Hamedan, and Sanandaj. The main slogans typically on display criticized the high cost of living and job insecurity, but also water scarcity and government failure to adjust wages and pensions to offset the higher costs of basic goods [‘Teacher demonstrations’ 2022]. As well as demanding better working conditions and higher pensions, the protests were also a way to criticize the government’s record on various other issues, such as reducing poverty and the failure to deliver on promises made during the electoral campaign [‘Pensioners rally in Iran’ 2022].

In May, following the government’s decision to revoke subsidies on imported goods, like wheat, basic foods, and medicine, protests erupted in several cities in the provinces of Khuzestan and Chaharmahal and Bakhtiar [‘One killed as price’ 2022]. After a few days, other provinces also witnessed demonstrations, included Ardabil, Esfahan, Gilan, Khorasan-e Razavi, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad, Lorestan, Tehran, and Yazd. According to a report published by Amnesty International, Iranian security forces cracked down on the protestors [‘Iran: they are shooting’ 2022]. Demands for better economic conditions, higher salaries, and increased pensions in face of rising prices and the cost of living crisis, were also combined with slogans confronting the political elite, including some targeting the Supreme Leader himself behind the chorus margh bar dicktator («death to the dictator») [‘Fazeli’ 2022]. This chant was not a new one in the context of popular uprisings in Iran. It was also a recurring refrain in the 1978-79 revolutionary movement – at that time being used to target the Shah. The resurfacing of this slogan in May 2022 spoke to a broader sense of social frustration that was no longer confined solely to economic hardship but also to political disillusionment. At the end of the month, other protests erupted in the city of Abadan due to the deadly collapse of the Metropol building. This disaster was responsible for 34 deaths and triggered angry demonstrations throughout the province. The protestors’ complaints centred on corruption and professional negligence, as the building’s construction did not meet compliance standards and ultimately resulted in a structural failure [Berg 2022]. Anti-government sentiment and slogans characterized these marches, which were violently put down by the police [‘Iranian police fire shots’ 2022]. As a consequence, the country’s labour minister, Hojatollah Abdolmaleki, resigned [‘Iranian labour minister resigns’ 2022].

All these public gatherings were usually spontaneous and leaderless, mainly localized in controversial provinces, such as Iranian Kurdistan and the oil-rich Khuzestan, and lacking any real political support. Despite the heavy state repression, they were never completely subdued and always ready to break out once more. Indeed, social discontent erupted again in mid-September after a twenty-two-year-old Kurdish woman, Mahsa Jina Amini,1 died in suspicious circumstances while under the custody of the Iranian morality police (Gasht-e ershad).2 This young woman was visiting the capital with her family when she was arrested on September 13 for wearing what was perceived to be an «improper headscarf», which was allegedly not compliant with the latest government regulations.

At the beginning of 2022, Iran’s Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice sent a 119-page document to government offices and agencies outlining new regulations concerning the dress code for women. The Hijab and Chastity Project, as this directive has been named, was intended to tighten control on women’s clothing by imposing further restrictions on their individual choices ostensibly with the aim of «cleansing society of the pollution caused by nonconformance with Islamic dress codes» [‘Chastity and hijab project’ 2022]. After this document had been made public, some women walked the streets without any headscarf as an act of individual resistance to protest against the new regulation. Behind the symbolic issue of the hijab, also known as the Islamic veil, Iranian women have long opposed discriminatory laws, gender segregation, partial exclusion from the job market [‘Unemployment with basic education’, 2022; ‘Unemployment rate for male’ 2021], and the reduction of their individual liberties since the very foundation of the Islamic Republic and its juridical system.3 Those deemed as bad-hijabi (a women wearing an improper veil) were frequently assaulted by the morality police, and in some cases even arrested. For example, the young writer Sepideh Rashnoo was arrested on July 16 for protesting about the mandatory veil on public transport in Tehran. Two weeks later, she appeared on national television and read out an allegedly forced confession [‘TV «confession» of Iranian anti-hijab’ 2022]. During the summer, owing to the release of these new regulations, further acts of individual resistance, such as women walking in streets without the hijab, were widespread. It is important to acknowledge, however, that such public acts of resistance against state control over women’s bodies and their choices have deep and profound roots. They are in fact the continuum of decades’ worth of struggles and campaigns headed up by Iranian feminists and social activists [Mohammadi 2007]. What has occurred in the autumn of 2022 can be seen as a new form of mobilization based upon old, unresolved grievances.

2.2. Women led demonstrations

Mahsa Jina Amini died in a coma three days after her arrest while in police custody. The authorities claimed that she suffered from poor health conditions and had suddenly passed away due to an unexpected heart attack. To corroborate this version of events and to deny responsibilities, incomplete and fragmented video footage of her detention was circulated, while the Amini family themselves rejected these official claims and denied that she had any previous health issues. According to her parents, Mahsa Jina was brutally assaulted by police officers, as images of her last moments in hospital show signs of injuries and abuse on her body. President Raisi called the family to express his condolences, but no further measures were taken to investigate what happened in police headquarters. On September 17, demonstrations expressing solidarity with Mahsa Jina Amini spread throughout the country, beginning in Saqqez, her Kurdish city of origin. More than 150 cities and small towns witnessed public gatherings, and there were scenes of young women cutting their hair and burning their headscarves [Gritten 2022]. While street demonstrations are by no means a new method of expressing dissent, these protests immediately stood out in terms of the varied level of social participation, the style of mobilization on display, and their clear resonance both domestically and amongst the international community.

Firstly, these protests attracted and brought together a rather heterogenous social group, predominantly led by young women between the ages of 15 and 25. Young girls were at the forefront of these street demonstrations, but they were also joined and supported by men and women of different generations, across various social groups, and from distinct ethnic backgrounds. As such, one of the real novelties of this wave of protests has been its intersectionality. Protestors gathered behind the powerful slogan zan, zendeghi, azadi («women, life, freedom»), which has fast become the rallying call characterizing this period of unrest [Bajalan 2022]. This motto has its origins in the Kurdish resistance movement (jin, jiyan, azadi) and was first used by Kurdish women in the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). It is important to underline this specifically Kurdish angle, as the 2022 women-led protests in Iran also gave voice to the struggle of ethnic minorities within the country. Therefore, while the solidarity expressed to Mahsa Jina Amini provided a platform to reflect upon the state’s continuing violation of women’s rights, these protests also broadened to include wider ethnic unrest against state discrimination. Ethnic minorities, especially Kurds and Baluchi, took to the streets to express their wider frustration at decades of political and social inequity. In the case of the Kurds, in particular, their struggle against the central power in Iran is deep-rooted, as evidenced by the fact that half of the prisoners held in Iranian jails are Kurds [Ghaderi & Goner 2022].

Back on the streets, young girls demanded their rights to self-determination and bodily autonomy. They challenged the role imposed upon woman by the state, criticizing the patriarchal hierarchy within Iranian politics, state-violence, decades of socio-political discrimination, and the humiliating treatment carried out at the hands of the morality police. These demands were also immediately supported by young men, who took part in this wider mobilization because state recognition of women’s rights was considered an indispensable and fundamental step towards the recognition of broader individual rights and freedoms. Therefore, women’s demands, which in Iran have their origins in decades’ worth of women’s activism, have now assumed a more universal character. However, these protestors were not asking for minor reforms or gradual changes, but rather for a comprehensive political transformation. Anti-government slogans such as «down with the Islamic Republic» or «down with dictatorship» would resonate for weeks. Thousands of videos circulated on social media and were reported on international broadcasts [‘The rallying cries’ 2022].

Secondly, with regard to the style and characteristics of these widespread mobilizations, streets, schools, and universities have been the key spaces of dissent. Young women occupied secondary schools, refused to attend lectures, took off their veils in class while standing in front of pictures of ayatollah Khomeini. University students organised sit-ins across several campuses [‘Iranian Students Launch Sit-in’ 2022]. Meanwhile, symbolic places and notable icons of the revolution were attacked or vandalized. Khomeini’s own house was set on fire nine weeks after the eruption of the protests [Plummer 2022]; and public posters of the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, were also set on fire. Like previous demonstrations, these protests were spontaneous, not organised and lacked any obvious leadership; however, they ultimately facilitated collective acts of civil disobedience. If the absence of real leadership has limited the ability of the protest movement to transform itself into a transversal and structurally inclusive political movement, it has also enabled it to remain strongly resilient in the face of state intimidation, as the authorities have struggled to identify or make an example of any visible political figureheads.

Thirdly, both the domestic and international response to the Iranian protests has underlined the universality of women’s rights issues, whose recognition is of interest not only to (Iranian) women but to all human beings. Peaceful parades were organised in European and North American capitals and cities; and the various campaigns that circulated on social media were also aimed to show solidarity and understanding with the Iranian youth. Prominent public figures within Iranian society – famous movie directors and actors, such as Ashgar Farhadi, Rakhshan Bani-Etemad, and Tanareh Alidoosti – spoke out loudly through their social media channels against state repression. Iranian athletes participating in international competitions made symbolic gestures in support of the protestors. In October, the rock climber Elnaz Rekabi removed her headscarf while competing in a contest in Seoul – though once back in Iran she was forced to make a televized apology [Gritten 2022]. The Iranian football team refused to sing the national anthem before their first match at the FIFA Would Cup in Doha [Arun 2022]. Yet despite all these expressions of solidarity, the aggressive response to the protests by the police and military forces did not abate, nor was the Iranian nezam persuaded to introduce any sorts of reform.

Despite widespread participation in these protests, the majority of the Iranian population did not take part. In some places, merchants were forced to close their shops, mainly to avoid further damages to their properties; workers, especially those in the vital petrochemical sector, though somewhat timidly declaring their support of the protests, have not followed up with any significant mobilization of their own [Batmanghelidj & Kalp 2022]. The majority of people still appear very cautious, perhaps frightened by the possibility of a resulting power vacuum, or because they do not consider the youth movement to be strong enough to genuinely force a change in the system.

When the protests erupted in Iran, President Raisi was speaking at the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York, delivering a speech on Iran’s mission to fight injustice [United Nations 2022]. A few days later, he warned the protestors, stating that «chaos will not be accepted» [Gritten 2022]. In early October, Ali Khamenei made his first statement on the protests during a graduation ceremony for police officers. The Supreme Leader accused the United States (US) and Israel of plotting against the Iranian republic by spreading sedition and by infiltrating the protest movement with their own spies [‘Imam Khamenei’ 2022]. This familiar narrative of accusing external forces and enemies of spreading chaos within the country was used to both direct and justify the state’s response to events. First, the authorities refused any compromise with the people on the streets, who were condemned as agents of the doshman (enemies) [‘The enemy’s plan failed’ 2022]. Second, all demonstrations would continue to be purged by extreme force. National television focused upon the damages caused during the unrest, such as burned mosques, attacks on ambulances, and the disruption of public transport. On this basis, the nezam authorized the police and security forces to take all necessary measures to supress the protests, from the use of pellet guns and tear gas to public executions [Shams 2022].4

On November 24, the United Nations Human Rights Council approved the formation of an independent international fact-finding mission to investigate the alleged human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran [United Nations Human Rights 2022]. At the end of November, the Iran Human Rights association claimed that there had been at least 488 deaths, including 40 children and 29 women. Most of the victims were recorded in the provinces of Sistan Baluchistan and Kurdistan [‘Iran Protests’ 2022]. This data clearly demonstrates the harsh nature of the repression, particularly within ethnic minority provinces. The Oslo-based Human Rights Watch reported that an estimate of more than 18,000 people had been arrested [‘Iran: Death Sentences’ 2022]. This number could feasibly be higher and is difficult to verify.

Despite several prominent internal voices speaking out against the crackdown on protesters, such as former President Mohammad Khatami, former Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri [‘People’s voice’ 2022], or the Supreme Leader’s own niece, Farideh Moradkhani, who was later sentenced to three years in prison for her comments, the Iranian state has not shown any signs of reconsidering its approach. The violent repression has continued for a period of over three months and, to date, it is difficult to foresee any possible change or developments.

3. Economy and the financial situation

By 2022, the Iranian economy had not shown any significant signs of improvement; and, in fact, several domestic and external factors threatened to contribute to its worsening. While nuclear negotiations had long remained at a standstill, the Iranian economy continued to suffer profoundly from the secondary sanctions that had been reimposed by the Trump administration in 2018. President Ebrahim Raisi made little improvements and implemented some highly contested reforms in order to mediate the rising costs of imported commodities. Raisi’s attempts to revive the economy, by reversing inflation and fighting corruption and tax evasion, did not achieve any effective results.

3.1 Economic challenges and fragile reforms

Looking at macroeconomic trends, there were some improvements in the first quarter of the year, such as the reduction of the unemployment rate, which has been estimated at 8.9% – a positive figure compared to December 2021, when it was around 9.6%. However, this rate has continued to fluctuate and, in July, increased to 9.2% [‘Iran Unemployment Rate’ 2022 (a)]. The unemployment rate for women is consistently higher than that of men. According to the Statistical Centre of Iran, in June 2022, the rate of women who were unemployed at the age of 15 or over was reportedly 16% [‘Iran Unemployment Rate (b)]. A serious concern also arises from the youth unemployment rate, which rose to 23.6%, in February 2022, from 22.1% in the final quarter of 2021.

In March, the government announced an increase of around 57% in the monthly minimum wage for workers, in response to several public protests [‘Iran: Labor Protests’ 2022]. The minimum wage per month was set at 5.679 million tomans (about 203 US dollars). This manoeuvre, however, would cause a significant increase in operating costs and consequently led to many companies reducing their overall number of contractors, or opting for more informal employment relationships with their workers (i.e., hiring on a non-contractual basis), as a means to offset the additional costs. This is against the backdrop of an already precarious workforce situation. It is estimated that more than 90% of Iran’s workforce is on short-term contracts, with no guarantees over contract renewal, no protections or access to benefits, and under the risk of being fired for no reason at any time [‘The Beating Heart’ 2022].

Poverty has remained widespread across various social groups; it is estimated that around 60% of the country’s population lives either at or below the poverty line [Kozhanov 2022]. Absolute poverty stands at 18.4%, which equates to one in five Iranians living in absolute poverty [‘Autopsy of unrest’ 2022]. These figures reveal the failure of the incumbent government to win the war against poverty, which was one of the main promises and slogans of Raisi’s electoral campaign.

Another significant economic issue relates to the rate of inflation, which has more than doubled since Raisi took office. Inflation grew considerably from January 2022, when it was estimated at 35.9%, reaching 54% by July [‘Inflation Rate’ 2022]. This negative trend would mainly impact the lower strata of Iranian society, while also reducing the purchasing power of the impoverished middle classes. The effects of inflation increased the prices of basic goods, food, and housing. In April, food prices were 40% higher than in the same period in 2021 [‘Explainer: Raisi’s First Year’ 2022]. The following month, the government lifted import subsidies for essential goods, provoking an increase in food prices by 82% compared to the previous year [Soghom 2022]. The price of rice, milk, meat, and cooking oil more than doubled, while foreign goods were more and more difficult to find. The cost of eggs and red meat increased by 53% in just one year [‘How Much Did The Price’ 2022]. A further contributing factor was the significant drop of the Rial, the Iranian currency, that has fallen more than 40% against the dollar since August 2021 [Shahla 2022]. Due to the rampant inflation, domestic mismanagement, and the ongoing effects of international sanctions, the pharmaceutical sector also increased the cost of its wares. Drugs were difficult to acquire, especially those for rare diseases or special treatments that were usually imported [‘Iran: How Corruption’ 2022].

In May, President Raisi announced that electronic coupons would be issued to help stabilize prices and enable people to buy limited amounts of bread at a subsidized cost [‘Iran’s Raisi’ 2022]. The «economic surgery», which was the name given to the plan for economic reform, included a review of subsidies and the discontinuation of the lower exchange rate used for the import of essential goods, such as food [Khajehpour 2022]. As mentioned above, public criticism soon emerged over these manoeuvres, which had resulted in a price increase for imported goods and had accelerated inflation [Kozhanov 2022]. This latter also had a deleterious effect on the cooperation between the industrial and banking sectors. Due to rising inflation and rising production costs, small and medium industries needed more capital and, as such, were looking to secure loans, whereas the banks were unable to provide sufficient financing to these industries as a result of inflation. The banks’ limited balance sheet led to a general reduction of resources across the banking network, as well as the imposition of an interest rate cap. It is estimated that 92% of the requests for loans from small and medium-sized enterprises have gone unanswered [‘The Great Thirst’ 2022].

President Ebrahim Raisi based his electoral campaign and domestic discourses on economic recovery, but during his eighteen months in office the economic and financial situation did not present any signs of improvement. Moreover, the “resistance economy”, which has been the typical response by the conservative camp to circumvent international sanctions, has shown its limitations. For instance, achieving self-sufficiency in staple foods – a desired held by the Supreme Leader and specifically referenced in his inaugural New Year’s address in March [‘Nowruz speech’ 2022] – presented several difficulties. Iran relies on food imports and there are still several major barriers to achieving full self-sufficiency in food production. The issue of water shortages in several provinces is becoming a fundamental threat, not just in terms of changes to various ecosystems, but for all human-related activities. Agriculture provides for 90% of domestic food demand, but it also consumes 92% of available fresh water resources [‘Analysis: Warnings’ 2022]. Diminishing rainfall, due to rising temperatures, desertification, and old-fashioned and unsustainable irrigation systems, has adversely impacted on the availability of water and hence on domestic production [Mesgaran et al. 2017]. Boosting national cultivation runs the risk of further endangering water supplies in vulnerable provinces.

Trade relations with China, Iran’s biggest commercial partner, were still ongoing in 2022, but the second part of the year witnessed a major contraction. According to Bourse and Bazaar foundation, Beijing continued to purchase Iranian oil despite sanctions; however, the overall trade between Iran and China witnessed a contraction, which fell to a monthly total of $1.04 billion, the lowest level since February 2022. The Chinese import from the middle eastern country trended downward in the autumn, dropping to a 24-month-low of $365 million [‘China-Iran Trade Report’ 2022]. Other Chinese imports from Iran also declined, with a fall of 30% from July to September, settling at $673 million [‘China-Iran Trade Report’ 2022]. These data are not confirmed by official sources as they need time to get processed and will be release during 2023.

4. Foreign policy

Iranian foreign policy in 2022 has been affected by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing war. This event has not only forced a change in Iran’s positioning within the global arena, but also added further uncertainty over the long-standing nuclear negotiations. In this regard, despite several meetings and an intention to keep these talks alive, mutual disagreements between Iran and the US have effectively led to a standstill. While some conditions from the Iranian side have been considered «unacceptable» by the US, Tehran has also continued to develop its enrichment program, provoking severe criticism from the IAEA.

4.1 The nuclear negotiation

Since April 2021, Vienna has hosted the negotiations between the P4+1 (UK, France, Russia, China, and Germany) and Iran, who have collectively sought to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran has refused to engage in direct talks with the US, despite the latter’s crucial role in directing the outcome of any such negotiations. In March, the parties appeared very close to reaching an agreement, as confirmed by Joseph Borrell, the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who stated on his Twitter account: «A pause in [the] Vienna Talks is needed, due to external factors. A final text is essentially ready and on the table. As coordinator, I will, with my team, continue to be in touch with all JCPOA participants and the U.S. to overcome the current situation and to close the agreement» [‘Josep Borrell Frontelles’ 2022]. However, some remaining disagreements and the eruption of the war in Ukraine have affected any positive outcomes from these talks.

There are a number of reasons why the possibility of reaching an agreement in March never materialized. Firstly, the Russian invasion of Ukraine shifted international attention and concerns back to the European continent, creating new strategic priorities for all parties involved in the negotiations. In mid-March, the Iranian minister of foreign affairs, Hossein Amirabdollahian, met with his counterpart in Moscow. In light of the pause in talks, Sergei Lavrov vowed to promptly resume negotiations, and insisted that Russian military operations in Ukraine would not have hampered any potential nuclear deal [Hafezi et al. 2022]. Regardless, due to the war in Ukraine, new priorities for the European countries involved with the negotiations took precedence over securing a new agreement with Iran.

Secondly, disagreements between the US and Iran still remained over a variety of issues, and these were unable to be resolved. The Islamic Republic has always sought guarantees that a future US administration would not suddenly reverse any previously agreed deal (as the Trump administration had done in May 2018 by unilaterally withdrawing from the JCPOA). However, this request has been rejected by current US President Joe Biden, who cannot legally bind his potential successors to any treaties signed by their predecessors in office. This remained a major stumbling block in all phases of the negotiations. Another unsolved issue was Tehran’s demand that the US remove the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp from their list of foreign terrorist organizations [US Department of State 2022 (a)]. These disagreements led to a two-month breakdown in negotiations until Enrique Mora, the European Union envoy coordinating talks with Iran, visited Tehran in early May to launch fresh discussions. Borrell, commentating on Mora’s trip to Tehran, said that they hoped to «relaunch the work between the parties» [European Union External Action 2022] and reopen the door for negotiations.

Another key problem and concern for the P4+1 was related to the problematic investigations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) into traces of uranium discovered at various undeclared sites in Iran. The IAEA has estimated that Iran’s stockpiles of enriched uranium have grown to more than eighteen times the limit originally set by the JCPOA. Iran has continued to enrich uranium beyond the 3.67% threshold set out in the 2015 deal, increasing their stocks of highly enriched uranium (HEU) at both the 20% and 60% level [‘Iran’s enriched uranium’ 2022]. As Tehran displayed no willingness to engage in a cooperative approach nor to provide convincing and technically sustainable proof of its peaceful nuclear activities, on June 8, the IAEA adopted a resolution urging Iran to cooperate with the Agency [IAEA 2022(a)], in order to «fulfil its legal obligations and, without delay, take up the Director General’s offer of further engagement to clarify and resolve all outstanding safeguards issues» [IAEA 2022(b)]. Shortly afterward, Iran informed the Agency that it would remove the 27 surveillance cameras which, under the terms of the JCPOA, had been installed across Iranian nuclear facilities to monitor all nuclear-related activities [IAEA 2022c].

In the summer, the «final text» drafted by the EU brought some cause for optimism, and the relevant parties were once again sounding positive that a new agreement was close [Motamedi 2022]. The Iranian negotiation team also expressed confidence that the deal was finally near to being revived, but some of its demands were still being rejected [Hashem & Hagedorn 2022]. In late August, President Raisi stated that he stood ready to restore the nuclear deal but only if the IAEA would close their investigation into the alleged traces of uranium discovered at those undeclared sites in Iran [Motamedi 2022]. More specifically, however, Iran continued to call for the removal of international sanctions and sought other guarantees from the US, conditions that the Biden administration was not willing to satisfy [‘MP: Iran has other options’ 2022].

With the eruption of popular protests in Iran in mid-September, the nuclear talks remained in deadlock. The US State Department spokesman, Ned Price, declared that the revival of the deal was «not our focus right now» [US Department of State 2022b]. While pressures on the US continued to come from Israel, a long-standing opponent of the revival of any agreement with Iran [Stein 2022], the Islamic Republic has found itself engaged on several fronts: responding to the domestic protests, continuing the tug-of-war with the IAEA over the acquisition of advanced centrifuges [Murphy 2022], and realigning its relationship with Russia in the shadow of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

In November, while the Iranian Foreign Minister Amirabdollahian was declaring his intention to send a delegation to Vienna to «resolve remaining issues» [‘Iran to send team’ 2022], Tehran announced that it had begun enriching uranium to 60% at its Fordow facility – in a defiant response to an IAEA resolution that advocated more transparency and for further investigation into Iran’s activities by the Agency. At this point, any possibility of reviving the nuclear deal appeared remote, and by no means a priority for the relevant parties. Both the Biden administration and the other European countries were far more concerned about the conflict in Ukraine and with the worsening human rights violations in Iran. On December 14, Iran was ousted from the United Nations women’s group. Despite several rounds of negotiations during the year and a handful of near-breakthroughs, the nuclear talks have not shown any signs of progress or improvement; and though the door for further discussion remains open, as it currently stands, any hopes of reviving the JCPOA appear slim.

4.2 The «Look to the East» policy and Iran-Russia relations in light of the Ukraine war

One of the core pillars of Ebrahim Raisi’s foreign policy is his «Look to the East» strategy, which aims to strengthen commercial, military, and security ties with countries like Russia and China. This policy is not necessarily new, but its pursual has often been alternated with attempts at rapprochement with the West – the latter typically having been urged by pragmatic/reformist governments. Since 1991, Iran and Russia strengthened their strategic partnership and found ground for common cooperation in several fields. After President Donald Trump introduced his «maximum pressure» campaign against Iran, the Islamic Republic turned again its attention to the East in order to consolidate its commercial and security partnerships and to circumvent or nullify the effects of international sanctions. Raisi reiterated the strategic importance of «looking East» throughout his first presidential term, during which the continuing impasse over nuclear negotiations remained a critical factor. In January, the president declared himself ready to finalize a 20-year partnership with Russia [‘President in a group of economic’ 2022]. This long-term cooperation agreement would look to benefit Iran by expanding its ties with neighbouring and regional countries, with the aim of neutralizing the impact of sanctions, but also to help consolidate regional relations via agreements with Eurasian forums and organizations boasting Russian membership [Noori 2022]. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine profoundly altered these mutual relations and, as a result, Iran’s position on the global stage.

In March, the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei blamed the West and particularly the US for the crisis, implying that the Russian military campaign was an understandable response to NATO’s threatening activities along the Ukrainian border with Russia [‘Iran supports ending the war’ 2022]. But to avoid further escalation (and also not to entirely alienate the West during the ongoing nuclear talks), the Iranian government declared their support for «the preservation of the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of all countries» [Government of the Islamic Republic 2022]. Despite the rhetoric, however, the Islamic Republic soon took a clear side in the war; and while this may have consolidated Iran’s relationship with Moscow, it has also accelerated its own international isolation.

The Ukraine crisis not only deeply affected the Iranian economy but also the country’s positioning in the global arena. Tehran aimed to consolidate its commercial and financial ties with Russia, while the latter sought to learn from and capitalize upon Iran’s long experience in resisting international sanctions. The closer relationship between Iran and Russia can be considered a clear strategic necessity, rather than an alliance of friendship; this holds true despite the fact that, at the outset of the conflict, Iran found itself directly competing with Russia on oil prices. In response to Western sanctions and reduced demand from Europe, Moscow redirected the bulk of its oil exports to Asia (and at a discount price). In the summer, Iran tried to remain competitive by raising their own exports to China and by offering Beijing a further discount on the oil price.

In July, Ali Saleh-Abadi, the governor of the Central Bank of Iran, visited Moscow and met with Alexander Novak, the deputy prime minister, and Maxim Reshetnikov, the minister of economic development. During this visit, they discussed the expansion of investments and further monetary and banking cooperation, in order to develop an exchange system as an alternative to the use of the dollar [‘Tehran, Moscow agree’ 2022]. Economic ties were also discussed by President Vladimir Putin, during his official visit to Tehran in July, when he met with Ebrahim Raisi and Ali Khamenei. This visit was meant to strengthen bilateral relations and to consider ways to eliminate the use of the dollar in trade between the two countries. Among the other issues that were discussed was the operationalization of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a multimodal transportation route connecting India, the Persian Gulf, and the Caspian Sea via Iran, from where it then connects to Saint Petersburg and Northern Europe via Russia. The INSTC was not only meant to increase commercial volume between Iran and Russia, but also to offer an alternative route to the road and rail corridor which facilitates Turkey’s connection to Azerbaijan and Central Asia [Tavsan 2021]. In addition, Tehran and Moscow also finalized their cooperation over both rail and maritime routes concerning the Caspian Sea [‘Russia’s 1st rail transit’ 2022].

The most controversial aspect of the Iran-Russia alliance has been the support given by the Iranian military to Moscow in the Ukraine war. According to American sources, by as early as the summer a Russian delegation had conducted several visits to an airfield in central Iran to evaluate and explore the possibility of acquiring Iranian drones [Madhani & Gambrell 2022]. Since then, Moscow is alleged to have purchased a large number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones) that were manufactured in Iran. This could be part of a deeper military partnership between Moscow and Tehran, which prospects are difficult to estimate at date. Sources close to Al Jazeera revealed that the Islamic Republic delivered around 2,400 drones (Mohajer-6s and Shahid 131s/136s) to Russia, which have subsequently been deployed in Ukraine [Varghese 2022]. These drones are typically cheaply produced and mainly used for long-distance attacks, enabling Russia to hit far-ranged targets in central Ukraine from their bases in Crimea [Knights & Almeida 2022]. There, Iran sent specialist trainers to teach the Russian military how to use the drones. Tehran has been severely criticized by the international community for providing this military support to Russia. Despite initial denials, the Iranian Foreign Minister Amirabdollahian finally confirmed that drones were sold to Russia, but claimed this had happened in the months prior to the invasion [‘Iran confirms drones’ 2022]. In December, the US imposed sanctions on three Russian entities connected to «Moscow’s growing military relationship with Tehran» [US Department of State 2022c].

In building up this perceived «anti-Western axis», Moscow and Tehran further bolstered their economic and military alignment at the expense of international isolation. Due to the war, Russia was obliged to consolidate its relations with countries that remained outside of the Western sphere, such as Iran [Divsallar 2022]. Likewise, the Islamic Republic hastened to sign beneficial commercial agreements in order to revive its faltering economy. Above all, however, military and security cooperation was at the core of Moscow and Tehran’s closer relationship.

Another aspect that highlighted Raisi’s «looking East» policy was the signing of the Memorandum of Obligations, which saw Iran become a permanent member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) on September 15 at the end of the SCO summit held in Samarkand [‘Iran signs memorandum’ 2022]. Russia played an important role in sponsoring the Iranian membership, especially after the Ukraine war. The Iranian full membership of the SCO would further strengthen Iran-Russia relations, in time when Moscow is keen is keeping closer its best allies for its regional and international goals. Established in 2001, the SCO is a Central Asian intergovernmental organization focused on regional security, cooperation, and development. By 2021, the eight permanent members (China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, India, and Pakistan) had accepted Iran’s application for full membership. The Islamic Republic had previously held observer status for thirteen years. Joining the SCO was considered by the Iranian elite as an important step toward strengthening multilateral relations with neighbouring states and making the country a pivotal player as both an energy supplier and as a major transit hub for commercial trade between Central Asia and Europe. This latter ambition is perhaps more of a long-term strategy due to the current lack of modern railways or road networks, as well as any significant maritime access to Iranian ports. Moreover, Central Asian relations are not necessarily as smooth as they may seem. Many SCO members compete with one another across several sectors [Hunter 2021]. For instance, China and India are both competing over investment in the Iranian port of Chabahar, which is located in a valuable geostrategic area and could serve as a prominent commercial hub for the wider region.

With the aim of expanding trade, attracting foreign investment and contributing to the regional security and stability Iran has sought to bolster its relationship with Central Asian countries, as well as with Russia and China, the leading members of the SCO, since the early 2000s. This need appears even more urgent in light of the more recent international sanctions against Tehran, even though it may take years before Iran could start benefitting from this formal membership. For now, any immediate benefits are somewhat limited and further obstacles, such as the persistence of international sanctions that might limit SOC members to trade with Iran to avoid US financial repercussions, will inevitably need to be negotiated. But also, Iran’s failure to join the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is a serious obstacle for monetary and banking trade. However, full Iranian membership of the SCO has certainly served a symbolic purpose, being portrayed as a significant diplomatic victory for Raisi during his presidency

In January, the 25-year comprehensive cooperation agreement between Iran and China entered its implementation phase. This long-term deal was signed in March 2021 with the aim of establishing mutual cooperation across all commercial, security, and military sectors. As another component of the «look to the East» policy, this agreement was intended to consolidate both economic and security ties with China, Iran’s major trading partner. However, as alluded to previously, results in trade have proven to be quite modest. One aspect that might explain this trend is China’s interest in ameliorating relations with countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). President Xi Jinping visited Riyad on December 9 and met with GCC leaders. During the summit, the parties released a joint statement vowing to continue their strategic dialogue, to build cooperation and mutual support; but they also underlined the need to resolve issues over Iran’s nuclear programme [Saudi Press Agency 2022]. China’s strategy in the Middle East appears to have shifted. On one hand, China has exposed its ambition to consolidate its relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates; yet, on the other, China has also revealed its intention not to rely solely upon Iran. Due to the impasse over the nuclear talks, Beijing has been experiencing difficulties in preserving strong commercial relations with Iran or launching any significant investments in the country.

5. Conclusion

The year under review in this essay – 2022 – has not necessarily been an exceptional year, but it has seen certain trends that were already well underway in Iran be amplified, both in terms of domestic and foreign policy. This paper has sought to present and trace some new trajectories, particularly in terms of how the Iranian elite are attempting to preserve their power, and the costs Iran seems willing to incur in order to fortify both its regional and international position.

The eruption of popular protests, primarily led by young women, was a clear demonstration of festering popular dissent – and not only within female circles. The protests that followed the death of Mahsa Jina Amini clearly spoke to a weakening of the so-called «social contract» and highlighted the deep ruptures that have come to exist between the state establishment and Iran’s general population, as the former struggles to reform itself, and the latter appears increasingly detached from the country’s historic institutions and societal models. The protests – by no means a new phenomenon in the history of the Islamic Republic – have involved different segments of Iranian society, continuing in the same vein as other previous apolitical and uncoordinated grassroot movements. The novelty here was the visibility of a new form of radicalism, both from the protesters and in the response of the authorities. Whereas young women challenged and contested laws and customs through individual and collective forms of rebellion and civil disobedience, the authorities responded with brute force, attempting to suppress the demonstrations by means of extreme violence.

Iranian foreign policy has been greatly influenced by Iran’s decision to support the Russian military effort in Ukraine. Iran-Russia rapprochement has come at the cost of additional international sanctions for the Islamic Republic, adding yet further stress to the country’s economy. Many voices within the nezam have objected to the idea of tying themselves too closely to Russia or China, two powers that have a track record of pursuing their own regional and international agendas, which are not always in line with those of the Iranians. Iran also sought to forge relationships with powers sitting outside the Western sphere, as can be seen by their request to join the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), in a bid to explore alternative markets to Western ones.

In light of these domestic and international challenges, the nuclear talks have remained at a standstill. At the end of 2022, President Biden effectively suggested that any prospective deal over the JCPOA was ‘dead’ [‘Video shows Biden’ 2022]. Though this remark was given in an unofficial capacity – an offhand comment made while meeting with his supporters – it did imply that no major progress had been achieved. Officially, the Iranian negotiation team has frequently declared its readiness to strike a new deal; however, the lack of transparency over the alleged uranium discovered at undeclared sites in Iran, coupled with the ongoing crisis in Ukraine (with Iran having abandoned its neutrality by supplying drones to Moscow), has inevitably led to any revival of the JCPOA dropping down the priority list.

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ISSN 2385-2526

2022 was the first full year under Taliban rule. Partly overshadowed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, political and economic developments in Afghanistan received comparatively much less attention than those occurring in the former Soviet space. Nevertheless, Afghanistan witnessed a tumultuous year, amid domestic political adjustments, ethnic power struggles and a dramatic economic and humanitarian situation. Socio-economic conditions have overall worsened under the Taliban with rising levels of food insecurity and refugees both within Afghanistan and in neighbouring states. Internationally, regional countries, including Central Asian Republics, Russia, Pakistan, India and China have maintained their political and economic engagement with the new rulers in Kabul, while refraining from providing official legitimacy to the regime.

Keywords – Taliban government; China-Afghanistan relations; Pakistan-Afghanistan relations; humanitarian crisis.

1. Introduction

In his 2008 co-authored book Fixing failed states. A framework for rebuilding a fractured world, former Afghan President Ashraf Ghani noted how the «failed state problem» was «at the heart of a worldwide systemic crisis that constitutes the most serious challenge to global stability in the new millennium» [Ghani 2008: 4]. 13 years onwards, as the Taliban advance was overwhelming Afghan forces amid the US’ announced retreat, Ghani left the country in disarray. His fleeing was highly symbolic of the wider dismemberment of Afghanistan’s democratic setup, including long fought-for human rights. Inevitably, debates on whether Afghanistan was a failed state started to re-emerge in media [Economist 2021; Young and Faulconbridge 2021], policy [Raine 2022; Crisis Group 2022] and academic [Brick Murtazashvili 2022] circles. Discussions around the idea of «state failure» in the academic and development practitioners literature generally point towards the ability of a government to perform a number of key tasks, including: protect its citizens from different types of violence; have international and domestic legitimacy; look after its citizens’ basic needs and therefore possess the capacity to deliver services [e.g. health, education] to the population [Stewart and Brown, 2009]. Against such a backdrop, and given the interest that this question has generated in discussions around Afghanistan, this article proceeds by first assessing governance under the Taliban in 2022 on the three areas – authority, legitimacy and service delivery – just outlined. Drawing on news reports and official documents from the international and local organisations still operating within the country, the empirical survey provided below reveals that the Taliban authority has been challenged on multiple fronts domestically and not yet legitimised internationally; in addition, despite some mildly positive trends in terms of exports and revenue collection, the socio-economic situation within Afghanistan remains critical in terms of human rights (and in particular women’s rights) and living conditions of the wider population. Overall, the analysis details a critical picture suggesting Afghanistan’s drift towards a failed state. The final section of this article dissects the country’s international relations under Taliban rule, with a focus on the key regional players including Central Asian Republics, Russia, India, Pakistan and China.

2. Taliban authority over Afghanistan

Since returning to power in the second half of 2021, the Taliban have strived to establish full control over the Afghan territory. While their ability to conquer the 34 Afghan provinces in their advance towards Kabul in 2021 was impressive, in 2022 a number of domestic challenges to their authority emerged, primarily from militant groups opposed to their rule. The Taliban have responded to these challenges by strengthening ties with Al-Qaeda, similarly to what had happened in 1996 when the group first took over. The killing of Al-Qaeda’s leader Al-Zawahiri on 31 July 2022 by a US drone strike, exemplifies these dynamics.

At the time of his killing, Al-Zawahiri resided in the heart of Kabul’s diplomatic area, in a house that was reportedly owned by a top aide of Sirajuddin Haqqani, one of the key Taliban figures and de facto interior minister. Al-Zawahiri’s presence in Kabul attracted international attention to the Taliban’s inability or lack of willingness (perhaps both) to break with Al-Qaeda [Hakimi and Price 2022]. It is unclear how many, among Taliban leaders, were aware of Zawahiri’s presence in Kabul. However, his residence in an Haqqani-linked shelter has been interpreted as a sign of the close ties between the Haqqani network and Al-Qaeda, dating back to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s [Drevon, 2022]. This was confirmed by a report from the UN Monitoring Team, which noted that the relationship between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda «remains close» [UN Security Council, 2022a: 3].

Such close ties between the two groups have helped the Taliban strengthen their grip over Afghanistan, despite the regime facing a number of challenges stemming from a myriad militant groups operating within the country. The most visible one has been the Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-KP), the local branch of the Islamic State. The latter has deployed the same insurgent tactics that the Taliban themselves had adopted with the former elected government, in an attempt to challenge the Taliban’s ability to maintain security and govern. In order to gather support and build its profile as a challenger to Taliban rule, IS-KP carried out a series of attacks in the northern parts of Afghanistan, that are home to those constituencies that were less favourable to a Taliban takeover [Watkins 2022]. In addition, the IS-KP went for high-profile targets for their attacks, including the Russian Embassy in Kabul (more on this below) and a hotel hosting Chinese nationals, in order to maximise the visibility of their actions and to undermine the Taliban regime in the eyes of important regional players. According to a report by the UN Monitoring Team, the strength of the IS-KP in Afghanistan ranges between 1,500 and 4,000 members, although ethnic differences and geographical distance within the group make effective coordination difficult [UN Security Council, 2022a: 18].

In addition to IS-KP, other opposition groups have emerged, including: the National Resistance Front (NRF), formed by political and military leaders, including former Vice President Amrullah Saleh and coalesced around Ahmad Massoud, son of Ahmad Shāh Massoūd, former leader of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance [Foschini, 2022]; groups supported by former warlords as well as ones established by remnants of the Islamic Republic’s armed forces [Giustozzi, 2022]. While these groups do not necessarily pose a significant threat to the Taliban regime, they force the government to committing large security forces in parts of the north, where these groups are primarily based [Giustozzi, 2022].

3. Domestic legitimacy

While internationally the regime has not yet been recognised by any country (more on this in section 5), from a domestic standpoint the question of legitimacy is important as it interlinks with key developments in the year under examination, including the composition of the Taliban government and wider dynamics of representation (or rather lack thereof) in the new political setting.

The Taliban were successful as an insurgent force because of the decentralised structure that allowed Taliban commanders enough independence and autonomy in pursuing the wider common objective of toppling the Afghan government [Motwani 2022]. But in the transition from an insurgent movement to a political organisation tasked with ruling the country, the Taliban are building a centralised, largely Pashtun-dominated structure, which is causing frictions within their ranks, and partly undermining their domestic legitimacy [Motwani 2022]. Some of the internal frictions emerged over the draconian measures curbing women’s right to education (discussed in section 4 below), with interior minister Sirajuddin Haqqani unusually airing his discontent towards the group’s supreme leader for the policies he has decided to impose in the country.

In addition to internal frictions, the Taliban government is composed of all men and 43 out 53 members (80%) are ethnic Pashtuns (the non-Pashtuns include two Uzbeks, four Tajiks, one Turkmen, one Hazara, one Nuristani, and one Khwaja) [Bahiss 2022]. Such a Pashtun-dominated government reflects the exclusionary nature of the movement and it has led to the persecution of ethnic and religious minorities in the name of quelling the military resistance in the north justified by ethno-sectarian divisions [Madadi, 2022]. The arrest of popular Uzbek Taliban commander, Makhdoom Alam, in January 2022, is a case in point. Alam, who fought the US and the Afghan government for nearly two decades and who was responsible for the fall of six northern provinces to the Taliban in 2021, was arrested on precise orders from Taliban’s former deputy defence minister Mullah Mohammad Fazl, as a way to sideline the commander, whose influence had been growing as a result of his battlefield successes [Pannier 2022]. Following the arrest, hundreds of Uzbek protesters surrounded the Taliban’s security headquarters in Maymana to demand his release. Violence erupted and four people were killed. To quell the protest, the Taliban sent reinforcements, including a unit of suicide bombers and the confrontation ended after four days of negotiations [Pannier 2022]. Although the Taliban governor of the province denied any discrimination on part of the movement, one of the protesters in Maymana, interviewed by the Washington Post, noted that local populations «have been victims of discrimination for a long time» and that «the Taliban say they are an Islamic government and in Islam there is no discrimination. So why do they want to arrest our leaders and those who represent us?» [Raghavan 2022]. Overall, this episode epitomises the exclusionary nature of the Taliban regime to any non-Pashtun elements of the Afghan society, thereby undermining their domestic political legitimacy, especially in the northern parts of the country.

4. Service delivery and socio-economic conditions under Taliban rule

Since the Taliban’s takeover, the Afghan economy is projected to contract cumulatively between the second half of 2021 and the whole of 2022 close to 30-35% [World Bank 2022]. Low growth rates (between 2.0 to 2.4%), and no signs of improvement in per capita incomes owing to high population growth and no significant improvement in poverty or food insecurity, suggest a critical general picture regarding the Afghan economy. A UNDP report [2022] noted that the freeze on $9 billion in foreign assets belonging to Afghanistan’s central bank, coupled with international sanctions, have caused a severe liquidity crisis in the country, also contributing to a rise in the food basket’s price by almost 35 percent. According to the report, nearly 20 million Afghans are classified as experiencing high or critical levels of food insecurity, almost twice the average in the preceding three years.

Despite an overall gloomy outlook, two areas stand out with a slightly more positive performance: domestic revenue collection and exports. As for the former, according to the World Bank, total revenue reached US$ 1.1 billion between 22 December 2021 and the end of August 2022 (exceeding last year’s collections during the same period). This was the result of increased revenues collected at borders (including import duties and the Business Receipt Tax), following a decline in corruption in customs and at road checkpoints [Byrd 2022; Watkins 2022; World Bank 2022]. With regards to the increase in exports, Afghanistan’s coal exports to Pakistan went up significantly as a result of the price difference between Afghanistan’s coal price and that of other coal exporters. Coal exports amounted to US$ 63.6 million in 2021 but have jumped to US$ 81.8 million in just Q1-2022 [World Bank 2022].

Besides the economic situation, social and humanitarian conditions within the country remained extremely difficult. From the first report to the UN’s Human Rights Council by the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan, a dramatic picture emerges regarding the condition of women under Taliban rule. The report notes «the staggering regression in women and girls’ enjoyment of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights» and that women and girls have «rapidly disappeared from all spheres of public life» [UN Human Rights Council 2022: 3]. Measures to that effect include sacking civil servants and female judges as well as suspending secondary education for girls; the stipulation that women should stay at home; the ban on certain travel without a mahram (a close male relative) and mandatory dress codes. In addition, the Taliban issued an order by which «male family members are punishable for women’s conduct» and, as the UN Special Rapporteur noted, this is «effectively erasing women’s agency and prompting increased domestic abuse». [UN Human Rights Council, 2022: 4].

The situation of refugees in the country remains likewise critical. According to the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), almost 32,400 people have left their homes this year due to fighting. In addition, close to 727,900 people have returned from neighbouring countries to Afghanistan (including 661,600 from Iran and 66,300 from Pakistan) [UNOCHA 2022]. Overall, according to the United Nations Human Rights Commissioner (UNHCR) there are nearly 3.4 million Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in Afghanistan, in addition to refugees and asylum seekers abroad as detailed in Table 1 below.

What is interesting to note from the data on the top 5 host countries, is that there are only two (i.e. Pakistan and Iran) of Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries who have taken refugees. On the contrary, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, all Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbours, have decided not to take refugees within their own borders. The motivations behind this choice are discussed in the next section.

5. The international relations of Afghanistan under the Taliban

By the end of 2022, the Taliban regime was not yet recognised internationally. However, such a formal lack of recognition did not necessarily translate into a lack of engagement, especially as far as regional countries were concerned. Central Asian Republics (CARs) acted as key diplomatic hubs, hosting regional meetings with stakeholders to engage the Taliban leadership. China, on its part, has announced its readiness to align the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with the development strategies of Afghanistan and to include the latter in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). India too, a country that had consistently and unflinchingly backed anti-Taliban forces, from the Northern Alliance in the late 90s all the way through to the Ghani-Abdullah government in more recent years, has adjusted to the new reality and started engaging the Taliban leadership.

5.1 The Central Asian Republics’ regional diplomacy

CARs have played an important role as hosts to a number of meetings that brought together Taliban representatives and regional countries. Such a diplomatic activism was prompted by the fact that threats to regime stability and national security represent the main lens through which CARs interpret the Afghan scenario. The concerns around the risk of a domestic spillover for CARs from an unstable Afghanistan are therefore best epitomised by the refusal by Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to allow refugees in permanently out of a fear they might be accompanied by militant extremists. To allay some of these concerns, on 26-27 May, Tajikistan hosted a meeting of national security advisers from China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Uzbekistan. Participants encouraged the de facto authorities to create inclusive political structures, pursue a sustainable domestic and foreign policy, ensure compliance with the norms of international law and take steps to eradicate terrorist elements [UN Security Council 2022]. On 26 July, Uzbekistan hosted a conference on Afghanistan which saw the participation of a Taliban delegation led by the de facto Minister for Foreign Affairs, Amir Khan Motaqi. Like in the Tajikistan meeting, participants emphasized the importance of counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics efforts as well as inclusive governance and respect for human rights [UN Security Council 2022]. Beyond security considerations, economic and infrastructure talks were part of CARs relations with Afghanistan in 2022. For instance, in early June a Turkmen delegation visited Kabul to discuss the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline project. Similarly, in early August, the Government of Uzbekistan and the Afghan authorities announced that the survey and mapping for the proposed Termiz-Mazar-Kabul-Peshawar railway project had started [UN Security Council 2022]. While looking promising in principle, these infrastructural projects have been regular staples in discussions between Afghan governments and regional partners well before the Taliban took over. Little progress was made over the past 20 years, and it is difficult to see how any genuine infrastructural endeavour could materialise with the precarious security situation in the country.

5.2 The Kremlin and Kabul: Developing trade ties amid political caution

Russia’s approach to Afghanistan was two-pronged: politically, Moscow has not officially recognized the new regime in Kabul, and it has hosted in November 2022 the Moscow consultation process without inviting the Talban leadership. Economically, the Kremlin has instead engaged with the Taliban regime by signing a preliminary deal for the sale of Russian oil to Afghanistan.

As just noted, one of the most visible manifestations of Russia’s role in the Afghan scenario was the 4th meeting of the Moscow format of consultations on Afghanistan, held in the Russian capital on the 16th of November 2022, and including India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Established in 2017 as a regional forum involving special envoys of 11 countries, the forum’s main aim was to ensure regional security. Moscow took the leadership role in this process, so that it could pursue two of its core national security interests: 1) preventing the potential threats deriving from instability, violence, and extremism in Afghanistan and the rest of Central Asia; and 2) Moscow’s long standing opposition to any US or Western security presence in Central Asia. Although dynamics on the ground have changed in 2022, with the Taliban regime now in power, security and geopolitical concerns are still paramount for Russian policymakers. Evidence of this can be found from the official statement issued by the Russian Foreign Ministry after the meeting. While calling on the US and NATO to «compensate for the damage inflicted on the Afghans over the years», it also called the Taliban leadership to form a «truly inclusive government in Afghanistan, reflecting the interests of key ethno-political groups, as well as the need to eradicate terrorist, drug and other threats emanating from this country» [Tolo News, 17 November 2022]. The most visible manifestation of this threat came on 5 September 2022, when the suicide bombing of the Russian embassy in Kabul exemplified Russian concerns about the IS-KP’s expanding presence in Afghanistan. That was the first attack on a foreign embassy since the Taliban takeover of Kabul in August 2021.

On the economic front, Moscow and Kabul agreed on a preliminary deal that would involve Russia supplying around one million tonnes of gasoline, one million tonnes of diesel, 500,000 tonnes of liquefied petroleum gas [LPG] and two million tonnes of wheat annually [Yawar and Greenfield 2022]. Importantly, both Russia and Afghanistan (alongside Iran) are countries that are de facto isolated and cut out of the international banking system. If finalised, the deal would represent the first major trade deal that the Taliban have agreed since taking power in 2021. While the benefits to the isolated landlocked country are clear, less so are Russia’s motivations behind the deal. Some observers noted that agricultural goods and the prospect of future access to Afghanistan’s natural-resource wealth could be on the table [Scollon 2022]. Overall, Russia’s approach to Afghanistan has remained largely in line with that of previous years, with the only important difference of a renewed willingness of stepping up economic engagement.

5.3 India and the Taliban: Recovering the lost ground

New Delhi’s position vis-à-vis the Taliban regime at the outset of the new Taliban era in 2021 was the weakest among regional countries. Years of unflinching support to anti-Taliban forces prevented policymakers in New Delhi to establish meaningful relations with the Taliban. 2022 was the year in which India was forced to take a U-turn and engage with the Taliban leadership. On 2 June, a delegation of senior Indian officials travelled to Kabul to meet with Taliban leaders. During the meeting, the two sides reportedly discussed «India-Afghan diplomatic relations, bilateral trade and humanitarian aid» (Reuters, 2022). Shortly after, on 23 June, India reopened its diplomatic mission in Afghanistan. These symbolic moves, while aimed at showing some overtures to the Taliban regime, also carried important implications for Delhi’s own national security concerns. Reports suggest that in return for India’s moves towards the Taliban, the latter has pledged to take action against some of the jihadi groups (e.g. Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed) that have safe havens in Afghanistan [Bacon and Mir, 2022]. India’s attempt to engage the Taliban also aims at driving a wedge between the Taliban and Pakistan, at a time in which the latter is concerned about the Taliban’s relations with the Pakistani focused Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). But India’s engagement with the Taliban rests on the latter’s capacity to control militant groups operating from Afghanistan, which has come under question. The Taliban’s crackdown against IS-KP, which has fallen short of providing some clear successes, suggests that they may still struggle to conduct targeted operations. Similarly, it is unclear whether they will be able to keep the promise of reining in LeT and JeM, and how that might affect ties with Pakistan.

5.4. Pakistan and the Taliban rule: Emerging strains in bilateral ties

As opposed to India, in 2021 Pakistan emerged as the country which seemed in an ideal position vis-à-vis the Taliban takeover, given the long-cultivated ties between the Taliban and authorities in Islamabad [Boni 2022]. However, since the initial euphoria which accompanied the return of the insurgent group in Kabul, a number of challenges emerged for Pakistan.

First, the Pakistan-focused faction of the Taliban, the TTP, has gained new strength and has repeatedly carried out attacks on Pakistani soil. In 2022, the number of terrorist incidents in Pakistan was at its highest level (630) since 2016 (1032). Moreover, in 2021 Pakistan only recorded four suicide attacks, while in 2022 there were thrice as many (13), most of which claimed by the TTP [South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2023]. Such a worrying trend has raised concerns in Islamabad about the Afghan Taliban’s willingness to rein in this faction. After all, TTP chief Noor Wali Mehsud’s pledge of allegiance to Maulvi Hibatullah Akhundzada, the Afghan Taliban leader, is a potent reminder that ties between the two are strong, and that it might be difficult for Pakistan to navigate its relations with the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban to its advantage. While the Afghan Taliban have indeed facilitated the agreement of a five month truce between Pakistan and the TTP (which came to an end in November 2022) Pakistan has so far failed to rein in the terrorist group, whose main operational area remains in Northwestern Pakistan and in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) [Zafar 2022]. The TTP is composed of mostly ethnic Pashtuns, which partly explains the strong bond with the Afghan Taliban, whose lands encompass the areas across the Pakistan-Afghan border (known as the Durand Line).

The latter represents another contentious point in bilateral ties between Islamabad and Kabul. In line with previous Afghan governments who considered the Durand Line an artificial border, the Taliban have refused to accept it as the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. In September 2022, the spokesman of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defense, Enayatullah Khwarazmi, claimed that Pakistan has «no right» to separate Pashtuns living on either side of the Durand Line. Pakistan, on its part, has been building since 2016 a 2,600 km long border fence, to prevent infiltration of militants on its soil. As evidence of Pakistan’s preoccupation with the volatile security situation across the porous border, in August 2022 the Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif warned the National Assembly of a growing TTP threat in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and anti-TTP protests were held across KP [The Express Tribune 2022; The Friday Times 2022].

The third contentious point in bilateral ties is related to Pakistan’s geopolitical ambitions to bridge its economy to those of CARs, especially at a time in which its foreign policy has significantly tilted towards China (and Asia more broadly) and away from the US [Corsi 2021; Boni 2021a]. Between 2020 and 2021, Pakistan’s business council has published for the first time three country profiles of Central Asian states (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan), as a sign of Pakistan’s desire to boost trade with the region [Abbas 2022]. Similarly, works are underway for the construction of the Central Asia-South Asia Regional Trade and Transmission Project (CASA-1000) a 1,270km power transmission line that is expected to export excess hydropower generated in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to energy-hungry Pakistan through Afghanistan.

In order to meet Pakistan’s trade an energy needs, as well as its wider geopolitical ambition of reorienting its foreign policy towards the surrounding region, a stable Afghanistan and a good working relationship with the leadership in Kabul are pre-requisites. Both were lacking in 2022.

5.5 China in Afghanistan: Pursuing security

China’s approach to Afghanistan in 2022 has largely followed Beijing’s engagement of the previous years [Boni, 2021b]. Those who were expecting China to fill in the void left by the US’ withdrawal were up for disappointment. The economic slowdown following the zero Covid policy, coupled with unprecedented country-wide public protests, meant that China’s main focus was to preserve domestic stability. In many ways, this also helps explain China’s key security concern vis-à-vis Afghanistan. To policymakers in Beijing, as with many of their counterparts in the region, the first and foremost preoccupation is that the Afghan territory becomes a fertile ground for groups whose main target is China, and in particular its Westernmost region, Xinjiang. While the Taliban have reassured China that they will not allow their territory to become a base for militants to organise and launch operations against other countries, there are signs that Uyghur militants maintain a presence in Afghanistan. Notably, Abdul Haq, the leader of the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), was seen celebrating Eid in the country alongside family members [Pantucci 2022]. A report from the UN Monitoring Group in February highlighted that there were some 200-700 fighters associated with TIP in Afghanistan [UN Monitoring Group 2022].

As we have seen before with the Moscow format of consultations on Afghanistan, China too has developed its own multilateral setting to coordinate regional countries’ efforts at stabilising Afghanistan and addressing the potential security challenges stemming from it. Known as the «Tunxi Initiative of the Neighboring Countries of Afghanistan on Supporting Economic Reconstruction in and Practical Cooperation with Afghanistan», it held its third meeting in China at the end of March 2022. Interestingly, in the statement issued at the end by China’s Foreign Ministry, it was mentioned that «China supports the extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor […] and is ready to promote synergy between the Belt and Road Initiative and the development strategies of Afghanistan, and support the smooth operation of the China-Afghanistan freight train services, to help Afghanistan better integrate into the regional economic integration process» [MFA-China 2022a]. Similar remarks were made a few days before by then Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who made a surprise visit to Kabul and met Amir Khan Muttaqi, Acting Foreign Minister of the Taliban government [MFA-China 2022b]. Talks about extending the BRI to Afghanistan are not new [Boni, 2022]. Yet, very little has materialised in the past few years in terms of actual infrastructure investments, whether within or outside the aegis of the BRI. While in 2022 Beijing has removed tariffs on 98% of imported Afghan goods and it has re-established an air transport corridor for Afghan pine nuts (worth around $800 million annually), these are fairly low-level engagements that signal caution more than anything else (Fiala 2022). The attack on a hotel in Kabul in December 2022, claimed by the IS-KP and reportedly targeting Chinese citizens, is an important reminder that before any meaningful economic engagement can take place, and before the Taliban regime is recognised, Beijing, like the other regional players, would be looking for security reassurances.

6. Conclusion

The first year of Taliban rule was characterised by struggles for domestic legitimacy between the Taliban and other militant groups seeking to challenge their authority. In addition, the group’s Pashtun-dominated, exclusionary structure has further alienated ethnic minorities, especially in the northern provinces and have led to popular demonstrations against the Taliban regime. While in 2021 many observers questioned whether this time the Taliban would be a more moderate force which would adopt policies preserving some of the basic human rights, the first year of Taliban rule revealed the true face of the movement. Curbing women’s rights and their participation to public life; excluding ethnic minorities from key posts in the new administration; the banning of music in the country, all these Taliban actions cast a very murky shadow over the country’s present and future. The evidence presented in the article also displays some signs of Afghanistan drifting towards being a failed state, especially regarding questions of legitimacy, both domestic and international. Regional countries have been mainly preoccupied that Afghanistan does not become a fertile ground for militant groups targeting their own soil. But the killing of Al-Qaeda’s leader from a safe house linked to a Taliban leader, alongside the presence of TTP and TIP leaders in the country, are potent reminders that stability in Afghanistan is far from achieved, and that security considerations are likely to continue dominating the agenda for the foreseeable future, as they did in 2022.

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ISSN 2385-2526

In early 2022, opposition parties, led by the Pakistani People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistani Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N), stepped up their attacks on Prime Minister Imran Khan to oust him. Allies of the Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) governmental coalition also expressed dissatisfaction with Khan due to dire financial straits from worsening national economic distress. The government of the former cricket player lost its parliamentary majority and faced a no-confidence vote from the opposition. Although the ousting of the Khan government was officially motivated by economic misrule, it was ultimately driven by friction over foreign and domestic policy decisions resulting in Khan losing the support of the Army. In a swift turn of events, the National Assembly accepted Khan’s allegations of a plot between the United States and the opposition to oust him and rejected the no-trust motion. However, an intervention of the Supreme Court of Pakistan overturned these decisions. Taking advantage of his vulnerability, the political opposition dismissed Khan with a parliamentary vote.

Imran Khan was succeeded by Shehbaz Sharif, the younger brother of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and leader of an alliance of united opposition parties having the common aim to ouster the PTI government. The fledgling government had to address a dire economic crisis amidst significant pressures from Khan’s PTI opposition party and an unprecedented natural disaster crisis. In parallel, the new administration had to mend relations with Washington cooled by Imran Khan’s foreign policy, taking care not to compromise crucial ties with Beijing.

Keywords – China; crisis; economy; floods; opposition; Russia; USA

1. Introduction

Pakistan’s aspirations to play a leading international role are expressed in the provisions of the Economic Outreach Initiative launched in 2020 [Government of Pakistan 2020, December 16]. The vision of the national foreign policy is centred on the domestic economy and supported by a geo-economic narrative aimed at promoting a positive image of Pakistan to the world and helping develop the country’s economic potential [Ibid.]. In January 2022, Pakistan unveiled part of its national security policy confirming a focus on economic growth and key partnerships, particularly with China as well as hoped-for ties with the United States [Government of Pakistan 2022; Yousaf 2022, January 11; Akhtar 2022, January 21].

In the period under analysis, Pakistan faced a severe economic crisis, which was the culmination of long-dated structural economic features.1 The financial distress was also attributable to the global Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 («SARS-CoV-2», henceforth «COVID-19» or «Coronavirus») health emergency. Pandemic-induced supply chain shortages have contributed to rising prices and a growing vulnerability to global shocks. In addition, inflation triggered by the surge in world oil prices linked to the Russian invasion of Ukraine aggravated the situation in Pakistan’s domestic economy.

In 2019, Pakistan borrowed US$ 6 billion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Initially, Khan’s government agreed with the IMF’s conditionalities but eventually failed to meet all of them and faced the suspension of the loan. Additionally, Khan’s administration borrowed US$ 10 billion altogether from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and China. During Khan’s tenure, Pakistan’s relations with a key traditional ally of Pakistan – Saudi Arabia – deteriorated over the neutral position kept by Riyadh on the Kashmiri issue and Islamabad’s attitude towards exploring new strategic partnerships [Corsi 2020, pp. 462-463]. At the same time, China remained dissatisfied with the slowed-down progress of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC, refer to section 4) and did not appreciate relations with the PTI government.

Pakistan’s ties with the United States plunged over Pakistan’s foreign choices [Notezai 2022, July 23]. Islamabad’s partnership with Beijing amid the US-China confrontation challenged Pakistan-US bilateralism and relations with the Western powers [Boni 2022, pp. 159-170].2 At the same time, Washington’s disinterest in forging a new partnership with Pakistan after its disengagement from Afghanistan further strengthened the PTI government’s strategic ties with China and Russia. In February 2022, Imran Khan visited Moscow to secure Russian energy support. Khan’s state visit occurred the same day Russia began military operations in Ukraine. The timing seemed set to represent the PTI leader’s acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the armed aggression and a choice of a side.

These substantial deviations from the provisions of the Economic Outreach Initiative and the foreign policy vision of the military establishment, combined with other internal frictions, fostered a lack of trust in the generals toward Khan, who lost the support of the Army [Jamal 2022, February].

Amid growing public discontent over rising inflation and economic hardship in the country, the Pakistani opposition filed a no-confidence motion in the National Assembly against Khan with the requisite number of votes needed to pass. The political opposition had fought Khan in the past, but this time he was made vulnerable by the lack of support from the military establishment [Nawaz 2022, April 14]. The votes of dissident PTI lawmakers and coalition partners left no chances for the government and its leader, who accused Washington and the opposition of a conspiracy to influence Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policy.

The Pakistani parliament chose Shehbaz Sharif to guide the nation. Sharif, the leader of the PML-N, inherited the leadership of a country facing critical economic challenges and high instability due to Khan’s attacks on the military establishment and the new government’s legitimacy. Furthermore, shortly after the election, the new government faced a national emergency due to torrential monsoon rains that caused severe flooding.

The new government’s top priority was to address the growing balance of payments crisis. Austerity, inflation, unemployment and a shortage of foreign exchange reserves limiting Pakistan’s import capacities stimulated the rise of political contestation and popular discontent. The new coalition government faced constant pressure from Imran Khan, who called for early general elections and did not interrupt his political attacks even during the national crisis triggered by the natural disaster. The victory of the PTI party in by-elections in several constituencies, including the Punjab province, raised further questions about the legitimacy and longevity of Sharif’s government.

Domestic priorities drove the new government’s foreign policy, which focused on diplomacy seeking to guarantee further financial assistance from the IMF and allies and reopen a dialogue with the United States. In his inaugural address, Sharif aligned his government’s approach with the provisions of the national security policy and called for improving relations with key partners.

2. The economic backdrop of the political crisis

A US$ 6 billion IMF Extended Fund Facility (EFF) rescue program was launched in July 2019 to address domestic and external imbalances [IMF 2019, July 3]. The IMF disbursed an immediate outlay of US$ 1 billion while the remaining amount was agreed to be phased in, subject to quarterly and half-yearly reviews [Corsi 2019, pp. 461-464]. Funding for the program was subsequently suspended amid the country’s growing economic challenges when Khan refused to embrace some of the policies and reforms necessary to complete the sixth revision, such as, for example, an increase in tariffs (electricity, energy, oil, etc.) and a lifting of tax exemptions and subsidies [The Business Standard 2022, January 31]. In 2022, the IMF relaxed these conditions to relaunch the stalled program and disburse the next US$ 1 billion loan tranche. IMF requested the Pakistani government to make the list of sovereign guarantees public, that is, the financial obligations and risks to which public finances are subject [Rana 2022, January 5; Sinha 2022, January 30]. Other IMF conditions involved ensuring the autonomy of the central bank, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), from the federal government’s control.

On 13 January 2022, the National Assembly approved the Financial Supplement Bill, also known as the «mini-budget», which was a financial plan to meet the conditions set by the IMF [PakTribune 2022, January 4; Fabbri 2022, February 8]. The mini-budget increased taxes in multiple sectors and targeted the withdrawal of approximately US$ 2 billion in tax exemptions.3 Moreover, a new bill was approved, in line with the IMF conditions, the SBP Amendment 2021. The salient features of this bill mainly entailed changes to the legal framework of the central bank to increase its autonomy, strengthen its accountability for controlling inflation and achieve financial stability [Government of Pakistan Finance Division 2022; Hameed 2022, January 6].

Following Senate approval of the SBP Amendment bill 2021 into law by a one-vote majority, the IMF board approved the release of the US$ 1 billion sixth tranche under the EFF [The News 2022, February 2].4 By then, Islamabad had received almost US$ 3 billion from the IMF – roughly half the program’s value. Nevertheless, despite the disbursement of the sixth instalment, the EFF remained suspended due to the government’s failure to comply with the implementation of other agreed conditions.

The measures introduced with the mini-budget impacted the vast majority of the citizens of Pakistan and caused internal institutional and political friction. In February 2022, Khan decided to freeze gas and electricity prices and announced government subsidization until the next fiscal year budget, despite cost increases in the global market. He also confirmed a tax amnesty regime for the industrial sector. The opposition protested the bill as a risk to national security given that further indirect taxes would generate more inflation and increase poverty [South Asia Journal 2022, January 17; Ani News 2022, February 10]. While not opposed to SBP’s autonomy, the opposition expressed concern for the lack of control over fiscal and monetary policy, which could make the SBP vulnerable to external influences from other countries and international financial institutions [Noshab 2022, January 5].

According to the SBP, under PTI’s mandate, Pakistan’s total debt and liabilities had increased by about 80% over pre-PTI government figures to approximately US$ 100 billion, exceeding liabilities accumulated by any previous government. Low tax collection, currency devaluation and high spending were among the main reasons for the rise in public debt [Siddiqui 2022, May 17; Gul 2022, May 17]. Pakistan’s forex reserves reduced from around US$ 17 billion to US$ 10 billion in two months. The country’s trade deficit was US$ 35.4 billion during the three quarters of the fiscal year 2021-22, 70% higher than the same period in the previous year. At the same time, inflation rose from less than 9% to 12.7% [State Bank of Pakistan 2022; Aamir 2022, April 13].

3. The external dimension of the crisis: Pakistan’s relationship with Russia under the Khan administration

Pakistan’s economic distress can also be attributed to vulnerability to energy supply shocks as well as the global supply chain crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. An over-reliance on imported natural gas made the domestic economy prone to inflationary shocks triggered by the surge in world oil prices. As European countries faced gas shortages following the Ukrainian crisis, Pakistan’s gas imports were reduced and shipping costs increased, resulting in energy scarcity and soaring prices [The Express Tribune 2022, June 15; Sabir 2022, June 19].

Pakistan’s relations with Russia have grown significantly since the economic cooperation of the 1970s and have developed in the context of strong and long-standing Indo-Russian ties. After the end of the war in Afghanistan and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow established new relations with Islamabad. In 2011, when the United States and Pakistan reached their lowest level of confidence following the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistani territory by US military forces [Corsi 2011, pp. 101-108], Russia lifted the arms embargo on Pakistan and, in 2014, entered into a defence cooperation agreement with it. In parallel, Islamabad and Moscow enjoy a mutual collaboration with Beijing that has grown in recent years. Interests in Afghanistan and Central Asia and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have seen these three countries support the Taliban government in Kabul. Subsequently, Pakistan, Russia and China recognized each other’s positions and interests in Afghanistan [Subramanian 2022, February 24]. At the same time, the relations of each of these countries with the United States have deteriorated in recent years.

The widened gap between Pakistan and the United States strengthened the strategic partnership between Islamabad and Moscow [Roy 2021, June 29; Yousafzai 2022, January 20]. Growing economic, energy and defence cooperation bind the two governments. Pakistan is interested in Russian military equipment and commissioned Russian Gazprom to build the Pakistan Stream pipeline carrying liquefied natural gas from Karachi to the city of Kasur in Punjab [The News 2022, September 15]. Russia has expressed interest in investing in the US$ 1.2 billion Central Asian and South Asian Power Plant (CASA-1000)5 project to create sustainable electricity trade between Tajikistan, the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, which is expected to have a commercial start date in 2024.

In February 2022, at the invitation of Russian President Vladimir Putin, Imran Khan visited Moscow, which was the first state visit of a Pakistani leader to Russia in 23 years. The visit had geopolitical significance given the contextual absence of a dialogue between the White House and Khan [Mallik 2022, February 6].

Khan went to Russia to seek greater bilateral economic engagement and support for energy projects [The Express Tribune 2022, February 24; Yousaf 2022, February 25]. Regarding defence and security, Pakistan’s concerns were triggered by Russia’s supply of a new modern S400 air defence missile system, obviously targeted against India. Talks centred on a mechanism for intelligence-sharing and enhanced cooperation. In regional and Afghan contexts, Pakistan and Russia cooperate and coordinate at various international multilateral and regional levels, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the United Nations.

Although Khan did not make any statements from Moscow on the crisis in Ukraine, the timing of his trip to Russia – the same day as the Russian military invasion of Ukraine – proved to be a foreign policy blunder and created tensions with the military establishment, as explained in the following pages [Siddique 2022, February 25]. Pakistan expressed support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, calling for easing tensions and establishing a dialogue. However, Pakistan refused to vote on a United Nations Security Council resolution that deplored the Russian military aggression [Yousuf 2022, March 1; Ibid. 2022, March 2; Sinha 2022, March 6].

4. The external dimension of the crisis: Pakistan’s relationship with China under the Khan administration

The CPEC is a segment of China’s BRI launched in 2015. CPEC is an economic corridor connecting Kashgar in the Xinjiang autonomous region in north-western China to the Pakistani port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea near the border with Iran. The initiative establishes connections via land routes, special economic zones and oil pipelines, including energy and infrastructure projects currently under construction throughout Pakistan. CPEC attracts 25 billion worth of Chinese investments and supposedly favours China’s trade with the countries of the Middle East, Africa and Europe [Zaidi 2022, January 17]. Moreover, CPEC offers Pakistan the opportunity for economic development while having strategic political importance due to strengthening bilateral relations between Islamabad and Beijing. Since the launch of CPEC, Pakistan’s economy has grown significantly, with China as the main creditor. Notably, the percentage of public and publicly guaranteed external debt to China increased from 9.3% in 2013 to 27.4% in 2021 [Younus 2021, May 26; Afzal 2021, December 25; Naseer 2022, January 28;].

In early February 2022, Imran Khan visited Beijing to attend the Winter Olympics opening ceremony and meet the country’s leadership. The visit marked the culmination of celebrations to commemorate the 70th anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries. Khan met with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang to discuss wide-ranging issues. Several agreements were concluded during the visit, including industrial cooperation under the CPEC between the Pakistani Board of Investment and the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission [Dawn 2022, February 4; Wani 2022, February 8]. However, Khan left Beijing without significant achievements. Despite the agreements, the CPEC’s progress in recent years has been slow due to the pandemic. Moreover, China’s concerns have grown regarding its investments in Pakistan due to the lack of security and stability in the volatile northwest areas and Baluchistan [Siddique 2022, February 9; Baloch 2022, October 1]. Beijing showed reluctance to approve further loans for projects to be implemented under CPEC over concerns about the growing national debt and Pakistan’s ability to service the loans [South Asia Monitor 2022, May 8; Chaudhury 2022, May 10].

Chinese leaders were reportedly uncomfortable with Imran Khan’s premiership [Worldakkam 2022, July 31]. Beijing did not appreciate the Khan administration’s interference and controls over Chinese investment to ward off the damaging effects on the country due to a lack of transparency, tax incentives, unfair advantages and the possible advance of corruption.

5. The internal dimension of the crisis: Khan and the military establishment

Mr. Khan’s electoral success in 2018 was primarily traced to the support he received from the country’s military establishment [Corsi 2018, pp. 362-365; Ibid. 2019, pp. 456-457]. During its tenure, the PTI accepted frequent military interventions in domestic and foreign politics [Ibid. 2020, pp. 452-454]. However, towards the end of 2021, the Pakistani military began reducing its support for Khan. The ex-cricket champion faced friction with the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Qamar Javed Bajwa, over issues related to a critical appointment and foreign policy. In October 2021, the two clashed over replacing the director-general of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). While Khan wanted General Faiz Hameed to continue his post, he was eventually replaced by General Nadeem Anjum.6 Subsequently, Khan supported Hameed’s candidacy as Army Chief to replace General Bajwa upon the expiration of his term in November 2022.7 The political repercussions of these frictions were intense [Mishra 2022, May 7].

Khan’s foreign policy deviated significantly from the military establishment’s vision of building, strengthening and expanding strategically important international partnerships while nurturing the ongoing ties with China [Corsi 2021, pp. 347-349]. Imran Khan adopted an uncompromising foreign policy stance by communicating to the world, in no uncertain terms, Pakistan’s readiness to forge alternative alliances without hesitation if the Western powers did not show interest in establishing bilateral relations with Islamabad beyond those focused on security. Indeed, the Biden administration showed little interest in strengthening economic ties with Pakistan. This was made evident by the absence of direct communication between the two leaders. During and after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Washington expressed a continued interest in relations with Islamabad only concerning a strategic security partnership [Corsi 2021, pp. 352-356.]. The Biden administration perceived Khan’s refusal to cultivate such ties with the White House as a sign of the PTI government’s reluctance to prioritize US interests in South Asia, which increased Islamabad’s isolation from Washington.8 Along with the absence of a high-level dialogue, Khan publicly expressed his unease about bilateral relations with the United States and stressed his resistance to Washington’s foreign policy using anti-American rhetoric [Rana 2022, March 9; Masood 2022, March 22].

Khan’s visit to the Kremlin, which occurred when Russia invaded Ukraine, further alienated Islamabad from Western partners at the risk of hampering the military’s efforts to promote a more meaningful role for Pakistan globally [Mohan 2022, February 23]. Also, Khan created tensions with the European Union when he took a provocative approach against Brussels after being urged by the European Commission to condemn Russia’s attack on Ukraine during the March 2022 United Nations General Assembly session [Yousuf 2022, March 9].

The tensions with the military materialized in the position of political neutrality assumed by the Army, which did not intervene to protect Khan from the attacks of the opposition, allowing the development of the political crisis [Subramanian 2022, March 31].

6. Opposition reinvigorated, and the ousting of the Khan government

2022 began with opposition parties blaming Imran Khan when the Monitoring Committee of the Pakistan Election Commission made it public that the ruling PTI had not disclosed it was the holder of bank accounts on which it had received millions of dollars between 2008 and 2013 from donors [Virk 2022, January 5]. PML-N Vice President Maryam Nawaz Sharif called for Imran Khan’s resignation [Hassan, 2022, January 7]. In January 2022, the PPP announced a rally against rising prices and gas shortages, calling on the Electoral Commission of Pakistan to act against the PTI [The Express Tribune 2022, January 7]. Despite the political friction between the PPP and the PML-N, Bilawal Bhutto agreed to rejoin the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM).9

Riding the wave of public discontent due to the country’s economic difficulties, on 8 March 2022, opposition parties filed a motion of no confidence against the premier in parliament, which was then submitted to the National Assembly on 28 March 2022 [Khan 2022, March 20; Singh and Ravishankar 2022, March 31].

According to the provisions of the Constitution, a prime minister is elected by a majority of the 342-member National Assembly (172 votes). The same votes are needed to oust a prime minister and dissolve a cabinet with a vote of no confidence [Shehzad 2022, March 18]. The PTI government had 179 seats in parliament, including 17 lawmakers belonging to coalition parties [Corsi 2018, pp. 366-370]. Dissident lawmakers from the ruling PTI party and coalition partners announced they would not vote against the motion [Pakistan Standard 2022, March 16; Dawn 2022, March 17]. On 30 March 2022, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement-Pakistan (MQM-P) – Khan’s ally with seven members in the National Assembly – struck a pact with the opposition and left Khan’s ruling coalition [The Indian Express 2022, March 31; Subramanian 2022, March 31]. When a group of ruling coalition lawmakers announced they were considering voting against Khan, it was clear that the opposition had the numbers to oust the Prime Minister [OpIndia 2022, March 8; Shah 2022, March 18; Almeida 2022, March 25].

7. The alleged international conspiracy behind the fall of the PTI government

Khan and the PTI accused the opposition of disloyalty to the state, alleging that it was part of an international conspiracy against the democratically elected government in Pakistan. According to Khan, the PDM coalition and the Biden administration had plotted a coup to oust him from politics and form a government with the tacit consent of the military establishment. Khan referred to meetings held between US consular staff members and Pakistani opposition leaders and a communication from the Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, Asad Majeed, according to which Washington had expressed regret over Khan’s independent foreign policy [Oborne 2022, April 7].

On 7 March 2022 – the day before the motion was submitted to the National Assembly Secretariat – Donald Lu, the assistant secretary of State for South and Central Asia in the United States Department of State, had allegedly told Ambassador Majeed that if the no-trust vote against Khan was successful, Washington would normalize bilateral relations with Pakistan. According to Khan, his meeting with Putin was an irritant and one of the reasons the US government wanted him removed from power. Upon Khan’s ouster, the Kremlin released a formal statement accusing Washington of «another attempt of shameless interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan for its own selfish purposes» [The News 2022, April 5]. The statement added that the political situation in Pakistan «leaves no doubt that the US intended to punish disobedient Prime Minister Imran Khan» [Ibid.]. Khan’s allegations led to a denial by the US State Department spokesperson [The Hindustan Times 2022, April 30].

While a motion of no confidence is regulated under Article 95 of the Constitution, the PTI invoked Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Charter which states that «loyalty to the State is a fundamental duty of every citizen». On 3 April 2022, the Vice President of the National Assembly, Qasim Suri – a member of the PTI – called the motion of no-confidence against Imran Khan unconstitutional and «supported by foreign powers» and did not allow it to be voted [The News 2022, April 3]. Soon after, Imran Khan advised the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Arif Alvi, to dissolve the assemblies and prepare for elections within 90 days in line with the provisions of the Constitution of Pakistan. Subsequently, the Cabinet Division10 de-notified Imran Khan as prime minister while confirming his position until a provisional government was appointed [Mohan 2022, April 3]. On 7 April 2022, the Supreme Court of Pakistan overturned President Alvi’s decision and ruled that the dissolution of the lower house was unconstitutional [The Express Tribune 2022, April 7]. On this basis, the Supreme Court ordered the restoration of the National Assembly and called for it to vote on the non-trust action against Imran Khan on 9 April 2022. That day, after a long session of the National Assembly, the motion was passed with 174 votes. In the early hours of 10 April 2022, Imran Khan’s term as prime minister of Pakistan was over [Almeida 2022, April 9; OpIndia 2022, April 10].

The opposition nominated PML-N President Shehbaz Sharif as an interim premiership candidate. Minutes before the vote, the PTI National Assembly members resigned en masse in protest, forcing new by-elections to undermine the new government’s legitimacy.

8. Domestic challenges of the new coalition government: the economy, Khan’s opposition, and the floods

With 174 votes – two more than the required simple majority – the Pakistani parliament chose opposition leader Shahbaz Sharif as prime minister to guide the country at least until general elections, which are due no later than October 2023 [Masood and Goldbaum 2022, April 11]. Shehbaz Sharif is the younger brother of former Pakistani premier Nawaz Sharif. He was elected to the National Assembly in 1990 and became chief minister of Punjab in 1997. Together with Nawaz, Shehbaz Sharif spent several years in exile in Saudi Arabia following General Pervez Musharraf’s military coup in 1999 [Purkayastha 2022, 10 April; Hassan and Peshimam 2022, April 9; First Post2022, April 10; The Express Tribune 2022, April 12]. After returning to Pakistan in 2007, Shehbaz Sharif was re-elected chief minister of Punjab in 2008 and 2013, governing the province until the PTI’s electoral success in 2018. In 2018, he was appointed president of the PML-N after Nawaz Sharif was disqualified from office as opposition leader in connection with the Panama Papers scandal [Corsi 2018, pp. 359-362].

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif inherited a country in a challenging economic predicament. A complex external conjuncture combined with procyclical domestic policies had increased domestic demand to unsustainable levels and led to significant fiscal and external deficits, rising inflation and eroding reserve buffers. In April 2022, the IMF set five main conditions for relaunching the EFF bailout package. These measures included the cancellation of fuel subsidies, lifting the tax amnesty regime, increasing electricity tariffs, imposing new taxes and guaranteeing savings to reduce the budget deficit [Rana 2022, April 21].

In May 2022, in Doha, Qatar, a delegation from the new government led by Finance Minister Miftah Ismail and the IMF initiated the seventh economic review interview to relaunch the stalled EFF bailout package [The Express Tribune 2022, May 18]. Pakistani authorities agreed in principle with the IMF’s requests. Yet, a consensus was not reached on several issues, such as the budget deficit, the revenue target, the plan to withdraw energy subsidies, inflation, and the rationalization of expenses [The Express Tribune 2022, May 20; Ibid. 2022 (a), May 22; Ibid. 2022, May 25; Ibid. 2022, May 26].

On 10 June 2022, amid intense pressure to stabilize the economy and reach an agreement with the IMF, the new government unveiled its budget for the fiscal year 2022-23. Finance Minister Ismail presented the spending plan to the National Assembly with an outlay of about US$ 50 billion. The austerity measures proposed included both stabilization efforts and additional taxes. The plan showed that Pakistan had agreed to meet IMF conditions such as the reversal of subsidies, withdrawal of the tax amnesty scheme, increased tariffs, and the imposition of new taxes to revive the aid package. The budget set development spending at US$ 4 billion, out of which about US$ 1.7 billion (a 2.7% increase over the previous fiscal year), initially earmarked for defence, was then reduced to US$ 1.4 billion to comply with the limitations imposed by the IMF.

Proposed critical interventions included raising taxes on the wealthiest segments of society, privatizing government assets to increase revenue and reducing national expenditures [Syed 2022, June 12; Masood 2022, June 29; Rana 2022, July 6]. The budget law introduced a reduction of subsidies to the electricity sector, and provided for an increase in tariffs of around 20%. In addition, a 455% increase in the targeted revenues from the oil development tax to US$ 3.7 billion heralded the end of subsidies on petroleum products.

The budget set the target at US$ 43 billion, including an additional 2% tax on individual taxpayers, 39% on banking companies and an increase in the tax burden on non-resident Pakistanis [Government of Pakistan Finance Division 2022; Aamir 2022, June 9; The Express Tribune 2022 June 9; The News 2022, June 10]. Conversely, a tax reversal and subsidiary incentives were offered to the construction and real estate sectors [Kiani 2002, June 11; Sajjad 2022, June 11; Business Recorder 2022, June 11].

After completing the combined seventh and eighth reviews under the EFF for Pakistan in July 2022, the IMF Executive Board approved Pakistani authorities’ request for waivers of nonobservance of the performance criteria. IMF acknowledged measures taken by Pakistan to address the country’s worsened fiscal and external positions and allowed for the immediate disbursement of the US$ 1.17 million tranche [Rana 2022, July 14; IMF 2022].

The dire economic situation did not improve under the new government, whereas Khan’s popularity grew [Tarar 2022, May 15]. Khan’s post-ouster political reaction and call for a genuine democratic system and parliamentary government in Pakistan mobilised the masses and increased his grip on the people. Khan announced street demonstrations and protests criticizing the armed forces, threatening to overthrow the new government and demanding that early elections be held before the expiry of the government’s term at the end of 2023. Police arrested several PTI opposition leaders, and protests turned into skirmishes between police and Khan’s supporters [Mahmood 2022, May 23].

The resignations en masse of all the PTI lawmakers in parliament’s lower house in April 2022 following the change in government imposed new by-elections. Three months after Khan’s ouster, the PTI party won 15 Punjab provincial assembly seats out of the 20 available in the July 2022 by-elections [Adnan 2022, July 17; The Express Tribune 2022, July 18]. The electoral success was astounding, weakening the credibility and legitimacy of the coalition government because Punjab is traditionally the electoral stronghold of the PML-N – the leading political force. Thanks to the landslide victory, the PTI controlled Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Gilgit-Baltistan. Similarly, Khan won an important constituency in Karachi, which is a stronghold of the MQM-P [The Express Tribune 2022, August 21; Ibrahim 2022, August 24]. Moreover, in October 2022, the PTI won seats in Peshawar, Mardan, Charsadda, Faisalabad, Nankana Sahib and two of three Punjab Assembly seats [GeoTv 2022, October 17].

Khan’s political attacks were not interrupted by the natural disaster that hit Pakistan at the end of August 2022 [Jamal 2022, September 8; The Express Tribune 2022, August 5]. Pakistan faced unprecedented rainfall and catastrophic monsoon floods, which in August alone tripled the average annual rainfall [Mallick 2022, September 6; Atlantic Council 2022, September 9]. According to the media, Sindh and Baluchistan, the worst-affected provinces, experienced 784% and 496% increases in monsoon floods, respectively [Abbas 2022, August 26]. One-third of the country was flooded, over 1500 people died, and about 33 million were affected by the disaster [Patel 2022, August 31]. Pakistan appealed for assistance from the international community, receiving donations and aid from many nations to address the «climate» catastrophe, as the United Nations described it [UNOCHA 2022 (a); Times of India 2022, September 10; Adil 2022, September 8; Wadhwa 2022, September 10; UNOCHA 2022, November 14].

With damages estimated to be more than US$ 40 billion, a projected 2.2% decline in GDP, displaced people and increased food insecurity across the country, the floods severely impacted the already suffering national economy [UNOCHA 2022 (b); The International Rescue Committee 2022, August 30; Mangi 2022, October 19; The World Bank 2022, October 28]. The response of the government proved to be inadequate in providing rescue and timely assistance to the population [Khan 2022, August 29]. Imran Khan accused the past Sindh PPP governments of years of corruption and mismanagement in governing the province.

The by-election results showed that Khan could survive as a prominent politician without the support of the Army and that, had the election been conducted in 2022, Khan would have had a chance to return to power. Strengthened by the electoral results, Khan intensified his attacks against political opponents and the military establishment. During an Islamabad speech in August 2022, Khan attacked and threatened police officers and a judge over the arrest and alleged torture of Shahbaz Gill. A special assistant to Khan, Gill was charged with sedition, arrested and allegedly tortured under interrogation after inciting soldiers to disobey orders from their military leaders. Over his speech, Khan was charged under anti-terror legislation by the police. The Islamabad High Court granted Khan a protective bail blocking his potential arrest; however, his addresses were banned from broadcast television and his access to some social media was reportedly also disrupted. According to Mr. Khan and his allies, his opponents and the military had initiated a crackdown on him and his party to prevent him from returning to power [Shankar 2022, August 22; Campbell 2022, August 22].

In October 2022, Pakistan’s Election Commission disqualified Khan from holding public office after finding him guilty of illegally selling gifts from foreign dignitaries when he was prime minister. While the consequences of the ruling were not known in the period analysed by this text, Khan’s popularity increased further [Rafiq 2022, September 2; Naseer 2022, September 8; Khatlani 2022, October 23]. At the end of October 2022, Khan launched a week-long march from Punjab heading to Islamabad followed by thousands of PTI supporters to force the government of Shehbaz Sharif to early elections [Raja 2022, October 31]. During the march, Imran Khan was injured and wounded in the leg in an assassination attempt in Wazirabad by a gunman who was captured afterwards. Addressing the nation from the hospital, Khan accused the government and the military of being behind the attack. Members of the PTI party revealed that they had been informed of possible assassination attempts and challenged the involvement of one gunman only reporting about hearing automatic gunfire. The captured shooter claimed that he acted alone for no political reasons. While the event strengthened the opposition, it indicated the need for a de-escalation of the tension reached by Pakistani politics, where Sharif’s government was supported by the military establishment but appeared not to have that of the people. The government refused to hold an early election but maintained an open communication channel with Khan [Dawn 2022, November 3; The Express Tribune 2022, November 4].

9. Foreign policy priorities of the new government: reconciliation with the United States, confirmation of strategic ties with China and a stable relationship with Afghanistan

Addressing foreign policy issues in his inaugural speech to parliament after the elections, Shehbaz aligned with the Economic Outreach Initiative’s provisions and reiterated the partnership’s centrality with China while wishing the country to forge equally good bilateral relations with the United States [The News 2022, April 11; Yousaf 2022, April 19; Riedel and Afzal 2022, April 22]. PPP President Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of the coalition government, made a debut visit to Washington in May 2022 [The Express Tribune 2022 (b), May 22; Ibid. 2022, May 27]. In June-July 2022, an official visit of the US Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs to Islamabad focused on the US-Pakistani partnership, highlighting the 75th anniversary of bilateral relations [Daily Times 2022, July 2; South Asia Journal 2022, July 2; The Express Tribune 2022, July 30]. A series of communications and meetings between the two governments reiterated the mutual commitment to deepen Pakistan–US ties, particularly after the humanitarian crisis [Yousaf 2022, July 7; Hussain 2022, July 8; US Department of State 2022, September 26; The News 2022, September 27]. In addition, the US State Department approved a US$ 450 million sale of F-16 aircraft and related equipment to Pakistan [Reuters 2022, September 8; Jamal 2022, October].

In August 2022, several US drone strikes occurred in Afghanistan, including one that killed al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul. It is unclear where the drones took off and their route to the Afghan air space. However, the increase in the strikes in Afghanistan strengthened the belief that the Pakistani military allowed Washington to use Pakistani territory or airspace after Khan’s sacking as part of the alleged plot that ousted the former premier [Rafiq 2022, September 4].

In May 2022, Foreign Minister Bhutto Zardari embarked on a trip to Guangzhou, China, at the special invitation of his Chinese counterpart, Foreign Minister Wang Yi. The visit, which coincided with the 71st anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations between Pakistan and China, focused on discussing the accelerating progress of the CPEC as well as regional and international issues. In June 2022, General Bajwa also visited China to attend the Pak-China Joint Military Cooperation Committee meeting, which is a bilateral military cooperation platform. In addition, an agreement was reached with Beijing for a US$ 2.3 billion commercial loan with an interest rate reduced by 1% to 3.8% [Yousaf 2022, May 21; Kartha 2022, June 15; Rana 2022, June 2]. According to unconfirmed sources, this was another by-product of the ouster of Imran Khan [Worldakkam 2022, July 31].

The new government confirmed its predecessor’s approach to Afghanistan by pleading for the Afghan cause and urging the international community to aid the neighbouring country.11 Tensions with the Taliban affect internal security, and Islamabad strives to resolve irritants and establish stable and sustainable bilateral ties with Afghanistan [Dawn 2022, January 5; Kugelman 2022, January 6; Rana 2022, January 9]. Pakistan has engaged in dialogue with Kabul to contain cross-border terrorism.12 Following the takeover of Kabul in August 2021, Islamabad requested the new rulers to address its main internal security problem, namely the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The TTP is a Pashtun-centric organization that comprises several Pakistani militant groups and has targeted the Pakistani government and its security forces. After the defeat suffered in 2014 by the intervention of the Pakistani security forces, it has reorganized and expanded its operations beyond the northern frontier areas. It is now mainly based in eastern Afghanistan, in Gilgit Baltistan and Baluchistan and has escalated attacks in Pakistan after the Taliban gained control of the country [Corsi 2021, pp. 360-361; Schroden 2022, October; Khattak 2022, January 24; The Express Tribune 2022, April 19].

Instead of providing a list of the most wanted TTP terrorists, the Taliban government offered to broker a peace deal with the banned organisation. The agreement led to a ceasefire in November 2021, which lasted only one month [Khan 2022, December 10]. The killing of the TTP’s most wanted commander, Muhammad Khurassani, in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province in January 2022 seemed to end the peace prospects [The Express Tribune 2022, December 11; Kamran 2022, January 9; Ibid. 2022, January 11]. Casualties among Pakistani soldiers in clashes with militants led Pakistan to launch air strikes against TTP fighters in the Afghan provinces of Khost and Kunar in April 2022 [Siddique 2022, April 21; South Asia Journal 2022, April 22]. In June 2022, the TTP announced an indefinite ceasefire. Pakistani authorities confirmed the resumption of negotiations, which resulted in a deadlock shortly thereafter [Naseem 2022, March 30; Jadoon 2022, June 24; Yousuf 2022, August 1].

10. Conclusions

Tensions with the Army over foreign policy and internal affairs led Imran Khan to lose the military establishment’s support. The political opposition exploited the vulnerability of Prime Minister Khan, gaining support for a motion of no confidence in parliament against him. Having lost the trust of the National Assembly, Khan had to resign as prime minister. He publicly accused the political opposition of having woven a plot with the United States, which was implemented with the tacit consent of the military. According to the former premier, the plan aimed to remove him from the political scene as he was unbalancing Pakistani foreign policy towards the Eastern bloc of China and Russia to the detriment of relations with the US and Western allies, which were desired per the Army’s geopolitical plans.

The parliament entrusted Shehbaz Sharif, president of the PML-N and leader of the opposition, with the post of prime minister. Once in power, the new prime minister had to focus on external relations to rebuild ties with strategic international partners. The severe economic crisis that gripped Pakistan at the time of Imran Khan’s fall did not find relief with the new government, which was forced to take unpopular measures to guarantee international loans while coping with a national emergency triggered by monsoon floods. Despite his fall from power, Khan’s popular following did not diminish. On the contrary, his party, the PTI, obtained significant results in by-elections in traditional strongholds of other political forces. Khan stirred crowds of followers, putting pressure on the fledgling government with constant demands for early elections. At the same time, he decried the alleged attempts by the military and opposition to crack down on the political opposition which he led, to avoid the possibility of his return to power.

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ISSN 2385-2526

The year in Sri Lanka was dominated by a severe economic crisis which led the central bank to declare financial default for the first time in the country’s history. The crisis has generated a large popular movement against President Rajapaksa and the Prime Minister which, after months of massive street protests, led to the resignations of both. After much hesitation, the new government negotiated a program of financial aid with the International Monetary Fund. However, many unknowns remained about the new President’s ability to introduce the reforms imposed by the international partners, and about the sacrifices that will be required of an already exhausted population. Although the military has avoided openly entering politics, the use of violence by the security forces and the new government’s hard line towards the protesters placed great uncertainty over the future of Sri Lankan democracy. Colombo’s need for urgent economic support has also led to a rapprochement with India, which has been the regional partner most willing to approve aid packages for the island-nation.

Keywords – Sri Lanka; debt crisis; popular protest; Rajapaksa; civil-military relations; democracy in South Asia.

1. Introduction

Despite the signs of economic crisis that emerged in Sri Lanka during 2021, few observers would have foreseen the upheaval that hit the country the following year. Since the beginning of 2022, the Sri Lankan economy was characterized by a deep crisis which manifested itself in the shortage of basic consumer goods, such as food, fuel and medicines. The struggling of a vast part of the population, with the exception of the wealthiest, in meeting their most basic needs led to a spontaneous wave of dissent. This quickly turned from an economic protest to a general uprising against the government and President Rajapaksa in particular, accused of inefficiency and corruption. Despite an attempt by the President and his circle to respond with emergency measures, the movement – dubbed Janatha Aragalaya, or «people’s struggle» in Sinhalese – did not subside. The protests culminated in July, with the crowd storming major government buildings in Colombo. This unprecedented manifestation of popular protest led to the resignation of the President. To the surprise of most observers, therefore, within months the crisis brought down the seemingly immobile power system of the Rajapaksa family and its allies. Despite the excessive use of violence by the security forces against the demonstrators, and despite the ties between the Rajapaksa family and the military, the army showed general restraint, declaring that it had no intention of assuming power. The following sections will analyse the evolution of the Aragalaya movement and its ability to force a change of government. At the same time, the essay will highlight the limits of institutional politics, including the opposition, in meeting the demands of the movement. Furthermore, the essay discusses the wider repercussions of the events in Sri Lanka. The crisis has prompted a redefinition of cooperation programs between Colombo and its two main Asian partners, Delhi and Beijing. This fact has inevitably had an impact on India-China economic competition in South Asia. The last part of the essay examines the indicators of the Sri Lankan economy at the end of 2022, and evaluates its prospects for exiting the crisis.

2. The beginning of the protest

Sri Lanka’s precarious economic situation was already evident at the end of 2021, due to long-lasting imbalances, which had been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. In particular, declining incomes from tourism and remittances from migrants had led to a shortage of foreign currency. This in turn forced the authorities to proclaim a ban on the import of non-essential goods. In the summer, the authorities had gone so far as to declare a food emergency, and to ration all basic goods and impose fixed prices [Abenante 2021, p. 342]. This policy created the context for the protests that developed in the first months of 2022.

Although the wave of protests that shook Sri Lanka concentrated in the capital Colombo, the first roots of the discontent lay in the agricultural sector. This is hardly surprising given the importance of the sector in the national economy. In 2022 agriculture represented about 7% of the national GDP and employed more than 30% of Sri Lankan workers, especially in the production of rice and tea [US-ITO 2022]. Moreover, those two sectors had been particularly favoured by state subsidies. The early signs of unrest began in March 2021, when the government had decided initially to limit, and then on 26 April to ban altogether the use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides in agriculture. The decision was justified by President Rajapaksa with the widespread concern about the link between chemicals and the increase of non-communicable diseases, and as part of an ambitious plan to make Sri Lanka an oasis of organic farming [Presidential Secretariat 2021, April 22; Jayasinghe and Ghosal 2022, March 3; Ellis-Petersen 2022, April 20]. However, according to various independent observers, the government’s plan was driven by two more practical reasons: first, to reduce the budget deficit, since a system of public subsidies for the purchase of chemical fertilizers was in force; second, to save precious foreign currency, since fertilizers were almost totally imported and costed about 400 million US$ a year [Economy Next 2020, February 23; Nikkei Asia 2022, October 24].

The government’s decision forced the farmers to switch to exclusively organic cultivation at a very short notice. This proved to be the beginning of the economic disaster. International agencies had advised Colombo that a sudden ban on chemical fertilizers in the absence of a scheme for the local production of organic fertilizers, or to purchase such products in the international market, would result in a sharp reduction in the crop [US$A 2021]. Despite the President’s promise that the state would distribute organic fertilizers, the impact on the country’s agriculture was acutely felt: rice production fell by 20% in just six months of the ban; similarly, tea production and exports decreased by 18% between November 2021 and February 2022. While before the ban Sri Lanka was self-sufficient in rice production, when the crisis began it was forced to spend 450 million US$ on rice imports [Talukdar 2022, July 22].

According to various technical experts, the government’s decision to ban all chemicals was hasty and superficial, as the transition to organic cultivation takes time and cannot be imposed overnight [Ellis-Petersen 2022, April 20; US$A 2021]. Although the government reversed its decision and lifted the ban in November, the effects had already hit the national economy hard. They produced a sharp increase in food prices on the domestic market, and also damaged the trade balance, since rice and tea were among the main sources of foreign currency. Despite an attempt by the Agriculture Minister Mahindananda Aluthgamage to defend the strategy of making Sri Lanka free from chemical fertilizers, President Rajapaksa about a year later admitted that the ban had been a major mistake [The Hindu 2021, November 24; Outlook 2022, April 19].

3. The expansion of the protest and the financial default

The resulting shortage of food and other basic goods was at the roots of the unrest. In March the protest extended from the peasant community to other social groups, above all to the younger generation. At the same time, it shifted its focus from agriculture to government policy in general, accusing the authorities, and the Rajapaksa family in particular, of mismanagement and corruption. The protest initially took the form of local street demonstrations, and night vigils in middle-class residential neighbourhoods [Keenan 2022, April 18]. However, it escalated into a nationwide agitation as a reaction to President Rajapaksa’s special address to the nation on 16 March. In the speech, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, consistent with his uncompromising style, refused to assume responsibility, instead placing the blame for the crisis on the COVID-19 pandemic and on financial imbalances created by his predecessors and opponents: «I am not responsible for this crisis…those who contributed to the creation of this crisis are criticizing the government in front of the people today» [Ministry of Mass Media 2022, 16 March]. As usual, the President’s speech made extensive reference to military rhetoric and Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism, which were the two cornerstones of his public image. However, it seemed that this ideological approach did not appeal to the population. The apparent disorientation of the authorities in the face of the crisis was confirmed a week later. On March 23, an All-Party Conference was organized by the President. The initiative was boycotted by the opposition and did not produce concrete results, apart from the confirmation of ongoing contacts with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for financial assistance. The fact that Rajapaksa had decided not to bring the discussion before the Parliament, choosing instead an informal inter-party meeting at his residence was emphasised by part of the media, and appeared as a further demonstration of the President’s mistrust of democratic processes [The Sunday Times 2022, March 27].

Popular protest grew in intensity as a reaction to the apparent lack of action by the authorities. A week after the All-Party Conference, the agitation was organized through social media and concentrated in the capital Colombo, in the area of the government buildings. The demonstrators began to openly demand the resignation of the President – behind the slogan «GoGotaGo» – and the exit from national politics of the entire Rajapaksa family [Keenan 2022, April 18]. The first serious incidents occurred on the evening of 31 March when the crowd headed for the private residence of the President and clashed with the security forces. This resulted in physical confrontations and the arrest of fifty people. In the following days, several media and social activists denounced an excessive use of force by the police and military forces. The Sri Lanka Collective Against Torture reported several cases of beatings, and the unjustified use of rubber bullets and tear gas against a mostly peaceful demonstration [The Island Online 2022, April 4]. On 1 April, faced with the gravity of the situation and fearing a popular uprising, President Rajapaksa proclaimed a state of emergency. A curfew was imposed across the country, along with the shutdown of social media. According to media sources, between 31 March and 4 April, more than 600 protesters were arrested [Asia News2022, April 4].

This, however, did not stop the protests, and crowds took to the streets of the capital again on 4 April, calling for the resignation of the Rajapaksa family from official functions. Five days later, with the slogan «Occupy Galle Face», the demonstrators took possession of the Face Galle Green area in Colombo, near the Presidential Secretariat, making it their base [The Hindu 2022, April 12]. In the following weeks this base turned into a tent city with free food, medicines, portable toilets, psychological support, and even a book exchange service. The area was mainly frequented by young men and women from different social classes: students and social activists, teachers, lawyers and farmers. This sort of ideal community, with its joyful and peaceful atmosphere, was pitted by protesters against the corruption and violence of the state agencies.

The resilience of popular protests, and the apparent lack of credible responses on the part of the executive, led to a worsening political crisis. On 3 April, the entire 26 members of the government resigned, with the notable exception of the Prime Minister, Mahinda Rajapaksa – brother of the President – who remained in his post. The ministers who resigned included three members of the Rajapaksa family: Basil, Minister of Finance, Chamal, Minister of Agriculture, and Namal, Minister of Sports [Asia News 2022, April 4]. Although this seemed to be a first sign of change, it soon became clear that the move, rather than being the result of an internal outcry, had been agreed with the President and the Prime Minister, so as to allow the former to appoint a new cabinet [Al Jazeera 2022, April 3]. Unsurprisingly, the protesters reacted with a great deal of scepticism. The protest not only did not stop but even intensified its tone and slogans. The fundamental request now became the exit from the political scene of all members of the Rajapaksa family.

In response, Gotabaya Rajapaksa made a last-ditch effort to break the impasse by involving opposition parties in the government. On 4 April, the President launched an appeal to all political forces, including the opposition, to form a government of national unity. In the statement, the President invited «all the political parties represented in the parliament to meet to accept the ministerial portfolios in order to find solutions to this national crisis» [Al Jazeera 2022, April 4]. However, all the main opposition groups rejected Rajapaksa’s appeal. The secretary of the main opposition party, the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB-United People’s Power), Ranjit Madduma Bandara, declared that «the people of this country want Gotabaya and the entire Rajapaksa family to leave and we cannot go against the will of the people and we cannot work alongside the corrupt» [Ibidem]. In fact, the opposition gave the impression of fear of being involved in the responsibility of governing such a difficult situation. Apparently, their strategy was to let the Rajapaksa family and its allies remain the sole target of popular discontent [Keenan 2022, April 18].

The plan seemed to work, as growing popular pressure caused the first fractures in the government. On 5 April, 43 members of Parliament, including 11 members of Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP-Sri Lanka’s People’s Front), the party to which the Rajapaksas belong, announced their intention to set up an autonomous parliamentary group. They were soon joined by 14 MPs from another party allied with the government, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), which at the same time withdrew from the ruling coalition; they were also followed by 16 MPs from other SLPP allied parties and two from the Ceylon Workers’ Congress (CWC), an organization representing the Tamil workers’ community. Moreover, the Minister for Property, Housing and Community Infrastructure, and the Deputy Speaker of Parliament also announced the resignations from their posts. Central bank governor Ajith Nivard Cabraal had also resigned the day before [Colombo Page 2022, April 5; Asia News 2022, April 4].

4. The resignation of the Rajapaksas

The tug of war between protesters, the opposition and the government, was accompanied by a complex debate on international economic assistance. Despite Colombo’s evident need for urgent aid in order to save the economy from collapse, the possibility of an intervention by the IMF, or other supranational bodies, was seen by many politicians with mistrust. At the All-Party Conference on 23 March, this feeling found clear expression in the view that international assistance would turn into yet another debt trap for the island-nation. Furthermore, there was widespread fear that loans would be accompanied by demands for unpopular austerity programmes [The Sunday Times 2022, March 27]. This sentiment was at the root of the Colombo government’s propensity for bilateral negotiations with India and China to obtain short-term loans, rather than for a comprehensive aid package with an international organization. This is an explanation for the delay with which Colombo started negotiations with the IMF, but also for the considerable duration of the discussion. In fact, despite suggestions from experts, President Rajapaksa and the Central Bank governor repeatedly refused to enter into negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank (WB) for the restructuring of the state’s international debt [Keenan 2022, April 18, p. 4]. Based on official statements, it was only in mid-March that the President began negotiating with the IMF. The reason for this reluctance was not difficult to see: since early March, the IMF outlined the reforms it believed were essential for Sri Lanka. These included heavy austerity measures such as cuts in public spending, direct and indirect tax increases, an end to the Central Bank’s inflationary policy, and the placing on the private market of state-owned enterprises [Ibidem]. A similar position was expressed by the WB Country Director for Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka, who affirmed the need for Sri Lanka to address the structural roots of the crisis with a profound program of reforms [Daily FT 2022, April 18].

On 6 April, Gotabaya Rajapaksa formed a committee of three prominent economists – two of whom had previously held positions in the IMF and the WB – to negotiate with the international partners [Times of India 2022, April 7]. Colombo announced the start of negotiations with the IMF for 18 April, also stating that it urgently needed to receive at least 3-4 billion US$ as immediate aid for 2022 [Keenan 2022, April 18, p. 4]. On 12 April, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka communicated the suspension of payments on its external debt, pending the conclusion of negotiations with the lenders and foreign creditors. Sri Lanka thus became the first Indo-Pacific state to declare financial default since the 1997 Asian economic crisis. It was also the first financial default in the history of the island-nation [Jayasinghe and Do Rosario 2022, April 12; Parkin and Cornish 2022, May 19].

Despite these partial signs of progress on the economic level, between April and May the political situation was at a standstill. On the one hand, President Rajapaksa and the Prime Minister seemed determined to stay in power despite the mounting economic crisis. On the other hand, the protest movement did not retreat a step, undeterred by the pressure of the security forces. Moreover, in early May the public order situation seemed dangerously out of hand when groups of Rajapaksa supporters began to attack the demonstrators. In between, the opposition seemed uncertain what to do. While they were determined not to enter a government led by any member of the Rajapaksa family, they lacked an alternative plan. There were two reasons for the hesitation of the opposition. First, they were highly divided internally, being composed mainly of the SJB, some former supporters of Rajapaksa, the leftist organization Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP-People’s Liberation Front), and smaller Tamil and Muslim parties. Second, they lacked the parliamentary numbers either to get a no-confidence vote, or to start an unlikely impeachment proceeding against the President. The scarce representation in parliament made it equally difficult to go down the road of amending the Constitution to deprive the President of his executive powers. This procedure required a 2/3 majority in parliament, which seemed clearly out of reach. However, the opposition’s refusal to share the management of the crisis, in order to leave its burden on Rajapaksa’s shoulders, could have been interpreted by sectors of the society as hindering the negotiations with international donors, and therefore as an antipatriotic attitude [Keenan 2022, April 18, pp. 5-7].

However ambiguous from the outset, the strategy of the opposition to reject a government of national unity was the key to the first turning point of the crisis, namely the resignation of Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa. In his place, the President appointed the veteran politician – and six times Prime Minister – Ramil Wickremesinghe. This gesture came after the failure of all attempts to placate the protests with public appeals. For weeks, the Prime Minister appealed to the demonstrators’ responsibility: «every second you protest in the streets» he declared in mid-April, «our country is losing opportunities to receive potential dollars» [News Wire 2022, April 11; Colombo Page2002, April 13]. Finally, on 5 May, he announced his resignation, justifying it as a step to allow for the formation of a government of national unity [Gunasekara and Mashal 2022, May 9]. The move by the Prime Minister had obviously been thought of by the Rajapaksa circle as an inevitable sacrifice in order to avoid the downfall of the President. However, this prediction turned out to be wrong. The spokesmen of the Aragalaya movement refused to dissolve, demanding that Gotabaya Rajapaksa also take a step back. A similar attitude was followed by the opposition parties, which maintained their refusal to join an emergency government.

The strategy of the opposition left much room for debate. According to some observers, its hesitation gave the President and his supporters a chance to strengthen themselves, making the possibility of regime change more difficult. On the other hand, many analysts admitted that it was very difficult to oust Rajapaksa, given the extensive powers that the President attributed to himself with the 20th amendment to the Constitution approved in October 2020 [ICJ 2020, October 27; Abenante 2021, pp. 335-336]. Furthermore, given the close ties between the President’s family and the military, and the threatening tone of some government statements, there was widespread fear that the army could make a show of force against the protest movement, and even that it might decide to take power into its hands [Keenan 2022, April 18, p. 6].

5. The July uprising and the escape of the President

After two more months of economic crisis, faced with the President’s refusal to resign, on 9 July a crowd of around 100,000 demonstrators stormed the Presidential and the Prime Minister’s buildings, even heading towards their private residences. The world media released images of cheering protesters inside government offices, inevitably bringing to mind the 6 January assault on Capitol Hill in Washington, DC. However, unlike the latter case, in Colombo the demonstrators showed overall respect towards public properties, and the atmosphere was more one of celebration and joy than of anger. Despite this, on the evening of 9 July a fire was reported in the private residence of Prime Minister Wickremesinghe. Independent sources have raised doubts about the demonstrators’ responsibility for the fire, both for the peaceful behaviour maintained by the movement, and because the episode followed documented acts of violence by the police [Keenan 2022, July 18]. Faced with the dramatic situation, the same evening the speaker of Parliament announced the resignation of the President. Evidently fearing for his safety, Gotabaya Rajapaksa left the country for the Maldives on 13 July, after appointing former Prime Minister Wickremesinghe as Acting President. From the Maldives, Rajapaksa finally headed to Singapore, from where he sent the resignation letter [NBC 2022, July 13; Keenan 2022, July 18].

Although these events apparently marked the victory of the Aragalaya movement, and seemed to pave the way for peace, this was not the case. On 19 July Wickremesinghe delivered a scathing speech aimed at the protesters, in which he called them «fascists» and accused them of aiming for power. The Acting President’s speech heralded a show of force that took place three days later. In the early hours of 22 July the army, along with the police, intervened at Face Galle Green. During the action, which saw the destruction of the camp and the arrest of many leaders and members of the movement, eyewitnesses and journalists reported the excessive use of violence by the soldiers, especially around the Presidential Secretariat. The credibility of the reports seemed to be confirmed by the official protest of the US, UK, Germany and other countries’ diplomatic authorities in Colombo for the brutality of the military. A United Nations Human Rights Office’s statement said that it was «alarmed by the unnecessary use of force» [Srinivasan 2022, July 22]. According to the security forces’ statement, the action was allegedly caused by the protesters’ refusal to leave the area. However, the Aragalaya’s leaders denied the fact, stating that the demonstrators had announced their withdrawal from the area for the afternoon of the same day. Independent observers suggested that the action was primarily motivated by the authorities’ desire to punish protesters for the 9 July storming of government buildings and residences [Keenan 2022, July 18; Srinivasan 2022, July 22].

6. A transition to where?

Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s escape from Sri Lanka on a military plane, accompanied by his wife and two bodyguards, and Wickremasinghe’s appointment marked the beginning of a delicate political transition that appeared very uncertain from the outset. Wickremasinghe was then formally elected President by the Parliament on 20 July. Two days later, he appointed Dinesh Gunawardena as the new Prime Minister. However, the political change had no appeal to those social groups that created the protest movement. The new President was labelled by the Aragalaya as not credible to lead a real change in Sri Lankan politics. Second, he already ran – and was defeated – twice in the presidential race in 1999 and 2005; this prompted many observers to consider him desperate for office. Third, Wickremasinghe relied on Rajapaksa’s SLPP parliamentary support to get elected and to govern. Finally, the leaders of the protest movement blamed him for his confrontational attitude and for the violence of 9 July [Keenan 2022, July 25]. For all these reasons, the new President was considered by most observers as a politician who was ill suited to introduce real change. The strategy of the opposition also remained hesitant throughout the crisis. This was confirmed during the election of the new President. The recognized leader of the opposition, Sajith Premadasa, head of the SJB, after having initially run for office, on 19 July announced his withdrawal from the election. Instead, he announced his party’s support for Dullas Alahapperuma, former Minister of Information and Mass Media in Rajapaksa’s cabinet [France24 2022, July 19; Reuters 2022, July 19]. This may explain why the Aragalaya remained broadly equidistant from all political fronts, and generally maintained an attitude of suspicion, even distrust, towards institutional politics. Like many other similar movements, the Aragalaya was born spontaneously out of institutional politics mainly thanks to social media. This was in part a strength of the movement. However, in the long run, it turned into an element of weakness, due to its disorganization and lack of recognized leaders [Keenan 2022, July 25].

7. A Chinese debt-trap?

The uncertainty of the prospects of the government born from the protest movement was also linked to its ability to understand and deal with the structural causes of the economic crisis. From this point of view, a crucial aspect was given by the nature of the state debt. Most of the observers of Sri Lankan economy emphasised the long-term nature of its financial imbalances. In particular, it has been emphasized that the Sri Lankan economy has been a «highly export dependent economy» basically since 1948 [Chandrasekhar and Gosh 2022, May 2022]. This has resulted in a tendency to build up a chronic trade and current account deficit, which has been financed for decades mainly by foreign borrowing. This imbalance was particularly acute after the country’s economic opening in 1977. Its external debt increased greatly in the 2000s, especially after the 2008 financial crisis. If in 1977 it amounted to 1 billion US$, in 2008 it had increased to 16 billion, and in 2020 it had reached 56 billion [Ibidem]. Based on long-term poor economic choices, Colombo’s economy has also suffered from widespread corruption. The effects of COVID-19, and the Russo-Ukrainian war had the effect of exploding these contradictions. Beyond a general consensus on the structural nature of the crisis, opinions differed on its responsibilities. Two currents of analysis can be distinguished: one believes that, despite the chronic long-term weakness of the Sri Lankan economy, the proximate cause of the crisis would be the debt contracted with China for investment in large infrastructures. A second line of thought instead believes that the debt with China is not the cause of the crisis, but that it was caused by the economic strategies dictated by Western international bodies, in particular the IMF.

Analysts who believed China was primarily responsible for the collapse of the Sri Lankan economy pointed out that Beijing encouraged Colombo to invest in large projects, financed with high-interest loans. These would have created the debt trap over the years. The same authors emphasised the close connection between Beijing and the Rajapaksa family’s power system during the 2000s. It was during the period 2005-2015 – under President Mahinda Rajapaksa – that Colombo started such large and expensive projects such as the Hambantota port (2007), the Mattala International Airport (2010), the Colombo International Container Terminal (2011), and the Lotus Tower (2012) [Wignaraja, Panditaratne, Kannangara and Hundlani 2022, p. 4; Rowand 2022, July 13].

The alternative interpretation is offered by those analysts who argue that the debt contracted by Colombo with Beijing is much lower than it is often assumed in the West. In fact, it is not easy to quantify Sri Lanka’s Chinese debt, and estimates may vary depending on the sources. Yet, current analyses place it between 10% and 20% of Colombo’s overall external debt. According to a Chatham House study, the total value of Chinese infrastructure investments in Sri Lanka between 2006 and 2019 amounted to 12.1 billion US$, or 14 per cent of Sri Lanka’s 2018 GDP. This figure was considerably lower than those of other regional economies, as the Maldives, Pakistan, Cambodia and Laos [Wignaraja, Panditaratne, Kannangara and Hundlani 2022, p. 5]. The amount of Chinese loans to Sri Lanka by 2016 was about 9% of the total government debt [Jones and Hameiri 2022, pp. 13-19]. According to this line of analysis, therefore, the fundamental cause for the collapse of the Sri Lankan economy would not be Chinese investments, but rather the poor economic policy decisions by Colombo and the neo-liberal economic recipes promoted by Western governments and international financial institutions. These would have pushed Colombo towards an ever-greater openness to external investments, and therefore to excessive dependence on foreign debt [Talukdar 2022, July 22; Scott Tyson 2022, August 19].

8. Economic assistance and foreign relations

The country’s economic crisis led to an interesting reversal of relations between Colombo, Delhi and Beijing. In 2021 Colombo relied mainly on China for economic support, as it was the only partner willing to grant financial assistance without setting conditions, at least formally. On the contrary Delhi, while pushing towards close relations with Sri Lanka, on the basis of Prime Minister Modi’s «neighbourhood first» policy, set the condition that Colombo first enter into an agreement with the IMF in order to obtain economic aid. The latter condition, of course, was unwelcome to the Sri Lankan government as it would have inevitably required profound reforms. According to most observers, Delhi had lost ground to Beijing in terms of influence in Sri Lanka. In 2022, however, the scenario reversed: since the beginning of the crisis, Colombo found more open interlocutors in India than in China. On 17 March, Delhi guaranteed an emergency credit line of 1 billion US$ to Colombo. These were followed by a variety of other aids from India throughout the year. According to India’s High Commissioner to Sri Lanka, Delhi provided around 4 billion US$ in support to Colombo from January to August [Balachandran 2022, June 25; HCI 2022, May 7; Economy Next 2022, August 23].

Compared to Indian activism, Beijing’s responses to Colombo’s contacts were much more cautious. The Chinese government has certainly promised to support the Sri Lankan economy; however, it has set a series of stringent conditions: first of all, Colombo had to obtain a debt restructuring from its lenders; secondly, Beijing called for the conclusion of the China-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement; finally, the Chinese government insisted that Colombo become more «independent» with respect to Western partners and the IMF. It is true that Beijing also offered immediate economic assistance packages; in May the Chinese government approved a loan of 76 million US$ to Sri Lanka. However, these were too small compared to the size of the crisis and, in any case, they were much smaller than the Indian offer [Balachandran 2022, June 25; Al Jazeera 2022, April 12].

Despite Colombo’s doubts about the conditions linked to international financing, the Sri Lankan government has decided to go down that road. After starting negotiations with the IMF in March, Colombo finalized an agreement on an approximately 2.9 billion US$ Extended Fund Facility on 1 September [IMF 2022, September 1; Keenan 2022, October 10]. Of course, the program was not without costs and included a series of fundamental but heavy reforms for an already impoverished population; these included tax increases, energy and fuel price changes and the fight against corruption [IMF 2022, September 1]. This opened up important uncertainties for the future political stability of the island-nation.

9. The economic indicators at the end of the year

The severity of the crisis that hit Sri Lanka in 2022 took many economic observers by surprise, given the moderate growth expected the previous year. The forecast for 2021 and April 2022 by the Asian Development Bank were for GDP growth rates of 3.3 and 2.4% respectively. Yet, the updates in September 2022 provided a negative figure of -8.8 per cent [ADB September 2022, p. 17]. For 2023, the projection was slightly improving, due to the measures implemented by the government and by foreign assistance programs, although still with a figure of -3.3 per cent [Ibidem]. Interestingly, Sri Lanka’s performance stood out as the only negative data in a picture for South Asia’s GDP that was marked by overall growth. Equally negative was the evolution of the inflation rate, which rose from 6 per cent in the last 2021 figure to 14.2 in January 2022, reaching 64.3 per cent in August. The inflation forecast for 2023 was moderately lower, albeit still very high, at 18.6 per cent. Foreign exchange reserves, which totalled about US$ 3.10 billion at the end of 2021, had essentially halved to 1.72 billion in August 2022 [Ibidem, pp. 165-166].

The emergence of the crisis also prevented Sri Lanka from benefiting from a general recovery in international tourism in many, though not all, countries in the region. In Sri Lanka, the growth of tourism that had manifested itself in September 2021 was blocked by the economic crisis in April 2022. Similarly, remittances from migrants had risen in other Asian countries even above pre-pandemic levels, while they reached just 43 per cent of previous levels in Sri Lanka. This was caused by unfavourable exchange rates which discouraged migrants from sending money through formal channels [Ibidem, p. 37]. The trade deficit decreased by 18.6 percent in the first half of 2022 as exports, especially in the textile sector, grew faster than imports, which were financed by economic support from India [WB 2022].

As widely reported, poverty in the country increased dramatically during the year. The poorest sections of the population have been hit the hardest due to inflation, food and medicine shortages, limited supply of fertilizers, and declining remittances. This has particularly affected women, who already suffered from unequal conditions before the crisis. Sri Lankan and international NGOs have launched appeals underlining that the crisis has affected men and women differently, and encouraging the adoption of specific measures to alleviate the gender gap [Ibidem; GHA August 2022].

10. Conclusion

Sri Lanka faced one of the most serious crises in its history during the year. The new president Wickremesinghe and the government dealt with an enormous challenge; namely not only to restore the country’s economy, but above all to introduce profound reforms in the political and economic structure. The President was expected to dismantle the system created by the Rajapaksas, based on centralization of power in the hands of the Presidency. Moreover, the inevitable austerity measures demanded by the IMF and international partners will likely generate discontent among the population. There was widespread scepticism about Wickremesinghe’s ability to handle such a critical stage, if only because he did not appear to have the necessary consensus. The Aragalaya movement criticized Wickremesinghe’s nomination from the outset, also citing the fact that in the 2020 election he was not even elected to his parliamentary seat. The President’s hostile attitude towards the protests helped complete the picture. These doubts seemed to be erased when Wickremesinghe put forward in August a plan to limit the powers of the President and strengthen those of Parliament, as he had promised during the protests. Indeed, with the approval by Parliament of the 22nd amendment to the Constitution on 21 October, the new executive seemed to be heading in the right direction. However, the Amendment was criticized by the opposition for being too limited. According to this view, the Constitution did not introduce accountability and transparency, and still left excessive powers to the President [ICJ 2022, August 9; Kuruwita 2022, October 26]. Beyond these uncertainties, on the positive side, the Aragalaya movement has been a very important novelty in Sri Lankan politics. For the first time, a transversal political movement has arisen in a country historically crossed by divisions along religious and ethnic lines. The success of a largely young, inclusive and peaceful movement certainly opened hopes for the stabilization of the country.

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ISSN 2385-2526

This article focusses on the five major developments which characterized Indian international relations in 2021 and 2022. The first of them was the gradual disengagement between Indian and Chinese military forces along the Himalayan undefined border. The second was the launching of an ambitious «vaccine diplomacy» aimed mainly to strengthen India’s influence world-wide, but more specifically in Asia. The third was India’s role in the Quad. The fourth was joining Israel, the UAE and the US in a new quadrilateral entente. The fifth was India’s reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Concerning the first development, this article analyses the peculiar and undefined nature of the Himalayan border, highlighting the fact that in large areas it exists only on the drawing boards of India’s and China’s military staffs and leading political circles. This situation – which, by itself, makes incidents bound to happen – is of no easy solution, even if the two parties involved were characterised by a sincere desire to resolve the issue, which does not seem to be the case. In fact, as this article points out, in spite of the process of disengagement along the Himalaya, anti-Chinese feelings remained dominant among Indian politicians and public opinion. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that, as this article shows, India’s «vaccine diplomacy» (which, after a promising start, failed spectacularly), her participation in both the Quad proper and the new quadrilateral entente (whose official name became I2U2), and her highly ambiguous policy of neutrality on the Russian invasions of Ukraine (in spite of India’s close connection with the US) had all as a main aim confronting and containing China.

Keywords – India-China relations; India-China border; vaccine diplomacy; Quad; I2U2; India’s Russian policy.

1. Introduction

The year 2020 had witnessed the worst situation of tension on the India-China border since at least 1987, when the two countries had found themselves on the brink of war. The years under review, however, saw the gradual and concerted – although admittedly halting – disengagement of the two countries’ armed forces at the points of greatest tension. This, nonetheless, did not translate into any improvement of the deeply antagonistic view of China entertained in India by the whole political class, most analysts and large sections of the public opinion.

In the final analysis, therefore, tension with China mixed with deeply rooted suspicions on the alleged anti-India goals of Beijing’s foreign policy remained the backdrop and ultimate driving force of India’s foreign policy during the period under review. Not surprisingly, the other main developments of India’s foreign policy in the years here analysed were managed by the Indian government with the need to confront China in mind as well, or perhaps above all.

The first of these developments, which was preeminent in 2021, was the attempt to transform the world-wide COVID-19-induced health crisis into an opportunity for India. The aim was to build up India’s influence world-wide, but particularly in Asia, with the view to counterbalance China’s own influence. After a promising start, nonetheless, New Delhi’s attempt ended in failure, mainly as a consequence of the Indian government’s mismanagement of the COVID-19 crisis at home.

New Delhi, however, remained in the international limelight because of her role in two minilateral alliances. The first was the Quad, namely an entente between Australia, India, Japan and the US. Relaunched in 2017, after a period of hiatus, the Quad became particularly active in the two years under review. The second minilateral alliance was another four-country entente, which came into being in the closing months of 2021 and, beside India, included Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the US.

A main, although undeclared, finality of the Quad remained – in this period as in the years before – the containment of Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific. In the other quadrilateral entente, also, which had mainly economic finalities, the anti-China dimension was not absent. Either preventing or slowing down Chinese economic expansion in West Asia was among the finalities pursued by the sponsor of the entente, namely the US. This, no doubt, was a goal unambiguously shared by India.

The final development that India had to cope with in the period under review was the need to manage the international fall-out of Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. During the previous years, the India-US military connection had become so close as to constitute – according to some analysts, including the author of these lines – a de facto alliance. Whether or not the India-US military closeness was a de facto fully-fledged alliance, Washington and its allies expected India to side with them against Russia. Nonetheless, India took an ambiguous neutral standing, refusing to publicly condemn the Russian invasion and not hesitating to profit from the possibility of buying oil and other Russian goods at discounted prices. Contrary to the expectations of many, however, the US and its closest allies, instead of sanctioning India, fairly quickly accepted its highly ambiguous position. Behind their reaction there was the fact that, while the US was engaged in facing down Russia in Europe, it saw as its main and most dangerous challenge a rising China. Whereas India’s support in tackling the Russian aggression in Europe would have been welcome but far from decisive, its role in the US-sponsored anti-Chinese arc of containment in the Indo-Pacific was crucial. As that was a role which, indeed, New Delhi was happy to play, India could count on the indulgence of the US and its allies as far as her hedging on the Ukraine question was concerned.

In the next sections, India’s foreign policy in the years 2021 and 2022 is analysed by focussing on the key points just highlighted.

2. The border problem with China

2.1. The India-China disengagement process along the Himalayan border: A timeline

As noted above, the year 2020 had seen the most dramatic increase in tension along the Sino-Indian Himalayan border since 1987. As discussed elsewhere [Torri 2021], at the closing of that year, in spite of attempts at negotiation, which had been haltingly going on since summer, no concrete step forward on the path towards de-escalation had been taken [Torri 2021]. As a result, during the winter months, the substantial and enhanced number of troops which had been deployed by both China and India along or in proximity to the disputed parts of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), namely the supposed provisional Sino-Indian border,1 maintained their forward position, braving «the deadly risk brought about by the extreme weather conditions of the Himalaya in Winter time» [Bedi 2021]. Eventually, possibly also as a consequence of «the attrition both armies had suffered during their LAC deployments in intense cold, October onwards» [ibid.], a first disengagement agreement was reached and announced on 10 February 2021 by China and a day later by India [ibid.].

The agreement, which was the result of the 9th round of talks at the level of the commanders of the two opposing armies,2 saw the complete withdrawal of troops from the contested Pangong Tso area by 19 February and its transformation in a buffer zone. This was followed by the setting up on 25 February 2021 of a hotline connecting the Indian and Chinese foreign ministers.

In the following months of 2021, the rounds of talks at corps commanders level went on and resulted, on 31 July 2021, in the agreement for a further disengagement at Patrolling Post 17A, near Gogra Post in Eastern Ladakh [Kaushik 2021]. However, in the following months, the further corps commanders’ meetings did not result in any additional disengagement. Some eight months later, namely by March 2022, it had become clear that disengagement in Hot Springs, Depsang and Demchok – namely contested areas considered of high strategic relevance – was too important a question to be reached at the level of corps commanders and had to be made at the highest political level [Ramachandran 2022, 15 March].

In this situation, on 25 March 2022, there was a surprise passage to Delhi on the part of Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who met both his Indian counterpart, Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, and India’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval. Wang appeared less interested in breaking the border stalemate than in de-emphasizing the importance of the border problems. Following what had become the traditional Chinese approach to the relation with India, Wang stressed the interests shared by both China and India at world level, in the attempt to relaunch some kind of bilateral cooperation [MFA-PRC 2022a].

Indian reaction to Wang’s approach was negative. As cogently summed up by India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar: «The frictions and tensions that arise from China’s deployment since April 2020 cannot be reconciled with a normal relationship between the two neighbours» [Al Jazeera 2022, 26 March].

Wang and Jaishankar met again on 7 July 2022, on the side-lines of the Group of Twenty (G20) Foreign Ministers meeting in Bali. In the interval between the two meetings, Beijing strived to mollify New Delhi’s hostility by supporting India’s role as the rotating chair of the SCO, which India would assume in September of that same year, and of the G20, due in September 2023 in New Delhi.

Beijing’s strategy was not totally devoid of results, as made clear by the Indian Foreign Minister’s thanks to China for its support, given by Jaishankar on the side-lines of the Bali meeting [MFA-PRC 2022b].

This more relaxed situation possibly explains why, on 17 July 2022, the 16th India-China Corp Commanders level talks resulted in the agreement to disengage from Gogra Hot Spring Area, which was carried out by 13 September 2022 [News On Air 2022, 16 September; Jash 2022].

The concluding months of the year 2022 did not see any further disengagement. Between 15 November and 2 December, Yudh Abhyas, a joint military exercise involving India’s 9th Assam Regiment and the US 11th Airborne Division was carried out in Auli, just 100 kilometres from the LAC’s central sector in Uttarakhand. Not surprisingly, the joint exercise provoked China’s protest that the exercise violated the India-China agreements of 1993 and 1996. [Ramachandran 2022, 13 December].

The situation seemed to further worsen when, on 9 December 2022, Indian and Chinese troops clashed at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Arunachal Pradesh. Nevertheless, the clash was a minor one, causing «minor injuries to a few personnel from both sides». Besides, after the clash, the two sides «immediately disengaged from the area» [The Wire 2022, 22 December].

On 20 December 2022, a fresh round of high-level military talks was held, «with a focus on resolving the remaining issues in Eastern Ladakh». Although the «frank3 and in-depth discussion» between the two parties did not lead to any further disengagement, at least the two parties «agreed to maintain the security and stability on the ground in the Western sector». They also agreed «to stay in close contact and maintain dialogue through military and diplomatic channels and work out a mutually acceptable resolution of the remaining issues at the earliest» [The Wire 2022, 22 December].

2.2. The lack of positive repercussions of the disengagement process on Indian public opinion

Summing up, the years 2021 and 2022 saw a slow, even haltingly, but nevertheless substantial process of disengagement along the LAC. This, however, did not improve the deeply negative view of China entertained by India’s political class, most Indian analysts and the quasi-totality of Indian public opinion. As noted by former ambassador M. K. Bhadrakumar, the «breakthrough» at Pangong Tso of February 2021 «was a good thing to happen», and was to be «savoured as a net gain on the road to peace». «Curiously», however, noted the former ambassador,

… the opposite seems to be happening. The reduction of military tensions in Pangong Tso has become a matter of heartburn for sections of the media and the fraternity of India’s ‘China hands’ – and possibly, hawkish elements within the establishment – who scoff at the very notion of peaceful resolution of territorial differences with China now or ever [Bhadrakumar 2021].

The same attitude continued to be preeminent for the whole period under examination. Accordingly, for example, as noted by a well-known Indian senior journalist, Prem Shankar Jha, in March 2021 «Beijing emphatic assertion that India should host the BRICS summit in the latter part of the year despite the confrontation in Ladakh has been greeted with suspicion by the media» [Jha 2021b].

In fact, most Indian analysts dismissed the positive political value of any disengagement as either the consequence of the caving in by Indian negotiators under Chinese pressure or due to the fact that China had adapted to accept Indian requests because forced by its own internal problems. So, for example, according to Colonel Ajai Shukla, the Pangong Tso disengagement had resulted in the Indian army giving up the possibility to enter an area which India had patrolled since the 1962 Sino-Indian war [Shukla 2021, 12 Febbraio; Singh, Sushant, 2020b]. On her part, Professor Amrita Jash, in an otherwise appreciable analysis of the India-China boundary dispute, while commenting the completion of the September 2022 disengagement in the Gogra-Hot Spring area, reached the conclusion that it did not signal any real progress on the path to effective de-escalation. In her opinion, China – as well as India herself – had been forced to disengage by the necessity to improve the diplomatic atmosphere prior to the SCO summit due on 15-16 September 2022. Also, the need for Chinese President Xi Jinping to maintain internal and external stability in view of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, due in October 2022, had played a role. Her conclusion was that:

If one appreciates these two factors, the recent disengagement process in eastern Ladakh tends to appear more as a temporary adjustment, or tactical manoeuvring, rather than a genuine push to resolve the dispute. Lasting de-escalation therefore remains elusive [Jash 2022].

Even more pessimistic was the conclusion reached by noted analyst Harsh V. Pant. Pant observed that «India tried to forge a partnership with China based on shared global outlooks», in the belief that «this global convergence would eventually lead to a bilateral convergence», namely to a solution of the border problems. However, in Pant’s evaluation, such a belief was nothing different from a «mythology». Indian foreign policy decision-makers had continued to perpetuate it «till it was once and, hopefully, forever shattered by the bloody clashes of June 2020 in the Galwan Valley, leading to the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers» [Pant 2022].

2.3. Where on earth is located the LAC?

Summing up, most Indian analysts shared a deeply pessimistic outlook concerning India’s relation with China. This pessimistic outlook descended from the view, entertained not only by most of them, but also by the bulk of Indian politicians and public opinion, that China, through the use of a complex and varied set of political, economic and military strategies, was bent on surrounding, choking and subordinating India, while nibbling away at her northernmost national territory.

Discussing the features of India’s negative outlook of China and the reasons which explain them is a quite complex subject, which cannot be satisfactorily discussed here and, anyway, exceeds the thematic limits of this article. In order to remain inside them, it suffices to focus on the fact that, in the period under review, the pre-existing negative outlook related to China was reproposed and strengthened chiefly on the basis of analyses which focussed mainly on the border situation, whose unsettled state was explained as a result of China’s allegedly unrelenting pressure. This pressure was read as aimed at expanding China’s control over Indian territory by making use of what – with a successful metaphor – has been described as «salami slicing» strategy. According to well-known Indian analyst Brahma Chellaney, this strategy «centers on a steady progression of small actions, none of which serves as a casus belli by itself, yet which over time lead cumulatively to a strategic transformation in China’s favor» [Chellaney 2013].

This kind of analysis, although superficially convincing and in line with the evaluations by most Western analysts, has, nonetheless, a crucial drawback. This is the unstated assumption that the LAC – exactly as the Line Of Control (LOC) dividing India from Pakistan in Kashmir – although not an official border, is, at the very least, a well-defined provisional border, whose layoff is clear to both parties and acknowledged by both of them. Or, to put it in the words of a well-known Indian weekly [India Today, 2015, 11 June] «a demarcation reflecting territories that are at present under both side’s control, pending a resolution of the boundary». Reality, however, was strikingly different.

As already explained elsewhere [Torri 2021], a well-defined and mutually acknowledged, although unofficial, dividing line separating China-controlled from India-controlled territories does not exist along most of the Himalayan border. What does exist is a series of permanently or semi-permanently occupied posts, controlled by either India or China, sprinkled along the Himalaya. These bases are in the middle of territories which are de facto «no man lands» and have never or only fitfully been patrolled by either military (or, in some cases, by both, although at different times of the year). The posts effectively held by either China or India are notionally connected by lines which have never been mutually demarcated on the ground. In some cases, these lines are notionally drawn along areas where the military of the nation claiming them as part of its own territory has never set foot, or, at the most, has done so only temporarily, or only recently.

The bases permanently or semi-permanently manned by either militaries and the lines notionally connecting them make up the LAC. Here a first main problem is that the LAC according to India and the LAC according to China are massively divergent, as shown by the fact that the Indian LAC is 3,488 kilometres long, whereas the Chinese LAC is only around 2,000 kilometres long [e.g., Singh, Sushant, 2020a].

This state of affairs, although crucially important, is usually overlooked by politicians and analysts, both Indian and Chinese. Nonetheless, the peculiar nature of the Indian and Chinese systems of control in the Himalayas and the fact that the two states have such wildly different ideas about the length of the provisional border entail at least three notable consequences.

The first is that, in practice, there is not one LAC, but, rather, two; and, as already noted, widely divergent at that.

The second consequence is that these two widely divergent LACs, along much of their respective courses, have a kind of phantasmatic existence: they concretely exist only on the drawing boards and in the operational plans of the militaries of either India or China. Quite simply, they do not exist on the ground along large tracts of their respective courses.

The third consequence is that, particularly where the LACs only exist on the official or semi-official maps of one of the two states, they sometimes coincide, but, more often, they do not. While sometimes they are divided by a «no man» land, sometimes they overlap.4 And, very often, they overlap in areas which are usually seen as strategically important. This is the necessary consequence of the fact that both India and China, in unilaterally drawing (on their maps) their respective LACs, have arbitrarily inserted as part of the territories that each nation claims as its own as many areas as possible that are considered strategically important. It goes without saying that, in most cases, these are areas which have never been permanently occupied and only in some cases have been or are fitfully patrolled – and sometimes, as already noted, by the militaries of both nations, although during different periods of the year.

In the final analysis, no internationally valid border divides India from China, as an internationally valid border must first be jointly agreed by the two nations involved and then jointly demarcated on the ground. This problem, however, is compounded by the peculiarity that along much of the territory where an Indian-China official border should lie, not even a provisional border exists, but only a series of permanently or semi-permanently manned bases, separated by wide stretches of what it is, to all effects, no man land.

This is a kind of situation that, in spite of its many ambiguities, would not be dangerous per se. The problem is that both China and India have been moving forward, advancing deeper and deeper into unoccupied territories and sometimes even into territories that have been briefly or fitfully occupied by the other side.

When these forward moves occur, two outcomes are possible. If side A realizes that side B is entering a no-man area, trying to assume its de facto control, side A countermoves, entering the same area and confronting the other side, in the attempt to put an end to the actual occupation of what is invariably claimed as territory belonging to side A. This countermove is usually carried out through a mixture of psychological pressures – for example showing boards with writings asking the opposite party to retire – and manoeuvring aimed at assuring a tactically dominant position. Most times the ongoing incident is resolved in just one day, with both sides retreating to their starting points. Historically, only in few cases these confrontations have continued for longer periods, and in even fewer have resulted in violent confrontations [Bhonsale 2018, particularly Table 4]. Unfortunately, as already remembered, in 2020 these confrontations escalated from non-violent to violent and, although without the use of firearms, caused human losses and triggered such a rise in tension to apparently push the two countries on the verge of war.

The second possible outcome occurs when one of the two sides establishes a permanent or semi-permanent basis in the formerly no-man land, without the opposite side realizing it, if not at a later date. When the realization that the opposite party has silently extended its de facto control on previously unoccupied land occurs, the aggrieved party reacts in different ways, depending on its nationality. If it is Indian, a massive number of indignant analyses appear on the traditional and new media, decrying the fact that more or less large tracts of the sacred and inviolable soil of the motherland have treacherously been annexed by China. These analyses usually end up with stern criticism of the incumbent government, which is accused of ineptitude, weakness, guilty complacency and many other rather despicable shortcomings. Often, these accusations are taken up by the opposition in parliament. Conversely, if the aggrieved party is China, the reaction is not so immediate and vocal. When, however, the same process occurs in reverse, the Chinese media does not fail to justify the action of its armed forces by presenting it as a reaction to previous Indian encroachments.

While the Indian press highlights and emphasizes China’s transgressions on alleged Indian soil, it is usually silent when the opposite happens. As a result, if one uncritically relies on Indian press reports, the impression is inescapable that transgressing the phantasmatic provisional Himalayan border is a one-way Chinese affair; Indians are never guilty of it. This powerfully contributes to strengthen the prevailing impression, entertained by Indian public opinion, that China is steadily implementing an aggressive and treacherous «salami slicing» strategy, aimed at nibbling away Indian territory. Only rarely what has become India’s «common wisdom» on China is challenged by statements from representatives of the dominant political and military circles. One of these rare statements was authored by the Indian Minister of State for Road Transport and Highways and former army chief, General V. K. Singh, on 7 February 2021. Singh, a well-known hawk on China, while speaking to the Indian media, flatly stated:

…none of you come to know how many times we have transgressed as per our perception. We don’t announce it. Chinese media does not cover it… Let me assure you, if China has transgressed 10 times, we must have done it at least 50 times, as per our perception [The Hindu 2021, 7 February].

2.4. Viewing the LAC from the other side of the border

In China, although analyses and debates on the situation of the Himalaya have much less prominence than in India, they are not totally absent. It is therefore of interest to see how Chinese analysts view the problem.

What immediately stands out is that, apparently, the Chinese approach to the problem is a mirror image of the Indian one. Like their Indian counterparts, most Chinese analysts, when discussing the situation along the Himalaya, appear convinced of the existence of a well-defined LAC. Of course, the difference is that the LAC they refer to is the one conceived by China.

This perception explains how the criticism made by Chinese analysts is mirror-like to that made by Indian analysts. This mirror-like symmetry goes to the point that two influential Chinese analysts, Hu Shisheng and Wang Jue [2020], while discussing «India’s tough foreign policy towards China», make use of the term «sausage slicing» to describe what they see as «a never-ending assertion of territorial rights via aggressive patrolling» on the part of India along the undefined Himalayan border [see also, Jha 2021].

2.5. What implies the existence of an undefined and non-demarcated border

At this point, before moving forward, it is imperative to assess the meaning of what has been argued so far. An internationally acknowledged Sino-Indian border does not exist and a continuous provisional border does not exist either, while extensive tracts of the territory between China and India are simply no-man land. Also, in most cases incidents along the phantasmatic Sino-Indian border have historically occurred in what is, to all effects, no-man land. In the final analysis the only fact which is clear and indisputable is that both China and India claim certain borders that extend on territory that they do not control and, anyway, whose control is not acknowledged by the counterpart. It is also worth stressing that both sides have been quite outspoken in claiming areas that are under the control of the other side. China, after tacitly accepting for decades the McMahon line, namely the highest crest of the Himalaya, as the de facto Sino-Indian border in the Eastern sector, beginning in 20065 has started to vocally and publicly claim what it calls Southern Tibet – namely the present-day Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh – as historically part of its own national territory [Torri 2022: 126-130]. On its part, India has never given up its claims on Aksai Chin, that is a territory never controlled by Delhi and largely under Chinese sway since the 1950s. India’s claims were reiterated and strengthened in 2019 by the number 2 in the Indian government, Home Minister Amit Shah. Shah publicly claimed the entire Aksai Chin as Indian territory in two separate speeches in parliament, declaring that regaining control of it was «worth dying for» [Business Standard 2019, 22 November and 5 December].

Allocating responsibility for «transgressions» taking place beyond a boundary which legally does not exist and whose de facto lay is a matter of dispute is objectively difficult. Nevertheless, undeterred by this difficulty, most Indian and Western analysts seem to have very clear ideas about what is happening in the Himalayas and which party is transgressing on land which is not inside its national borders. So, for example, a learned reader of the first draft of this article has flatly stated that, after the incidents in 2020,

the PLA [the Chinese army] remains in control of a sizable – exactly how large is unclear – area in Ladakh that India considers its own. It has not withdrawn since it took those areas in early 2020 and although New Delhi is reluctant to discuss it, China is effectively occupying significant territory – perhaps 38,000 square kms […] So, while there has been some tactical disengagement, the strategic gains made by China in 2020 remain, and that needs to be recognized […].

This claim is grounded by its author on «extensive media reporting», exemplified, in his/her considered opinion, by an article published in the prestigious French daily Le Monde [2022, 9 August]. This article, however, is squarely based on two arbitrary and one-sided assumptions. The first is that the international Sino-Indian border is the border claimed by India since the 1950s – namely a territory that India never controlled and which was never assigned to India by an international treaty. The second is that the LAC lies exactly where India claims it lies.

The argument that the PLA has occupied extensive tracts of Indian territory in the Himalaya has been supported by one of the editors of this journal, who has brought to this writer’s attention some reports in the Indian press, discussing a paper stating that in 2020 India lost control of 26 of the 65 Patrolling Points in Ladakh, as result of «[r]estrictive or no patrolling by Indian Security Forces (ISFs)» [The Wire 2023, 25 January; The Economic Times 2023]. In other words, the argument made by these Indian press reports and the paper they discuss is that China had occupied Himalayan territory which India claimed as its own on the (tenuous) basis that it had previously patrolled it. Nevertheless, even this tenuous basis of legitimacy for India’s claims had been nullified by the simple fact that India, for reasons better known to her political and military leaders, had voluntarily stopped patrolling those particular areas. This, read together with the fact that no legal border exists in the region, is far from proving that China has occupied Indian territory.

What it proves – and its relevance should not be underestimated – is that Indian public opinion is convinced that China has illegally occupied Indian territory. This may well be a wrong perception; however, as stated by a well-known sociological law, what is held to be true – never mind that it actually is – becomes true in its consequences. This is exactly what has happened in this case. The fact that Indian public opinion has become convinced that China is illegally occupying Indian territory cannot but have consequences. The most dangerous one is that any solution of the Sino-Indian ongoing tensions has been made both extremely difficult and improbable.

2.6. Why Western analysts share the Indian view of the India-China border problem

Western analysts have the tendency to accept the Indian view concerning the Himalayan border problem as the correct one because it nicely dovetails with the currently dominant China-related narrative in the West. This narrative is based on the idea that the world crisis triggered by the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy of 15 September 2008 was read by China as signalling the visible decline of Western – and, more specifically, US – power. This perception encouraged Beijing to develop an increasingly aggressive foreign policy towards its neighbours, evidently on the basis of the idea that the capability on the part of Washington to protect its allies was diminishing. This new aggressive policy really took off in or around 2012, with Xi Jinping’s ascent to power.6 Accordingly, as stressed by Indian analysts themselves – e.g., former Indian national security adviser Shivshankar Menon [2022] – China’s aggressiveness along the Himalaya is part and parcel of a more general Chinese new approach to foreign policy, fully visible in the East China and South China seas.

This analysis does not take into account two elements. The first is that the problems between China and India did not start either in 2008 or 2012, but in the 1950s. The second element is that, between 1988 and 2005-2006, the India-China relations went through a phase of visible improvement. This positive trend, however, was reversed in 2005-2006, namely before the start of the new phase of China’s foreign policy. Without dwelling on the causes of this somersault (which this author has discussed elsewhere in some detail [Torri 2020]), what is important to stress here is that the tensions between, on the one hand, China and her Eastern and South-eastern neighbours and, on the other, China and India do not have the same origins and causes. Considering the two sets of tensions as the two faces of the same coin can only cloud our ability to arrive at a full understanding of the problem we want to explain.

A heuristically sounder way to put the causes of the tensions along the Himalaya into perspective is to reflect on the fact that the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) has had problems in settling its land borders with no less than 14 neighbouring countries. In some cases, these problems, particularly those with the URSS and Vietnam, have been so difficult to solve to cause major military clashes. Nonetheless, it is a fact that only the land problems with India and Bhutan – the latter a state which is little different from an Indian protectorate – remain unresolved. 7

Of course, a comparative study of the reasons why the land border problems between China and its neighbours have been solved in 12 cases but not in the case of India and a state that is India’s de facto satellite, although no doubt useful, is beyond the scope of this article. Here the problem has been recalled only as a caveat against the unthinking acceptation of the thesis that the assertive turn taken by Xi Jinping’s China in the Indo-Pacific and its launching of projects like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) do account for the dramatic worsening in India-China relations and India’s growing wariness about Beijing’s intentions. This, of course, is what has being argued by the bulk of the literature on the topic with such a consistency to transform the «newly aggressive Xi Jinping’s China foreign policy» thesis into something akin to the «common wisdom» on this topic.

Without venturing into the ongoing debate on how aggressive and truly new China’s «new aggressive foreign policy» really is, this author’s contention is that India-China relations were already conspicuously deteriorating before Xi’s rise to power and for reasons that had nothing to do with it [Torri 2020]. Which means that China’s supposed new aggressiveness against India might have been a contributing factor to the deterioration of India-China relations, but certainly not its causal factor. Not taking into account the past of China-India relations can only distort any analysis aimed at identifying the root causes that continue to make India-China relations difficult.

2.7. Some concluding reflections on the India-China border situation at the end of the period under review

At the end of the period under review, two contradictory elements characterized the situation along the undefined and not-demarcated India-China border. One, scarcely noted by the Indian and Western press, pointed to an improvement of the situation; another, on which Indian and Western media focussed, pointed to a situation of increasing danger of all-out military confrontation.

2.7.1. The coming into being of a more tranquil situation

As discussed above, during the period under review, the danger of war gradually receded and, eventually, on 10/11 February 2020, a first disengagement agreement was reached. Of course, the agreement was important by itself and also as a potential first substantial step forward on the path to peace and tranquillity along the border. What, however, potentially made it a turning point in the long-drawn India-China border dispute was another development, firstly highlighted by senior Indian journalist Prem Shankar Jha. In Jha’s words:

To say that this [the agreement leading to the 10/11 February disengagement] has been a crucial breakthrough in the longstanding border dispute would be an understatement. For the agreement is not only an explicit acknowledgement that a ‘Grey Area’ or ‘No Man’s Land’ has existed between the two countries’ conflicting definitions of the LAC, but also marks a formal elevation of this area to the status of a ‘buffer zone’ [Jha 2021a].

In fact, the creation of buffer zones separating the India-claimed Himalayan areas from those claimed by China continued in occasion of the further disengagements, contributing to highlight the existence of two LACs divided by a «no man» zone.

Admittedly, the meaning of this quite important development, went lost to most Indian analysts, as shown by the fact that whereas some of them claimed that the disengagement had been a victory for India, inasmuch additional territory had been included in the Indian side of the LAC [Pant and Joshi 2021], others claimed the exact opposite, pointing out that India had lost to China areas previously part of the territory on the Indian side of the LAC [Shukla 2021; Sawhney 2021]. Also, when reporting the establishment of a buffer zone as result of the second main disengagement (agreed on 31 July 2022), the Indian defence establishment and the Indian press, rather than admitting that the mutual acknowledgement of the existence of two LACs, separated by a buffer zone, was underway, preferred to claim that «a temporary no-patrolling zone on either side of the LAC» was established [Kaushik 2021; emphasis added]. Others, implied that the buffer zone had been created on areas previously controlled by India [Khan 2022]8

In sum, most Indian analysts appeared either unable or unwilling to comprehend the potential political meaning of the ongoing disengagement process.

2.7.2 The coming into being of a more tense and dangerous situation

Both China and India had started to expand and improve their military infrastructures along the Himalaya well before the 2020 clash. Beginning in 2020, not only there was an acceleration in the building of military infrastructures on both sides of the uncertain dividing line, but also a redeployment of both Indian and Chinese troops, with the dual objective of strengthening the respective defensive positions and enhancing their capability to launch offensive strikes. Both armies built or modernized new airports and heliports, completed with hardened shelters, sometimes supposedly nuclear-proof, for aircrafts, unmanned aerial vehicles and long-range surface-to-air missiles. Both armies built new strategic roads, integrated on the Indian side by the building of new bridges, tunnels and heated accommodations for Indian troops. India was also planning the construction of two strategic railway lines in the Northeast and an additional one in Ladakh.

The number of the troops deployed behind the respective sides of the LAC dramatically increased, their striking power enhanced by the induction of vehicle-mounted howitzers, light tanks and main battle tanks; their mobility by the deployment of helicopters capable of ferrying both soldiers and artillery. At the same time, both India and China strengthened the respective air forces deployed at striking distance from the adversarial side.

In building up their military forces and logistic infrastructures, India and China had to cope with different challenges, created by the different configuration of the terrain in the two countries. Behind China’s forces deployed on the Himalaya, there is an extensive high plateau, quite distant from the Chinese heartland. This means that the Chinese have to negotiate very long supply lines. The situation on the Indian side is quite different, with shortened supply lines. However, the Chinese supply lines are a comparatively dense network of all-whether roads, which could be disrupted by India only with difficulty. Conversely, at least a part of the most recent road connections on the Indian side are dirt tracks, which not only could easily be disrupted by Chinese attacks, but are already being damaged by the inclemency of the weather.

The different configuration of the terrain plays a role also as far as the offensive capabilities of the two air forces are concerned. As pointed out by Manoj Joshi: «Operating from the high Tibetan plateau, Chinese aircraft pay a weight penalty and cannot carry a full war load. Besides, Indian radar systems located high in the Himalaya pick them up as they take off. Indian fighters […] can take up full war loads and pop up over the Himalaya to strike» [Joshi 2023].

If it is clear that the armed forces of both countries have been going through a dramatic increase in men and means, it is more difficult to assess the exact consistency and power of the two military apparatuses, and, more importantly, if one of the two is in a position of superiority vis-à-vis the other.9

Judging also from the «cautiously worded statement» by Indian Army chief General Manoj Pande on 15 January 2023 [Sagar 2023], the impression of this writer is that Chinese and Indian forces had reached, at that point in time, a situation of substantial parity along the Himalayan undefined border.

In the absence of either a mutually agreed provisional border or code of conduct, military power parity is a deterrent as good as any against imprudent and risky military adventures. Nonetheless, according to a confidential research paper by the Ladakh Police, made public by Reuters in mid-January 2023 – and already alluded to in section 2.5. – the situation remained dangerous. The paper, based on intelligence gathered in the border areas, interpreted in the light of a study of the pattern of India-China military tensions over the years, came to the conclusion that new clashes between Indian and Chinese troops along their contested frontier could not be ruled out [Reuters 2023].

Summing up, the situation along the contested Himalayan border remained contradictory. Disengagement and the building of buffer zones appeared to point towards an improvement of the situation of tension along the Himalaya. The profoundly antagonistic view of China on the part of Indian public opinion and the confidential report of the Ladakh police pointed in the opposite direction.

3. India’s vaccine diplomacy and its failure

In the years under review India’s confrontation with China was not limited to the Himalayan heights. Confronting China’s influence was indeed also a key objective of the «vaccine diplomacy» launched by Narendra Modi on 19 January 2021, while the COVID-19 pandemic was in full swing. On that day, the Indian Prime Minister announced that the first shipments of India-produced vaccine doses to neighbouring countries would begin the following day [Magee 2021].

There is little doubt that Modi saw the pandemic as a crisis that had to be turned into an opportunity, in order to prop up India’s international standing as a major world power and confront and diminish China’s influence in South Asia and elsewhere. These were objectives that could be reached if India succeeded in playing the role of defender of the health interests of weaker nations and leveraging her strength as the largest world producer of generic medicines.10

This strategy started to be implemented already in 2020, and became even more incisive once the anti-COVID vaccines became available in December of that year. In January 2021, India launched a veritable international vaccine campaign, making massive doses of anti-COVID vaccines available first to neighbouring countries and then world-wide. By the end of March 2021, however, the brutality and negligence with which the Indian government had managed the pandemic domestically came home to roost [Maiorano 2022]. As soon as the second and devastating COVID wave hit India in mid-March 2021,11 the Indian government was forced to put an end to anti-COVID vaccine exports. Limited exports were restarted several months later, in mid-October 2021, but it was only at the end of November that they resumed at full speed. By that time the good will and influence gained by India up to mid-March 2021 had been largely squandered.

3.1. From success to disaster

When, in December 2020, the mass production of SARS-CoV-2 vaccines became possible, India, because of its solid pharmaceutical industry, was in pole position to become a main producer world-wide [Madan 2019]. In particular, already in June 2020, the British drug maker Oxford AstraZeneca and Serum Institute of India (SII), India’s No. 1 biotechnology company and a foremost one world-wide, had entered an agreement. Under it, SII would produce one billion doses of AstraZeneca’s anti-COVID vaccine, to be distributed to low-income countries, including India [Rajagopal 2020]. At the beginning of January 2021, the AstraZeneca vaccine was granted emergency use authorization both in India and in a series of other countries of the Global South12 [AstraZeneca.com 2021; Pasricha 2021a]. At the same time, other India-produced COVID vaccines appeared to be on the verge of commercialization, in particular the completely indigenous Covaxin, produced by Bharat Biotech in cooperation with the Indian Council of Medical Research and the Pune National Institute of Virology [Pant & Tirkey 2021; Singh, Bawa, et al.; Dhar 2021].

In mid-January 2021, once the COVID-19 vaccines had become fully available, India started to massively export them to neighbouring countries. The first consignments went to Bhutan, Maldives, Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar and Seychelles. Mauritius came soon after. Then, in February, India’s vaccine exports went beyond the South Asian/Indian Ocean area, reaching the Caribbeans, Brazil, Algeria, South Africa and Egypt. India also contributed to the COVAX programme,13 which, in turn, supplied vaccine doses to «nearly 100 countries in the global South by the end of 2021» [Ariyawardana 2022: 153].

The number of vaccine doses exported by India was really remarkable. As on 11 May 2021, it amounted to 66,369,800 vaccine doses sent to 95 nations [Tyagi 2021].14 Only 16% of the doses exported, namely 10.715.000, had been sent as aid. An additional 30%, namely 19.862.800 vaccine doses, had been donated to the WHO as supplies for the COVAX programme (of which, however, India was also a beneficiary [Gettleman et al. 2021]). Finally, something more than half of the vaccine doses, namely some 54% of the total exports, equal to 35.792.000 doses, had been sent as commercial supplies by the two main Indian vaccine manufacturers; SII and Bharat Biotech [Kurup 2021].

This massive programme of exports was presented as the prosecution of India’s well-honed tradition of international solidarity. Given India’s record in this field,15 there is no doubt that this explanation is not devoid of truth. Nonetheless it does not represent the whole truth; significantly, not a single dose of vaccine was ever sent to Pakistan, regarded by India as an enemy. Also, as noted above, more than 50% of the doses exported were supplied on commercial bases. But, in truth, not even pro-Modi analysts had any doubt that, together with humanitarian considerations, another – and possibly preeminent aim – of the India-promoted world-wide vaccination campaign was enhancing Indian influence, mainly in order to confront China. The pursuit of this objective was favoured by fact that, in the field of medical supplies, India had «actually a comparative edge and advantage over China» [Pasricha 2021a].16

India’s vaccine diplomacy, at first extremely successful and hailed as such by most analysts, had two fatal flaws. The first was the mistaken conviction, which Modi made public in his special address in Davos of 28 January 2021, that India had already won its domestic battle with the pandemic. In fact, the Indian ruling circles were so sure to have defeated the pandemic thanks to the policy of brutal lookdowns which had been implemented in 202017 that no preparatory work had been done in order to prepare the country for a possible second wave. Hence, India’s pharmaceutical resources had been deployed to promote the international distribution of India-produced vaccine doses. When the second wave struck, it spread death and destruction all over India, forcing the government to halt the export of vaccines, included those which had already been paid or, anyway, promised. It was a decision which came as a rude shock both to countries, such as Nepal, which depended on Indian supplies, and the COVAX programme.

The second fatal flow of India’s vaccine diplomacy was the government’s grossly mistaken overevaluation of the capability of Indian pharmaceutical industry to produce COVID vaccines. As shown in a hard-hitting analysis by Indian journalist Neeta Sanghi, in the period under review the generally held belief in India was that her pharmaceutical industry contributed 60% of the world’s production of vaccines. Hence the conviction that India was in the position to contribute an equal share of COVID vaccines world-wide.

Unfortunately, these beliefs were mistaken. India did account not for 60% of the total vaccines available world-wide, but, more modestly, «for around 60% of the total vaccines supplied to UNICEF» [Sanghi 2021; emphasis in the original]. UNICEF vaccines do not represent the totality of global vaccines and are largely aimed at immunizing children in poor countries. In sum, India-produced vaccines, although being a quite sizeable quota of the world production, were by far less than 60%. More relevant for the present discussion is the fact that the manufacturing strategy behind the production of COVID-related vaccines rested mainly on the transformation of seasonal influenza vaccines. This was a kind of vaccine for which India’s pharmaceutical industry had a low production capability, because the market of influenza vaccines is largely restricted to developed countries. In other words, India’s pharmaceutical industry had always produced limited quantities of seasonal influence vaccines and, consequently, had a low capacity for production of anti-COVID vaccines. So, ultimately, the actual COVID-related production capability of vaccines on the part of the Indian pharmaceutical industry, was indeed around 20% (to be exact, according to data of India’s Ministry of External Affairs, made public in April 2021, India’s contribution to the global volume of doses of COVID-19 vaccines was 21%) [Sanghi 2021].

The government’s inability to go beyond its own slogans and acknowledge the limitations of the Indian pharmaceutical industry was then compounded by the short-sighted policy towards both foreign and domestic vaccine manufacturers. Pfizer, which, in the closing months of 2020, had applied for authorization to produce vaccines in India, was openly discouraged by Health Minister Harsh Vardhan and ended up by withdrawing its application in January 2021. But domestic producers fared no better. The government forced the price tag of India produced vaccines below US$ 3.00, namely below the price considered by COVAX as the minimum viable charge for COVID-19 vaccines. By itself, this move was not necessarily a negative one, had the government intervened to support the domestic producers through financial subsidies and/or advance payments against future supply. But it was only after the second wave struck and vaccine shortages became glaring that the government moved to support domestic producers [Ariyawardana 2022]. In fact, it was only on 19 April 2021, namely more than one month after the stop to vaccine exports, that the government, at long last, agreed to subsidize the enhancing of the vaccine production capacities of the two main Indian vaccine producers – SII and Bharat Biotech – by supplying them with Rs. 30 billion and 15 billion respectively.

By then, government policies had radically shifted from complacency about the existing COVID-19 vaccine production capacity to an activism bordering on recklessness. Already on 12 April 2021, the government had decided to approve foreign vaccines without any further local trials, provided that either they had already been approved for emergency use by the regulatory authorities of some foreign countries (the US, the UK, or Japan), or had been prequalified by World Health Organization (WHO). Also, in the case of the Russia-produced vaccine Sputnik V and the domestically produced Covaxin, the government approved their employment in spite of the fact that both of them had neither received the emergency use authorization by foreign regulators nor concluded the usual clinical trials in India [Thakur 2021].

3.2. Reaping the consequences of failure

As already stated, a main goal of India’s vaccine diplomacy was confronting China. Particularly important was preventing the expansion of Chinese influence in South Asia. Pakistan, because of its solid connection with China, epitomised by the realization of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) [Boni 2019], was considered a lost cause – and, as noted above, no India-produced vaccine dose ever went to Pakistan. But New Delhi was deeply interested both in repairing relations with Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka, which for different reasons had deteriorated, and in offsetting Chinese influence over those countries.

Beijing, as soon as Chinese-produced anti-COVID vaccines had become available, had offered them to Dhaka, Thimphu and Colombo. At first, Beijing’s offer had not been taken up, both because of doubts about the efficacy of the Chinese vaccines and the ready availability of India-produced AstraZeneca inoculations. Of course, things changed when, as seen above, in March 2021 India stopped all vaccine exports, including the doses already paid for.

Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka could not but turn to countries other than India to procure the vaccine doses they needed. Then, just a month after India stopped her vaccine exports, namely in April 2021, the WHO granted its approval to Chinese-produced Sinopharm. In the same period, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi offered to set up an emergency reserve of vaccines for the South Asian region [Pasricha 2021b]. Thus, the geopolitical space left vacant by India was soon filled by other countries, in particular China but also Russia [Bose 2021].

In a way, even more galling for New Delhi was China’s public offer to help India in fighting the dramatic surge of COVID cases caused by the second pandemic wave. The offer was first made public by a spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Minister on 22 April 2021 [Reuters 2022, 22 April.], and then reiterated by the Chinese Foreign Minister in a phone conversation with his Indian counterpart on 30 April [Xinhua, 2021, 1 May], and, more important, by China’s President Xi Jinping in a letter to Modi that same day [The EurAsian Times, 2021, 11 May].

India had been one of the first nations to send medical supplies to Wuhan, once the COVID pandemic first became manifest there. Consequently, New Delhi could have accepted Beijing’s offer as a return for the help provided in 2019. But, evidently, even seasoned that way, that was a morsel too bitter to be swallowed whole by India’s ruling class. The face-saving solution was found in not giving any official response to the Chinese government’s offer, thus silently letting it fall through, but in accepting the assistance of private, non-governmental Chinese agencies, such as the Red Cross Society of China.

Of course, the distinction between help from the Chinese state and help from private, non-governmental Chinese agencies was a rather insubstantial fig leaf. Certainly, it did not prevent Sun Weidong, the Chinese ambassador in New Delhi, from pouring salt on the wound to Indian pride. In a public speech on 8 June 2021, Sun, basing himself on what he termed «incomplete statistics», claimed that, in the first half of May only, China had sent to India more than 100.000 oxygen concentrators, 8,000 ventilators, 90,000 thermometers and over 100 million masks. He also compared Beijing prompt response to India’s plight to Washington’s evasive answer to India’s request for medical help [Roche 2021].

China’s help to India, however, was not an isolate case. Even before Beijing’s offer of help to New Delhi, India had been reduced – as noted by Neeta Sanghi [2021] – «from being the “pharmacy of the world” to a desperate seeker of imported vaccines». The hard reality of the unfolding disaster caused by the second wave of the COVID pandemic forced India to put an end to the policy of refusing foreign aid. This policy had been followed since 2004, when then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had refused foreign assistance in dealing with the consequences of the massive tsunami that devastated the coastal areas of the eastern Indian Ocean that year.18 Now, in 2021, by making use of the flexibilities allowed in the official policy on receiving foreign aids – which had been set out in a position paper in March 2008 – India accepted medical supplies from no less than 25 countries, other than China. Interestingly, among them there was Pakistan [Quinto 2021; Chakraborty 2021].

3.3. Attempting to get back into the game

By mid-November 2021, the COVID situation in India started to improve. This allowed Modi to relaunch India’s vaccine diplomacy. In September, the members of Quad, including India, vowed to deliver over a billion of India-manufactured vaccine doses. In doing that, the Quad nations were promising to finally implement a programme that had originally been announced in March but blocked by India’s COVID crisis. The following month, at the G20 summit held in Rome on 30-31 October, Modi boldly offered to deliver five billion doses of anti-COVID vaccine by the end of 2022 [Ganguly 2021].

India’s late return to the game of «vaccine diplomacy» and Modi’s boast that India would supply five billion vaccine doses by the end of 2022 could not return India to the central position in the fight against COVID-19. As noted by Šumit Ganguly: «Prime Minister Modi’s tragic handling of COVID-19 and his uneven policy record at home and abroad [did] not inspire much confidence in his return to the global stage or in India’s ability to deliver on the commitments it makes». Also, as again pointed out by Professor Ganguly, while at the beginning of the year only India and China were distributing vaccine doses to the Global South and beyond, by the beginning of December G7 countries, including the US, had «pledged to donate billions of doses by the end of 2022». Their entering the game «meant that India’s return to vaccine diplomacy would be additive rather than distinctive». This, by itself, would negate Modi’s objective to present India as a key world player in the fight against the COVID pandemic [Ganguly 2021].

When Narendra Modi promised that India would supply 5 billion doses, his offer dwarfed that made by higher-income countries, which had committed to donate no more than 2.74 billion doses [Kiernan et al. 2021]. However, once again, Modi’s promise turned out to be nothing but an empty boast: data collected by the Launch and Scale Speedometer, updated to mid-February 2023, show that India-donated vaccine doses were no more than 71 million. India, therefore, had given a minuscule proportion of the quantity promised by Modi and was only 8th in the scale of donor countries.19

4. The revival of India’s foreign policy after the failure of «vaccine diplomacy»

The period between the failure of India’s vaccine diplomacy, signalled by the freeze of COVID vaccine exports in late March 2021, and the beginning of the Ukraine crisis eleven months later saw India’s attempt – on the whole successful – to restore her dented prestige at the international level. This objective was reached through a set of different initiatives, in particular the role that India played as non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), her participation in the activities of the Quad and her joining a new US-sponsored quadrilateral entente, the «Western Quad» or «I2U2». Both her participation in the reenergized Quad and her joining the I2U2 represented less the start of new trends in India’s foreign policy than the crowning or completion of long-term trends, in most cases ongoing well before Modi’s ascent to India’s prime ministership.

4.1. India at the UNSC

On 1 January 2021, India became a non-permanent member of the UNSC, a two-year term office. This was a position which allowed India to promote the pursuit of her long-sought goal of obtaining a permanent UNSC seat. Also, India took over as president of the UNSC in August 2021, namely the same month that saw the Taliban’s violent seizure of power in Afghanistan [Boni 2022]. This was a development deeply contrary not only to US and Western interests, but also to those of India, given Indian involvement in supporting the Ghani government. As UNSC president, India chaired the discussions on how to manage the Afghan catastrophe, and played an active role in moulding Resolution 2593. Adopted with 13 votes and two abstentions (China and Russia),20 Resolution 2593 demanded that Afghan territory not be used to threaten or attack any country, and reiterated the importance of combating terrorism in Afghanistan. It also called for enhanced efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan and asked the Taliban to honour their statement of 27 August 2021, in which they had promised that Afghans could leave the country at any time and from any border they wished [United Nations 2021]. The resolution soon came to represent the consensus view of the global community on how to deal with the situation in Afghanistan.21

4.2. India and the Quad

The period under review saw the rapid and conspicuous growth in relevance of the Quad, namely the quadrilateral entente including Australia, India, Japan and the US. This entente had originally taken shape as a result of the joint efforts of these four nations in providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief following the 2004 Tsunami. After a few years of promising growth, the Quad had come to a sudden end, being disbanded in 2008. However, on 11 November 2017, the quadrilateral entente was resuscitated in a meeting of senior officials belonging to the four nations, held on the side-lines of the ASEAN summit in Manila. Both in its first and second phase, the institutional framework of the Quad had been limited to periodical meetings between representatives of the four member nations. Also, its objectives remained indefinite up to the beginning of its second phase. Nevertheless no one doubted that the Quad was an alliance in progress, whose main – although undeclared – objective was the containment of China.22

Adhering to a well-defined anti-China common strategy and implementing it was however made difficult – and had caused the folding up of the Quad in 2008 – by several factors. One was the different economic and military structures of the member states; another, possibly more important, was their different geographical locations. Significantly, during the Quad’s first phase, the member states were constantly unable to conclude their meetings with a joint statement. Rather they issued separate statements that, although with several elements in common, were characterized by important differences. Significantly, as noted by some analysts, anti-China positions in the different final statements were spelled out with a clarity and forcefulness which were directly proportional to the geographical distance of the state authoring the statement from China [e.g., Torri 2018: 19-20].

The relaunching of the Quad in November 2017 was mainly the work of the Trump administration. In sponsoring the rebirth of the four-nation entente, Washington not only aimed at strengthening the US sponsored anti-China arc of containment, but at transforming the Quad into the nucleus of a NATO-like military organization.

This was a goal made explicit on 31 August 2020 by US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun. Nonetheless, it was a prospect that left India – namely the only Quad member country to have a land border with China, and, as already noted, an extremely long and unsettled one – decidedly cold.

The Quad had a de facto military arm, represented by the periodical Malabar Exercise,23 which had a powerful reach on the Indian and Pacific Oceans; however, the four countries entente did not have a corresponding land-based military organization. This made India the Quad member country by far more exposed to a possible retaliation by China. Hence, New Delhi’s continuing reluctance to the Washington sponsored transformation of the Quad into a full-blown military alliance. It was a reluctance which induced then US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to define India as the «wild card» in the four-country entente [NDTV 2023]. Significantly, although the rebirth of the Quad had been hailed by a joint communiqué on the part of the member states, each of them accompanied it with its own communiqué. As in the first phase, although the four different communiqués had much in common, they had significant variations as well.

The situation changed when the Biden administration took over (20 January 2020). It soon became clear that the new administration – as the previous one – considered the Quad as a main instrument to wield US influence over the oceans surrounding the Asian continent, and, therefore, to project such influence inside the continent itself. In this project, India could not but play a key role, as, without her, the control of the Indian Ocean – from the east coast of Africa up to the strategically decisive Malacca Straits – would have been extremely difficult if not totally impossible. No doubt, this was something that had been understood by the Trump administration too. Nonetheless, the most that it had done to ally New Delhi’s preoccupations had been tightening the bilateral military connection and continuing with the increasingly massive sales of state-of-the-art weapons to India. This strategy, however, had had limited results in dispelling India’s doubts about a militarization of the Quad. Very possibly, the perception of both India’s importance as a member state of the Quad and the need of ally her fears was at the origin of a radical change of emphasis in the identification of the Quad objectives on the part of the Biden administration.

Since the Biden administration took over, both the number of the Quad meetings and the level of the representatives taking part in them grew spectacularly [see table 1]. At the same time, the Malabar exercise, which after 2007 had been de-escalated to a bilateral India-US exercise, to become a trilateral one (including Japan) in 2014, further expanded. Beginning with its 23rd edition, held in November 2020, the Australian navy was included. It is worth stressing that, although Australia had been requesting to re-join24 the Malabar exercise since 2017, India had hitherto resisted the request.

Not only the importance of the Quad was growing, but Indian attitude towards it had become more welcoming. The turning point in both developments was the first summit of the Quad leaders, which took place in the virtual format (due to the persistence of the COVID pandemic) on 12 March 2021. The meeting concluded with a joint statement, entitled «The Spirit of the Quad». In it, after the habitual rhetoric about «promoting a free, open, rules-based order, rooted in international law», the objectives of the four countries entente were clearly defined. They were the response to the economic and health crisis caused by COVID-19, the combat against climate change, the control of the cyber space, the control of critical technologies, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure investments, humanitarian-assistance, disaster-relief and maritime domains awareness [The White House 2021].

What characterized this programme – which was reiterated in a more detailed form in the joint statement concluding the Quad leaders’ meeting 24 May 2022 [The White House, 2022b] – were two elements. The first was the absence of any explicit reference to any present or future military dimension of the entente. The second was that most objectives outlined, and potentially the most relevant among them, had an unmistakably anti-China subtext. The control of the cyberspace aimed at negating it to China; the control of critical technologies was undisguisedly aimed at competing with Huawei, the Chinese leading global provider of information and communications technology (ICT); quality infrastructure investment aimed to compete with China’s BRI; even the response to the COVID-19-induced crisis was in competition with China’s attempt to promote its influence through its own «vaccine diplomacy».

Indian analysts and political personalities have sometimes claimed, usually in an implicit way, that the metamorphosis of the Quad project from an Asian NATO in the making to an organization which aimed at containing China by making use of non-military means was the result of India’s influence. Basing ourselves on the available documentation, however, it is difficult, if not impossible, to decide if metamorphosis of the Quad objectives was autonomously decided by Washington or brought about or at least facilitated by New Delhi’s diplomacy. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that it satisfied India’s sensitivities and served its interests. Also, the Biden administration-promoted Quad policy was clearly complemental to autonomously sponsored India-promoted foreign policy strategies. Or, reversing the point of observation, some potentially important India-promoted foreign policy strategies might be viewed as complemental to the prosecution and expansion of Quad-promoted strategies.

In particular, this was the case with the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI). Launched by Narendra Modi at the East Asia summit of 2019, IPOI aspired to «create partnerships between like-minded states», with the objective «to pool their resources in areas like maritime security, trade, sustainable use of maritime resources under a blue economy, capacity building through the sharing of crucial information and resources, and building maritime infrastructure for connectivity and disaster prevention» [Panda 2023]. Differently put, Quad-promoted and IPOI-sought-after objectives were synergetic.

4.3. India and the «Western Quad»

The announcement that, beside the original one, a new quadrilateral entente was in the making, including India, Israel, the UAE and the US, was made on 18 October 2021, while India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar was on an official visit to Israel. The announcement was the result of decisions taken during a part-virtual, part-in person summit between the foreign ministers of the four states [Laskar 2021; Malhotra 2021].

The new grouping was provisionally called International Forum for Economic Cooperation. However, UAE Ambassador in India Ahmed Albanna defined it the «West Asian Quad» [Rossi 2022b]. The label stuck and continued to be used by the media also after the change of the official name of the new entente to I2U2 (the two Is being the initials of India and Israel and the two Us those of the US and the UAE).

The goal of the new entente was openly transactional: ideological considerations were pushed aside in favour of integrated economic cooperation. This was favoured by the complementarities of the economies involved and by the fact that the «Western Quad» was the logical culmination of a series of initiatives already under way.

Concerning the economic complementarities, Israel contributed with technical expertise, the UAE with investments, India with low-cost manpower; on its part the US, which could provide both investments and expertise, also acted as the guarantor of the entente. Looking at things from the vantage point of Indian interest, it is clear that her joining the new entente was the end result of the convergence of two different trends: one was the increasingly close connection with Israel; another was the increasingly close relationship with Arab Western Asia. The eventual harmonization of these hitherto somewhat contradictory trends had been offered by the US-sponsored Abraham Accords. Announced on 13 August 2020 and effective since 15 September of the same year, the Abraham Accords had normalized the relations between Israel and the UAE.25

At the time of the signing of the Abrahms Accords, India’s connections with both Israel and the UAE were already on a visible upward swing. In 1992, the year when India established diplomatic relations with Israel, bilateral trade between the two countries amounted to a modest US$ 200 million; from April 2021 to January 2022, however, it had grown to a little less than US$ 6.3 billion, with the balance of trade in favour of India. This balance left apart the huge arms exports from Israel to India, which, after the normalization of the bilateral relations, had rapidly made of Israel one of the main arm suppliers to India, in direct competition with the US and Russia. Also, numerous strategic partnerships between Israel and India were already on foot in the field of agriculture, climate, water, science and technology, and food [Bhamidipati 2022]. Finally, India and Israel were also united by an intelligence-sharing agreement for counterterrorism purposes [Rossi 2022b].

As far as India’s connection with the UAE is concerned, it must be noted that the latter country was host to an Indian expatriate community numbering nearly 9 million people. Their annual economic remittances accounted for some 65% of the total remittances to India, or some 3% of India’s GDP. The UAE was also one of India’s key suppliers of oil and India’s third largest trade partner as well as India’s second largest export destination [Suri & Sethi 2023].

The tightening of the relations between India and not only the UAE but Saudi Arabia too had resulted in agreements aimed at countering the economic activities and ensuring the extradition of Indian and Pakistani terrorists based in those Arab countries. Particularly since the visit of Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud to India in 2006, Saudi Arabia and the UAE had been «investing in India’s national infrastructure projects, increasing non-oil trade with India and expanding crucial imports from India ranging from vaccines to wheat» [Ganguly and Blarel 2022]. Most specifically, according to Francesco Galietti, CEO of Policy Sonar, a political risk consultancy, the backbone of the economic connection between the UAE and India had become «the manufacturing value chain in food production and processing». In Galietti’s evaluation: «The Emiratis use India as an outdoor garden, financing the creation of dedicated infrastructure in the Indian subcontinent and deploying DP World’s formidable terminal operators»26 [Rossi 2022b]. This set of connections had underpinned the India-UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) signed on 27 March 2021, a few months before the announcement of the creation of the Western Quad.

The 2021 India-UAE CEPA had two main aspects: the first was either the elimination or gradual and substantial reduction of all the tariff and non-tariff barriers in the two-way trade; the second was the equal treatment granted to Emirati companies in the case of their participation in tenders for public contracts in India [GOI 2022; UAE n.d.]. Symptomatic of both the importance of the UAE-India CEPA and the interest of both parties in concluding it was the fact that the agreement was reached in barely 88 days, namely a really unusual and surprisingly rapid timeframe [Rossi 2022a].27

The Western Quad was presented as – and, undoubtedly, at the moment of its launching preeminently was – «an international forum for economic cooperation, with a focus on exploring, emphasizing and ultimately channelizing the unique capabilities of each country into a joint working group» [Sengupta 2021]. Nonetheless, there are few doubts that the initiative had been sponsored by the US as a way to counter and possibly block China’s growing economic penetration into Israel and the UAE.

Quite apart from the economic benefits accruing from her participation in the I2U2, this was a political objective that India could not but wholeheartedly share. From this viewpoint, the new quadrilateral entente foreshadowed the coming into being of a sort of eastern wing of an anti-China US-sponsored arc of containment, of which the Quad proper was the eastern wing. In this context, India played the role of connecting link and supporting keystone of the whole system. It is also worth noting that India had another additional political advantage from its participation in I2U2. Being a member of the Western Quad strengthened her attempt to isolate Pakistan from the Gulf countries.28

It is significant that, in spite of the tensions caused in the India-US relation by New Delhi’s position on the Ukraine crisis (analyzed below), the tightening of the I2U2 grouping progressed rapidly and smoothly. On 14 July 2022 the first (virtual) prime ministerial/presidential meeting of the leaders of the four countries was held and the launching of two important projects, both located in India, was announced. They were a US$ 2 billion UAE-financed project, aimed to create a series of integrated food parks across India, and a cooperative hybrid renewable energy project in Gujarat, consisting of 300 megawatts of wind and solar capacity complemented by a battery of energy storage system [The White House, 2022c].

5. The Ukraine crisis and India’s (ambiguous) neutrality

On 24 February 2022, Russian armed forces, which had been amassing near the border with Ukraine since October 2021, invaded the neighbouring country. The invasion, baptised by Russian President Vladimir Putin with the Orwellian name of «special military operation», had Ukraine’s «demilitarization» (namely the dismantling of Ukraine’s armed forces) and «denazification» (namely regime change and the imposition of a vassal regime in Kyiv) as their declared goals.

In starting the invasion, Vladimir Putin most likely acted under the double delusion that Russian military forces would if not fully conquer, at least come to control the vital ganglia of Ukraine, including its capital city, in a matter of days and that the West would meekly accept the fait accompli without any reaction more dangerous than some indignant public censures.

The unexpected and highly effective resistance offered by Ukraine and the rallying behind it of the US and the most important European states transformed what had been planned as an unstoppable, victorious blitzkrieg and a painless political operation into a long-drawn war and the most dangerous and prolonged European-centred crisis since the end of World War II. Its cascading political and economic effects soon began to be felt not only in Europe but in much of the rest of the world.

The Western powers, while providing Ukraine with military and non-military supplies, tried to isolate Russia both politically and economically, by imposing increasingly tighter sanctions on it. In this, however, their success was limited; many countries, particularly in the Global South, hedged their bets choosing some form of neutrality. In some cases, it was a neutrality that bordered on tacit or badly concealed support for Russia.

Among the countries which, since the beginning, espoused a position of alleged neutrality, there was India, which justified her position by claiming that, rather than taking sides, she preferred to work for peace. In fact, since the beginning of the «special military operation», Modi had kept his lines of communication open with both the Russian and Ukraine Presidents, in the alleged effort to favour direct negotiation between the two.

While the Ukraine crisis unfolded, India’s position became increasingly nuanced and ambiguous. Her refusal to openly condemn Russia was qualified by a series of official positions which sounded as implicitly critical of Russian behaviour.29 Also, India kept sending humanitarian help to Ukraine [e.g., Ukrinform.net, 2022; The Print, 2022]. Conversely, nonetheless, in spite of the sanctions imposed by the West on Russia, India accepted Russian offer to buy Russian oil at discounted price.

Not surprisingly, India’s stance triggered a series of criticisms on the part of Western politicians and media. Rather counterintuitively, however, these criticisms were not accompanied by any sanction on the part of the US and its closer allies. In fact, India’s standing on the Ukraine crisis came to be de facto accepted by them after a little more than one month since the start of the Russian invasion. By the end of the year, it had become crystal-clear that, in spite of India’s ambiguity toward Russia, India-US relations remained particularly close and cordial.30

5.1. India’s policy of ambiguous neutrality: its beginning

When, on 26 February 2022, only two days after the launching of Russian invasion, the UNSC voted on a resolution demanding the immediate withdrawal of the Russian troops, India was one of the three countries which abstained.31 India also abstained on a procedural resolution calling for as emergency session of the UN General Assembly [Lukin and Pareek 2022].

On 3 March 2022, at a special Quad meeting, convened by US President Biden specifically to discuss «the war against Ukraine and its implications for the Indo-Pacific», India was the only one among the four members of the entente not to condemn Russia [Jayasekera 2022]. However, no public denunciation or criticism of India’s position followed, but only «gentle efforts», made far from the limelight, aimed at convincing India to change her position [Prakash 2022]. In fact, the months from March to May witnessed a «flurry of diplomatic activities», characterized by exceptionally numerous high-level visits to New Delhi on the part of heads of governments, foreign ministers and senior-level officials, together with virtual meetings between Modi and the leaders of countries such as the US and Australia [Venkataramakrishnan 2022].32

A fortnight after the Quad special meeting, on 18 March 2022, an Indian government official revealed that India had decided to increase her imports of Russian oil, which was offered with a 20% discount [Al Jazeera 2022, 18 March]. In the following months, India’s imports of Russian oil boomed. By September 2022, they had increased 10 times compared to the year before, which had transformed Russia from a marginal player to India’s third-biggest oil supplier [Das and Ghosal 2022]. By October, Russia became India’s top oil supplier (making up for 22% of India’s total crude imports), surpassing her traditional key providers, namely Iraq and Saudi Arabia [The Wire 2022, 6 November]. Also, the value of India’s coal imports from Russia significantly increased and, by September 2022, had risen four-fold compared to the previous year [Das and Ghosal 2022].

5.2. The US’ acceptance of India’s policy of neutrality

On 21 March 2022, US President Joe Biden, discussing the Quad position on the Ukraine crisis at a business round table, while stressing that Japan and Australia had been «extremely strong […] in terms of dealing with Putin’s aggression», admitted that India’s standing on the matter was «somewhat shaky» [Das 2022a].

Counterintuitively, however, ten days later (31 March) both the US and Great Britain signalled their acceptance of India’s decision to buy discounted Russian oil. Daleep Singh, US deputy national security adviser for International Economics, declared that the US, although hoping that there would be no rapid growth of Indian oil imports from Russia, was not going to set any «red line», as «[f]riends do not set red lines» [Das 2022b]. On her part, British Foreign Minister Liz Truss stated that her country respected India’s decision to buy discounted oil from Russia [Reuters, 2022, 31 March].

On 11 April there was an unplanned virtual meeting between Biden and Modi, requested by the US [The White House 2022a; Pandey 2022]. This was followed by the already planned 2+2 India-US meeting, bringing together the foreign and defence ministers of the two countries. What had been the most significant political result of the 2+2 meeting, anticipated by the bonhomie visible in the bilateral Biden-Modi meeting, was made clear by US Secretary of State Tony Blinken’s declarations on 11 April. At the joint press conference which concluded the 2+2 meeting, Blinken stressed the connections existing between the US and India «across virtually every realm: commerce, education and security». With reference to India’s purchases of Russian energy resources, the US Secretary of State noted that there were «carve-outs» for them. Which, in plain language, meant that exceptions, although made with some effort or difficulty, could be made. As already signalled by Daleep Singh, Blinken’s only caveat was that the US was «looking to allies and partners not to increase their purchases of Russian energy». A statement that, however, was preceded by the caveat that: «Every country is differently situated, has different needs, requirements…», and followed by the acknowledgement that there was «a long history, a long relationship between India and Russia, which was going back to a time when the US was «not able to be a partner of India». Blinken’s conclusion was that: «We [the Americans] are now both able and willing to be such a partner, to be a security partner of choice for India» [Business Standard, 2022, 12 April].33

Summing up, the bilateral Biden-Modi virtual meeting and the closely following 2+2 ministerial meeting sanctioned the fact that the US and India had agreed to differ on the Ukraine question, while maintaining and increasing their connections.

5.3. The reasons behind India’s neutrality towards Russia

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion, the US and its most important allies framed the conflict in Ukraine as an all-out fight counterpoising democratic countries to autocratic regimes. Viewed in this perspective, the ambiguous neutrality of India, the world’s largest democracy, could not but appear surprising. Of course, here a main problem was that, as documented by analyses in this journal and elsewhere, since Narendra Modi’s ascent to the prime ministership India had gone through a severe democratic involution. Hence, when the Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine the political configuration of the «largest world’s democracy» – and according to Modi’s bizarre claims, the oldest one, together with the US [The White House 2022a], and the «mother of all democracies» [Outlook, 2023, 15 March] – was in an advanced stage of democratic involution. The process, started in 2014 by Modi’s ascent to the prime ministership, was transforming India’s democracy into a political system much more similar to that of Russia and other authoritarian democracies (such as Hungary and Poland), than to the democratic systems prevailing in the main Western democracies.

However, it goes without saying that the question of democracy had relevance only at the rhetorical level. The policies followed by all the countries affected by the Ukraine war were firmly grounded on realpolitik.

In the case of India, its stand on the Ukraine crisis was motivated by the pursuit of two objectives, both ultimately related to the containment of China. This applies even if, rather paradoxically, New Delhi and Beijing found themselves on the same side when (abstaining from) voting on the Ukraine question in the UN.

The first reason behind India’s Ukraine policy – so obvious to be immediately individuated and widely commented by analysts and media world-wide – was related to India’s still heavy dependence on Russia supplied weapons and weapon systems. Although India, the world’s main importer of arms, had been differentiating the sources of its acquisitions during the previous two decades, and, consequently, decreasing the share of Russian arms which she bought [The Economist 2022, 14 April], the facts remains that the Indian armed forces were still predominantly equipped with Russian weapons [Jaffrelot and Sud 2022]. Any sudden and drastic reduction in arm supplies from this source could not fail to reflect negatively and conspicuously on the operational capabilities of the Indian armed forces. In turn, any reduction in these operational capabilities could not but reflect negatively on India’s ability to militarily counter China.34

This kind of constraint was quite evident. But another one was present that, in the evaluation of such a perceptive analyst as Ashley Tellis, was even more important. This was the necessity on the part of India to preserve its friendship with Russia «to prevent deepening Russian ties with China» [Tellis 2022]. A Russia which, put under pressure by the West, could find some sort of support only from China, therefore becoming increasingly closer to it – and, given the hugely different weight of the two countries, increasingly dependent on it – was nothing less than a geopolitical nightmare for India. This explains an Indian «neutral» policy that, in the eyes of Indian strategic elites themselves amounted to «a subtle pro-Moscow position» [Tellis 2022]. The objective of this policy was giving Russia enough political space to prevent or at least slow down too tight an embrace between Moscow and Beijing.

In the final analysis, the reasons behind New Delhi’s ambiguous Russian policy, while squarely based on the pursuit of national self-interest, did not clash with the long-term interest of the US itself. Keeping Indian armed forces in good shape, and therefore maintaining India as a credible military counterweight to China, was fully congruent to the US policy in the Indo-Pacific. Likewise, creating a geopolitical space which would allow Russia some freedom to manoeuvre, which, in turn, would prevent its subordination to China from being an inevitable outcome, did not go against Washington’s interests. All this goes a long way in explaining Washington’s acceptance of New Delhi’s stand, particularly if one keeps in mind that the latter’s ambiguity on Russia was coupled by the clear-cut alignment with the US position in the Indo-Pacific.

5.4. The US’s continuing acceptance of India’s neutrality towards Russia

The April turning point – represented by the bilateral Biden-Modi virtual meeting and the 2+2 ministerial meeting – was confirmed by the decision taken by the US House of Representatives on 14 July 2022. It concerned the vexata quaestio of India’s acquisition of Russia-produced, state of the art long-range surface-to-air mobile missile defence system S-400 Triumf.

The Triumf system was generally considered as the most sophisticated air defence platform in existence, with the additional advantage to cost around half of its Western equivalents [Pandey 2021]. Not surprisingly, many countries had shown interest in buying it, including India. However, since 2017, countries which bought from Russia could be targeted by US sanctions, imposed on the basis of the US Countering America’s Adversaries Trough Sanctions Act (CAATSA) [Public Law 2017]. CAATSA, which had been signed into law on 2 August 2017, aimed «to counter aggression by the Governments of Iran, the Russian Federation, and North Korea». It made possible to sanction any country, company or individual that had «significant transactions» with any of the three countries in the crosshair of CAATSA. Naturally enough, a major Russian defence hardware as the S-400 system soon became a privileged objective of CAATSA sanctions. Not only China but also a NATO member-state as Turkey was sanctioned because it had bought Triumf anti-missile platforms.

Among the countries which had decided to buy the S-400 system there was India, which signed a US$ 5 billion deal with Russia to buy five S-400 platforms in October 2018 and started to induct them in December 2021. Since the signing of the deal, the threat of CAATSA sanctions had hanged on India like a sword of Damocles. On 14 July 2022, nonetheless, the House of Representatives passed a legislative amendment, authored and sponsored by Indian-American Congressman Ro Khanna, urging the Biden administration to waive any possible CAATSA sanction on India. As explicitly stated by Khanna, the House’s request aimed at helping India to deter aggressors like China [The EurAsian 2022; The Indian Express 2022].

The amendment still needed the approval of the Senate and the signing of the US President before becoming law. However, the fact that it had been passed in the House of Representatives by a bipartisan vote, meant that its final enactment was little more than a formality [Bedi 2022].

These openings on the part of the US were reciprocated by an enhancement on the part of India of her subtle and mainly indirect criticisms to Russia’s aggression. On 16 September 2022, on the side-lines of the annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, there was a bilateral Modi-Putin meeting, the first face-to-face one since the launching of the Russian invasion. In that occasion, the Indian Prime Minister stated: «I know today’s era is not [an era] of war», and added that he hoped to discuss «how we can move forward on the road of peace in the coming days» [Laskar 2022].

By making this statement, Modi was not finally distancing India from Russia on the Ukraine war. Rather, he was carrying on the political line constantly followed since the Russian invasion of Ukraine; namely keeping a de facto pro-Russia position, made more palatable to the US and other Western countries by some anodyne criticism to Moscow. Significantly, India continued to abstain on the UN votes condemning Russia. Also, India took part to the 2022 edition of the quadrennial Russia’s Vostok military exercise, held between 1 and 7 September. India’s participation – which was blandly criticized by the US – was nonetheless limited and, in deference to Japan’s objections, did not include taking part in the drills in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan [Ollapally 2022; Noll 2022; Ferris and Nouwens 2022]. Conversely, India joined the Quad Malabar exercise off Yokosuka between 8 and 18 November and, as already noted, the Yudh Abhyas joint India-US military exercise was carried out in Auli (Uttarakhand), close to the China border, between 15 November and 2 December [Business Standard 2022, 27 October].

Against this backdrop, India-US relations continued to be characterized by cordiality, which was visible during the meeting between India’s Foreign Affair Minister S. Jaishankar and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, on the side-lines of the 77th session of the UN General Assembly. As stated by Jaishankar at the joint press conference which he held with Blinken, the India-US alliance was «a very positive experience […] with a lot of promise», offering the potentiality to jointly «shape the direction of the world» to India and the US [De Silva and Jones 2022].

6. Conclusion

During the two years analyzed in this article, the polar star of India’s foreign policy appears to have been the need to cope with what New Delhi sees as the Chinese threat. The disengagement along the Himalayan border, which, during the period under review, did take place, was far from bringing about any substantial improvement in the relations between the two Asian giants. With very few exceptions, China continued to be viewed as an existential threat by little less than the totality of Indian politicians, analysts and public opinion. Accordingly, any major Indian foreign policy move made in the period under review appears to have had as a main or, at the very least, a relevant objective either confronting China or self-positioning in view of a future confrontation with it. This remains true in spite of the disengagement along the Himalaya and the curious fact that, immediately after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, New Delhi found itself on the same side as Beijing when voting at the UN on Russia. India’s moves concerning «vaccine diplomacy», her proactive participation in the Quad, her joining the I2U2, and keeping a neutral stand as far as Russia’s Ukraine war was concerned could be explained – and were explained – with different motivations. Nonetheless, behind or together with any other motivation, the need to confront and face down China either presently or in the future loomed large.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s overriding goal in foreign policy is to have India acknowledged as a major world power. It is clear that, in his opinion – and in that of the bulk of Indian politicians and analysts – the litmus test of India’s status as a major world power is reaching a position of parity with China. Given the huge differential in economic power between the two countries – a differential that will hardly be overcome in a foreseeable future – the India-China parity, so eagerly sought after by Modi, can only be reached by firmly positioning India inside the networks of alliances and ententes that nations such as the US and Japan have been building to counter China’s rise.

In the final analysis, notwithstanding its many ambiguities and turn-arounds, the basic course of India’s foreign policy, far from being erratic, or «reliably unreliable» [The Economist 2022, 24 November], is unmistakably and reliably consistent. Any apparently erratic move is motivated by the urge to confront China.

Only a major rethinking of the relation with China – which at the moment looks highly unlikely – could change it.

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ISSN 2385-2526

During 2022 there were three main political developments in India. First, state elections were held in seven states and the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won in five of these, confirming its enduring popularity and dominance over the country’s political system. Second, several political parties started to manoeuvre in light of the 2024 general elections. The BJP restructured its executive bodies, strengthening the grip on the party apparatus by the Shah-Modi duo. The Congress sought to rejuvenate itself through a country-wide march aimed at promoting unity and against the BJP’s divisive politics. And several regional parties reoriented their alliances (particularly in Bihar), in order to better their odds at surviving in a BJP-dominated system. Third, the process of involution of India’s democracy continued, particularly in terms of threats to freedom of expression and minorities’ rights. The economy seems to have recovered fully from the COVID-19 pandemic crisis and adapted well to the new geopolitical scenario triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, social tensions remain visible, in particular because of the economy’s inability to create enough jobs.

Keywords – India; local elections; democracy; opposition.

1. Introduction

Over the course of 2022, India entered into general election mood. Several parties started manoeuvres in light of the 2024 elections. This included the BJP, the Congress and several regional parties. Meanwhile, the political landscape continued to be marked by the BJP’s dominance of the political system and its repercussions, particularly in terms of the party’s ability to win state elections (despite some drawbacks) and the government’s enduring pursue of a Hinduisation of society and public sphere and the erosion of the country’s institutions.

The economy seems to be back on its feet after the severe contraction in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Growth rates rebounded to very high levels and inflation, despite the geopolitical crisis triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, remained under control. However, structural problems of India’s development model remain unsolved, particularly in terms of job creation.

This article deals with political developments first, in section 2, which will analyse the results of state elections held in 2022 (Goa, Manipur, Punjab, Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat and Himachal Pradesh), the strategies that political parties adopted over the course of the year to prepare for the 2024 general elections, and the ongoing crisis of India’s democracy. In section 3, the article will look at India’s economic performance and discuss the job crisis, epitomized by some large scale «job riots», which took place during 2022.

2. Domestic politics

The political landscape of India during 2022 was dominated by three main developments. First, there were elections in seven states, two of which were particularly important: Gujarat and Uttar Pradesh. There were also the elections for the Municipal Council of Delhi. Second, some political parties started manoeuvring in preparation for the electoral campaign which will take most of 2023, as the general elections are due by mid-2024. Third, in continuity with previous trends, the process of democratic erosion deepened, particularly in terms of minority rights. These three developments are discussed in this section.

2.1. Elections in the states and the enduring dominance of the BJP

The 2022 state elections were held in two rounds, the first one in February-March (Goa, Manipur, Punjab, Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh), and the second one in December (Gujarat and Himachal Pradesh). The BJP was the incumbent party in six of the seven states that went to polls and managed to retain five of them. Table 1 summarizes the results across the states, whereas the tables in the appendix provide the detailed state-by-state results.

Overall, the results confirm the enduring dominance of the BJP. While it is true that the performance of the party at the state level is much less impressive than at the national level, it remains that, at the time of writing in December 2022, the saffron party is ruling (either on its own or in coalition) in 16 out of 30 local governments.1 Nearly half of the population (48.7%) is ruled by a BJP government [Poddar 2022b, 9 December].

The BJP’s dominance at the state level should be qualified somewhat, however. First, the «iron law of state politics» post-2014 [Maiorano 2021a] was confirmed in this round of elections, whereby the BJP’s performance in the states is significantly poorer than its performance in the national elections (Figure 1).

Except for Manipur, the curve of the BJP’s performance has an inverted «V» shape, reflecting its higher electoral appeal in the general vis-à-vis the state elections. In most states, moreover, the BJP remains vulnerable, and elections are competitive. For instance, in 2022, the BJP not only lost Himachal Pradesh to the Congress; it was also replaced by the AAP as the leading party in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, after three terms in power. Second, in six of the states where the BJP currently governs (Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Goa, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and Maharashtra), the party was actually defeated at the polls, but managed to form the government after it engineered defections from other parties [Outlook 2022b, 13 July]. The ability of the BJP to engineer defections is however a reflection of its dominance at the national level, as the party has access to a disproportionate amount of funds as well as to enforcement agencies that are directed against opposition politicians to convince them to jump ship [Maiorano 2022a].

Having said that, the BJP’s performance in 2022 remains impressive, as it came on the backdrop of the economic crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic and, in the case of Gujarat, the inflation spike in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The BJP’s ability to fend off anti-incumbency feelings was in fact nothing short of spectacular in Uttar Pradesh, where no party had been voted back to power since the 1980s – and no chief minister re-elected after serving a full term since 1957; and in Gujarat, where the BJP won its seventh consecutive election with the largest vote share any party achieved since the Congress in 1985 and the largest majority in the history of the state (156 seats, out of a total of 182).

Figure 1 – BJP’s performance (vote share) 2017-2022 in selected states

Source: Trivedi Centre for Political Data, Ashoka University

The big prize of 2022 was, needless to say, Uttar Pradesh, India’s most populous state. Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath could not bank on a particularly impressive economic performance. While during the previous Samajwadi Party government from 2012 to 2017 the economy had grown at an average of nearly 7%, during Yogi’s tenure, thanks also to the pandemic, growth plummeted to an average of 2% per year. Per capita income growth, on the other hand, crashed to 0.43% per annum [Singh, Ajit Kumar 2021]. Moreover, employment rates fell sharply and the agricultural sector showed ample signs of distress [Jabob 2022, 31 January], not only with the farmers’ protests of 2021, but also as a consequence of the government’s policies aiming at banning beef, which caused a widespread stray cattle problem, which devastated crops [Maiorano 2022b].

Nevertheless, and mirroring the national electoral landscape, none of these signs of economic malady seems to have had any major impact on voters’ mind, as the BJP was returned to power with a comfortable, albeit reduced, majority (255 seats out of 403). The saffron party, while losing 57 seats as compared to 2017, in fact increased its vote share by 1.62 percentage points (to 41.29%). Significantly, the Samajwadi Party (SP), which achieved one of its best performances ever (32.06% of vote share, an increase of over 10 percentage points), won less than half the seats of the BJP (111, or 164 including its allies). This was significant as what had traditionally been a triangular (or even quadrangular) contest in the past, in 2022 turned into a bipolar contest between the BJP and the SP, as the two other poles (the Congress and the BSP), collapsed. The former’s vote share reduced to 2.33% and two seats. The BSP, on the other hand, lost nearly 10 percentage points (to a vote share of 12.88%) and won only 1 seat. However, the collapse of the two previously crucial political parties of UP did not add sufficiently to the SP’s vote and seat share to challenge the dominance of the BJP. In fact, ten years before, the SP had won a comfortable majority with just 29% of the popular vote, in what was a triangular contest [Sen 2022]. But the BJP’s dominance and the coming into being of a bipolar party system increased dramatically the share of the votes that are needed to win a majority. At this stage, only the BJP is able to mobilize such a large segment of the electorate.

In fact, the social coalition strategy of the saffron party is the key to its dominance. The BJP’s social base of support in UP was built as a local variant of the national strategy, based on winning the vote of every community except the Muslims [Chhibber & Verma 2019]. In UP, however, two other communities have strong ties to other parties and were therefore thought to be unlikely BJP voters: the Yadavs, a large middle caste strongly associated with the SP; and the Jatavs, a large Dalit caste, which formed the main support base of the BSP. Post poll-data show that the BJP’s strategy worked. In fact, it worked even better than excepted [Beg et al. 2022, 12 March]. First, the saffron party consolidated and increased its support among the upper castes, winning over 80% of their vote. Second, the BJP’s support among the non-Yadav Other Backward Classes (OBCs) ranged between 54 and 66%, registering major increases since 2017 among most caste groups. Third, among non-Jatav Dalits, the BJP won about 44% of the votes (up from 32% in 2017). Furthermore, Yogi’s party nearly tripled its support among the Jatavs (from 8 to 21%), on the one hand contributing in no small measure to the collapse of the BSP and, on the other hand, furthering the process of «proletarianisation» of the party [Maiorano 2019].

The SP, which had tried during the electoral campaign to dilute its image as the party of the Yadavs, succeeded only to a limited extent. In fact, it increased its support among its core supporters (Yadavs’ support increased from 68 to 83%) and made some gains among other OBCs and Dalit castes (including the Jatavs). More importantly, the SP was chosen by the great majority of Muslims (from 46% in 2017 to 79%), clearly a result of strategic voting by the community and strong sign of strong polarization along religious lines.

Overall, the results in UP offer some insights into both state and national politics. First, it seems that the social engineering strategy that successfully displaced the Congress and gave a spotlight to the BSP and the SP might not be working anymore [Verniers 2022, 5 April]. This strategy was designed to work in a multi-polar context, where winning over a large, core community and co-opting selected local elites from other castes was enough to win a sizable share of the seats. The big loser of the 2022 elections, the BSP, was relying exactly on this model, which however cannot be sufficient in a context where there is a dominant party winning nearly half of the votes. In such a context, strategic voting assumes more significance and directs votes towards the most credible alternative to the dominant party – in the 2022 elections, the SP. The latter, however, was also largely relying on a core and co-option strategy, rather than horizontal mobilization of all caste groups (like the BJP did). The SP did bank on strategic voting, but this helped only so much as to arrive a distant second.

Second, UP is perhaps the state where the parallels between the local and the national strategy of the BJP are more apparent. As at the national level, economic conditions on the ground do not appear to matter much in determining electoral outcomes. Rather, voters seem to be increasingly attracted by the BJP multi-pronged strategy based on personalized campaigns, strongman politics, welfare delivery, and Hindutva. It is likely that a similar strategy will be at the centre of the BJP’s electoral campaign for the 2024 general elections.

The second particularly important electoral contest of 2022 was Gujarat, Narendra Modi’s home state. While the BJP’s victory was widely expected – so much so that Hardik Patel, President of the Gujarat Pradesh Congress Committee, quit the party and joined the BJP shortly before the elections – the extent of its dominance over the state’s politics was truly spectacular. The saffron party won over half of the popular vote (52.5%) resulting in the largest seat share any party ever secured (156 out of 182 seats). One obvious factor playing in favour of the BJP was the good performance of the AAP (12.92% of vote share), which transformed a bipolar party system into a triangular contest. In fact, the Congress, which had won 41% of the vote in 2017, lost nearly 15 percentage points (mostly in favour of the AAP). However, the BJP’s dominance was such that in a great majority of seats, the division of the opposition hardly made a difference. In fact, the sum of the Congress and the AAP’s votes surpasses the BJP in only 51 seats, indicating that opposition fragmentation enhanced the BJP’s victory, but did not determine it. Another indication of the BJP’s spectacular performance was the enormous margin with which the BJP won in each seat: more than 25 per centage points, on average, on the runner up [Saikia 2022, 8 December].

Overall, the Gujarat results are in line with those of UP. The winning formula relied heavily on Modi’s personality – in the absence of popular state-level leaders – Hindutva and welfare delivery. This again suggests that, at least in the BJP’s core regions (in the North and West of the country), this might be the message that the party will present to voters in 2024. There is another message that the Gujarat verdict offered. This is the obvious fact that, in the absence of multiple, state-level, unified anti-BJP fronts, it will be difficult to dislodge Modi’s party from its dominant position in India’s electoral landscape. However, as Gujarat shows, opposition parties have incentives not to unite and to fight for the second spot instead, as the AAP and the Congress did.

2.2. Political adjustments with an eye to 2024

Several political parties seemed to be starting preparations for the electoral campaign that is expected to kickstart in early 2023. The strategies varied significantly. Starting from the ruling party, in August 2022, the BJP reshuffled the Parliamentary Board (PB) and the Central Election Committee (CEC), the highest decision-making bodies of the party. The re-organisation resulted in the top echelons of the party being even more tightly controlled by the Modi-Shah duo than before, thus furthering the centralization of the party. In fact, the change in the composition of the two bodies dealt a blow to potential rival sources of power to the Prime Minister and his right (and left) hand, Amit Shah. First, Nitin Gadkari, former president of the BJP and one of the party’s senior members that the RSS had been nurturing for leadership, was dropped from both the PB and the CEC. Moreover, Maharashtra Deputy Chief Minister Devendra Fadvanis, and Gadkari’s arch-rival from his natal Nagpur, found a spot in the CEC. While both members of the RSS, Gadkari’s exclusion was seen both as yet another blow by Modi and Shah to one of the few independent voices within the party and, perhaps more importantly, a blow to the RSS and its attempts to exert its dominance over the BJP [Deshpande 2022, 21 August]. Another prominent leader who lost its spot in the top bodies was Madhya Pradesh Chief Minister Shivraj Singh Chauhan (also an RSS favourite). While the reasons for its exclusion remain unclear, the effect has been to remove one of the few leaders with an independent base of support, thus tightening Modi-Shah’s control over the party. It might also be that Modi and Shah killed two birds with one stone as, by dropping Chauhan, they could argue that no sitting chief minister was part of the PB, thus justifying another notable exclusion, that of UP Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath [Mahajan 2022, 18 August].

Less directly related to the forthcoming general elections – but certainly helping the BJP to be in a better position – was the shadowy manoeuvring, which led to the collapse of the Shiv Sena-Nationalist Congress Party-Indian National Congress coalition government in Maharashtra. In 2019, the BJP and the Shiv Sena had formed an electoral alliance, which, however, fell apart shortly after the declaration of the results, paving the way for the somewhat eclectic alliance between former adversaries, the Congress, the Congress Nationalist party and the Shiv Sena itself. While inherently fragile, the coalition muddled through for two and a half years, until a group of Shiv Sena MLAs and Ministers, led by Eknath Shinde, rebelled against their leader and Chief Minister, Uddhav Thackeray. Political drama followed, with MLAs from both camps being secluded in hotels in Mumbai (Thackeray’s faction) and BJP-ruled Gujarat and Assam (Shinde’s faction), until, on 29 June, Thackeray threw the towel and resigned. Shinde became the chief minister, while BJP’s leader Fadvanis became his deputy. Most of the rebel Shiv Sena MLAs found a place in the new Cabinet. Undoubtedly, the BJP «went all out to cultivate the rebels, protect them, and win them a few more by employing investigating agencies and bringing about pressure besides allurements» [Palshikar 2022a]. Be as it may, the BJP will face the 2024 general election from a position of strength in India’s second most populous state.

Finally, in September 2022, the government took over the presidency of the G20 from Indonesia. India was supposed to chair the G20 earlier on, but it first swapped with Italy, in order to make it coincide with the 75th anniversary of independence in 2022 and then swapped it again with Indonesia. While no official reason was given, it is likely that the government thought of using the international spotlight with an eye to the 2024 elections. Between January and September 2023, India will host over 200 meetings scattered through many locations across the country, where giant billboard will show the Prime Minister’s picture alongside the Indian G20 presidency’s logo, which is a lotus flower (the same as the BJP).

Turning to the opposition side, clearly things could be better. The dominance of the BJP – as in any dominant party system – constrains and limits what the opposition can achieve, especially since the saffron party does not restrain from using investigative agencies, its control over the economy and its influence over the media to further its dominance and crash the opposition. However, as Asim Ali proposed, it is possible to clearly divide opposition parties in two camps: on the one hand, crisis-ridden political parties; and, on the other hand, parties whose prospects are much brighter [Ali 2022a]. The former includes the Congress, the Left and the large «Mandal» parties of UP and Bihar. In the latter group, we find regional parties from the East and South of the country which have, so far, fended off the BJP’s attempts to invade their turfs (e.g., the Trinamool Congress in West Bengal; the Dravidian parties in Tamil Nadu; the Telugu parties in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana; the Biju Janata Dal in Odisha; etc.) and the AAP, which appears to be on an expansion sprout.

The Congress party best exemplifies the crisis of the opposition, as it is arguably the party which has most suffered from the BJP’s expansion. The Grand Old Party lost 40 of the 50 elections it contested since 2014 and suffered from a haemorrhage of leaders who joined other parties (mostly the BJP) [Mishra 2022, 27 March]. At the time of writing, the Congress rules in only two states (as many as the AAP). Yet, any attempt to limit the dominance of the BJP will necessarily have to pass through the Congress. Not only does the party still commands about 20% of the national vote – long distancing any other opposition party – but there are a very high number of Lok Sabha seats where the contest is between the Congress and the BJP. In 2019, there were 186 such seats.

During 2022, there were two attempts to invert course, both of which had mixed results. First, in September 2022, the party elected a new president, the first non-Gandhi since the 1990s. The new president, 80-year-old Mallikarjun Kharge, however, can hardly be seen as a sign of deep renovation that could turn the fortune of the party. On the one hand, Kharge is widely seen as an emanation of the Gandhi family. On the other hand, his age and that of the majority of the Party Steering Committee, show how the gerontocratic structure of the party keeps exerting its influence. In fact, 75% of the members are over 60 years old and most of them either did not contest or lost their seat at the 2014 and 2019 general elections.2 It is hard to imagine how the reorganization of the Congress party might boost the morale of the party workers or spark off the political imagination of (mostly young) voters.

The second noteworthy initiative of the party – or, perhaps more precisely, of Rahul Gandhi – is a country-wide march (the Bharat Jodo Yatra, or Unite India March), from Kanyakumari on the southern tip of India, to Jammu and Kashmir, over a period of 150 days. The initiative is significant for several reasons. First, it is the first major political initiative to specifically counter the BJP’s divisive politics. Second, the march has focused on substantive issues like unemployment and growing inequalities, themes which are grounded on very bread-and-butter issues, which should resonate with many voters. Third, despite a very inhospitable media environment, which has at first largely ignored the march, it has successfully grasped attention and political rallies along the route are very well attended. Fourth, the march as a means to reach political objectives has a long pedigree in India, from Mahatma Gandhi during the freedom movement to some national politicians of the past, such as Chandra Sekhar, to numberless state level initiatives in recent times, often coronated by success. Fifth, the march’s stops have become gathering points for civil society organizations which have taken the opportunity to forge alliances.

However, the yatra might fall short of rejuvenating the Congress and project a new image of the party ahead of the 2024 general elections. First, as noted by Suhas Palshikar, the Congress party organisation remained largely dormant except on the exact route of the yatra. If there were hopes that the yatra could galvanize Congress workers in the states where the march passed, this has just not happened. «There is, on the one hand, a careful show of strength on the route of the Yatra and a deafening silence elsewhere» [Palshikar 2022b, 22 December]. Second, while the yatra focused on substantive issues and took on the Hinduization of India pursued by the BJP, it has hardly proposed an alternative vision to Modi’s Hindutva-cum-welfare agenda, which, as we saw, is popular and successful. Third, the yatra is largely a one person show – Rahul Gandhi’s. Whether the initiative will be sufficient to shake off Gandhi’s image as a predestined politicians coming from the family accused day in day out (justly or otherwise) of being responsible for much of India’s maladies, is a big question mark. In other words, in a way the yatra tries to challenge Modi on the terrain where he is more comfortable, that of a battle between personalities. And Modi has no rival in terms of popularity, resources and ability to speak to the heart and belly of the voters. Moreover, the yatra was thought to resemble more a social movement than a political one, with the result that the party seems to «speaks to citizens, but not to voters, and bypasses political questions, electoral or otherwise» [Mehta 2022, 24 December].

Finally, conversations3 by this writer with people who work for political consultancies hired by the Congress party, reveal that the yatra put the party’s finances under stress. According to these sources, in some states the party will not reimburse air travel to party workers anymore and only 3AC class rail fares will be booked. This, according to these sources (whose claims however could not be verified), signals deep financial distress, especially when compared to the flourishing budget of the BJP.

Other parties seem to be better placed. A first group includes regional parties in the East and South of the country. Some of these – like the Trinamool Congress in West Bengal, the Biju Janata Dal in Odisha, the Tamil and the Telugu Parties – seem to have found a potent formula to contrast BJP’s Hindutva in ethno-linguistic mobilization [Ali 2022a]. In a way, the core political strategy of this party is a local variation of the BJP’s national platform: by substituting religion with language, an emphasis on welfare schemes and strong (if very centralized) party organisations, these parties have been able to resist the dominance of the BJP. In fact, the saffron parties in at least some of these states (like West Bengal, Odisha and Telangana) has successfully taken on the role of main opposition party, replacing the Congress, but it has been unable to mount a serious challenge to ruling parties.

Two further parties have begun noteworthy manoeuvres in sight of the 2024 general elections. The first one is the AAP, currently in power in Delhi (where, as mentioned, it also replaced the BJP at the Municipal Corporation level) and in Punjab. As noted above, the party also performed very well in the Gujarat state elections and won over 6% of the votes (and 2 seats) in Goa in 2022, which should lead to the recognition as a national party by the Election Commission.4 Since 2017, the APP contested the elections in 18 states, although with marginal influence in most of them. What seems to be clear, however, is that the APP is on an expansion sprout based on three main platforms, which again cannot but remind of the BJP’s national strategy. First, the promotion of the «Delhi model of development» (akin to Modi’s «Gujarat model»), based on free and relatively high-quality public services. Second, populist appeals, carefully tailored on local conditions. For instance, the AAP defended migrants in Delhi, but promises jobs reservations for locals in Uttarakhand [Ali 2022(a)]. Third, the AAP adopted a soft Hindutva approach, with the objective of forming a social coalition that cut across caste and class – something that the party managed to stitch together in Delhi [Banerji 2022, 11 June]. This strategy on the part of the AAP signals – together with similar flirts with Hindutva by other opposition parties, including the Trinamool Congress and the Congress itself – that the BJP’s political project is advancing to the stage of a hegemonic one which will be difficult to eradicate, even in a post-Modi India [Palshikar 2023b, 6 January].

Second, in August 2022 the Janata Dal (United) (JDU), one of the strongest «Mandal» parties, and an ally of the BJP in Bihar, broke off from the saffron party and formed a «grand alliance» with the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD). The move by chief minister Nitish Kumar is the latest twist in a convoluted story of alliances and counter alliances which have characterized Bihar’s politics since Modi took office as Prime Minister. In 2013, Nitish Kumar left the National Democratic Alliance, after Modi was selected as the prime ministerial candidate, only to join hands again in 2017 [Scroll.in 2022c, 9 August]. The august 2022 decision seem to be dictated by electoral compulsions in sight of the 2024 general elections and the 2025 state elections. The JD(U) was probably feeling the pressure of the BJP, which, at the 2020 state elections, had surpassed the JD(U) as Bihar’s largest party. The inclusion of the JD(U) in the «grand alliance» of Bihar makes it significantly «grander» than the coalition that was put together for the last state 2020 elections, which, however impressive on paper, failed to become a significant challenge to the BJP-JD(U) combine. It is rather a replication of the 2015 grand alliance which won the state elections then, only to disintegrate when Nitish Kumar decided to ally with the BJP again in 2017.

The «grand alliance» of Bihar also reminds of a similar coalition between the two Mandal parties of UP, the SP and the BSP, at the 2019 general elections, which hoped to limit the BJP’s dominance in the state. In UP, it did not work, but the Bihar’s grand coalition might be better placed. First, the coalition is in power, and this naturally gives them an advantage. The BJP, on the other hand, having run the state in coalition for the last five years, will be able exploit anti-incumbency feelings only to a certain extent. Second, caste arithmetic is more in favour of the JD(U)-RJD alliance than to its counterpart in UP. In both states, the key constituencies are the Other Backward Castes and the Dalits (being the upper caste solidly behind the BJP and the Muslims equally solidly being the grand alliances). In UP, as mentioned above, the BJP was able to make significant inroads among both communities, effectively forming a rainbow coalition which excluded only the Muslims and the core castes of the SP (Yadavs) and the BSP (Jatavs). In Bihar things are different because: a) Dalits have been brought into the fold of Mandal politics to a greater degree; b) while in Bihar too both Mandal parties have a core caste constituency (the Yadavs for the RJD and the Kurmis for the JD(U)), smaller OBCs castes (so called Extremely Backward Castes, or EBCs) have also been brought on board, chiefly through a policy of reservation for these castes, which started when Nitish Kumar first became chief minister in 2005 [Ali 2022b, 22 August]. Finally, Nitish Kumar decided to double down on Mandal politics by launching a caste census, which is scheduled to be completed by May 2023 [Mahaprashasta 2023, 10 January]. The real issue with counting castes is to have a precise estimate of the OBC population and possibly amend the reservation policy accordingly. While this carries risks for the two Mandal parties – it will probably show that Kurmis and Yadavs have acquired a much more dominant position in state’s politics and administration than thought – it might also potentially expand the two parties’ support base to other OBC groups or at least prevent them from joining the BJP en masse, as it happened in UP. There is one potential obstacle to this plan of action. The Supreme Court of India has repeatedly held that reservations cannot exceed 50% of the available spots. However, in November 2022, the Supreme Court upheld the decision by the Union Government to reserve 10% of government jobs and places in educational institutions for the so-called Economically Weaker Sections (EWS). The EWS are defined in economic and not in caste terms. However, two key legislative provisions effectively make the upper caste the real target of the new policy. First, EWS are defined as whoever has a family income of less than 800,000 rupees per year (and excluding big landlords). The income criteria would cover more than 90% of Indians, classifying them as EWS. Second, however, Scheduled Classes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST) and OBCs are excluded from the EWS category, on the basis that they are already benefiting from reservations. In practice, the EWS quota will give reservations to non-rich upper castes. Legal experts are divided on whether the Supreme Court’s upholding of the EWS quota will put into question the 50% ceiling [Poddar 2022a, 20 November]. But what is certain is that it created a political opportunity to at least credibly show voters the willingness to push the reservation ceiling up. Jharkhand, for instance, increased reservations to 77% within days of the Supreme Court judgment. In Bihar, where the only segment of the population that is very unlikely to back the grand alliance is formed by the upper castes, the political opportunity to play the Mandal card is particularly favourable for the JD(U)-RJD. In short, it seems that the ruling coalition of Bihar is engineering a reversal of the BJP’s «all but the Muslim» strategy, but focusing on every segment of the electorate, except the upper castes.

A final point to conclude this brief excursus on the state of the opposition concerns the question of whether these parties will form a united front against the BJP in 2024. For what can be seen at the time of writing, the question is obviously on many party leaders’ mind. Small steps such as backing a common Presidential candidate in 2022 were relatively successful, but the stakes were admittedly low, as the BJP and its allies had the number to elect whoever they chose. (Eventually, Droupadi Murmu was elected, the first tribal to become President of the Republic, and a woman). Other than that, some big regional parties (like the RJD, JD(U), and the Trinamool Congress) have started discussions to form a national opposition front. However, the real game will be played in the states, which is where potentially significant alliances are to be formed, if the BJP’s dominance is to be seriously challenged. Moreover, as mentioned above, the role of the Congress remains important in a very high number of constituencies, while the temptation for upwardly political parties (like the AAP) to feast on the remains of the Grand Old Party – thus compromising opposition unity – will be hard to resist. The Congress party is at the same time an asset and a liability for regional parties.

2.3 Further democratic erosion

The erosion of India’s democracy is now a medium-term process, which has been widely analysed.5 In 2022, many of the trends and policies adopted by the Indian government in recent years continued. These included the usage of investigative agencies to target journalists, opposition members and civil society leaders [Tiwari 2022, 21 September; Outlook 2022c, 13 October]; the erosion of institutions, including attempts by the government to have a greater say in the appointment of Supreme and High Court judges [Jain & Chaturvedi 2023, 19 January] – reminiscent of Indira Gandhi’s quest for a «committed judiciary» [Maiorano 2015]; and threats to freedom of expression [Reed 2022, 10 October], such as the arrest of Mohammed Zubair, founder of AltNews, a fact-checking website. Zubair was arrested in June 2022 on the basis of some 4-year-old tweets and kept in jail for almost a month, until the Supreme Court eventually granted him bail, noting that the UP government had effectively «trapped [him] in a vicious cycle of criminal process where the process itself has become the punishment» [Anand 2022, 26 July].

In short, India’s democratic erosion continues in parallel with the BJP’s deepening of its dominance over the political system, so much so that one of the country’s leading analysts started questioning if «irrespective of electoral outcomes, we are bound to witness a further weakening of the liberal norm» in the future, as an authoritarian and majoritarian form of governance that root in the minds of the voters [Palshikar 2023a, 1 January].

In this article, I will just briefly mention two somewhat new developments that have taken place during 2022 and that concern the Indian state’s ongoing alienation of the Muslim minority. The first one is the spat of demolitions of Muslim homes and properties across a number of BJP-ruled states. This is not entirely new. During the emergency (1975-77), for instance, many buildings and homes were demolished as part of the «beautification» of (predominantly Muslim) Old Delhi. Another instance was the demolition of slums in numerous states throughout the year, to make space for urban development, which at times resulted in Muslims being displaced and struggled to find alternative accommodation because of their identity [Lobo 2015]. What seems to be new, however, is the reason why homes were demolished, that is as a form of extra-legal punishment for alleged violations of law and order.

The events in Jahangirpuri in Delhi in April 2022 are illustrative. On 16 April a procession to celebrate Hanuman Jayanti passed through the mainly Muslim area. Violence erupted. The Muslim community maintained that some Hindus tried to enter the local Mosque with a flag reciting «Jai Shri Ram»; the Hindus on the other hand blamed the Muslims for the violence. Be as it may, a local BJP leader, Adesh Gupta, wrote a letter to the Municipal Corporation (ruled by the BJP) asking to demolish the homes of «anti-social elements». The municipal authorities immediately sent bulldozers and the police to demolish – without giving notice to the residents, as per the law – «illegal encroachments». The Supreme Court halted the demolitions, but the bulldozers did not stop until over one hour after the Court had issued its order, despite the presence of the Mayor on site and news organisations having reported about the Court’s stay [Scroll.in 2022a, 20 April]. Shops, homes and the entry gate to the Mosque were demolished. The Jahangirpuri facts were not isolated. Similar instances had occurred in BJP-ruled UP [Outlook 2022a, 12 June], Madhya Pradesh [BBC News 2022a, 15 April], and Gujarat [Scroll.in 2022b, 2 May]. The demolitions were called by three United Nations Special Rapporteurs (for Housing, Minority Issues and Freedom of Religion) a form of «collective punishment».6

The second (also not entirely new) development was an acceleration on the cultural project of the current establishment to demonize the Muslim community. The cultural demonization of the Muslim community is a multi-pronged strategy by Hindutva-affiliated groups and has a long history. During the yatras demanding the demolition of the Babri Masjid in the 1980s and 1990s, for instance, Hindutva groups had circulated videos and recordings. More recently, music producers created hundreds of songs with incendiary lyrics, at times blasted through loudspeakers at processions passing through Muslim areas and shared millions of times via social media [BBC News 2022b, 8 August]. There have also been several instances of political speeches explicitly calling for the killing of the Muslims [Al-Jazeera 2021, 24 December].

In 2022, this strategy was somewhat brought to a higher level through a film, The Kashmir Files, directed by Vivek Agnihotri. The film claims to be telling «the truth» about the exodus of Kashmiri Pandits in the 1990s, as the insurgency broke out in the Valley. The film is historically inaccurate and single-mindedly aimed at demonizing Muslims: men are shown lusting Hindu women and betraying their neighbours to support terrorism, while children are depicted branding automatic weapons and insulting Hindu Gods [Ayyub 2022, 29 March]. The film has been a record-breaking hit, also thanks to the government’s tax concessions (reducing the tickets’ price) and Modi’s invitation to watch the film [Chowdhury 2022, 30 March]. The prime minister even congratulated the film crew in person [Hindustan Times 2022b, 13 March]. In theatres, the audience chanted nationalistic slogans and abuses to the Muslim community and trigged calls for the boycott of Muslims economic activities [The Quint 2022, 21 March].

The film is but the last example of the ongoing Hinduisation of India’s public sphere, though the promotion to leading position in academia and research centres of Hindu extremists and sympathizers; the renaming of street and cities to delete India’s Muslim past; the re-writing of history textbooks; or the construction of a grandiose system of temples in Varanasi – one of Modi’s pet projects in his constituency – aimed at undermining the city’s syncretic past [Maiorano 2022c].

3. The economic situation

The Indian economy continued to present contradictory trends. On the one hand, India recovered from the pandemic-induced recession. On the other hand, the job situation continued to remain dire. Starting with the good news, during the year ending in quarter 2 (Q2) of the financial year 2022/23 (July-September 2022), real GDP grew by 6.3% (year-on-year), one of the fastest among emerging market economies [The World Bank 2022]. This robust growth is remarkable, given the economic pain through which India’s major trading partners (the US, UK, China) went through in 2022, in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the ongoing global supply chains disruptions, inflationary pressures, high energy costs and higher rates of interests. The two main drivers of growth were private consumption and investments. The former was led by upper income consumer goods (like automobiles and air travel), while the latter was sustained by government’s capital expenditure (part of Modi’s infrastructure push). Conversely, private investments played a minor role, as India Inc. remains cautious, given the uncertain geopolitical landscape and the Reserve Bank of India’s decision to increase interest rates by 35 basis points to 6.50% [Business Standard 2022, 1 December]. The two major constraints on growth were government final expenditure (whose decline is almost entirely attributable to the progressive rolling out of the pandemic-related relief measurers) and the sharp increase in imports (not matched by the increase in exports). On this note, while the overall balance of payment situation remains sustainable, also thanks to very florid reserves of foreign currency, trade balance with China deteriorated further, which is a source of concern more for geopolitical reasons than for economic ones. According to the latest data released by the Chinese customs, overall trade between the two countries reached US$ 136 billion, of which US$ 118.5 billion were Chinese exports to India.

Inflation increased in 2022, following the global trend. While this was understandably a cause for concern for the Indian government as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) remained above the RBI’s upper limit of 6% for most of the year (averaging at 6.7%), in the last part of 2022 it eased down significantly and trended downward.

Finally, the rupees weakened significantly against the dollar, as did most currencies in the world. While this contributed to a higher import bill (and lower GDP growth) and depleted foreign reserves, it also sustained exports. Probably the most significant implication of a weak rupee was the (albeit small) political repercussions, as Modi had vehemently attacked the government back in 2013 when the rupee had fallen below 64 to the dollar [The Indian Express 2022, 17 July]. At the time of writing in January 2023, the exchange rate was about 81 to the dollar.

Looking beyond standard macroeconomic indicators, 2022 signalled the enduring difficulties of the Indian economy to create enough jobs for what is one of the fastest-growing working age population in the world. In January, riots broke out in UP and Bihar, which were described as the country’s first «large scale unemployment riots» [Hindustan Times 2022a, 28 January]. The railways had announced some 40,000 non-technical jobs in the two states, for which over 10 million candidates applied to. When the railways announced that a second exams would be introduced to reduce the number of candidates, riots broke off, as people attacked and burned trains and other railways properties.

A few months later, India witnessed another series of unemployment riots, when the government announced a reform of the recruiting system for the army. In June, the central government announced that the «Agnipath» (Tour of Duty) will be the only way into the three wings of the Indian army. Selected recruits will have a service tenure of four years, after which 25% of them will be permanently enlisted. None of the «Agniveers» will be entitled to a gratuity or pension [Rai 2022]. The stated objective is to lower the average age of serving soldiers, although experts questioned the limit of four years as too short to optimally utilize a soldier. A key reason, however, was probably to save money. The pension bill in 2022/23 ate up almost a quarter of the entire budgetary allocation to the Defence Ministry (and another quarter went for salaries). These figures have increased sharply since 2015, when the government implemented both the One Rank One Pension reform, and, the following year, the recommendations of the Seventh Pay Commission [Singh, Sushant 2022, 13 July]. The reform sparked off violent protests across the country. Many aspiring soldiers feared being left unemployable after four years of service [Singh, Karan Deep & Kumar 2022, 17 June]. Perhaps more importantly, the reform closed yet another source to the Holy Grail of formal employment, seen by many as the only true avenue to upward social mobility. The private sector has been unable to create stable, formal jobs, making it «hardly surprising that government jobs are a loud political demand» [Aiyar 2022, 20 June].

In fact, India’s employment problem is huge and not getting better. The gravity of the situation can be seen from two angles. First, the youth’s labour market; and, second, the overall participation to the labour force. According to the International Labor Organization (ILO)’s estimates, India’s youth (aged 15-24) unemployment was 28.3% in 2021, up from 22.7 in 2019.7 The corresponding figures for other countries are much lower: Pakistan, 9.4%; China, 11.4%; Bangladesh, 14.7%; Indonesia, 16%. The average for Lower Middle-Income Countries (to which India belongs, according to the World Bank’s classification) is 18.5%. Data from the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE) are even worse. In April 2022, the CMIE’s data showed that the unemployment rate in the 20-24 age bracket was 42%. Unemployed people aged 20-29 represent 80% of the total unemployed. Moreover, official data (from 2017/18) show that unemployment rates are higher among the most educated, feeding frustration and, occasionally, violence [Iyer 2022, 13 May].

The second factor, India’s low participation to the labour force, is equally worrying. Total labour force participation rate (LFPR) (of people aged 15 and above) declined from 58.3 in 1990 to 45.6.8 Of course, part of the decline is due to the increased number of students. But this is a very partial explanation at best, as shown by comparing India’s LFPR with that of other countries when they had a GDP per capita similar to India’s today (US$ 1937)9. Economist Vivek Kaul [Kaul 2023] made the comparison, which is reproduced in the table 2.

The gap is almost entirely explained by India’s extremely low Female LFPR, which, in 2021, was just 19%, as compared to 35% in Bangladesh, 49% in Brazil, 53% in South Korea, 54% in Indonesia, 62% in China and 70% in Vietnam. Even Saudi Arabia has a higher FLFPR (31%). Furthermore, the trend is negative, as India’s FLFPR was 30.4 in 1990. Again, part of the explanation is increased educational opportunities for Indian women. But Mody notes that a majority of women who withdraw from the labour force are over 25 and come from low-income family, pointing at a lack of job opportunities and patriarchal social norms as the best explanation [Desai & Joshi 2019; Mody 2023].

In short, India’s labour force is shrinking, despite the fact that the country is in the midst of a demographic dividend, whereby the working age population is expanding rapidly. This means that India is only very partially exploiting the window of opportunity that its demographic structure currently offers.

4. Conclusions

The political developments of 2022 signalled that, as the country prepares for the 2024 general elections, the ruling BJP appears to be steadily in control of the situation. Despite some setbacks at the state level, the dominance of Modi’s party over India’s political system remains solid. Above all, the resounding victory of the party in UP – India’s most populous state and the key to rule the country – confirmed the trend of the last few years: the BJP is largely immune to economic setbacks and mismanagement.

The BJP, along with opposition parties, started preparations for the general elections, which took different forms. The BJP went through a rather profound re-organisation of the top echelons of party, which crystallized Modi and Shah’s control over the apparatus, largely at the expense of locally powerful party leaders and the RSS. The government also engineered defections in key states (above all, Maharashtra), which will help the party in 2024.

The opposition parties also re-aligned themselves with an eye to 2024. The Congress’s first family left the presidency of the party, while Rahul Gandhi embarked on a country-wide yatra. Both moves aimed at rejuvenating the party and both had limited success (the yatra more than the change of leadership). Some regional parties started a dialogue among themselves to form localized anti-BJP alliances, but it remains to be seen how far these will go. The past record is not promising. Still other parties went onto an expansion spree, chiefly among them the AAP, which won the elections in Punjab and performed very well in Gujarat. The latter elections, however, also showed the incentives for opposition parties to fight for the second spot, in a BJP-dominated political system.

India’s democracy continued to suffer. The institutional erosion proceeded, as did the threat to freedom of expression. In this article, I focused in particular on the ongoing Hinduisation of the state and the deepening of the majoritarianism. The Muslim minority continues to be at the receiving end of the government’s construction of a Hindu state.

Finally, the article has analysed the economic situation from two angles. First, the overall good performance of the economy, despite the difficult geopolitical environment. However, and second, the article has also showed the underlying socio-economic tension over an economic model that concentrates wealth creation at the top and does not generate enough jobs.

Appendix

Detailed results of seven state elections held in 2022. All data are taken from the website of the Election Commission of India. The acronyms of the alliances and parties followed by the full names are given after the last table.