Enlightenment and Violence. Modernity and Nation-Making / Tadd Fernée – New Delhi: Sage Publications India, 2014, pp. LXVII/386.

 Theoretical Ground

In the Fernée’s framework, the Enlightenment heritage has to be interpreted as a question in the history of ideas, an “interconnected web spanning debates on nationalism, revolution and post-structuralism”. Starting from some of Bipan Chandra’s comparative reflections between liberation movements and the British, French, Russian and Chinese modern revolutions, the author encompasses the Enlightenment heritage as a “multicentered practical-discursive formation”. Framing it in a world scale, Fernée sets the Enlightenment out of the classical limits of dychotomical, transcendent and teleological thought, and – borrowing from Dewey – defines the Enlightenment heritage as a “centerless environment of multiple histories”. Doing so, Fernée reshapes the nature of Enlightenment as non-Eurocentric, not linearly ontological nor epistemic, but inserted in a logic of “discursive practical regions of density”, claiming a discursive universality no more linked to a Hegel-Comtean linear construction, (i.e. Hegel’s view on the West in Philosophy of history or the Bernard Lewis’ conception of Islam) but rather to a

“Synthetic re-interpretation of radical pluralist innovators in Enlightenment interpretation such as John Dewey, Max Weber, Hannah Arendt, Michael Polanyi, Mohammed Arkoun, Abdul An-Naim and Amartya Sen” (xvii).

Tadd Fernée’s point of view claims to demonstrate an “emerging ethics of reconciliation in nation-making”; to do so, he focuses on the close relationship intercurring between the Enlightenment viewed as a “multicentered practical-discursive formation” and the violence as a “discursive-practical limit”. In the words of the author, therefore,

“The central means-ends issue concerns – as far the nation-making prospects for a democratic modernity – the political construction of violence” (xiv).

Fernée studies these means within the framework of political violence upon the nation-making path that follows the paradigmatic moment of Revolution. Such notions converge in a point between the discursive and the practical moment in the articulation of nation-making, seen through the lens of the Enlightenment heritage. The author takes as an example

“[…] The English Civil War, the American, French and Industrial Revolutions, decolonization and the project of a new global juridical order following World War II. Each was an experience of traumatic violence, bringing into question the relation between rapidly changing existence and the traditions of value, requiring radical adjustments in institutional accretions, the authority of ideals, imagining and thought over choice and conduct”. (Xxxvii-xxxviii)

Fernéee, substantially, argues that those revolutions merge the discursive moment of Enlightenment with the practical, as they involve a relationship between a body of ideals, imaginings and thought and their practical-mundane dimension (adjustment of contingency according to the new system).

The interaction between institutions and lifeworlds is – as a matter of fact – the “integral dimension of modern violence” (xxxviii). As a consequence, the transformation of the traditional hierarchical institutions into a different social pattern, inspired by a democratic-egalitarian form of political interaction, becomes the core of Enlightenment from its beginnings in XVII century. Moreover, its link with violence as a vector of change assumes a central position in speculation, so that the French Revolutionary tradition is seen as a region of overwhelming discursive-practical density within the Enlightenment Heritage.

The book is articulated in seven chapters, connected by a thread aiming at demystifying the role of violence, and at drawing an alternative historical construction, articulated around the Enlightenment Heritage as a keystone in the nation-making process.

The First chapter interprets Akbar’s “Universal Peace” (Sulh-i Kul) as one of the expressions of Enlightenment, portraying the complex and multicultural texture of India in the XVI century. Akbar’s court is seen as a dialogic place, and Fernée underlines how the syncretic concept of fana, shared by every religion and mystic movement present in India, had been conveyed in a practical public policy of non violent resolution of conflict in the multiconfessional and heterogeneous texture of the Mughal Empire. By means of a parallel between Akbar and Philip II of Spain, both enthroned in 1556, Fernée denotes a deep demarcation between the enlightened perspective played by Akbar’s Universal Peace and Philip’s fiery and dogmatic manner of conceiving religion as the leading principle of the State, which brought to the exclusion of entire parts of the Spanish society in reason of their faith. Fernée concludes recalling Akbar’s rationalistic nature of thought, which pursues an epistemic idea of God, rather than an immediacy of religious experience, in a syncretism between aql (reason) and taqlid (blind faith).

The second chapter frames the European Enlightenment between Revenge and Reconciliation. The author focuses on the nature of Enlightenment in the XVII and XVIII centuries and depicts two distinct paths. According to the logic followed in the whole essay, he represents an opposition between two distinct natures of Enlightenment: the flexibility of lifeworld practice on the one hand, and the construction and the feeding of a coercitive “general will” idea on the other. The critical connection point is the Revolutionary moment. Fernée argues that in the French Revolutionary process, the necessities of transforming the society from above had to be pursued by a transcendent articulation of universal values, in order to comply with a teleological and linear thought, thus undermining democracy and the very precepts of Enlightenment.

The third chapter draws a history of the early Indian Nationalism. Fernée points out its discursive-practical formation, spotting the inherent contradiction in the complex relationship with the English language, with its limits and possibilities. At the same time, the author highlights the multiplicity of the discursive practical formation influencing the early Indian Nationalism, from the classic European legacy of Enlightenment to the domestic sources, such as Akbar or the original Indian institutions. The dialectics regarding the double nature of Enlightenment is embodied in the comparison drawn by Fernée between Rammohun Roy and Henry Derozio. The former is seen as an example of a centerless pluralism grounded upon a many-sided conception of truth; the latter as an exponent of Radical Enlightenment, directly inspired to the trascendent French Enlightenment dogmas of the XVIII century.

Chapters four and six are more connected, as they analyse a contiguous history sector: while the former underlines Gandhi’s role in enlarging the Ethics of Reconciliation to a Mass Movement, the latter focuses on the Nehruvian era, analysing the role of the Ethics of reconciliation in the Nation-Making process: both are case studies centred on the non-violence as a practice of Nation Making. The Gandhian experience is identified with Humanism, as he gathered the final sense of Nationalism out of the identitarian and dualistic thought by shifting from the trandescental to the immanent, thus overturning the dialectics between enemies.

Nehru is seen as an original thinker-statesman, and his position in the Enlightenment tradition is drawn through different moments of the post-independence period. The chapter particularly overcomes his policies about the language and the tribal issues, reading them as pluralistic and many-sided forms of politics.

Chapter five deals with the Ottoman-Turkish experience of Enlightenment. Fernée focuses on the “polarity change” in the same case study: from the dismantling of the heaven sent hierarchical order (Janissary-Sultan-Bureaucracy-Ulema) and the positioning of the people at the core of sovereignity (1826), to the return to a transcendental order, inspired by the ethnic homogeneity, the construction/imposition of a “general will” and a strong assimilationist tendency of the Young Turks.

Finally, chapter seven looks into Iranian Enlightenment as a struggle for Multi-Cultural Democracy, and its failure, tracing its historical experience under an Enlightenment perspective, from the Tobacco revolt of 1890-91, through the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11 to the National Front period under the leadership of Mohammed Mossadeq (1941-53).

The book offers a well articulated reading of the dynamics of Nation-Making from a perspective entwining the Enlightenment and the violence issues in a framework suitably grounded and skillfully organized. Through the comparative analysis of four case studies (Europe, India, Persia/Iran and the Ottoman-Turkish experience), Tadd Fernée propounds an interpretative key to design new non-violent patterns for the solution of the conflicts of the modern era, managing diversified materials and gathering them in a coherent vision. The perspective of “Enlightenment and Violence” is interesting and reliably founded. By re-defining the Enlightenment borders into a multipolar model, the author traces an original map of thought, consisting of non-contiguous (temporally and geographically) realities unified under the Enlightenment Heritage umbrella.

 

Red Tape: Bureaucracy, Structural Violence and Poverty in India/ Akhil  Gupta – Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012, pp. 384 (ISBN: 9780822351108)

Red Tape, il nastro rosso che storicamente lega i documenti ufficiali e rimanda alle pratiche amministrative che li producono, è un importante punto d’arrivo nella bibliografia dell’antropologo Akhil Gupta. Accademico indiano, nato a Jaipur e naturalizzato americano, di formazione tecnico-scientifica (PhD in ingegneria a Stanford), l’autore è oggi una delle massime voci dell’antropologia politica, dello sviluppo e dello Stato in ottica postcoloniale, direttore del “Centre for India and South-Asia” all’Università della California.  Tra i suoi lavori più citati ricordiamo: il saggio Beyond Culture: Space, Identity and the Politics of Difference, 1992, composto con J. Ferguson e manifesto della nascente antropologia critica; l’antologia The Anthropology of the State, 2006, curata insieme ad A. Sharma; l’etnografia della cooperazione Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture in the Making of Modern India, 1997. Nella sua ultima monografia, attingendo dalla ricerca già condotta negli anni Novanta nei block office di Mandi, centro rurale nell’Uttar Pradesh, l’autore esplora i meccanismi burocratici con cui si dispiega il welfare indiano, reo di riprodurre quelle stesse ineguaglianze che si proporrebbe di sradicare.

Denso e provocatorio, Red Tape muove dal quesito paradossale e paradigmatico dell’India contemporanea: “Come è possibile che, nonostante gli sforzi pubblici di inclusione sociale e presa in carico delle fasce deboli, gran parte della popolazione indiana ancora viva in condizioni di estrema povertà?” (p.3). Scardinando invece luoghi comuni e opinioni dominanti su politica, crescita e Stato postcoloniale, le argomentazioni con cui Gupta articola la sua replica interrogano la relazione tra burocrazia e miseria, basandosi su un minuzioso lavoro etnografico (svolto raccogliendo osservazioni e testimonianze tra uffici, funzionari, ispezioni, certificati) e su una lucida analisi delle implicazioni teoriche che ne derivano.

Al cuore della questione si staglia la “violenza strutturale” esercitata dallo Stato sui cittadini, in particolare sulle masse a cui si rivolgono le propagandistiche campagne anti-povertà. Come molti analisti dell’India postcoloniale, Gupta fa leva sull’ipertrofia e frammentazione dell’autorità statale (dove al necessario decentramento subentra il mancato coordinamento dei diversi livelli amministrativi) e sull’arbitrarietà del welfare, anche nella recente transizione da socialismo a neoliberismo. Confrontandosi criticamente con i concetti di “biopotere” e “nuda vita” di Foucault e Agamben, e dialogando con noti teorici contemporanei quali V. Das, M. Lock, D. Fassin e M. Herzfeld, Gupta interpreta i dati empirici indagando le disfunzioni dell’amministrazione statale nella gestione della popolazione, talora dipingendo vignette etnografiche di rara profondità. Tre sono i principali dispositivi burocratici individuati nella global governance indiana: corruption, inscription, governmentality, che danno il titolo ai capitoli centrali del volume.

Il dilagare della corruzione è da tempo riportato nei media come scandaloso emblema dello Stato indiano, che filtra nei discorsi pubblici e nelle chiacchiere quotidiane, alimentando una serie di aspettative collettive su politica, governo e civil servants che ne sono l’espressione. Gupta riferisce cronache di tangenti e mazzette come pratiche routinarie nell’interazione tra cittadini e burocrati, ma anche tra funzionari di diversa gerarchia e status, che mantengono in azione il sistema perverso dell’apparato statale indiano. Senza cedere all’idea sbrigativa di una rapace avidità dei singoli, l’evidenza etnografica narra piuttosto la funzione fàtica e performativa della corruzione spicciola (p.78): metodo per stabilire contatti vantaggiosi e garantirsi beni e servizi altrimenti fuori portata per molti, nonostante le ideologie politiche di sovvenzione e promozione dei bisognosi.

Esplorando il concetto di “iscrizione”, l’autore non si limita a indagare le pratiche di registrazione d’ufficio, ma sonda anche i molteplici usi e significati che la scrittura può assumere nei contesti studiati. In un Paese plurilingue che ancora insegue l’obiettivo di una massiccia alfabetizzazione della popolazione, non solo lo Stato agisce sui cittadini attraverso la parola scritta, talvolta incomprensibile e spesso coercitiva, ma l’abilità di servirsene da parte dei singoli non è condizione sufficiente perché la popolazione possa interagire efficacemente con il sistema ed esercitare forme di resistenza (più o meno legittime, da istanze conformi alla legge a tentativi di contraffazione). Particolarmente interessante è il “feticismo” riservato a documenti e attestati anzitutto educativi, come se in essi si celasse un potere di riscatto sociale raramente garantito (p.186). Ancora più allarmante è la pedante compilazione di report e censimenti, spesso basati su dati inattendibili riportati dagli ispettori, che generano un’ulteriore stereotipizzazione della popolazione e una fallita comprensione dei bisogni reali di chi vive nell’indigenza.

Con razionalità amministrativa o governa-mentalità, l’autore esamina due progetti locali di sviluppo rurale attuati in U.P., rivolti rispettivamente alla cura dell’infanzia (Integrated Child Development Services) e a un presunto empowerment femminile (Mahila Samakhya). Se l’implementazione dei programmi copre tempi storici contigui ma divisi dall’apertura dell’India all’economia di mercato nei primi anni ‘90, Gupta traccia più convergenze che differenze tra i due modelli di sviluppo, comunque mossi da “idee, tecnologie e mezzi transnazionali” (p.239). In entrambi i casi molte risorse sembrano andare sprecate, quando non intascate da funzionari che pure si dicono impegnati nell’alleviare la miseria dei concittadini. La mancanza di esiti sociali a lungo termine è imputata alla stessa messa in atto dei progetti, dove beneficiari e attori finiscono con il coincidere: nella gestione dell’anganwadi (centro-rifugio) sono le donne target delle attività a fungere da volontarie senza equa retribuzione. A prescindere dalla cornice ideologica, l’arbitrarietà dei microprocessi burocratici ostacola reali mutamenti sociali, sotto il velo illusorio di magnanimi interventi pubblici.

L’amara chiosa dell’autore rilancia infine un ulteriore paradosso: benché la normalizzazione della miseria sia denunciata come omicidio colposo di massa, nessuno è perseguibile, al contrario “nell’India post-Indipendenza lo Stato continua a fondare la sua legittimità sull’impegno a garantire la crescita degli ultimi [marginali, subalterni, outcast], puntualmente senza riuscire a mantenere quanto promesso” (p.292).

Empiricamente solido, politicamente urgente e teoricamente raffinato, le criticità del testo si possono rilevare nella ridondanza delle tesi centrali che in parte sacrificano coesione e concisione, e nell’insufficiente disaggregazione della categoria di poveri, da cui restano escluse le fasce marginali urbane che avrebbero reso più pregnante la critica sociale, rivelando contraddizioni di genere e casta/classe qui scarsamente considerate. Una certa reificazione della povertà si accompagna però al riconoscimento della sua immagine mutevole e storicamente determinata; cenni alla Mandal Commission (1989) e all’introduzione del “sistema quote” lasciano intravedere la consapevolezza di altre questioni socio-politiche volutamente lasciate sullo sfondo. Qualche perplessità pone invece la trattazione, sollevata in epilogo, del discorso su violenza armata e scontro tra Stato, maoisti e gruppi tribali, con un salto temporale non del tutto ragionato.

Per quanto manchi di comparazioni areali (l’esperienza in U.P. non può essere estesa all’intera Federazione) e di un aggiornamento storico più puntuale (tra campo e scrittura sono trascorsi quasi due decenni), il testo rimane una delle più ricche e convincenti indagini antropologiche sulla violenza strutturale perpetrata dallo Stato postcoloniale indiano a danno degli strati vulnerabili della nazione. Fonte di inesauribili dibattiti, il lavoro sarà di sicuro interesse per etnologi politici e asiatisti, ma anche per esperti di relazioni internazionali, cooperazione e sviluppo, che troveranno in queste pagine analisi bottom-up tali da incrinare idee consolidate su povertà, progresso e apparato statale nella più contestata e potente democrazia sud-asiatica.

Rimane da chiedersi se le intuizioni di Gupta possano sollecitare una revisione della macchina burocratica indiana e un ripensamento epistemico “dell’ordinaria sofferenza umana” (p.138) in un Paese abitato da oltre 1.2 miliardi di persone, dove i significati di sviluppo, globale e postmoderno sono mediati dall’eredità storica del Raj britannico. Pur con qualche scetticismo, resta da vedere se l’attenzione manifestata dal nuovo Primo Ministro Modi verso il Civil Service saprà intaccare la “maligna negligenza” (p.137) con cui la classe dirigente ostenta benevolo interesse per un’umanità di miserabili, traghettando lo stato sociale verso il neoliberismo nella prima era post-Congresso.

 

Paolo Puddinu (a cura di), Un viaggiatore italiano in Borneo nel 1873, Il Giornale Particolare di Giacomo Bove (Parte I), Regione Piemonte, Provincia di Asti, Astigrafica 2014.

Paolo Puddinu (a cura di), Un viaggiatore italiano in Giappone nel 1873, Il Giornale Particolare di Giacomo Bove (Parte II), Ieoka, Sassari, 1999.

 

Il libro curato da Paolo Puddinu, Un viaggiatore italiano in Borneo nel 1873, Il Giornale Particolare di Giacomo Bove (parte I), è lo studio della prima parte di un diario personale scritto dal cadetto della Marina Militare italiana, Giacomo Bove, durante una missione di esplorazione in Borneo. Il Giornale Particolare, il diario di bordo che, secondo una tradizione ancora in auge nella Marina Militare, tutti i componenti dell’equipaggio devono scrivere durante la navigazione, fu redatto a bordo della pirocorvetta a ruote della Regia Marina Italiana, “Governolo”.

L’opera di Puddinu va a completare un corpus composto di due parti. La prima parte del Giornale Particolare inizia con la narrazione dei giorni antecedenti la partenza della missione dal porto di La Spezia, il 13 dicembre 1872 e si interrompe l’8 maggio 1873, quando la “Governolo” si trovava in viaggio di trasferimento, dall’arcipelago delle isole Sulu al Giappone. La seconda parte del diario, pubblicata sempre da Paolo Puddinu nel 1999, riprende la narrazione del viaggio che portò la nave italiana fino al Giappone. Di qui, dopo una sosta di quasi quattro mesi, la pirocorvetta rientrò in Italia, nel porto di La Spezia, il 28 febbraio 1874.

In quel periodo il governo italiano aveva dato vita a numerose missioni internazionali per valutare la possibilità di inserirsi nell’alveo della politica imperialista europea e per conquistare territori oltre mare. In Asia Orientale erano state allacciate buone relazioni con il Giappone, la Cina, il Siam e la Birmania e, durante un viaggio di esplorazione nel Borneo della nave “Clotilde”, nel 1868, erano state individuate alcune zone nelle quali realizzare una colonia. Il proposito italiano, in quell’occasione, si era scontrato con l’opposizione della Gran Bretagna. Per questo motivo, la nuova missione della “Governolo”, a cui si accompagnava anche una nave più piccola, la “Vedetta”, doveva svolgersi nella massima segretezza.

La pubblicazione della prima parte del Giornale Particolare è legata al recente, quanto casuale, ritrovamento del manoscritto presso un antiquario italiano, manoscritto successivamente acquistato dalla Regione Piemonte e affidato a Paolo Puddinu per lo studio dei contenuti. Con questo volume si viene a colmare una lacuna nella grande produzione narrativa di Giacomo Bove. A distanza di pochi anni da quella missione, infatti, dopo altri viaggi di esplorazione intorno al mondo, dal Polo Nord alla Patagonia e al Congo, Giacomo Bove diventò uno dei più famosi esploratori italiani. La sua fama derivava, oltre che dalle sue intrepide imprese, dalla sua abilità nel raccontarle sia nei suoi libri, pubblicati in varie edizioni nell’Ottocento, sia nelle numerose conferenze da lui tenute in Italia e all’estero. Inoltre, non è da trascurare la cassa di risonanza che le opere del romanziere Emilio Salgari, ambientate nel Borneo, ispirate dai racconti di Bove, hanno avuto sulla celebrità dell’esploratore italiano.

Il libro di Puddinu riporta la versione integrale del giornale particolare di Bove, annotata dal curatore e preceduta da cinque capitoli introduttivi, sempre ad opera di Puddinu. Nel primo capitolo introduttivo, Puddinu descrive le vicende rocambolesche relative al ritrovamento del manoscritto, visto che gli sforzi profusi dalla comunità scientifica e dagli appassionati per ritrovarlo erano stati per lungo tempo vani. In merito alla vicenda della scomparsa del giornale di Bove, Puddinu propone nelle sue riflessioni anche alcune ipotesi, fondate sull’analisi di documenti provenienti da archivi privati e da quelli della Società Geografica Italiana. Secondo Puddinu, la probabile causa della scomparsa del volume originale è legata ai tentativi da parte dei discendenti di altri componenti della spedizione di nascondere il giornale di Bove, al fine di plagiarne i contenuti. Nel secondo capitolo, si espongono le caratteristiche generali del manoscritto che, pur essendo stato conservato in eccellente stato, manca di alcune pagine. Talvolta, per una maldestra opera di rifilatura del rilegatore, in alcune parti, sono state tagliate alcune righe. Tuttavia, il volume originale ha conservato intatta la grande parte del manoscritto, oltre a tutti i disegni, le mappe, gli schizzi e alcune fotografie originali, incollate nelle pagine dallo stesso Bove. Ciò ha facilitato la pur complessa opera “paleografica” del curatore del volume. L’edizione di Puddinu, infatti, ricostruisce fedelmente l’impaginazione di Bove, la disposizione dei testi, dei titoli, degli “a capo” e l’interpunzione, conservando nel contempo gli errori di ortografia, le imprecisioni e le ripetizioni dell’autore. Il medesimo criterio è stato impiegato per la riproduzione dei disegni, delle mappe, delle fotografie e delle didascalie, restituendo in questo modo al lettore un’opera il più possibile simile all’originale.

Nel terzo capitolo, Puddinu ha ricostruito la biografia di Giacomo Bove, grazie anche alle notizie che lo stesso Bove ha riportato nel suo diario, relative alla sua infanzia e al rapporto con la sua famiglia. Nel capitolo che segue, poi, è riportata un’esauriente bibliografia delle opere di e su Giacomo Bove pubblicate in Italia e all’estero.

I due capitoli conclusivi della parte introduttiva sono dedicati alle relazioni del giovane Regno d’Italia con le potenze europee e alle relazioni dei paesi europei con quelli asiatici. Nel primo di questi due capitoli, in particolare, è stato delineato da Puddinu un quadro storico generale della politica internazionale italiana nel periodo in cui iniziava la missione di esplorazione nel Borneo. Nel successivo capitolo, elaborato da chi scrive, sono state analizzate le relazioni internazionali incentrate sul Borneo alla fine dell’Ottocento.

Attraverso una ricostruzione accurata e minuziosa del processo decisionale ministeriale di condurre una missione esplorativa in Borneo, Puddinu analizza i primi passi della politica di espansione coloniale italiana dopo l’unità d’Italia. L’utilizzo di fonti tratte dagli archivi diplomatici del Ministero degli Affari Esteri e dell’Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare Italiana, oltre che da carteggi privati, ha consentito al curatore del volume di restituire le ambizioni della classe politica italiana – anche se non sempre condivise dai ministri dello stesso governo – di fronte al tentativo di inaugurare una politica colonialista. I dubbi e le opposizioni di alcuni gruppi politici di fronte all’organizzazione di una missione densa di pericoli e di incognite, come quella nel Borneo, erano stati agilmente superati dai diplomatici italiani. La ricostruzione storica di Puddinu, in questo capitolo, dimostra, tuttavia, l’ingenuità e la poca esperienza nell’ambito internazionale di quegli stessi diplomatici. L’entusiasmo, seguìto all’allacciamento delle prime relazioni diplomatiche con i governi asiatici, infatti, aveva portato la classe politica italiana a sottovalutare l’opposizione che le grandi potenze imperialiste avrebbero sollevato di fronte ai tentativi italiani di realizzare una colonia nel Borneo. La ricostruzione storica dell’opposizione da parte degli Stati Uniti, dell’Olanda e, in particolare, della Gran Bretagna al progetto italiano, ben documentata da Puddinu, costituisce il nodo cruciale entro cui si svolge l’intera vicenda della missione in Borneo.

Da questo punto di vista, il diario di Bove costituisce una fonte diplomatica di grande importanza, poiché i racconti delle difficoltà diplomatiche, che il comando della spedizione incontrò in occasione delle soste a Point de Galles, a Penang e a Singapore, risultano, dalla lettura del diario, essere il riflesso puntuale della scarsa abilità e delle difficoltà interne del governo di Roma. Bove, grazie al suo rapporto di amicizia con il comandante della missione, Enrico Accinni, aveva partecipato a tutte le riunioni e a tutti gli incontri tra il comando italiano della missione e i rappresentanti diplomatici europei in Asia. Di conseguenza, nel diario sono da un lato ricostruite le trattative tra i rappresentanti diplomatici e, dall’altro, sono riportati i commenti che seguivano tra i responsabili italiani, una volta terminati tali incontri.

L’inquadramento degli eventi raccontati nel diario è facilitata dalle annotazioni del curatore, che costituiscono una vera e propria bussola per orientarsi sui luoghi visitati da Bove, spesso riportati nel diario in maniera errata (a causa della trascrizione non scientifica dei nomi locali) o con denominazioni che, per il lettore di oggi, sono oramai desuete. Inoltre, la puntuale ricostruzione da parte del curatore dei numerosi profili biografici dei personaggi che Bove incontrò durante il suo viaggio aiuta il lettore a capire meglio il contesto descritto dal viaggiatore. Altrettanto importante, infine, appare lo studio, da parte del curatore, dei racconti storici di Bove. In alcune parti del suo giornale, infatti, Bove riporta fatti accaduti prima del suo arrivo, come per esempio la rivolta dei cinesi di Bau a Kuching (la stessa rivolta che fa da sfondo alla conclusione de I pirati della Malesia  di Emilio Salgari). Tali resoconti storici sono frutto in parte di letture di libri inglesi, in parte di resoconti ascoltati da vari personaggi incontrati nel viaggio. I fatti descritti da Bove, in molti casi, sono stati analizzati e confrontati dal curatore con un’ampia letteratura di viaggio italiana e straniera, attraverso la quale Puddinu ha potuto verificare la veridicità o l’imprecisione degli episodi descritti.

Nel complesso, l’intero diario di Bove, cioè l’insieme della prima e della seconda parte, riveste un’importanza storiografica di alto livello. Innanzitutto consente una progressiva umanizzazione di un breve periodo della vicenda colonizzatrice italiana, dopo l’unificazione del regno. La “storia di vita”, intesa come rappresentazione dell’evento, si intreccia così con la storia degli eventi. In sostanza si tratta di una frammento di vita privata che diventa fonte storica importante nella ricostruzione sia delle relazioni diplomatiche italiane, durante la missione, sia delle condizioni socio-economiche dei paesi asiatici, visitati durante il viaggio. Le descrizioni minuziose dei quartieri delle grandi città, così come delle povere abitazioni dei villaggi sperduti ai piedi del Kinabalu, o i disegni delle residenze o dei costumi dei capi villaggio, non solo conservano la memoria di una realtà poco conosciuta, ma finiscono per diventare una pietra di paragone con le miserie e le difficoltà dell’Italia appena unita. Appare infatti evidente come per Bove, un giovane di appena vent’anni, il cui spirito di osservazione sorprende per la piena maturità, i valori del mondo malese non fossero né inferiori né superiori ai valori dell’Occidente o delle altre civiltà asiatiche, ma, semplicemente, diversi.

In definitiva, il Giornale Particolare di Giacomo Bove, offre agli studiosi un’ulteriore possibilità di superare la visione orientalista che, per lungo tempo, ha caratterizzato in Italia e in Europa gli studi delle civiltà extra-europee. Il diario di Bove, attraverso le informazioni che dà e le riflessioni che le accompagnano, rappresenta, infatti, una chiara dimostrazione della fallacia dell’essenzialismo, cioè dell’idea vetero-orientalista che esista un’“essenza” che caratterizza le civiltà asiatiche, sostanzialmente immutabile e fondamentalmente estranea e irriducibile rispetto alla “civiltà occidentale”.

 

1. Introduction

In 2014 Turkmenistan further enhanced its position in the regional political and economic chessboard, developing relations of cooperation with both Central Asian countries and non-regional countries, mainly interested in the Turkmen gas.

Ashgabat’s support to the realization of regional infrastructures of transport – such as the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran railway – represents the main contribution of the Turkmen government to the development of regional trade and interconnections, also allowing Turkmenistan to play the role of Central Asian trade hub, given its strategic geographic position.

In the security field, Turkmenistan has necessarily dealt with two potential threats which could trigger a condition of instability: the impact of the Russia–Ukraine confrontation on the domestic scenario and the growing Taliban threat in the eastern region, bordering with Afghanistan.

In the energy sector, President Gurbanguly Mälikgulyýewiç Berdimuhamedow is aware of the existing unbalanced situation which could affect the national strategy of export’s diversification: on the one hand, the long-term energy partnership with China is granting Turkmenistan a huge market for its rising gas exports. However, on the other hand, this scenario prevents the achievement of a diversification strategy, hampering or delaying the concrete realization of alternative export routes.

The forthcoming creation of the Agrarian Party of Turkmenistan represents a relevant development in the domestic scenario. In fact, it must be interpreted as another relevant step undertaken by Berdimuhamedow on the long road to implement a multi-party political system.

2. Turkmenistan and Russia: an awkward issue

The effects of the Russia–Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea by Russia have seriously concerned the Turkmen authorities, which are worried about the perceived Russian aggressive attitude in post-Soviet space. Moscow’s aim to protect the rights of ethnic Russians in the post Soviet space is perceived as a potential threat for Turkmenistan as well as for the other four Central Asian states, which are home to sizeable communities of Russian-speaking populations. About 4% of Turkmenistan’s population (110,000 residents) hold dual citizenship. The measures of cultural and administrative discrimination adopted in Turkmenistan against Russians could offer a pretext to Moscow for intervention, also allowing Russia to set back Turkmen’s projects of energy diversification to European markets.[1] In fact, the potential participation of Turkmenistan in the Trans Caspian energy corridor represents a serious threat for Russia’s energy strategy, boosting an alternative route of energy imports for the EU.

At the Caspian summit[2] held on 29 September 2014 at Astrakhan the five littoral countries (Turkmenistan, Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan) failed to reach an agreement on the Caspian Sea status, which brought to a halt the realization of the Trans Caspian pipeline, preventing the construction of the missing link between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. At the same summit, the five Caspian countries agreed to prevent any outside military presence in the region, substantially weakening all projects of security and naval cooperation which some littoral countries – Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan – seemed about to realize with either NATO or the United States.

Officially the Turkmen President welcomed this agreement, which reflects the main principles of good neighbourhood, cooperation, friendship and stability on which Turkmen foreign policy is based. However, Berdimuhamedow is also interested in hampering Russia’s attempts to create a Caspian Collective Security System (currently proposed only to Azerbaijan). Formally aimed to preserve this strategic region from outside influences, the Caspian Collective Security System would in fact bring the Caspian region inside the Russian orbit of power.[3]

Another area of friction in Turkmenistan–Russia relations is represented by Moscow’s project to involve the Central Asian countries in a security, economic and political framework of cooperation, by making use of different regional organizations. Turkmenistan refused to join the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) as well as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),[4] on the basis of the permanent neutrality, which continues to represent the main orientation of its national foreign policy.

According to the Turkmen Ambassador in Russia, Berdymurat Rejepov, Turkmenistan is not interested in joining the EEU, preferring to develop bilateral relations with Russia, considered as a strategic partner.[5] Ashgabat is profoundly wary of Russian integration projects, based on the geopolitical ambition to extend its influence in the region.

However, Russia disposes of some levers to pressure Turkmenistan, trying to obtain a more collaborative approach on the regional integration framework. First of all, given Moscow’s orientation to protect the Russian-speaking population in the post soviet space, Moscow could consider some of the cultural and administrative decisions adopted by the Turkmen government as discriminatory, intervening to defend the rights of the local Russian community. Moreover, the adoption of restrictions on Turkmen guest workers in Russia could be an even more effective tool: in fact their forced return to Turkmenistan would increase unemployment and decrease money remittances, triggering social instability.[6] In the economic field, Russian influence on Turkmenistan appears limited, considering that Moscow is only Ashgabat’s fourth trade partner, while China plays the lion’s share, with 43.3% of total trade.[7]

In the security field, following Nato’s disengagement from Afghanistan, Turkmenistan could need Russian support to address the growing Taliban threat on the Turkmen-Afghan border, a factor of dangerous instability which could also affect the whole regional security architecture. In 2014 there was a steady increase in fighting in the Jowzjan and Faryab provinces of Afghanistan, which border with Turkmenistan. In two different attacks in February and May 2014, six Turkmen border guards were killed along the southern border.[8] Incursions and provocations of supposed Taliban fighters as well as their clashes with Turkmenistan’s military have been reported, signalling the risk of cross-border incursions, bound to spread instability in Turkmenistan. The decision to adopt and preserve the country’s neutrality policy has led Turkmenistan to avoid, until now, cooperation with regional security organizations, such as the CSTO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In September 2014, Nikolai Bordyuzha, the Secretary General of the CSTO, expressed his hope that Turkmenistan (and Uzbekistan) ‘will cooperate in terms of overall efforts to ensure stability in the region’, in order to contain ‘undesirable tendencies’ in Central Asia such as the intensification of cross-bordering incursions and extremist activities.[9]

3. A regional-oriented foreign policy

The visit of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkmenistan – his first visit to Central Asia after becoming President in 2014 – clearly highlights the strategic relevance of the Turkmenistan–Turkey cooperation in the economic and security field. An integral part of Ashgabat–Ankara cooperation is also the containment of Russia’s ambitions. Turkey is the second trade partner for Turkmenistan, with 600 Turkish firms and companies which currently operate in Turkmenistan. The bilateral trade turnover of this successful partnership amounted to US$ 4,75 billion in 2013, going over US $ 5 billion in 2014.[10] In addition to the agreement on energy cooperation, allowing Ashgabat to supply the TANAP gas pipeline project,[11] the two sides agreed to increase military cooperation. President Berdimuhamedow stressed the need to obtain modern military equipment and to improve training in order to address the dangerous challenges to national security and stability, represented by Taliban’s incursion across the Turkmen–Afghan border.[12]

Another increasingly influential Turkmen partner – and not only in the energy sector – is China. Following a visit from President Berdimuhamedow to Beijing in May 2014, Turkmenistan and China established a strategic partnership, by signing several memoranda of understanding aimed at increasing cooperation in the fields of infrastructure, telecommunications, agriculture, health care and technology.[13]

Ashgabat is also promoting the realization of two strategic infrastructures, aimed at promoting cooperation and improving trade integration of the regional non-Russian states. The aim is to allow Turkmenistan to play a significant role in the future regional security architecture.

The Iran–Turkmenistan–Kazakhstan railroad and the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Tajikistan rail line will make Turkmenistan a regional hub, in a promising trade network connecting Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. This same network would open alternative export routes for the Central Asian landlocked economies.[14] In April 2014, Turkmenistan’s president visited Tajikistan to discuss the railroad project. In doing this, Berdimuhamedow was trying to remedy Ashgabat’s exclusion from the Dushanbe and Kabul agreement – which had been announced in January 2014 – concerning the realization of the Tajik section of the railway.[15] Although excluded by the definition of the railroad, which had been done by Tajikistan and Afghanistan without consulting Turkmenistan, Berdimuhamedow promised to finance the Turkmen section of the railroad, also realizing a link to the northern Afghan town of Andkhoy. The project should be operational in 2015. However, even if Turkmenistan realizes its part, the uncertain definition of the Tajik part of the railroad and insufficient financial investments[16] may postpone its realization.[17]

On December 3 2014, the Turkmen President together with Kazakh President Nursultan Äbishuly Nazarbayev and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani participated at the inaugural ceremony of the new railroad linking Turkmenistan with Kazakhstan and Iran. The railway – whose construction began in 2009 – has a total length of 925 kilometres. Of which, 85 kilometres are in Iran, 700 in Turkmenistan and the remaining 140 in Kazakhstan.[18] This infrastructure – which is a part of the North-South international transport corridor – will allow Turkmenistan both to enhance trade, political and energy cooperation with two powerful neighbours such as Kazakhstan and Iran, and to reach new profitable markets for its cotton exports.

4. Between growing dependence on gas exports to China and the need to diversify export routes

In the last five years, the availability of huge gas reserves and the strategic geographic position between West and East markets have allowed Turkmenistan to successfully develop a multi-vector energy strategy. That aim is gas export diversification, attracting foreign investments, technologies and know-how in order to realize the necessary infrastructures to develop gas fields and to increase national production. The launch of the Sino-Turkmen gas pipeline (China-Central Asia Gas Pipeline, CAGP) in 2009 has represented the main achievement of this strategy, ending the Russian monopoly on Turkmen gas exports.[19] Turkmenistan continues to hold the fourth largest natural gas reserves in the world, after Russia, Iran and Qatar. However, since 2012 the British Petroleum Statistical Review reduced its estimates on Turkmen gas reserves from 24 trillion cubic metres (tcm) (2011) to 17.5 tcm (2012).[20] In spite of this revision, the Turkmen government has expressed great expectations on the development of Galkynysh field, which British Auditor Gaffney, Cline & Associates ranked as the world’s second largest (after North Dome, located in Qatar) with gas reserves of between 13.1 and 21.2 tcm.[21] According to Turkmen authorities, following the exploitation of Galkynysh field, Ashgabat will produce 250 billion cubic metres (bcm) of gas per year by 2030 and export 200 bcm per year.[22] This means that, in the next 15 years, Turkmenistan national gas production should more than triple, because it is currently equal to 62.3 bcm per year.[23]

In January 2014, Turkmenistan’s President Berdimuhamedow announced that his government – in order to achieve this goal – would intensify its efforts to raise foreign investment in the energy sector.[24] However, the unaltered position of the Turkmen government – which refuses the involvement of major international companies in Production Sharing Agreements (PSA) to develop onshore gas fields – has hindered all attempts to attract financial investment and know how. At present, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is the only foreign company to detain a Production Sharing Contract on onshore gas field (Bagtyarlyk) but several international companies – such as Chevron, ExxonMobil, Total, Eni, Malaysia’s Petronas, Gazprom, British Petroleum, Germany’s RWE – have showed interest in investing in the Turkmen energy sector, driven by geopolitical and economic aims. [25]

In 2014 some factors of vulnerability in the Turkmen energy strategy emerged, particularly the growing dependence on gas exports to China. At present Ashgabat’s gas exports are delivered to three markets: China, Russia and Iran. Beijing is the main energy partner for Ashgabat. In 2013 China imported 24.4 bcm of gas (half of Chinese gas imports) from Turkmenistan.[26] In May 2014, the Iranian Ministry of Energy announced the decision (reversed six months after) to stop Turkmen gas imports – in order to develop national production – while in September Gazprom announced it was no longer interested in purchasing Central Asian gas. Turkmen gas exports to Russia fell from 50 bcm in 2009 to 9.9 bcm in 2013.[27]

This situation clearly highlights Turkmenistan’s strategic need to open new energy corridors to achieve its diversification’s policy of energy export routes, balancing the predominant role now conquered by China.[28] Ashgabat and Beijing have also enhanced energy cooperation aimed to realize infrastructures and to exploit new fields in Turkmenistan. On 7 May 2014 president Berdimuhamedow attended the opening ceremony at the gas processing plant at the Bagtyarlyk field, located in the Lebap eastern region (near the Uzbek border), with a capacity of 9 bcm of gas per year. This plant was built by the CNPC, which invested US$ 4 billion for the development of this promising field with reserves estimated at tcm 1.3. Bagtyarlyk is the main source of gas which currently feeds CAGP: Turkmen gas exports to China are projected to reach 40 bcm by 2016, while the peak of 65 bcm of gas per year will be achieved in 2020, after the development of Galkynysh field and the realization of line D of CAGP.[29] During the visit of Xi Jinping in Turkmenistan in September 2013, Turkmenistan and China’s presidents announced the completion of the first phase of construction of the Galkynysh gas field and launched the construction of the second phase, while planning the realization of new additional gas pipeline (line D) to increase the transport capacity of the China-Central Asia gas pipeline network.[30]

5. Eastern and western energy export routes: progresses and delays

In this scenario, the slow implementation of some alternative pipeline projects – notably the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline and the Trans Caspian corridor – is hampering Ashgabat’s plans of export diversification.

The TAPI pipeline has been envisaged as the eastern corridor of exports, through which Turkmenistan will supply the lucrative South Asian markets of India and Pakistan, crossing Afghanistan. TAPI should deliver 33 bcm of Turkmen gas by 2017–2018. Originally the natural gas field of Dauletabad was indicated as the main source of supply for this project, but the stagnant/declining production of this mature gas field will make it necessary to commit Galkynysh production also.[31] The implementation of this pipeline may have a strategic relevance for Ashgabat because it will offer an additional export option, bypassing at the same time China and Russia and concretely realizing a diversification of export routes. On 29 October 2014, at the meeting of the Council of Elders, Berdimuhamedow affirmed that TAPI’s construction is planned to start in 2015.[32]

In November 2014, the four state gas companies of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India[33] established a company that will build, own and operate the planned TAPI Pipeline.[34]

In spite of much progress, there are serious security, economic and geopolitical concerns which affect the TAPI project, hindering its realization.

Afghanistan’s permanent condition of instability severely weakens the possibility to realize this energy route, considering that the planned TAPI route is supposed to cross Southern-Western Afghanistan (Herat, Helmand, Kandahar) as well as Pakistani Baluchistan. Given the unsettled situation of these areas, the TAPI security and its possibility to regularly supply energy remain an open question. If instability in the Afghanistan and Pakistan region has always been one of the main weakness of the TAPI project, the rising tensions along the Turkmen-Afghan border contributes to increase the uncertainty about TAPI implementation. In 2014, frequent incursions and clashes provoked by supposed Taliban fighters have caused Turkmen armed forces to intervene; but the security scenario will clearly worsen after the complete withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan.[35]

In November 2013, in an attempt to speed up the implementation of the project and to assure its economic feasibility, the ADB was appointed in the role of transaction advisor for the TAPI gas pipeline project, with the task of helping the TAPI members to find the necessary financial support.[36] This is a task of crucial importance, as the estimated cost of the project has increased from the US$ 7.6 billion originally estimated by Penspen in 2008 to around US$ 9–12 billion.[37]However, as noted above, Turkmenistan’s persistent refusal to allow major international companies to develop the onshore gas fields, supposed to feed the TAPI pipeline, remains a major hurdle for the realization of the project.

The Trans Caspian pipeline (TCP) project appears to have been revitalized in 2014, following the cautious rapprochement between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. The two countries have discussed the prospect of energy cooperation, which, since 1991 has been made difficult by Ashgabat and Baku both claiming the ownership of Kyapaz/Serdar offshore oilfield in the Caspian Sea.

Rovnag Abdullayev, head of Azerbaijan state oil company SOCAR, and Berdimuhamedow, met twice in 2014, discussing the implementation of a joint project and the possibility of building a trans-Caspian gas pipeline. During the international oil and gas exhibition, which was held in Ashgabat in November 2014, Abdullayev said that Baku ‘is ready to provide necessary infrastructure, a diversified system of oil and gas pipelines and other opportunities for implementation of projects in the oil and gas sector of Turkmenistan’.[38]

Furthermore, Turkmenistan has also enhanced its energy cooperation with Turkey, which will play the role of hub in the TCP project, delivering Azerbaijani – and potentially Turkmen gas – to EU markets. As a matter of fact, Turkmenistan and Turkey have further proceeded in implementing their 2013 agreement – according to which Turkmen gas will be delivered to Turkey – signing a framework agreement to deliver Turkmen gas to TANAP.[39]

Nevertheless, the unsolved legal status of the Caspian Sea obstructs the possibility to deliver Turkmen gas to Azerbaijan and then to Turkey through the TANAP pipeline. Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan share a common position concerning the possibility of building an underwater Caspian pipeline with the consensus of the nations directly involved. However, Russia and Iran oppose this solution, privileging consensus among all five littoral states (Turkmenistan, Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Iran) and also threatening to use their right to veto to prevent all Caspian pipeline energy projects. During the fourth Caspian summit held in Astrakhan in September 2014, the five littoral countries failed to achieve a final division on the Caspian’s offshore waters and seabed, postponing once again the solution to the next summit in 2016.[40]

On the Turkmen side, one of the big problems to solve is that the East–West pipeline – designed to supply the TCP or generally the western corridor – is still unfinished. This pipeline should deliver 30 bmc of gas per year from the Shatlyk gas field in the South-east of the country to the Caspian coast, reaching a total capacity of 40 bmc, thanks to additional gas extracted from Caspian deposits. No foreign companies or firms are involved in its realization, which has an estimated cost of US$ 2 billion.[41]

6. Economic successes and constitutional changes

In the domestic scenario, Berdimuhamedow has undertaken a gradual process of democratization and reforms, aimed at creating a multi-party political system. As a matter of fact, the Agrarian Party of Turkmenistan, the latest to be created among the Turkmen parties, will be the third in the country, together with the existent Democratic Party and the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. The last one was founded in 2012, after a 21-year period of a one-party system.

The Agrarian Party organizing committee decided to hold the founding congress on 28 September 2014 and apply for registration to the Ministry of Justice, in accordance with national legislation.[42]

In the economic sphere, the Turkmen government has showed its clear will to further implement a diversification policy, in order to lessen the dependence on revenues deriving from the hydrocarbon exports. The development of the agricultural sector – through the modernization of agriculture industry infrastructures and the adoption of modern technologies – will increase the production of cotton, wheat, rice and other products which will be delivered to meet both internal needs and external demand.[43]

This decision also reflects the will of the Turkmen government to further implement the policy of economic diversification, in order to lessen their dependence on revenues linked to hydrocarbon exports: the development of the agricultural sector – through the modernization of agriculture industry infrastructures and the adoption of modern technologies – will increase the production of cotton, wheat, rice and other products which will be delivered to meet both internal needs and external demand.[44]

Turkmenistan is benefiting from the robust growth of its economy, mainly supported by gas exports to China and high public investments. In the period January–September 2014, Turkmenistan’s GDP grew by 10.3%. According to the recent Euromonitor International analytical report, in 2014 Turkmenistan was the leader in the list of the top 5 countries in the world for fastest growth in annual disposable income.[45] This economic success reinforces Turkmenistan’s role in the regional scenario, where Kazakhstan holds the fourth place. Since early 2014 the country’s foreign trade turnover has exceeded $21 billion, which shows their success in the development of non-hydrocarbons sectors, such as textiles, food industries, production of construction materials, chemicals, agriculture.[46]

Berdimuhamedow has also proposed to carry out constitutional reform, which reflects the political evolution and socio-political transformations that occurred in the country, mainly following the development of market economic relations and private entrepreneurship. In May 2014, the Turkmen President signed a decree ‘On establishment of the Constitutional Commission and its composition for improvement of the Constitution’. Two months later, during the first session of this Commission (on 6 August 2014), Berdimuhamedow reaffirmed his political will to amend the current Constitution. These changes will be in continuity with the Constitutional amendments adopted in 2008, which abolished the Khalk Maslahaty (people’s council) legislative body, transferring its powers to the president and the Mejlis (parliament).[47]

Nel corso del 2014, il Turkmenistan ha visto rafforzarsi le minacce alla stabilità e alla sicurezza nazionale, legate alle incursioni armate dei talibani lungo il confine afgano-turkmeno, situazione che è destinata ad aggravarsi dopo il ritiro delle truppe NATO dalla regione. Inoltre, le tensioni russo-ucraine e l’annessione della Crimea alla Russia hanno aumentato i timori del governo di Ashgabat sulle ambizioni russe nello spazio post-sovietico.

In ambito energetico, il Turkmenistan – che possiede le quarte maggiori riserve di gas al mondo – ha ulteriormente approfondito la cooperazione con la Cina, nazione verso la quale viene convogliato oltre il 50% delle esportazioni di gas turkmeno: tuttavia, il sostanziale stallo che accomuna gli altri progetti di gasdotti (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India e il corridoio transcaspico) impediscono al governo di Ashgabat di realizzare compiutamente la strategia di diversificazione delle rotte energetiche d’esportazione.

Grazie alla centralità della propria posizione geografica, il Turkmenistan rappresenta un perno determinante per la realizzazione dei progetti di infrastrutture regionali di trasporto, legittimandosi nel ruolo di «hub» ferroviario, stradale e commerciale.

 

1. Introduction

Since his victorious presidential campaign back in 2011, Almazbek Sharshenovich Atambayev had pledged that Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy would be markedly pro-Russian, heralding a break with the small Central Asian republic’s post-independence multi-vector foreign policy.

While this policy tous azimuts has eventually tired all foreign partners because of Bishkek’s unrelenting efforts at securing greater revenues in exchange for its support, the final closure of the Transit Center at Manas (as the US air base in the capital airport was formally called) in June 2014 and the concomitant negotiations for accession to the Russia-sponsored and led Customs Union (since 1 January 2015 the Eurasian Economic Union[1], or EEU) was none the less stunning, if – after all – expected.

The chapter explores the intertwined nature of foreign policy pressures and domestic political processes, paying special attention to the effects of Russian leverage on Kyrgyzstani politics. Together, external and domestic factors have given rise to an increasingly unstable and crisis-prone Central Asian state, one where, as Blank notes, ‘its long-standing domestic weaknesses are compounded by its external crises’[2]. The paper is structured around the year’s main story, namely that of Bishkek’s long and tortuous path towards accession to the Customs Union (CU), the organisation comprising Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and, since 1 January 2015, Armenia. Corollary to this are two distinct but equally significant events that have also shaped the domestic political discourse in favour of closer ties with Russia. The first one is the crisis in Ukraine, which has had reverberations across the whole Central Asian region. The second is the fallout of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, which has – once again – raised the spectre of a revival of Islamic radicalism, be it in the forms of a revamped Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan or greater vulnerability to the recruitment of young Kyrgyz by radical organisations. This, of course, relates to the rise of the Islamic State in 2014 whose successes – understood in terms of the unravelling of both Syria and Iraq and the parallel set up of a new state, or caliphate – has attracted a growing number of fighters from Central Asia, especially Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Kyrgyzstan’s relations with Moscow have translated into a more repressive domestic environment, with the introduction of a law on ‘foreign agents’ and an increasingly anti-gay rhetoric (both policies reminiscent of Putin’s in Russia). Last, but not least, are the deteriorating relations with neighbouring Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Border disputes and clashes are now routine. This bodes ill not only for the countries in question, but also for Russia which might find itself enmeshed in regional inter-state disputes[3]. Although Kyrgyzstan might have stepped back from the brink of state collapse, this has come at a worrying price: dependence and entrapment.

2. The main narrative: accession to the Eurasian Union

On 1 January 2015 the Eurasian Economic Union emerged from a five-year incubation known as the Customs Union. Sponsored heavily by Russia, seen in some Western chancelleries as Moscow’s attempt to ‘re-Sovietise’ the neighbourhood, the organisation now counts four members: Armenia (who joined in 2015) and the three founding members, namely Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus.

President Atambayev first announced that the country would join the Russia-led Customs Union in 2011[4]. Delays have followed, partly caused by Kyrgyzstan’s initial refusal to agree on the roadmap to accession. This was followed by attempts to secure concessions and financial compensation to offset the expected costs of membership and the requirement to align local legislation to the CU regulations, adjusting tariffs accordingly. After much wrangling there has finally been a breakthrough in the negotiations in the summer, prompted by Bishkek’s awareness that it was running out of options. Moscow has also been keen on adding another (small yet symbolic) member to the much-trumpeted project of Eurasian economic integration. The path to actual membership, finally formalised in late December 2014[5], was far from a smooth journey[6].

One of the strong arguments put forward in favour of Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the Customs Union is the long-term economic benefits deriving from the integration of the small Central Asian economy in a 170m-strong market across Eurasia. In fact, securing membership in the Customs Union is no small matter for Kyrgyzstan. Exports to CU countries fell 18.6% in 2011, although rebounded to 9.2% and 10.1% in 2012 and 2013 respectively. In a country where most politicians are pro-Russian, many of the media are Russian-owned and the local population has traditionally felt close to Russia (partly also because of the fact that over a million Kyrgyz, out of a total population of five million, work in Russia as migrants[7]), it would have been reasonable to expect a rather uneventful process. Instead, after giving the impression ‒ for years ‒ of heading resolutely towards joining the Customs Union, Kyrgyzstan’s roadmap to accession has faced strong headwinds from Fall 2013 onwards, throughout the whole 2014[8]. In November 2013 Kyrgyzstan’s authorities rejected the roadmap for accession to the Customs Union proposed by the Eurasian Economic Commission on the grounds that it had not been consulted and it had not agreed to the terms of accession.

2.1. After muted years, doubts over membership arise (too late?)

There was never any doubt that should Kyrgyzstan eventually join the CU/EEU, this would be the result of a decision which would take into account the political advantages of such a step. Economically, in fact, there are quite a few costs attached to the CU/EEU membership. For a start this will significantly led to a spike in Bishkek’s tariffs as per CU regulations, raising the question of how it will manage to continue to meet its WTO obligations (which entail significantly lower customs tariffs). Raising the tariffs would risk jeopardising the current benefits as the main entry and re-export point for Chinese goods in Central Asia.

Membership would help diversify the small and weak Kyrgyz economy away from being the point of entry and export of Chinese goods towards production. In the short term, however, these positive future results are bound to be counterbalanced by loss in revenues, higher unemployment and, possibly, rising social tensions. Customs duties will have to be increased to be brought in line with those of the Customs Union. Before this even happens, in the year under review consumers behaviour was already responding to expected price hikes in 2015. Purchase of cars, for example, has increased in 2014 in the expectation that import tariffs would rise by 30% in 2015, over 250% (compared to current prices) in 2016 and a whopping 1000% by 2019.

Overall, what is unclear at present is how the country, should it become part of both WTO and CU, will handle the tariff differences. At present Bishkek’s politicians maintain that Kyrgyzstan will negotiate exemptions on an individual basis (per country, per product), which does not seem feasible, showing political naivety at best, bad faith or incompetence at worst. At the same time, Russia’s adhesion to the WTO in 2012 and Kazakhstan’s expected entry next year raise the same questions of harmonisation of tariffs. How to protect a Eurasian economic market while not defaulting on international obligations is now a challenge for Russia and Kazakhstan as well, not just Kyrgyzstan any longer. The local business community forecasts a difficult adjustment period[9]: revenues from re-exported goods generate about 15% of the country’s GDP; 85% of the goods on sale in Kyrgyzstan are later re-exported. Sale of goods officially ‘Made in Kyrgyzstan’ but actually ‘Made in China’, represents 7% of overall tax revenues. 15% of Bishkek’s one-million population is employed in the market. The concerns of the business community aside, outright opposition to joining the Customs Union in the country has traditionally been small, yet vocal: A lively internet-based movement called ‘Kyrgyzstan against the Customs Union’ has become especially vocal against official Bishkek’s position, attracting hundreds of supporters on its Facebook page. The small Reform party has also voiced discontent with the country’s official position. The Central Asian Institute of Free Market has published a rather critical report highlighting the risks stemming from joining the CU. Sporadic protests have erupted in the capital, where opposition to the CU is voiced.

2.2. Cushioning the costs: Bishkek’s attempt to strike a separate deal

President Atambayev has repeatedly stated that joining the CU/EEU is a necessary step for the country[10], while at the same time asking for concessionary loans and financial compensation to offset the cost of losing Kyrgyzstan’s competitive edge vis-à-vis Chinese goods. Failing to agree on the terms is what stalled the process so far. Bishkek asked for ways to cushion the fallout, including a grace period for the three main markets of Dordoi and Madina in Bishkek and Kara-suu in the southern part of the country, which would be granted free-zone status; the costs of re-profiling such markets thereafter; concessions over a range of 1,000 products, many of which are Chinese goods (especially textiles); the creation of a US$1bn Development Fund (US$200m over a period of five years) to smoothen the adjustment process and an additional US$215m to strengthen border infrastructure and bring it in line with Customs Union standards. One of the main opponents to such a separate deal has been Kazakhstan’s president Nursultan Nazarbayev, who objected to the prospect of a ‘one-legged’ membership, explicitly opposing extending a special free-zone status to the main bazaars in the neighbouring republic. Kazakhstan’s position is far from inconsequential, since economic ties between Bishkek and Astana are close and profound. Between 2008 and 2013 bilateral trade has increased 72%; it was at US$1.5bn in 2012, up 41% from the previous year; turnover exceeded US$1bn in 2013. Moreover Kazakhstan’s is the largest source of FDI in the country, operating joint ventures in the construction, energy and banking sectors; 70% of the goods sold at the Dordoi and Madina markets in Bishkek are bought by Kazakh customers. The two countries have agreed on a number of concessions that allow either tariff-free or concessionary deals to Kyrgyz exports to Kazakhstan (and vice versa). In addition a new pipeline supplying Kazakhstani oil is currently under discussion and Kazakhstan has begun supplying 30,000 cubic meters of gas to Kyrgyzstan, reducing its dependence on neighbouring Uzbekistan. Finally, Kazakhstan remains the second destination for Kyrgyz labour migrants.

In short, Kyrgyzstan cannot afford losing ties with its wealthier and larger northern neighbour, especially since Bishkek’s exports to Uzbekistan, Russia and Ukraine have shrunk in the first half of 2014 by 33%, 20% and 50% respectively.

2.3. A breakthrough at last

Formally, the Eurasian Economic Union was established, with much fanfare, in Astana on 29 May[11], on the basis of the Customs Union. This was contingent on local legislation being brought in line with the regulations of the CU and the terms of Kyrgyzstan’s membership being agreed upon by both the members and the prospective country itself. The Customs Union’s international treaty framework currently consists of 110 international treaties. The 182-point Roadmap outlines the legislative changes that need to be enacted to align national legislation to the CU regulations and treaty framework. Over the summer Russia and Kyrgyzstan agreed that the former will establish a US$500m fund to ease Bishkek’s accession to the Customs Union. However, at present, the details of such a plan remain unspecified. On 26 September the Russian Duma ratified the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union. At the margins of the meeting in Moscow, Kyrgyzstan’s President Atambayev confirmed that the country will join the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, and the common economic space in January 2015. That was followed in November by the ratification by the Russian parliament of an agreement governing economic cooperation with Kyrgyzstan, paving the way for the country’s integration in the Eurasian Union[12]. Prior to that, in August, the Kyrgyz Cabinet of Ministers had approved a package of bills paving the way for accession by beginning to bring the local legislation into compliance with that of the Customs Union. Finally, on 23 December Kyrgyzstan signed an accession agreement to join the EEU[13]. The agreement came into effect on 1 January 2015. On that occasion President Atambayev announced that he hoped the country would become a full member by May[14]. The rush to make a formal statement by the end of the year, immediately followed by the announcement of a delay, left many observers perplexed.

3. Russia’s leverage

It is difficult to underestimate the extent of Kyrgyzstan’s dependence on Russia. Links (social, economic, cultural, military) are many-fold and profound. Leverage, understood in terms of Bishkek’s vulnerability to Moscow’s pressure, is also considerable. The Russia-Ukraine crisis of 2014[15] illustrates this well.

The diffusion of Russian media can easily construct a Russia-friendly narrative of events. Local media would not have the resource to withstand in an information war. Apart from having a significant military presence throughout Kyrgyzstan, the US$1bn deal to develop the country’s military signed in 2013 reinforced Bishkek’s security dependence on Moscow. In August 2012, Kyrgyzstan agreed to a 15-year extension of the lease to Russia of the base in Kant, a military air base east of Bishkek. The agreement will enter into force when the current deal expires in 2017. In an informal summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, held in Bishkek on 28 May, Russia and the attending Central Asian partners discussed ways to strengthen the military component of the organisation, focussing on the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF). The charter of the organisation has been broadened to allow it to mediate conflicts between members or send units in cases of domestic upheavals[16]. Russian companies own or have large stakes in local companies. Important investment projects like the Kambarata-1 hydropower plant can come to completion only if Russian capital is retained.

3.1. The closure of the Manas Air Base and the decline of Western influence

The consolidation of Russian influence and presence comes at a time of steady US (and Western more broadly) decline in the region[17]. The waning of US presence was captured symbolically as well as practically by the closure of the US air base, vacated in June 2014. The Manas base opened in December 2001, and was home to approximately 1,000 US military personnel and various tanker planes at the time of its closure in mid-2014. In almost thirteen years over a million (US and/or NATO) troops passed through the hub on the way to or from Afghanistan. From the start, however, the base has been subject to the attempts by local officials to extract rents, political controversies and scandals[18]. The base has also become one of the main sources of revenues for Kyrgyzstan, contributing up to 3% of the national budget. Rents from the base have enriched the country’s leaders, their families and associates. Contracts for supplying the base, such as the fuel contracts, have been particularly lucrative, amounting to a billion US dollars over the past six years. The agreement of the use of the base at Manas has been subject to multiple renegotiations in recent years. The ousting of Kyrgyzstan’s former president Askar Akayev and the FBI investigation that followed exposed corruption surrounding Manas-related contracts. The lease of the base was re-negotiated a first time in 2006. In February 2009, then-president Kurmanbek Bakiyev announced that the base would close shortly as Kyrgyzstani authorities handed Washington a 180 days’ notice. Around the same time, Kyrgyzstan signed a comprehensive deal with Russia. Many saw the two events as connected. In June 2009, a new contract raised rent payments from 17 million dollars to 60 million dollars a year, with an additional 117 million dollar one-off sum. In 2010, the agreement was extended for a year and, subsequently, for another three years until July 2014. Financial considerations aside, the need to secure a logistical hub in Central Asia has made the United States vulnerable to Kyrgyzstan’s domestic unrest and the local political shenanigan, tarnishing Washington’s image in the country[19].

4. Worrying trends in global politics

The yet-to-be-understood implications of US withdrawal from Afghanistan aside[20], it was the Russia-Ukraine crisis and the rise of the Islamic State that captured the attention of Bishkek’s ruling circles during the year.

4.1. The Ukraine crisis

On 21 February Ukraine president Viktor Yanukovych was ousted after months of protests (known as the ‘Euro-Maidan’, or just ‘Maidan’[21]) sparked by Yanukovych’s sudden political turnaround in November 2013, when he walked out of the imminent closure of an Association Agreement with the European Union and moved instead towards closer economic ties with Russia, a move that could have possibly led to Kiev’s integration in the Customs Union.

The power vacuum at the centre, grievances in the eastern regions of the country, un-addressed issues of autonomy across the country and, not least, Russia’s wrath at what the Kremlin perceived as a western-orchestrated coup brought a sudden unravelling of the Ukrainian state. First, in a swift turn of events Crimea[22] first voted in a disputed referendum for secession on 16 March, proclaimed independence on 17 and was subsequently annexed by Russia on 18 March. Soon thereafter, in early April, the ‘war in the Donbass’ started between Russia-backed rebel groups in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk and Kiev’s troops.

Ukraine is not a major economic partner for Kyrgyzstan; accordingly, the direct fallout – missed delivery of goods aside – was not considerable. At the same time two important lessons were drawn from a closely observing Bishkek. The good news for Bishkek was that a Ukraine-style scenario appeared unlikely: whereas in Ukraine foreign policy choices are open and, therefore, can become the subject of domestic (political and now military) confrontation, Kyrgyzstan has no real alternative to the Customs Union membership, nor has the country ever seriously contemplated exiting Russia’s orbit. In addition, neither the elites nor the public are as split as in Ukraine. Russia remains popular among the populace, but the lack of a transparent debate about the costs and the benefits of membership are causing disgruntlement. The second was that, if provoked, Russia has both the ability and the will to react strongly in no time. In light of the afore-mentioned links between Kyrgyzstan and Russia, Moscow could sanction Bishkek quickly and effectively.

Similarly to the other Central Asian republics[23], Kyrgyzstan’s initial reaction was muted, reflecting genuine concerns and dilemmas[24]. On the one hand the élites were uneasy with openly embracing a position that de facto would justify Russia’s intervention in the domestic affairs of a fellow post-Soviet republic, therefore setting a dangerous precedent. On the other hand, there was the need not to anger such an important political, security and economic partner. In the end Bishkek gave in and expressed support for Russia’s position[25].

The sanctions that the West imposed on Russia throughout 2014 did not affect the Russian economy only[26]. As Moscow’s economy headed towards recession and the Russian ruble plummeted in November and December, Central Asian migrants were confronted with the consequences. Apart from the loss of jobs, even the remittances that they sent home suffered because of the need to convert rubles into dollars; in fact, the devaluation of the Russian currency made the Central Asian Kyrgyz migrants’ earning almost worthless. In addition, Russia slowed down on the investment it had previously pledged to ease Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the Customs Union.

4.2. The rise of Islamic State

The second event that found echoes in Kyrgyzstan was the rise of the Islamic State (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant). In fact, the impact of the internationalisation of the Syrian war was also being felt in the country[27]. Following reports that the presence of young fighters from Kyrgyzstan had been reported in Syria in the territory ruled by the Islamic State earlier in the year, the Kyrgyz authorities unleashed a more hands-on, and heavy-handed, approach to the matter, with periodic arrests of suspects across the country.

The growing appeal of the Islamic State came at a terrible time for Kyrgyzstan. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan, coupled with the closure of the Manas base, left Kyrgyzstan increasingly exposed to the threat posed by Islamic militants based in northern Afghanistan. In addition, the country’s own official Islamic institutions have been mired in scandals for years, leaving the authorities with no local source of authority or legitimacy to counter religious radicalism.

Although evidence of the widespread nature of radicalism in the Central Asian region is scant[28], the fear of such a scenario has been used by the local elites to justify repressive measures (see below) and for Russia to press for even closer security cooperation[29].

5. A more repressive domestic environment

Politically the country remains fairly open in the region. At the same time, closer ties with Russia have led to a more repressive turn in local politics, with the introduction of two pieces of legislation that are closely reminiscent of similar bills adopted in Russia. The consolidation of an anti-gay discourse, matched by the introduction of an openly anti-gay bill[30] in October, well sits with an analogous Moscow-sponsored ‘fight against gay-propaganda’. The second is a law that requires NGOs receiving funding from abroad to register (re-register, that is) as ‘foreign agents’, a term which underlines their equivocal, ambiguous status in the country. In addition, the authorities have increased restrictions of protests and inspections at opposition media have also intensified[31].

Other issues also reveal worrisome trends in local politics. This is the case with regard to inter-ethnic relations and specifically the situation of the Uzbek minority in the country[32]. Four years have passed since the June 2010 clashes between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the south of the country that caused over 400 deaths and hundreds of thousands of refugees[33]. Although the wounds have begun to heal[34], the price for this has been the fading of the country’s multi-ethnic and multi-cultural identity. Some sort of stability has returned to the south, but signs of Uzbek culture, until recently omnipresent, are more and more difficult to note. Uzbek-language schools are closing and those that are still open lose students to those where tuition is delivered in Kyrgyz[35]. Young Uzbeks tend to change their passport entry (the one referring to ethnic identity) to that of the dominant group (Kyrgyz) to ensure that they will not be penalised in their career paths[36].

6. Tensions between neighbours

If domestic problems compounded by great power manoeuvring were not serious enough, the regional security environment also deteriorated in 2014. While the fact that relations with Tashkent are tense should no longer surprise anyone, what has changed over the past twelve months is that ties with Tajikistan have also worsened, marking a dramatic change for the worse, compared to the post-independence period when relations between Dushanbe and Bishkek (Central Asia’s two weakest states) were cooperative.

Over two decades relations between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have been relatively smooth, despite micro-level conflicts over access to water and land in border regions in the early 1990s, and fears that waves of migrants from Tajikistan would be illegally taking over land in the southern province of Batken, adjacent to Tajikistan’s Sughd province. Relations with Uzbekistan have been traditionally poor, and have worsened in recent years[37]. Trouble has not stemmed from the presence of ethnic minorities on either side of the border, but from territorial disputes and accusations from Tashkent that Kyrgyzstan may be unable to curb the activities and incursions of Islamic militants in the Ferghana Valley. Disputes over gas supplies (from Uzbekistan) and water access (from Kyrgyzstan) have traditionally soured bilateral relations[38]. Shootings at the border have increased in number and intensity[39].

In the case of the Tajik-Kyrgyz border most disputes are local and are unlikely to be internationalised[40]. At the same time, their increasing frequency is causing significant disruption to local livelihood and economic exchange (trade and smuggling). What has thus far prevented an escalation of the conflicts (apart from their local character, as noted) is the fact that both countries can ill afford another tense border situation since both Bishkek and Dushanbe’s economies suffer from constant blockades from neighbouring Uzbekistan. However, shootings along the Kyrgyz-Tajik border have increased over the past year[41]. 46% of the border is still un-demarcated and the two states have been unable to set up mutually agreed border posts in disputed areas. Kyrgyzstan is also planning to build a road to bypass the Tajik enclave of Vorukh, which would leave the latter totally isolated from mainland Tajikistan and surrounded by Kyrgyz territory. At the same time Tajikistan’s relations with Moscow are also cozy and Dushanbe might also join the Customs Union in the coming year.

Kyrgyzstan’s ever growing closeness to Russia risks further poisoning relations with Tashkent and Dushanbe[42]. Promises of Russian investment in local infrastructure and hydropower projects are seen in Bishkek as a way to reduce energy dependence on an unreliable supplier, Uzbekistan. That may well be the case, but the move would come at a price, namely that of increasing Bishkek’s already considerable economic dependence on Moscow (complemented with an additional poisoning of relations with Tashkent). Even the attempt to secure gas supplies from Turkmenistan rests upon the good will of Tashkent, since Turkmen gas would need to be delivered – on Uzbek territory – via Uzbektransgaz, the state gas company of Uzbekistan, in charge to deliver gas supplies for domestic consumption and export. Although Tajikistan is also likely to join the Custom Union eventually, the stepping up of border controls and tariffs will surely hamper cross-border trade, upon which the livelihood of border communities so critically depends.

7. Conclusion

Bishkek’s elites have evidently run out of options and made the final push towards the Eurasian Union. In a sign of less-than-overwhelming enthusiasm, the authorities, including President Almazbek Atambayev, have referred to the choice as ‘the lesser of two evils’ – namely ‘the rise in inflation and prices’ on one side and the ‘biggest social and economic problems’ on the other – in a situation in which there is ‘no other option’.[43] Admittedly, these declarations are not the most exciting way to welcome this important endeavour.

In reality Kyrgyzstan has no credible alternative to joining the Customs Union. While domestic crises of various natures continue to plague Kyrgyzstan’s politics and the economy, in a situation in which the EU is unable to provide security, the US is withdrawing from Manas and China appears unwilling to provide security, Russia remains the only reliable partner. Many in the country fear that the ever more extensive practice of debt-for-assets swaps and the integration into the Eurasian Union will slowly but inexorably result into greater dependence upon Russia, in the long term possibly resulting in a loss of sovereignty for Bishkek. Whether this will be the case remains to be seen. Margins of manoeuvre are narrowing further, though, and maintaining too close a relationship with a single power risks resulting in the country’s entrapment in such an alliance.

Fin dalla campagna elettorale del 2011, il Presidente Almazbek Atambayev aveva promesso che, nel caso di una sua elezione, la politica estera del Kirghizistan sarebbe stata più decisamente filo-russa. Ciò è puntualmente successo ed ha portato ad una cesura tra i due decenni precedenti di politica estera multi-vettoriale da parte di Bishkek e la fase attuale di cooperazione stretta con Mosca. Questo capitolo esamina il nesso tra pressioni esterne e processi politici interni, dedicando una attenzione particolare all’influenza russa sulla politica kirghisa.

Il contributo è focalizzato sul principale sviluppo del 2014, ossia la via tortuosa della repubblica centroasiatica verso l’Unione Economica Eurasiatica, che comprende Russia, Bielorussia, Kazakistan e Armenia. Vengono considerati anche due altri eventi che hanno avuto conseguenze per la regione centroasiatica: la guerra in Ucraina ed il ritiro degli Stati Uniti dall’Afghanistan. I rapporti più stretti tra Kirghizistan e Russia hanno portato ad un sistema politico più repressivo. I rapporti tra Bishkek ed i paesi confinanti (Uzbekistan e Tagikistan) sono peggiorati vistosamente.

Il Kirghizistan può anche aver compiuto passi indietro dal baratro del fallimento dello stato, in cui sembrava sul punto di precipitare nel 2010-2011, ma la sopravvivenza è stata mantenuta a caro prezzo: la dipendenza da un altro stato.

 

1. Introduction

In 2014 Afghanistan was dominated by the presidential election that led to the victory of Ashraf Ghani, after two successive terms in office by Hamid Karzai. Despite the ultimate success of the transition, the election has been marred by the same problems of fraud and ballot stuffing that characterised the previous polls. The declaration by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) of the victory of Ashraf Ghani over the former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, who won the first round, has sparked outrage from Abdullah’s supporters. The result was a political impasse, which has requested two «political rescue» missions by US Secretary of State John Kerry. After a prolonged negotiation, Ghani and Abdullah signed a deal which provides for the creation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) and the position of Chief Executive Officer (CEO), to which Abdullah was appointed. Despite the difficulties, it would be wrong to underestimate the historical significance of the 2014 election. For the first time since «9/11», Kabul has been able to peacefully change its political leadership and therefore to take at least a first step towards political institutionalisation.[1] The formation of the new GNU obviously sparked a debate on whether or not the new political landscape will be able to tackle the immense problems left open by the previous administration. Issues including, among others, the reconciliation process, the corruption of the public administration, the need to revive the Afghan economy despite the inevitable reduction of the financial benefits coming from the international military force.

The other important event of the year was the end of the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) on 28 December, which completed the planned withdrawal of the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) troops from Afghanistan. This event did not mean, however, the end of the international military presence. Immediately after his appointment, President Ghani signed two pacts – the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the US and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with NATO – this guarantees the continued military presence of the coalition under the new Resolute Support Mission (RSM). The agreements represent an important political signal of the US to maintain its support to the fragile Afghan State in the wake of the events in Iraq and Syria. In the meantime, a clear worsening of the situation has marked the war between the insurgency, the international coalition and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). In addition to the constant rise in the level of violence, the conflict has claimed fewer victims from the coalition forces, while those among the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) have reached a record high figure. Given the greater role of the ANSF, this is not surprising. However, most tragic has been the rise in the number of civilian casualties, which in 2014 reached its highest number since 2001. Two other important arguments discussed in this paper are the prospects of the dialogue between Kabul and the Taliban under Ghani’s leadership, and the situation of Kabul’s relations with Pakistan, which saw interesting developments. The essay will end with a short assessment of the state of the Afghan economy in 2014.

2. Presidential election: Background and preparation

According to the complicated schedule dictated by the Constitution, in 2014 Afghanistan was due to elect the President and the provincial councils. Of the two polls, obviously it was the first that attracted most of the observers’ attention. The country faced the new presidential election with mixed feelings. From one point of view, the end of the Karzai era was seen by many independent analysts as a necessary step to tackle some of the most urgent problems left open by the previous administration. To this extent, the decision of the government to respect the Constitution and call for the election – despite the awareness of the many flaws in the electoral machinery – was welcomed by almost all parties, except for some hard-line Karzai supporters. In fact, some observers had suspected that the President could take the lack of security as a pretext for delaying elections, in order to get some guarantees about his own future from the main candidates.[2]During 2013, in the south-western «Pashtun belt», there were various meetings of tribal leaders and other interest groups who expressed their fear about a possible victory of Karzai’s main contender, Abdullah Abdullah, who was widely seen as the Tajiks’ candidate.[3] Not surprisingly, between 2013 and 2014, the US administration sent clear messages to Kabul that a failure in convening the election would mean the likely suspension of American military and financial aid.[4]On the other hand, the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) of July 2013 reiterated the Afghan government’s commitment to «conduct credible, inclusive and transparent Presidential and Parliamentary elections in 2014 and 2015», as a condition for the donor countries’ continued support.[5] These promises necessarily included a reform of the electoral mechanism. However, given the structural problems that have characterized almost all Afghan elections since 2001, this was not an easy task to accomplish. In particular, the 2009 presidential election that confirmed Karzai in his role had been largely marred by frauds.[6] These problems included the absence of a voter list, the surplus of voter cards as compared to the actual number of voters, the absence of electronic IDs, and the lack of truly independent bodies of electoral monitoring. It was therefore expected that the Afghan government would take serious action to solve these problems before the 2014 election.

A partial fulfilment of this commitment had appeared to be approved by the Parliament in July 2013 with a legal framework, which was generally welcomed by the Western partners.[7] On the basis of these new laws, the 2014 elections were to be the first to be held under a legal framework approved by a democratically elected body. However, the opposition, as well as some independent analysts, noted that the new electoral laws excluded the presence of international actors in the two main monitoring bodies, the IEC and the Independent Electoral Complaints’ Commission (IECC). Moreover, according to some Afghan political actors, the selection mechanism for both institutions gave too much power to the President.[8]

This said, obviously few observers expected the new legal framework to solve all the problems of the Afghan elections, given that some of these problems are linked to traditional social and political dynamics. It is widely recognised that, on the part of many actors, manipulation has become an integral part of the political process.[9] Moreover, given the absence of an efficient post-election invalidation process, the monitoring conducted by the IECC reflects more the ability of the candidates to negotiate the result rather than the reality of frauds.[10] These aspects are to be placed in a wider political context dominated by the fragmentation and weakness of the political parties, and by a presidential system, which emphasises the executive powers to the highest degree, leaving only a marginal role to the parliament.[11] Although this system was considered by many to be ill-suited to the characteristics of Afghan polity, the choice of a strong executive had been supported by the international coalition – especially the US – and by the majority of the Pashtun community, in the aftermath of the 2001-02 military intervention. Nowadays, most of the observers agree that a democratisation of Afghanistan would necessarily imply the dilution of the President’s power, the strengthening of the political parties, and the reform of the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system adopted for legislative elections.[12]

3. Electoral strategies

Before the election started, many observers focused on Hamid Karzai’s strategy. The experience of the 2009 Presidential election taught analysts how great the government’s power of influence was. Most observers expected that Karzai would try to create obstacles to the election of Abdullah Abdullah – his main opponent in 2009 and the strongest candidate in 2014 – and would throw his weight behind one of the Pashtun candidates. It is true that the President had, many times, been repeating that he would remain neutral. The stance obviously had earned Karzai international praise. However, there is evidence to support the view that the President’s official «neutrality» concealed a more complex strategy. While the incumbent President did not openly support any candidate, his entourage has exerted much influence over the election process. This conclusion may be inferred by the many meetings that took place at the Presidential Palace, concerning the elections agenda, as well as the activism shown by Karzai’s supporters in the months before the election.

From the beginning of the electoral campaign until the end of 2013, Karzai did not endorse any single candidate, while distributing his favour between Zalmai Rassoul, Abdul Rassul Sayyaf, Ashraf Ghani and his own brother Qayyum. This game, according to many analysts, was aimed at creating a fragmented political scene where Karzai could act as a political broker and retain much of his influence. This appeared logical, given that Karzai, since 2003, had benefited from the fragmentation among the opposition forces.[13] However, this strategy appeared to change towards the end of 2013 and the early months of 2014. The reason being that the exit polls released in late December 2013 disclosed a scenario of a likely victory for Abdullah Abdullah. According to independent observers, the disclosure of the polls created «a panic» in the President’s entourage.[14] The President’s response was to concentrate all his resources on a single Pashtun candidate, which was identified by some observers as being the former Foreign Minister Zalmai Rassoul.[15] However, Karzai never officially endorsed him, and the following events suggest that until the last moment, there was considerable uncertainty in the Presidential circle as to who was the «right» candidate.

Perhaps the most interesting move was the unofficial Jirga (tribal assembly) convened in April 2014 by some important tribal heads and other leaders of Kandahar’s Pashtun – mainly Durrani – community, in order to find a united candidate for the Presidency. Although the Presidential entourage denied any involvement in convening the Jirga, it appeared that the President had played a major role in organizing it through his tribal and family connections. However, the fact that the Jirga ultimately failed in its objective was a clear indication not only of the decline of the ethnic factor in Afghan politics, but also of the President’s difficulties in trying to influence the vote. In fact, the Jirga ended with no less than two favoured candidates: Zalmai Rassoul and Qayyum Karzai.[16] The stalemate was resolved a few days later, when the pressure against the fragmentation of the pro-Karzai vote led to Qayyum’s withdrawal from the election and to his declaration of support to Rassoul. The fact that, in the same days, other Pashtun heavyweights offered their support to Rassoul led many independent observers to see the move as inspired – if not altogether directed – by Hamid Karzai. However, interestingly enough, Rassoul was considered the weakest among the potential candidates. According to three pre-election polls disclosed in December 2013, the struggle was one between Abdullah and Ghani.[17] This peculiar circumstance therefore, led some observers to suggest that the President had reverted to supporting a weak candidate in the hope of fragmenting the vote and playing the role of a political broker after the election.[18]

4. The tone of the campaign and the first result

The start of the campaign, from February to April 2014, was characterized by a generally optimistic feeling. This was motivated by two basic elements: the fact that for the first time the incumbent President had to leave office seemed to make the election more open than usual to surprising results; second, the President’s reluctance to endorse any specific candidate contributed to giving the vote a fresher outlook. The impression was confirmed by the general tone of the campaign, which was unusually free from ethnically motivated rhetoric. The apparently low focus of the candidates on ethnic issues was quite surprising, considering that all the candidates had strategically chosen their supporters from the minority communities.[19] Despite considerable differences in the situation in Kabul and in the provinces, for observers, the competition left the impression of a true change of pace.

This was confirmed, at least until the very last days of the campaign, by the low level of violence. Although the Taliban had warned Afghan citizens not to participate in the polls, stating that they would attack the election centres, the campaign went on largely undisturbed.[20] In particular, the lack of attacks against the large public rallies, which were relatively easy targets, led many observers to wonder whether the Taliban had decided to allow the elections. However, the Taliban intensified violence in the days immediately preceding the election, launching large-scale attacks against offices of the IEC, the Ministry of Interior, NGOs and even a Hotel occupied by Afghan journalists and foreign observers.[21] Despite this late upsurge, however, the general view of the analysts was that the violence caused by the insurgents had been much lower than expected.[22]The EU representatives echoed in their comments, such optimism after 5 April, when they declared: «The Taliban [have] lost».[23]

The announcement of the preliminary results confirmed the pre-election polls, revealing that Abdullah had prevailed with 45% of the votes, with Ashraf Ghani following with 31.6% and Zalmai Rassoul with 11.4%.[24] Considering that none of the candidates won a majority of votes, the IEC announced a second round of elections on 14 June between Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani.

5. The second round

During the second round of elections, Abdullah’s side seemed to have acquired a comfortable margin, which encouraged the leading politicians to organize fewer rallies and focus instead on backroom negotiations. Some candidates and other influential figures close to Karzai – such as Zalmai Rassoul, Gul Agha Shirzai, the governor of Nangarhar, and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf – appeared ready to give their allegiance to Abdullah. This seemed to offer evidence that Karzai and his entourage had accepted the latter’s victory, and that Abdullah had concluded a deal for a smooth transition. However, after the second round of elections was complete, Abdullah’s entourage started claiming that large-scale frauds in favour of Ashraf Ghani had taken place. These claims were supported by the release of a series of audio recordings of phone conversations between some unidentified men – which Abdullah’s team claimed were the IEC secretary, Zia-ul-Haq Amarkhel, and other officials – who spoke about the need to favour Ghani. The ensuing scandal involved Karzai and his entourage, given that Amarkhel was generally considered «Karzai’s man». Despite Amarkhel’s attempt to resist the scandal, his position became untenable after police found him travelling without authorization with blank election ballots. Despite denying any wrongdoing, he finally resigned.[25]

On 7 July 2014 the EIC announced the preliminary results of the second round of elections: Ghani had won 56.44%, while Abdullah received 43.56% of the votes.[26] The reaction of Abdullah’s team was one of shock and outrage against what they called the «triangle of fraud» – namely, Ghani, the IEC and Karzai. The day after the announcement, Abdullah met his supporters – some of which were carrying weapons – at the Loya Jirga tent of the Polytechnic University in Kabul, where he declared himself the winner of the elections; making a direct reference to the heavily disputed 2009 Presidential election, Abdullah stated that this time he would not give up his claims. In the tense atmosphere that followed, Afghanistan seemed to be once again on the brink of civil war: Muhammad Atta Noor, the governor of Balkh province and supporter of Abdullah, went as far as calling for the occupation of government palaces in Kabul and for the establishment of a «parallel government».[27] However, Abdullah showed great moderation, asking his supporters to remain patient, and instead calling for the US intervention.

6. What happened?

There is no consensus among the observers on the scale and direction of frauds, apart from the fact that they happened. The general view is that frauds and ballot stuffing have favoured both Abdullah and Ghani, with a higher prevalence for the latter. According to most independent analyses, however, it is unlikely that the frauds could justify such a complete reversal of the result. Still it remains very difficult to form a clear idea about electoral frauds in a peculiar context such as Afghanistan, in the light of the structural problems already mentioned. According to most international experts, the absence of a voters list and the tendency by the IEC to issue cards in excess to the actual number of voters, makes the task of safeguarding the regularity of the process almost impossible. The fact that these problems were known for years and that, despite this, the international actors pressed Kabul to respect the electoral schedule, should lead to a serious discussion about the responsibility of the international community for what happened.

Obviously Ghani’s team defended the result. According to their view, the increase in the number of votes was due to the return to a more «traditional» style of campaigning: Ghani had established contacts with tribal leaders and religious scholars, who helped him in reaching out to voters. Moreover, Ghani’s entourage candidly admitted to having established contacts with at least two insurgency groups – Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin and Haqqani – in order to get protection from violence and carrying on the campaign in the areas controlled by them. The fact that, in the second round of elections, Ghani received the support of influential figures in the South, such as Qayyum Karzai, would also have contributed to spreading his message.[28]

It is difficult to value the weight of these explanations. However, it may be safely stated that the second round of elections was much more influenced by ethnic considerations than the first. The two camps increasingly began to be identified according to their prevalent ethnic affiliation: Tajiks and Hazaras for Abdullah, Pashtuns and Uzbeks for Ghani. This factor may have considerably influenced the result, although it is difficult to say to what extent. To add to the existing confusion, the data announced by the IEC were extremely unreliable: most observers have found it difficult to believe that the turnout of the run-off was higher than that of the first round, when all the available observations suggest the opposite. Moreover, the IEC announced that they invalidated less than 12,000 votes (about 0.15% of the total) which seemed to be a very low number compared to the past elections, when the rate tended to be around 20% (18.8% in the 2009 Presidential poll).[29]

7. The US intervention

Since the beginning of the crisis, the US administration emphasised their neutrality and appealed to both candidates to maintain calm. On 7 July 2014 Abdullah announced that he had received a phone call from President Barack Obama and that the Secretary of State John Kerry would soon come to Kabul. On 12 July, Kerry, after at least two days of negotiations, together with the two candidates and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Jan Kubiš, announced an «internationally supervised» audit of the votes, to be held in Kabul with the assistance of ISAF. More importantly, Kerry stated that both candidates had agreed to «abide by the results of the audit and that the winner of the election [would] serve as president and [would] immediately form a government of national unity».[30] This result was not an easy one to obtain. From one point of view, Hamid Karzai’s opposition to international «interference» was well known. In fact, after meeting the two candidates, Kerry was said to have met Karzai separately. Moreover, considerable international pressure seems to have been exerted on the IEC and the IECC in order to have them accept the audit.[31]

However, new difficulties soon arose. First, the 12 July 2014 agreement had apparently left space for different interpretations, and in fact a conflict emerged between the two camps. Second, in early August, a new conflict exploded regarding the criteria of the audit, which – according to Abdullah’s team – were not rigorous enough to reveal the extent of the fraud. All this forced John Kerry to return to Kabul on 7 August in order to resolve the impasse. After meeting again with the two candidates and Karzai, the US Secretary of State conducted another press conference with Ghani and Abdullah in which they confirmed the July deal.[32] However, in order to resolve all remaining objections posed by Abdullah, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon had to personally endorse the result of the audit. In a message on 11 September 2014, he supported the regularity of the audit, defining it as «robust, comprehensive and consistent with international best practices».[33]

8. The final outcome and the GNU

On 21 September 2014, after prolonged negotiations between the two parties and more than five months since the beginning of the process, Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah signed an agreement aimed to form a new GNU. Interestingly enough, the deal was announced – and signed – before the disclosure to the public of the audit’s result by the IEC. Apparently, this choice was made on a specific request by Abdullah’s team, lest that the result could spark violence. In fact, a few hours later, the IEC chairman announced that the audit had been completed and that Ashraf Ghani was the new President. However, no figures were given, and the IEC stated that the results had been «submitted to both candidates…and [would] be published on the IEC website in the near future.[34]

The deal provided for the creation of no less than five new institutions: a CEO, with the powers of an «executive prime minister» – a position which was immediately occupied by Abdullah –, two deputies, a council of ministers and a leader of the opposition.[35] Despite the considerable time spent by the political actors in discussing details, the new arrangement seemed to be filled with contradictions. The ambiguity was especially evident with reference to the relationship between the President and the CEO. While one passage of the deal stated that the CEO would be «under the authority of the President»,[36] the remaining parts of the document seemed to present the two figures as holding equal power. In fact, it is easy to see that the GNU has emerged as an attempt to translate a power-sharing mechanism between two same-level partners into constitutional terms.[37] However, the remaining ambiguity in the deal might cause future contestations. It is also easy to see that the new arrangement considerably altered Afghanistan’s institutional structures, posing some de facto limits to the President’s powers and creating a sort of hybrid «half-presidential/half-parliamentary» system. In fact, the President himself has announced the convening of a Loya Jirga, with the task of amending the Constitution, which seems to indicate that Ghani intends to complete the modification of the institutional structure. After all, this would be in line with Ghani’s thought, given that he stated, before the elections, to be in favour of diluting the Presidential powers after Karzai’s long reign.[38] Moreover, according to some observers, the constitutional Loya Jirga could be the first step towards conceding to the minorities a major degree of decentralization; apparently, this is a request that Ghani received from his Uzbek ally Abdul Rashid Dostum.[39] Anyway, the balance of power between the President and the CEO will be measured soon by the new government appointments. This will be a very relevant and delicate passage, given that both Ghani and Abdullah have to distribute power among the various political figures that have provided their vote banks. These uncertainties, together with the failure of the two leaders to fully disclose the details of the political deal, have certainly contributed to a new pessimistic outlook on Afghanistan’s transition. While emphasizing its historical character, it is impossible to deny that backroom negotiations rather than voters have decided the final outcome, thus making the transition less «democratic» than expected.

9. Election and Taliban strategy

In comparison to the 2009 Presidential election, when the Taliban policy was that of disrupting the vote, in 2014 the insurgency – or at least part of it – seemed to have adopted a much more pragmatic style.[40] This is in line with a gradual process of politicisation of the insurgency, which has been observed in the field. Over the past few years, the Taliban have basically conducted a two-fold strategy: the first was the military offensive against the foreign troops and the pro-government Afghan forces; the second was the attempt to offer an image of the movement as a reliable shadow-government, capable of providing a better administration than the Karzai regime.[41]

This is a crucial background to understand the sometimes-contradictory approach of the Taliban towards the elections in 2014. Despite the strong statements issued before the election, the actual level of violence deployed by the insurgents has been low.[42] Well-informed analysts have explained this peculiarity as a division inside the movement between a sector in favour of the disruption of the electoral process, and another that preferred to manipulate it in order to obtain a «favourable» President. According to various sources, before and during the first round of the election, some Taliban commanders had talks with local Pashtun tribal assemblies, regarding the possibility of supporting Ashraf Ghani. These talks became more frequent when it became clear that the strongest candidates were Ghani and Abdullah; many sectors among the Pashtuns thought that a victory of the Tajik leader would be detrimental to their interest. A further important factor has been the external pressure exercised by Saudi Arabia, which saw the election of Abdullah negatively. Saudi authorities apparently pressured the Taliban to allow the vote to go on, in the belief that an attempt to obstacle the election would have probably affected only the Pashtuns, therefore giving an advantage to Abdullah.[43]

All these different pressures made the division inside the insurgency more manifest than before. Therefore, during the first round of elections, the insurgency approached the political process with almost as many strategies as the number of existing shuras (Taliban councils). Some of the latter decided not to attack the voters, others did it but in a «soft» manner, and still others – particularly the Haqqani-led Miran Shah shura – carried on with the military offensive. This situation can explain the otherwise ambivalent strategy followed by the Taliban between February and April. However, much of this changed after the announcement of the preliminary result, with Abdullah apparently ahead. The possibility of a Tajik President was seen as a danger by many Taliban, and also intensified the external pressures on the insurgency to allow the vote. Therefore, although considerable differences remained, in the second round of elections, the general strategy was that of not disrupting the vote, particularly in the Pashtun belt, in order to advantage Ghani.

In short, the election emphasised the difficulties faced by the movement in its shift from a purely military-ideological movement to a political one, mainly due to the lack of a universally recognised hierarchy. This said, the election of Ghani may open new perspectives of dialogue with the insurgency. The statements by the new President, soon after his nomination, about the need to reopen the reconciliation process may give further strength to this path.[44]

10. The end of Enduring Freedom and the start of Resolute Support

On 28 December 2014, with a ceremony in Kabul, NATO and ISAF troops officially ended their combat operations in Afghanistan after 13 years, leaving the task of continuing the war on the ANSF. As noted above, there is a close link between Afghanistan’s political transition and the end of the OEF. Without the successful completion of the presidential election it would have been impossible to sign the BSA with the US – a pact that former President Karzai had refused to sign in 2013. On the other hand, without the BSA, the US had declared their unwillingness to guarantee the continued support to Kabul that the Obama administration had promised.

However, the 28 December ceremony has not, in fact, ended the foreign military presence in the country, as NATO and the US have inaugurated the new RS mission. According to NATO sources, the new mission will have only training and support aims and will involve more than 12,500 soldiers from 28 NATO member countries and 14 partner States. Media sources also suggest that, besides the RS mission, there will be a presence of 5,550 US troops involved in anti-terrorist activities against al Qa‘ida.[45]

Apart from the institutional changes, during the past twelve months, the main development was the transformation of the conflict from an international one to a civil war. This development is visible from the data on casualties, which reveal that the number of victims among foreign troops constantly decreased, reaching the lowest number in 2014 with 75 casualties. The reverse side of the coin has been the rise in the number of Afghan victims, both military and civilians. According to independent sources, in 2014 alone there have been approximately 5,000 casualties among the members of ANSF – 3,200 of which belonged to the National or Local Police, and the rest to the ANA.[46] The year 2014 also saw the highest number of casualties among the Afghan civilian population. It has been estimated by the UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) that the number reached 10,000 at the end of the year, with an increase of 19% since 2013.[47] Independent analysts and UN sources have explained the rise in civilian deaths with a change of strategy by the Taliban.[48] Due to the reduced protection provided by ISAF and NATO, the Taliban have been spreading their operations, attacking the ANSF in open battles in populated areas. In such circumstances, the possibility of civilians being involved in ground battles has sharply increased. The insurgents have also used targeted killings and suicide attacks in order to intimidate government servants, village elders and Peace Councils members.[49] On the other hand, the Taliban have made less use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), which were the Taliban’s favoured tactic between 2007 and 2011.[50] The withdrawal of foreign troops is also likely to have other consequences on the Taliban strategy. With the war becoming more and more an intra-Afghan conflict, it has become increasingly difficult for the Taliban to justify the war as a jihad, as it may be observed through the analysis of their statements.[51] Indeed, the change of the nature of the war from a struggle against foreign invaders to a civil conflict might become a problem for the insurgency, as it is bound to put in doubt its legitimacy in the Afghans’ eyes.

11. The prospects for peace

Although what has been said does not seem to justify any optimism for the future, two factors suggest that the new political landscape in Kabul may offer a historical occasion for achieving peace. These elements are, first, the much improved cooperation between Pakistan, US and Afghanistan regarding the peace process and second, the fact that Ahsraf Ghani is better placed than Karzai to carry on the peace negotiations with the Taliban. From the first point of view, during 2014, Pakistan appeared to collaborate with the US in a manner that had not been seen for at least ten years.[52] In 2014, the US was, for the first time, targeting Pakistani Taliban who found refuge in Afghan territory, a move which seemed to be an exchange for Islamabad’s greater activism in arresting or killing al-Qa‘ida members in Pakistani territory. The change in Pakistani attitude seems to be related to a growing awareness that a stabilization of the Afghan political scene is a necessary step for putting an end to Pakistan troubles with its own militancy.[53]Moreover, the political transition in Kabul and the international withdrawal are likely to create a political space for which both India and Pakistan will compete. India’s economic activism in Afghanistan was confirmed early in 2014 by the announcement of a 2 billion dollars investment in Afghanistan.[54] In the wake of Indian economic initiatives, Islamabad is well aware of the crucial importance of enhancing the economic ties between the border Afghan-Pakistan regions, which in turn requires placing militancy under control.[55] Ashraf Ghani’s rise to power also offers some new opportunities to keep the peace process on going. As noted above, Ghani already established contacts with some sectors of the insurgency during the election. After his nomination, he sent signals to the Taliban that he intends to strengthen what he has termed «inter-Afghan dialogue».[56] While the Taliban have been repeating their intention to keep fighting as long as «a single foreigner remains in Afghanistan in a military uniform», there is evidence that at least some Taliban commanders in the field favour establishing a dialogue with Ghani.[57] The future, however, remains highly uncertain, given the great division of strategy that currently exists between the Taliban commanders. Moreover, it is yet to be seen what measure of political weight will be given in the power sharing deal in Kabul to Abdullah Abdullah, whose reservations about the peace talks with the Taliban are well known.

12. Economic development

Political and security uncertainty dominated the Afghan economy in 2014. The basic economic indicators were, on the whole, stable compared to 2013. Still the economy confirmed the negative trend that emerged since 2011. The GDP growth in the fiscal year 2014 (which ended on December 21, 2014) is estimated to have reached 3.5%, which marks a slight increase compared to the 3.3% of 2013. However, the figure shows a negative trend that has affected the economy since the GDP exceptional rise of 2012. This volatility can be explained, first of all, with the large dependence on agriculture, which is linked to the variable weather conditions. After the peak of 2012, when an exceptionally good harvest pushed agricultural production to a 31.5% growth, the figure slipped to a very low 1.6% in 2013 and remained basically unchanged in 2014. The growth rate of per capita GDP reached 1.5%, with a 0.2% improvement from 2013.[58]

On the demand side, the reduction of the international military presence has had a negative effect; this is a structural change to which the Afghan economy needs to adjust. However, things have been made worse by the uncertainty about the approval of the Bilateral Security Agreement with the US, which lasted until September 2014 when Ghani signed the document. Most analysts foresee that this development will pave the way for an improved 2015 performance. The year 2014 confirmed Afghanistan’s dependence on international assistance, which accounted for about 60% of its budget expenditure.[59] This factor causes the country’s economic balance to be precariously linked to the evolution of the international political climate, and to the state of Kabul’s relations to donor countries. As expected, among the other economic indicators, the inflation rate decreased from 7.4% (2013) to 6.8% at the end of 2014, in the wake of the lower level of private consumption. It is important to note that most observers foresee an improvement for 2015, on the basis of the apparently stabilized political situation. Much of this, of course, will need to be confirmed.

A clearly negative development concerns the situation of opium production. The relevance of this indicator lies not only in the fact that Afghanistan produces at least 90% of world’s opium, but also in the connection between production and security conditions in the provinces. The total area dedicated to poppy cultivation in 2014 marked a 7% increase since 2013. The spread of cultivation in the territory confirmed the close link between opium-production and the strength of the insurgency, given that the vast majority of the opium (89%) was produced in the nine provinces of the South and West where government control is weaker.[60] The Afghan government appears to have made considerable efforts to obstruct opium production. In addition to the physical eradication campaigns, in 2013, Kabul started a program called «Food Zone», which was aimed to reduce the farmers’ dependency on opium poppy and to support their shift to licit productions. However, in the areas where the program has been started – such as in Helmand, which alone produced 46% of all Afghan opium – the 2014 results were disappointing.[61] Poppy eradication activities have also marked a considerably negative trend, with a decrease of 63%. This worrying development is connected to the worsening security conditions in the southwestern provinces, and the governors’ consequent difficulty in implementing the eradication policy.[62]

L’Afghanistan nel 2014 è stato dominato da due eventi tra loro interconnessi: le elezioni presidenziali e la fine della missione di combattimento delle truppe ISAF e NATO. Le elezioni hanno condotto alla nomina di Ashraf Ghani, pur confermando i gravi problemi strutturali del meccanismo elettorale afgano. Abdullah Abdullah, già leader dell’opposizione a Karzai e giunto in seconda posizione al termine del ballottaggio, ha rifiutato il risultato elettorale. La conseguente crisi politica è stata risolta con la formazione di un governo di unità nazionale formato sotto l’egida degli Usa e dell’ONU. Le truppe internazionali hanno completato il loro ritiro dal paese, confermando al contempo una presenza militare tramite la nuova operazione Resolute Support. Quest’ultima dovrebbe, in teoria, avere solo compiti di supporto alle forze di sicurezza afgane, lasciando dunque a quest’ultime la responsabilità della guerra contro l’insorgenza.

 

1. Dal dialogo con i militanti alla campagna militare nel Waziristan del nord

I propositi di dialogo con il TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, alleanza di una dozzina di gruppi militanti operativi in Pakistan), con i quali il nuovo governo di Nawaz Sharif aveva iniziato il proprio mandato nel maggio del 2013, si erano scontrati con l’irrigidimento delle posizioni dei talibani pachistani, all’indomani della morte del loro comandante, Hakimullah Mehsud, ucciso da un drone americano[1]. Tuttavia, all’inizio del 2014, i lavori della commissione governativa incaricata di avviare le trattative con la controparte del TTP progredivano, nonostante le violenze.

Mentre l’unica richiesta concreta del governo era il raggiungimento del «cessate il fuoco», il TTP produceva una lista di rivendicazioni che includeva il ritiro delle forze militari dalle FATA (Federally Adminstered Tribal Areas), la liberazione di detenuti dalle carceri pachistane, il ritiro delle truppe militari statunitensi dall’Afghanistan e l’introduzione della legge islamica nel paese.

Gli attentati che si succedevano alla fine del gennaio del 2014 e nel febbraio successivo, inclusa l’esecuzione di 23 paramilitari prigionieri dei militanti dal 2010,inducevano il governo Sharif a lanciare un’azione militare nel Nord del Waziristan, che interrompeva temporaneamente le trattative in corso. A seguito dei bombardamenti, il TTP proclamava il «cessate il fuoco» per un mese a partire da marzo del 2014, aprendo alla possibilità della ripresa dei negoziati.

Tuttavia le violenze continuavano, anche se, in diverse occasioni, lo stesso TTP ne prendeva le distanze, a dimostrazione dell’assenza di compattezza tra le fila dei militanti, elemento, questo, che non facilitava i colloqui di pace.

Nell’aprile del 2014, il JUI-F (Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam Fazl), partito conservatore fondato su principi religiosi, decideva di ritirare il proprio sostegno all’amministrazione Sharif. Il portavoce del movimento politico dichiarava che la decisione seguiva l’assenza di consultazioni e di coordinamento interno alla coalizione di governo in merito all’adozione di decisioni concernenti il dialogo con il TTP, criticando in particolare l’adozione della Pakistan Protection Ordinance (PPO). La PPO è una normativa controversa, approvata nel 2013 dal presidente della Repubblica Islamica del Pakistan, Mamnoon Hussain, con un decreto che definisce nemico dello stato chiunque attenti alla pace del paese. In sostanza, essa ha introdotto una sorta di principio di «occhio per occhio» che autorizza l’uso della forza pubblica in maniera proporzionata alle violazioni commesse, consentendo alle forze di sicurezza di esercitare un potere di polizia discrezionale e l’uso di metodi di contro-terrorismo non convenzionali. La PPO era convalidata dall’assemblea nazionale il 7 aprile del 2014 ed approvata in via definitiva, sempre dal parlamento, nel luglio successivo, con il nome di Pakistan Protection Act. Questo nonostante la forte opposizione del PTI, del PPP (Pakistan People’s Party), della JI (Jamaat-e-Islami) e dell’MQM (Muttahida Qaumi Movement), che lo definivano incostituzionale ed in aperta violazione dei diritti umani[2].

Il 23 maggio del 2014, pochi giorni prima della visita ufficiale di Sharif a Delhi, in occasione della cerimonia d’insediamento del nuovo premier indiano, il governo pachistano assecondava nuovamente le pressioni dei militari e autorizzava un secondo attacco contro alcuni campi di addestramento dei miliziani nei pressi di Miranshah, capoluogo del Waziristan del nord, nelle FATA.

2. L’operazione Zarb-e-Azb

L’attacco ad uno dei terminal dell’aeroporto di Karachi, compiuto da un commando dei talibani pachistani il 9 giugno del 2014, nel quale morivano 38 persone, era il prodromo dell’avvio di una operazione militare lanciata alla metà del mese nel Waziristan settentrionale e condotta dall’aviazione e dalle truppe di terra con il sostegno dei droni americani.

Il Waziristan del nord è un distretto delle FATA (i distretti delle aree tribali del Pakistan prendono il nome di agencies) nel quale, dopo l’attacco terroristico a New York dell’11 settembre del 2001, si sono insediati molti dei talibani in fuga dal confinante Afghanistan. Negli anni a seguire, il Waziristan del nord è divenuto la roccaforte di molti gruppi armati, tra i quali il TTP, formatosi nel dicembre del 2007[3]. Dal 2002, le aree di frontiera con l’Afghanistan sono state teatro di diverse operazioni militari pachistane, che si sono succedute con fortune alterne nell’intento di sradicarvi la militanza islamista. Proprio nel 2002, per la prima volta dal raggiungimento dall’indipendenza del Pakistan, l’esercito intervenne nelle FATA lanciando l’operazione Al-Meezan[4], che vide lo spiegamento di truppe nella valle di Tirah, nella Khyber agency, e a Parachinar, nell’agency di Kurram, per contenere l’entrata di talibani in fuga dall’Afghanistan. Due anni dopo, nel marzo del 2004, l’operazione Kalusha fu condotta nel Waziristan meridionale[5]. Nel 2009 fu la volta dell’operazione Rah e Rast, che interessò la valle dello Swat[6]. I governi succedutisi ad Islamabad avevano evitato di intervenire in forze nel Waziristan settentrionale, resistendo alle continue pressioni esercitate dagli americani e dai propri militari, anche a costo di esacerbare le frizioni con gli alleati d’oltreoceano e le forze armate. Il pericolo più grave, infatti, era determinato dal timore che un intervento potesse innescare una rappresaglia da parte del TTP il quale, alla luce degli audaci attacchi degli ultimi anni, aveva dimostrato sorprendenti capacità organizzative[7].

Nell’agosto 2014, però, il governo di Nawaz Sharif doveva piegarsi alle pressioni dell’esercito, alimentate dalle violenze culminate con i gravi avvenimenti di Karachi, e ne autorizzava l’intervento nel Waziristan del nord. Infatti, oltre al tentativo di contenere gli estremismi nel paese, la campagna militare era anche mirata a mettere in sicurezza l’area di confine con l’Afghanistan prima del ritiro delle truppe della NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) entro la fine del 2014[8].

L’operazione, denominata Zarb-e-Azb, per la quale erano dispiegati oltre 30.000 militari, iniziava con i bombardamenti dell’aviazione pachistana, seguiti, dopo circa due settimane dall’inizio dell’offensiva, da interventi di terra concentrati nell’area di Miramshah. Le fonti ufficiali dell’esercito riferivano di una vittoria schiacciante sui miliziani, che, dopo alcune settimane, contavano circa un migliaio di caduti contro le ben più esigue, ma non meglio precisate, perdite tra i militari. Tra i primi caduti, a detta delle poche fonti alle quali era consentito seguire l’intervento, c’era lo stesso comandante uzbeco Abu Abdul Rehman al-Maani, l’ideatore del piano messo in atto la settimana precedente all’aeroporto di Karachi. Tuttavia, la chiusura dell’area alla stampa alimentava i dubbi sul reale impatto della campagna, che, progressivamente, si estendeva anche a zone adiacenti Miramshah e si protraeva per il resto del periodo in esame. In effetti, secondo alcune fonti, i miliziani sarebbero riusciti a lasciare il capoluogo del Waziristan del nord prima dell’inizio dei bombardamenti, confondendosi con i molti sfollati[9].

Effettivamente, il piano dell’operazione sembrava non aver considerato le conseguenze dell’inevitabile crisi umanitaria che sarebbe stata innescata dai combattimenti. Circa 800.000 profughi si spostavano dal Waziristan del nord verso Bannu, principale centro urbano situato nell’omonimo distretto della provincia del Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, dove, però, non trovavano strutture in grado di accoglierli. Le autorità non consentivano il libero movimento agli sfollati, e un ingente numero di questi, circa 70.000, preferiva raggiungere le vicine province afgane dove, a detta loro, ricevevano un’accoglienza migliore che nel proprio paese[10].

Secondo le stime di alcune analisi indipendenti, il numero degli attacchi dei militanti, così come quello delle vittime, si era ridotto di circa il 30% dall’inizio della campagna Zarb-e-Azb[11]. Tuttavia, anche ad operazione militare in corso, il TTP organizzava alcuni assalti di alto profilo, come quelli del settembre 2014 ad una base navale di Karachi e ad un convoglio di paramilitari a Peshawar.

I timori delle ritorsioni dei militanti per la campagna militare nel Waziristan del nord si dimostravano fondati quando, il 16 dicembre del 2014, un commando composto da 9 membri del TTP, con indosso le divise dei paramilitari dei Frontier Corps, si introduceva in una scuola di Peshawar, la Warsak Road, facente parte del sistema di strutture scolastiche gestite dall’esercito pakistano e nella quale studiano centinaia di figli di militari. Il gruppo di fuoco uccideva indiscriminatamente 149 persone, tra le quali 132 studenti di età compresa tra gli 8 ed i 18 anni, e solo l’intervento dei corpi scelti dell’esercito pachistano bloccava il massacro portando in salvo quasi mille persone. Rivendicando la responsabilità dell’efferato attacco, il portavoce del TTP spiegava che si era trattato di una rappresaglia innescata dall’operazione Zarb-e-Azb. Le istituzioni pachistane, la maggioranza dei governi esteri e molte delle organizzazioni internazionali multilaterali esprimevano unanimemente il proprio sdegno per l’accaduto. La società civile pachistana condannava l’evento e chiedeva una presa di posizione decisa contro i militanti da parte del governo. L’orrore suscitato dall’evento risultava nell’abolizione, da parte dell’amministrazione di Sharif, della moratoria sulla pena di morte per i reati di terrorismo, in vigore in Pakistan dal 2008, decisione che, a sua volta, sollevava molte critiche. In seguito al massacro di Peshawar erano intensificati i bombardamenti condotti tanto dagli aerei pachistani, quanto dai droni radiocomandati nelle aree di frontiera con l’Afghanistan, ed erano potenziate anche le operazioni militari di terra in atto nella Khyber Agency e nella valle di Tirah, in una specie di caccia all’uomo. Sharif, che fino a pochi mesi prima era stato un fautore del dialogo con i militanti, adesso prometteva cambiamenti sostanziali nella lotta al terrorismo. Il premier annunciava la formazione di una nuova forza paramilitare specificamente addestrata a contrastare questo genere di crimini. Per snellire i procedimenti giudiziari, Sharif rivelava anche l’intenzione di formare nuove corti militari che si occupassero specificamente dei casi di terrorismo. Infatti, secondo il sistema vigente, e tranne i casi di attacchi alle forze armate, i crimini di natura terroristica sono competenza del sistema giudiziario civile, caratterizzato da tempi lunghi e ritardi[12].

3. Le accuse a Musharraf

In seguito alle vicissitudini giudiziarie che lo avevano interessato nel 2013, l’ex presidente della Repubblica Islamica del Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, rischiava la pena capitale o il carcere a vita, per alto tradimento, come sancito dall’articolo 6 della costituzione[13].

Dal momento della citazione in giudizio e dopo la revoca degli arresti domiciliari, l’ex generale aveva addotto motivi di salute e di sicurezza personale che gli avrebbero impedito di partecipare alle udienze, anche se le sue richieste di sottoporsi a cure mediche all’estero non erano accolte dai giudici giacché gli era negato l’espatrio[14].

Alla fine di marzo del 2014, una corte speciale dava lettura dei capi d’imputazione per i reati contestati a Pervez Musharraf in merito alla dichiarazione dello stato di emergenza del 3 novembre del 2007 ed al conseguente sovvertimento delle norme costituzionali.

Le accuse mosse a suo carico erano fondate, oltre che sulle norme del citato articolo 6 della costituzione, sull’High Treason (Punishment) Act del 1973. A Musharraf era contestato di aver emanato, sempre il 3 novembre del 2007, il Provisional Constitution Order No.1 in qualità di comandante in capo delle forze armate. Questa normativa aveva conferito al presidente della Repubblica Islamica del Pakistan l’autorità di emendare la costituzione e di sospendere i diritti fondamentali[15]. Lo stesso giorno, Musharraf aveva emesso l’Oath of Office (Judges) Order, 2007, che obbligava i magistrati a prestare giuramento di fedeltà alle disposizioni del Proclamation of Emergency Act e all’ordine costituzionale provvisorio in forza da quel momento. In seguito, il 20 novembre successivo, l’allora presidente del Pakistan aveva emesso il Constitution (Amendment) Order, 2007, seguito dal Constitution (Second Amendment) Order 6, 2007, anch’esso considerato illegale in quanto attribuiva alla corte suprema la possibilità di disporre il trasferimento di sede dei casi giudiziari, modificava le prerogative giurisdizionali dell’alta corte e riaffermava, convalidandola, la validità delle nuove disposizioni costituzionali. La corte specificava anche che si trattava di atti criminali riconducibili al solo presidente, giacché non erano stati convalidati dal parlamento.

Al dicembre del 2014, il processo a Pervez Musharraf non si era ancora concluso.

4. Gli attriti tra governo e militari

La formalizzazione delle accuse a carico di Pervez Musharraf era forse l’esempio più tangibile delle tensioni esistenti tra il potere esecutivo ed i militari. Questi hanno governato il Pakistan per oltre la metà della storia del paese e, quando non al governo, hanno svolto un ruolo di primo piano nella definizione delle politiche delle amministrazioni elette. Negli ultimi anni gli equilibri sono mutati e, dal 2007, altre istituzioni – la magistratura, il governo, il parlamento – e, in misura inferiore, la società civile, in particolare la stampa, hanno progressivamente fatto valere la propria indipendenza sulle questioni di dominio pubblico[16]. Le forze armate, preoccupate che il processo all’ex generale rappresentasse un precedente in grado di affermare la supremazia della magistratura e del governo sullo stato maggiore militare, tentavano di assicurare a Musharraf – senza riuscirci – la possibilità di rifugiarsi all’estero[17].

Anche i negoziati in atto con i militanti del TTP erano un motivo di attrito tra i militari ed il governo, giacché i generali si lamentavano dell’arbitrarietà delle decisioni prese dall’amministrazione di Sharif[18]. Persino la visita di Nawaz Sharif a Delhi nel maggio del 2014, in occasione del giuramento del nuovo premier indiano Narendra Modi, era percepita dai media come una decisione audace del primo ministro pachistano e antitetica al volere dei militari.

Nel periodo in esame, i media in Pakistan subivano pesanti intimidazioni. In particolare, tre giornalisti dell’«Express Tribune» erano uccisi nel gennaio del 2014 dai militanti e, nell’aprile successivo, Hamid Mir, un noto giornalista e conduttore di Geo News, un canale televisivo di proprietà del gruppo Jang che trasmette un popolare notiziario, era ferito in un attentato a Karachi, dopo averne scampato un altro l’anno precedente.

Nell’ultimo decennio, Geo TV ha dominato l’informazione televisiva, proponendo programmi di approfondimento giornalistico che, in taluni casi, hanno provocato reazioni dell’establishment militare. Questo è avvenuto, per esempio, in occasione di servizi che denunciavano l’inefficienza delle forze armate nel caso della cattura di Osama bin Laden, o l’interferenza dell’ISI (Inter Service Intelligence, il più potente dei servizi segreti militari) negli affari politici della nazione[19]. «Geo News» era già stata oscurata tra il 2007 ed il 2008, all’indomani della proclamazione dello stato di emergenza da parte di Musharraf[20]. Trasferitasi a Dubai, aveva subìto la stessa sorte anche negli Emirati Arabi Uniti, su richiesta del governo pachistano. Spostatasi su diverse frequenze satellitari, era stata nuovamente oscurata nel 2009 dopo che si era apertamente schierata a favore della protesta degli avvocati contro il governo[21].

Recentemente, Hamid Mir si era occupato dei desaparecidos del Belucistan e delle torture inflitte loro, così come ai loro sostenitori – secondo il giornalista – dai membri dell’ISI. Inoltre, Mir aveva anche criticato la solidarietà che l’establishment militare aveva dimostrato a Pervez Musharraf in occasione delle sue vicissitudini giudiziarie.

In seguito alle accuse mosse da Hamid Mir contro l’ISI, i militari chiedevano alla PEMRA (Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority), l’autorità preposta al controllo delle telecomunicazioni, di oscurare l’emittente televisiva. A «Geo TV» era dunque sospesa la licenza per 15 giorni ed imposta una multa di 10 milioni di rupie (quasi 100.000 dollari) in seguito ad un reclamo formale del ministero della Difesa.

Il Committee to Protect Journalists, un’organizzazione indipendente no-profit fondata nel 1981 che promuove la libertà di stampa a livello globale, accusava l’establishment militare di condurre una campagna contro l’emittente televisiva, accusata dai generali di perseguire un’agenda contraria agli interessi del paese[22].

Amnesty International esprimeva la propria preoccupazione in merito ai fatti e a proposito della concreta possibilità che l’ISI fosse impegnato in una campagna d’intimidazione ai danni dei media. Sulla scia del caso di Mir, la stampa dava spazio a decine di altre storie analoghe di rapimenti e uccisioni, fra cui il caso di Saleem Shahzad, redattore capo della filiale pachistana dell’«Asia Times Online», ucciso nel maggio del 2011, e quello dei presunti abusi commessi dalle forze di sicurezza ai danni dei separatisti del Belucistan[23].

Il breve tentativo di oscurare Geo Tv si scontrava con la dichiarazione d’illegalità del provvedimento da parte della PEMRA, avvallata dal governo di Sharif. Tuttavia, il gruppo Jang querelava per diffamazione l’ISI e chiedeva un risarcimento di 500 milioni di dollari ai servizi segreti, al ministero della Difesa ed alla stessa PEMRA[24].

La visita di Nawaz Sharif al giornalista ferito e le voci che il governo prestava fede alle accuse che questi aveva mosso contro l’ISI spostavano l’attenzione, e con essa le frizioni, ai rapporti tra l’amministrazione civile del Pakistan ed i militari, già polarizzati dal processo contro Musharraf. Le ripercussioni politiche non si facevano attendere. Imran Khan, leader del PTI (Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf), prendeva le difese dei militari e accusava Geo TV di aver favorito la vittoria elettorale di Sharif nel 2013[25]. Hafiz Saeed, il leader del gruppo Lashkar-e-Taiba, riprendeva le dichiarazioni di Khan, così come facevano alcuni leader di movimenti confessionali, i quali accusavano il canale di blasfemia.

5. L’opposizione a Nawaz Sharif

La schiacciante maggioranza che Nawaz Sharif aveva ottenuto alle elezioni del 2013 aveva prodotto ottimismo e creato aspettative circa la possibilità di risollevare il paese, in modo particolare la sua disastrata economia e la situazione della sicurezza interna[26]. Tuttavia, da allora, il governo Sharif aveva dovuto far fronte alla vivace opposizione tanto del PTI di Imran Khan, quanto di quella di Tahir-ul-Qadri, un pachistano naturalizzato canadese e fondatore, nel 1989, del movimento politico PAT (Pakistan Awami Tehrik).

In occasione delle celebrazioni per l’indipendenza del Pakistan, il 14 agosto del 2014, Imran Khan organizzava una marcia pubblica (l’azadi march o «marcia delle libertà») da Lahore a Islamabad per protestare contro le presunte frodi avvenute alle elezioni del maggio del 2013, con l’obiettivo di rovesciare il governo di Sharif e di rendere inevitabili nuove elezioni.

Qadri, con il sostegno di numerosi attivisti del PAT e della sua organizzazione non governativa d’ispirazione religiosa, la Minhaj-ul-Quran, fondata nel 1981 a Lahore, auspicava una rivoluzione in grado di sradicare la corruzione dal sistema democratico nazionale e l’instaurazione di un nuovo governo. Come già avvenuto nel gennaio del 2013, nel giugno del 2014 Qadri tornava in Pakistan per organizzare, come Imran Khan, una marcia su Islamabad, che si svolgeva il 14 agosto 2014[27]. Il suo rientro dal Canada era caratterizzato da un evidente nervosismo del governo, il quale ne dirottava il volo a Lahore per evitare che il leader del PAT incontrasse i suoi sostenitori ad Islamabad.

Secondo la maggioranza dei commentatori, Khan e Qadri avevano ben poche possibilità di riuscire nei propri intenti, né le irregolarità della tornata elettorale del 2013, così come accertate dagli osservatori, giustificavano le accuse mosse ai danni di Sharif. Tuttavia, tanto la data scelta per le manifestazioni, che coincideva con le celebrazioni della ricorrenza dell’indipendenza del paese, quanto la loro concomitanza con l’operazione Zarb-i-Azb, che, come ricordato, era accompagnata da un alto numero di sfollati, costituivano un elemento di preoccupazione per il governo[28]. Come previsto dall’articolo 245 della costituzione della Repubblica Islamica del Pakistan, che regola le funzioni delle forze armate, era dunque deciso di dispiegare l’esercito a protezione di Islamabad e, in forza dell’articolo 144 del codice di procedura penale, erano anche vietati gli assembramenti nella capitale[29].

Prima delle marce erano arrestati oltre 30 sostenitori del PAT, ed era anche spiccato un mandato di arresto ai danni dello stesso Tahir ul-Qadri in seguito alla morte di un poliziotto avvenuta durante gli scontri che si erano verificati in occasione di una protesta organizzata dal suo raggruppamento politico. Una sorte analoga era riservata anche a molti attivisti del PTI[30].

Le due marce si svolgevano in maniera pacifica nel tragitto tra Lahore ed Islamabad e, anche quando i dimostranti, raggiunta la capitale, varcavano le recinzioni della «zona rossa», delineata a protezione degli edifici istituzionali, non si registravano interventi degni di nota da parte delle forze dell’ordine. Tuttavia, le manifestazioni non radunavano le folle che i due leader avevano inizialmente auspicato. Infatti, secondo alcune stime, i partecipanti erano circa 50.000, con una predominanza dei sostenitori di Qadri, e non le centinaia di migliaia inizialmente annunciate[31]. A parte questo, le iniziative di Khan e Qadri, seppur facendo presa su una parte della popolazione pachistana, stanca degli insuccessi del governo di Sharif, non riuscivano ad avere l’appoggio dell’intellighenzia nazionale. Quest’ultima, infatti, percepiva le marce come mere mosse politiche, fatte in assenza di programmi ben definiti, anziché come un tentativo di apportare miglioramenti degni di nota al sistema democratico vigente nel paese.

Qadri rivelava il suo programma, consistente in un’agenda di 10 punti, che reclamava le dimissioni e l’arresto del premier, del fratello Shahbaz Sharif, governatore del Punjab, e dei ministri del governo; chiedeva anche lo scioglimento del parlamento e delle assemblee provinciali, la formazione di un gabinetto composto da non meglio identificati tecnocrati, nominati e non eletti, che avrebbe dovuto adottare una serie di riforme economiche[32].

Il PTI invocava una campagna di disobbedienza civile e di resistenza fiscale ed intimava a Sharif di dimettersi, minacciando di ritirare i propri 34 parlamentari,in modo da mettere a repentaglio il normale prosieguo del processo democratico del paese.

Il 30 agosto 2014, dopo che Khan e Qadri avevano annunciato, con fermezza, che le proteste sarebbero continuate indeterminatamente, finché Sharif non si fosse dimesso, s’innescava una guerriglia urbana tra polizia e dimostranti, che, in occasione del tentativo di avvicinarsi alla residenza del premier a Islamabad, produceva vittime e centinaia di feriti.

La reazione dell’esercito non si faceva attendere. Il capo delle forze armate, il generale Rasheel Sharif, che pochi giorni prima dei disordini aveva auspicato una soluzione politica alla crisi, tentava una mediazione tra le parti e, con un comunicato, i militari si dichiaravano «pronti a svolgere la propria parte per garantire la sicurezza dello stato». Questa era una formulazione che, data la storia del Pakistan, diffondeva il timore di un imminente colpo di stato[33]. Tuttavia, ben presto l’esercito prendeva le distanze dalle vicissitudini politiche, né interveniva per interrompere le proteste. I militari coglievano così l’opportunità, offerta dalle marce, di mettere in risalto la vulnerabilità del governo di Sharif. Il premier, infatti, doveva riconoscere il ruolo svolto dall’esercito in difesa delle istituzioni democratiche e della stabilità del paese, alludendo implicitamente alla propria incapacità di ottenere lo stesso risultato, e confermava, sempre indirettamente, l’influenza dell’establishment militare sull’amministrazione civile.

Nell’ottobre del 2014 le manifestazioni si estendevano anche a Lahore e Karachi e, progressivamente, perdevano intensità seppur mantenendo presidi in zone vitali della protesta.

6. Relazioni tra Pakistan e India

Nawaz Sharif accettava l’invito di Narendra Modi e partecipava alla cerimonia d’insediamento del neoeletto premier indiano organizzata il 26 Maggio del 2014 a Delhi. I brevi colloqui bilaterali che ne seguivano si limitavano ad espressioni di intenti in materia di sicurezza e di scambi commerciali e preannunciavano successivi incontri di natura tecnica. La visita di Sharif in India era la prima di un leader pachistano dagli attacchi terroristici di Mumbai del 2008 ed era percepita dalla stampa nazionale come un tentativo di ammorbidire le relazioni diplomatiche dei due paesi[34].

L’incontro tra i due premier, seppur benaugurante, non era seguito da una fattuale distensione dei rapporti bilaterali. Al contrario, nel periodo in esame si registravano violazioni del «cessate il fuoco» lungo la LoC (Linea di Controllo: il confine di fatto tra i due paesi), che si intensificavano nell’ottobre del 2014.

Contrariamente a quanto deciso in occasione della visita di Sharif in India, alla metà di agosto del 2014 il governo di Delhi sospendeva i dialoghi previsti con la controparte pachistana a causa dell’incontro formale avvenuto tra l’ambasciatore del Pakistan, Abdul Basit, ed una delegazione dei leader separatisti del Kashmir composta dal Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, da Syed Ali Shah Geelani, da Yasin Malik e da Shabir Shah. Sebbene la questione del Kashmir non fosse all’ordine del giorno nei dialoghi tra India e Pakistan, non si trattava di un incontro inusuale ma, al contrario, di consultazioni fino a quel momento tollerate dai governi di Delhi[35].

7. Economia

Il 21 giugno del 2014, la camera bassa del parlamento pachistano approvava la legge finanziaria per l’anno fiscale luglio 2014 – giugno 2015.

Come quello dell’anno precedente, anche il nuovo bilancio mirava a stabilizzare l’economia nazionale, così come richiesto dalle condizioni imposte dall’FMI (Fondo Monetario Internazionale) all’esborso del prestito di oltre sei miliardi e mezzo di dollari concordato nel settembre del 2013[36]. Il nuovo schema finanziario si sovrapponeva a quello del 2008 per il quale, nel 2013, il Pakistan aveva già restituito 3,4 miliardi di dollari e ne avrebbe dovuto restituire altri due nel 2014-2015[37].

Come i precedenti bilanci, anche quello del 2014 allocava un’alta percentuale delle risorse disponibili, il 33%, al risarcimento dei debiti[38]. Gli stanziamenti per la difesa aumentavano di oltre l’11% rispetto all’anno precedente (6,8 miliardi di dollari), cifra che portava l’ammontare delle spese militari a circa il 20% del totale e a quasi il 3,5% del prodotto interno lordo.

Tra i tagli alla spesa introdotti dalla legge fiscale, quelli concernenti i sussidi al settore energetico e agricolo erano degni di nota perché, a causa della loro esiguità, dimostravano la difficoltà di apportare riduzioni significative all’intervento statale in settori chiave dell’economia del paese.

La scarsità energetica costituiva un problema concreto per Sharif, la cui promessa di soluzione era stata uno dei cavalli di battaglia della sua campagna elettorale nel 2013; ma l’incapacità di mantenere l’impegno preso era, adesso, sotto gli occhi di tutti. La costruzione di nuovi impianti di produzione energetica, inclusa quella solare, non sopperiva alla mancanza di un sistema razionalizzato dei costi al consumo dell’energia elettrica. Infatti, era noto che il suo prezzo, troppo basso, non bilanciava quelli di produzione e che questo era uno dei motivi principali dell’assenza di profitto settoriale e delle continue interruzioni dell’erogazione del servizio. Sharif decideva di non aumentare le tariffe, ignorando i consigli della NEPRA (National Electric Power Regulatory Authority, l’ente preposto alla regolamentazione dell’energia elettrica). L’assenza di progressi concreti nel settore energetico metteva a rischio il prestito dell’FMI: infatti, l’incremento delle tariffe e la diminuzione dei sussidi statali erano condizioni poste all’esborso delle varie tranchesdell’EFF (Extended Fund Facility), accordato nel settembre del 2013.

In 2014, tensions mounted between the government of Nawaz Sharif and the military establishment across multiple issues.

Pervez Musharraf, former general and president of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, arrested in 2013 and facing charges of high treason, was indicted in the period under review. The army came to Musharraf’s rescue by trying to persuade the civil government to allow his exile out of Pakistan for health-related reasons. Yet, the government and the judges firmly resisted the pressure by the army.

Another element of tension between the government and the army was the former’s decision to try to negotiate with the Islamist militants of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Ceasefire initiatives were repeatedly sought by the civilian administration but violence failed to be halted. The army was determined – and ultimately succeeded in obtaining the green light from the government – to launch a major military operation against the militant’ hideouts in North Waziristan, a bordering area with Afghanistan, needing to be secured before NATO combat troops left the neighbouring country.

The assassination attempt in Karachi on Mr Hamid Mir, Pakistan’s leading television talk-show host, opened another field of confrontation between the military establishment and the civilian government. Mir’s accusations that the main military intelligence service, the ISI, was responsible for the attack triggered a national debate about the army’s attempts to suffocate dissenting voices. Once Prime Minister Sharif allegedly backed Mr Mir, the media-army tension turned rapidly into tension between the government and the army.

Also the in-country political tensions between the government and the opposition parties, in particular the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and the Pakistan Awami Tehrik (PTA) – plus the popular demonstrations organized by both the PTI and PTA against Sharif’s administration, turned into an opportunity for the armed forces to stress the Prime Minister’s difficulty in asserting his authority.

Tensions mounted between Pakistan and India. Exchanges of fire along the Line of Control, the de facto heavily guarded frontier between Pakistan and India, left more than 20 people dead, in the most serious violation since the 2003 cease-fire agreement.

 

1. Introduzione

Lo Sri Lanka ha visto, durante il 2014, il perdurare delle dinamiche che hanno caratterizzato lo scenario politico e sociale del paese dalla fine al conflitto civile, nel 2009. In particolare, il supremo potere politico ha continuato ad essere esercitato dal presidente Mahinda Rajapaksa (il cui vero nome è Percy Mahendra Rajapaksa). Eletto presidente per una prima volta nel novembre 2005 e rieletto per la seconda volta consecutiva nel gennaio 2010, Mahinda Rajapaksa ha continuato a guidare il governo della United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA), dotato di un’ampissima maggioranza parlamentare. A sua volta, questa maggioranza parlamentare era espressione della popolazione sinhala, ovvero l’etnia di maggioranza nello Sri Lanka, grata al presidente per avere condotto il paese fuori dalla guerra civile, tramite l’annientamento delle Tigri Tamil (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, LTTE),

Tuttavia, nel corso di questi nove anni, si è assistito, da un lato, all’instaurazione di un clima politico repressivo e autoritario, dall’altro all’incapacità dell’amministrazione singalese di attuare politiche in grado di riconciliare i vari gruppi etnici presenti nell’isola. Il presidente Rajapaksa, infatti, è riuscito a concentrare vasti poteri su di sé e sulla propria cerchia famigliare, piegando alla sua volontà l’autorità giudiziaria ed modificando la costituzione tramite l’emanazione del 18° emendamento. Quest’ultimo, la cui legalità è stata duramente contestata, ha permesso a Rajapaksa di attribuire alla figura del presidente nuovi poteri e di abrogare il limite di due mandati, rendendo così possibile la sua rielezione. Nel corso del 2014, si è assistito, pertanto, all’attuazione di politiche volte ad accrescere il livello di militarizzazione dell’apparato statale e a soffocare le espressioni della società civile. Tale tendenza è stata inoltre legittimata in una certa misura dalla presunta riorganizzazione delle Tigri Tamil, paventata durante la prima metà dell’anno.

Nonostante che il presidente avesse in passato governato con pugno di ferro, durante il 2014, per la prima volta, sono emersi alcuni segnali di debolezza. Il primo è relativo alla decisa pressione che la comunità internazionale, principalmente tramite le risoluzioni emanate dall’UNHRC (United Nations Human Rights Council), ha esercitato nei confronti del presidente. Il secondo è il dato proveniente dalle elezioni provinciali di marzo e di settembre, caratterizzate da un’inedita erosione dei consensi per la coalizione dell’UPFA.

Nel primo caso, le sanzioni dell’UNHCR dimostravano l’insofferenza dei paesi occidentali nei confronti delle politiche del governo singalese sia sul fronte interno che su quello esterno. L’intensificazione delle relazioni economiche e diplomatiche tra Colombo e Pechino ha infatti suscitato non poche apprensioni in seno all’amministrazione statunitense, principale promotrice delle risoluzioni dell’UNHRC.

Nel secondo caso, sul versante domestico, il calo dei voti ha persuaso il presidente Rajapaksa a indire in anticipo le elezioni presidenziali, fissando la data del voto al gennaio 2015, nella speranza di ottenere un nuovo mandato, prima di perdere ulteriori consensi tra l’elettorato. La decisione di anticipare le elezioni è stata accompagnata dall’apertura di alcune crepe nella coalizione di governo, che hanno portato alla defezione di tre ministri. Particolarmente importante è stata la diserzione di Maithripala Sirisena, ministro della Salute, passato nei ranghi dell’opposizione per candidarsi come presidente alle elezioni del gennaio seguente. La sua candidatura, infatti, è stata in grado di compattare i partiti di opposizione in un fronte comune che, ipoteticamente, potrebbe essere in grado di impedire la rielezione di Rajapaksa.

Se l’aprirsi di un’opposizione interna all’UPFA e l’erosione dei consensi tra la popolazione non si sono risolti in una vera e propria crisi di governo, gli avvenimenti appena descritti hanno comunque fatto emergere alcune fragilità che, solamente l’anno precedente, sembravano lungi dal potere sfiorare la monolitica coalizione di governo. L’insoddisfazione verso l’amministrazione Rajapaksa, già diffusa tra i cittadini tamil e tra le classi medie urbane, esponenti della società civile singalese, pare si sia allargata alla popolazione rurale oltre che all’interno della stessa coalizione di governo. Solamente le elezioni del gennaio 2015 saranno però in grado di decretare se l’egemonia della famiglia Rajapaksa sulla nazione sia giunta al crepuscolo o se l’avere condotto il paese fuori dal conflitto civile possa garantire al presidente l’imperituro appoggio della popolazione sinhala.

2. L’istituzione della commissione di inchiesta dell’UNHRC

Il 27 marzo 2014, a Ginevra, l’UNHRC ha decretato l’istituzione di una commissione di inchiesta internazionale deputata ad indagare sui presunti crimini di guerra e sulle violazioni dei diritti umani commessi dalle forze armate singalesi e dalle Tigri Tamil durante le ultime brutali fasi del conflitto civile che ha afflitto lo Sri Lanka per 26 anni, dal 1983 al 2009.[1] L’adozione di tale risoluzione è stato un evento simbolicamente molto significativo, sebbene il governo singalese, lungi dall’assecondare le istanze dell’organismo internazionale, abbia respinto con sdegno l’ipotesi di un intervento esterno.

A cinque anni dalla fine della guerra civile, conclusasi con l’annientamento delle LTTE e con la completa vittoria del governo centrale, lo Sri Lanka non è stato in grado di portare giustizia alle vittime del conflitto. Al contrario, esso ha assicurato la totale impunità ai responsabili degli abusi commessi, non riuscendo a mettere in pratica neppure i limitati suggerimenti della commissione di inchiesta filo-governativa, la Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC), istituita nel 2010. La scarsa volontà dimostrata dalle autorità dello Sri Lanka nel perseguire la giustizia e nell’addivenire ad un serio processo di riconciliazione nazionale ha quindi spinto l’UNHRC ad emanare una serie di risoluzioni, nel 2009, nel 2012 e nel 2013, il cui scopo era quello di incoraggiare il governo singalese a impegnarsi in tal senso. Il contenuto delle precedenti risoluzioni concerneva però anche un’altra questione, ossia la preoccupante situazione della tutela dei diritti umani. La sistematica violazione dei diritti umani da parte delle autorità singalesi sotto l’amministrazione Rajapaksa, infatti, era tale da suscitare l’apprensione di ampi settori della comunità internazionale. Le sollecitazioni del Consiglio sono però state costantemente rigettate dal governo dell’isola, spingendo in tal modo l’UNHRC ad adottare la risoluzione del 27 marzo, proposta dagli Stati Uniti ed approvata grazie al voto favorevole di 23 paesi. Tra i 12 paesi contrari alla decisione si sono schierati, tra gli altri, la Cina, le cui relazioni con Colombo sono divenute negli ultimi anni estremamente amichevoli, e il Pakistan; tra gli stati che si sono astenuti dal voto, vale la pena di annoverare il Giappone e l’India. L’astensione di quest’ultima, che aveva invece votato a favore delle precedenti risoluzioni, era ufficialmente dettata dal fatto che l’UNHRC non avesse tenuto in debita considerazione i progressi fatti dal governo singalese in direzione di una riconciliazione nazionale e dal timore che l’istituzione di una commissione di inchiesta internazionale potesse ostacolare tali «ragguardevoli sviluppi».[2] Nel settembre 2013 infatti, per la prima volta nella storia dello Sri Lanka, erano state indette le elezioni per la formazione del Provincial Council della provincia Settentrionale, popolata prevalentemente dall’etnia tamil. Nonostante ciò, il risultato delle elezioni, che avevano visto la vittoria del partito d’opposizione, la Tamil National Alliance (TNA), era stato appannato da una serie di circostanze che attenuavano ampiamente la portata storica e politica di tale evento.[3] In realtà, pare più probabile che l’astensione dal voto dell’India riflettesse in larga misura il desiderio di Delhi di non danneggiare le relazioni con il governo singalese, evitando di spingerlo ad avvicinarsi ulteriormente all’orbita cinese. Di conseguenza, pur non negando la necessità di un’inchiesta indipendente e credibile sui crimini di guerra, l’India ha deciso di non sostenere «l’approccio controproduttivo e tale da minare la sovranità nazionale [dello Sri Lanka]», quale era considerato quello proposto dall’UNHRC.[4]

La reazione dell’amministrazione Rajapaksa di fronte alla decisione del Consiglio è stata ostile e indignata come, del resto, lo era stata in occasione delle precedenti e meno decisive risoluzioni. Il ministro degli Esteri, G. L Peiris, spiegando la contrarietà dello Sri Lanka riguardo alla risoluzione dell’UNHRC, ha infatti affermato che il governo singalese non avrebbe cooperato con le indagini. La legittimità dell’inchiesta internazionale veniva confutata dalle autorità singalesi, che la giudicavano come una violazione della sovranità nazionale del paese. Lo Sri Lanka non soltanto si è rifiutato di collaborare con la commissione investigativa, ma ha in seguito deciso di boicottarne l’opera, negando la concessione del visto di entrata ai membri della squadra investigativa internazionale.[5] Nella visione del presidente Rajapaksa, la pressione internazionale a cui il governo dell’isola è stato sottoposto era nociva, perché contribuiva a polarizzare le spaccature etniche del paese, e ingiustificata, dal momento che gli sforzi fatti in direzione della riconciliazione nazionale e della pace erano stati notevoli. Tale punto di vista si basava soprattutto sul fatto che il governo avesse effettuato massicci investimenti nell’area settentrionale dello Sri Lanka, i quali hanno in effetti permesso la ricostruzione delle infrastrutture e il ripristino dei trasporti, nonché l’espansione dei servizi bancari, portando ad una rapida crescita della depressa economia della provincia del Nord (cresciuta nel 2012 del 25%).[6] A dispetto di tali progressi, la provincia Settentrionale non solo ha continuato ad essere una delle più economicamente arretrate dello Sri Lanka, contribuendo soltanto al 4% del Prodotto Interno Lordo (PIL), ma, una volta cessate le ostilità, ha visto permanere sul proprio territorio un ingente dispiegamento delle forze armate, circostanza che ha ostacolato il consolidamento democratico e il rifiorire dell’economia all’interno dell’area.

La pressione esercitata dall’UNHRC sullo Sri Lanka era interpretata dall’amministrazione Rajapaksa come parte di una cospirazione messa in atto dai paesi occidentali per destabilizzare il governo nazionale. Durante la campagna elettorale per le elezioni dei consigli provinciali, il presidente Rajapaksa ha infatti colto l’occasione per screditare l’opposizione interna, asserendo che la diaspora tamil stesse premendo sulla comunità internazionale al fine di rovesciare il governo, con l’appoggio dei partiti d’opposizione nazionali.[7] In una certa misura, tale tesi trovava effettivamente riscontro nella realtà. L’onnipotenza del presidente Rajapaksa e del suo gabinetto ha reso pressoché impossibile per i partiti d’opposizione competere per il potere o, quanto meno, influenzare le decisioni dei vertici politici. L’appoggio della comunità internazionale, di conseguenza, è risultato un utile mezzo nelle mani delle opposizioni per cercare di controbilanciare il potere di Rajapaksa.

Se l’efficacia della risoluzione adottata dall’UNHRC sul processo di riconciliazione nazionale dello Sri Lanka rimane incerta, ciò che invece appare chiaro è il fatto che il governo singalese non è disposto ad impegnarsi seriamente verso questo obiettivo. Il paese è infatti rimasto spaccato in due, dal punto di vista sia geografico che etnico. La conclusione del conflitto civile ha visto emergere il trionfalismo del gruppo di maggioranza sinhala, prevalente nell’area centro-meridionale dell’isola, mentre tra la popolazione tamil, residente principalmente nella zona nord-orientale, è prevalso un sentimento di sconfitta e di impotenza. Il risultato di questa spaccatura è stato il consolidamento di due visioni contrapposte e ostili della realtà politica dell’isola: la prima teme il ritorno di un nuovo imperialismo occidentale in Sri Lanka, tramite l’intervento dell’UNHRC; la seconda paventa invece una forma di neo-colonialismo sinhala a danno dell’etnia tamil.[8] Sta di fatto che il timore di ripercussioni economiche, quali un calo degli investimenti esteri e degli scambi commerciali, o addirittura l’imposizione di vere e proprie sanzioni finanziarie, potrebbe indurre il governo a cambiare le proprie posizioni sulla questione dei crimini commessi durante la guerra civile. Un primo segnale in tal senso è pervenuto il 19 agosto 2014, quando il presidente ha annunciato la nomina di due personalità internazionali a consiglieri della Presidential Commission Investigating Cases of Missing Persons, ossia la commissione istituita da Rajapaksa nell’agosto dell’anno precedente per indagare sui circa 20.000 casi di uomini e donne scomparsi durante la guerra. I due consiglieri, l’attivista indiano Avdhash Kaushal e il giurista pachistano Ahmer B. Soofi, si sono uniti ad altri tre esperti – due inglesi e un americano –, completando il comitato consultivo deputato ad assistere la commissione presidenziale. La mossa del presidente Rajapaksa, giunta a circa due mesi di distanza dalla designazione dei membri della commissione investigativa dell’UNHRC, è quindi parsa una reazione diretta alla pressione esercitata dalla comunità internazionale. Inoltre, nel luglio dello stesso anno, il mandato della commissione presidenziale è stato ampliato, venendo a comprendere anche la possibilità di indagare sui crimini compiuti durante la guerra civile.[9] Se questi sviluppi sono certamente apparsi incoraggianti, occorre comunque del tempo per appurarne l’effettiva portata. Il fatto che la commissione non abbia carattere indipendente, bensì faccia capo al presidente Rajapaksa, ha lascito molti dubbi sulla sua concreta efficacia, soprattutto se si tiene conto degli scarsi risultati ottenuti dalla precedente commissione filo-governativa deputata ad investigare sui crimini di guerra: la Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission.

3. 3. L’allarme suscitato dalla presunta riorganizzazione delle Tigri Tamil

Nello stesso periodo in cui, presso l’UNHRC, si dibatteva il caso riguardante lo Sri Lanka, nell’isola asiatica si è assistito ad un crescente allarmismo, causato dalla presunta riorganizzazione delle LTTE. L’ipotesi secondo cui le Tigri Tamil stessero pianificando una ripresa delle attività sovversive ha preso forma il 13 marzo 2014, quando nel distretto di Kilinochchi si è verificata una sparatoria tra la polizia e un uomo identificato come l’ex guerrigliero tamil Ponniah Selvanayagam Kajeepa, alias Gobi. Il conflitto a fuoco si è concluso con il ferimento di un poliziotto appartenente alla Terrorism Investigation Division. L’avvenimento, che è parso confermare i precedenti timori delle forze dell’ordine riguardo ad un eventuale riorganizzazione delle Tigri Tamil, ha provocato una decisa reazione da parte delle autorità singalesi, le quali hanno mobilitato massicci contingenti militari e di polizia per catturare il sospetto.[10] La provincia Settentrionale, già fortemente militarizzata, ha così visto sul proprio territorio un ulteriore dispiegamento delle forze armate. Grazie ad un’operazione militare che pare abbia coinvolto centinaia di soldati, l’11 aprile l’esercito è riuscito a scovare il presunto terrorista. L’intervento delle forze armate si è concluso con l’uccisione di Gopi e di altri due uomini, identificati anch’essi come ex combattenti delle LTTE, ossia Sundaralingam Kajeepan, alias Thevihane, e Navaratnam Navaneethan, alias Appan. L’episodio ha rappresentato il primo conflitto a fuoco tra esercito e ribelli tamil dalla conclusione della guerra civile. Secondo il ministero della Difesa, Gopi sarebbe stato il promotore di un movimento, con base nell’area di Pallai, nella penisola di Jaffna, mirato a fare risorgere le LTTE con la complicità di alcuni gruppi della diaspora tamil. Il gruppo di sediziosi locali sarebbe infatti stato guidato da due leader delle LTTE basati in Europa.[11]

L’inasprimento delle misure di sicurezza messo in atto dal governo singalese ha condotto le forze dell’ordine ad effettuare una serie di arresti, invero abusando del draconiano Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA). Nel corso del 2014, infatti, sono stati oltre 80 gli arresti effettuati sotto la giurisdizione della legge anti terrorismo, a partire da quello di Balendra Jeyakumari e della figlia tredicenne Vidushika, accusate di avere dato riparo a Gobi.[12] L’arresto delle due donne non ha mancato di suscitare proteste, dal momento che Balendra e Vidushika Jeyakumari erano soprattutto note per il loro impegno civile, rivolto a fare luce sui casi di scomparsa avvenuti durante il conflitto. Pochi giorni dopo il fermo di Balendra Jeyakumari e della figlia, la polizia ha proceduto ad arrestare altri due sospetti, ossia un attivista per i diritti civili, Ruki Fernando, e il prete cattolico Padre Praveen. Questi ultimi però sono stati rilasciati in breve tempo, in seguito alla pressione esercitata dai gruppi internazionali di tutela dei diritti umani.[13] Le severe misure di sicurezza adottate dal regime Rajapaksa per sventare un’eventuale riorganizzazione delle LTTE hanno incluso anche la messa al bando di 16 organizzazioni e di 424 membri della diaspora tamil. Questi ultimi sono stati classificati come sostenitori del terrorismo dal governo singalese, il quale, di conseguenza, ha proceduto al congelamento dei loro beni. Tale provvedimento era d’altronde conforme alla risoluzione 1373 delle Nazioni Unite in materia di terrorismo internazionale, il cui contenuto impone ai governi nazionali di congelare i beni di «coloro che commettono o tentano di commettere atti terroristici».[14]

L’allarme scaturito dall’ipotetica rinascita delle Tigri Tamil è emerso con una tempistica quanto meno sospetta. La questione si è infatti presentata proprio a ridosso del dibattito dell’UNHRC sullo Sri Lanka, il quale si trovava sotto osservazione non solo a causa dei crimini di guerra rimasti impuniti, ma anche per il clima repressivo e la costante violazione dei diritti umani di cui si era responsabile il governo dell’isola. Il pericolo rappresentato da un’eventuale riorganizzazione delle LTTE contribuiva infatti, da un lato, a legittimare l’atteggiamento oppressivo dell’amministrazione singalese e, dall’altro, a fornire un valido pretesto per intensificare l’utilizzo di misure repressive. Nel primo caso, le esigenze di sicurezza nazionale hanno fornito al regime Rajapaksa una giustificazione non soltanto per posticipare ulteriormente l’attesa riduzione delle truppe stanziate nell’area nord-orientale dell’isola, ma persino per incrementare la presenza dell’esercito nella regione. Nel secondo caso, i provvedimenti adottati dalle autorità per fare fronte alla supposta minaccia derivante dalla ricostituzione delle Tigri Tamil hanno contribuito a compromettere maggiormente la già fragile situazione della democrazia singalese. A destare particolare allarme, oltre allo spregiudicato utilizzo del PTA, erano soprattutto le possibili conseguenze della messa al bando, come terroristi, dei sopra citati membri della diaspora tamil. Tra le organizzazioni classificate come «terroriste» si trovavano, tra le altre, il British Tamil Forum, il Canadian Tamil Congress, il Global Tamil Forum e l’Australian Tamil Congress, ossia gruppi che, nei rispettivi paesi di adozione, non solo erano legalmente registrati, ma godevano anche di fiducia e prestigio. Se fino al 2009 larga parte delle organizzazioni della diaspora tamil avevano effettivamente sostenuto in modo attivo le LTTE, dopo la conclusione del conflitto civile il loro impegno si era principalmente rivolto alle questioni concernenti i crimini di guerra e la violazione dei diritti umani nello Sri Lanka, tramite la raccolta di testimonianze e la segnalazione di abusi. Le misure repressive adottate dal governo Rajapaksa contro i membri di tali organizzazioni non apparivano giustificate da nessuna evidenza concreta. In effetti, esse parevano principalmente mirate da un lato a colpire e a isolare gli attivisti e i politici tamil locali che avevano legami internazionali e, dall’altro, a screditare la diaspora tamil internazionale, il cui ruolo nel promuovere l’intervento dell’UNHRC nello Sri Lanka non era stato marginale.[15] Più, quindi, che da motivi concernenti la sicurezza nazionale, il provvedimento a cui l’amministrazione singalese era ricorso è apparso soprattutto finalizzato a indebolire la componente tamil locale.

In definitiva, si può affermare che il potenziale rischio di una ripresa del terrorismo tamil è stato certamente sfruttato dall’amministrazione Rajapaksa per consolidare un regime in cui, al declino delle istituzioni democratiche, si accompagnava una crescente militarizzazione dell’apparato statale. La risposta del governo singalese è infatti parsa come il corollario di un percorso, in atto sino dalla conclusione della guerra civile, caratterizzato dal soffocamento del dissenso e dal trionfalismo sinhala. Tali considerazioni hanno portato alcuni osservatori persino a dubitare della veridicità delle informazioni riguardanti la riorganizzazione delle Tigri Tamil, la cui rinascita sarebbe giunta in modo talmente puntuale e opportuno, per il regime Rajapaksa, da risultare sospetta. Questa teoria, secondo cui sarebbe stato il governo stesso ad orchestrare l’intera vicenda, trarrebbe origine dal fatto che le autorità singalesi, ossia l’unica fonte di informazioni sulla presunta rinascita delle Tigri Tamil, non abbiano diffuso nessuna prova volta a dimostrare che gli uomini uccisi dall’esercito fossero effettivamente reduci delle LTTE, determinati a risvegliare il movimento ribelle.[16] Se una simile congettura appare invero azzardata, è però certo che il governo dello Sri Lanka abbia tratto vantaggio dalle circostanze per perseguire i propri obiettivi, avvalendosi di contro-misure sproporzionate rispetto al rischio reale. Infatti, la probabilità che un tentativo di ripristino della defunta organizzazione tamil possa avere successo è alquanto remota, considerato il ramificato controllo che le forze armate esercitano non solo nell’area nord-orientale, dove esso è maggiormente invasivo, ma anche in vasti comparti dell’amministrazione statale nazionale. Il regime Rajapaksa ha certamente strumentalizzato ed enfatizzato il rischio di un ritorno del terrorismo tamil per giustificare, agli occhi della comunità internazionale, la rampante militarizzazione dello stato singalese e la costante repressione del dissenso interno, fenomeni che sono andati acuendosi in seguito al configurarsi di tale minaccia alla sicurezza nazionale.

4. La crescente militarizzazione dell’apparato statale e gli sfollamenti forzati della popolazione

Come precedentemente osservato, a partire dal 2009, nello Sri Lanka si è assistito ad un fenomeno che può essere definito come paradossale, ossia la costante militarizzazione delle istituzioni statali nella fase del dopo guerra. Sebbene tale fenomeno non risulti evidente, prendendo in considerazione i mutamenti annuali del principale indicatore del livello di militarizzazione di un paese, ossia la percentuale di spesa pubblica per la Difesa rispetto al PIL, che risulta lievemente diminuita rispetto al 2009, un’analisi più dettagliata è in grado di convalidare l’ipotesi sopra esposta. Infatti, se in termini relativi la spesa militare è passata dal 3,6% del PIL del 2009 al 2,6% del 2012, in termini assoluti essa è considerevolmente aumentata. Nel 2009 la somma destinata alla Difesa è infatti stata di 175 miliardi di rupie,[17] mentre nel 2013 questa è cresciuta a 253 miliardi, aumentando in questo caso anche in termini relativi rispetto all’anno precedente (dal 2,6% del PIL del 2012 al 2,7%).[18]

Il processo di militarizzazione dello Sri Lanka si è poi declinato attraverso forme che sarebbero difficilmente decifrabili tramite un’esclusiva analisi dei dati macro economici. Esso, infatti, è stato caratterizzato, in primo luogo, dalla logica dell’occupazione e dell’umiliazione della parte sconfitta, che ha trovato espressione attraverso il mantenimento del controllo, da parte dell’esercito, dell’area nord-orientale del paese.[19] Vale la pena di descrivere un episodio esemplare, proprio di tale dinamica, verificatosi durante il maggio 2014, quando nella città meridionale di Matara ha avuto luogo «la parata della Vittoria». La manifestazione, che aveva lo scopo di commemorare il quinto anniversario della vittoriosa conclusione del conflitto, ha inevitabilmente destato alcune controversie, dal momento che una simile celebrazione, lungi dal promuovere la riconciliazione nazionale, ribadiva il trionfo dell’etnia sinhala su quella tamil. Inoltre, se si considera che, contemporaneamente, la polizia e l’esercito hanno impedito lo svolgimento di una commemorazione ufficiale dei caduti tamil, che avrebbe dovuto svolgersi nella provincia Settentrionale, risulta chiaro come la narrazione prevalente tendesse non a superare ma a cristallizzare le divisioni proprie del periodo di guerra civile.[20]

La militarizzazione dell’apparato statale non è tuttavia rimasta circoscritta alle sole zone del nord-est. Nel corso del 2014 è infatti divenuto chiaro come tale fenomeno riguardasse in realtà l’intero paese, manifestandosi con prepotenza nella stessa capitale, Colombo, e nelle città meridionali dello Sri Lanka, dove è stato realizzato un programma di sviluppo urbano gestito dall’omonimo ministero. Quest’ultimo, assieme al Land Reclamation and Development Board (LRD), è stato posto, dopo la fine della guerra, sotto l’autorità del ministero della Difesa, capeggiato dallo stesso presidente, in qualità di ministro, che lo gestisce attraverso il fratello, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, che ha la carica di segretario del ministro.

A partire dal 2010, i progetti di sviluppo e di miglioramento di alcuni quartieri degradati di Colombo hanno condotto il ministero della Difesa e dello Sviluppo Urbano a dare il via ad una serie di sfollamenti coatti destinati a coinvolgere tra i 70.000 e i 135.000 nuclei famigliari. Gli abitanti di aree quali Slave Island, Narahenpita, Barnes, Borella, Bauddhaloka Mawatha, Wanathamulla e Maligawatta sono quindi stati forzati ad abbandonare le loro proprietà affinché venissero demolite , per permettere l’edificazione di nuove infrastrutture. Il piano di sviluppo, la cui realizzazione si è intensificata durante il 2014, avrebbe dovuto portare alla demolizione delle aree fatiscenti della città e alla successiva costruzione di attività commerciali e abitazioni di lusso, trasformando in tal modo Colombo nel «fulcro commerciale dell’Asia meridionale».[21] Tuttavia, l’esecuzione del progetto è stata caratterizzata dallo scarso riguardo per le normative vigenti, dal momento che il Land Acquisition Act (LAA), che regola l’acquisizione di proprietà private da parte dello stato, prevede questa possibilità solamente nel caso si persegua uno scopo di pubblico interesse.[22] Nonostante l’ampia gamma di usi previsti da tale legge, il fatto che l’LAA sia stato impiegato per favorire il capitale privato, in particolare attraverso la realizzazione di hotel, di ristoranti e di campi da golf, ha naturalmente destato numerose proteste da parte di giuristi e attivisti singalesi.[23] Se infatti il piano di sviluppo urbano, sostenuto dalla Banca Mondiale, è certamente destinato ad attrarre gli investitori stranieri e a promuovere il turismo, creando nuove risorse economiche per il paese, gli enormi costi umani e sociali di tale operazione ne hanno però inevitabilmente offuscato il successo. A creare ulteriori perplessità circa i vantaggi di una simile operazione per la popolazione nel suo complesso, si è poi aggiunta la questione riguardante i vasti incentivi fiscali che sono stati concessi ad alcune delle compagnie decise a investire il proprio capitale nel progetto di sviluppo urbano promosso dai fratelli Rajapaksa.[24]

Inoltre, sebbene esistesse un piano di ricollocamento della popolazione evacuata, ovvero il National Involuntary Resettlement Policy, l’esecuzione degli sfollamenti è stata contrassegnata dallo scarso preavviso con cui le notifiche di sfratto sono state date e dalla vaghezza dei termini di compensazione. Soprattutto, però, il piano portato avanti dall’UDA, nonché dal ministero della Difesa, ha messo in luce l’elevato livello di militarizzazione e di centralizzazione raggiunto dell’amministrazione pubblica. L’intero processo di sfollamento della popolazione è stato affidato all’esercito, che ha svolto il proprio compito impiegando diffusamente intimidazioni e maltrattamenti. Neppure l’intervento della National Human Rights Commission, che nel marzo del 2014 aveva emesso un’ordinanza per bloccare gli sfratti dei residenti di Wanathamulla, è riuscito ad impedire il proseguimento delle operazioni da parte delle forze armate.[25] D’altronde, l’alto grado di impunità che è stato concesso dalle autorità singalesi ai membri dell’esercito e della polizia ha certamente avuto un ruolo decisivo nel processo di militarizzazione in atto nello Sri Lanka. É oltretutto risultato evidente che le operazioni di sfollamento attuate delle forze armate nella città di Colombo abbiano presentato dinamiche e dimensioni molto simili a quelle condotte negli ultimi due anni del conflitto civile nelle aree del settentrione e dell’oriente dell’isola, ovvero le zone che sono state il principale teatro degli scontri bellici.[26] L’intero processo di recupero delle aree urbane degradate è dopo tutto avanzato su un percorso assai differente da quello democratico, tanto che i cittadini e i rappresentanti politici dell’opposizione non hanno avuto alcuna voce in capitolo.

Il fenomeno degli sfollamenti da parte delle forze armate rappresenta in realtà soltanto un aspetto dell’ampio processo di militarizzazione che ha condotto i membri dell’esercito a ricoprire funzioni più estese di quelle che normalmente, in tempo di pace, competono loro. Non più confinati ad incarichi di sicurezza nazionale, i militari hanno assunto la funzione di veri e propri stake holders nella gestione della res publica, giungendo a ricoprire importanti incarichi all’interno dell’amministrazione statale e del corpo diplomatico. I membri delle forze armate hanno quindi assunto un ruolo sempre più rilevante sia tramite la gestione di attività economiche statali, sia avviando con successo iniziative imprenditoriali private nel settore del commercio e dei servizi.[27] La dimostrazione più lampante di questa tendenza è rappresentata dalla Rakna Arakshaka Lanka (RAL), ovvero una compagnia a carattere paramilitare di proprietà governativa. La RAL, che è sotto l’esclusivo controllo del ministero della Difesa, è un’impresa commerciale che fornisce ad enti sia pubblici che privati un’ampia gamma di servizi, che comprendono il settore della sicurezza militare (incluso il ramo dello spionaggio) e civile (ad esempio all’interno delle università), quello della formazione e del welfare e persino il comparto della ristorazione. La compagnia, il cui personale è costituito prevalentemente da ex personale dell’esercito, non risponde alle norme che generalmente regolano l’attività imprenditoriale pubblica o privata, godendo così di ampi privilegi.

L’infiltrazione degli spazi civili da parte dei militari è stata favorita da due circostanze: la prima è costituita dalla glorificazione dell’esercito, avvenuta in seguito alla conclusione della guerra. Tale meccanismo ha condotto i membri delle forze armate ad acquisire un vasto potere all’interno della società civile e, conseguentemente, a beneficiare di un ampio numero di programmi di benessere sociale a loro riservati, finanziati dalle donazioni di cittadini e di enti privati. Parallelamente, si è assistito all’introduzione della disciplina e dei valori militari nella vita civile, come, ad esempio, l’organizzazione di corsi di addestramento militare all’interno delle università. In secondo luogo, il processo di militarizzazione degli spazi civili è stato agevolato da istituzioni democraticamente elette, ovvero dal presidente e dal parlamento.

L’esercito, dal canto suo, ha avuto un ruolo funzionale rispetto al fenomeno di centralizzazione e di accrescimento dei poteri presidenziali, permettendo a Mahinda Rajapaksa, che è anche comandante in capo delle forze armate, nonché ai membri della sua famiglia, di dare vita ad un sistema di governo che appare sempre più simile ad un’oligarchia. Il regime Rajapaksa ha quindi favorito e sostenuto la militarizzazione dell’apparato statale, che ha a sua volta consentito l’instaurazione di un controllo assoluto sulla popolazione civile in periodo di pace.[28]  Tale controllo sulla società, che ha permesso al regime singalese di limitare fortemente la libertà di espressione dei cittadini, ha assunto col tempo connotati sempre più autoritari e opprimenti. Tra le numerose misure repressive adottate dal governo durante l’amministrazione Rajapaksa, si è distinta, nel corso del 2014, quella riguardante la regolamentazione delle Organizzazioni Non Governative (ONG). Tramite una circolare del 1° luglio 2014, il segretariato nazionale per le ONG, che opera anch’esso sotto la giurisdizione del ministero della Difesa, ha infatti stabilito alcune nuove regole finalizzate a proibire alle suddette organizzazioni una serie di attività, fra cui lo svolgimento di conferenze stampa, di workshop e seminari per giornalisti, nonché la divulgazione di comunicati stampa.[29] Questo provvedimento era ufficialmente motivato da cavilli giuridici, ovvero dal fatto che le attività sopra elencate non fossero previste dalla legge che regola il mandato delle ONG. Invero, nell’aderire meticolosamente alla legge ordinaria, il governo Rajapaksa stava agendo in spregio della stessa costituzione dello Sri Lanka, che garantisce a ogni cittadino i diritti fondamentali di espressione e di assemblea.[30] È infatti verosimile ipotizzare che le proibizioni imposte alle ONG mirassero principalmente a soffocare il dissenso e rappresentassero l’ennesimo passo intrapreso dal governo singalese sulla strada dell’autoritarismo, resa percorribile proprio grazie alla crescente militarizzazione delle istituzioni statali e sociali.

5. Le elezioni provinciali

Il 29 marzo 2014, l’elettorato delle province dell’Ovest e del Sud, popolate prevalentemente dall’etnia sinhala, è stato chiamato al voto per il rinnovo dei rispettivi Provincial Councils. La decisione di indire tali elezioni avrebbe dovuto offrire al presidente l’occasione, da un lato, di verificare la robustezza della propria popolarità in quelle aree dove essa era maggiormente radicata, dall’altro, di lanciare un messaggio alla comunità internazionale circa la determinazione del popolo singalese a non «tollerare interferenze straniere», con riferimento all’inchiesta avviata dall’UNHRC.[31]

L’esito delle elezioni non è stato lusinghiero come probabilmente avevano auspicato Rajapaksa e la sua coalizione di governo, ovvero l’UPFA, che detiene il potere in otto delle nove province del paese.[32] Sebbene l’UPFA sia emersa come forza egemone, l’affluenza alle urne è stata scarsa e il risultato del voto ha evidenziato un calo di consensi per l’alleanza guidata dal presidente. Quest’ultima, infatti, ha conquistato 33 seggi su 55 nella provincia Meridionale, ossia cinque in meno rispetto alle elezioni del 2009, e 56 su 104 nella provincia Occidentale, perdendo così 12 seggi rispetto al 2009.[33] Il risultato più rappresentativo concerne però il distretto di Hambantota, luogo di origine del presidente Rajapaksa, nonché destinazione privilegiata degli investimenti governativi, dove l’UPFA ha visto decrescere la propria percentuale di voto dal 67% delle precedenti elezioni provinciali, al 57,4%.[34]

Tali risultati non potevano certamente essere interpretati come un drammatico mutamento del comportamento elettorale, avendo permesso all’UPFA di riaffermarsi come principale entità politica nelle due province in questione. D’altro canto, è stato comunque possibile riscontrare l’emergere di una nuova tendenza di voto, che ha visto l’alleanza partitica guidata dal presidente singalese perdere voti in favore, non tanto del principale partito d’opposizione, lo United National Party (UNP), quanto piuttosto di una terza formazione politica, ovvero il Democratic Party, guidato dall’ex generale delle forze armate Sarath Fonseka. Quest’ultimo ha avuto un ruolo decisivo nella vittoriosa conclusione della guerra civile, conducendo l’esercito singalese, prima del suo arrivo virtualmente allo sbando, alla schiacciante vittoria sulle Tigri Tamil. Una volta cessate le ostilità, Fonseka, lasciato l’esercito, aveva debuttato nell’arena politica, concorrendo alle elezioni presidenziali del 2010 come principale avversario di Rajapaksa. Sebbene Fonseka fosse stato sconfitto dal presidente in carica, il suo vasto potenziale elettorale era risultato evidente. La carriera politica dell’ex generale aveva però subito una repentina interruzione quando, l’8 febbraio 2010, era stato arrestato con la motivazione, invero pretestuosa, di avere architettato un colpo di stato militare ai danni del governo.[35] Sottoposto al giudizio di una corte marziale, Fonseka era stato riconosciuto colpevole e condannato a scontare tre anni di carcere. La sua detenzione, tuttavia, si era conclusa in anticipo, quando, il 21 maggio del 2012, era stato rilasciato in seguito alla concessione della grazia da parte del presidente. È probabile che tale iniziativa fosse stata provocata dalla reazione della comunità internazionale di fronte all’incarcerazione di Fonseka, interpretata come l’ennesimo abuso di potere messo in atto dall’amministrazione Rajapaksa. Il fatto che la grazia presidenziale fosse giunta il 18 maggio 2012, poche ore prima dell’incontro a Washington tra il ministro degli Esteri dello Sri Lanka, G. L. Peiris, e il segretario di stato statunitense, Hillary Clinton, non è quindi apparso come una coincidenza.[36] Quali che siano stati i motivi che hanno spinto il presidente a concedere la grazia, tale decisione ha permesso a Fonseka di presentarsi alle elezioni. Il risultato è stato che il suo partito, il Democratic Party, ha ottenuto l’8% dei voti nella Western Province, diventando la terza forza politica dell’area, mentre nella Southern Province ha guadagnato oltre il 6% dei consensi.[37]

Sebbene siano sorte delle controversie riguardo al diritto di voto attivo e passivo di Fonseka, avendo quest’ultimo subìto delle condanne penali che ne impedirebbero l’esercizio, la Commissione Elettorale singalese ha stabilito che, almeno fino a quando non venga presentata un’obiezione in tribunale, non intraprenderà nessuna azione per invalidare i diritti civili dell’ex generale. In realtà, benché la costituzione singalese neghi per sette anni il diritto di voto a coloro che hanno scontato un periodo detentivo di almeno sei mesi, in caso di ottenimento della grazia presidenziale tale limitazione verrebbe a decadere.[38] Il ritorno di Fonseka sulla scena politica ha di conseguenza fatto sorgere alcune aspettative circa la possibilità di una sua candidatura alle prossime elezioni presidenziali. Tuttavia, il risultato delle elezioni provinciali svoltesi in settembre nella provincia di Uva, nel sud dell’isola, ha ridimensionato le speranze del Democratic Party, il quale è riuscito a superare l’1% dei consensi solamente nel distretto elettorale di Wellawaya. Ciò che ha accomunato il voto di marzo e quello di settembre è stato invece la riconferma dell’UPFA come forza politica di maggioranza. Anche nel caso della provincia di Uva, però, l’alleanza partitica guidata da Rajapaksa ha registrato un significativo calo della propria percentuale di voto, passata dall’81% delle elezioni del 2009 al 51%. Il principale beneficiario del calo di popolarità dell’UPFA è stato, in questa circostanza, il maggiore partito d’opposizione singalese, l’UNP, il quale, grazie al 40% dei consensi, ha pressoché raddoppiato il proprio numero di seggi, passando ad occuparne 13, rispetto ai sette conquistati nel 2009.[39] Il merito di tale notevole risultato è da attribuire non tanto al leader storico dell’UNP, Ranil Wickremesinghe, quanto piuttosto al giovane candidato Harin Fernando, il quale è riuscito a ottenere sorprendenti risultati, specialmente nel distretto elettorale di Badulla.

In definitiva, si può affermare che la frammentazione dei partiti di opposizione ha permesso all’UPFA di conservare il potere in tutte e tre le province in cui il voto ha avuto luogo. Inoltre, durante la campagna elettorale svoltasi nella provincia di Uva, la Commissione Elettorale e altri organismi di monitoraggio del voto hanno denunciato il perpetrarsi di numerosi abusi, quali intimidazioni ed atti di violenza, avvenuti nell’indifferenza delle forze dell’ordine.[40] Tali soprusi, compiuti principalmente a danno dei partiti di opposizione, erano il naturale riflesso di un apparato statale disfunzionale, le cui anomalie erano attribuibili alla graduale concentrazione di potere nelle mani del presidente.

6. Estremismo buddista e violenza settaria

Il nazionalismo buddista sinhala è un movimento politico radicale che affonda le sue radici negli ultimi anni del XIX secolo, basando la propria ideologia sulla presunta supremazia culturale del gruppo etnico maggioritario dello Sri Lanka. Entrato sulla scena politica singalese in seguito all’ottenimento dell’indipendenza, nel 1948, il nazionalismo buddista si è consolidato, acquisendo un carattere marcatamente ostile alle minoranze etniche del paese. Non vi è poi dubbio che tale ideologia abbia avuto un ruolo sia nello scoppio della guerra civile, sia nel suo sanguinoso svolgimento nell’arco di 26 anni. Il governo Rajapaksa è però stato il primo a sposare l’ideologia buddista sinhala.[41] A partire dalla fine della guerra, l’estremismo buddista ha gradualmente assunto una connotazione specificatamente anti musulmana, e in parte anche anti cristiana, acquisendo una crescente legittimità sia a livello politico che sociale. Nello Sri Lanka contemporaneo, l’ascesa del buddismo radicale è stata principalmente favorita dal gruppo militante Bodu Bala Sena (BBS, letteralmente, brigata del potere buddista), che, dal momento della sua creazione nel 2012, ha messo in atto una strategia mirata a promuovere tra la popolazione l’ostilità contro le minoranze religiose dell’isola.[42]  Attraverso una retorica che ritrae i membri della comunità musulmana come una minaccia per l’etnia di maggioranza, il BBS è stato il principale responsabile di una serie di attacchi ai danni della minoranza musulmana, rimasti per lo più impuniti. L’ostilità anti islamica, che a partire dal 2102 si era manifestata attraverso numerosi episodi di violenza, durante il 2014 ha acquistato intensità e dimensioni allarmanti, principalmente grazie all’atteggiamento conciliante dell’amministrazione Rajapaksa nei confronti del nazionalismo buddista. Il 15 giugno, nella città meridionale di Aluthgama e in altre aree circostanti, è infatti scoppiato un vero e proprio tumulto settario, che ha portato all’uccisione di due musulmani e un tamil e al ferimento di circa ottanta persone.[43] L’episodio ha rappresentato per lo Sri Lanka uno degli episodi di violenza religiosa più cruenti degli ultimi decenni.

Apparentemente, la violenza anti musulmana ad Aluthgama è stata sprigionata da un litigio automobilistico, avvenuto il 12 giugno, tra alcuni giovani musulmani e un monaco buddista accompagnato dal proprio autista. In seguito alla lite, il BBS ha infatti organizzato una serie di manifestazioni pubbliche in difesa del monaco, incitando all’odio religioso e alla violenza anti islamica gli abitanti delle aree di Beruwala, Dharga Town e Aluthgama, dove sono avvenuti i maggiori disordini. I tumulti che sono seguiti alle manifestazioni del BBS hanno visto folle di fanatici buddisti attaccare, derubare e incendiare abitazioni, attività commerciali e altre proprietà, per lo più appartenenti a musulmani, incluse alcune moschee, una scuola materna e una clinica medica. Nonostante il coprifuoco imposto dalla polizia in seguito ai primi episodi di violenza, i tumulti si sono protratti fino alla notte del 17 giugno, provocando lo sfollamento di circa 10.000 persone, soprattutto musulmani.[44] Nei giorni seguenti, nonostante l’intervento dell’esercito, la violenza non è comunque completamente cessata, dato il perdurare di focolai di tensione.

La durata e l’intensità degli attacchi hanno penosamente messo in luce l’incapacità del governo e della polizia di mantenere l’ordine pubblico. Sono occorse 72 ore, infatti, affinché le autorità si risolvessero a bloccare le manifestazioni del BBS, ponendo così fine ai disordini. Inoltre, stando alle testimonianze delle vittime, pare che le forze dell’ordine si siano dimostrate complici degli stessi assalitori, assistendo impassibilmente agli attacchi ed evitando di intervenire per frenare le sommosse.[45] Il governo Rajapaksa, dal canto suo, ha sollecitato i media nazionali a non pubblicare notizie relative ai tumulti di Aluthgama, giustificando tale richiesta col pretesto di non fomentare la disarmonia etnica. Nonostante l’imposizione della censura, che ha incluso il blocco dei siti web di alcuni quotidiani, alcuni giornalisti hanno ugualmente tentato di documentare gli attacchi, divenendo a loro volta vittime degli assalitori.[46]

Sebbene l’esplosione di violenza fosse inizialmente apparsa come un avvenimento spontaneo, in risposta al presunto sopruso verbale subìto da un monaco buddista, alcune circostanze parrebbero convalidare l’ipotesi secondo cui gli attacchi sarebbero invece il frutto di un piano organizzato. Innanzitutto, l’arsenale con cui gli assalitori erano equipaggiati, che comprendeva armi da fuoco, bombe molotov e bombole di gas, lascia pensare ad un certo livello di preparazione logistica. Allo stesso modo, molte delle zone colpite dalla violenza hanno assistito ad un’interruzione della fornitura di energia elettrica e alla disattivazione delle linee telefoniche. Infine, secondo quanto dichiarato da alcuni testimoni di etnia sinhala, gli assalitori non sarebbero stati residenti dell’area, bensì forestieri provenienti da altre zone, condotti nell’area di Aluthgama e di Beruwela con uno scopo preciso, ovvero fomentare la violenza settaria.[47]

Se tali indizi inducono a ipotizzare l’esistenza di una pianificazione alla base dell’ondata di violenza verificatasi in giugno, ad avvalorare la teoria dell’attacco premeditato vi sarebbe anche un altro fattore. Mangala Samaraweera, membro del partito d’opposizione UNP, ha infatti apertamente accusato il governo di coprire, attraverso la secretazione di alcuni documenti, tre ufficiali dei servizi segreti singalesi che avrebbero spalleggiato il BBS durante l’offensiva anti musulmana. Senza contraddire tali accuse, il portavoce dell’esercito, Ruwan Wanigasooriya, durante una conferenza stampa, ha significativamente affermato: «[…] qualche politico, grazie ai suoi privilegi parlamentari, sta tentando di rivelare dettagli segreti sui membri dell’intelligence nazionale».[48]Quindi, Wanigasooriya, non negando il coinvolgimento degli ufficiali dei servizi segreti, ha di fatto diffidato i membri del parlamento dal diffondere informazioni riservate, rafforzando in tal modo la teoria secondo cui l’intelligence nazionale sarebbe stata implicata nello sprigionamento della violenza settaria. Il segretario alla Difesa ha invece negato ogni coinvolgimento da parte del suo dicastero, anche se pare ormai accertato che il BBS goda di un qualche patrocinio all’interno dell’apparato statale, tanto che proprio Gotabhaya Rajapaksa sembra esserne il principale fautore.[49] L’ambiente favorevole in cui il BBS è riuscito fino ad ora ad operare, godendo di un elevato livello di impunità e di un’ampia disponibilità di mezzi, difficilmente avrebbe potuto crearsi se non con l’appoggio diretto delle istituzioni statali. Ne è prova non soltanto il fatto che il leader del BBS, il monaco Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara, abbia potuto condurre indisturbato la serie di manifestazioni pubbliche all’origine dell’ondata di violenza anti musulmana, ma anche che tra le 135 persone arrestate in seguito agli attacchi, Gnanasara non fosse tra queste. Inoltre, i 13 attivisti del BBS arrestati dalla polizia per avere istigato e fomentato gli attacchi sono stati prontamente rilasciati in seguito alla minaccia di Gnanasara di autoimmolarsi nel caso in cui i membri del suo gruppo fossero stati ulteriormente trattenuti.[50]

L’ipotesi, assai verosimile, secondo cui certe sezioni dell’amministrazione statale avrebbero favorito l’ascesa dell’estremismo buddista sul panorama nazionale, vede alla base di questa dinamica un interesse principalmente di tipo elettorale. Se infatti l’elettorato tende generalmente a scegliere i propri rappresentanti rispondendo all’evocazione dei simboli emotivamente più potenti, l’utilizzo di politiche identitarie, volte a mobilitare la popolazione su linee religiose, può risultare una tattica vincente da un punto di vista elettorale.[51] Il calo di popolarità subito dalla coalizione al potere in occasione delle elezioni provinciali avrebbe infatti potuto essere compensato dalla messa in atto di una strategia indirizzata alla creazione di un nuovo nemico interno. Tale tattica era infatti potenzialmente in grado di compattare la piattaforma elettorale sinhala su basi esclusivamente etniche, marginalizzando di conseguenza altri fattori generalmente influenti sulla scelta del voto.[52] Considerate le circostanze, che vedono, da un lato, il presidente Rajapaksa ansioso di mantenere solida la propria base elettorale, e, dall’altro, una popolazione sempre meno entusiasta della coalizione al potere, è quanto meno probabile che l’amministrazione singalese abbia dimostrato una certa tolleranza verso l’estremismo buddista nella speranza di potere raccogliere in blocco il voto della popolazione sinhala.

7. 7. L’annuncio di elezioni anticipate e la comparsa di fratture nella coalizione di governo

La teoria sopraesposta appare tanto più verosimile se si considera come l’ansia del governo Rajapaksa, riguardo ad un possibile declino elettorale, fosse emersa in modo esplicito attraverso la decisione di anticipare di circa due anni la data delle elezioni presidenziali. Queste ultime, che avrebbero dovuto avere luogo alla fine del 2016, sono state spostate dal presidente al gennaio 2015, allo scopo dichiarato di potere ottenere un terzo mandato.[53] A causa di una vera e propria anomalia costituzionale, nello Sri Lanka è infatti possibile indire elezioni anticipate in presenza di un governo ancora in carica, come già accaduto in occasione delle ultime elezioni presidenziali.[54] Inoltre, grazie alla promulgazione del discusso 18° emendamento, avvenuta nel 2010, il limite di due mandati presidenziali è stato abolito, permettendo così a Rajapaksa di essere il primo presidente della storia dello Sri Lanka a ricandidarsi per la terza volta di fila. Se, date le circostanze, l’annuncio di elezioni anticipate pareva avere automaticamente determinato l’esito della futura competizione elettorale, a ovvio vantaggio del presidente, l’apertura di inaspettate crepe nella coalizione di governo ha letteralmente scompaginato le carte in gioco. Per la prima volta dal 2005, ovvero da quando Rajapaksa è in carica, la solidità del governo dell’UPFA è stata scossa da una serie di defezioni, che hanno aperto la strada a possibili nuovi scenari politici, prima inimmaginabili. Innanzitutto, il 18 novembre 2014, il partito Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), di orientamento nazionalista sinhala, è uscito dalla coalizione di governo; parallelamente, Patali Champika Ranawaka, membro del JHU, ha rassegnato le sue dimissioni da ministro della Tecnologia e della Ricerca. Tuttavia, la fuoriuscita del JHU dall’UPFA non è stata esclusivamente dettata da un aperto contrasto con il governo in carica, quanto da calcoli strategici finalizzati a mantenere aperte tutte le possibili alternative, in vista delle prossime elezioni presidenziali.[55] Se l’abbandono del JHU ha costituito un avvenimento rilevante, ma non in grado di minare la stabilità e le prospettive future del governo Rajapaksa, la defezione del ministro della Salute, Maithripala Sirisena, avvenuta il 21 novembre, è invece risultata un’azione gravida di conseguenze. L’ex ministro, passato all’UNP, era infatti uno dei membri di maggiore spicco del governo, nonché il segretario generale dello Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), ovvero il principale partito all’interno dell’UPFA, a cui apparteneva lo stesso Rajapaksa. La sua diserzione dall’SLFP era invero motivata dalla inaspettata decisione di presentarsi, come candidato comune dell’opposizione, alle imminenti elezioni presidenziali. Il passo compiuto da Sirisena ha immediatamente trovato un ampio e trasversale appoggio, che comprendeva quello, politicamente cruciale, dell’ex presidentessa dello Sri Lanka, Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, probabilmente la vera artefice dell’iniziativa. Kumaratunga, dopo la cessazione del suo mandato presidenziale nel 2005, aveva iniziato a collaborare con la statunitense Clinton Foundation, intrattenendo stretti rapporti con le diplomazie occidentali, per lo più maldisposte nei confronti dell’amministrazione Rajapaksa. Nelle settimane che hanno preceduto le dimissioni di Sirisena, l’ex presidentessa pare quindi essersi prodigata, in patria e all’estero, nel tentativo di creare un fronte comune, credibilmente sostenuto da Stati Uniti, Europa e India, in grado di sfidare Rajapaksa e il suo governo.[56] Sulla candidatura alla presidenza dell’ex ministro della Salute è poi confluito il favore sia del Democratic Front di Fonseka, sia del JHU. Le dimissioni di Sirisena hanno inoltre aperto un vero e proprio varco nell’SLFP, portando alla fuoriuscita di altri cinque parlamentari, tra cui il ministro della Pesca, Rajitha Senaratne, tutti confluiti nell’UNP.[57]

Le motivazioni che hanno spinto Sirisena ad abbandonare il gabinetto Rajapaksa e a candidarsi nei ranghi dell’opposizione sono da ricondurre ad una profonda insoddisfazione nei confronti della leadership autoritaria e nepotistica del presidente. L’ex ministro ha infatti dichiarato che: «Il paese è governato da una malcelata dittatura, in cui i membri di una sola famiglia gestiscono l’amministrazione e l’economia», prospettando quindi l’intenzione di abolire il 18° emendamento, nel caso fosse eletto presidente.[58] Inoltre, è ragionevole ritenere che il fronte politico formatosi a sostegno di Sirisena mirasse anche a ridefinire la politica estera del paese, riavvicinandolo agli Stati Uniti e all’Europa ed evitando così eventuali ripercussioni economiche derivanti da un deterioramento dei rapporti con i due grandi partner commerciali dell’isola.

Questi avvenimenti, tuttavia, non si sono risolti in un’immediata crisi di governo: l’UPFA ha infatti continuato a godere di una solida maggioranza, come ha dimostrato la votazione per l’approvazione della legge finanziaria 2015, avvenuta in parlamento il 24 novembre, con il favore di 152 deputati su 225. In quell’occasione, può avere giocato a favore del governo il fatto che Rajapaksa abbia più o meno velatamente minacciato i parlamentari recalcitranti dell’UPFA, avvisandoli di essere in possesso di documenti compromettenti sul loro conto.[59] Ciò nondimeno la defezione di Sirisena ha lanciato quella che si può definire come la prima seria sfida al governo dell’UPFA, da quando la coalizione amministra la nazione. Il presidente Rajapaksa si è infatti trovato di fronte ad una duplice minaccia: da un lato, l’erosione dei consensi registratasi alle urne, in occasione delle elezioni provinciali di marzo e di settembre; dall’altro l’emergere di un’opposizione interna al suo stesso partito e il prospettarsi di un duro confronto per il mantenimento della carica presidenziale. Sirisena potrebbe infatti essere l’unico candidato in grado di contendere a Rajapaksa i voti della popolazione rurale sinhala, che ha fino ad ora costituito il nocciolo duro della sua ampia base elettorale. Soprattutto, Sirisena ha saputo dare una soluzione ai problemi che, durante gli anni del governo Rajapaksa, avevano reso debole e frammentata l’opposizione. La candidatura di Sirisena è infatti riuscita a compattare i partiti d’opposizione attorno a una leadership solida e prestigiosa, rendendo verosimile l’eventualità di sottrarre a Rajapaksa l’opportunità di prolungare le sua presidenza per un terzo mandato.

8. Politica estera

In seguito alla conclusione del conflitto civile, lo Sri Lanka è gradualmente entrato nell’orbita cinese, consolidando le proprie relazioni con Pechino dal punto di vista sia economico che politico. L’amministrazione Rajapaksa ha infatti dimostrato il proprio sostegno alla Cina, appoggiando pienamente la strategia perseguita da Pechino di promozione della cosiddetta «nuova via marittima della seta», mirata a consolidare la presenza del gigante asiatico sull’Oceano Indiano. Grazie ai notevoli investimenti cinesi nell’economia dell’isola, lo Sri Lanka ha a sua volta potuto beneficiare dell’amicizia con Pechino per rafforzare la propria posizione di fondamentale snodo marittimo e finanziario dell’Oceano Indiano. La Cina è infatti divenuta il principale investitore diretto, nonché il maggiore paese donatore, dello Sri Lanka, finanziando la realizzazione di imponenti progetti. Tra questi spiccano il porto e l’aeroporto internazionale di  Hambantota, la centrale energetica a carbone di Norochcholai, un nuovo terminal portuale a Colombo e la prima autostrada singalese a quattro corsie. Dal 2009, Pechino ha inoltre concesso allo Sri Lanka una serie di prestiti a lungo termine che, sebbene non siano vincolati ad alcuna regolamentazione, a differenza di quelli erogati dalle agenzie internazionali, vedono un tasso di interesse sul debito decisamente elevato rispetto a quello praticato da istituti di credito quali la Banca Mondiale o l’Asian Development Bank.[60]

Se l’economia dell’isola ha comunque beneficiato della prodigalità cinese, l’attiva collaborazione creatasi tra i due paesi è stata d’altro canto il riflesso di un’affinità tra le rispettive aspirazioni politiche. L’instaurazione di relazioni strategiche, attraverso la costruzione di infrastrutture marittime sulle coste dei paesi litorali dell’Oceano Indiano, ha infatti rappresentato per Pechino uno strumento per affermare i propri interessi commerciali e militari sull’area, entrando in tal modo in competizione con le aspirazioni indiane. L’alleanza stretta con lo Sri Lanka rientrava quindi all’interno di un più ampio disegno, noto come la strategia del «filo di perle», mirata ad imporre l’influenza cinese sulle acque che dalla Cina portano al Golfo Persico e al Mar Rosso.

L’amicizia tra Pechino e Colombo, notevolmente rafforzatasi nel corso del 2013 in seguito alla firma di un Accordo di Cooperazione Strategica (Strategic Cooperative Partnership), è stata sottolineata nel settembre dell’anno seguente dalla visita del presidente cinese Xi Jinping nello Sri Lanka. Questo viaggio ha rappresentato un evento molto significativo, essendo la prima volta, negli ultimi 28 anni, in cui un presidente cinese si è recato in visita nell’isola. L’incontro tra Xi Jinping e Mahinda Rajapaksa è stato di notevole importanza anche in virtù della firma di 27 accordi, i quali prevedevano una serie di ingenti investimenti cinesi in vari settori e l’attuazione di un piano di cooperazione strategica e militare.[61] Tra gli accordi economici più rilevanti, spiccava l’imponente progetto per la costruzione di un’isola artificiale di fronte a Colombo, che grazie ad un prestito cinese di 1,4 miliardi di dollari, potrà ospitare la costruzione di un nuovo porto destinato, sulla carta, a divenire uno degli scali più importanti della «nuova via marittima della seta». Durante la visita del presidente cinese, i due paesi hanno quindi deciso di avviare i negoziati che porteranno, entro il 2015, alla firma dell’Accordo di Libero Scambio (Free Trade Agreement). Quest’ultimo è destinato ad incrementare il volume di scambi commerciali tra i due stati, che già notevolmente cresciuto a partire dal 2005, ha permesso alla Cina di sostituirsi agli Stati Uniti come il secondo partner commerciale dello Sri Lanka, dopo l’India.

L’alleanza tra Pechino e Colombo si è inoltre articolata su un vettore anti statunitense, dal momento che Washington si è resa promotrice delle risoluzioni dell’UNHRC concernenti i crimini di guerra. È d’altro canto verosimile ipotizzare che la pressione esercitata dagli Stati Uniti in seno all’UNHRC rappresentasse per Washington uno strumento destinato ad allontanare Colombo dall’orbita cinese.

Gli Stati Uniti non sono però l’unica nazione a cui l’amicizia tra i due paesi asiatici è risultata invisa. La vicinanza geografica e culturale rendeva infatti lo Sri Lanka un paese tradizionalmente legato all’India. Il rafforzarsi dei legami fra Colombo e Pechino si è pertanto sviluppato in concorrenza con le ambizioni indiane di mantenere lo Sri Lanka nella propria orbita politica ed ecomica. In effetti il rinserrarsi dei rapporti fra Cina e Sri Lanka è stata vista a Delhi come parte di una strategia cinese di «accerchiamento» del Subcontinente; cioè una vera e propria minaccia per gli interessi nazionali dell’India. Il voto sfavorevole dell’India, in merito ad un intervento diretto dell’UNHRC nello Sri Lanka, ha quindi credibilmente costituito uno sforzo, da parte di Delhi, di venire incontro alle esigenze del proprio vicino, evitando di spingerlo ulteriormente nelle braccia dell’antagonista cinese. L’India, che in passato è stata condizionata nelle sue relazioni con lo Sri Lanka dalla influente componente tamil nazionale, decisamente ostile alle politiche del governo Rajapaksa, è quindi parsa, nel corso del 2014, mutare posizione, adottando una condotta fondata soprattutto su considerazioni di realpolitik.

Dopo la votazione avvenuta a marzo presso l’UNHRC, che già aveva sancito un mutamento nell’atteggiamento indiano sulla questione, l’insediamento a Delhi di un nuovo governo ha aperto la strada a scenari inediti riguardo ai rapporti con lo Sri Lanka. La grande vittoria ottenuta dal Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in occasione delle elezioni nazionali indiane del maggio 2014, ha infatti permesso al governo guidato da Narendra Modi di prescindere, nel proprio atteggiamento verso lo Sri Lanka, dalle istanze esercitate dai partiti tamil. L’amplissima maggioranza detenuta dal nuovo governo indiano è infatti risultata tale da permettergli una libertà di manovra di cui i precedenti governi della United Progressive Alliance (UPA) non avevano mai goduto. L’amministrazione Modi non si è comunque dimostrata insensibile alle rivendicazioni della popolazione tamil dello Sri Lanka, continuando a sollecitare insistentemente il governo Rajapaksa affinché questo trovasse «una soluzione politica in grado di andare incontro alle aspirazioni di equità, dignità e giustizia della comunità tamil».[62]

In seguito all’instaurazione del governo del BJP in India, i rapporti tra Delhi e Colombo sono quindi parsi migliorare, subendo un’evoluzione positiva anche in merito all’annosa questione dei pescatori tamil indiani arrestati, e talvolta uccisi, dalla marina militare dello Sri Lanka. I pescatori del Tamil Nadu, tradizionalmente, tendono infatti a spingersi sino all’isolotto singalese di Katchatheevu, dove di frequente vengono intercettati e trattenuti dalle autorità dello Sri Lanka.[63]L’argomento è stato spesso causa di frizioni tra i due paesi, soprattutto per via della posizione intransigente adottata dai leader politici del Tamil Nadu, desiderosi che il governo centrale indiano adottasse un approccio maggiormente aggressivo nei confronti dello Sri Lanka. La questione dei pescatori tamil sembra che abbia ricevuto una soluzione proprio in seguito all’insediamento di Narendra Modi a Delhi, salutato dal rilascio di 74 pescatori, il 14 agosto 2014, da parte dell’amministrazione Rajapaksa, in segno di buona volontà. Il gesto ha così riaperto la strada al dialogo bilaterale sul problema, sebbene i negoziati tra i due paesi non siano riusciti a giungere ad una soluzione condivisa.[64]

Se nella prima parte del 2014 le relazioni tra lo Sri Lanka e il vicino indiano hanno assistito ad un sviluppo piuttosto positivo, a partire dal mese di novembre, si è verificato un improvviso mutamento di tendenza. L’ormeggiamento temporaneo, nel porto di Colombo, di un sottomarino a propulsione nucleare e di una nave da guerra cinesi ha infatti provocato la reazione indignata di Delhi. Sia le autorità cinesi che quelle singalesi hanno tentato di mitigare la portata dell’avvenimento, descrivendolo come il risultato di una «normale pratica internazionale», mirata al semplice rifornimento di carburante. A dispetto di queste rassicurazioni, l’episodio non poteva che destare l’enorme preoccupazione dell’amministrazione indiana, che ha individuato nell’atteggiamento del governo singalese un inaccettabile gesto di ostilità. L’ormeggiamento delle due imbarcazioni da guerra cinesi avveniva inoltre in violazione dell’accordo tra India e Sri Lanka del luglio 1987, che vietava l’utilizzo a scopo militare dei porti singalesi da parte di altri stati e imponeva ai due firmatari che i rispettivi territori non fossero impiegati per «attività compromettenti l’unità, l’integrità e la sicurezza dei due paesi».[65] L’episodio, oltre ad allarmare l’India, spingendola a riconsiderare le proprie relazioni con lo Sri Lanka, è stato giudicato minaccioso anche dal governo statunitense. Il percorso del sottomarino da guerra, giunto sino al Golfo Persico, ha infatti rappresentato il primo viaggio conosciuto di un’imbarcazione cinese di questo tipo attraverso l’Oceano Indiano. L’espansione e l’incremento dell’attività della flotta sottomarina nucleare cinese ha rappresentato per gli Stati Uniti la sfida più significativa emersa nell’area dell’Oceano Indiano. «L’accrescimento della capacità cinese di concretizzare le proprie rivendicazioni territoriali» ha di conseguenza avuto un ruolo determinante nel ridisegnare le relazioni diplomatiche e strategiche all’interno della regione, influendo di conseguenza sui rapporti tra l’India e lo Sri Lanka.[66] Il fatto che l’amministrazione Rajapaksa abbia ignorato le reiterate proteste dell’India, che aveva messo in guardia lo Sri Lanka circa le conseguenze derivanti dall’ospitare nei propri porti imbarcazioni belliche cinesi, ha di certo generato una profonda diffidenza da parte di Delhi nei confronti del governo dell’isola. Secondo Brahma Chellaney, esperto indiano di relazioni internazionali, è assai probabile che l’episodio possa portare con sé degli strascichi, influendo a lungo termine sulle relazioni indo-singalesi.[67]

9. Politica economica

La crescita economica registrata dallo Sri Lanka durante il 2014 è stata elevata, attestandosi al 7,5% del PIL. Il dato ha d’altronde confermato una tendenza che, nell’ultimo decennio, ha visto il paese crescere economicamente ad un tasso medio annuo del 6,4%.[68] Tale crescita è stata il risultato degli ingenti investimenti pubblici nella costruzione di infrastrutture e, soprattutto, della costante espansione del settore privato, in particolare quello industriale e quello dei servizi, che durante l’anno in esame hanno visto una crescita rispettivamente del 12,4% e del 6,1%.[69]Sebbene il turismo sia stato un settore che ha ampiamente beneficiato degli investimenti pubblici e privati, impennandosi del 33% durante il 2014, esso ha contribuito ancora in modo marginale alla crescita economica dello Sri Lanka, attestandosi a circa il 2% del PIL.[70] A dispetto di questi aspetti positivi, il 2014 ha rappresentato nello Sri Lanka un anno disastroso per quanto concerne il settore agricolo, la cui crescita, già precedentemente in rallentamento, è precipitata allo 0,2%.[71]Questo dato era da ricondurre alla drammatica siccità che ha afflitto il paese tra la fine del 2013 e l’inizio del 2014, la quale ha influenzato in modo estremamente negativo l’andamento della produzione agricola, comparto nel quale è impiegato circa il 31% della popolazione.[72] Il cattivo corso dei monsoni, che ha vessato lo Sri Lanka per tre anni consecutivi, ha chiaramente avuto gravi conseguenze per gli agricoltori, che hanno visto il proprio reddito declinare costantemente a causa della mancanza di acqua per l’irrigazione, della scarsità di sementi di qualità e degli insostenibili livelli di indebitamento. La prolungata assenza di precipitazioni ha avuto un drastico impatto specialmente sulla produzione di riso, decresciuta di tre milioni e mezzo di tonnellate rispetto all’anno precedente, ponendo così una grave minaccia alla sicurezza alimentare dell’intero paese. La diminuzione nella produzione di riso è stata compensata tramite il ricorso alle importazioni, che, in ottobre, ne hanno fatto aumentare il prezzo del 36% rispetto al 2013.[73] Le condizioni climatiche avverse hanno danneggiato in modo particolare l’area nord-orientale, dove è stata rovinata quasi metà delle coltivazioni.[74] La provincia Settentrionale e quella Orientale, le aree più arretrate dell’isola da un punto di vista economico, pesantemente colpite dal cattivo andamento dei monsoni, risultavano in una situazione disastrosa.[75] La siccità del 2014 ha colpito circa 1,8 milioni di singalesi, danneggiando in modo gravissimo soprattutto i piccoli coltivatori, ovvero la maggioranza degli agricoltori nelle aree vessate dall’aridità del clima.[76]L’arrivo del monsone nella regione meridionale, in giugno, non ha oltretutto portato il sollievo sperato, presentando precipitazioni talmente copiose e concentrate in un breve lasso di tempo da causare danni devastanti al territorio e alla popolazione, colpita da frane, alluvioni e uragani.

Nell’ultimo decennio, nello Sri Lanka, le catastrofi naturali legate alla violenza delle precipitazioni monsoniche pare abbiano causato una perdita economica quantificabile in un miliardo di dollari, senza considerare gli enormi costi umani che esse hanno presentato.[77] I cambiamenti climatici, e le conseguenti calamità meteorologiche, hanno posto in essere un serio rischio per lo sviluppo economico e sociale dello Sri Lanka; si prevede infatti che l’instabilità del clima nell’area aumenterà, a detrimento dell’agricoltura, delle risorse idriche, dell’ambiente, del settore energetico e della pesca.

Per quanto concerne gli altri aspetti economici, è da rilevare come il tasso di inflazione, che nel febbraio 2013 aveva raggiunto un picco del 9,9% a causa della politica di svalutazione della rupia, durante il 2014 sia costantemente diminuito, passando dal 4,4% di inizio anno, al 3,5% registrato ad agosto.[78] Sebbene la diminuzione dell’inflazione non abbia coinvolto i prezzi dei beni alimentari, generalmente aumentati a causa del cattivo andamento del monsone, essa è stata accompagnata da un abbassamento dei tassi di interesse sui prestiti bancari, la cui esosità era stata motivo di una contrazione del credito al settore privato.[79]

L’economia continuava poi ad essere caratterizzata da alcune debolezze strutturali, la prima delle quali può essere individuata nel costante deficit della bilancia commerciale, circostanza all’origine delle forti svalutazioni della rupia avvenute negli anni precedenti. Ciò nondimeno, durante il primo semestre del 2014, l’aumento del 16,8% delle importazioni, accompagnato da una lieve diminuzione delle importazioni dell’1,2%, pareva configurare un discreto miglioramento della situazione, portando il debito singalese dai 4,44 miliardi di dollari del 2013 a 3,55 miliardi.[80] Su una base cumulativa, il deficit della bilancia commerciale era quindi diminuito, nel giugno 2014, di circa il 20% rispetto all’anno precedente, principalmente grazie alla tenue ripresa economica dei mercati europei e statunitensi, ossia i maggiori importatori di prodotti provenienti dallo Sri Lanka. Hanno inoltre contribuito a ridurre il deficit commerciale singalese l’incremento degli investimenti esteri diretti, pressoché duplicati, l’aumento delle rimesse degli emigrati, cresciute di oltre il 10%, e la notevole espansione del turismo.[81] Nel mese di agosto, l’improvviso e consistente aumento delle importazioni, prevalentemente di petrolio, non è riuscito ad invertire la tendenza positiva sopra illustrata; tuttavia, tale circostanza ha messo in luce la precarietà dei risultati raggiunti e le fragilità caratterizzanti la composizione e la struttura del commercio singalese verso i mercati esteri, scarsamente differenziato e basato prevalentemente sulle esportazioni di tè e prodotti tessili.[82]

Un ulteriore punto debole dell’economia singalese era rappresentato dal consistente deficit fiscale, che, nel corso del 2013, era risultato del 5,8% in rapporto al PIL ed era aggravato dalla pessima situazione finanziaria in cui versavano molte imprese governative.[83]

Nonostante il consistente aumento del reddito pro capite registratosi negli ultimi due decenni, il gettito fiscale del paese ha subito una costante erosione, giungendo a rappresentare, nel 2012, circa l’11% del PIL. Tale problema era imputabile sia ad un sistema difettoso ed iniquo di tassazione, in cui le imposte indirette coprivano l’80% circa delle entrate, sia ad un’elevata evasione fiscale. A dispetto delle misure adottate negli scorsi anni al fine di giungere ad un consolidamento fiscale, mediante un ampliamento della base impositiva indiretta anche al settore finanziario, nel 2013 le entrate nelle casse dello stato sono comunque risultate piuttosto deludenti. Esse si sono attestate al 13,6% del PIL, mancando l’obiettivo di ridurre il deficit fiscale al 5,2%, nel corso del 2014. Alla fine del mese di aprile, infatti, il gettito fiscale singalese era risultato inferiore di oltre il 15% rispetto alle aspettative, portando il deficit a 347 miliardi di rupie già nell’arco del primo quadrimestre e facendo allontanare il traguardo prestabilito.[84]

Per quanto concerne la legge finanziaria per l’anno 2015, essa è stata notevolmente influenzata dalla decisione di anticipare le elezioni presidenziali al gennaio appunto del 2015 e dal conseguente obiettivo di modellarla in modo da aumentare le possibilità per Rajapaksa di essere rieletto. Di qui una serie di misure che avrebbero comportato un aumento significativo della spesa pubblica, incrementata del 15% rispetto all’anno precedente; tra questi provvedimenti di natura espansiva sono da segnalare: l’incremento delle pensioni e dei salari minimi degli impiegati sia pubblici che privati; una riduzione dei prezzi del carburante e delle tariffe dell’elettricità e dell’acqua; un aumento dei sussidi agli agricoltori, duramente colpiti dalla siccità; una diminuzione dell’1% dell’imposta sul valore aggiunto e un abbassamento del limite massimo di tassazione sul reddito al 16%; lo stanziamento di incentivi politici ed economici alle piccole e medie imprese; un incremento delle risorse finanziarie destinate alla salute e all’istruzione, che avrebbero visto salire le somme a loro disposizione, rispettivamente, da 117,6 miliardi di rupie a 139,5 e da 75,9 miliardi di rupie a 96,5.[85] Una considerevole parte della spesa pubblica sarebbe poi stata destinata, in linea con la politica economica degli ultimi anni, allo sviluppo delle infrastrutture e dei trasporti. La legge finanziaria per il 2015 ha inoltre previsto un consistente incremento, di circa il 12%, dell’importo destinato al settore della Difesa, assecondando una tendenza che, dalla fine della guerra civile, ha paradossalmente visto aumentare in modo costante la spesa pubblica per questo comparto. Gli stanziamenti economici per la Difesa sarebbero risultati nel 2015 di 285 miliardi di rupie, ovvero il 16% della spesa totale; inoltre, secondo fonti ufficiose, tale somma potrebbe ulteriormente aumentare, per giungere a 370 miliardi entro il 2017.[86] Vale poi la pena notare che il presidente Rajapaksa, ricoprendo contemporaneamente la carica di ministro della Difesa, ministro della Finanza e ministro dei Trasporti, avrebbe da solo avuto il controllo su circa il 40% dei fondi stanziati dalla legge finanziaria.[87] L’unico settore che pare non avere tratto beneficio dal carattere espansivo della legge finanziaria è stato quello della Tecnologia e della Ricerca, sul quale è convogliato solamente lo 0,23% della spesa totale.

Nonostante le misure destinate ad aumentare la spesa pubblica, e a mantenere i consensi tra la popolazione, la legge finanziaria cercava di mantenere gli obiettivi di consolidamento fiscale e di riduzione del debito pubblico, ammontante al 75% del PIL.[88] Secondo i disegni del governo, l’espansione dello schema per il pagamento delle tasse arretrate avrebbe avuto un ruolo decisivo nell’assicurare nuove entrate nelle casse dello stato; tramite l’erogazione di prestiti agevolati, gli evasori fiscali avrebbero ottenuto un finanziamento, da restituire entro cinque anni, per ripagare il loro debito ad un tasso di interesse del 6%.[89] Il proposito di portare il deficit fiscale al 4,6% del PIL risultava però poco realistico e in deciso contrasto con la linea espansiva perseguita dalla legge di bilancio per il 2015. Se si aggiunge il fatto che la manovra finanziaria prevedeva anche un aumento del limite massimo di indebitamento da parte del governo, innalzato di 440 miliardi di rupie, l’incoerenza della politica economica perseguita dall’amministrazione Rajapaksa appare evidente.[90]

Per concludere, la legge finanziaria per il 2015 conteneva in sé gli elementi per soddisfare pressoché ogni settore sociale, mantenendo contemporaneamente, almeno sulla carta, l’obbiettivo del rigore fiscale. Tuttavia, l’incoerenza di fondo della legge non era il suo difetto principale. Questo era piuttosto rappresentato dalla mancanza di un piano strutturale a lungo termine, in grado di rendere autopropulsivo lo sviluppo economico del paese. Una critica che rimane valida anche se si considera che, rispetto agli anni precedenti, la legge finanziaria per il 2015 ha posto una maggiore attenzione alla valorizzazione del capitale umano.

Two main political trends characterized Sri Lanka in 2014. The first was the persistence of those political features which had been taking shape since the establishment of the Rajapaksa administration in 2005. Indeed, since his election, President Percy Mahendra Rajapaksa has benefited from both a large parliamentary majority and mass support. The latter was strengthened by the victorious conclusion, in 2009, of the civil war against the Tamil Tigers. Accordingly, in 2010, President Rajapaksa was able to change the Constitution, enacting the 18th Amendment, which brought about both an expansion of the presidential powers and the possibility for a President to be elected for a third consecutive term (Rajapaksa was in his second term). During the years of Rajapaksa’s government, the country has witnessed both the implementation of repressive policies and either the inability or the lack of political will in bringing about a reconciliation between the Sinhala and Tamil communities, after the long civil war. Such a political climate worsened in 2014, because of the consolidation of Rajapaksa’s authoritarian regime, resulting in the rampant and conspicuous militarization of both state institutions and civil society. Furthermore, in the first months of the year, the apprehension caused by the supposed resurgence of the Tamil Tigers contributed to legitimate the increased presence of the army in the North-Eastern area of the country (namely in that part of the island were the Tamils are the majority). At the same time, the government extensively involved the military personnel in its urban development policy, which resulted in further erosion of the democratic space. Last but not least, the year under review saw the further sectarian polarization of society, this time to the detriment of the Muslim community. Such a polarization was fostered by Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist movements, particularly the radical organization Bodu Bala Sena («Buddhist Power Force», BBS), which, in June 2014, promoted anti-Muslims violence in Beruwala, Dharga Town and Aluthgama, resulting in one of the worst religious riots in recent times.

Nevertheless, alongside with those developments, the first signs of vulnerability on part of the Rajapaksa government started to become visible. First, the regime was put under pressure by a United Nations Human Rights Council’s resolution, which accused the Sri Lanka government of war crimes and human rights violations. Second, in occasion of the provincial elections, held in March and September 2014, the ruling coalition, the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA), faced an unprecedented decline in the popular vote. Such a decline persuaded President Rajapaksa to anticipate the presidential election to 8 January 2015, with the aim to be re-elected for a third mandate before losing further popular support. The decision to anticipate the presidential election was followed by the emergence of rifts within the ruling coalition, made visible by the resignation of three UPFA ministers. Crucially important was the resignation of Health Minister Maithripala Sirisena, who went over to the opposition, was able to unite it, and became the opposition common presidential candidate, emerging as an existential challenge to President Rajapaksa’s hitherto undisputed position of power. 

 

1. Introduction

In 2014, Nepal was headed towards a resolution of the problems that caused the political and constitutional impasse of 2012 and 2013. The first Constituent Assembly resolved on May 28, 2012, before drafting the new Constitution, to replace the interim Constitution of 2007. This brought the country to a political deadlock. In March 2013, Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai stepped down to facilitate the election process of the second Constituent Assembly. Chief Justice Khil Raj Regmi was appointed to serve as de facto prime minister and to form a new government. The results of the election – which was held in November 2013 – saw the emergence of the Nepali Congress as the leading party, closely followed by the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist), and this brought the country to another period of political deadlock. In February 2014, a new coalition government was formed under the new Prime Minister, Sushil Koirala, who replaced Regmi, ending the political impasse. Koirala established, as his main task, the drafting of the Constitution. On November 27, at a press briefing at the end of the SAARC summit, he said that the Nepali parties were trying to find a consensus in order to promulgate the Constitution by January 22, 2015. Other key goals of the Koirala government were economic development and completing the peace process through the investigation and persecution of human rights abusers during the civil war (1996-2006). During the first half of 2014, following the election of the second Constituent Assembly, Nepal’s economy stabilised. New input for development also resulted from improved relations with India. In his two visits to the country in 2014, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi signed important economic agreements to develop Nepal’s hydropower potential and to buy electricity to help tackle India’s energy shortages, and also provided Nepal with a $1 billion line of credit for various development purposes.

2. An Ongoing Political Impasse

The political deadlock which paralysed the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal due to the lack of a Constitution and ongoing quarrels between the parties continued during the first months of 2013.[1] As has been rightly noted, Nepal’s political parties «have been unable to agree even on a regular annual budget».[2]

The 1st Nepalese Constituent Assembly, which was elected in May 2008, had the task of writing a new Constitution and acting as the interim legislature. However, the Parliament did not succeed in its mission to draft a new Constitution, and eventually, Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai dissolved the Constituent Assembly on May 28, 2012. The major points of disagreement were whether the government should be central or federal, and the division of regions. The Maoists parties and those that represent the Madhesi people (who inhabit the Terai region) demanded a federation of single-ethnicity states, while the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist) demanded a smaller number of states based on multiple ethnicities.

Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), one of the key players in the Maoist insurgency and the 35th Prime Minister, serving from August 2011 to March 2013, had scheduled the 2nd Nepalese Constituent Assembly elections for November 22, 2012, but the vote was put off by the Election Commission. Once again, the country was without a functional government and without a Constitution. The two mainstream political parties, namely, the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist) and the Nepali Congress, had long quarrelled about conducting an election under the authority of Bhattarai. The dispute between the parties twice led to a postponement of the elections. Nepal was and is still ruled under an Interim Constitution.[3]

In March 2013, Bhattarai agreed to step down to ease the election process, and all of the major parties agreed to form an interim government led by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Khil Raj Regmi, and a council of ministers chosen by him, although the interim Constitution does not allow for a provisional government led by a Chief Justice. The appointment raised many doubts in the country. First, the parties were criticised for not working together to build democracy and to draft the Constitution, but instead being driven by their obsession with power. Doubts were raised about bringing a judicial figure into the political domain. Moreover, Regmi’s appointment was proposed by Pushpa Kamal Dahal, also known as Prachanda, the Chairman of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), an ex-leader of the guerrilla war against the royal government, who served as Prime Minister from 2008 to 2009. Because the idea to appoint the Chief Justice to the role of interim Prime Minister came from Prachanda, this raised some suspicion that the move was part of a Maoist conspiracy to co-opt the judiciary. According to an editorial published in the Nepali Times, «[i]t was a proposal by one party that wanted to remove the last remaining hurdle in its quest for absolute power. After dissolving the assembly, buying into media, coopting the police, appeasing the army, infiltrating the bureaucracy, only the Supreme Court was standing in the way».[4] Voices were raised to comment that the Chief Justice should not have accepted the proposal, as it was «ethically wrong».[5]

After a mechanism was proposed to oversee his government until the day of the election of the new Constituent Assembly-cum-Parliament, Regmi, too, expressed reservations about heading the interim government unless he could have a free hand in choosing his ministers. It was also proposed that, if the interim government failed to hold the election by the first week of June, it would be dissolved. Regmi’s fear was that he would only be used as a proxy to endorse the decisions made by the main parties. Every political force and the civil society agreed on the need for fresh elections for a new Constituent Assembly to finally draft the Constitution, but this time, on some solid basis of agreement, which could lead to a result shared by the majority of the parties that had emerged in the first election. The three main parties were the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) – which originated out of the fusion, in 2009, of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unity Centre-Masal) – followed in the second position by the Nepali Congress, and in the third position, by the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist). Elections for the sake of elections that were to be held on June 21, 2013 would not solve the matter, and it would be better to give the new Chairman of the Interim Election Council, namely, PM Khil Raj Regmi, enough time to organise free and fair voting, even if it occurred later in the year.

3. New Interim Government: Chief Judge Khil Raj Regmi’s Appointment as Chairman

The quarrels between the parties and the impossibility of drafting the new Constitution caused widespread disillusionment among the Nepali people against the main political parties and their leaders. According to a Himalmedia Public Opinion Poll 2013 which was carried out over a period of one week in mid-February in 38 districts for a total of 3,508 respondents, reflecting the proportionality of Nepal’s ethnicities, geography, gender, age, and literacy, 61,1% of the respondents thought that democracy was under threat, and 39,4% of the respondents thought that the major reason was the wrangling among political parties. Of the disputes among the parties, 15% of the respondents assigned responsibility to the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), led by Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal, and 9,1% indicated foreign interference (85,3% indicating meddling from India). More than half of the respondents did not trust the party leaders, and 10,19% wanted to have an independent candidate.[6] It was time for the political leadership to take action.

Despite the criticism of the Nepal Bar Association and the protests of a dozen fringe political parties, which on June 14 called a general strike in the Kathmandu Valley to protest against the formation of the government under a chief justice, the major parties finally agreed on the name of the chairman of the Interim Election Council. This agreement was part of an 11-point deal reached by the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), the Nepali Congress, the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) and the United Democratic Madhesi Front. The last group mentioned was a coalition composed of three Madhesh-based political parties, the Madhesi Jana Adhikar Forum, Nepal (also called the Madhesi People’s Rights Forum, Nepal), and two minor parties: the Tarai-Madhesh Loktantrik Party and the Sadbhavana Party. The parties also agreed to hold the election on June 21, or to postpone the date until November in case of a lack of agreement.

On March 14, 2013, Chief Judge of the Supreme Court Khil Raj Regmi was sworn in by President Ram Baran Yadav, the 1st President of Nepal (serving from July 2008 and still incumbent). Regmi’s service as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was unanimously considered beyond reproach; however, his capacity as a leader was doubted because of his failure to appoint judges in the Supreme Court during his 22 months as head of the Judicial Council, and his legal reconciliatory approach was considered a weak point.[7] Regmi was charged with leading a new interim government and supervising the elections, to be held in three months, by June 21, 2013, and he became de facto prime minister. This brought the impasse between the four main political parties to an end.[8]

Foreign countries, including the UK, India, China, Switzerland, and the USA, welcomed the agreement among the four major political parties. As stressed by the US Embassy’s statement congratulating the Nepalese people, the agreement on a Chief Justice-led government was «a complex and challenging process and we commend the parties for their willingness to make the compromises necessary to achieve this important political milestone».[9]

Besides the appointment of Regmi, the top leaders of the four major political parties who signed the 11-point deal also agreed on two other key issues: forming a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to provide transitional justice and updating the voters’ list before the polls. Regmi’s main political task was to hold the elections, and in his first speech, he urged all parties and the civil society to cooperate in the process. Despite being criticised as a weak leader, his nonpartisan status actually helped the country to head towards elections.

Immediately after being appointed, Regmi included two former bureaucrats in the Cabinet, and five days after his election, he included eight more ministers and allotted them portfolios, after the High-Level Political Committee Coordinator agreed on their names. A few days after his appointment, in fact, Regmi had set up a High-level Political Committee to help the Interim Election Council. The eight-member committee has two each from the four major political parties, Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), Nepali Congress, Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist) and United Democratic Madhesi Front. It was presided over by the Chairman of UCPN-Maoist Pushpa Kamal Dahal. There was a major effort to overcome the difficulties that had brought the country to a political and constitutional crisis.[10] The first Cabinet chaired by Regmi pledged to hold free, fair and inclusive elections in June in order to reflect the will of the Nepalese people. The Cabinet requested the political parties who had opposed Regmi’s election to get engaged in the Constituent Assembly elections, and it appealed to civil society and the media to create a favourable environment for the elections.

4. The Second Constituent Assembly and the New Government

On June 13, 2013, the Interim Election Government formed in March and headed by Chief Justice Khil Raj Regmi announced that the election of the new Constituent Assembly, a unicameral body tasked with drafting a new Constitution and serving as the country’s Parliament, would occur on November 19, 2013. The lack of a political consensus had forced a deadline extension from the planned June 2013 election.

Out of the 139 political parties registered in May at the Nepal Election Commission, 76 were new ones, a sure signal that the democratic debate was florid. They did not exist during the first Constituent Election of May 28, 2008. However, despite the support of the four major political parties, there was still no consensus on the November elections. The new Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), a new party formed in 2012 from a split from the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and holding the same name as the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), merged into the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), did not register in the Election Commission, saying that the election was not possible under the current political situation. An alliance of 33 smaller political parties led by Mohan Baidya, the Chairman of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), issued a statement declaring that «the Government was unconstitutional as it was formed through an unconstitutional Presidential decree and holding an election on the basis of such a decree is akin to pushing the country towards further crisis».[11] They wanted a party-led government and wanted to postpone the elections.

The Terai groups advocating Terai separatism and Madhesi self-determination declared their agenda, endorsing an eight-point course of action aimed at disrupting the Constituent Assembly polls. The problem of the inclusion of the marginalised Terai groups in the constitutional process and the number of ethnicity-based regions have been present in Nepal since the beginning of the democratic debate regarding drafting a new Constitution to replace the interim Constitution of 2007.[12]

In August, the monarchist Rastriya Prajatantra Party Nepal announced the launch of a nationwide signature campaign in October to demand the return of the monarchy. There were strikes and violent protests by the opposition parties in the months before the elections, and all of the electoral constituencies along the 1,700 Km border with India were kept under special surveillance in view of the elections.[13]

Some 12,21 million people from 102 castes and ethnic groups, speaking 92 languages, voted in the second Constituent Assembly. The Assembly was enlarged to 601 seats to ensure the highest degree of participation of the parties by instituting a 60/40 ratio for proportional and first-past-the-post representations. A total of 30 parties and 2 independents were represented. The Nepali Congress, which had been the second party in the first elections, emerged as the largest party, winning 105 of the 240 seats of the first-past-the-post seats and 91 proportional seats, for a total of 196 seats. It was closely followed by the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), which won a total of 175 seats. The Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) had a total of 80 seats, and the Rastriya Prajatantra Party Nepal received 24 seats. In November, Pushpa Kamal Dahal, the Chairman of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), demanded that the vote counting be stopped, claiming elections fraud, and asked for an independent investigation, refusing to participate in the Constituent Assembly if his demands were not met. The Election Commission, however, ruled out a revote or recount.[14]

The election manifesto released by the Nepali Congress in October stated that a new Constitution was to be drafted within a year of the election and that it would establish multiparty competition, periodic elections, separation of powers, press freedom, a transparent and inclusive governing system, a federal structure, including two provinces in the southern plains or Terai, and a focus on the economic development of the country.

The elections brought the country to another period of political deadlock because no party had won a clear majority, although, in December, the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) agreed to join the Constituent Assembly and to participate in writing the final chapters of the Constitution.

The results of the elections showed that the forces that have been fighting for an identity-based federalism, namely, the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the Madhesi parties, had been defeated, although they had been confirmed as significant forces. The Terai, or Madhesh, region begins at the Indian border and includes the southernmost part of the intensively farmed Gangetic Plain. The region is the breadbasket of the country and is the main link between Nepal and its biggest trading partner, India. The Madhesi parties wanted a single and separate province spanning the southern third of the country from east to west. However, in the elections, the Nepali Congress emerged as the strongest force in the Madesh, although the party had always opposed ethnicity-based federalism, warning that it could lead to conflicts between the various ethnic groups.

On February 10, the Chairman of the Nepali Congress, Sushil Koirala, a member of the party since 1955, was elected Prime Minister by the Constituent Assembly, ending months of political crisis. He secured 405 votes, although 148 representatives of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), the Rastriya Prajatantra Party-Nepal and some small parties in the Maoist-led alliance voted against him. Regmi resigned as interim prime minister and as chief justice, because the Nepal Bar Association said that he could no longer serve as chief justice.

Koirala was known as a «clean politician» with a reputation for having an austere lifestyle, and there was a large echo in the country when he said that he could list just three mobile phones as his assets, as he did not possess land, houses, financial investments or even a bank account. His main task was to bring the country to stability. He pledged to give the nation a new federal democratic Constitution and to use all of its resources for economic development. After long negotiations with the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), the second largest party in the Constituent Assembly, to ensure the strongest possible support to draft the Constitution, at the end of February, Koirala formed a new coalition government of 21 ministers from the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist). The new government was criticised because, despite electoral promises to include women, and ethnic and linguistic minorities, only two ministers were women, both from Terai, and none were from the far west, the poorest area of the country. The major tasks of the new government, besides drafting the new Constitution, were holding local body elections to vote for local people’s representatives, which had been delayed for 16 years, and completing the peace process, including the formation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Commission on the Disappeared to provide transitional justice.[15] In March, a 145-point common minimum programme of the coalition government, a 13-point ethical code of conduct for the ministers – including the prime minister – to ensure austerity and good governance, and a 10-point method for running the administration in a transparent way, were announced. The programme was a commitment of the ruling parties to complete the political process and to improve the economy. In August, the Chief Election Commissioner, Neel Kantha Uprety, said that the Election Commission was ready to conduct the local body elections within the next three months, only after the political parties arrived at a consensus, adding that the system of local body elections was more complicated than that of the Constituent Assembly elections.[16]

5. New Hopes for the Economy

The Nepali economy stabilised during the first half of 2014, following the election of the new Constituent Assembly, which reduced the political uncertainty. Economic growth, however, was slow, although it was projected to recover to 4¾ percent in 2013/14, from below 4% the year before, supported by agriculture, increased fiscal spending, and continued strong remittance inflows.[17]

Great expectations for economic growth resulted from the first and second visits of Indian Prime Minister Modi to Nepal. Kathmandu hosted, on November 26-27, the 18th summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) «Deeper Integration for Peace and Prosperity». The hope was that India, the biggest state and the largest economy among the eight member states, would take special responsibility, not only to make the summit a success, but «to invest more in its own bordering areas of Uttar Pradesh, North Bihar, North Bengal, Tripura, and Assam so that the local populations of Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh don’t view India as a country of the fourth world» in terms of infrastructure, especially roads, railways, health services, and education.[18] The first priority of SAARC was, in fact, economic integration, although the outcome was considered disappointing.[19] The Agreement for the Regulation of Passenger and Cargo Vehicular Traffic, and the SAARC Regional Agreement on Railways, which would improve trade, regional tourism and interaction between the eight state members, were stalled for three months because Pakistan held back.[20] The SAARC Framework Agreement for Energy Cooperation (Electricity) was signed. According to the independent newspaper, Kathmandu Post, one of the largest in the country, the role played by Koirala to facilitate the bilateral talks between India and Pakistan, which brought Modi and the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, to agree to sign the Framework Agreement on Energy Cooperation and to commit to signing the two other pacts within three months, was a big diplomatic success.[21] More importantly, the day before the beginning of the summit, Nepal and India signed a deal to build a $1-billion hydropower plant. The deal allows India’s state-owned company, Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam, to construct a 900-megawatt hydropower project on Nepal’s Arun river, with electricity expected to be generated starting in 2021. Both Nepal and India suffer from electricity shortages and blackouts. Nepal will receive about 22% of the power generated for free, while the remainder will be exported to India.

This was the second deal on hydropower projects. During the first visit of PM Narendra Modi to Nepal at the beginning of August, Nepal and India had agreed to sign an agreement that would allow the exchange of electricity generated from hydroelectric projects in Nepal. A big project that would be beneficial for both countries was signed by India and Nepal in September: the Upper Karnali Hydropower Project. Slated for completion in 2021, it will be the largest hydroelectric power station in Nepal, using the water from the Karnali River to generate electricity to export to India.

On October 21, a historic Power Trade Agreement (PTA) was signed to increase cooperation in the field of transmission interconnection, grid connectivity and power trade, paving the way for the free trade of power between the two countries, to encourage and facilitate investments in the power sector, to explore new areas of cooperation and to monitor the progress in those areas by establishing two joint working groups.[22]

During his visit in August, Modi announced $1 billion NRs as a concessional line of credit to Nepal for various development purposes and an «HIT» (meaning highways, I-ways and transways) formula for the development of the country.[23] He also pledged to expedite the long delayed project to build a 41-km Amlekhgunj (Nepal)-Raxaul (Bihar) petroleum pipeline, which would later be extended to Kathmandu. The formal talks began at the end of August, but in November, they could not be finalised due to disagreements on the technical and financial implementation.

Before the SAARC summit 2005, activists called the «People’s SAARC» issued a 24-point declaration stressing that the SAARC leaders should also include the rights of migrants and the creation of support mechanisms for stranded migrants and migrants in need in the agenda.[24] Migrant workers from Nepal bring back 30% of Nepal’s GDP at a high human cost due to dubious recruitment agencies, which in some cases, are backed by transnational organised crime. Standard contracts and minimum wages in South Asian countries would reduce the influence of trafficking organisations.

In a press briefing at the end of the SAARC summit, Prime Minister Koirala clarified that Modi, who, two days before had said that the preliminary Constitution should be drafted in agreement, was not pushing Nepali leaders to reach an understanding in order to promulgate a new Constitution in consensus, because the process was up to Nepal. He underlined, however, that the parties were indeed trying to find a consensus to promulgate the Constitution by the January 22 deadline.

6. Completing the Peace Process: The Commission on Investigation of Disappeared Persons, Truth and Reconciliation Act 2014

Nepal’s success in writing a new Constitution also depends on how it handles the issue of providing justice for victims of the civil war. Since the end of the conflict, the investigation and prosecution of abusers of human rights during the war has been a key point of discussion in the country. The 11-point deal among the four major parties, which led to the appointment of Regmi, included forming a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate human rights violations, such as torture, enforced disappearance, extrajudicial killings and crimes against humanity, which took place during the conflict, to provide transitional justice, and to give one Colonel and two Lt Colonel posts to the Maoist combatants who had been integrated into the Nepali Army. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was already planned by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2006. One of the main problems the country faced in 2006, after the end of the 10-year-long civil war, was the integration of the ex-Maoist combatants of the People’s Liberation Army, Nepal, the armed wing of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) led by Pushpa Kamal Dahal (who later served as Prime Minister from August 2008 to May 2009), into the national Nepal Army or into civil society.[25]

In 2013, the government had issued a Truth and Reconciliation Commission Ordinance (TRC) with the duty to prohibit potential amnesties for serious crimes as a political deal, without meeting the minimum international standards required. The discourse on the TRC bill had been focused on either the prosecution or amnesty for war time crimes, and the political infighting focused on the question of impunity. The arrest in the United Kingdom of Col. Kumar Lama in January 2013 on allegations of torture during the Nepali civil war was an embarrassing incident for Nepal, while foreign peacekeeping missions denied positions to prominent Nepalese generals.[26]

In January 2, 2014, the Supreme Court rejected the ordinance introduced by then Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai in 2013, following pressure from the Nepal Army and the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), granting a de facto amnesty, even to those involved in serious human rights violations. The Supreme Court passed the directive to restructure the Commission under pressure from the international community to ensure that the transitional justice mechanisms meet established international standards. However, in March, the 110th session of the Human Rights Committee pointed out the slow progress of the country in its reforms, in ensuring justice to the victims of various forms of human rights violations, in ensuring the distribution of citizenship certificates without any legal hassles, and in curbing the corporal punishment and killing of women in the name of witchcraft. The ill-treatment of Tibetan refugees living in Nepal was also mentioned in the meeting.[27]

On the occasion of the International Right to Truth Day of March 25, the National Victims Alliance (NVA) pressed the government to unveil the truth regarding the disappeared persons, forming an all-powerful and impartial Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a Commission on Disappeared, to punish the perpetrators of human rights violations and to implement the Supreme Court’s order on transitional justice. Making the status of disappeared citizens public to ensure the right to truth, providing medical treatment to injured and physically impaired persons, and distributing identity cards to victims of the war were among the series of demands.[28]

In 2012, according to the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, Relief and Reconstruction Unit, Ganesh Prasad Upadhyay, some 17,800 people died during the civil war. In 2014, some 850 cases of enforced disappearance were registered and were under investigation by the Nepal Human Rights Commission, and over 3,000 cases of severe human rights abuse were registered.[29]During the 10-year conflict, civilians were targeted for extrajudicial killings and torture by both state security services and rebels. Women were caught in the violence between police and the Royal Nepalese Army, and in the violence and forced recruitment by Maoists. Rape became a gendered weapon and an instrument of retaliation and political repression.[30]

The fear shared by the international humanitarian organisations, NGOs and the relatives of victims was that abusers, especially those in political positions after the war, would enjoy impunity. According to the 2013 report by Amnesty International, in the previous four years, successive governments had withdrawn hundreds of criminal cases against individuals accused of serious offences, including murder, citing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement concluded between the Government of Nepal and The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), dated November 21, 2006, which called for the withdrawal of cases brought against individuals «due to political reasons».[31]

The ruling of the Supreme Court of Nepal on January 2014 overturned the 2013 Ordinance on Investigation of Disappeared Persons, Truth and Reconciliation Commission by forming a separate Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Disappearance Commission to ensure their effective implementation, making suspects of gross human rights violations ineligible and reducing the discretionary power of the Attorney General to decide on prosecution. However, the ruling was considerably criticised by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and national and international NGOs for its failure to comply with international legal standards.[32]The ordinance was partially changed by the Supreme Court by establishing the two commissions, enacting new laws excluding the possibility of amnesty for serious human rights violations, and criminalising serious human rights violations as specific offences within domestic law. Under the recommendation of the Supreme Court, an Expert Task Force was formed that included Government officials, human rights lawyers, victims and conflict experts, to assist with the drafting of a new law. However, the Expert Task Force only had some two weeks to meet, deliberate and draft its recommendations before the Bill was passed.

The Bill was passed by Nepal’s Parliament on 25 April 2014 as the Commission on Investigation of Disappeared Persons, Truth and Reconciliation Act 2014. It was promulgated into law on May 21, despite the previous political opposition of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), who dissented on a comprehensive investigation of war crimes on the grounds that all war-era cases were political in nature and that punishing the perpetrators would not help to maintain peace in society and would not allow a new Constitution to be drafted if the questions of truth and reconciliation remained unsettled.

The Bill, based on a consensus between the major three parties, the Nepali Congress, the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) and the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), was supported by all of the parties, excluding smaller parties, such as the Rastriya Prajatantra Party Nepal, whose Chairman Kamal Thapa remarked that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as it was envisioned, would pardon the perpetrators involved in serious crimes committed during the war era.[33] With the Bill, «there has been some effort to implement the recommendations of the Supreme Court, with the creation of two separate commissions, the inclusion of safeguards to enable the participation of vulnerable witnesses, the incorporation of a system for institutional reform and, importantly, a commitment to establish a Special Court to adjudicate conflict era abuses».[34] Nevertheless, the Bill presented flawed provisions, allowing amnesty for crimes committed under international law and gross violations of human rights. It was also criticised for failing to define key terms, such as «serious violation of human rights», «act of disappearing a person» and «reparation» in accordance with international law, and for the power of the Commission to reconcile victims and perpetrators without the consent of the parties involved. The Bill did not comply with international law and standards on transitional justice, and the International Commission of Jurists made a series of recommendations to the government of Nepal to amend the problematic points, while Human Rights Watch asked the government to act immediately to fix crucial flaws.[35] Nevertheless, despite the problematic points, the Bill is a big step towards providing justice to victims of the civil war and towards settling one of the main remaining questions that has constituted an obstacle to the reconstruction process of the country.

Nel 2014 il Nepal si è avviato alla soluzione del problemi che avevano causato l’impasse politica e costituzionale dei due anni precedenti. La prima Assemblea Costituente si è sciolta il 28 maggio 2012, prima di redigere la nuova Costituzione che avrebbe sostituita quella ad interim del 2007. Questo ha portato il paese a uno stallo, sbloccato solo dalle dimissioni del primo ministro Baburam Bhattarai, a cui è succeduto il presidente della Corte Suprema, Khil Raj Regmi. Le elezioni della seconda Assemblea Costituente, che si sono tenute a novembre 2013, hanno visto emergere come primo partito il Nepali Congress, seguito con uno scarto di pochi voti dal Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist). Questo ha portato a un altro periodo di impasse politica, risolto nel febbraio 2014 con la formazione di un nuovo governo di coalizione guidato da Sushil Koirala. Il principale obbiettivo di Koirala è stato quello di redigere la Costituzione. Il 27 novembre, alla conferenza stampa in chiusura dei lavori del summit dei leader della SAARC, Koirala ha dichiarato che i partiti nepalesi stavano cercando di arrivare ad un accordo generale per promulgare la Costituzione entro il 22 gennaio 2015. Altri due obiettivi chiave del governo Koirala sono stati lo sviluppo dell’economia e la conclusione del processo di pace seguito alla guerra civile del 1996-2006 attraverso il definitivo accertamento delle responsabilità dei crimini di guerra la messa sotto processo dei responsabili.

Durante la prima metà del 2014, a seguito dell’elezione della seconda Assemblea Costituente, l’economia del Nepal si è stabilizzata. Un ruolo chiave nel miglioramento della situazione economica è stato rivestito dall’India. Nelle sue due visite al paese, il nuovo primo ministro indiano, Narendra Modi, ha firmato due importanti accordi per sviluppare l’enorme potenziale idroelettrico del Nepal, comprando l’elettricità per far parzialmente fronte alla carenza energetica dell’India. Modi ha anche aperto una linea di credito al Nepal di un miliardo di dollari, destinati a finanziare vari altri progetti di sviluppo. 

 

1. Introduction

In India, the dominant event in the year 2014 was the 16th general election and its results, namely the resounding victory of the Narendra Modi-led BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) and the catastrophic defeat of the Indian National Congress (hereafter, the Congress). The Congress, which headed the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), in power during the previous two legislatures, crashed to the worst electoral defeat in its whole history, tumbling from 206 seats to 44; on its part, the BJP was able to conquer the absolute majority of the Lok Sabha seats. This happened exactly 30 years since any Indian party had been able to do the same.

Although the BJP victory and the Congress defeat did not arrive unexpectedly, what was unforeseen and surprising was the magnitude of both the BJP victory and the Congress defeat. The dominant party system – which historians, political scientists, politicians and analysts had considered gone for good – appeared to be back with a vengeance. Although Narendra Modi put together a coalition government, the BJP, thanks to its absolute majority in the Lok Sabha, was in a position of absolute strength vis-à-vis both its allies and the parliamentary opposition. The latter appeared weak and divided. In fact, the number of seats of the main opposition party, the Congress, at 44, was so low as to prevent it from being acknowledged as leader of the Opposition. Equally, or maybe more, remarkable was the loss of power of the regional parties, which, since the mid 1990s, had wielded increasing power at the all-India level by playing the role of indispensable allies to whichever party was in power at the centre. Although maintaining practically the same amount of popular vote and Lok Sabha seats as in the previous general election, the local parties were consigned to a situation of virtual irrelevance as the BJP, having conquered the absolute majority of the Lok Sabha’s seats, was now in a position to dispense with their help.

This being the situation, the present article is mainly focussed on the general election, the causes of its (largely unexpected) results and its consequences, namely the coming into power of the Narendra Modi-headed new government and its policies. However, as a necessary preamble to the treatment of the main theme, the short-lived government of the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) in Delhi will be examined. In fact, at the end of the year preceding the 2014 general election, the AAP’s unexpected positive result in the local Delhi elections, held in December 2013, and the successive formation of an AAP minority government (with the outside support of the Congress) had appeared to many as a potential turning point in Indian politics. Indeed, the Delhi events seemed to have opened the possibility that the AAP could become a key contestant in the approaching general election, turning it into a triangular contest between the BJP, Congress and AAP, and, at the end of the day, being a potential danger less for the Congress than for the BJP. [2]

In fact, although the Arvind Kejriwal-led AAP had been born from the Hazare-led anti-corruption movement – namely a movement which had mainly been aimed against the Congress – and although the AAP had kept all the anti-Congress thrust of its parent movement, it is a fact that its potential rise as a key contestant at the all-India level could attract those numerous voters who, although disillusioned with the Congress, would have some qualms in voting for a rightist and anti-secular party like the BJP. This did not happen for several reasons; but possibly the most important among them was the AAP’s record when in government and, even more, its abrupt decision to resign.

2. The short-lived Aam Aadmi Party government in Delhi

At the end of 2013, the elections in the Delhi Union Territory had seen unexpected good results for the recently launched Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), which, pushing aside the Congress Party, came second, just behind the BJP. In fact, in the Delhi Vidhan Sabha (Legislative Assembly) the BJP had 32 seats; the AAP 28, and the Congress, formerly the party in power, just eight.

These results determined a stalemate, as neither of the two major parties was in the position to form a government by itself. After much debate within the Congress – whose eight seats could still play a strategic role in the Delhi Assembly – and after considerable hesitation on the part of the AAP, on 23 December 2013 the latter eventually accepted the Congress’ support in order to form a government. As a consequence, the AAP government – headed by Arvind Kejriwal, and with the outside support of Congress – was sworn in on 28 December 2013.[3]

In accepting the government of Delhi, the AAP in general and their leader in particular were consciously running a political risk which was at the same time very high, but, in a way, unavoidable. Not accepting the challenge to form the government in Delhi would indeed be tantamount to admitting the AAP’s inability to translate its message of integrity, transparency and accountability into an effective policy aimed at solving those ills – corruption and bad administration – which Kejriwal’s party had so successfully denounced. On the other hand, for the AAP the act of governing was beset with difficulties; these were partly related to the AAP’s short history, partly to the complex composition of its social following, and, partly, to the fact that the Delhi government, being a Union Territory government, had much less power and autonomy than a state government.

Having been launched as recently as 26 November 2012, the AAP had not yet had the time to think out any comprehensive policy to tackle and try to solve the many problems besetting the country in general and Delhi in particular. The lack of a well-defined comprehensive policy, however, was not only the result of the AAP’s recent creation, but also depended on the inter-class and inter-caste nature of its social basis. In fact, an inter-class and inter-caste alliance against the common enemy represented by the existent corrupt political system was a feat comparatively easy to accomplish; on the contrary, it was noticeably more difficult to mediate among different class and caste interests, devising a set of effective policies which could satisfy either all or most of the social segments backing the AAP. Last but not least, as noted above, the Delhi government, being a Union Territory government, had less power than the state governments. By itself, in a situation in which the Union government and the Delhi government were ruled by different political combines, the Delhi government’s ability to act and implement its policies had an effective limit in the Union government’s political will.

All these handicaps contribute to explain the dismal performance, the short life (just 49 days) and final failure of a party not devoid of intellectual resources[4] and a leader who, before entering grass-root politics, had a solid educational background as an engineer and past experience as a civil servant. In fact, the AAP government started to operate energetically, and, during its first weeks in office, kept a part of its electoral promises by slashing power and water prices. Moreover, the AAP encouraged the residents of Delhi to use their mobile phones to record government workers demanding bribes, and report them through a hotline. This policy resulted in hundreds of officials, who were suspected of corruption, being moved out of key jobs, and – according to some reports – a conspicuous decline of corrupt practices in Delhi.[5]

However, as soon as the party had to confront different and more complex issues, difficulties started to arise. A detailed analysis of the AAP government activities would be too long to perform here; it suffices to notice that some of the AAP government’s decisions did disappoint one or another of the social sectors supporting the party, whereas other decisions were plainly wrong, possibly the result of lack of experience.[6] The situation was made more difficult by the fact that the Delhi government, being a Union Territory government, did not have any control over the Delhi police force, which was subject to the Union Home Ministry. The result was that tensions soon developed between the chief minister and the head of the Delhi police. As Kejriwal was to remember: «The first move I made when I was Chief Minister was to summon the Police Commissioner and told him firmly that I would hold the police accountable for incidents of rape. When three such incidents took place, I went on a protest.»[7]

Of course, the spectacle of a chief minister demonstrating in the streets was something unusual and shocking. Although some kind of modus vivendi between the chief minister and the Delhi police commissioner was later found, to many, Arvind Kejriwal turned from being Delhi’s Chief Minister to being Delhi’s Chief Protestor.[8]

These difficulties may explain Kejriwal’s decision to up the ante, by pushing for the approval in the Delhi Assembly of two bills in line with the AAP’s basic philosophy. These two laws were a Jan Lokpal Bill, namely an anti-corruption law which was stricter than the one approved the previous December by the Union parliament, and a Swaraj Bill, which radically decentralized the government of Delhi, by conferring wide powers on the 2,720 mohallas (regions) in which the Union Territory was organized.[9] Both bills, however, were opposed not only by the BJP but also by the Congress. The Swaraj Bill was criticized as too complex a piece of legislation, implying extensive changes in the existing laws, to be tabled in the Vidhan Sabha without a previous in-depth examination by the different parties. The Jan Lokpal bill, on the other hand, was opposed on technical grounds: according to a 2002 Executive Order, any piece of legislation implying financial expenditures had to be cleared in advance by the central government. Kejriwal, however, argued that the Executive Order was unconstitutional and he pressed for the discussion of the Jan Lokpal bill without any previous consent by the Union government. Moreover, on 9 February, Kejriwal made it clear in a NDTV television interview that, if the two laws were not passed, his government would resign.[10] As if that was not enough, on 11 February, Kejriwal ordered the Delhi anti-corruption bureau to start an investigation against Mukesh Ambani, chairman of Reliance Industry Ltd and generally considered the richest businessman in India. Ambani was accused of having conspired with the incumbent Union oil and gas minister, M. Veerappa Moily, and former minister, Murli Deora, both eminent Congress politicians, to push up the price of the Reliance extracted Krishna-Godavari basin gas, by creating an artificial shortage.[11]

All this caused the complete breakdown of the already difficult cooperation between the AAP and the Congress. The result was that, on 14 February, while the Vidhan Sabha «descended into uproar», the motion to introduce a vote on the Jan Lokpal bill was roundly defeated.[12] True to his word, Kejriwal immediately resigned, putting an end to the AAP government in Delhi.

According to many commentators, the AAP government’s resignation had been a goal consciously pursued by Kejriwal. Unable to tackle Delhi’s manifold problems and carry out effective policies to address them, he had preferred to go down fighting in favour of the anti-corruption bill. In doing this, Kejriwal’s actual goal was to assume the high moral ground, presenting himself as a «martyr», the victim of an unholy and unprecedented Congress–BJP alliance, come together to defend Mukesh Ambani.[13]

In resigning, Kejriwal asked the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi for immediate new elections, which, no doubt, he expected to be held at the same time as the imminent general elections and which he was confident to win by gaining at least 50 of the 70 Delhi Vidhan Sabha seats. However, that did not happen, and, although the Vidhan Sabha was dissolved, the Delhi territory came under presidential rule, namely under the direct control of the Union government; unexpectedly for the AAP leadership, this was a situation bound to last up to the end of the year under review, and beyond. Meanwhile, many political initiatives taken by the AAP government were left unaccomplished, while others were overturned. At the end of the day, Kejriwal’s decision backfired, discrediting the AAP.

As noted above, at the end of 2013, Kejriwal’s party appeared positioned to play a key role in the coming general election, competing with the two all-India parties (the Congress and the BJP) and ready to play the spoiler particularly vis-à-vis the BJP. After the AAP resignation, that possibility rapidly waned. It is true that, according to some opinion polls, those hopes were already overblown at the end of January,[14] mainly because of the AAP’s lack of financial and organizational resources. However, while the AAP was in government and Kejriwal appeared active in the attempt to solve the Capital Territory’s manifold problems, the possibility for the AAP to repeat the Delhi miracle of December 2013 at least in some of the main Indian cities was not to be discarded. But any hope of that came to an abrupt end with Kejriwal’s resignation. Months later, AAP party leaders and Kejriwal himself conceded on several occasions that the AAP resignation had been a major political blunder.[15]

3. The general election

The period up to mid May of 2014 was dominated first by the electoral campaign and then by the voting. As has become customary, the voting itself was articulated in several phases in the different parts of India: the first was held on 7 April; the ninth and final one was held on 12 May; finally, the results were declared on 16 May.

As usual, the Indian general election established a set of new records: the largest electorate ever in the history of the world (814.5 million people); the maximum number of voters who actually voted (540.7 million people); the highest percentage of voters who actually voted in the history of India (66.38%), the longest period of time during which the votes were cast (36 days); the maximum number of parties (484), the maximum number of candidates (8,251).

The electoral struggle saw the participation of two major political alliances and a number of other parties, among which the AAP, which went to the polls alone or, like the Communist parties, were part of a political alliance, the Left Front. The two major alliances were gathered around the only two parties which could be considered all-India parties, namely the centre-of-left Congress and the rightist BJP. The Congress headed the UPA (United Progressive Alliance), which had been in power during the two previous legislatures, and had as its campaign leader Rahul Gandhi. The BJP headed the NDA (National Democratic Alliance), and was led by Narendra Modi. Finally there were the parties which did not join any alliance; among those, on the eve of the elections, particularly strong looked the SP (Samajwadi Party), the BSP (Bahujan Samaj Party) – both rooted in the northern giant state of Uttar Pradesh –, the DMK (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) of Tamil Nadu, and the CPI-M (Communist Party of India – Marxist), the strongest of the Left Front parties, rooted in West Bengal, Kerala and Tripura.

Already during the electoral campaign and increasingly during the voting it had become clear that the BJP would emerge as the victor. However nobody was prepared for the dimension of the BJP’s victory; significantly, still at the closing of the voting marathon and immediately before the results were made public, most polls indicated that the Narendra Modi-headed alliance would fall short of winning 272 of the 543 seats in the Lok Sabha.[16] On the contrary, the BJP alone conquered 282 Lok Sabha seats, namely the absolute majority, whereas the whole NDA had 332 seats. On the other hand the Congress and its allies went down in a much more devastating defeat than anticipated: the Congress itself, suffering the worst defeat in its whole history – worse still than the historical debacle of 1977, at the end of the Emergency period – gained only 44 seats and its allies only 15 more, for a total of 59 seats.[17]

Details of the results are given in Tables 1 to 3. However, some of them must be stressed here. The BJP shot up from 116 seats to 282 and from 18.8% of the popular vote to 31%; on the other hand, the Congress crashed down from 208 seats to 44, and from 28.55% of the popular vote to 19.31%. This means that the distorting effect of the first-past-the-post electoral system, which is always strong in a plural and heterogeneous society like India, greatly favoured the BJP which, with 31% of the popular vote got a 51.93% share of the Lok Sabha elected seats,[18] and as greatly hindered the Congress, which, with 19.31% of the popular vote obtained 8.10% of the share of the Lok Sabha elected seats. In fact, the Congress’ share in the Lok Sabha seats was so limited that the «Grand Old Party» of India emerged from the 2014 general election without the constitutional requisites to be officially acknowledged as leader of the Opposition. Once this is said, the fact remains that the BJP’s victory was as clear-cut and convincing as the Congress’ defeat.

Parties	Number of seats	Plus/minus compared with 2009	Popular vote	Plus/minus compared with 2009
BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party)	282	+166	31%	+12.20%
Shiv Sena [Maharashtra]	18	+7	1.85%	+0.30
TSP (Telugu Desam Party)[Andhra Pradesh & Telangana]	16	+10	2.55%	+0.04
Lok Janshakti Party [Bihar]	6	+6	0.41%	-0.04
Rashtriya Lok Samata Party [Bihar]	3	not present in 2009	0.19%	not present in 2009
Apna Dal [Uttar Pradeh]	2	+2	0.15%	+0.03
PMK (Pattali Makkal Katchi)  [Tamil Nadu]	1	+1	0.33%	-0.14
Swabhimani Paksha  [Maharashtra]	1	0	0.20%	+0.08
Naga People’s Front [Nagaland]	1	0	0.18%	-0.02
National People’s Party[Meghalaya]	1	not present in 2009	0.10%	not present in 2009
All India N.R. Congress  [Puducherry]	1	not present in 2009	0.05%	not present in 2009
Other NDA parties (5)	0		0.89%
Total	332
Source: Election Commission of India (http://eci.nic.in/eci/eci.html)

Table 1. Nationwide 2014 electoral results: NDA parties

Table 2. Nationwide 2014 electoral results: UPA parties

Parties	Number of seats	Plus/minus compared with 2009	Popular vote	Plus/minus compared with 2009
Congress (Indian National Congress)	44	-162	19.31%	-9.24
Nationalist Congress Party [Maharashtra]	6	-3	1.56%	-0.58
Rashtriya Janata Dal [Bihar]	4	0	1.34%	+0.74
Jharkhand Mukti Morcha	2	0	0.30%	-0.10
Indian Union Muslim League  [Kerala]	2	0	0.20%	-0.01
Kerala Congress	1	0	0.08%	-0.02
Other UPA parties (4)	0		0,32%
Total	59		23.83%
Source: Election Commission of India (http://eci.nic.in/eci/eci.html)

Table 3. Nationwide 2014 electoral results: non-NDA/non-UPA parties which gained at least one seat

Parties	Number of seats	Plus/minus compared with 2009	Popular vote	Plus/minus compared with 2009
AIADMK (All India Munnetra Kazhagam) [Tamil Nadu]	37	+28	3.27%	+1.60
Trinamool Congress [West Bengal]	34	+15	3.84%	+0.34
Biju Janata Dal [Odisha]	20	+6	1.7%	+0.12
CPI-M (Communist Party of India – Marxist)	9	+-7	3.25%	-2.08
YSR Congress Party (Yuvajana, Shramika, Rythu Congress Party) [Andhra Pradesh and Telangana]	9	not present in 2009	2.5%	not present in 2009
Samajwadi Party [Uttar Pradesh]	5	-18	3,37%	-0.05
AAP (Aam Aadmi Party) [Punjab]	4	not present in 2009	2.05%	not present in 2009
IUDF (All India United Democratic Front) [Assam]	3	+2	0.42%	-0.10
J&KPDP (Jammu and Kashmir People’s Democratic Party)	3	0	0,13%	+0.01
JD(U) (Janata Dal – United) [Bihar]	2	-18	1.1%	-0.44
JD(S)  (Janata Dal – Secular) [Karnataka and Kerala])	2	-1	0.67%	-0.15
Total
Source: Election Commission of India (http://eci.nic.in/eci/eci.html)

Another aspect worthy of highlight is the drastic decline in the political strength of the regional parties, namely those parties which are politically significant in only one of the Indian states.[19]These parties became increasingly influential in the 1990s and 2000s, as the two all-India parties – the Congress and the BJP – could cobble together a majority at the centre only thanks to the support of a more or less wide number of regional parties. In 2014, in spite of the debacle of some of the major regional parties of the North – the SP and the BSP in Uttar Pradesh and the Janata Dal (United) in Bihar – the regional parties obtained the same number of seats (212) and practically the same share of the popular vote (46.7% in 2009 and 46.6% in 2014) as in 2009.[20] However, the fact that the BJP succeeded in conquering the absolute majority of the Lok Sabha seats completely changed the terms of the political equation. Quite simply, the regional parties went from indispensable to superfluous in the survival of the Union government.

Finally, the results of the AAP must be taken into account. Kejriwal’s party won only four seats, all of them in the Punjab, and a paltry 2.05% of the popular vote. At least for the time being, these results transformed the AAP into a (second-rate) regional party. It was a very disappointing outcome, particularly when compared with the rosy expectations of its leaders and many political analysts[21] only a few months before.

3.1. The electoral battle

After the AAP government’s resignation in Delhi, which suddenly deflated the hopes of Kejriwal’s party and its supporters of playing a major role at the all-India level, the 2014 general election can be seen, although in a very simplified way, as a kind of duel to the finish, less between the NDA and the UPA than between the BJP and the Congress. As already noticed, it was a duel which ended up in a total victory of the former over the latter. However, an additional element must be stressed: the BJP won even in those states where it confronted other, and apparently quite strong, political adversaries, as was the case in Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Bihar; on the other hand, the Congress lost resoundingly even where it was not confronted by the BJP, as was the case, most notably, in Andhra Pradesh. Accordingly, the all-India BJP–Congress battle will be examined first, to be followed by the examination of the battles which were fought in UP and Bihar, where the BJP vanquished some of the strongest regional parties, and in Andhra Pradesh, where, although not confronted by the BJP, nevertheless the «Grand Old Party» bit the dust.

3.2. The political battlefield

In order to understand how the battle royal between the BJP and the Congress was fought and before describing the battle itself, three background elements must be examined: the first is how the political battlefield was delimited; the second is the nature of the opposing armies; the third is the strengths and weaknesses of the two opposing leaders.

The political battlefield can be seen as potentially delimited by the results, in the 2004-14 legislatures, of the UPA governments led by the Congress, and the results of the Modi-led BJP governments in Gujarat in 2001-14. Here, the term «potentially» is not employed by chance: during the electoral campaign, whereas the results of the Modi governments in Gujarat became a kind of reference paradigm, any discussion on the UPA governments’ results was limited to the admittedly gross scandals which had become of public domain in the second half of the second UPA government and to the slowing down of the rate of growth and the persistence of a high price inflation, particularly of food prices, during the same period. In other words, the Congress party was unable to lay claim to the UPA governments’ achievements since 2004, which were far from being insignificant, both at the economic level and from the standpoint of social justice.

In ten years of power, the UPA governments had pushed a policy of neoliberal reforms, counterbalanced by social policies aimed at protecting the weaker social strata and enlarging the space of democracy. The neoliberal reforms had translated into the steady growth of the GNP, even if, during the last two years that growth had slowed down.[22] On the other hand, the UPA governments had implemented laws such as the 2005 National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (giving the right to 100 days of work to any rural family); the 2005 Right to Information Act (opening the work of the government to the scrutiny of both individual citizens and grass root organizations); the 2006 Forest Rights Acts, granting land and forest rights to India’s adivasis(tribals); the 2013 Food Security Act, granting a certain quantity of food on a monthly basis at very reduced prices to some 80% of the population; and the 2013 Land Acquisition Act (which provides a fair compensation to those whose land is expropriated in order to favour economic development).

These policies – both the prosecution of the liberal reforms and the launching of a set of anti-poverty and/or anti-discrimination laws – could and have been roundly criticized both because they were not rightist enough or, vice versa, because they were not leftist enough. This is a fact that, by itself, could be taken as an indication that such policies did represent a balanced approach to the problems that they were supposed to solve. This was exactly what was claimed by Jairam Ramesh, one of the Congress leaders, after the defeat. «There are some people who would say we were not Left enough – said Ramesh –; some would say we were not Right enough. These are simplistic binary options which I reject. Let us say we were on the right track. We were stressing growth with empowerment. Without growth, empowerment is hollow; without empowerment, growth is meaningless.»[23] However, it is a fact that, during the electoral campaign, the Congress appeared unable to highlight the economic and the social achievements of the UPA governments. Indeed, the Congress campaign was a «listless and confused campaign»,[24] which was ultimately fought on the battleground chosen by Narendra Modi.

On his part, Modi was able to project the Gujarat economic record during his tenures as chief minister as the model of economic development, a model supposedly invented and implemented by Modi and ready to be applied to the whole of India. In doing so, Modi was able to push to the background a set of potentially embarrassing elements: that the Gujarat development was not unique; that other Indian states had been growing faster than Gujarat; that the Gujarat model was far from being inclusive; that, historically, Gujarat had always been one of the wealthiest areas of India; that, in fact, the beginning of the Gujarati economic boom predated Modi’s arrival as chief minister.

3.3. The two opposing armies

The political army deployed behind Narendra Modi was made up by the BJP, the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, namely an extremely powerful and well organized non-parliamentary organization), and the parties allied with the BJP, gathered in the NDA (National Democratic Alliance). Moreover, among Modi’s supporters there were two powerful social groups: one was what the Indian press likes to call India Inc., and the other the Indian middle class.

The BJP, like the other Indian parties, is far from being a democratic organization. However, even because, after 2004, the central leadership had been weak, a number of influential leaders had conquered a position of eminence and a solid following in their respective states. Narendra Modi was one among these influential state leaders; but Vasundhara Raje in Rajasthan, Shivraj Singh Chouhan in Madhya Pradesh, and Raman Singh in Chhattisgarh were hardly less successful, powerful and popular in their own states. This means that the BJP had in-depth political roots in a number of important states.

Beside the party, there was the RSS, historically the most important non-parliamentary Hindu organization. The RSS is a secretive, extremely well-knit, semi-military body, which controls, more or less closely, or at least influences most other political or social Hindu organizations, including the BJP. In an electoral battle, its strength rests on its well-organized and numerous body of volunteers. The allied parties were much less influential and well organized than either the BJP or the RSS. But, at least the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra and the TDP (Telugu Desam Party) in Andhra Pradesh were political forces to be reckoned with.

Much more important support was given to Narendra Modi’s camp by the two powerful social groups named above: India Inc. and the middle class.

The first social group was made up by that limited number of extremely wealthy families which dominate the private economy in India. Historically, the political strategy of its members has been that of hedging their bets by supporting all the main parties in the political battlefield, even if not necessarily with the same amount of financial resources. But already before the 2009 general election some key members of this group started to abandon their traditional position of equidistance.[25] The Ambanis and the Birlas in particular came out with open support not so much for the BJP as for Narendra Modi. This happened at a time when the BJP’s official candidate for the prime ministership was not Modi, but Lal K. Advani.[26] After the BJP’s defeat in the 2009 elections, big business support for Modi consolidated. Significantly, the CEO confidence survey, carried out by the Economic Times in January 2013, revealed that 74 of the 100 top businesspeople polled preferred Narendra Modi as the prime ministerial candidate, whereas only seven chose Rahul Gandhi.[27] This pro-Modi preference eventually resulted in the strategic choice by most of the top Indian corporations to massively bankroll the BJP and the BJP alone (with very few exceptions, particularly the Tatas, who kept the traditional policy of funding the two main parties on a more or less equal footing).[28] Quite important also was the support given to Modi by India Inc. through its control of the massive majority of the press and the totality of private television networks. Press and television on one side projected Modi as a dynamic, strong-willed, intelligent leader, a kind of knight sans peur et sans reproche (fearless and blemishless), while, at the same time, highlighting and magnifying out of proportion Rahul Gandhi’s weaknesses and gaffes.

The support of the middle class – a minority, but an influential one – was hardly less decisive. Some of its members, grouped in the «Citizens for Accountable Governance» – mostly young professionals and corporate executives who worked on a voluntary or semi-voluntary basis – played a key role as an extremely effective consulting and campaign solutions team.[29] Other members of the middle class either ran a widespread social media campaign in support of Modi or offered their technical know-how to realize startlingly innovative electoral methods. Among these methods, there was the utilization of holograms representing Modi and carrying out his message in those corners, particularly in rural India, where Modi could not be present in person.[30]

The situation of the opposing army was starkly different. The Congress appeared to be at the fag end of a long-term organizational decline. It was a decline that Rahul Gandhi had time and again declared he had decided to reverse. However, nothing concrete had ever been done. In fact the Congress on the eve of the 2014 elections was characterized by an all powerful central leadership presiding over a party organization which, in most Indian states, appeared to be in shambles. This all powerful central leadership had consciously precluded the emergence of any strong and popular party leader at the state level.

In this situation of weakness, the Congress could not hope for any decisive help coming from its allied parties, which, by and large, were lightweights. The only relatively strong allies, the Nationalist Congress Party in Maharashtra and the DMK in Tamil Nadu, had been badly tainted by the scandals emerged in the second half of the 2009–14 legislature.

What appeared really striking, however, was the social isolation of the Congress. Of course, the middle class had never supported the «Grand Old Party»; but the new positioning of India Inc. squarely behind Modi was a new and much unwelcome development. Moreover, even the connections with social groups which, traditionally, in most of India, had been on the Congress side – such as the dalits, the tribals, and the Muslims – appeared weak and in a state of flux.

Finally there was the problem of the younger and especially first-time voters. This was a statistical class which was bound to be highly significant in the 2014 general elections, when the number of first-time electors would equal some 120.53 million people out of an electorate of about 833.06 million, namely 14.47% of the total electorate. [31] This means that on average, in each constituency, first time voters would be around 43,000. This was a highly relevant proportion, because well above what had been the winning margin in 226 of the 553 constituencies in the 2009 general election. [32] Differently put, first-time voters could swing the result of the vote in 41% of the electoral constituencies. Although at least some Congress leaders appeared to be aware of the relevance of this group,[33] the party seemed totally unable to connect with it and no specific strategy aimed at mobilizing it behind the party had been either devised or implemented.

3.4. The leaders of the two opposing armies

No doubt a main element in explaining the 2014 general election was the massive diversity in ability between the leaders of the two opposing armies: Narendra Modi and Rahul Gandhi.

A brief analysis of the two leaders is in order here. Rahul Gandhi is the heir to a political dynasty which has ruled India for most of its history as an independent nation. He has been pushed into the political arena by his mother, Sonia, who, since the late 1990s, has been the leader of the Congress party and the real power behind the throne in the UPA governments. The problem is that Rahul has always appeared to be both an extremely reluctant political player, and a person devoid of any political skills and personal charisma.

On the eve of the 2014 elections, the selection of a new Congress campaign leader and a new candidate for the position of prime minister had been made necessary by Manmohan Singh’s declining prestige and Sonia Gandhi’s health problems. Particularly important appears to have been the latter’s inability to lead the Congress electoral campaign, due to her lack of physical strength. Sonia Gandhi had been an impressive campaigner in the 1998, 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections; in particular in the 1998 campaign, although unable to lead the Congress to victory, Sonia Gandhi had kept together a party that seemed headed for disintegration, whereas, in the 2004 campaign, she almost single-handedly led the party to an unexpected and resounding victory. However, all that changed in the summer of 2011, when she underwent a mysterious surgical intervention in the USA, possibly cancer-related, which left her with much less physical energy than before.[34]

In the Congress there were still some politicians who could have faced the challenge mounted by Modi on a level approaching parity; but the problem was that, had one of these leaders been chosen and emerged victorious, the Nehru-Gandhi family’s grip on the party would have been broken. Sonia Gandhi’s control of the party was based on her ability to deploy a conspicuous electoral following; that ability gone, the sceptre would pass to the victorious leader at the polls. Therefore, for Sonia Gandhi, the only way to keep control over the party was to choose as leader of the electoral campaign – and as candidate to the prime ministership – a member of her family.

The choice of Rahul was made by Sonia without arousing any opposition inside the party. In fact, many in the party had been clamouring for Rahul Gandhi’s appointment as the new leader, and none had openly been opposing it. Paradoxically, all the difficulties came from Rahul himself, who appeared as reluctant as ever at the prospect of actively and seriously playing the role of leader. At the time of his choice as Congress Vice President and de facto party campaign leader (19 January 2013), Rahul Gandhi had already been in politics for some ten years, although fitfully. In fact, during the 2009 general elections, the Gandhi scion had played a very active role and led the party to a good positioning in the crucial state of UP. But that effort had been a flash in the pan: no sustained and continuous work to reorganize the party had followed it.

Equally important and as negative was Rahul Gandhi’s difficulty in connecting with Indian youth. Although a very young politician by Indian standards (in 2014 Rahul Gandhi was 43 years of age, while Narendra Modi was 62), and although he had spent an important part of his political career as leader of the Youth Congress and its student wing, young Gandhi had been unable «to throw up a big idea that would make him particularly attractive to teenage India».[35] In a way more significant was the fact that he had been virtually absent in two causes that had been particularly important for young Indians: the Anna Hazare-led agitation against corruption, which had been the dominant political development in 2011, and the mass protest demonstrations which had shaken Delhi following the horrific Nirbhaya case of gang rape in on 26 December 2012.[36] All this was compounded by Rahul Gandhi’s inability «to reach out to a highly interactive generation which thrives on constant communication», an inability which was epitomised by his reluctance to address press conferences, to participate in high-profile college fests, and, last but certainly not least, by the fact that he was not present in the social media space, not even having a Twitter or a Facebook account.[37]

To anybody but the Congress rank and file – and, maybe even in his own eyes, judging from some of his own declarations – young Rahul Gandhi appeared as a person without qualities, who had been projected to his position as Congress leader only because he was the son, grandson and the great-grandson of three former prime ministers.

On his part, Narendra Modi appeared as Rahul Gandhi’s exact opposite, being a self-made man and a social media skilled user. We shall dwell on the latter point in the next section. Here the former point will be tackled.

Modi is a man of humble origins, hailing from «a caste of lowly oil-pressers» and the «third of six children of a poor tea-seller at Vadnagar Railway Station, in Gujarat»,[38] who rose through the RSS and BJP rank and file. Inducted into the BJP national executive in 1991, Modi became chief minister of Gujarat in 2001, and remained in power winning a total of three consecutive state elections.

Far from having an easy path to being chosen as the leader of the BJP electoral campaign and its prime minister designate, Modi had to fight all along the way and overcome considerable hurdles. He had been confronted both by the opposition of a strong group of BJP leaders, among whom the most powerful one was his former mentor, Lal K. Advani, and by the open hostility of Nitish Kumar, the chief minister of Bihar and the leader of the Janata Dal (United), namely one of the key components of the NDA. On the top of all that, for quite some time the RSS leadership had appeared far from enthusiastic at the idea of having Modi as the BJP’s prime minister designate.[39]

In a long struggle, which began in 2012, Modi gradually pushed aside the internal opposition, and compacted the party behind himself. While the struggle was still on, at the beginning of 2013, the RSS leadership changed their attitude vis-à-vis Modi, and started to actively support him. From then on Modi’s march became unstoppable: on June 2013 he was officially put in charge of the electoral campaign, and on 13 September he was designated as the party candidate to the prime ministership. All this happened in spite of the opposition from Advani and others, thanks to the open support of the RSS leadership, and at the cost of an open break with Nitish Kumar’s JD(U).[40]

3.5. Narendra Modi’s electoral campaign

The electoral campaign was started by Narendra Modi in September 2013, well in advance of the Congress campaign. From the beginning, Modi presented himself as the politician responsible for the extremely successful «Gujarat model» of development, which, if elected to the prime ministership, he would replicate at the all-India level. This dominant leitmotif was supplemented by other, maybe less insisted upon, themes, but hardly less important in conquering crucial swathes of the electorate. One was the fact that – different from what had been the rule in the BJP leadership (and in the leadership of most Indian parties, barring the caste-based ones) – Modi himself belonged to a low caste. This was complemented by the attention that Modi gave to the dalits, exemplified by his remark on 3 March 2014, at a rally in Muzaffarpur (Bihar), that «The next decade will belong to the dalits and the backwards».[41] This was a trump card particularly in states such as UP and Bihar, where the low castes (or so-called Other Backward Classes) and the dalits are numerous and politically powerful.

Another theme, utilized with devastating results, was the contrast with Rahul Gandhi. Modi continuously highlighted the fact that, whereas he was a self-made man who, starting from the lowest rungs of the social ladder, had climbed to the top on the strength of his willpower and abilities, his adversary was the pampered scion of an illustrious family, without any particular personal merit, whom Modi derisively dismissed as the Shahzada, the «princeling».  On the same wave length was the chai wallah (tea vendor) affair: a mocking remark by the well-known congressman and former minister Mani Shankar Aiyar, hinting at Modi’s past as a boy serving tea in his father’s outfit, was readily capitalized on in order to claim that those who thrived on dynasty politics could not accept being challenged by somebody «whose mother used to wash dishes».[42]Moreover, the adroit handling of the affair by the Citizens for Accountable Government (on which more later), made of the ubiquitous chai wallahs of India as many pro-Modi activists.

Finally, Modi was well aware of the importance of targeting the young and the relevance to that end of the new forms of communication, from mobile phones and text messages to the massive use of the social media, including Twitter and Facebook. Already during the summer of 2013, namely before the official launch of his electoral campaign, Modi had taken a position on the rising cost of education at various institutions (something that Rahul Gandhi never did) and, in August, in a meeting of the BJP central leadership in New Delhi, had asked his party’s state units to focus their attention on young and first-time voters.[43] One can surmise that, in doing so, Modi was spurred by several considerations. The first was that, for an age group whose components were around six to ten years old in 2002, the months-long anti-Muslim pogroms which had convulsed Gujarat in that year – and which remained the most conspicuous blot in Narendra Modi’s political career – were bound to be unimportant.[44] Another consideration behind Modi’s attention to Indian youth must have been his conviction that, by projecting his developmental ideology through the new media – which supplied most young people with information and moulded their Weltanschauung – he could fully mobilize a population category, which, historically, had had a low level of participation in the electoral process.[45]

There is no doubt that, from the beginning of the BJP electoral campaign, a great deal of attention was given to young and first-time voters, including those in the rural areas. Modi personally reached out to young voters through social media like Google Hangout and Twitter while, at the same time, putting in charge of the campaign to mobilize the same group not only the Yuva Morcha (the BJP youth wing), headed by Anurag Thakur, but a newly created special committee. This committee was headed by the «relatively youthful» BJP general secretary, Muralidhar Rao (sometimes spelled Murlidhar Rao), who had emerged through the BJP rank and file among other reasons because of his remarkable skills as a student organizer.[46]

In carrying out his multi-pronged attack, Modi, as a rule, dwelled on divisive religious/communal themes only exceptionally, and mainly in the last legs of his long-drawn-out campaign. But, in a way, the religious subtext to his developmental and meritocratic rhetoric was made clear not only by Modi’s stray remarks on the matter, but by those of other leaders of the Hindu Right and his own closer help, Amit Shah. Apart from that, there is no doubt that the massive campaign led on the ground by the RSS volunteers fleshed out Modi’s technocratic and meritocratic rhetoric with the assertion and reiteration of the traditional religious/communal tenets proper of the Hindu Right in general and the RSS in particular.

While on the campaign trail, Narendra Modi showed himself to be an extremely active campaigner, an extraordinarily effective speaker and a master of the minutiae of the single constituencies where he campaigned. [47] Both the overreaching developmental ideology propounded by Modi and the command of the minutiae in any given constituency were the result of previous work by Modi and his helpers.

What made the developmental ideology compelling, particularly for the middle class, was not only – and, maybe, not so much – Modi’s economic record, but the capability that he had shown in opposing, and expelling from Gujarat, those organizations of the Hindu Right which, still in the time of Vajpayee’s governments (1998-2004), had fiercely opposed the neoliberal economic agenda, harking back to swadeshi, namely the autarchic economic policy of nationalist lore.[48]On the other hand, Modi’s mastery of the minutiae of the different constituencies was the by-product of the in-depth research work carried out by the Citizens for Accountable Governance.

In fact, the Citizens for Accountable Governance played a crucial role in organizing the whole campaign, in producing talking points for Modi and in putting together and distributing Moditva, a book collecting Modi’s speeches. As noted above, it was again this group which translated Mani Shankar Aiyar’s chai wallah remark into a propaganda weapon.[49] The group was headed by Prashant Kishor, namely a political operative very close to Modi. However, as already recalled, the group was chiefly made up of non-politicians, mainly young middle class professionals and corporation executives. Rather unexpectedly, the group showed an uncanny ability at working harmoniously with both the BJP and RSS personnel. This became visible and brought huge electoral rewards particularly in UP.[50]

Last but not least, thanks to the decisive role played by his alter ego, Amit Shah, Modi was able to develop a very effective relationship with the RSS volunteers, deploying them as an extremely efficient ground army.[51]

3.6. Rahul Gandhi’s electoral campaign

On the eve of the campaign, Sonia Gandhi set up a committee under her chairmanship, including most of the party’s senior leaders, which should have directed the ensuing electoral battle. However, after meeting only once, the campaign committee de facto stopped functioning, Sonia Gandhi became inactive, and the proposals made at the committee’s initial meeting were forgotten. The organization of the campaign then passed into the hands of Rahul Gandhi, his sister Priyanka and a group of non-political, mostly foreign-educated advisers.[52]

Superficially, «Team Rahul» looked much like the pro-Modi Citizens for Accountable Governance. But there were two key differences: Team Rahul was less efficient, and its members were «people with no electoral experience […] no stature, standing, respect and credibility in the party».[53]Perhaps more important, Team Rahul’s coming to the foreground as the electoral campaign organizer brought about a situation in which Rahul and his team «did not listen» either to the party cadres or to the Congress legislators and senior leaders and did not communicate with them. The consequence «was a rift between grassroots workers and party leaders» and the fact that the party became «unresponsive» to the directives from the top.[54]

In this situation of isolation, Rahul and his team fell back on an electoral strategy that was not proactive but reactive; reactive, that is, to the storm of accusations which had scourged the party in the second half of the 2009–14 legislature. They were of three different kinds: the first was that the Congress was a party beset with corruption; the second was that the prime minister, Manmohan Singh, during the second UPA legislature had become apathetic and a silent accomplice to the widespread corruption in his own government; the third was that the social content laws enacted by the party had been a waste of public money and a source of corruption (or, as Modi liked to claim, the UPA economic policies were not development policies, but dole policies). In an astonishing – and astonishingly inept – surrender to these accusations, the party apex put on the back burner attempts to lay claim to the UPA’s political and economic achievements. Rather, it was decided to project Rahul Gandhi as a «new man», a kind of Indian Heracles who would clean those stables of Augeas which had become the Congress. Hence Rahul Gandhi had to be separated from the old Congress ruling class and constructed as the demiurge who would mould a new kind of party – younger, cleaner, more democratic and more efficient. The result of this choice was the decision to project Rahul Gandhi as the sole face of the Congress during the electoral campaign; significantly, both Sonia Gandhi and Manmohan Singh did not feature on the most recurring election posters, «leaving Mr. Gandhi’s youthful features, often trendily unshaven, beaming alone».[55] This could not but be a self-defeating choice, as Rahul Gandhi was not credible as the external saviour: after all, he had been in and out of politics for ten years, always very near to the Congress real centre of power, namely his own mother.[56]

On top of it all, the Congress strategists appeared unable to decide how Rahul Gandhi should counter Modi’s onslaught. In fact, they vacillated between two lines: the first highlighting Modi’s communal past and warning the electorate of the dangers of the communal agenda which was possibly hidden behind his developmental rhetoric; the second attacking the developmental rhetoric itself, showing the social shortcomings and economic limitations of the «Gujarat model».

As they had done more than once when confronting Modi on his home turf (namely in the Gujarat state elections), and with similar disappointing results, the Congress strategists decided that raking-up memories of the 2002 communal riots in Gujarat «would prove counter-productive, resulting in a Hindu consolidation».[57] However, the Congress’ attempts «to punch holes in Modi’s claims on [the] development front found few takers particularly since the Congress party’s own credibility had hit an all-time low».[58] Eventually, as the campaign progressed, the Congress «changed tack and started attacking Modi for his divisive agenda and communal leanings». At that point, however, Modi had already succeeded in projecting himself «as a strong and decisive leader», the only one with the ability to take charge of India’s many problems and put them right. [59]

Apart from the confused and vacillating strategies implemented by the Congress, what made its whole campaign ineffective was Rahul Gandhi himself. A handsome, photogenic and likeable person, Rahul did show an energy, when on the campaign trail, which has been unfairly appraised by the Indian media.[60] But the fact remains that, if Modi, although «a master in exaggeration», was a great communicator; Rahul Gandhi, on his part, was a very poor communicator, and «a master of misplaced metaphors».[61] Rahul’s speeches came through as rich in generic (and hardly questionable) promises of reform of both his party and the social and political system, but totally devoid of any concrete plans to implement such promises. Possibly the lowest point in Rahul Gandhi’s whole campaign – and the undeniable demonstration of his lack of communication skills – was the television interview with Time Now editor in chief Arnab Goswami, on 27 January 2014. In it, young Gandhi came through as an immature leader, prone to give «clownish non-answers».[62]

3.7. The BJP’s breakthrough in the Hindi heartland

So far the 2014 electoral battle has been described as mainly a direct contest between the BJP and the Congress. However, the BJP victory would not have been so massive, had the party not conquered the two key northern states of UP and Bihar, namely the core of the Hindi belt. Between them, UP and Bihar send 120 members to the Lok Sabha (80 the former, 40 the latter), namely 22% of the elected members. If, in 2014, in those two states the BJP had conquered the same amount of seats as in 2009, its overall majority would have been equal to 211, instead of 282.[63] In other words, the BJP would still have a majority, but much less than the absolute majority, which would have considerably limited its political options and power. Significantly, most of the pre-election analyses set the margin of the BJP victory around 200–210 seats, which possibly means that Modi’s party was not expected to win so massively in UP and Bihar.

What makes these two states such interesting case studies is that the Congress was a minor player in both, as the political landscape was dominated by a number of powerful regional parties: the Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party in UP; the Janata Dal (United) in Bihar. Accordingly the BJP won – and won massively – by defeating the local regional parties.

3.7.1. The BJP’s breakthrough in UP

The political situation in UP in the previous decade was characterized by the fact that the BSP and the Samajwadi Party appeared to have successfully marginalized the two all-India parties: the Congress and the BJP. In turn, this had left the political arena free for a long-drawn-out duel between the two regional parties. The Samajwadi Party’s main constituency was made up by the alliance between the Yadavs, namely the most powerful of the OBCs (Other Backward Classes), and the Muslims. On the other hand, the BSP’s core constituency was made up by the dalits. The two parties had been able to gain the absolute majority of the UP Assembly seats – the BSP in 2007, the SP in 2012 – by extending their social basis to include all the OBCs, in the case of the Samajwadi Party, or the bulk of the upper castes in the case of the BSP.[64]

On the eve of the 2014 election campaign, the public mood in UP appeared characterized by a general disillusionment with both the BSP and the Samajwadi Party. In fact, their abysmal record when in power had led to a «deep sense of alienation», particularly among the non-Yadav OBC supporters of the Samajwadi Party and the non Chamar/Jatav Dalit[65] followers of the BSP. [66]

Against this background, communal tension, which after 1992–93 had been on the wane, resurfaced in August–September 2013, when, in the northern UP district of Muzaffarnagar, a violent confrontation pitted the Jats (the locally dominant Hindu caste) against the Muslims. This resulted in the murder several scores of persons, the bulk of whom were Muslims, and the displacement of the whole local Muslim community.[67] The reasons and the unfolding of the riots need not to detain us here; what is important is an examination of its political consequences. The Muslims felt betrayed by the SP government, which had failed to protect them and had been laggard in succouring them. On the other hand, the BJP, which, led by Amit Shah, had been reorganizing itself in UP already for many months, was in the position to make capital of the riot. It projected the Jat–Muslim clash as «a broader battle between Hindus and Muslims», persuading «the Jats, as also other non-Muslim social groups, that they had been discriminated against not because they were Jats, but because they were Hindus».[68] At that point, a video was posted online showing what was alleged to be the brutal beating by a Muslim mob of two persons, supposedly two Hindus. The video – which had been filmed in Pakistan, and had no connection with the Muzaffarnagar clash – played a role in making the situation even tenser. At that point, the BJP, in the successful effort to portray itself as the only party willing to fight the pretended injustices suffered by the Hindus, organized a ceremony in Agra to felicitate the Jats who had been implicated in the riots.[69]

In UP as in the remainder of India, the BJP’s electoral campaign worked like a Swiss timepiece, making use of both the most advanced IT techniques and the time-tested and capillary ground propaganda carried out by the RSS. During the campaign, the developmental theme came to be integrated with two others: the first was Narendra Modi’s low caste origin, aimed at seducing the OBCs; the second, which became prominent particularly in the closing days of the electoral campaign, was the raking up of some of the traditional topics of the Hindu Right: the ban on beef exports and the building of the Ram temple on the site of the Babri Masjid, the mosque razed to the ground by Hindu activists in 1992. Thanks to the situation of communal tension caused by the Muzaffarnagar riots and their inept handling by the UP government, the strategy paid handsomely. As pithily summed up by Ajaz Ashraf of Scroll.in: «It wouldn’t be wrong to say that the politics of religion and caste comprised the cake, while development was the cherry on top.»[70]

3.7.2. The BJP’s breakthrough in Bihar

In a way, the case of Bihar is more difficult to explain than that of UP. For quite a long time, Bihar had been considered, and rightly so, one of the most backward states in India, marked by the spread of crime and corruption. Then, following the 2005 state elections, a new government, based on the alliance between the BJP and the Janata Dal (United), a local regional party, took power. The new government, led by Nitish Kumar, the JD(U) leader, started to turn things around spectacularly: the rampant criminality and widespread corruption which had beset the state was effectively rolled back, and, even as a consequence of the new and more favourable law and order situation, the economy started to grow rapidly. In the 2010 state elections, the BJP-JD(U) combine was returned to power, even if the relative position of strength between the two parties was reversed in favour of the JD(U). By that year, Bihar had already become the second fastest growing state in India, averaging an annual growth rate of 11% in the five years from 2004/05 to 2008/09 (which put Bihar «just a shade behind Gujarat’s well-publicized growth of 11.05%»)[71]. During the second BJP-JD(U) government, Bihar’s growth rate further and conspicuously accelerated, making of it the fastest growing state in India. In 2012–13, Bihar’s rate of growth reached the stellar 15.05%, which put it well ahead of Gujarat (which, with a 7.96% rate of growth, was only sixth).[72]Differently from what was the case in Gujarat, Nitish Kumar, while actively promoting an economic growth which was spearheaded by infrastructure building and the rapid increase of the tertiary sector, advocated «caution on land acquisition for urbanization or industrialization and would not have the state intervene on behalf of big money».[73] Again differently from what was the case in Gujarat, Nitish Kumar, particularly since 2009, put a great deal of effort into promoting a socially inclusive growth, by empowering the weakest sections of society, particularly the EBCs (Extremely Backward Classes), the Mahadalit (namely the most backward among the scheduled castes), and women.

For some eight years, beginning in 2005, Kumar ran one of the most «trouble free» coalition governments in India,[74] having a good working relation with the local BJP. However, already during the 2009 general election and the 2010 Bihar state election, it became clear that Nitish Kumar’s relationship with the BJP rising star at the national level, Narendra Modi, was bad, as shown by the fact that Kumar prevented Modi from campaigning in Bihar.[75] In June 2012, Nitish Kumar made it clear that he would not accept the Gujarat chief minister as the NDA leader. When, in spite of his warnings, Modi was chosen by his party as the campaign leader, on 16 June 2013 Nitish Kumar left the NDA and broke his alliance with the BJP in Bihar (where he was able to remain in power thanks to the support of some independent Members of the Legislative Assembly).

The break had not arrived unexpected, and the BJP was ready for it. In the following propaganda battle, the BJP claimed that credit for Bihar’s phenomenal growth went less to Nitish Kumar than to both the BJP state ministers and the economic support from the central government. But the BJP’s real trump card was another, namely that Modi belonged to an «extremely backward caste». The BJP strategists anticipated that, by itself, this was bound to attract at least a part of those EBCs which had hitherto made up one of the key social blocks supporting Nitish Kumar. Consequently, BJP strategists actively began to build an electoral front which, beside the high castes, traditionally represented by the BJP, included both EBCs and dalits.[76]

The ensuing electoral campaign rapidly demonstrated two things: the first was that, at least in Bihar, eight years of unprecedented and uninterrupted economic growth coupled with social peace and a constant effort at making growth as inclusive as possible hardly had any impact at the electoral level; the second was that, at least in Bihar, what really counted was caste arithmetic. In turn, caste arithmetic implied the distribution of (promised) rewards to the several castes, but, firstly and most importantly, to their leaders. It was through the promise of rewards to such caste leaders that social support was consolidated behind the BJP and party alliances were put in place.

Two things made the BJP promises alluring: the first was that, at the all-India level, the BJP was clearly on the roll, while the Congress was as clearly in a state of difficulty. The second was, as rightly guessed by the BJP state strategists, Modi’s caste origin, plus his newly found attention for dalits. Joining Modi meant to jump on the bandwagon of the very probable victor at the all-India level; staying with Nitish Kumar meant to join a leader who, even if victorious at the state level, could hardly hope to have any decisive political leverage at the national level and, consequently, could not offer the same rewards as Modi. Not surprisingly, the Bihar BJP soon proved itself to have an almost irresistible gravitational force: some politicians who had hitherto belonged to the JD(U) now entered the BJP or formed their own party in order to arrive at an alliance with it; others, who, the situation having been different, could have allied with the JD(U), now sought an alliance with the BJP. An example of the former case is that of Upendra Kushwaha, a low caste leader, who, after leaving the JD(U) to create his own party, the Rashtriya Lok Samata Party, eventually joined hands with the BJP (February 2014); exemplary of the latter case was the alliance with the BJP of Ram Vilas Paswan’s Lok Janshakti Party, representing the Bihari dalits.[77]

In a situation in which caste arithmetic was crucial and party alliances indispensable, Nitish Kumar showed himself incapable of building a strong anti-BJP party coalition. He had to face the competition of that same old enemy he had ousted from power in 2005: the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD). Led by Laloo Prasad Yadav, the RJD had as its potential electoral base the Yadavs, namely the most numerous and powerful among the Bihari OBCs, and the Muslims. In the period leading up to the general election, Nitish Kumar worked towards reaching an alliance with the Congress, but eventually failed; likewise he failed in the attempt to gain the support of the majority of the Muslim community. The latter decided that Laloo Prasad’s RJD remained a more effective weapon against Modi, possibly because Laloo Prasad was eventually able to stitch an alliance with both the Congress and the Indian Nationalist Congress (a member of the UPA).

Already some weeks before the elections, it became clear that, in most of Bihar, the real struggle was between the BJP-led alliance and the RJD-led alliance, whereas the JD(U) was isolated and, in the intentions of vote, well behind either combine.[78] In fact, at the polls the BJP gained the absolute majority (22 seats out of 40), while its two allies, the LJP and the RLSP, won respectively six and three seats. On its part, the JD(U) crashed down from 20 to two seats, ending behind the RJD (which gained four seats, while its allies, the Congress and the NCP won two and one seats respectively).

3.8. The Congress debacle in Andhra Pradesh

The general election was held in Andhra Pradesh concurrently with the state election, which was the last one in the undivided state. In fact, on 2 June 2014, Andhra Pradesh was officially divided into Andhra Pradesh proper and Telangana, bringing the number of the Indian states from 28 to 29. When the elections were held, the state was still formally united, but its impending division was the dominant factor in the political landscape and, as explained below, was crucial in determining the results both for the Lok Sabha and the Vidhan Sabha (which, soon after the elections, was divided in the Andhra Pradesh Vidhan Sabha and the Telangana Vidhan Sabha).

Whereas, in 2009, the Congress party had secured 38.95% of the votes in the state and had conquered 33 out of 42 Lok Sabha seats (which made AP the single largest contributor to the Congress’ victory), in 2014 – after the bifurcation of the state – the party won two Lok Sabha seats (both in Telangana) and just 11.5% of the votes. Moreover, the performance of the Congress at the elections for the states’ legislative assemblies was equally (if not more) disastrous: the party failed to conquer a single seat in AP proper (often called Seemandhra) and won just 21 (out of 119) seats in Telangana. Overall, the party lost as many as 135 assembly seats.[79] Victory was shared between the Chandrababu Naidu-led TDP (Telugu Desam Party), an ally of the BJP, which triumphed in the electoral districts bound to remain in Andhra Pradesh, and the K. Chandrasekhar Rao-led Telangana Rashtra Samithi, which won in the districts bound to become the new state of Telangana.

These results are mainly explained by the way in which, during the previous years, the UPA government at the centre, but most particularly the Congress, had managed the process of bifurcation.

3.8.1. How the demand for the creation of Telangana was finally granted

The demand for a separate Telangana state preceded the formation of the state of Andhra in 1953.[80] In fact, the State Reorganization Commission established by the Indian government in December 1953 had advised against the immediate merger of Telangana and Andhra into a unified state.[81] However, the government decided otherwise. Then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru brokered a «gentlemen’s agreement» between political leaders from the two regions that should have ensured political and economic safeguards for Telangana.

However, as noted by a government-appointed commission in 2010, most of the terms of the deal were not respected in the subsequent decades[82]. In the late 1960s, major protests erupted in Telangana. Then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi managed to reach an agreement with the local political leaders that resulted in the 32nd Amendment of the Constitution. However, protests did not stop and erupted once again in the mid 1980s and then again in the mid 2000s.

There are several reasons why the supporters of the Telangana state advocated the bifurcation of the state. Most of these reasons ultimately stem from the backwardness of the region. The 2009 Backward Region Grant Fund identified 13 of the districts in AP as particularly backward; nine of them were in Telangana (i.e. all the Telangana districts except Hyderabad).[83] Telangana supporters have argued ever since that the backwardness of the region was mainly due to an unfavourable share of the waters of the Krishna and Godavari rivers, to under-spending in education, and to the under representation of Telangana within the state’s civil service. The Srikrishna Committee (appointed in 2010) found that most of these claims were fairly substantiated, although it also noted that Rayalaseema, namely one of the two sub-regions of Seemandhra (or Andhra Pradesh proper), was at least as backward as Telangana, if not more so.[84]

Telangana supporters attributed this lack of attention to their region’s needs to the fact that the politics of AP had been dominated by politicians from Seemandhra. The Srikrishna Committee found this claim to be substantiated too. In just 10.6 years of the 54 years between 1956 and 2010, for example, was the chief minister of the state from Telangana.[85] Similarly, the crucial finance ministry was allocated to politicians from Telangana for just 9.5 years.[86] Since 1983, the chief minister came from Telangana only once (Dr Marri Channa Reddy, between December 1989 and December 1990).

In 2001, a significant development brought the bifurcation issue to the forefront of national politics. A member of the TDP, Kalvakuntla Chandrashekar Rao (popularly known as KCR) formed a new political party, the Telangana Rashtra Samiti (TRS). The party had a single-point agenda: the formation of a separate Telangana state.

Despite the fact that both the BJP, then ruling at the centre, and the Congress had declared on several occasions that, in principle, they did not oppose to the creation of the new state, nothing concrete happened during the NDA governments (1998-2004). This was mainly due to the opposition of the TDP (which was part of the NDA)[87] and of the great majority of AP’s political class. At the centre an additional element in preventing the creation of Telangana might have been fears that accommodating the demand for Telangana would spark off similar requests in other parts of the country, particularly in West Bengal and Maharashtra. It is however a fact that the NDA government adopted a very different policy with regard to other comparable situations; so much so that, in 2000, it created three new states: Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Uttaranchal.[88]

Obviously resentful at the BJP’s attitude, the TRS then decided to make an alliance with the Congress in view of the 2004 general elections. As a result, after the elections, the newly formed UPA government committed itself to «consider the demand for the formation of a Telangana state»[89] in the Common Minimum Programme, which fixed the political agenda of both the UPA and the Left Front (which granted external support to the first UPA government).

By the end of the 2004-2009 legislature, however, nothing concrete had come out of the promised «consideration» of the Telangana demand. In fact, just before the 2009 general election the Congress-led AP government,[90] the Congress party at the national level and the BJP[91] all declared to be in favour of the formation of Telangana. Not surprisingly, after the elections, and soon after the convincing victory of the Congress at its allies, KCR decided to force the hand of the new UPA government. On 29 November 2009, the TRS leader went on an indefinite fast. The law and order situation in Hyderabad (and KCR’s physical condition) degenerated rapidly. On 9 December 2009 – Sonia Gandhi’s birthday – the government capitulated. Home Affairs Minister P. Chidambaram announced that the government had decided to proceed with the creation of the new state.[92]

3.8.2. Endgame in Andhra Pradesh/Telangana … and the end of Congress

The announcement was obviously celebrated in Telangana. However, it also led to massive protests by Seemandhra’s legislators belonging to all parties, many of whom resigned en masse.[93]

There were three main reasons why the prospect of bifurcating AP worried legislators from Seemandhra. First, since Hyderabad is in Telangana, Seemandhra politicians were concerned for the financial situation of the residual state. The city, a high-tech and pharmaceutical hub, generates a large share of the state’s revenue. There has been a great deal of confusion regarding how big this share actually is. Seemandhra’s politicians, in particular, were keen to demonstrate that, without Hyderabad, the residual state was condemned to bankruptcy. The figures that they provided ranged from nearly half to as much as three-quarters of the state’s total revenues. However, the actual figure is around 17%.[94]

The second reason concerned the economic interests that businessmen from Seemandhra have in Hyderabad and Telangana. This is a particularly sensitive issue, as a very large proportion of Andhra Pradesh’s political class has important economic interests in Telangana.[95] Officially, businesspeople-cum-politicians feared that the new Telangana government would seize their properties. This was based on rather shaky grounds, as every Indian citizen can legitimately have business interests and properties anywhere in the country. However, and this was probably their real concern, the virtual totality of their business activity depended upon the owners’ influence over the state government. This influence would obviously be lost in the new state with unpredictable consequences for pending contracts, land allocation, and future contracts (often stipulated under very dubious circumstances).                Finally, Seemandhra politicians feared that their influence over national politics would be severely reduced.[96]

This being the situation, on 23 December 2009, just two weeks after the announcement of the process of bifurcation of the state, the Congress-led central government backed off. The Ministry of Home Affairs declared that no step would be taken until a broad consensus was reached.[97]The announcement provoked a strong reaction by Telangana’s legislators and ministers (both at the state and at the national levels), who presented their resignations en masse;[98] at the same time, Seemandhra MLAs (Members of the Legislative Assembly) decided to withdraw theirs.[99] At this point the Congress party had succeeded in the rather difficult endeavour of representing in Seemandhra the party that wanted to create Telangana, and in Telangana the party that did not want to bifurcate the state.

In February 2010, the central government decided to buy some time through the appointment of the above-quoted Srikrishna Committee. The committee found the reasons behind the demand for a separate Telangana «not entirely unjustified».[100] However, it recommended keeping the state united, provided that some constitutional safeguards for Telangana were introduced. In other words, the committee suggested replicating the model that had failed in the decades before. The committee, however, recommended also, as the «second best option»,[101] creating Telangana with Hyderabad as its capital. Of course, the report disappointed everyone, and left the hot potato in the hands of the central government.

To add confusion to an increasingly confusing situation, the Union government decided not to publish the eighth chapter of the Srikrishna Report, dealing with the consequences of the creation of the state in terms of law and order. The AP High Court, however, ordered the government to make the entire report public. The court, moreover, claimed that the information included in the secret chapter demonstrated that the committee was «against the creation of Telangana».[102]

The central government, however, filed an appeal in the AP High Court, against the ruling, claiming that disclosing the report would endanger the integrity of the country.[103] This argument was accepted by the court, and the secret chapter remained secret.[104] However, the «secret chapter saga» certainly did not contribute to bring the Telangana and the Seemandhra partisans nearer, which was what the government claimed to be pursuing. In 2011 and 2012, a regular pattern emerged. The Union government would make a statement, that led to protests and to resignations, that in turn led to a counter-statement by the Union government, that led to counter-protests and to counter-resignations and so on.

This situation ended up in the virtual paralysis of the administrative activity in Andhra Pradesh. The state bureaucracy split in two parts, along regional lines, each refusing to cooperate with the other.[105] In October 2013 a strike of the power sector employees in Seemandhra led to severe shortages of power, petrol and water, which in turn led to difficulties in withdrawing cash from ATM machines, made inoperative intensive care units, and brought about the virtual paralysis of the public and private transportation systems.[106]

In the meanwhile the political situation became more and more confusing. Since 2012 it had become clear that the electoral prospects of the Congress, particularly in Seemandhra, were bleak. The Congress lost a high number of seats in the by-poll elections in both regions.[107] The AP Congress party started to fall apart, as an increasing number of legislators defected to other parties.[108]

In July 2013 the Congress party had come to the conclusion that the decision on Telangana could not be deferred further. Two political considerations convinced the party’s high command. First, with the national elections looming, the party did not want to concede an easy electoral issue to the BJP, which had repeatedly proclaimed itself to be in favour of the creation of Telangana. Second, the party had reached the conclusion that, irrespective of the final decision on Telangana, the electoral prospects in Seemandhra were disastrous.[109] Hence, the only thing the Congress could do was to concede statehood to Telangana, hoping to reap the political benefits. The latter consideration was based on the assumption that the TRS would merge or at least make an alliance with the Congress, as KCR had stated on several occasions.[110] However, on the eve of the elections, KCR realized that his party was stronger than expected and decided – wisely – to contest the elections on his own.[111] This was a fatal blow for the Telangana Congress party.

In July 2013, the Congress Working Committee (CWC) issued a resolution endorsing the bifurcation of the state and suggesting that Hyderabad would be the common capital for ten years before becoming the exclusive capital of new state.[112] The cabinet cleared the Telangana bill on the lines of the CWC resolution in October 2013.

In the following months Seemandhra legislators (both at the state and national levels) reached a new low in terms of disrespect for parliamentary procedures. The AP Legislative Assembly (where MLAs from Seemandhra were in a majority) rejected the Telangana bill (which constitutional provisions required to be submitted to the assembly for consideration) among major disruption. The «vote» on the bill lasted less than 30 seconds.[113] In the Lok Sabha, a Seemandhra MP even resorted to pepper spray against his colleagues in an attempt to stop the discussion of the bill.[114] The Lok Sabha eventually approved the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act on 18 February 2014. However, Indian citizens could not see the approval of the bill on television: all nine television cameras inside the Lok Sabha chamber «mysteriously» stopped working minutes before the vote.[115]

Summing up, the astonishingly inept tackling of the whole Telangana issue by the Congress destroyed the party in the whole of the undivided Andhra Pradesh. The haemorrhage of party members, which, as noted above, had started in 2012, continued (and intensified) up to the 2014 elections.[116] By then, the party existed more in name than in deed, especially in Seemandhra.[117] The result was the virtual destruction of the Congress state party, which crashed down from 33 to two Lok Sabha seats.

 

.9. What triggered the «Modi wave»?

Once all the above has been said on the 2014 electoral battle, and even at the risk of somewhat oversimplifying a very complex issue, it is perhaps necessary to try to sort out what factors, among the many singled out above, played the key role in Narendra Modi’s smashing victory.

The real mainspring of Modi’s victory – the triggering element in determining the «Modi wave» – seems to have been the ability to build what one can term the «Modi legend». It has been noted that, during the electoral campaign and before, Modi was projected as a dynamic, strong-willed, intelligent leader, a kind of fearless and blemishless knight, a statesman of superior abilities, responsible for making Gujarat bloom, who would do the same for the whole of India. This is largely a legend, in the true meaning the word: although based on some elements of reality, it is a tale of fantasy. Once this is said, it is a fact that Modi’s legend has been accepted as reality by the majority of Indians, quite independently of their class, caste, and even regional belonging.

How was this legend crafted and, more importantly, how it was accepted? Certainly, to think that it was born spontaneously would be dangerously naive. In fact, Modi’s legend started to be built before the 2009 elections, when, as noted above, some key members of India Inc. decided to support the choice of the then Gujarat chief minister as the new BJP candidate to the national prime ministership. From that time onward, considerable economic and intellectual resources were employed in exalting Modi’s supposedly exceptional qualities,[118] and in concealing his many blemishes. In this the traditional media – private television stations and major newspapers and magazines owned by India Inc. – played a crucial role.

This strategy had an increasing impact on the political vision of the Indian middle class, which, in turn, spread it far and wide by making use of the non-traditional media and, during the electoral campaign, supplied its own energies and skills in supporting Modi. Finally, Modi and his number two, Amit Shah, showed the ability to build a working political alliance between the middle class activists and the traditional grass root organizations of political Hinduism. In turn, middle class activists and the traditional Hindu grass root organizations were able to spread Modi’s legend among the masses. Crucial in making possible the success of their efforts was the adroit and massive use of new and not so new technologies: holograms and mobile phones – the latter utilized for both text messages and direct calls – spread Modi’s message well beyond the middle class and urban India to even the most backward social strata in the most inaccessible corners of the country. As noted above, holograms were made use of particularly in the far away rural areas, which Modi could not reach in person; on the other hand, the penetration of television and mobile phones allowed the BJP campaign to reach around 74% of the population.[119]

At the end of the day, all this was made possible by India Inc.’s initial strategic decision to support Modi. Accordingly, it was India Inc. that played the decisive role in Modi’s victory. However, Modi’s victory was so complete as to give him all the strength that he needed to be – if he so desired – his own man.

4. Narendra Modi’s government

On 26 May 2014 Modi’s government was sworn in. Consistent with Modi’s promise to ensure «minimum government, maximum governance», the cabinet was one of the smallest in recent times: 23 cabinet ministers and 22 ministers of state. However, political compulsions led Modi to expand the Council of Ministers in November, when the size of the cabinet reached 65 members (Manmohan Singh’s included 77 members).

The composition of the cabinet reflected the magnitude of the BJP’s victory: out of 23 cabinet ministers sworn in May, as many as 19 belonged to the BJP, leaving little space for other members of the NDA, who had to content themselves with less important positions. The most important posts went to senior BJP leaders like Arun Jaitley (Finance and Defence),[120] Rajnath Singh (Home) and Sushma Swaraj (External Affairs).

The  composition of the cabinet also reflected the usual attempt to give representation to most communities and regions. However, there was a clear effort to reward the castes and regions that had contributed the most to Modi’s victory. Out of 45 cabinet members, over 20 were from the RSS’s Brahmin–Vyshya–Rajput core constituency. Only three Dalits found a place in the Cabinet along with a single Muslim (Dr Najma Akbarali Heptulla, a former Congressman).[121] The states of UP, Bihar and Maharashtra (which gave a decisive contribution in terms of number of MPs) got the highest number of Cabinet members. Strangely, Rajasthan (where the BJP won all 25 seats) was not represented.[122] The expansion in November did not significantly change the social and political composition of the cabinet. Among the 21 new faces, only one did not belong to the BJP (Y.S. Chowdary, TDP).

It appears that two main political considerations drove the Cabinet expansion. First, a few MPs who had recently joined the BJP after defecting from other parties had to be rewarded. Especially important were the defections of Birender Singh (a prominent Jat leader from Haryana, who had been a member of the Congress party for 42 years), and of Suresh Prabhu (a Maharashtra MP formerly with the Shiv Sena). The former became Minister for Rural Development (a rather important job for a politician belonging to a farming caste), while the latter was appointed as Railways Minister (another very important ministry that controls huge budgetary allocations). Second, the acquisition of prominent leaders from the opposition parties and their induction into the government was also a way to strengthen the party’s prospects for a series of state elections that were due shortly after the cabinet expansion (in particular in Haryana and Maharashtra).

5. The politics of Modi’s government

The first six months of Narendra Modi’s government have been characterized by two interconnected political processes. First, there has been a marked concentration of powers in the prime minister’s hands. Second, there has been a similarly marked attempt to implement a cultural agenda tailored on the RSS view of the world.

The two processes are intertwined. First, Modi has been operating at various levels to centralize political power in his own hands. However, this centralization process – part of which has been the tightening of Modi’s control on the BJP – has left out the RSS, which, in the period under review, remains the strongest alternative power centre to the one represented by the prime minister. In fact, during the first six months of Modi’s government a tacit understanding between the two power centres seems to have been put in place: the prime minister is leaving a free hand to the RSS in the cultural sphere, as long as the RSS does not interfere too much with government affairs.

The concentration of powers in Modi’s hands has been particularly evident in two spheres. First, the prime minister has been able to sideline internal enemies within the BJP and to take full control of the party. Second, as a direct consequence of the absolute majority enjoyed by the BJP in the Lok Sabha and the control that Modi exercises on his party, power has been concentrated in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). Both aspects make Modi’s government remarkably different from the coalition governments that have ruled India since 1989, and much more similar to those headed by Indira Gandhi in the 1970s and 1980s.[123] Another similarity is with the Modi government in Gujarat (2001–2014), where he was able to effectively crush alternative sources of power – including the RSS and the BJP – and establish a somewhat authoritarian one-man rule.[124]

Modi’s conquest of the BJP started before the general elections, when he was able to make the party appoint him as the prime ministerial candidate, despite the resistance of the «old guard» (especially some influential politicians like Lal Kishan Advani, Murli Manohar Joshi and Sushma Swaraj)[125], the scant enthusiasm of the RSS,[126] and the open opposition of an important political ally, Nitish Kumar (chief minister of Bihar).[127]

Modi was thus able to fill the list of BJP candidates with a number of «Hindu incendiaries, tweedy ex-civil servants, sundry swamis, and so on [that] share[d] one common characteristic: staunch devotion to the leader.»[128] He was then able (9 July 2014) to install Amit Shah (a highly controversial figure, facing prosecution for murder) as party president.[129]

The extraordinary electoral result of the BJP obviously reinforced Modi’s position within the party. In fact, both the media and the party attributed the results to Modi’s leadership and popularity (an argument that was partially confirmed by post-poll surveys).[130]

As a consequence, Modi was able to sideline internal enemies relatively easily. Vajpayee (whose health had precluded him from political activity for about a decade), Advani and Joshi have all been kept out of the two highest decision-making bodies of the party, the Parliamentary Board and the Central Election Committee.[131] The only two representatives of the old structure of power who managed to keep a (formally) important position were Rajnath Singh and Sushma Swaraj. The former, despite past acrimony, played a key role in the nomination of Modi as prime ministerial candidate and was thus rewarded with the Home Ministry.[132] Sushma Swaraj was given the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, their power was more cosmetic than substantial. Singh’s position has been compromised by some leakages (originating from the PMO) concerning his son Pankaj allegedly accepting bribes for fixing a bureaucratic post.[133] Furthermore, the actual limitation of Rajnath Singh’s real power became evident when he was substantially excluded from the selection of candidates both for the Lok Sabha elections and the subsequent round of by-polls in his home state (UP). Swaraj, on the other hand, has been systematically excluded from all important foreign policy decisions, as these are handled directly by Modi.[134]Summing up, the fact that the names of elected members of the BJP have been either chosen or approved by Modi and his most trusted lieutenant, Amit Shah, and the fact that Amit Shah was handpicked by Modi as the new president of the BJP are proof of the supremacy of the prime minister over the party. Although a few BJP leaders have expressed their unhappiness at this situation, [135] there are few doubts that, in the period under review, Modi’s grip over the party has become virtually unshakable.

The control of the party was important for Modi as a defence against any threat to his leadership coming from his own political camp. However, as it became clear during the first months of his government, the real centre of power was not the party but the government or, rather, a government which was immediately brought under the iron control of the prime minister and his PMO. In fact, just a few days after taking office, Modi scrapped the Groups of Ministers (GOM and eGOM) that had functioned as a collective (although rather inefficient) decision-making mechanism within the cabinet during the UPA governments.[136] He, then, summoned all chief secretaries – not a single minister was present at the meeting – and told them that they could approach him directly, without keeping their ministers in the loop.[137] Ministers were also denied the right to choose their own top bureaucrats and even personal secretaries, as all bureaucratic appointments came to be decided by the PMO.[138] Ministers were even told not to talk with the media,[139] with the exception of Finance and Defence Minister Arun Jaitley, one of Modi’s most trusted allies, and arguably the only minister who retained some clout over governmental affairs.[140]

Decision-making was thus completely centralized within the PMO, which not only was put in charge of what Modi considers his policy priorities – foreign relations, national security, infrastructure projects, etc. – but even routine matters like the composition of the Indian delegation for the Asian Games.[141] This, paradoxically, could not but cause delays in policy-making, which is the opposite of what, in Modi’s professed intentions, the centrality of the PMO in decision-making should achieve.[142]

There are some indications that the concentration of powers in Modi’s hands goes beyond the institutional field. The press reported rumours that a few ministers were being kept under surveillance. For example, Nitin Gadkari, a former BJP president and incumbent Minister of Transport, has allegedly complained to the RSS chief that his residence (along with that of other BJP leaders) had been bugged.[143] According to an article that appeared in Outlook (1stSeptember 2014), Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Prakash Javadekar, was on his way to Delhi airport to attend a conference in Kenya when he received a call from the PMO requesting him to dress appropriately. «What bothered Javadekar was the thought that somebody was keeping a tab on his movements and giving minute-by-minute information to the PMO.»[144]These rumours tend to be more credible since similar allegations regularly emerged when Modi was chief minister of Gujarat.[145]

The concentration of power in Modi’s hands, however, might have some political advantages for the BJP. Liberal opinion-makers and the urban middle classes were extremely annoyed by the two power centres (Sonia Gandhi and Manmohan Singh) that characterized the UPA’s regime, [146]which, according to them, caused a virtual policy paralysis.[147]

The second process that marked the first six months of Narendra Modi’s government was the implementation of a cultural agenda dictated by the RSS, with the adoption of the Hindutva[148]ideology as its guiding star.

It should be noted, however, that Modi, at least for the time being, has not undertaken what we could call «the high road» to Hindutva. This would entail action in three core areas, which are prominent in the RSS agenda: the implementation of a uniform civil code; the revocation of Jammu and Kashmir’s special constitutional status; and the construction of a temple on the ruins of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya.

Dealing with any of these issues would have major domestic and international consequences; in particular the implementation of the above mentioned three key Hindutva goals would badly shake the social contract that binds the 150 million-strong Muslim community to the Indian state. It is very unlikely that Modi – who has always appeared to be less a Hindu extremist than an extremely pragmatic politician[149] – will want to pursue the high road to Hindutva, at least as long as his popularity remains high.

Nevertheless, once all the above has been said, there is no doubt that, in the period under review, the BJP was undertaking the «low road» to Hindutva. This replicated Modi’s strategy during the electoral campaign, during which – as noted above – he presented himself as the «development man» and left the dirty job of polarizing the electorate to others, in particular Amit Shah, especially in sensitive regions like UP. To put it in slightly different terms, Modi promotes two parallel discourses: development at the national level, and Hindutva at the local level.

It seems that Modi is either unable or, more probably, unwilling to control what the BJP and the RSS do at the local level and to draw a clear line about what the BJP/RSS members can or cannot say or do.[150] Perhaps the most extreme example of Modi’s inability/unwillingness to control the Hindutva extremists is the appointment of a five-time MP from Gorakhpur, Yogi Adityanath, as the lead campaigner for the round of by-poll elections held in September 2014. Adityanath has a long history as a troublemaker.[151] He is also one of the main proponents of the «Love Jihad» conspiracy theory, according to which there is a secret plan, elaborated by the Muslim community, aimed at seducing and marrying Hindu women, in order to alter the demographic equilibrium between the two religious communities. Adityanath has a more «colourful» definition of «Love Jihad» that is worth reproducing in its entirety: it is «a system where a girl surrounded with fragrance is enticed into a stinking world; where the girl leaves her civilised parents for parents who might have been siblings in the past; where purity is replaced with ugliness; where relationships have no meaning; where a woman is supposed to give birth every nine months; where the girl is not free to practise her religion; and if the girl realises her mistakes and wants to be freed, she is sold off».[152]

The «Love Jihad» theme dominated the campaign for the by-poll elections in UP and in other states. Adityanath even urged Hindus to marry 100 Muslim women for every Hindu woman who had married a Muslim man.[153] All this happened without Modi and the BJP leadership taking any action against Adityanath, not even openly distancing themselves from Adityanath’s open effort at disseminating hatred between the different religious communities.

Several other BJP politicians were rewarded for similarly promoting hatred between communities. Giriraj Singh, for example, raised a storm when, during the general election campaign, he suggested that opponents of Modi should migrate to Pakistan.[154] This has not prevented him from becoming Union Minister of State for Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises. Likewise, Sanjeev Baliyan, who has been accused of having fomented the riots in Muzaffarnagar in 2013, has been chosen as Minister of State for Agriculture and Food Processing.[155] Sadhvi Niranjan Jyoti, Minister of State for Food Processing Industries, when opening the election campaign for Delhi on 2 December 2014, asked voters at an election rally in Delhi to «chose between ‘Ramzadon’ (those born of Ram) and ‘haramzadon’ (illegitimately born)», [156] highlighting through this vivid phrase that only the Hindus («those born of Ram») are legitimate Indians, whereas all others are illegitimate. These are far from being isolated examples.[157]

The behaviour of BJP ministers and MPs has had two consequences. First, opposition parties are finding an unexpected common platform against the communalization of the political discourse. The winter session of the parliament has been disrupted several times because of the protests of the opposition, thus impeding the government to move bills into parliament.[158]

The second, and more worrisome, consequence is that Hindu extremists across the country are increasingly feeling free to target minorities and to undertake provocative initiatives, as they know that they will not face any serious repercussions. There are many examples of provocative initiatives taken by RSS-affiliated organizations. In October 2014, communal violence broke out in East Delhi as a result of the months-long marches and demonstrations organized by the Hindu Jagran Manch in front of the local mosque.[159] In July, some MPs belonging to the Shiv Sena (the Maharashtrian Hindu right-wing party which, at the time was an ally of the BJP) tried to force-feed a fasting Muslim.[160] In December, a church was burned down in Delhi «not by accident», according to local residents.[161] A week after that, the RSS organized a mass-conversion ceremony in Agra (200 Muslim families were offered money to «go back» to Hinduism), and announced that 5,000 more families would be converted on Christmas day in Aligarh.[162]

To be fair, these episodes are hardly a novelty. However, what is unprecedented is, on the one hand, the scale of the initiatives and, on the other hand, the location of the conversion ceremonies in cities historically associated with Muslim culture. This is probably a sign that Hindu extremists are becoming increasingly confident, as they feel that the state is behind them. It is significant that Modi has remained silent on all communal controversies and has not taken any action against those who explicitly played the communal card for political purposes.[163]

Overall, all this is resulting in increasing levels of communal violence, especially on the eve of elections. In UP alone, in the ten weeks that followed Modi’s appointment (i.e. in the period up to the by-polls), 605 communal incidents took place,[164] a number that is almost equal to the total number of communal riots which occurred in the entire country during the whole of 2012 (668). The situation is becoming so worrisome that even Tavleen Singh – a well known journalist and one of Modi’s staunchest supporters – wondered: «Why is the Prime Minister allowing the RSS to steal his mandate?».[165]

There is a second area in which the promotion of Hindutva has been particularly apparent. This is the «saffronization» of the state’s institutions, particularly educational institutions. Controlling educational institutions has always been a priority for the Sangh Parivar, namely the galaxy of Hindu organizations headed by the RSS. The RSS has always been keen on reducing the influence of Marxist (and supposedly pro-Congress) historians on the formulation of educational curricula. This had been attempted by Morarji Desai in the late 1970s[166] and, more recently, by the Vajpayee’s governments (1998–2004).[167]

Modi is following in the footsteps of Desai and Vajpayee. The Minister for Human Resource Development (which handles education policy), Smriti Irani, in spite of her Parsi-sounding (acquired) family name, is a long-time RSS worker coming from a family of long-time RSS workers. It is now a rather well established fact that she meets the RSS leadership on a regular basis to discuss educational policy.[168]

Irani also appointed numerous RSS-friendly persons to important educational institutions. In July 2014, she appointed an unknown historian, Yellapragada Sudharshan Rao, as the chairperson of the Indian Council for Historical Research.[169] In fact, Professor Rao’s articles, mainly on the historicity of Indian epics, have never been published in any peer-reviewed journal.[170] He has also vowed to prove the authenticity of the Mahabharata and of the Ramayana during his term.[171] In November Mrs Irani appointed Vishram Jamdar – a self-professed «RSS man»[172] – as the chairman of the Nagpur Institute of Technology. During the Cabinet expansion in November, Ram Shankar Katheria (a former RSS pracharak) joined Mrs Irani’s Ministry.

The long-term harmful influence of the RSS on the government’s cultural agenda is also evident from the work of the Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF), a Delhi-based think tank that was set up by the Vivekananda Kendra, one of the RSS affiliated organizations, and very close to Narendra Modi. The VIF has been preparing an 11-volume history of India.[173] According to a fellow of the VIF, the objective of this multi-volume work is to present «the correct cultural, traditional and spiritual aspects of India» and to challenge the dominant view of India’s history, whose supposed objective is to «make us feel inferior and destroy our fundamental Indian values».[174] It remains to be seen how influential the VIF’s version of the history of India will be. However, there are reasons to believe that it will be important, at least as a propaganda instrument.

The VIF has provided a good number of senior officials to Narendra Modi’s government. For instance, Ajit Doval, founding director of the VIF, was chosen as National Security Advisor; Nripendra Misra, a member of the VIF’s executive council, became Modi’s principal secretary; P.K. Misra, former senior fellow of the VIF and Modi’s principal secretary at the time of the Gujarat riots in 2002, has been appointed additional principal secretary to the prime minister.[175] This obviously does not mean that all VIF affiliates are Hindu extremists – far from it – but it is certainly true that the Foundation has a clear ideological orientation that is not very dissimilar from the RSS.

Other state institutions were equally involved in the promotion of an RSS-inspired cultural agenda. Doordarshan Television is apparently subject to significant pressures from the government. In October 2014, the station broadcast the entire speech of the RSS sarsanghchalak (supreme leader), Mohan Bhagwat. This was a sign, according to senior officials, of the growing influence of the RSS on state-owned television. Another official claimed that the Information and Broadcasting Minister, a former member of the RSS student wing, meets the station’s Director General every morning. The official stated that he had not seen such an attempt to control Doordarshan since the times of the authoritarian Indira Gandhi-imposed emergency regime (1975–77).[176]

6. The economy

6.1. The situation in the first five months of the year

After two difficult years, at the beginning of the period under review, the Indian economy started to turn around. At the beginning of February 2014, both the National Council of Allied Research (NCAER), India’s oldest and largest independent think tank, and, one month later, India Ratings & Research, a credit rating and research agency belonging to the Fitch Group, estimated India’s economic growth in 2014–15 as likely to grow from less than 5% in the preceding year to 5.6%.[177]

On the same positive note was the assessment made on 17 February 2014 by the UPA Union Minister of Finance, P. Chidambaram, in his presentation speech of the Interim Budget 2014-15.[178] According to Chidambaram, the slowdown of the Indian economy, which had begun in 2011–12, had started to reverse in the second quarter (Q2) of 2013–14. According to Chidambaram: «In nine quarters, the GDP [Gross Domestic Product] growth rate declined from 7.5 percent in Q1 (the first quarter) of 2011-12 to 4.4% in Q1 of 2013-14».[179] Then, thanks to the measures taken by the UPA government and the RBI (Reserve Bank of India),[180] growth in Q2 of 2013–14 was «placed at 4.8 percent» and growth for the whole year was estimated at 4.9%, which, according to the Minister of Finance, meant that: «growth in Q3 and Q4 of 2013-14 will be at least 5.2 percent».[181]

Still according to Chidambaram, by the end of the fiscal year 2013–14, the deficit would be contained at 4.6%, «well below the red line» drawn in the previous budget (4.8%), while the Current Account Deficit (CAD), which «threatened to exceed» USD 88 billion, would be brought down to 45 billion. The foreign currency reserves – which in the previous two years had become dangerously thin – would be up to USD 15 billion. The Wholesale Price Index (WPI), which at the time of the presentation of the previous budget stood at 7.3%, at the end of January 2014 was down at 5.05%. Food inflation – namely the main component in pushing up the WPI – although «still a main worry», had «declined sharply from a high of 13.6 percent to 6.2 percent».[182]Moreover, the rate of growth of agriculture was spectacularly on the rise,[183] whereas saving rates and investments had declined, but only marginally. The steps taken by the Union government to speed up the implementation of projects already approved through the creation at the end of 2013 of a Cabinet Committee on Investment and a Project Monitoring Group had been effective. In the Minister’s words, «by the end of January, 2014, the way [has been] cleared for completing 296 projects with an estimated project cost of Rs. 660,000 crore [6600 billion].»[184]The rate of exchange of the rupee, heavily under pressure during the previous financial year, had been stabilized.[185] Exports had «recovered sharply», in spite of the fact that the growth of global trade had declined from 6.1% in 2011 to 2.7% in 2013. Infrastructures had received «a big push»; so much so that: «In the 2012-13 and in the nine months of the current financial year [2013–14]», India had added «29,350 megawatts of power capacity, 3,928 kilometres of national highways, 39,144 kilometres of rural roads under PMGSY,[186] 3,343 kilometres of new railway track, and 217.5 million tonnes of capacity per annum in our ports.» Besides, according to Chidambaram, «19 oil and gas blocks were given out for exploration and 7 new airports are under construction.»[187]

At the end of the day, the only really negative note, «the Achilles’ heel of the Indian economy» in Chidambaram’s words, remained manufacturing.[188] In spite of this, the Minister of Finance could «confidently assert» that the economy was «more stable today than what it was two years ago». This was happening because: «The fiscal deficit is declining, the current account deficit has been contained, inflation has moderated, the quarterly growth rate is on the rise, the exchange rate is stable, exports have increased, and hundreds of projects have been unblocked.»[189]

Much of what was claimed by Chidambaram in his 17 February speech was substantiated, soon after the elections, by the 2014 Economic Survey [ES], tabled in parliament by the new NDA Minister of Finance, Arun Jaitley, on 9 July 2014. The ES, although stressing that the inflation was «still above comfort levels», confirmed the decline of the WPI inflation (to 6% in 2013–14, compared with 8.9% in 2011–12 and 7.4% in 2012–13); it pointed out that, at the financial year end, the CAD was down to 1.7% of the GDP as against 4.7% in 2012–13. On its part, the rupee, «after plummeting to Rs. 68.36 to a US dollar on 28 August 2013» had «gradually strengthened» reaching in March 2014 an exchange rate of Rs. 61 per US dollar. Moreover, foreign exchange reserves had increased in a substantial way, although less than projected by Chidambaram in his 17 February speech. In fact, they had gone up by nearly USD 40 billion, climbing up from USD 275 billion in early September 2013 to USD 314.9 billion on 20 June 2014. Finally, the fiscal deficit had declined even more markedly than projected by Chidambaram, «from 5.7 per cent of GDP in 2011-12 to 4.9 per cent in 2012-13 and 4.5 per cent in 2013-14» (against the 4.6% estimated by the UPA Minister of Finance). As pointed out by the ES, this result had been achieved «by reduction in expenditure rather than from increased revenue».[190]

Only concerning the GDP growth rate were the ES data somewhat less favourable than what had been estimated by Chidambaram. «After reaching a low of 4.4 per cent during the last two quarters (Q3 and Q4) of 2012-13 growth inched up to 4.7 per cent in Q1 of 2013-14 and further to 5.2 per cent in Q2 of 2013-14, only to decline to 4.6 per cent in the next two quarters» [191][namely the period September 2013 to February 2014], against the 5.2% estimated by Chidambaram. However, the ES, taking into consideration the improvement of both the CAD deficit and the fiscal deficit, was optimistic that, «no doubt [they would] feed into a higher growth in 2014-15».[192]

Summing up, the economic legacy left by the UPA to the NDA was far from being catastrophic, as shown by the fact that the previous six quarters had seen a marked improvement on several fronts, amounting to an upturn of the general economic trend. Most of this improvement was the end product of the economic policies implemented by the UPA government.

6.2. Waiting for Modinomics

After Modi’s victorious election campaign, with such a heavy emphasis on a renaissance of the Indian economy thanks to the implementation at the all-India level of the famed «Gujarat model» or what the Indian and international media were starting to dub «Modinomics», expectations and fears – depending upon one’s political perspective – for the Modi government’s first budget were high indeed. On the right, there were expectations of reforms aimed at dismantling India’s labour laws; privatizing public enterprises, including the profit-making ones; reforming higher education by ending the government’s «bureaucratic stranglehold on the university system», namely privatizing it; replacing or outright dismantling such allegedly wasteful and corrupt social programmes as the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act and the Food Security Act, namely the most progressive laws implemented by the UPA governments; introducing the Thatcher-inspired voucher system to siphon off public money in favour of private schooling and health care.[193] Of course, what were the expectations of the right were the fears of the left, according to which the Modi government intended: «to gut any and all labor, environmental and social legislation that impedes corporate profit making, while lavishing subsides, tax cuts and other largess on big business».[194] Some of Modi’s and Arun Jaitley’s first public utterances after the formation of the new government,[195] the hike in rail fares on 20 June[196] and the decision of the BJP-led Rajasthan government to emend three labour laws in order to favour the corporate sector[197] were all seen as pointers to the Modi government’s will to implement a new, pro-business economic policy. However, the real litmus test of the Modi government’s intentions could not but be the presentation of its first budget.

6.3. The first Modinomics budget

The presentation of the first budget of the Modi era was made by the Minister of Finance, Arun Jaitley, on 10 July 2014. The budget itself appeared to be structurally of the same kind as most budgets since the beginning of the neoliberal reforms. In other words, its aim was to push down both the deficit and taxation, by falling back on non-tax revenues and cuts in social spending. In pursuing this policy, the new budget showed a strong continuity with the latest UPA budgets, particularly with the interim budget. This continuity was admitted and justified by Jaitley himself in his speech of presentation of the budget, by saying that the steps announced in it were «only the beginning of a journey towards sustained growth» and that «it would not be wise to expect everything that can be done or must be done to be in the first Budget presented within forty five days of the formation of this Government».[198]

The most immediately visible element of continuity with the interim budget was the acceptance, on the part of the new NDA Minister of Finance, of the «very difficult task» set up by his predecessor «of reducing [the] fiscal deficit to 4.1 per cent of the GDP in the current year».[199]

The same continuity was perceptible on the side of taxation. Its structure, as in the previous UPA budgets, was characterized by low imposition on corporate profits and personal income, coupled by heavy indirect taxation. In fact, in Jaitley’s budget, the amount of taxation on both corporate profits and personal income did not significantly differ from the interim budget, even if the Jaitley budget introduced some new tax concessions for big business and minor cuts in income tax (paid by the more affluent part of the population). On the other hand, the budget, although raising indirect taxation, from which most tax revenues originated, increased it only marginally.[200]

Of course, static tax revenues made it necessary to find non-tax resources in order to bring down the fiscal deficit to 4.1%. These non-tax resources were to be found through the implementation of a two pronged policy of disinvestment and reduction in real terms of social expenditures. Capital receipts other than borrowing, namely, by and large, revenues accruing from disinvestment, were estimated in the order of Rs. 739.52 billion. A key element in this policy was the rise of foreign participation in the defence and insurance sectors. In both sectors, the composite cap of foreign exchange was raised to 49% from the pre-existing level of 26%.[201] On the other hand, expenditures related to social programmes – such as the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act – were decreased in real terms. However, the avowed policy of containing expenditures had at least a conspicuous exception. As pointed out by Arun Jaitley in his speech: «There can be no compromise with the defence of our country. I therefore propose to allocate an amount of Rs. 2,29,000 crore [2,290 billion] for the current financial year for Defence.»[202] In other words, the allocation for defence was being raised 12% compared with the previous financial year (in the interim budget the rise had been of 10%).[203]

In his speech, the Minister of Finance complemented the concrete decisions taken in the budget and aimed to reducing «wasteful expenditure» with a number of promises pointing the way towards the path leading to «a sustained growth of 7-8 per cent or above within the next 3-4 years along with macro-economic stabilization».[204] The most significant of these promises were the creation of an Expenditure Management Commission, «to review the allocative and operational efficiencies of Government expenditure» and the engagement «to overhaul the subsidy regime, including food and petroleum subsidies, and make it more targeted».[205] Again, on the side of promises there was that – already made time and again by both the NDA and UPA governments – of introducing a Goods and Services Tax (GST). [206] The GST would take away the taxation jurisdiction from the states, putting it in the hands of the central government, rationalizing the taxation system.

Maybe the most positive aspect of the budget – which, however, was once again in line with the interim budget provisos – was the high allocation for infrastructure. This was raised by Rs. 1000 billion over the actual 2013-14 expenditure.

At the end of the day, the main problem with the budget was the fact that it did not provide any significant stimulus to aggregate demand. In fact, the total proposed expenditure was only nominally higher than in the previous fiscal year, namely, taking inflation into account, de facto a decrease in real terms.

6.4. Modinomics at work

Because of the substantial continuity with the previous budget and because such continuity was expected, the reception of both India Inc. and the international capital to the 2014-15 budget, although somewhat lukewarm, was not negative.[207] The other side of the coin was that both India Inc. and the international capital expected the Modi government to move quickly to implement pro-growth and pro-big business policies. This and the many electoral promises made by Modi put his government in a position to do exactly that or, at least, to appear to do that. For the remainder of the year the government economic policies were characterized by a set of high profile announcements, some concrete decisions, and promises or news that the government was at work in preparing new reforms. What was indeed done did not amount to much and boiled down to two policies: the first was the progressive dismantling or cutting down to size of those protections enjoyed by labour in the formal sector of the economy; the second was putting equity in Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) on the market.

As far as the former policy is concerned, it can be noticed that it aimed at enlarging the informal sector – namely that sector of the Indian economy with no protection for labour, which on the eve of Modi’s electoral triumph included above 70% of the work force.[208] Here the main decision was taken at the end of July, when the cabinet cleared 51 amendments to the Factories Act, 1948, the Apprenticeship Act, 1961, and the Labour Laws Act, 1988. These amendments resulted in making women eligible for night-shift work, increasing the ceiling for overtime hours from 50 hours per quarter to 100, and repealing the liability to imprisonment for those who violated the Apprenticeship Act.[209]

As far as state disinvestment in the PSUs is concerned, on 6 August 2014, the cabinet formally approved what had already been promised by Arun Jaitley when presenting the budget. In other words the cabinet officially raised the maximum amount of foreign ownership allowed in military-equipment making firms from 26% to 49% and allowed up to 100% non-Indian ownership in railway construction companies.[210] On 10 September 2014, furthermore, Modi’s government decided to bring down its stake in three PSUs: Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), Coal India Ltd (CIL) and National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC). The government planned to sell 10% of CIL (of which it owned 89.65%), 5% of ONGC (of which it owned 68.94%) and 13.3% of NHPC (of which it owned 85.96%), realizing a total exceeding Rs. 450 billion.[211]

The above listed pro-business policies were supplemented by some further decisions heading in the same direction. On 2 July 2014, the Indian government decided to extend the period of validity of industrial licences from two to three years, extensible by a further two years.[212] On 20 October 2014, the Modi government took another major economic decision, namely the introduction, through an ordinance, of a new electronic bidding system for coal mining. India is rich in coal deposits – and short in energy – but exploitation of the domestic coal resources has historically been so defective as to force India to import much of the coal needed to produce energy.[213] On top of that, the way in which coal blocks meant for exploitation had been allocated by the UPA governments, mainly to private companies, without auction, had been denounced by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) in August 2012, causing a major scandal. According to the CAG, the arbitrary allocation system employed by the Government of India had caused a Rs 1860 billion loss to the exchequer. This had brought about the involvement of the CIB (Central Bureau of Investigation) and the courts. Finally, on 24 September 2014, the Supreme Court, which had previously declared illegal the allocations made between 1993 and 2010, cancelled 214 block allocations, directing CIL to take them over.

To remedy the adverse effect on domestic and, even more, international capital,[214] caused by the Supreme Court’s decision, the Modi government, while announcing that a thorough reform law on commercial mining was planned, introduced an ordinance putting up for e-auction 42 mines de-allocated by the Supreme Court, plus another 32 mines in different stages of production. As made public by the Minister of Finance, the proceeds of these auctions were to go to the governments of the states in which the mines were located. Accordingly, the major beneficiaries of the e-auctions were going to be the mineral-rich states of Jharkhand, Odisha, West Bengal and Chhattisgarh.[215] The e-commerce ordinance, introduced by the Modi government on the 20 October, was signed by the President of India the following day, thus becoming operative.[216]The ordinance, apart from breaking the logjam created by the Supreme Court’s decision, had the additional advantage (from the viewpoint of the major Indian corporations) of putting in the game once again those firms which had been unduly favoured by the UPA governments. In fact, the ordinance excluded from the auction only those firms whose representatives had been convicted of an offence relating to coal block allocation and sentenced to imprisonment for more than three years.[217]

On 30 October 2014, the Finance Ministry ordered a mandatory 10% cut in the centre’s non-plan expenditure for 2014–15.

From the cut were exempted interest payment, repayment of debt, defence capital, salaries, pensions and Finance Commission grants to states. The cuts implied some measures which were not particularly significant from an economic standpoint, such as the prohibition of state officers from travelling first class and making use of five-star hotels for official meetings (apart from those with top foreign officials), plus a freeze on new appointments in the bureaucracy. However, the bulk of the cuts was to take the form of reduction of state subsidies on food, fertilisers and petroleum. These measures were «virtually the same» as the initiatives taken yearly by the UPA governments since 2004 and «even copied the wording of earlier directives».[218] Excluding from its purview interest payment, repayment of debt, defence capital, salaries, pensions and Finance Commission grants to states, exactly as had happened with the analogous measures taken by the UPA governments, could not but have a limited effect. Indeed, according to Nomura Securities, the well-known Japanese brokerage firm, the NDA mandatory cut brought about savings amounting to roughly 0.3% of the GDP.[219]

Apart from the above listed decisions, the Modi government, but most particularly the prime minister, were careful in conveying an impression of dynamism though the continuous announcements of future reforms. Although these announcements did not translate into any concrete policy – at least in the year under review – some of them must be reported.

In July, the government started to discuss the possibility of radically emending the 2013 Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act (a name which, in daily use, is usually shortened to «Land Acquisition Act»). Indeed the Land Acquisition bill had met «with incessant criticism from industrial circles»[220] since it had been introduced to the Lok Sabha. So much so that, according to a well-known pro-Congress intellectual, it was that particular act which had been a main reason behind India Inc.’s decision to take sides against the Congress party.[221] The act, which had become operative at the beginning of 2014, had been the UPA government’s answer to the active popular discontent against land grabbing by Indian and international corporations. Accordingly, the act stipulated substantial compensations for both landowners and landless farmers and introduced a mandatory consent clause demanding approval from 70–80% of affected residents for land acquisition.[222] Before the enactment of the law, local governments could transform agricultural land into industrial land, forcing owners to sell it for a pittance and expelling landless labour from it; after the enactment, all this had become impossible, pushing up the cost of buying land by two to four times. This had made it difficult to develop industrial parks, which explains the hostility towards the act of both the private corporations and many state governments. However, although the reform of the Land Acquisition Act remained in the headlines during the second half of the year, at the end of the period under review, no final decision had yet been arrived on it.

Another neoliberal reform under consideration but far from being enacted at the end of the period under review was the Factories (Amendment) bill. The bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha on 7 August 2014, with the aim to remove smaller companies from the purview of various labour laws, such as the Industrial Disputes Act, the Factories Act, the Employee State Insurance Act and the Maternity Benefits Act.

On 10 September 2014, two members of the government, Commerce and Industry Minister Nirmala Sitharaman and Commerce Secretary Rajeev Kher, signalled the government’s intention to reverse the taxation policy on special economic zones (SEZs) introduced by the second UPA government in 2011, by reintroducing a series of conspicuous tax breaks.[223] However, at the end of the year under review, no decision had been taken.

Finally, the prime minister, during his public speech on Independence Day (15 August), personally made two high profile promises. The first was the vow «to strengthen manufacturing sector» by asking «all the people world over, from the ramparts of the Red Fort, «Come, make in India», «Come, manufacture in India». «Sell in any country of the world but manufacture here». The second was the promise to «replace the planning commission with a new institution having a new design and structure, a new body, a new soul, a new thinking, a new direction, a new faith towards forging a new direction to lead the country».[224]

The first promise was followed by the official launch, on 25 September 2014, of a «Make in India» campaign, aimed at simplifying or eliminating those bureaucratic barriers and labour and environmental regulations which made of India one of the most difficult locations in the world to start a business venture.[225] The campaign aimed at involving 25 economic sectors and the ministries presiding over them in a «holistic integration of perspective on manufacturing».[226]Putting it in simpler words, Modi’s aim was an overhaul of state regulations and labour laws in such a way as to lure foreign entrepreneurs and companies to increase radically their investments in a country which had hitherto been considered one of the least «business friendly» in the world.[227] In doing this, Modi was trying to exploit the potential advantage for India because local wages had become «significantly lower than in China, where – in response to growing worker militancy, including a wave of strikes – companies […] had to grant modest, but significant wage increases».[228] In spite of the emphasis given to the «Make in India» campaign, at the end of the year under review little of substantial had been accomplished.

Likewise, at the end of the period under review, the promise to disband the Planning Commission and to substitute it with a different organ, more responsible to the wishes of the states, had not been fulfilled. While giving rise to an intense debate in the national media on the past record of the Planning Commission and, even more, on what should substitute it, still at the end of 2014 Modi’s decision had not translated even into a clear-cut hypothesis on the structure and aims of the new organism was supposed to have. In fact, not even a new name for it had been indicated.[229]

 

6.5. Results of Modinomics

At the end of August 2014, official government estimates related to the three months ending in June indicated that the Indian economy had grown 5.7% from the same period in the previous year.[230] Although the Minister of Finance, Arun Jaitley, claimed that this was the result of the first 100 days of the Modi government[231] – a claim promptly accepted by an Indian press which continued to be massively pro-Modi[232] – it is really difficult to attribute this result to Modinomics. After all, the Modi government had been sworn in on 26 May 2014 and its first significant economic decisions had been taken in the budget presented on 10 July 2014.

The official results for the following quarter (Q2 2014–15: July–August–September), released at the end of November, although an improvement when compared with the same quarter in the previous fiscal year, registered a decline when compared with the previous quarter, the GDP rate of growth going down from 5.7% to 5.3%. This decline was to be put down to the slow growth of the manufacturing sector (only 0.1%, compared with 3.5%) and the difficulties for the agricultural sector, brought about by a bad monsoon.[233] However, although the GDP growth in the second quarter was lower than in the first, it nevertheless was higher than expected by most economists.[234] Anyway, the rate of growth during the first two quarters of 2014-15 represented a conspicuous improvement when compared with the first two quarters of 2013-14.

During the second half of 2014, the positive news on the GDP growth front was complemented by even more positive news on inflation. The inflation rate based upon the consumer price index (CPI) declined from an average of 11.5% in the first ten months of 2013 to 6.65% in the first ten months of 2014. Moreover, the general trend in the first ten months of 2014 was downward, going from 7.24% in January to 5.5% in October. [235] Particularly relevant and particularly positive was the decline of food price inflation, which in the previous years had been the main inflationary trigger: in October it was 5.6%, only marginally higher than the general CPI inflation.[236] This result was all the more remarkable as it came in a year that, in spite of the positive upturn in its concluding months, on average had been characterized by an adverse monsoon season. Here, the merit for this positive development went to the Modi government, for its «deft food management», which «included open market sale of wheat and rice from its buffer stock» and «putting a lid on procurement prices».[237]

Not surprisingly, at the close of the year under review: «Almost all forecasters, including the Reserve Bank of India, expected GDP growth during this year [2014-15] to be at least 5.5 per cent in a range between 5 and 6 per cent».[238] On its part, the think tank FocusEconomics expected the Indian GDP to grow 5.3% in the fiscal year 2014-15 and 6.1% in the year 2015-16.[239]Citigroup expected India’s GDP rate of growth to be around 5.6% in 2014-15 and around 6.5% in 2015-16, claiming at the same time that India had «really surprised» in 2014 and might do so again in 2015.[240] Finally, the UN World Economic Situation and Prospects 2015 estimated India’s GDP rate of growth at 5.4% in 2014, 5.9% in 2015 and 6.3% in 2016.[241]

No doubt, all the above amounted to positive results. How much Modinomics were really responsible for them remains, however, a moot point. In the previous section it was stressed that, in Modinomics, the politics of brave announcements and promises was at least as important as the policy of concrete decisions.[242] It is doubtful that, by itself, the concrete steps taken by Modi and his government could cause the upturn experienced by the Indian economy in the period under review. Indeed, as shown above, there is reason to think that this positive upturn had started before Modi’s victory. Apart from that, it is only fair to stress that, in such a complex socio-political and socio-economic setting as India, no significant reform can be implemented quickly. This, no doubt, was a fact of which Modi was well aware. Hence his politics of brave announcements and promises, which, while masking Modi’s difficulties and slowness in implementing his pro-business promises, did have a beneficial placebo effect on the economy. But, possibly, the most decisive help in making Modinomics a success of sorts was the crushing down of the international cost of crude oil (see Figure 1). In a country so heavily dependent on energy imports, this fortuitous development could not but have powerful positive cascading effects on the whole economy, giving much of the substance behind Modi’s politics of brave promises and announcements. Which, of course, is far from meaning that Modi did not intend to proceed at full speed, compatibly with the political and social hurdles he had to overcome, in implementing a set of neoliberal policies any inch of which was as invasive and non-inclusive as those he had implemented in his home state.

Table 4. Brent Crude and WTI (West Texas Intermediate) oil prices in US$ January 2014–January 2015

Source: Mike Bird, ‘How the price of oil could fall to just $20 a barrel’, Business Insider Australia, 7 January 2015 (http://www.businessinsider.com.au/how-low-can-oil-prices-go-2015-1)

7. State elections

During 2014 there were several state elections. The states involved were Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh,[243] Odisha (formerly Orissa), Sikkim,[244] Maharashtra, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, and Jharkhand. The tables below give an overview of the results in the largest states. (The party of the new chief minister is indicate in bold; in the case of undivided Andhra Pradesh are set in bold the parties of the new chief ministers of Andhra Pradesh/Seemandhra and Telangana).

Table 5. Andhra Pradesh – Incumbent government: Congress

	Seat won	Vote share %	Seat change
Congress	21	11.6	-135
BJP	9	8.5	+7
Telugu Desam Party (TDP)	120	29.1	+28
YSR Congress	68	28.9	NA
Telangana Rashtra Samiti (TRS)	61	14	+51
Source: Election Commission of India (http://eci.nic.in/eci/eci.html)

Table 6. Odisha – Incumbent government: BJD

	Seat won	Vote share %	Seat change
Biju Janata Dal (BJD)	115	43.4	+12
Congress	16	25.7	-11
BJP	11	18	+5
Source: Election Commission of India (http://eci.nic.in/eci/eci.html)

Table 7. Maharashtra – Incumbent government: NCP–Congress

	Seat won	Vote share %	Seat change
BJP	122	27.8	+76
Shiv Sena	63	19.3	+19
Congress	42	18	-40
Nationalist Congress Party (NCP)	41	17.2	-21
Source: Election Commission of India (http://eci.nic.in/eci/eci.html)

Table 8. Haryana – Incumbent government: Congress

	Seat won 2014	Vote share 2014	Seat change
BJP	47	33.2	+43
Congress	15	20.6	-25
Lok Dal	19	24.1	-12
Source: Election Commission of India (http://eci.nic.in/eci/eci.html)

Table 9. Jammu and Kashmir – Incumbent government: National Conference

	Seat won	Vote share %	Seat change
People’s Democratic Party	28	22.7	+7
BJP	25	23	+14
National Conference	15	20.8	-13
Congress	12	18	-5
Others	6
Source: Election Commission of India (http://eci.nic.in/eci/eci.html)

Table 10. Jharkhand – Incumbent government: Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

	Seat won	Vote share %	Seat change
BJP	37	31.26	+19
JMM	19	20.43	+1
JVM	8	9,99	-3
Congress	6	10,46	-7
AJSU	5	3,68	-1
Others	6
Source: Election Commission of India (http://eci.nic.in/eci/eci.html)

A brief look at Tables 5-10 reveals that, with the exception of Odisha, the story of the state elections is the story of the victory of the BJP and the defeat of the Congress. The Congress lost ground in Odisha too; however, the popularity of the incumbent chief minister, Naveen Patnaik, leader of the Biju Janata Dal (BJD), coupled with the negligible organizational strength of the BJP in the state, secured the fourth victory in a row for Patnaik’s party. It is also very significant that, for the first time in India’s history, the BJP obtained the relative majority of the votes in Jammu and Kashmir (India’s only Muslim majority state) and formed a coalition government with the People’s Democratic Party.

The results of the state elections were important for Modi and the BJP in ways that go beyond the mere conquest of some important states. First, they showed that Modi’s popularity was still intact. This is extremely important as Modi’s «winnability» galvanizes «vote mobilizers» that in turn multiply the BJP’s chances of winning in subsequent elections.[245] Moreover, Modi’s ability to win elections strengthens his position against his (still rather numerous) internal enemies within the BJP and in the RSS.

Second, the BJP and its allies now control the most economically dynamic areas of the country and as much as 37% of India’s GDP.[246] This is obviously important per se. But it is also important for the implementation of Modi’s national agenda on infrastructure. The BJP now controls, for example, all the states in the Delhi–Mumbai industrial corridor.

Finally, the BJP, although enjoying a comfortable majority in the Lok Sabha, does not control the Upper House. Hence, controlling the states is crucial for gaining the control of the Rajya Sabha, since its members are elected by the state assemblies.

8. Foreign policy

During its last two years in power, the attention of the UPA government was focussed on the difficult internal situation, without much time and energy to spare for foreign affairs. During that period, no major changes were visible in India’s foreign policy. However, there is no gainsaying that a certain level of unease had crept into two of India’s main foreign connections: the one with the US and the one with Russia.

The reorientation towards the US had become the pole star of India’s foreign policy since the fall of the USSR; in the most recent period, the key turning point in US-India relations had been the civilian nuclear agreement, realized between 2005 and 2008, which put an end to the international nuclear embargo on India.[247] Paradoxically, however, the US, which had taken the initiative in this difficult démarche, had not reaped all the anticipated economic rewards, because of the passing of the Nuclear Liability Act by the Indian Parliament in 2010. Although much criticized by the opposition, as it capped the amount of liability in case of each nuclear accident at Rs. 5 billion, the Act, by allowing both the victims of a nuclear disaster and the operators themselves of a nuclear plant involved in a disaster to sue the suppliers «for tortuous and criminal liability»,[248]effectively deterred the US nuclear companies from entering the Indian market. This was left open for French and Russian operators, which, unlike the US firms, in case of a nuclear accident could fall back on the economic help of their respective states. The situation had been made worse by the dissatisfaction of the Obama administration regarding what the US President himself considered the inability of the Indian government to push through a second generation, «big bang» neoliberal reforms, such as to open more space in the Indian market for international capital.[249]

Although, on the whole, the connection with the US remained a mainstay in India’s foreign relations, the relationship between the two countries had become cold enough to make possible, in December 2013, the Devyani Khobragade incident, and the following acrimonious spat between the two governments.[250]

Russia – traditionally a close friend of India – had recovered much of its importance as India’s partner and its main provider of weapons since Vladimir Putin’s ascent to power in 2000. However, the US–India civil nuclear agreement, if it did not open the lucrative field of building nuclear power plants to US private capital, had made possible the steep rise in importance of the US as an arms supplier to India. Although Russia still remained the biggest arms exporter to India in term of overall numbers (75% of the weapons imported to India came from Russia), value-wise the US had taken first position since 2013. [251] In fact, the value of the weapons and weapon systems bought by India from the US had grown to such an extent that, in 2013, the South Asian country had elbowed Saudi Arabia out as the main buyer of American arms. [252] Also, India had further diversified the sources of its military imports, particularly by turning to France in purchasing French Rafale fighters, and to Israel, among other reasons, to procure spare parts for Russia-supplied weapon systems.[253] All this had irritated Russia, but, to a certain extent, its loss to the US, France and Israel of an increasing share of India’s arms market had been counterbalanced by India’s support for Russia’s «legitimate interests» in Crimea and Ukraine.[254] Accordingly, as in the case of the India–US relationship, the India–Russia alliance – although less warm than in the past – had remained in place as a mainstay in India’s foreign policy.

Only in two fields had India’s foreign policy continued to show considerable dynamism even in the second half of the second UPA government: the first was the relationship with Japan, which continued to grow increasingly close and cordial; the second was Delhi’s spirited fight inside the World Trade Organization (WTO) for the safeguarding of India’s national interests.[255]

During the first half of 2014 and up to the formation of the Modi government, on one hand, no new developments occurred in the field of India’s foreign policy, and, on the other hand, foreign policy – as is generally the rule in Indian electoral politics – was conspicuous by its absence as a topic of debate in the electoral campaign.[256] This suddenly changed at the moment itself of the swearing in of the new Modi government. In fact, the heads of state of the other SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) countries, the prime minister of Mauritius and the head of the Tibetan government in exile were invited to the ceremony (26-27 May 2014).[257]

This move – widely seen as aimed at starting friendlier and closer relations with the neighbouring countries – was only the opening one in a kind of international campaign with two main goals: projecting India as a major world power and getting international support and cooperation in promoting and accelerating India’s economic development. This international campaign – it is worth stressing – was primarily led by the new prime minister in person, while the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sushma Swaraj, was relegated to managing the daily bureaucratic routine of her ministry and carrying out some of the foreign visits of less import.

In the period up to the end of the year under review, the new prime minister took part in no less than 10 state visits and/or major international conferences, and hosted no less than eight visits of prime ministers or heads of state of foreign powers (see Table 11), which made of him the most active Indian premier in foreign policy since Rajiv Gandhi’s time.

This intense diplomatic activity can be described as mainly – even if not exclusively – organized around two principal axes: the US–WTO–Russia axis and the China engagement/China containment axis. Its two main goals, as noted above, were: the acceptance of India at the international level as a major world power; and the acquisition, from the other major world countries, of direct investments, technological know-how and, more generally, any economic means necessary to speed up the growth of India’s economy. However, before focussing our attention on the pursuit of these objectives, it is necessary to return very briefly to the Modi government’s oath-taking ceremony and the meaning of the above quoted invitations to heads of states and heads of government.

As mentioned above, that ceremony was widely seen as aimed at starting friendlier and closer relations with the neighbouring countries. However, on closer examination, the rationale beyond that move seems to be different. Indeed, the hypothesis can be made that, according to RSS ideology, those invitations were aimed at stressing India’s hegemonic relationship with the other SAARC countries plus the Maldives. Namely, at stressing India’s position as paramount power in the geo-political space that, according to Hindu nationalist ideology, has historically been, and should be, part of India.

In fact, what Modi had in mind appears to have been the establishment of a set of bilateral relations based less on the principle of good neighbourhood than on the acceptance of India’s hegemony. This soon became visible in the evolution of the relationship with Pakistan. After the invitation of Pakistan’s President Nawaz Sharif to the swearing-in ceremony, the icy relations between the twin South Asian enemy countries had appeared to be heading towards a thaw. Modi had expressed words of sympathy for the victims of the recent floods in the Pakistani part of Kashmir, while Sharif had reciprocated by sending mangoes as a gift to Modi. However, this bonhomie suddenly evaporated when, on 18 August 2014, the Indian government cancelled the already planned foreign secretary-level talks with Pakistan. The reason for this move was the decision by Pakistan’s High Commissioner in New Delhi, Abdul Basit, to meet Hurriyat leaders,[258] according to a practice that had been tolerated by the previous Indian governments.[259] By then the Hurriyat – which had suffered a series of internal splits – enjoyed a limited political relevance. In spite of this, and in spite of the just noticed fact that the previous Indian governments, although objecting to these meetings, had never imposed any anti-Pakistan sanction, New Delhi’s decision was to put a stop to the recently renewed dialogue with Islamabad. This was as clear cut an indication as any that New Delhi, rather than negotiating with Islamabad on a position of parity, was interested in showing Pakistan – namely the only other South Asian state which, although far from having the same political weight as India, was not a lightweight – who was the dominant power in South Asia.

Table 11. A non-exhaustive list of Modi’s state visits abroad and of foreign dignitaries’ state visits to India in 2014

Dates	Modi’s visits abroad	Visits from foreign dignitaries
8–9 June		China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi visits India
16–17 June	Modi visits Bhutan
13–16 July	Modi visits Brazil and takes part in the BRICS conference at Fortaleza
30 July–1 August		US State Secretary John Kerry visits India
3–4 August	Modi visits Kathmandu (Nepal)
7–9 August		United States Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel visits India
30 August–3 September	Modi visits  Kyoto and Tokyo (Japan)
4–5 September		Tony Abbott, Prime Minister of Australia, visits India
11–12 September	Modi takes part in the SCO meeting at Dushanbe (Tajikistan)
17–19 September		Chinese President Xi Jinping visits India
26–30 September	Modi visits the USA and takes part in the UN general assembly
27–28 October		Nguyen Tan Dung, Prime Minister of Vietnam, visits India
4 November		Daniel Kablan Duncan, Irish Prime Minister, visits India
11–13 November	Modi visits Naypyidaw (Myanmar) and takes part in the East Asia Summit
14–18 November	Modi visits Brisbane, Canberra, Melbourne and Sydney (Australia) and takes part in the G20 summit
19 November	Modi visits Suva (Fiji)
25–27 November	Modi visits Kathmandu (Nepal) for the SAARC summit
10–11 December		Russian President Vladimir Putin visits India
Sources: Indian and international press; Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

8.1. The US-WTO-Russia axis

For quite some time after the 2002 Gujarat anti-Muslim pogrom, Narendra Modi had been kept at arm’s length by the Western countries. However, parallel with the rise of Modi’s political star in India, the anti-Modi wall in the West had started crumbling.[260] The US – which had cancelled Modi’s visa in 2005 – had been the last important nation to move away from its former anti-Modi position; eventually, in February 2014, namely before the conclusion of the Indian general election campaign, US Ambassador Nancy Powell had visited Modi, ending a nine-year boycott.[261]

Immediately after Modi’s victory, before the oath-taking ceremony, US President Barack Obama had congratulated the new Indian prime minister on the phone, inviting him to visit the United States in September.[262] This had been followed by US Secretary of State John Kerry’s statement on 20 May 2014, publicly congratulating Modi and pointing out that the US stood «ready to work closely» with the new Indian premier «to promote shared prosperity», namely economic cooperation, and «strengthen our security», namely bringing India more firmly into the arc of containment which the US was building around China.[263] This had been followed by the official announcement (28 July 2014) that Kerry would visit New Delhi for the 5th US-India Strategic Dialogue and meet the new Indian prime minister, heading an important delegation, which included US Secretary of Commerce, Penny Pritzker.[264]

Nevertheless, already before the official announcement of Kerry’s visit to New Delhi, the new Indian government took a momentous decision bound to irritate the US. At the WTO ministerial conference held in Bali in December 2013, a consensus had been reached on a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), namely a trade facilitation agreement aimed at reducing and standardizing customs and simplifying related bureaucratic rules. Once implemented by all the WTO countries, the agreement would reduce the total costs of trade between 13 and 15% for developing countries, and more than 10% for developed countries, creating an estimated number of 21 million new jobs and adding approximately USD one trillion to the global economy.[265]

Already at Bali, reaching the agreement – the first in the 19-year  existence of the WTO – had been made difficult by India’s insistence on a parallel pact. This pact would allow developing countries to subsidize and stockpile foodgrains for food security reasons, in amounts potentially bigger than that sanctioned by WTO rules. According to these rules, the value of subsidies aimed at maintaining public stockholding of foodgrains could grow only up to 10% of the value of agricultural production, calculated with reference to 1986–88 prices. Breaking through that ceiling would invite heavy financial sanctions.

This was an impending risk for India, particularly after the enactment, on 12 September 2013, of the Food Security Act, which was bound to raise food subsidies. [266] Hence, in December 2013, at Bali, Anand Sharma, then India’s Industry and Commerce Minister, heading the so-called G-33 group,[267] had fought a spirited battle to gain a «peace clause», namely an agreement that, while standing, would suspend any legal challenge to the food subsidy policy of any WTO country.

Eventually, a four-year «peace clause» had been agreed, a clear victory for India, but only a tactical one. In fact, in 2017, the whole question was to be examined once again, without any assurance that India could win the war, namely to be exempted from the ceiling on food stockholding and food subsidies.[268]

This being the situation, Narendra Modi, in one of his first decisions as premier, rather than waiting for 2017, decided immediately to rejoin battle on the issue. Clearly, he had come to the conclusion that it was better to confront a challenge which, anyway, he was bound to face in 2017, while enjoying all the political strength given to him by his recent and conspicuous electoral victory.

On 21 July 2014 – some days in advance of Kerry’s arrival in New Delhi, and 10 days before the deadline set for the final ratification of the Bali agreement by the WTO nations – the news started to circulate that, unless a more satisfactory solution was found for the problem of allowing developing countries to maintain their food-security-related public stockholding of foodgrains, India would not ratify the FTA.[269] As ratification by all the 153 WTO countries was imperative for the FTA becoming part of the WTO rules, this meant that India was ready to kill the agreement (and, as a result, possibly the WTO itself), unless it got its way.

In challenging the WTO consensus, Modi was possibly betting on the fact that his decision, although bound to trigger the ire of the US, was of less import to the Obama administration than the need to «reboot» the US–India connection. If that was Modi’s wager, it undoubtedly paid off. The decision not to sign the Bali agreement unless the agricultural subsidies question was satisfactorily resolved did trigger the ire of most WTO member states. In fact, the situation became so tense that rumours started to circulate that the consensus principle on which the WTO operated could be given up in favour of a policy of partial agreements, which would «leave behind those that don’t want to come along».[270] Kerry himself, at the end of his visit in Delhi, let the US displeasure be known, through the statement of a US State Department official.[271] However, India did not budge in spite of «tremendous pressure from other WTO members».[272]

Certainly, it is a fact that, notwithstanding Kerry’s warning, India’s stand at the WTO did not seem to affect the ongoing blossoming of the Washington–New Delhi relationship. The same US State Department official who had conveyed Kerry’s warning about India’s decision not to ratify the FTA nevertheless stressed that the Kerry–Modi meeting had been «strong and positive».[273] In fact, Kerry’s visit was closely followed by that of US Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel (7–9 August 2014), which highlighted the growing importance of the huge US arms sales to India and signalled the possible injection of US investments in the burgeoning India defence sector.[274] This was followed, in September, by the sending of a team of the Indian Defence Ministry to Washington, «reportedly with the aim of finalizing details for Indo-US joint production of the third generation Javelin anti-tank missile».[275]

All these diplomatic exchanges, although significant, were only the prelude to the crucially important official visit by Narendra Modi. A politician who, only one year before, was unable to obtain a visa to enter the US, now went to a five-day long official visit in that same country, receiving red carpet treatment from the US authorities and a rousing reception from the bulk of the influential, 2.8 million strong Indian-American community.[276]

During his visit Modi had two main objectives: attracting US private investment to India and renewing and expanding defence cooperation between the two countries. Modi pursued the former objective by meeting the CEOs (Chief Executive Officers) of several leading organizations both in New York and Washington. During these meetings, Modi successfully strived to convince the representatives of «America Inc.» that, in India, times had changed, «archaic» labour laws and bureaucratic impediments to the full deployment of international capital were on the way out, and, on top of it all, India was now ready to discuss modifications to its nuclear liability act.[277]

The objective of renewing and expanding defence cooperation was arrived at through the renewal of the 2005 cooperation agreement for an additional 10-year period and the decision by the US to make available advanced military technology to the Indian navy.[278] Moreover, in the joint declaration that concluded Modi’s visit, it was stated that the US and India would «treat each other at the same level as their closer partners» on questions such as «defense technology, trade, research, co-production and co-development».[279] Finally, the two countries, in a statement clearly aimed at China, stressed their support for freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.[280]

Modi’s triumphal visit was capped by his «wonderful» meeting with Barack Obama on 29 September 2014,[281] followed the next day by the quite unprecedented publication in The Washington Post of a joint editorial by the US president and the Indian premier.[282]

While Modi was visiting the US, the WTO question had resurfaced as a matter of preoccupation for US entrepreneurs.[283] However, Modi had reiterated India’s stand in a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations, saying that, while India was not against a trade facilitation agreement, it could not but take into account the welfare of its poor people. This, in turn, made it imperative for India that the agreements on trade facilitation and food security be secured together.[284]

In spite of the persistence of the WTO hurdle, some of the most perceptive India-watchers were convinced that, behind the scenes, India and the US were working together on brokering a compromise on the FTA.[285] That, indeed, some kind of behind-the-scenes negotiation had been going on became clear on 13 November 2014, when India and the US announced that they had reached an agreement on the WTO question. More than a compromise, however, the India-US agreement was an unqualified acceptance of India’s position. In fact, in exchange for India’s ratification of the FTA and waiting for a final solution of the food stockpiling subsidies, the «peace clause» would now have an indefinite timeframe.[286]

Clearly, Modi’s bet had paid off: economic and strategic cooperation with India was more important for the US than keeping faith with the neoliberal orthodoxy prohibiting food subsidies to agriculture. Of course, the bilateral US–India agreement had to be accepted by the WTO; but, given the US’s clout in the organization, the end result was not in doubt. In fact, on 27 November 2014, the WTO’s General Council «unequivocally» agreed to the indefinite «peace clause»; the fact that on the same occasion 31 December 2015 was set as the deadline to find a permanent solution for public stockholding for food security purposes was only a convenient fig leaf to cover the WTO’s complete surrender to India.[287]

Of course, this agreement represented a major political victory for India, but most particularly for Narendra Modi, who had decided to challenge the majority of the WTO member states and had been successful. Indeed it was such a complete victory as to make some observers wonder how it could have been reached without any concession in return.[288]

In reality, a potentially conspicuous cost – although an indirect one – brought about by the WTO victory and the increasingly close relationship with the US could be the deterioration of India’s relationship with Russia, historically India’s oldest and most faithful ally. In fact, Russia had followed with growing unease both the upgrading of the New Delhi–Washington relationship and the US cornering an increasingly huge share of the Indian weapons market.[289] Moreover, Russia – hemmed in by Europe and subjected to the US and EU sanctions because of its Ukraine policy – was clearly afraid that India’s support could ebb away, leaving an increasingly isolated Russia over-dependent on Chinese support.[290]

These preoccupations were however put to rest by the short but extremely successful visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin on 10–11 December 2014, when 20 agreements «worth billions of dollars» were signed.[291] The contract between the Indian Department of Atomic Energy and Russia’s Rosatom – aimed at building 12 nuclear reactors, beyond the two already under construction at Kudankulam, by 2035 – was among the most noteworthy among these agreements. Also worth noticing was the agreement between India’s Essar and Russia’s Rosneft, engaging the latter to supply 10 million tons of crude oil annually at a discount price. Moreover, Indian companies signed a 2.1 billion US dollar pact to source rough diamonds directly from Russia’s mining giant Alrosa (one of the main diamond producers in the world) to Indian polishing and cutting firms, without going through the main diamond hubs, such as Antwerp and Dubai. Finally, Russia showed itself to be open to the Modi-sponsored «Make in India» campaign, agreeing to produce in India and export from there 400 Mi-17 medium lift and Ka-226 light utility helicopters to the tune of 400 helicopters a year, and make in India the nuclear components for the 12 new Russian-built reactors. [292] Finally, another topic very much present in the Modi–Putin interaction was the necessity to address the problem of either supplying or manufacturing in India spare parts for Indian weapons of Russian origin. That was a crucial problem because India still maintained 60–70% of its defence inventory from Russia hardware.[293]

This being the situation it does not come as a surprise to find Narendra Modi’s declaration (11 December 2014) that Russia was to remain India’s «top defence supplier» and that the importance of the India–Russia relationship and «its unique place in India’s foreign policy will not change».[294] Also Modi reassured Putin that India would continue to oppose Western sanctions against Russia.[295] Both the multi-million-dollar agreements and Modi’s political assurances to Putin were the clear cut demonstration that India’s increasingly close entente with the US would not come at Russia’s expense.[296]

 

8.2. The China-engagement/China-containment axis

The other main axis around which Narendra Modi’s foreign policy has been organized is the relationship with the People’s Republic of China. This was a relationship which had two different aspects: engagement and containment. During the period under review, it became clear that, if, on one hand, Modi was interested in strengthening and rebalancing the economic connection with India’s giant neighbour in the North, on the other hand he perceived China as a military and political threat, which had to be put under control.

All this became evident in due course. At the moment of Modi’s electoral victory, however, the way in which he would deal with China was anybody’s guess. On one side there was the fact that, while the major Western countries had banned Modi, China had welcomed him with open arms. In fact Modi, who had already been to China once before becoming Gujarat chief minister, in that capacity officially visited it three times (in 2006, 2007 and 2011), always being received with the highest honours. Indeed, in the years of Modi’s chief ministership, economic relations between China and Gujarat flourished. It is true that, during the electoral campaign, while in Arunachal Pradesh (the Indian state that China reclaims as «South Tibet»), Modi decried China’s expansionist mindset. However that had been explained away by Chinese authorities as electoral campaign rhetoric. In fact, Modi’s election had been greeted with considerable satisfaction by China, and one Chinese commentator had gone so far to hypothesize that the newly elected Indian prime minister was «likely to become India’s Nixon».[297] On the other hand, those same Indian big businessmen which had so powerfully and decisively supported Modi in his elevation to the prime ministership were clearly in favour of the rebooting of India–US ties and the continuation of India–Japan ties.[298] In other words, they were in favour of a policy which could not but alarm Beijing. To this it must be added that the RSS leadership was traditionally hostile to China and that, by and large, Indian public opinion had consistently been against China at least since the 1962 Sino-Indian war.

China’s Prime Minister Li Keqiang, within three days of Modi’s victory, was the first head of government to phone him. This was followed by a two-day visit in New Delhi (8–9 June 2014) of China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, aimed at preparing for the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping.[299]

However, even before Wang set foot in India, Modi had signalled that any China engagement policy on his part would come accompanied by a series of conditionalities. The first signal had been the induction in the new government of former General V.K. Singh as Minister of State of External Affairs and Minister of State (independent charge) for the North East Region, and the choice of former master spy Ajit Doval as National Security Advisor. V.K. Singh, who was in charge of that same Arunachal Pradesh reclaimed by China as «South Tibet», was a well-known hawk on security issues, who had never concealed his aversion to China; on his part, Doval was known for his proximity to the Tibetan cause.[300] A second even more evident signal had been the above quoted invitation to the new Indian government swearing-in ceremony, along with the heads of state of the SAARC countries, the prime minister of the Maldives, and Lobsang Sangay, prime minister of the Tibetan government-in-exile from 27 April 2011.

Xi Jinping’s visit to India was planned for mid-September, rather later than desired by China.[301]Meanwhile, before Xi’s journey to India, Modi made three visits abroad, which were relevant in understanding – and making observers understand – where the new Indian prime minister really stood on the China question. Modi visited Bhutan on 16–17 June, and Nepal on 3–4 August. Significantly, both Bhutan and Nepal are Himalayan countries which share their borders only with China and India. In both cases it was clear Modi’s intention to bring those countries more firmly inside the Indian orbit, in competition with China. More relevant, however, was the third visit, which took Modi to Japan from 30 August to 3 September 2014, namely to a country whose relationship with China had been steadily and conspicuously worsening in recent years.

As remarked above, India–Japan ties had been flourishing under the UPA government, including its terminal period. Moreover, as in the case of China, Modi was no foreigner to Japan, which he had visited twice as Gujarat chief minister. Moreover, it seems, the new Indian prime minister enjoyed a close personal connection with Japan’s prime minister Abe Shinzō.[302] This being the situation, Modi’s visit to Japan was an almost total success. Japan promised to invest USD 35 billion in India over the next five years and double its FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) during the same period. Energy cooperation and military ties were upgraded. A «two-plus-two» security arrangement, namely regular meetings between foreign and defence ministers, was decided. Also an agreement was signed, concerning the joint production of rare earths, a group of 17 chemically similar elements crucial to the manufacturing of many hi-tech products, including mobile phones, hybrid cars, wind turbines and guided missiles. In nature, rare earths are indeed less rare that one might assume from their name; but their extraction is difficult and polluting, and, to a large extent, monopolized by China, from where Japan used to supply its needs. However, the worsening of the Japan–China relationship had brought about a diminution of China rare earth exports to Japan and Japan’s effort to diversify its sources.[303] Accordingly, the help of India, which owns 2.2% of the world’s known reserves, was welcomed. The agreement signed between Indian Rare Earths, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Indian Department of Atomic Energy, and Japan’s Toyota Tsusho Corporation was aimed at producing between 2000 and 2300 tons of rare earths in India, to be preferentially exported to Japan, thus fulfilling around 15% of the Japanese demand.[304]

The only visible snag in the successful outcome of Modi’s visit was his inability to finalize a nuclear energy agreement with Japan. At least for the time being, that was prevented by the Japanese public opinion’s sensitivity in relation to the fact that India was an atomic-weapons state which had neither signed nor intended to sign the NPT (Non Proliferation Treaty) and other nuclear weapons controlling agreements.[305]

Undoubtedly, Modi’s visit strengthened the Japan–India entente; and this was an entente which could be read as aiming, among other things, at containing China. The impression that, while waiting for Xi Jinping’s visit, Modi had actively been promoting an India-sponsored arc of containment around China was further reinforced by the official visit to India of Australia’s prime minister, Tony Abbot, who landed in Delhi the day after Modi’s return from Japan. During his two-day visit, Abbot signed an agreement (5 September 2014), engaging Australia to export uranium ore to India. This agreement was accompanied by the announcement of plans to increase security cooperation between India and Australia.[306]

It was in this rather inauspicious context that Xi Jinping’s «landmark visit to India» took place. It started with Xi’s arrival not in New Delhi, but, in a highly symbolical move, in the capital of Gujarat, Ahmedabad, on 17 September 2014, namely Narendra Modi’s 64th birthday.[307] Xi’s arrival was followed by the signing of a host of economic agreements between the two countries and China’s engagement to invest USD 20 billion for a fast train corridor and a new strategic road in the next five years. Although a sum decidedly inferior to that promised by Japan only a couple of weeks before – and much lower than «over 100 billion dollars» hinted at by the  Chinese consulate in Mumbai only days earlier – it represented a dramatic improvement over the USD 400 million invested by China in India during the previous ten years. On top of that, China agreed to spend a further USD 6.8 billion on the construction of two industrial parks, one in Gujarat and one in Maharashtra. Finally 24 Chinese companies engaged to buy pharmaceuticals, farming and other India-made products, for an additional USD 3.6 billion.[308]

These agreements signalled the existence of the reciprocal desire by Modi and Xi to strengthen and upgrade the economic ties between the two giant neighbours. Also, they seemed to open the path to a more cordial relationship between the two countries. However, in the late afternoon of 18 September 2014, the news became known that some 1000 Chinese soldiers had intruded beyond the LAC («Line of Actual Control», namely the provisional India–China border) in southern Ladakh. Modi, while dispatching troops on the spot, asked Xi – who, by the way, is the supreme commander of the People’s Liberation Army– to withdraw Chinese troops.

In spite of Xi’s assent to Modi’s request, the following day – the one concluding Xi’s Indian visit – Chinese troops were still on the Indian side the LAC.[309] It comes as no surprise that the cordial atmosphere between the two leaders suddenly turned icy, and, in a «rather strong way to express to the world their lack of agreement», the visit ended with two separate communiqués.[310]

It is possible that – as argued by Forbes’s Eric Meyer – the whole incident was engineered by Xi’s internal enemies.[311] But it had been the exact replica of a similar incident that had taken place one year before, during Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang’s visit to Delhi. This could not but encourage China’s many enemies in India to vent their anger against the neighbour of the North and caution India’s public opinion against the danger of any appeasement with it.[312]

At the end of the day, the Chinese incursion in Ladakh could not but give legitimacy to Modi’s decision to carry on with the containment side of his China policy. In the period under review, the last significant act of this policy was the tightening of India’s relationship with Vietnam, namely a state whose adversarial relationship with China has been likened to the adversarial relationship existing between India and Pakistan.[313]

The relationship between India and Vietnam – two countries which shared the preoccupation vis-à-vis a China, which was perceived as harbouring hegemonic ambitions and with which both India and Vietnam had fought a war and had an unsolved problem of undefined borders – has started to become increasingly close since 2000. In 2006, ONGC Videsh Limited (India’s largest oil and gas exploration and production company) obtained rights from Vietnam for block 127 and 128, namely for Vietnamese maritime territory which, however, was claimed as its own by China. Moreover, in 2007, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung visited New Delhi, signing a strategic partnership agreement.[314]

No doubt, Modi intended not only to maintain the already robust India–Vietnam connection, but to upgrade it. Already two days before Xi Jinping’s arrival in India, on 15 September 2014, seven important agreements had been signed between India and Vietnam at the presence of India’s President Pranab Mukherjee, then visiting Vietnam. These agreements strengthened the bilateral cooperation between the two countries on the basis of a «strategic partnership» focused on political, defence and security cooperation.[315]

On 27 and 28 November 2014, Pranab Mukherjee’s visit to Vietnam was reciprocated by Vietnam Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung’s visit to New Delhi, where the Vietnamese premier arrived accompanied by a large business delegation. Dung’s visit had a dual objective: one was diversifying and expanding economic relations; the other was promoting and expanding military and strategic cooperation.         The latter aim had an anti-Chinese bent that was clear to everybody. Certainly Modi, in his interaction with Dung, gave pride of place to the military cooperation with Vietnam, which Modi defined as among India’s «most important ones».[316] In doing so, the Indian premier stressed India’s commitment to modernize Vietnam’s defence forces; an aim that India would reach by making operational at the earliest the USD 100 million line of credit opened during President Mukherjee’s visit to Hanoi. [317] While the two premiers were discussing India–Vietnam military ties, ONGC Videsh Ltd and PetroVietnam signed a «Heads of Agreement» document «for mutual cooperation for exploration in PetroVietnam Blocks 102/10 and 106/10 in the South China Sea».[318] Although, unlike the blocks previously given for exploration by Vietnam to India, Blocks 102/10 and 106/10 were not reclaimed by China, the agreement could not but be viewed with distaste in Beijing, as China considers the South China Sea as part of its own sphere of influence. Finally, the joint statement concluding Dung’s visit had a distinctive anti-Chinese ring, asserting that the two premiers «agreed that freedom of navigation and overflight in the East [China] Sea/South China Sea should not be impeded».[319] This was a clear indication that New Delhi and Hanoi jointly disapproved of China’s attempt to expand its influence in the East China and South China seas, where such an attempt was resisted in particular by Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines, supported by the US.

Il presente capitolo analizza gli sviluppi politici ed economici in India nel corso del 2014. L’anno in questione è stato caratterizzato dalle elezioni generali, tenute per la 16ª volta dal raggiungimento dell’indipendenza. Tali elezioni hanno visto la catastrofica sconfitta del partito del Congresso, al potere nel corso delle due precedenti legislature, e la brillante vittoria del BJP, guidato da Narendra Modi. Le ragioni e le conseguenze di questo esito elettorale sono analizzate in dettaglio, non solo attraverso la trattazione dello scontro elettorale a livello panindiano, ma mediante lo studio di tre studi di caso, rappresentati dalle elezioni nell’Uttar Pradesh e nel Bihar (dove il BJP ha vinto non contro il Congresso, ma contro potenti partiti regionali a base castale) e nell’Andhra Pradesh (dove il Congresso ha perso non contro il BJP – che in quello stato è una forza politica irrilevante – ma contro i partiti locali). Il saggio si sofferma poi sul funzionamento del nuovo governo guidato da Narendra Modi, mettendo in luce il processo di accentramento dei poteri nelle mani del nuovo primo ministro e del PMO (Prime Minister Office) che lo caratterizza. Viene inoltre messo in luce come l’azione del governo Modi sia stata caratterizzata dall’attuazione dell’agenda «culturale» del fondamentalismo/nazionalismo indù. Anche se realizzata seguendo strategie di basso profilo, tale politica ha già avuto il risultato di portare ad un peggioramento nei rapporti fra le diverse comunità religiose.

Il capitolo passa poi ad analizzare l’andamento dell’economia, dimostrando come la ripresa economica fosse iniziata prima della conquista del potere da parte di Modi e come molti dei positivi sviluppi della seconda metà dell’anno siano stati frutto anche del crollo del prezzo del petrolio a livello internazionale. Infine, il capitolo analizza la politica estera indiana, sottolineando il nuovo dinamismo ad essa impresso da Modi e analizzandola come incentrata intorno a due assi:

quello volto a realizzare un avvicinamento con gli USA, senza per altro rinunciare a difendere gli interessi dell’India nell’ambito della World Trade Organization e senza mettere in pericolo il tradizionale legame con la Russia, e l’asse volto a costruire un arco di contenimento intorno alla Cina, evitando per altro uno scontro frontale con Pechino.

 

1. Preface

2014 opened in Bangladesh with the elections, held on 5thJanuary amidst unprecedented political violence which led to the killing of 29 people. The 2014 elections were recorded as the most violent in Bangladesh’s history.[1]

Throughout 2014, the government of the re-elected Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina faced several challenges. Firstly, the political crisis, fuelled by an alliance of 18 political parties led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), threatened to trigger a wave of protests similar to those of 2013. In turn, political instability brought to the fore the risk of adverse fallout on the economic situation. Secondly, the trials for the 1971 war crimes started in 2010, reaching their highest momentum in 2013 and continuing in 2014, with varied reactions from national and international public opinion. Thirdly, Sheikh Hasina’s government was charged with corruption and human rights abuses.

In 2013, for the first time in Bangladesh’s history, the incumbent prime minister gained a second mandate.[2] The large majority obtained by the Awami League allowed Sheikh Hasina to lead the country with a steadiness never experienced before, not even by Hasina’s main rival, Khaleda Zia.

A multifaceted and ambitious foreign policy has been a new factor, with stronger ties to India and promising relations with several countries, especially China, Japan and Russia.

2. Bangladesh politics after the 2014 elections

The 2014 elections represented a watershed in Bangladesh’s politics. One year is not enough to evaluate the long-term effects of the electoral results (Awami League’s 40% majority and 232 out of 300 seats in parliament).[3] It is, however, a sufficient lapse of time to draw some conclusions on the short-term effects.

The entire electoral process, including the results, was very much criticized, not only by the opposition but also by some prominent international actors.[4] The nature of the Bangladeshi democracy was questioned. Only 40% of the electorate voted. The restrictions imposed on the two main opponents, Khaleda Zia and Mohammad Hossain Ershad, were justified as measures to prevent violence, but on the polling day alone over 20 people were shot by the police. In spite of this gloomy start, which brought about fears of more violence in 2014, the year turned out to be much more peaceful and stable than the previous one.[5] Before the first session of the 10thNational Parliament, held on 29th January 2014, about 30 members of the outgoing government were dismissed for corruption or poor performance, as a sign of the government’s intention to create a new political climate.[6]

The large majority obtained by the Awami League provided Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina with an unprecedented strength and allowed her and her government to put forward several changes and reforms. However, the first half of 2014 continued to be influenced by the old patterns of Bangladeshi politics: polarization between the government’s supporters, especially those belonging to the Shahbag movement, and the wide and well-organized opposition, political tensions and open clashes. Residual street protests and violence went on at the beginning of 2014, with a declining intensity throughout the first part of the year. In 2013, rallies and hartals (the general strikes aiming at paralyzing the entire public life of the country) nearly caused the country’s economic collapse. The increasing normalization of the political situation in 2014 had a positive impact on several sectors and the country’s general mood. The Dhaka Tribune newspaper carried out two opinion polls respectively, in June and December 2014.[7] While in June, only 52% of the interviewees were unhappy with the BNP, in December, the discontent had increased to 62%. Even though the appreciation of the Awami League government slightly decreased between the first and second half of the year (from 75.3% to 72%), the overall evaluation was definitely positive. According to the respondents, «education has been the government’s biggest success», while the second was the investment in infrastructures. Concern has been expressed for the law and order situation, which remains critical. In spite of these results, according to another Dhaka Tribune poll carried out in the same period, if there was an election at the time of the poll, 41% of the interviewees declared they would have voted for the Awami League and 34% for the BNP.[8]

Nevertheless, 48% of youths between the ages of 18 and 24, expressed their preference for the BNP and 34% for the Awami League. The more radical character of the BNP, especially of its affiliates, might appeal more to youths. Indeed, they seem to be increasingly attracted by international Islamic fundamentalism.

In February 2014, the upazila (sub-district) elections took place. The BNP, which boycotted the 2013 vote by abstaining from the general elections, obtained 123 posts out of 224 candidates, and the Awami League obtained 117 out of 295. The Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) was one of BNP’s main allies, even though it had been banned from any polls. The BNP’s results were interpreted as being due to the JI’s presence within the coalition. This result confirmed Jamaat’s increased popularity in 2014.[9] Yet, the BNP was facing a deep crisis. The results of the 2014 election, independent from the BNP boycott, the ban imposed on the Jamaat by the government, and the low percentage of voters, may be interpreted as the electorate’s choice of continuity, while the opposition did not represent an alternative. Khaleda Zia was carrying out a party reform aimed at rejuvenating the party. This would imply an increasingly important role for her son, Tarique Rahman, who is supposed to inject a spirit of youth into the party. Unfortunately, Khaleda Zia’s son – who is so compromised with corruption cases to be forced to live abroad – is very unpopular, both within and outside Bangladesh.[10]

Sheikh Hasina’s electoral success was questioned not only by the Bangladeshi opposition, but also by some foreign powers, the UK and the US in particular. While the British criticism was milder,[11] the US went to the extent of asking «for a free and fair re-election in Bangladesh».[12]

Bangladesh’s politics were a matter of debate for the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 11th February 2014.[13] Additional criticism came from Jean Lambert, leader of the EU team who visited Bangladesh in the spring of 2014; the West remained unsatisfied with the poor progress regarding safety measures in favour of the garment industry workers.[14]

As far as the internal situation is concerned, while the political clash weakened in 2014, the opposition’s sharp criticism went on. The main charges against the government were corruption and human rights abuses.

3. Corruption and anti-corruption measures

Corruption has always been endemic in Bangladesh, which continues to be among the most corrupt countries in the world. Corruption involves all fields of Bangladeshi political life. The judiciary is the most affected. According to Doing Business 2014, the Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014 and The Transformation Index, Bangladesh’s courts, at all levels, «are both inefficient and subject to political influence from members of government, citizens and companies». The World Bank & IFC and Doing Business 2014 reveal that subscribing to a commercial contract in Bangladesh requires, on average, the fulfilment of 41 administrative procedures, taking about 1,442 days. According to the Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014, the police are not able to enforce law and order. The police themselves are affected by political interference, and the punishment of officials and prominent persons is biased by political factors. Appointments are determined by «bribes, nepotism and party loyalties, rather than by professional qualifications». The main reason for bribery within the police is officers’ low salaries. As far as the public services are concerned, the Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014 states that the bureaucracy is inefficient. According to the Investment Climate Statement 2013, ministries often require «unnecessary licenses and permits». Factory owners often offer bribes to speed up procedures, bypass inspections or relax the rules. Just to give an idea of the disastrous consequences of such a situation, cases of bribed inspectors were behind the Rana Plaza tragedy of 2013 and similar accidents frequently occurring in Bangladesh’s garment factories. The National Board of Revenue, the government authority for tax administration, is one of the most corrupt agencies in the country. Tax laws are enforced in a discriminatory way and tax evasion is extensive. One of the most corrupt sectors in the country is customs, where the problem extends from petty corruption (bribes and kickbacks to customs officers) to unofficial or irregular payments of import and export taxes. Officers exert their power to change tariffs and to expedite or delay customs processing at the frontiers or ports. These problems, and an overall lack of transparency in trade regulations and policies, represent the obstacles that make trading with Bangladesh uncertain. Chittagong port, handling approximately 80% of the total of Bangladesh’s import-export, is considered one of the most corrupt and inefficient ports in Asia. Political patronage is enforced to award public contracts for infrastructures in construction, transportation, utilities, and supplies. In April 2014, it was discovered that the public gas supplier, Titan Gas, provided illegal gas connections to approximately 500 companies. Corrupt officials received bribes for each connection. Illegal takeover of government land by politicians is frequent. Bangladesh passed several laws against corruption, such as the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, and the Money Laundering Prevention Act of 2002, while the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Penal Code contain specific reference to corruption crimes. The Money Laundering Law has been amended to include norms to prevent stock market manipulation. The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) was established in 2004, but in 2014 its power was significantly curtailed. Indeed, in 2013 the Anti-Corruption Commission Act was amended, passed by the parliament and signed by the president. The amended Act established that the ACC was obliged to obtain the government’s permission before investigating state officials, including judges. The ACC itself is not corruption-free. Other bodies involved in anti-corruption initiatives are the National Coordination Committee (NCC), the Office of the Ombudsman, the Auditor General and the Bangladesh Public Service Commission (BPSC). All these bodies lack independence and are occasionally affected by inefficiency and bribery.[15]

This climate does not attract foreign investors. One of the main challenges the Prime Minister will have to face is enforcing an efficient anti-corruption policy.

In April 2004, the Chittagong police intercepted a shipment of arms and hand grenades worth $5 million. The arms, made in China, were directed to insurgents in Assam, to trouble India. Pakistani spies seemed to be involved in the case. For years the case was ignored and Khaleda Zia, prime minister at that time, did not take any action. Her son Tarique Rahman was involved. A number of other corruption cases pile up against him in Bangladesh, while he lives in London. Since the Awami League came into power in 2009, they have taken the corruption issue seriously. On 30thJanuary 2014, the court sentenced 14 men to be hanged, most of them belonging or affiliated to opposition parties. The charges were smuggling related to the arms haul. Among the sentenced was Jamaat-e-Islami’s chief, Motiur Rahman Nizami. Already indicted for 1971 war crimes, he faces the risk of being sentenced to death twice.[16]

4. The trial for the 1971 war crimes: a landmark in Bangladeshi history

The charges against the government of human rights abuses, especially concerned the death sentences and the executions of 2013, related to the trials for the crimes of the 1971 civil war.

The opposition and those among the international observers who criticize the trial, do not take into account that the truth about the events of 1971 was strongly pursued by the people. The Shahbag movement, one of the main supporters of the trial, has relatives of the 1971 war victims among its members. The Shahbag activists, which have been described as undemocratic, protest peacefully with non-violent methods. The movement is formed mainly by youths and demands the country’s democratization.[17]

The prosecution of war criminals had been one of the main elements of political polarization and the clash between the government (and its supporters) and the opposition.

The trial went on throughout 2014, although with much less vigour than in 2013.

Undoubtedly, the trial, desired and instigated by Sheikh Hasina’s previous government in 2013, was partially exploited for electoral purposes. After the January 2014 elections, the usefulness of the trial diminished and it may have become politically counterproductive. The death of more than 100 people in violence related to the trial in 2013 may have affected the image of the Prime Minister, who adopted a softer approach and preferred «to advance her credentials as a wise, legitimate and moderate leader by leaving a flawed tribunal to grind forward only very slowly».[18]

However, seeing the trial exclusively under this light would lead to misunderstanding and underestimating the real impact of the events of 1971 and the deep scars they left on the Bangladeshi people. A meaningful and politically-conscious part of the population cannot bear the injustice of seeing the perpetrators of unspeakable atrocities living undisturbed and acting politically, within the organizations of radical Islam. Describing the trial simply as an electoral move would be like denying the necessity of war crimes trials, from Nuremberg to Cambodia.

5. Debating on the 1971 civil war: does it make sense?

In 2003, the famous ‘Blood Telegram’ was declassified. It was the telegram sent on 6th April 1971 to the State Department. Signed by the consul general, Archer Blood, and by the entire staff of the Consulate General of the United States in Dhaka, the telegram deplored the US backing of the West Pakistan Army in suppressing the uprisings following the non-recognition of the December 1970 election results. Ten years later, between August and October 2013, a series of articles about the Blood Telegram came into the international press, probably inspired by the ongoing trial. Again in 2013, a book, The Blood Telegram, was published by Gary J. Bass, a journalist and professor of international politics at Princeton and a 2014 Pulitzer Prize finalist.[19] Based almost exclusively on primary sources, the book is a remarkably accurate description of the events of 1971. It is built up around the figure and the role of Archer Blood. The consul general and the consulate staff were increasingly disgusted by the US government’s inaction, turning to overt support to Pakistan’s Army crushing Bengali dissent. Besides providing indisputable evidence of American political and military support to Pakistan, the most important US ally in Asia, the book reconstructs in detail the ‘forgotten’ genocide. It discloses the complexity of the events, which involved more than just two enemies opposing each other, but several interwoven rivalries: Muslims against Hindus; Bengalis against Biharis; and the Pakistani Army against the Awami League and the Mukti Bahini. Atrocities were committed by both sides, the army and its collaborators, and the Mukti Bahini. Bass’ book does not enter into the details of the responsibilities of the Jamaat-e-Islami, the Razakar Bahini and other radical Muslim organizations in the massacre, but it focuses on the international intrigues behind the war: US-Pakistan relations; relations between Pakistan, China and India; and Pakistan’s role in facilitating the China-US rapprochement, in view of the Sino-American negotiations at the end of the Vietnam war. The main subject of the book is Kissinger and Nixon’s staunch support to West Pakistan and to the Pakistani Army.

Strangely, the book did not have such remarkable resonance in Bangladesh as it had in the West, especially in Great Britain and in the United States, where it was reviewed by several famous newspapers and magazines.[20]

In Bangladesh, the only noticeable article appeared in the Dhaka Tribune on 14th August 2013: The Blood Telegram, Case for an American Apology. The article does not mention Bass’ book, but it extensively discusses the subject of the American President and Secretary of State’s active involvement in the events of 1971. The article draws the conclusion that «the American government does owe Bangladesh a long due apology», like Pervez Musharraf did during his presidency. As noted by the article, Musharraf was «the only Pakistani head-of-state to personally apologise to Bangladesh for the atrocities committed during the 1971 liberation war».

A more recent paper by an Italian scholar focuses on India’s response to the 1971 crisis «as one of the first cases of humanitarian intervention in world history» and calls into question this interpretation.[21] Even if the most recent literature on the subject does not deal with the question behind the trial of the JI’s war criminals, these scholarly and well-documented studies prove that the 1971 war crimes do not represent a subject that can simply be dismissed as electoral propaganda. More light has to be shed on the topic from a historical point of view and justice has to be done on behalf of the victims. Stating this does not mean to defend the death penalty. However, justice has to be done, and this brings about the need to impose appropriate penalties on those guilty of war crimes. Hopefully, especially after its post-electoral stabilization, the Bangladeshi government, in judging and punishing war criminals, will adopt an attitude in line with its declared aspiration to democracy.

6. A 360-degree foreign policy

6.1. India first

Due to its sustained economic growth over the past few years, Bangladesh can no longer be considered an underdeveloped country, the ‘basket case’ of the 1970s. Bangladesh indeed is becoming an increasingly important nation in the region, not only from the economic, but also from the strategic point of view. It lies across South and Southeast Asia, right at the centre of the highway under construction, which will connect these two important regions. Bangladesh is also facing the Bay of Bengal, which is attractive not only for its commercially interesting coastal area, but especially for its largely unexplored oil reserves. Bangladesh is therefore becoming the pole of multiple interests. India is the most directly and deeply involved power within Bangladesh, especially for its position. Whilst China does not border directly with Bangladesh, India shares a border with this country, a huge and troublesome frontier. India has several strategic, political and economic interests in Bangladesh. Firstly, Bangladesh has a key geographic position to contain Chinese expansion in South Asia. Secondly, India has a special link with Bangladesh, due to its involvement in the 1971 liberation war, which turned into the third Indo-Pakistani war. On the other hand, the new era of Bangladesh foreign policy, inaugurated by Sheikh Hasina’s second term of government, aims primarily at developing good relations with India. The government of Delhi supported the Awami League’s re-election, encouraging a democratic transition in Bangladesh. For the world’s largest democracy, promoting democracy elsewhere is a priority, in a region where authoritarian governments are most common. A secular and democratic Bangladesh can also help to contain the expansion of radical Islam in South Asia, and especially in India. Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), whose main objective is to establish an Islamic state in Bangladesh, and other groups such as Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) and the Jagrata Muslim Janata, are spreading in the region. India is used by the JMB for hideouts and for recruitment through the madrasas, the mosques and the social networks. JMB is connected with radical Muslim groups in India, as well as in Pakistan and Afghanistan. A recent JMB slogan is «Jihad from Bangladesh to Baghdad». JMB is also active in Myanmar, where it relies on the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO). Most of these groups act against India through their connections within the country, in particular among insurgents in border areas, especially in the Muslim-majority districts of Assam. India does not want to have another Pakistan on its eastern border and it is interested in cooperating to fight the expansion of terrorism in the region. Bangladesh has a key position in India’s ‘Look East Policy’. The main sector of Indian investment in South East Asia is infrastructure. In the region, India attempts the development of communications such as ports on the Bay of Bengal, trans-border railways connecting India more directly with its remote north-east regions or the superhighway connecting India with Southeast Asia.[22] Regional connectivity is a key factor to develop trade and investments. Last but not least, India, as well as the US and China, have obvious interests in Bangladesh’s energy resources. Both countries are interested in fostering bilateral ties.

The Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh, Shahidul Haque, visited India from 19th to 21st March 2014, on invitation from his Indian counterpart, Sujatha Singh. At the meetings, the Minister of External Affairs, the Indian National Security Adviser, and the secretaries of several ministries took part. The visit had a rather formal character, considering the approaching end of Manmohan Singh’s mandate. No decision was taken about sensitive issues such as the sharing of the Teesta waters that, in absence of an agreement, gave rise to many years of disputes, or regarding the land and sea boundary controversies.[23] The Teesta dispute ended on 7th July 2014, when the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague awarded Bangladesh 19,467 km2 of coast out of the 25,602 km2in the Bay of Bengal, leaving 6,135 km2 to India. It was a historic settlement, putting an end to a 40-year controversy between Bangladesh and India.[24]

Before the 2014 Indian general elections, the favourite candidate, right-wing leader Narendra Modi, was seen in Bangladesh as a controversial figure, particularly because of his pre-election statements against illegal Bangladeshi immigration, which had raised much concern in the country. After the elections, Modi’s proposed measures to combat illegal immigration from Bangladesh provoked an anti-Indian uproar in Dhaka. However, those initial fears have, to a large extent, been dissipated by some positive diplomatic developments. The visit of the Bangladeshi Foreign Secretary to India was followed by a trip by the External Affairs Minister of the newly elected Indian government, Sushma Swaraj, to Bangladesh from 25th to 27th June 2014.[25] The Indian minister defined the visit as «extremely fruitful and satisfying» and once back to New Delhi, she claimed that her visit had resulted in «an excellent beginning in addressing each others’ concerns and work together with the spirit of good neighbourliness».[26] The Indian Foreign Affairs Minister met several top-level Bangladeshi politicians: the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, the President Abdul Hamid, the Bangladeshi Minister of External Affairs A.H. Mahmud Ali, the leader of the opposition, Raushan Ershad, and the former prime minister, Khaleda Zia. The crucial moment of Sushma Swaraj’s visit was her speech to the civil society, held at the Bangladesh Institute of Strategic Studies (BIISS). The Indian Foreign Minister opened her talk «with a message of friendship and goodwill from the newly elected Government in India» and went on speaking about «comprehensive and equitable partnership» between the two countries, and «mutual beneficial relations, youth development and youth-led development». She mentioned the enormous human sacrifice that united India and Bangladesh in the 1971 war and defined «Bangabandhu Mujibur Rahman as the architect of Bangladesh».[27]

The evidence that Sushma Swaraj’s visit was not just diplomatic smoke but had some political substance was given by a few concrete steps taken in the following weeks. Visa relaxation for children under 13 and citizens above 65 was implemented. The Indian deputy Minister of External Affairs and the Minister of Development of North Eastern Region (DoNER), General V.K. Singh, visited Bangladesh on 23rd and 24th August 2014. The trip was carefully prepared through a meeting with the Chief Ministers of the Northeastern States, held in Guwahati, just before his visit to Dhaka. Manik Sarkar, the Tripura’s Chief Minister, asked for transit facilities by road, rail and sea through Bangladesh to the landlocked Northeast. Access to the waterways is a demand of the entire region since the partition. Besides connectivity, trade and commerce have been the keywords of Gen. Singh’s visit to Dhaka. He spoke about India’s intention to increase bilateral trade between Bangladesh and India.[28]

At the end of 2014, the 31-member Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs chaired by Shashi Tharoor recommended in «overall national interest», to settle the India-Bangladesh boundary dispute through an exchange between Delhi and Dhaka of enclaves and territories in «adverse possession» of either country. If an agreement was be finalized, India would receive 2,777 acres of land and Bangladesh 2,267. The possible settlement has been defined as an example of good diplomacy and it would also set a precedent for the solution of the Sino-Indian border dispute.[29]

6.2. A multilateral regional policy

Bangladesh’s foreign policy is facing a new era. It may be more appropriate to say that Bangladesh is developing its own foreign policy for the first time. The country is no longer the passive target of other nations’ policies or a mere recipient of external aid, as it has been since its foundation. The incumbent Sheikh Hasina’s government has already started to develop a regional multilateral policy, which received a much greater impetus after the Awami League re-election in 2014. As one of the founding members of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Bangladesh has an increasingly prominent role within the organization. After including Nepal and Bhutan in 2004, BIMSTEC has seven members. The founders are India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand. It covers an area stretching from South to Southeast Asia, «with over 22% of the world population and a collective GDP of nearly $2 trillion». The group has an impressive geopolitical and economic importance. The third BIMSTEC summit, held in Naypyidaw, Myanmar’s capital, from 3rd to 4th March 2014, was the occasion for Sheikh Hasina to launch intensive diplomatic activity. The Bangladeshi prime minister, who led a delegation of 54 members, met with his counterparts in India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar, and with Myanmar’s opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. The government of Bangladesh is particularly interested in improving trade and cooperation with Myanmar. Both countries wish to be part of the road connectivity project for the construction of the highway connecting India to Thailand through Bangladesh and Myanmar. The two countries are also planning to build seaports in Sittwe and Kyaukpyu to run a shipping line. In 2011, it was decided to establish the permanent secretariat of BIMSTEC in Dhaka, which started functioning in May 2014.[30]

Bangladesh is also a member of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) forum for economic cooperation, which held its second meeting in Dhaka in June 2014. BCIM aims at establishing an economic corridor along the old Southern Silk Road, connecting the Bay of Bengal, India’s Northeastern Region, Bangladesh and Myanmar to Southwest China. One of the BCIM objectives is to integrate the economies of India, China and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (FTA), representing 7.3% of the global GDP. India aims at reaching the Chinese market, as well as balancing China’s influence in the region through a multilateral BCIM-FTA integration. A further convergence between BCIM and BIMSTEC is also possible in the future.[31]

Bangladesh is not only the ‘gateway’ of India’s ‘Look East Policy’, but it has its own ‘Look East Policy’. Bangladesh has obviously much to gain and nothing to lose, from an economic point of view, in pursuing a regional foreign policy. Southeast Asia indeed is not only one of the world’s most hectic and attractive economic areas, but it is also the destination of Bangladeshi labour, above all, Singapore and Malaysia.[32]

Regional connectivity includes energy cooperation. In early 2014, Bangladesh agreed to provide India a power corridor passing through its territory and allowing the transmission of 6,000 MW of hydroelectricity from Arunachal Pradesh to Bihar. In exchange, Bangladesh will receive 500 MW. This was the third bilateral energy agreement. The previous two were signed in 2013. The first was a power grid to allow the transmission of 500 MW of energy from India to Bangladesh. The second was the establishment of a joint venture between India and Bangladesh to construct a 1,320 MW coal-fired power plant at Rampat Upazila.[33]

6.3. Bangladesh, China and Japan

The new foreign policy of Bangladesh aims at extending much beyond the region and includes the other Asian giants, besides India. A busy round of meetings took place from May to September 2014, between Bangladesh, China and Japan. From 25th to 28th May, the Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, was in Japan. A visit to China followed, in quick succession, from 6th to 11th June 2014. Finally, the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, was in Dhaka for less than 24 hours on 6thSeptember 2014.[34]

The first remarkable result of the Bangladesh-China summit was four military agreements signed on 12th May, in the presence of a Chinese delegation led by Chief Marshal of the People’s Army, Air Force General Xu Qiliang. The treaty included Chinese free of charge training and logistic support to the Bangladeshi army. Through the years, Bangladesh and China signed several bilateral agreements regarding trade, military sales, energy, transit and cultural exchanges. In March 2014, Bangladesh commissioned two navy frigates from China. In April, the two countries signed an agreement on the sale of two submarines to Bangladesh, which included the establishment at Kutubdia Island, in the Cox Bazar District, of a base for 035G diesel-electric Ming submarines, to be completed by 2019. Between 2009 and 2013, China supplied 82% of Bangladesh’s arms imports, including anti-ship missiles, tanks and fighter airplanes. Low costs and loan facilities are the reasons for Bangladesh’s arms purchases from China, even though the armed forces are not happy with the quality of Chinese military goods. Chinese arms are the cheapest in the world.[35] China’s financial support to Bangladesh has increased significantly in the last three years. The largest-ever infrastructure project in Bangladesh, the Padma multipurpose bridge, is to be built by China Major Bridge Engineering Company. China is also engaged in constructing a rail bridge over the Jamuna River and a high-speed railway between Dhaka and Comill.[36]

In 2014, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the construction of a 1,320 MW power plant in Moheshkhali sub-district. The launch of the first Bangladeshi satellite, Bangabandhu, was the outcome of the technical and infrastructural cooperation with China. On the other side, China is interested in entering the Bay of Bengal for its strategic importance and its energy resources. China is engaged in the modernization of Chittagong port. This project meets Bangladesh’s need to develop its naval infrastructure. China is competing with India and the US for access to the strategically important Indian Ocean region. From this perspective, Bangladesh is becoming a strong player in regional balances. It is acquiring, for instance, an increasing weight within the BCIM, as proved by the BCIM-EC meeting held in Dhaka in June 2014.[37] As a result of the May 2014 Sheikh Hasina visit to China, an agreement was signed for Chinese assistance in the construction of a power plant in Patuakhali and a multi-lane road tunnel under the river Karnaphuli. Chinese president Xi Jinping emphasized Bangladesh’s role along the 21st century Maritime Silk Road.[38]

While Sheikh Hasina’s visit to China in May 2014 was part of a series of meetings and exchanges which took place over the last few years, the visit to Japan ushered a new phase in bilateral relations between the two countries. Moreover, the visit of the Japanese premier to Dhaka in September 2014 was the first official trip to Bangladesh of a high member of the Japanese government for 15 years. The respective prime ministers signed a 21-point Comprehensive Partnership Agreement which engaged Japan to support Bangladesh’s development programmes. Since 2007, the number of Japanese companies operating in Bangladesh has increased from 61 to 176, and aid from Japan amounted to $11 million in 2013. Japan is also engaged in large-scale investments in Bangladesh.

An agreement has been signed on infrastructure developmental projects in Bangladesh: the construction of the Ganges barrage scheme; a multimodal tunnel under the Jamuna River; a multimodal Dhaka Eastern bypass; the Padma rail link connecting Dhaka-Jajira-Bhanga-Narail-Jessore; the construction of an inland depot at Dhirasram; and the purification of four rivers around Dhaka. Japan offered its support for capacity-building in nuclear security and safety. Japan’s engagement in Bangladesh’s infrastructural development amounts to $6 billion over the next five years for the implementation of the Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth Belt (BIG-B), which includes the construction of a deep sea port at Chittagong. The area is supposed to become a base for the supply of energy and the construction of superhighways across the country. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed for the reservation of facilities for Japanese investors in five Export Processing Zones in Bangladesh.

Japan has also promised a loan of $1.18 billion in the next fiscal year for five energy and city developing projects in Bangladesh. Japan dictated some conditions for its financial support, such as competitive incentives, and improvement in infrastructure and in labour supply.

Like India and China, Japan also has its strategic interests in South Asia, above all, connecting the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean regions, in order to provide a larger space for Japan’s economic goals. The relations between Bangladesh, India, China and Japan are based on mutual interests. Sheikh Hasina aims at making Bangladesh a middle-income country by 2021. This objective cannot be pursued without strong foreign investment. Bangladesh must, therefore, maintain friendly relations with all its powerful neighbours. Significantly, during Abe’s visit, Bangladesh announced the withdrawal of its candidacy as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council from the Asia Pacific group in 2016–2017.[39] Was it a courtesy gesture to leave the place to Japan, in order to ingratiate it and further improve and consolidate bilateral ties?

6.4. Bangladesh and Russia

Outside East and South Asia, Bangladesh’s main partner is Russia. Significantly, on 27th March 2014, Bangladesh, along with 57 other members, abstained from voting at the UN General Assembly resolution for Russia’s annexation of the Crimea. Messages followed from the Russian Ambassador to Dhaka, acknowledging Bangladesh’s stand. The most remarkable detail in this story is Dhaka’s explanation of its abstention: Bangladesh does not want to get involved «in the new cold war between Russian and the US», according to the principles of the Non-Aligned Movement. This statement takes us back to the cold war times. It reveals that the cold war climate, fuelled by the US, cannot go unnoticed. Thirdly, Bangladesh and other countries continue to choose and propose a line of foreign policy based on multi-polarism, although not necessarily non-alignment. Bangladesh’s abstention has been sharply criticized and Dhaka was charged as having turned its back on the Western countries and the US, which are very much committed to Bangladesh’s development. Dhaka has cordial relations with Russia since Sheikh Hasina’s taking office in 2009. She visited Moscow in 2013, signing the largest arms deal in Bangladesh’s history and obtaining a loan for the construction of Bangladesh’s first nuclear power plant, for an estimated cost of $2 billion.[40] In November 2013, Bangladesh supported Ekaterinburg instead of the United Arab Emirates as a candidate for World Expo 2020. Russia (and India) supported Sheikh Hasina’s government during its critical post-election days, in early 2014.[41]

6.5. Bangladesh within the UN

Bangladesh’s 360 degrees foreign policy is summarized by its participation in the 69th UN General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2014. It was also the 40th anniversary of Bangladesh’s membership at the UN. Sheikh Hasina led a 184-member delegation. For the first time, Bangladesh acquired a remarkable visibility at the UN. The UNGA was the occasion for a number of meetings and for promoting Bangladesh’s economic interests. The most important meetings were those with the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, the Commonwealth Secretary General, Kamalesh Sharma, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and US president Barack Obama. Sheikh Hasina also met the Norwegian, Nepalese and Belarusian prime ministers, the Commonwealth heads of government, US businessmen and a delegation of Bangladeshi expatriates. Even though these meetings may have had limited practical results, they at least represented a chance to promote Bangladesh and establish or strengthen ties for future developments. The Hasina-Modi meeting was the most meaningful, for several reasons. Firstly, it was the first ever meeting between the two prime ministers and, therefore, it was also much awaited. Secondly, it was important for the two leaders to get to know each other and continue to cultivate positive bilateral ties for the future. In spite of the change in the political leadership of India, the BJP government seems to be willing to adopt the line of its predecessor and maintain cooperative relations with Dhaka. During India-Bangladesh talks, Mr Modi praised Bangladesh and defined it as «a model for fighting terrorism».[42]

6.6. Bangladesh-US controversial relations

Last but not least, US-Bangladesh relations deserve specific attention. The US expressed sharp criticism regarding the democratic correctness of the 2014 election results, decrying as inappropriate the Awami League’s decision to fight them in spite of the BNP’s abstention. The real reasons for the barely concealed US hostility towards Sheik Hasina’s government, however, seem to be different. The special ties between India and Bangladesh have irritated Washington: India has been granted access to Bangladeshi ports and road networks; Indian companies have obtained exclusive rights on Bangladesh’s gas reserves; Bangladesh’s market has been flooded with Indian goods; taxes have been increased on Japanese imported cars, while being lowered on Indian cars; and the Indian telecommunication company, Bharti Airtel, has obtained tax advantages over other foreign companies. This policy – largely the outcome of Sheik Hasina’s decisions – is defined as «irrational» by the US and the media which support the North American country. Also, India is charged with interfering with Bangladesh’s internal affairs and exerting a hegemonic role in South Asia.[43] These factors interfere with American interests in the region, where Bangladesh is seen as an increasingly important player.

Firstly, Bangladesh straddles the new land and sea Silk Road envisioned by Washington, which should connect Central to Southeast Asia, passing across Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar and China. Secondly, Bangladesh, with its large and growing middle class, is becoming a very attractive market. Finally, Bangladesh’s skilled labour is a resource for industrial investments. The US is the largest market for Bangladesh’s ready-made garments, the pivotal industrial production of the country. All the above-mentioned are economic advantages that the US could reap depending on Bangladesh’s (and India’s) attitude. The US expects to corner a conspicuous share of the huge economic gains to be made across South and Southeast Asia and around the Bay of Bengal. However, the increasingly close Delhi-Dhaka connection obviously disturbs Washington.[44]

7. Economy and social issues

South Asia’s economic growth was 5.4% in September 2014 and 6.1% is expected for 2015. The optimistic forecasts for 2015 stem from the expected reforms of the Indian government to revive economic growth and from Bangladesh’s and Nepal’s sustained expansion.[45] Bangladesh’s economic growth is supported by remittance inflows and by a strong internal demand.[46]

Bangladesh’s economy has grown rapidly since 2009 and it doubled the results of Khaleda Zia’s government in 2006. This is considered one of Sheikh Hasina’s main successes.[47]

Thanks to Sheikh Hasina’s intense diplomatic activity, bilateral trade with Myanmar amounted to $100 million in 2014; it should reach $500 million after the construction of the Sittwe-Kyaukpyu shipping line and 1 billion by 2020.[48]

In spite of these encouraging results, in 2014 foreign investors adopted a cautious approach, fearing possible new political unrest due to the still precarious political situation.[49] Nevertheless, since the Bilateral Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement (BIPPA) signed by India and Bangladesh in 2009, the latter country became increasingly attractive for Indian investors. The main sectors where Indian companies have invested are power transmission lines, telecommunications, textiles, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, glass, plastics and engineering. Indian investments in Bangladesh in 2012 amounted to $2.5 million and contributed to creating 51,653 jobs.[50] The South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) Working Group, held in Kathmandu in November 2014, noted the progress of transport connectivity projects, but it recommended the completion of the still missing links, in order to transform transport corridors into economic corridors, and to promote multimodal transport connectivity to increase trade and investment opportunity among existing (and possibly future) corridors. Electricity transmission is the priority of SASEC Energy Working Group, with India as the hub interconnecting the projects of the SASEC countries. The use of regular ADB country-specific funding for national projects with regional implications is expected.[51]

Per la prima volta nella storia del Bangladesh, un primo ministro uscente ha vinto per la seconda volta consecutiva le elezioni. Questo è quanto è accaduto a Sheikh Hasina e al partito da lei guidato, la Lega Awami, a seguito delle elezioni del gennaio 2014. Sia l’opposizione, rappresentata soprattutto dal Bangladesh National Party (BNP) e dalla Jamaat-e Islam (JI), sia una parte della comunità internazionale hanno commentato negativamente tale risultato elettorale e il modo stesso in cui è stato raggiunto. Si è rimproverato infatti a Sheikh Hasina di avere voluto tenere le elezioni nonostante la decisione da parte del BNP e del JI di non parteciparvi. Una critica, questa, che non tiene conto del fatto che il mandato di Sheikh Hasina fosse giunto alla sua scadenza naturale e che sarebbe stato pretestuoso e antidemocratico rimandare i tempi delle elezioni in seguito a un’arbitraria imposizione da parte dei partiti d’opposizione. Sul fronte estero, le principali critiche all’esito elettorale sono arrivate dalla Gran Bretagna e dagli Stati Uniti. Quelle statunitensi sembrano essere state motivate non tanto dalle asserite questioni formali, quanto dal fatto, ben più sostanziale, che durante il governo di Sheikh Hasina il vigoroso rinserrarsi dei rapporti fra Bangladesh e India potrebbe tradursi in una diminuzione dell’influenza di Washington su Dacca.

Nel 2014 è poi proseguito il processo agli imputati per i crimini commessi durante la guerra civile del 1971, anche se con minore durezza di quanto non sia accaduto nel 2013, quando si era arrivati a due condanne a morte e a un’esecuzione.

Il secondo governo di Sheikh Hasina ha proceduto in due direzioni: sul piano interno, ha avviato un processo di democratizzazione e, sul piano internazionale, ha inaugurato una nuova politica estera, centrata sui rapporti regionali e volta a sfruttare al massimo la posizione strategica del Bangladesh per ottenere investimenti e vantaggi dai partner economici. Il Bangladesh si affaccia sul Golfo del Bengala, un’area doppiamente importante per i suoi giacimenti di gas naturale e per i collegamenti marittimi est-ovest. Inoltre, il Bangladesh si trova proprio al centro del crocevia tra Asia meridionale, Cina e Sud-est asiatico, lungo la direttrice di una rete di connessioni stradali, ferroviarie e marittime che gli Stati Uniti definiscono significativamente «Via della seta marittima del 21° secolo».

 

1. Introduzione: attesa e stagnazione

Dal 2010, anno delle elezioni generali che hanno decretato la svolta riformatrice e il progressivo allontanamento dei militari dal potere assoluto, che detenevano da quasi cinquant’anni, i cambiamenti avvenuti sono stati tali da ridisegnare l’intero assetto politico, sociale, economico del Myanmar. Senza dubbio si è trattato di una svolta che ha avuto ripercussioni positive anche sull’intera regione.

È però vero che le trasformazioni hanno inevitabilmente inciso su delicati equilibri politici, demografici, economici, sociali e religiosi. Ai conflitti etnici, solo in parte acquietati grazie ad una serie di fragili accordi di cessate il fuoco, si sono sovrapposti conflitti dettati da motivi religiosi, che hanno reso più tese le relazioni con gli stati confinanti, in particolare con il Bangladesh.

Nonostante che la situazione economica sia progressivamente migliorata, i conflitti sociali sono continuati tanto da arrivare a veri e propri scontri in seguito ad una serie di sentenze ai danni di giornalisti, uno dei quali è stato perfino ucciso dai militari.

In sede internazionale, il governo di Thein Sein è stato oggetto di critiche per il rallentamento delle riforme, ma queste sono state in gran parte sopite dall’approvazione del presidente degli Stati Uniti, Barack Obama, che, durante la sua visita di novembre, ha sottolineato lo sforzo del governo birmano nel proseguire sulla strada della democratizzazione. Un duro colpo per l’opposizione birmana, in particolare per la National League for Democracy (NLD), la quale sperava di incassare l’incondizionato appoggio delle democrazie occidentali per emendare la costituzione e poter candidare Aung San Suu Kyi alla presidenza.

2. La visita di Obama e la fine del sogno di Aung San Suu Kyi

È proprio dalla visita di Obama in Myanmar che occorre partire per delineare gli eventi accaduti in Myanmar durante l’anno qui analizzato. Tra il 12 e il 15 novembre 2014, il presidente statunitense ha calpestato il suolo birmano per la seconda volta durante il suo mandato, incontrando il suo omologo birmano Thein Sein e la leader dell’opposizione Aung San Suu Kyi.

A differenza del precedente viaggio avvenuto nel 2012, durante il quale era apparsa chiara l’intesa tra la Casa Bianca e Aung San Suu Kyi, quello del 2014 è stato segnato da scambi di battute acide tra diversi esponenti dell’amministrazione Obama e la stessa Suu Kyi.

Il vice Consigliere per la Sicurezza Nazionale USA, Ben Rhodes, il 31 ottobre aveva affermato che «parte degli sforzi di riforma sono in stallo, alcuni sono avanzati e taluni abbiamo visto che sono arretrati. Penso quindi che siamo di fronte ad una visione mista».[1]

La risposta di Suu Kyi è stata lapidaria e chiaramente irritata, chiedendo di poter «sfidare quelli che parlano così positivamente del processo di riforma»[2] e invitando a elencare «quali riforme siano state fatti negli ultimi mesi».[3] La leader dell’NLD ha anche aggiunto che gli Stati Uniti sarebbero «troppo ottimisti sul programma di riforme iniziato dall’attuale governo».[4]

Altrettanto raggelante per la leader dell’opposizione è stato il discorso di Obama al termine della sua visita in Myanmar. Proprio accanto ad Aung San Suu Kyi, il presidente degli USA, pur evidenziando che «il processo di riforma non è né completo né irreversibile [e] per tanti versi non procede con sufficiente velocità», ha indirettamente elogiato il governo di Thein Sein. Obama ha continuato il suo discorso, affermando: «l’economia ha iniziato a crescere, i prigionieri politici sono stati liberati, circolano più giornali e i bambini non vengono più obbligati al servizio militare. Questi sono importanti cambiamenti che hanno aperto grandi opportunità al popolo birmano».[5]

Pur condannando l’ingiusto articolo costituzionale che impedisce a chiunque abbia parenti con passaporto straniero di candidarsi alle elezioni presidenziali del 2015, l’affondo della Casa Bianca al governo di Nay Pyi Taw[6] non è andato oltre, isolando, di fatto, l’opposizione democratica birmana.

La pesantezza delle affermazioni di Obama, non riportate con la dovuta attenzione dalla stampa mondiale, hanno avuto immediate conseguenze sul piano politico quando, appena cinque giorni dopo la sua partenza dal Myanmar, Aung San Suu Kyi ha gettato la spugna, affermando che l’NLD non sarebbe riuscito a cambiare l’articolo 59f della costituzione che impedisce alla premio Nobel per la pace di candidarsi per le elezioni presidenziali.[7]

Una disgrazia non solo per la Lady, la quale aveva speso gli ultimi due anni di attività politica proprio con l’intento di garantirsi appoggi internazionali che spingessero Thein Sein e Shwe Mann a cambiare la costituzione, ma per l’intero processo di democratizzazione del Myanmar.

Non potendo partecipare alle prossime consultazioni, Aung San Suu Kyi dovrà aspettare un altro lustro, sperando nella capacità sua e del partito di convincere il parlamento e il futuro governo a emendare il testo costituzionale. Allora, però, Suu Kyi avrà già 75 anni; un’età avanzata, anche se, di per sé, non ne pregiudicherebbe la candidatura. Il pericolo maggiore per la leader dell’NLD potrebbe arrivare, in realtà, soprattutto dal suo stesso partito, divenuto oramai l’ombra di sé medesimo. Infatti, i suoi membri più carismatici e integerrimi sono morti (il 21 aprile 2014 è scomparso anche Win Tin) o troppo anziani per avere la forza di controllare un movimento sempre più indebolito dalla corruzione e governato da una nuova leva di politici rampanti e ambiziosi, poco propensi al ruolo marginale cui li ha costretti la propria leader.

3. La corsa alla candidatura presidenziale

Con l’esclusione della concorrente più agguerrita, la corsa alla candidatura per divenire presidente del Myanmar si è ristretta a poche figure. Sebbene nessuno dei possibili aspiranti si sia ufficialmente esposto, nel corso del 2014 si sono delineati alcuni schieramenti, tutti in seno alle componenti di maggioranza che formano l’attuale governo o che lo appoggiano.

Il candidato più forte sarebbe il sessantasettenne Shwe Mann, attuale presidente dell’Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), nonché portavoce della Pyithu Hluttaw, la Camera Bassa birmana. Generale in pensione, è stato considerato uno dei pupilli di Than Shwe durante il periodo in cui nel paese regnava la giunta militare. La sua abilità bellica nel fronteggiare la guerriglia karen gli è valsa il titolo onorifico di «Thura», coraggioso. Dopo le elezioni del 2010, Shwe Mann ha mostrato ineccepibili doti di organizzatore, riuscendo a sorprendere anche i suoi detrattori con la riforma del parlamento che è stato trasformato in un’efficiente macchina al servizio del governo. Tra l’altro, è stato Shwe Mann che, il 18 novembre 2014, ha escluso ogni possibile modifica della costituzione prima delle elezioni del 2015.[8] Le sue capacità organizzative e la lealtà (anche se spesso opportunistica) mostrata verso l’attuale esecutivo farebbero di lui il candidato preferito dai governi occidentali nel caso in cui l’opposizione non arrivi a scegliere un proprio rappresentante. Una parte dell’NLD, ormai fiaccato dalle lotte interne, avrebbe mostrato interesse per la candidatura di Shwe Mann in alternativa ad Aung San Suu Kyi, anche se le dichiarazioni in questo senso riportate dalla stampa sono state successivamente smentite dal direttivo del partito.[9] La famiglia Mann, inoltre, ha continuato a detenere il monopolio di importanti settori dell’economia birmana: Toe Naing Mann e Aung Thet Mann, figli di Shwe, presiedono la Redlink Communications Ltd., la Ayer Shwe Wah e la Htoo Trading Company[10],, quest’ultima sussidiaria della Htoo Group of Companies, il primo conglomerato privato birmano.[11]

Il secondo possibile candidato alla presidenza del Myanmar nel prossimo quinquennio potrebbe essere il comandante del tatmadaw (l’esercito birmano), il generale Min Aung Hlaing.[12] Il suo attuale ruolo è comprensibilmente guardato con sospetto dalle democrazie occidentali, ma, forse anche in previsione di una sua candidatura alla presidenza, nell’ultimo anno Min Aung Hlaing ha mostrato aperture verso le riforme. In particolare, nel discorso da lui pronunciato in occasione della giornata delle forze armate, ha specificato che il ruolo dei militari verrà gradualmente ridotto mano a mano che nella nazione maturerà la democrazia.[13]

Da sempre considerato moderato, Min Aung Hlaing ha da tempo intrapreso una riforma all’interno delle leve militari, imponendo anche cambiamenti strategici e logistici ai battaglioni impegnati nelle zone di conflitto. È a lui che si deve la diminuzione delle angherie perpetrate dal tatmadawnelle aree abitate dalle minoranze etniche, compresi i reclutamenti forzati di minorenni. Ed è sempre all’esercito che i leader rohingya si sono appellati per la difesa delle loro comunità dagli assalti organizzati dai rakhine in combutta con le autorità di polizia locali.

4. Il problema dei rohingya e il conflitto religioso

L’esercito, così come era stato concepito dopo l’indipendenza della Birmania nel 1948, è sempre stato una delle poche organizzazioni multietniche presenti nel paese e, quindi, elemento unificatore di una nazione divisa, ufficialmente, in 135 gruppi minoritari. Questa caratteristica è divenuta particolarmente importante dopo il 2010 quando, con l’inizio della democratizzazione, le tensioni sociali e religiose, sino ad allora represse con la forza, hanno potuto erompere in tutta la loro violenza. I governatori, che erano anche capi militari e come tali avevano come priorità la difesa della stabilità regionale,  potevano usare – e non avevano esitato a farlo – il pugno di ferro per reprimere ogni forma di conflitto. Ma, dopo il 2010, i governatori erano diventati funzionari esclusivamente civili che, in varie occasioni, si erano trasformati in veri e propri difensori di una delle fazioni coinvolte nelle lotte.

È quello che è accaduto anche nello stato del Rakhine, dove la maggioranza buddista, prima ostile al governo centrale, ha trovato proprio nel governo di Nay Pyi Taw un formidabile alleato per far valere i propri diritti sulla minoranza musulmana rohingya, ora unico nemico da fronteggiare.

I conflitti tra le due comunità si sono acuiti nel 2014, sfociando anche in scontri a fuoco lungo la frontiera con il Bangladesh, un chiaro segno che Dacca si sta preoccupando sempre più della situazione nell’attigua regione.[14]

L’internazionalizzazione del problema dei rohingya, termine utilizzato anche dal presidente Obama nella conferenza stampa tenuta accanto ad Aung San Suu Kyi, ha portato il Bangladesh a definire ufficialmente per la prima volta gli appartenenti a questa comunità come cittadini del Myanmar, quantificando la loro presenza tra le 300 e le 500.000 unità.[15] Il grande timore del governo bengalese e del suo maggiore partito, l’Awami League, è che i rohingya possano diventare sostenitori dei due movimenti dell’opposizione, il National Party e il Jamaat-e-Islami, che hanno nelle provincie di Chittagong e di Cox’s Bazar i loro principali serbatoi elettorali. Dalla fine del 2013, Sheikh Hasina, primo ministro del Bangladesh, ha ristretto l’accesso alle zone di confine alle organizzazioni non governative (ONG) e alle agenzie umanitarie internazionali, mentre nel luglio 2014 ha bandito i matrimoni tra bengalesi e rohingya.[16]

Le politiche adottate da Bangladesh e Myanmar nei confronti di questa comunità sono drammaticamente simili: così come ha fatto il governo Hasina anche quello di Thein Sein ha ordinato, nel febbraio 2014, la sospensione delle attività di diverse ONG, tra cui Médicins san Frontières (nel luglio 2014 MSF è stato invitato a rientrare nello stato Rakhine).[17] L’avversione da parte dei rakhine verso le organizzazioni internazionali, viste nell’ottica dello scontro frontale come alleate dei rohingya, si è riversata negli scontri avvenuti tra il 26 e il 27 marzo a Sittwe, dove 33 uffici di ONG e agenzie delle Nazioni Unite sono state assaltate e distrutte, costringendo 300 cooperanti ad abbandonare temporaneamente la città. Motivo del contendere è stata la rimozione (rivelatasi del tutto innocente e priva di intenzioni provocatorie) di una bandiera buddista da un ufficio di rappresentanza internazionale da parte di una cooperante.[18]

Il 27 maggio 2014 il parlamento ha approvato il Religious Conversion Bill, che, assieme all’Interfaith Marriage Bill, il Monogamy Bill e il Population Control Bill, faceva parte dei documenti contenuti nel pacchetto della National Race and Religion Protection, tutti rivolti a contrastare la comunità islamica presente in Myanmar.[19] Fortemente voluto dai movimenti buddisti sorti nel paese per contrastare la supposta espansione delle comunità musulmane, il National Race and Religion Protection obbliga, tra le altre cose, ad una lunga e costosa registrazione presso una serie di uffici statali chiunque voglia convertirsi all’islàm e, per le donne non musulmane che intendono sposare un musulmano, l’approvazione delle autorità locali.[20] Il pacchetto si aggiunge ad una serie di iniziative che limitano la libertà di movimento dei rohingya e il numero dei figli per le coppie musulmane (che ne possono al massimo avere due).[21]

Il timore dei buddisti dello stato Rakhine (il 60% dei 3,2 milioni di abitanti) è che ben presto l’immigrazione dal Bangladesh, sommata all’aumento naturale della componente rohingya, possa ribaltare l’equilibrio demografico a favore di quest’ultimi. In realtà, questo processo si è già verificato nel Nord dello stato, dove i kaman, un altro gruppo musulmano, riconosciuto dal governo birmano, superano le restanti etnie.

A questo si aggiunga che, secondo l’UNICEF il tasso di povertà del Rakhine è del 44%, ciò che ne fa lo stato più povero del Myanmar dopo il Chin[22].

Sballottati da un confine all’altro, molti rohingya cercano di rifugiarsi in altri paesi, spesso con la pressione degli stessi governi di Nay Pyi Taw e di Dacca, creando ulteriori problemi umanitari e diplomatici.[23] L’ASEAN, pur consapevole della situazione drammatica in cui vivono queste popolazioni, è stata incapace di dare una risposta globale ed esauriente, perché ogni qualvolta la questione si pone in sede ufficiale, prevale tra gli stati il principio di non interferenza negli affari interni.

5. Il censimento

All’interno della questione etnico-religiosa si è inserito, nel corso del 2014, il programma di censimento avviato dal governo birmano; strumento indispensabile per il regolare svolgimento delle riforme, delle politiche economiche e delle elezioni presidenziali del 2015.

Era dal 1983 che una rilevazione statistica di tale portata non veniva effettuata, ma a causa delle numerose aree inaccessibili per via dei conflitti in atto in quel periodo, bisogna risalire al 1931 per poter avere dati completi inerenti all’intera nazione.

Sebbene numerosi governi, per la maggioranza occidentali, abbiano compreso l’importanza di tale impresa per il futuro del Myanmar, poco è stato fatto affinché potesse essere portata a termine con successo. L’operazione è costata 73,5 milioni di dollari di cui 58,5 finanziati con l’aiuto dell’United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) e di otto nazioni, tra cui l’Italia.[24]

Il governo aveva chiesto di rendere opzionali domande riguardanti i dati più sensibili, quali l’appartenenza etnica, linguistica e religiosa, ma la proposta è stata bocciata dal gruppo di quattordici esperti statistici e tecnici internazionali che formavano l’International Technical Advisory Board perché, a loro avviso, avrebbe creato pericolo di rivolte tra i gruppi maggioritari.

Dalla parte opposta, rappresentanti di 31 nazioni etniche birmane avevano chiesto di rivedere la divisione etnica in 135 gruppi proposta nelle schede, risalente all’epoca coloniale, mentre altri gruppi contestavano l’inclusione in etnie a cui non sentivano di appartenere.[25]

Diverse, invece, erano le obiezioni avanzate dalla Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), l’unico gruppo che non ha ancora siglato un cessate il fuoco con Nay Pyi Taw (dal maggio 2013 vige nello stato Kachin una fragile tregua spesso interrotta da sporadici, ma intensi, combattimenti). L’organizzazione separatista contestava la suddivisione dell’etnia in 12 sottogruppi che, secondo i loro leader, era stata redatta ad hoc per smembrare l’unità della nazione kachin.[26]

Infine, come era da aspettarsi, particolarmente problematica è stata la conduzione del censimento nel Rakhine. L’iniziale proposta dell’UNFPA di includere la possibilità di dichiarare la propria appartenenza all’etnia rohingya è stata fonte di scontri e di proteste da parte dei buddisti. La minaccia di boicottaggio del rilevamento da parte dei rakhine ha indotto il governo a escludere l’opzione etnica, chiedendo agli operatori di interrompere immediatamente la compilazione della scheda se, dopo la prima domanda, l’interpellato si dichiarava di etnia rohingya.[27]

La macchina del censimento ha comunque portato a termine il compito tra il 29 marzo e il 10 aprile 2014, stabilendo, in forma ufficiosa (i dati definitivi verranno resi noti solo nel maggio 2015), la popolazione birmana in 51.429.420 persone, di cui 50.213.067 conteggiate e 1.206.353 stimate nelle tre aree degli stati Rakhine, Kachin e Kayin dove non è stato possibile avere stime precise.[28]

6. Le riforme allo stallo?

Se il censimento ha chiarito qual è lo stato attuale della popolazione e della società birmana, manifestando la volontà di procedere con il modello di sviluppo fin qui seguito, nell’ultima parte del 2014 le riforme sembrano aver subìto, se non proprio uno stallo, un rallentamento.

L’attesa delle elezioni, con i dibattiti focalizzati prevalentemente sugli emendamenti costituzionali, ha certamente contribuito a raffreddare gli entusiasmi del nuovo corso politico ed economico, ma sono in molti a riproporre lo spettro della dittatura militare nel paese, anche se, nella realtà, pochi ci credono.[29]

Il tatmadaw non ha più il potere che aveva fino al 2010: nel potente Consiglio di Difesa e Sicurezza Nazionale, il comitato che nomina i comandanti militari regionali e che si riunisce settimanalmente per decidere le eventuali amnistie e gli stati di emergenza, i rappresentanti delle forze armate sono la minoranza: 5 membri su 11. Anche il monopolio economico è oramai solo un lontano ricordo: ai due conglomerati appartenenti al tatmadaw, l’Union of Myanmar Economic Holding Limited (UMEHL) e il Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), nel 2011 è stato revocato lo status di esenzione erariale per ogni esportazione effettuata e, dal 2010, è in atto un processo di restituzione delle terre che sono state confiscate a partire dal 1988. Sebbene molto a rilento e con riluttanza, il ministero della Difesa ha restituito ai precedenti legittimi proprietari 18.000 acri sui 300.000 illegittimamente estorti.[30] Solo il 6%, ma è molto più di quanto abbiano fatto tutti gli altri ministeri. Su 2.689 richieste di annullamento di confisca inviate al ministero della Difesa dal 2010, 583 sono andate a buon fine, mentre nello stesso periodo gli altri organi statali hanno chiuso solo 299 pratiche su 6.599 contestazioni pervenute.[31]

Importante è anche il fatto che persino le spese destinate alla difesa sono oggi rese note, attraverso la loro incorporazione nel bilancio ufficiale. Questo rappresenta una soluzione di continuità rispetto agli anni in cui era al potere la Giunta militare, quando tali spese erano mantenute occulte, ma si stimava che ammontassero al 40% del bilancio nazionale. Nell’anno fiscale 2014-15 la spesa destinata alle forze armate è stata del 14%, con una riduzione, rispetto al 2011, del 5%.[32]

Anche così è legittimo ritenere che il volume di spesa per le forze armate sia ancora troppo elevato, specialmente se rapportato agli stanziamenti riservati alla salute (3,38 %) e alla pubblica istruzione (5,92%).

E proprio la scuola è stata al centro di imponenti manifestazioni da parte degli studenti nelle principali città del Myanmar, scesi in piazza per protestare contro la nuova Legge sull’istruzione nazionale. Il provvedimento, accentrando i programmi di insegnamento, impedirebbe al sistema educativo flessibilità e, soprattutto, proibisce ogni possibilità di scelta linguistica nelle aree etniche, essendo il birmano l’unica lingua franca accettata.[33]

Altrettanto problematica è la situazione della libertà di stampa. Nonostante che il Myanmar nel 2014 sia risalito di sei posti (dal 151° al 145°) nella classifica del World Press Freedom Index, rispetto al 2013[34], superando altri paesi dell’ASEAN, come Malaysia (147°), Singapore (150°), Laos (171°) e Vietnam (174°), nella seconda metà dell’anno si sono registrati episodi di violenza nei confronti di giornalisti. In luglio, cinque reporter dello «Unity Weekly» sono stati condannati a dieci anni di lavori forzati con l’accusa di aver violato segreti di stato, svelando l’esistenza di una fabbrica di armi chimiche nella regione di Magway;[35] il 16 ottobre, inoltre, cinque redattori del settimanale «Bi Mon Te Nay» sono stati condannati per aver riportato la notizia, rivelatasi poi falsa, che Aung San Suu Kyi sarebbe stata nominata a capo di un governo ad interim.[36]

Benjamin Ismail, responsabile dell’ufficio Asia-Pacifico di «Reporters Without Border», ha convenuto che, pur essendo «stati fatti progressi [nella libertà di stampa], la sentenza [che condanna cinque giornalisti per aver svelato l’esistenza di una fabbrica chimica] ci riporta indietro a tempi bui, quando i giornalisti ed i blogger che facevano il loro lavoro erano imprigionati in base a motivazioni che facevano riferimento alla sicurezza nazionale o con l’accusa di tentare di abbattere il governo».[37]

Infine il giornalista Aung Kyaw Naing «Par Gyi», arrestato alla fine del settembre 2014, mentre seguiva nello stato Mon il conflitto tra il tatmadaw e il Democratic Buddhist Karen Army, è stato ucciso agli inizi di ottobre dopo essere stato torturato.[38] La notizia è stata resa nota solo il 25 ottobre, pochi giorni dopo che Thein Sein era tornato da un viaggio in Italia, durante il quale si era lamentato che l’Europa non riconosceva gli sforzi compiuti dal Myanmar nel campo del rispetto dei diritti umani.[39]

7. Eppur si muove…

Il clima di incertezza che si è respirato in Myanmar si rifletteva anche nell’economia, in particolare in quella parte di popolazione che, per fronteggiare il forte aumento dei prezzi dei beni primari, deve affidarsi a quelle istituzioni statali che sono delegate a garantire la distribuzione di beni di consumo a prezzi calmierati. .

L’indice di povertà del paese ha raggiunto il 25,6% secondo le stime del 2010 Integrated Household Living Condition Survey (IHLCS) dell’United Nations Development Program (UNDP), ma supererebbe il 37% in base ai calcoli della Banca Mondiale, che ha alzato la soglia di povertà da 376.151 kyat (pari a circa 288 euro) per adulto per anno a 440.345.[40]

La sfiducia verso il sistema bancario diviene addirittura imbarazzante quando l’International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) rilascia dei rapporti in cui si afferma che ognuno dei 5 milioni di birmani all’estero (il 10% della popolazione) invia solo 566 dollari all’anno in patria, tramite i canali ufficiali, quando la media delle rimesse dei migranti asiatici dall’estero è di 4.000 dollari all’anno.[41] La spiegazione è che i birmani preferiscono affidare i loro risparmi a mediatori privati, meno costosi e più efficienti delle loro banche. Questa diffidenza verso lo stato risulta evidente neIn questo modo i dati dell’economia sommersa, che rappresenta il 50,7% del PIL del paese, seconda solo alla Thailandia (51,9%), entrambe le più elevate del continente asiatico.[42]

Se le famiglie birmane devono cercare altre vie per sopravvivere o arrotondare i magri stipendi, molto più rosea appare la situazione della macroeconomia e delle multinazionali, le quali fanno a gara per ottenere i permessi per investire nel settore delle risorse naturali del paese. Secondo il Myanmar’s Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (DICA), nella nazione hanno investito 772 compagnie straniere in 12 diverse filiere economiche, per un totale di quasi 50 miliardi di dollari.[43] Una cifra notevole, se si pensa che il Myanmar è stato soggetto ad embargo fino al 2011, cifra che può, almeno in parte, spiegare l’entusiasmo con cui oggi i governi europei e americani sostengono il gabinetto di Thein Sein.

I principali settori su cui le compagnie straniere investono sono quelli energetico e petrolifero (compreso il gas naturale), i quali assorbono rispettivamente il 33,79% e il 36,36% degli investimenti stranieri.[44] Il 26 marzo 2014, il ministero dell’Energia ha concesso a 12 società, tra cui la Chevron, la Total, l’ENI, la Statoil e la Shell, il mandato per iniziare le esplorazioni nelle acque del golfo di Martaban.[45] L’accordo prevede investimenti per 3 miliardi di dollari, di cui 226,1 milioni andranno alla Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), la compagnia statale. Alla fine del 2014 i progetti in corso per l’estrazione di petrolio e di gas naturale sono saliti a 115, per un totale pari a 14 miliardi di dollari di investiti provenienti dall’estero.[46]

La Cina continua ad essere il paese maggiormente presente nel Myanmar, in particolare nel settore energetico. Nell’agosto 2014 è stato completato l’oleodotto tra Kyaukpyu e Kunming che, accanto al già esistente gasdotto, porterà all’assetata economia di Pechino altri 2 milioni di tonnellate di petrolio grezzo.[47]

Tali progetti, però, hanno un impatto deleterio sull’ambiente e, spesso, sulla stessa popolazione birmana. A questo proposito, infatti, sono continuate le proteste di intere comunità in varie regioni del paese, costrette a subire le angherie delle autorità locali (principalmente la polizia) e, in alcuni casi, delle stesse manovalanze delle multinazionali. Oltre ai già noti malcontenti per l’ampliamento delle miniere di Monywa,[48] nel corso dell’anno si sono aggiunti quelli di 3.000 contadini che si sono opposti alle operazioni di scavo nella regione di Namkham, al confine con la Cina e con lo stato Shan, dove sei società stanno estraendo silicio, causando un aumento di malattie dovute alla silicosi.[49]

Nel febbraio 2014, l’approvazione della costruzione di sei nuove dighe lungo il corso del fiume Salween negli stati Shan, Karenni e Karen, ha avviato una nuova ondata di proteste interetniche.[50] I progetti, che coinvolgono cinque società cinesi, tre birmane e la Thailand’s Electricity Generation Authority, dovrebbero avere, una volta terminati, una capacità energetica produttiva di 15.000 MW. Essendo situati in zone dove ancora permangono tensioni tra gli eserciti etnici e il tatmadaw, l’intera area interessata è stata militarizzata e l’ingresso nelle regioni è proibito e rigidamente controllato. La conseguenza è stata l’isolamento delle popolazioni che ha reso difficile, oltre che pericolosa, l’organizzazione di campagne di informazione e di dissenso.

Accanto a imposizioni che lasciano poca scelta ai cittadini ci sono anche progetti miliardari temporaneamente abbandonati o addirittura cancellati, in seguito all’opposizione delle comunità locali. Il caso emblematico (e primo nella storia del Myanmar) della diga di Myitsone[51] non è rimasto isolato. Nel luglio 2014 è stata cassata (non è chiaro se in modo definitivo o meno) la costruzione della linea ferroviaria tra Kyaukpyu e Kunming, che seguiva lo stesso percorso del gasdotto e dell’oleodotto già esistenti.[52] L’annullamento del progetto è stato particolarmente significativo perché il governo birmano aveva riposto nella ferrovia le speranze di sviluppo della Zona ad Economia Speciale di Kyaukpyu, nel problematico stato del Rakhine.[53]

Inoltre la Cina, che nel progetto aveva preventivato un investimento di 20 miliardi di dollari, potrebbe cominciare a valutare se diminuire la sua presenza nel Myanmar, la cui affidabilità come partner commerciale sta venendo meno.[54]

La strada intrapresa nel 2010 sta comunque procedendo, anche se, come ci si poteva aspettare, comincia a trovare alcuni ostacoli che potrebbero far pensare ad un possibile riflusso. Anche se non si può escludere questa possibilità, occorrerà attendere le prossime elezioni presidenziali per delineare quale sarà il futuro del paese e le alleanze che si formeranno all’interno del parlamento.

Since 2010, the entire social, economic and political structure of Myanmar has been changing. US President Obama’s visit to Myanmar (November 2014) was marked by verbal confrontation between members of the Obama administration, who spoke quite positively about the reform process in the country, and Aung San Suu Kyi, who did not see any progress in reforms. Obama, while condemning the constitutional article which prevented Suu Kyi from being presidential candidate at the next general elections, stated that Burmese President Thein Sein had introduced major democratic changes.

The ethnic conflicts, partly defused by a series of agreements, have been replaced by religious conflicts. Particularly dangerous appears to be the conflict between the Muslim Rohingya and Buddhist Rakhine communities, at the border with Bangladesh. In 2014, fearing that the two main Bangladeshi opposition parties, the National Party and the Jamaat-e-Islami, could use the Rohingya issue to increase popular discontent, the Bangladesh government, led by the Awami League, for the first time officially stated that the Rohingya are not Bangladeshi, but Myanmar citizens.

 In 2014, the Myanmar government enacted the anti-Muslim National Race and Religion Protection laws. These laws aim to prevent easy conversion from Buddhism to Islam and intermarriage; moreover, they limit the maximum number of children for Muslim couples to two.

 The census, the first since 1983, reflected all the ethnic-religious problems affecting the country. Many among Myanmar’s ethnic nations asked to reform the ethnic classification, claiming that the existing one, although officially recognizing 135 groups, excludes a number of ethnic nationalities.

On its part, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), the only ethnic group which has hitherto signed a ceasefire with the Myanmar government, disputed the division of the Kachin people into 12 sub-ethnic groups. In fact, the KIO claimed that this division aimed at dividing the Kachin people.

In 2014, the power of the military appeared much weaker than in 2010. In fact, military conglomerates such as the Union of Myanmar Economic Holding Limited (UMEHL) and the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) no longer monopolized the economy’. Moreover, during the year under review, the Defence Ministry appeared on the verge of returning the lands illegally confiscated by the military junta. Also, between 2011 and the fiscal year 2014-15, the share of military expenses in the budget declined from 19 to 14%. This, however, still is too big a share, when compared to the 3.38% given to health and the 5.92% to education.

Student rallies were held in the main cities to protest against the new National Education Act, which centralizes the educational system. Press freedom was still at risk, with several journalists being jailed for revealing the existence of a chemical weapons factory. One journalist was tortured and killed by the army, being found guilty of reporting the civil war in Mon state.

In 2014, propelled by foreign investments, particularly in the energy and oil fields, the macroeconomic index showed significant increases. However, the Country Poverty Index was at its worst since 2010. Not surprisingly, during the year under review, the country was criss-crossed by social protests.

 

1. Introduzione

La fragile democrazia tailandese nel 2014 ha conosciuto il più triste degli epiloghi. Il 22 maggio l’esercito ha attuato un colpo di stato e ha preso la guida del paese, approfittando del vuoto di potere conseguente alla destituzione del primo ministro, la signora Yngluck Shinawatra, da parte della suprema corte. L’evento del 22 maggio non è arrivato inaspettato ma era stato preannunciato e preparato da una serie di atti, orchestrati in una strategia di lungo periodo. Nel novembre 2013, infatti, erano iniziate proteste di piazza che avevano paralizzato ampie zone della capitale. I manifestanti chiedevano le dimissioni del primo ministro a seguito del tentativo di far approvare una legge di amnistia di cui avrebbe beneficiato il fratello del primo ministro, Thaksin Shinawatra. Le proteste avrebbero potuto apparire anche legittime, ma oltre le dimissioni, la piazza chiedeva non tanto nuove elezioni, ma l’affidamento l’incarico di procedere a riforme istituzionali ad un consiglio formato da «autorevoli».

Il primo ministro scioglieva il parlamento il 9 dicembre 2013 e indiceva le elezioni per il 2 febbraio successivo.  La tornata elettorale si è svolta nonostante il boicottaggio degli oppositori e numerose azioni di disturbo che hanno impedito lo svolgimento delle operazioni elettorali in numerosi seggi. Il risultato a favore del partito di governo era scontato. Successivamente, le elezioni sono state dichiarate nulle perché a molti elettori è stato fisicamente impedito di accedere ai seggi dagli oppositori del governo.  Il 7 maggio 2014 la suprema corte ha dichiarato destituita dall’incarico Yngluck Shinawatra, riconosciuta colpevole di aver abusato del proprio potere, rimuovendo il capo della polizia nel 2011. Nella conseguente fase di vuoto istituzionale si è inserito l’intervento dell’esercito. In una prima fase è stata proclamata la legge marziale e i rappresentanti delle opposte componenti politiche sono stati convocati per trovare un punto di intesa. Verificata l’incolmabile distanza delle loro posizioni, il 22 maggio 2014 è stato portato a termine un vero e proprio colpo di stato, guidato dal generale Prayut Chan-ocha.

Tutti i rappresentanti delle forze politiche convocati per trovare una soluzione all’impasse istituzionale sono stati arrestati, compreso il primo ministro ed alcuni membri del suo governo, così come molti rappresentanti del mondo accademico e della società civile[1]. Immediatamente è stato istituito il coprifuoco in tutto il paese e sono state sospese le garanzie costituzionali. Le emittenti televisive e le radio per giorni hanno trasmesso solo musiche patriottiche. Inoltre, in un pesante avvertimento alla cittadinanza, è stata interrotta per circa un’ora la funzionalità del sito di Facebook. Quest’ultima azione è stata interpretata come un avvertimento ai cittadini affinché l’uso di internet e dei social network non fosse finalizzato ad organizzare il dissenso e la protesta.

La dittatura insediatisi in seguito al colpo di stato del generale Prayut Chan-ocha ha subito mostrato che l’intervento militare non era destinato a riportare l’ordine e a reintrodurre la democrazia nel breve periodo. La motivazione non dichiarata del colpo di stato era, infatti, la necessità di governare il paese nella fase di successione al trono, considerata ormai imminente viste le condizioni di salute dell’anziano re Bhumibol Adulyadej (conosciuto anche come Rama IX, in quanto nono monarca della dinastia Chakri). Come spesso è accaduto in Thailandia, anche in questo caso è stata strumentalizzata la legge sulla lesa maestà per mettere a tacere avversari politici e critici dell’istituzione monarchica.

La presa di posizione contro il colpo di stato degli Stati Uniti, del Consiglio europeo e dell’Australia hanno fatto sì che la Thailandia si avvicinasse alla Cina e al Myanmar.

L’economia ha subìto un rallentamento, con la conseguente diminuzione del PIL su base annua, e si è registrato un importante calo degli arrivi nel settore turistico. Di difficile soluzione si è rivelata la questione del fallimentare schema di sussidi destinati ai produttori di riso. In ogni caso, sotto la pressione del regime militare, l’assemblea legislativa ha approvato una legge di bilancio che prevedeva un deficit pari al 10%.

Infine, la giunta militare è apparsa intenzionata a usare il pugno di ferro contro i movimenti separatisti delle province del sud, dove l’etnia malese è maggioritaria.

2. 2. Cronaca di un colpo di Stato annunciato

Il colpo di Stato del 22 maggio 2014 può definirsi annunciato non solo perché in modo ricorrente le crisi politiche in Thailandia hanno avuto questo tipo di esito, ma anche perché le manifestazioni, che hanno semi paralizzato Bangkok per mesi, sembravano avere esattamente l’obiettivo di indurre l’esercito ad intervenire. Sono emersi, infatti, anche contatti tra gli organizzatori delle proteste e i vertici dell’esercito[2]. A capo delle proteste si è posto l’ex vice primo ministro Suthep Thaugsuban, ritenuto tra i responsabili, nel 2010, dell’uccisione di alcuni manifestanti nel corso dell’ondata di proteste contro il governo guidato da Abhisit Vejjajiva[3]. Il governo, guidato da Yingluck Shinawatra, ha voluto evitare di porre in atto azioni di forza contro i manifestanti.

Dopo aver presentato le dimissioni, Yingluck Shinawatra ha indetto le elezioni, che si sono svolte il 2 febbraio 2014. L’opposizione ha in realtà boicottato la tornata elettorale e ha messo in atto vere e proprie azioni di disturbo, tanto che in molti distretti è stato impedito ai cittadini di esercitare il loro diritto di voto. Successivamente, la Corte Costituzionale, il 21 marzo 2014, ha dichiarato che le eccessive irregolarità durante il voto rendevano nullo il risultato elettorale. Il governo Shinawatra ha così continuato le attività di normale amministrazione. Nel frattempo, la città di Bangkok diventava teatro di manifestazioni quotidiane sia da parte dell’opposizione sia da parte dei sostenitori del governo e soprattutto dei seguaci dei fratelli Shinawatra.

Il 2 aprile la Corte Costituzionale ha fatto propria una sentenza della Corte Suprema e ha annullato il trasferimento del capo della polizia, avvenuto nel 2011, poiché ritenuto un abuso di ufficio da parte del primo ministro.[4] Di conseguenza, la Corte ha poi destituito il 7 maggio per via giudiziaria il premier Yingluck Shinawatra ed altri otto ministri. Si è venuta quindi a creare una situazione di vuoto istituzionale, mentre il conflitto politico assumeva toni sempre più accesi e nelle piazze si verificavano i primi scontri tra le opposte fazioni. La Commissione Elettorale, nel frattempo, stabiliva la data del 20 luglio 2014 per le successive elezioni generali. L’ex primo ministro Abhisit Vejjajiva sembrava voler proporre un’apertura sul percorso di approvazione di una riforma del sistema elettorale, ma nella sostanza, non andava al di là degli annunci.

Ad alimentare le tensioni è intervenuto il 23 aprile l’omicidio del poeta Kamol Duangpasuk, critico della legge sulla Lesa Maestà.

La fatale e ricercata combinazione di vuoto di potere, proteste di piazza, livelli di tensione crescenti ha costituito il pretesto fondamentale per la realizzazione dell’ennesimo colpo di stato, iniziato il 20 maggio, con la promulgazione della legge marziale, e portato a termine il 22 maggio. Gli esponenti politici delle due fazioni erano stati convocati dalla giunta militare per trovare una soluzione politica. Preso atto della distanza incolmabile tra le diverse posizioni, la giunta militare procedeva al loro arresto e conferiva poteri dittatoriali al generale dell’esercito Prayuth Chan-ocha. Quest’ultimo annunciava che, entro 15 mesi, sarebbero state indette nuove elezioni, precedute da alcune riforme[5]. A distanza di sei mesi, tuttavia, il generale ha dichiarato che le elezioni generali potranno invece svolgersi nel 2016.[6]

Il generale Prayuth Chan-ocha, dapprima ha assunto il ruolo di capo della giunta militare denominata National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO). Successivamente, la giunta ha nominato i componenti dell’assemblea, con compiti sia legislativi che costituenti. Il 95% dei 300 membri dell’assemblea sono militari in pensione o ancora in attività. Ha suscitato grandi polemiche l’accettazione dell’incarico da parte di Somkit Lertpaithoon, rettore della Thammasat University, un’istituzione accademica sempre distintasi come laboratorio politico progressista favorevole alla democrazia.[7]  Il 25 agosto 2014 l’assemblea ha poi nominato il generale Prayuth Chan-ocha capo del governo,[8] passaggio obbligato che ha fornito una parvenza di legittimità alla sua presa di potere. Il generale ha così concentrato su di sé i poteri legislativo, esecutivo e militare ricoprendo il ruolo di guida dell’NCPO, di primo ministro e di capo dell’Esercito: in breve il dittatore della Thailandia del XXI secolo. Ognuno di questi incarichi ha avuto l’avvallo della firma del re.

3. 3. Un re malato, un principe non amato: successione o crollo della monarchia?

La Thailandia sta per attraversare uno dei momenti storici più difficili ed importanti della sua storia. L’anziano re è malato e già nel 2013 erano emerse voci di una sua possibile abdicazione a causa dei gravi problemi di salute. Nel 2014, il monarca non ha potuto né presentarsi in pubblico in occasione del suo compleanno, né pronunciare l’atteso discorso alla nazione.  Nonostante le sue precarie condizioni di salute, il sovrano ha comunque avallato con la sua firma sia la presa di potere da parte del generale Prayuth Chan-ocha, sia i successivi provvedimenti presi dal generale.

La successione al trono è considerata da molti analisti come la fase di maggiore instabilità e incertezza nel futuro prossimo del regno. In questo contesto, la nascita della dittatura è giustificata dall’esigenza di esercitare uno stretto controllo sulle istituzioni, sui cittadini e sul territorio in una fase che viene prevista come di grande difficoltà. L’erede al trono, il principe Maha Vajiralongkorn, non ha l’apprezzamento del popolo.[9] Fino ad oggi gli apparati di corte non sono riusciti a rendere popolare la sua immagine; il compito è stato quindi affidato ai militari. Nel mese di novembre 2014 ha suscitato grande clamore l’arresto di numerosi esponenti del corpo di polizia per corruzione e associazione a delinquere.[10] Lo scandalo ha riguardato anche alcuni parenti della consorte del principe. L’erede al trono ha immediatamente richiesto ed ottenuto che venisse tolto loro il cognome Akkarapongpreecha, concesso in quanto parenti della principessa. La vicenda è stata letta, da alcuni analisti, come dettata dalla necessità di fare pulizia in casa dell’erede al trono prima della successione.[11] In seguito, la principessa ha chiesto di rinunciare a tutti i titoli e privilegi reali, richiesta che è stata immediatamente accolta dal re. Tale atto probabilmente è da considerarsi propedeutico al divorzio, considerato necessario per portare a termine l’azione di pulizia.

La decisione di porre in atto il colpo di stato è stata sicuramente determinata anche dalla nota vicinanza del principe all’ex primo ministro Thaksin Shinawatra. Rapporto valutato in modo negativo dai più alti esponenti della corte, come il presidente del consiglio privato del re, Prem Tinsulanonda.[12] È probabile dunque che si sia voluto mettere il principe ereditario sotto controllo, non essendoci le condizioni per dichiararlo incapace o per sperare in una sua morte precoce.[13]

L’ascesa al trono del principe è temuta dalla maggior parte della popolazione, che da sempre lo ha ritenuto una figura inadeguata perché, tra l’altro, pare sia stato responsabile di traffici illeciti. Già negli anni ‘80 la maggior parte dei tailandesi si riferiva a lui con il nomignolo di  «Sia O»[14] ovvero l’equivalente del nostro «don» per i capi mafia, a causa di suoi collegamenti con ambienti criminali. In più occasioni sono stati riportati dalla stampa, e subito censurati, comportamenti del principe considerati moralmente inaccettabili per la cultura locale. Di grande impatto fu alcuni anni fa la diffusione di un video in cui la moglie del principe, in sua presenza, festeggiava nuda il compleanno del loro cane. La povera bestiola tra l’altro era stata nominata dal suo padrone maresciallo dell’aeronautica e ha preso parte in qualità di commensale ad alcune cene ufficiali.[15]

La faticosa opera realizzata da re Bhumipol, che ha restituito dignità e prestigio alla corona thailandese, rendendola il terzo pilastro del regno insieme alla religione e alla nazione, rischia di essere vanificata qualora a salire sul trono sia il principe Maha Vajiralongkorn.  Al di là di questo va tenuto in considerazione che il re ha guadagnato prestigio soprattutto grazie ai progetti che ha finanziato a favore della popolazione, come per esempio la riconversione delle colture di oppio, l’irrigazione nella regione del nord-est, l’attuazione dell’economia di sufficienza[16] e molti altri, seguìti personalmente dallo stesso sovrano. Il principe sembra non essersi mai preso cura di tali progetti o averne promossi di simili. Questo aspetto ha sicuramente un risvolto importante per il futuro di tali iniziative.

A prendersi cura dei progetti paterni e a promuoverne altri di pari importanza è la principessa Maha Chakri Sirindhorn, amata da tutta la popolazione. Tuttavia, le probabilità che possa essere designata a salire sul trono sembrano ormai svanite.

4. Nascita di una dittatura

Il colpo di stato del 22 maggio è stato giustificato dai suoi promotori con l’esigenza di riportare ordine e pace alla nazione. Tanto che la giunta si è data come denominazione National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO).  Quello che è apparso immediatamente chiaro è che i militari non avevano intenzione di restituire il paese ad un sistema nel breve periodo. In questa chiave sono da interpretarsi gli interventi sul sistema educativo a tutti i livelli. Nelle scuole sono stati subito promossi 12 princìpi dalla giunta a cui devono conformarsi i giovani studenti: 1. sostenere la nazione, le religioni e la monarchia, che è l’istituzione chiave; 2. essere onesti, pronti al sacrificio e pazienti con atteggiamento positivo per il bene comune dei cittadini; 3. essere grati ai genitori, tutori e insegnanti; 4. cercare la conoscenza e l’istruzione, direttamente e indirettamente; 5. fare tesoro della preziosa tradizione tailandese; 6. mantenere moralità, integrità, augurare il bene agli altri, oltre ad essere generosi e pronti alla condivisione; 7. comprendere, apprendere la vera essenza degli ideali democratici con Sua Maestà il Re come Capo dello Stato; 8. mantenere la disciplina, rispettare le leggi e gli anziani; 9. essere cosciente e consapevole di azioni in linea con le dichiarazioni di Sua Maestà il re; 10. praticare la filosofia dell’economia di sufficienza di Sua Maestà il Re. Risparmiare di denaro per il tempo del bisogno. Essere moderati e utilizzare il surplus per la condivisione o l’espansione degli affari, pur avendo una buona protezione; 11. mantenere la salute fisica e mentale e mantenersi inflessibili alla forza oscura o ai desideri, con senso di vergogna per le colpe e i peccati secondo i principi religiosi; . mettere l’interesse pubblico e nazionale prima degli interessi personali.

In tutti gli istituti, nel momento dell’alzabandiera, all’inno nazionale è stato aggiunto il canto «Restituire la felicità alla Thailandia», composto dallo stesso generale Prayuth Chan-ocha. Inoltre è stata avviata una riforma del sistema scolastico che ha previsto l’inserimento di «dovere civico» come materia di studio dalla prima elementare all’ultimo anno di scuola superiore. Sono stati previsti pesanti interventi nelle versioni dei testi di storia interpretata in chiave patriottica e nazionalista. L’attuazione della riforma è iniziata con la formazione dei docenti.[17]

Per illustrare i 12 principi è stato chiesto ad alcuni registi di realizzare dei cortometraggi da diffondere nelle scuole e nei cinema; tali cortometraggi sono stati raccolti in un film collettivo intitolato: «Thai Nyom» (Orgoglio thai). Grande clamore ha suscitato il pezzo da Kulp Kaljaruek, «30», in cui si vede un ragazzo realizzare un ritratto di Adolf Hitler e un suo compagno di scuola applaudire entusiasta. Inizialmente il regista ha difeso la sua scelta, ma dopo la formale protesta dell’ambasciatore dello stato di Israele, ha apportato delle modifiche.[18]

Per quanto riguarda le istituzioni universitarie, l’azione della giunta è stata soprattutto in senso repressivo ed intimidatorio. Immediatamente dopo la presa del potere da parte dell’esercito sono stati arrestati docenti e studenti sospettati di attività sovversiva. Una libreria di Chiang Mai ha subìto diverse perquisizioni in quanto nei suoi locali spesso si organizzavano dibattiti e seminari su tematiche considerate sovversive.[19]  L’azione intimidatoria dell’esercito appariva mirata a soffocare sul nascere qualsiasi tentativo di protesta. Fra le forme di intimidazione utilizzate vi è stata la collocazione di un presidio militare all’entrata dei dormitori dell’università. Un episodio più clamoroso è stata l’irruzione da parte dell’esercito in un’aula dell’Università Thammasat di Bangkok, dove si stava svolgendo un seminario sulla caduta delle dittature occidentali. Docenti e studenti sono stati trattenuti alcune ore e poi rilasciati. I militari hanno motivato la propria azione ritenendo che tale dibattito avrebbe potuto creare divisione nella società thailandese.[20]

Un aspetto sicuramente inquietante è che la dittatura sembra essersi già avviata nella spirale di paranoia caratteristica di altre esperienze dittatoriali. Sono stati già presi dei provvedimenti che potrebbero essere definiti ridicoli se non comportassero la possibilità per chi ne è vittima di essere arrestati e perseguiti in base alla legge marziale vigente nel paese: divieto di mangiare sandwich in pubblico; di leggere in spazi pubblici testi considerati sovversivi, come «1984» di Orwell; di fare il saluto con la mano alzata e le tre dita distese come nel film «Hunger Games».[21]Questi divieti nascono a seguito di episodi di protesta che hanno utilizzato tali forme per esprimere il dissenso nei confronti della dittatura. La stampa è stata sottoposta a censura e sono stati epici quanto vani i tentativi di tenere sotto controllo la rete internet. La giunta si è sforzata a rendere irraggiungibili molti siti grazie ad un sistema di filtri sempre più sofisticato; almeno per il momento, però, risulta semplice aggirare questo ostacolo grazie a programmi gratuiti. Come già ricordato, pochi giorni dopo il colpo di stato, i militari avevano chiuso per circa un’ora Facebook, un episodio che è stato interpretato come un avvertimento a non utilizzare internet e le sue reti per attività di opposizione alla giunta.

Il dissenso, in quella fase, non è ancora apparso in forma organizzata e diffusa. Episodi di contestazione si sono verificati soprattutto a Bangkok. Ha anche suscitato grande clamore la protesta messa in atto da cinque studenti universitari a Kon Kaen durante la visita del generale Prayuth il 19 novembre 2014. I cinque si sono alzati durante il suo discorso indossando magliette nere che componevano la scritta «No al colpo di stato», salutando come i dissidenti del film «Hunger Games» e urlando frasi inneggianti alla libertà. Hanno pagato il loro coraggio non solo con l’arresto ma anche con l’espulsione dall’università. [22]

Alcuni docenti universitari hanno espresso il loro dissenso contro la privazione della libertà accademica, presentandosi in occasioni ufficiali indossando in testa una scatola di metallo. In questo modo si alludeva a un detto thailandese, in cui si sollecita chi prova vergogna a coprirsi la faccia.[23]

4.1. Il generale che divenne dittatore

Un profetico editoriale pubblicato nel 2010 dal quotidiano thailandese ‘The Nation’ si interrogava se il generale Prayuth ocha fosse l’uomo da temere.[24] L’allora vice comandante dell’esercito aveva sempre mantenuto un basso profilo, ma sembrava inevitabilmente destinato ad assumere su di sé l’incarico di guidare un possibile colpo di stato. Nel 2006, infatti, era luogotenente del generale Anuphong Phaochinda, il capo dell’esercito che aveva rovesciato il primo ministro Thaksin Shinawatra. In seguito, nell’ottobre del 2010, Prayuth Chan-ocha ha sostituito Anuphong Phaochinda come comandante capo dell’esercito e ha mantenuto l’incarico anche sotto il governo guidato da Yingluck Shinawatra.

Il generale Prayuth ocha ha frequentato la prestigiosa Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy, dove ha conseguito anche una laurea in scienze. Ha prestato servizio nel 21° reggimento di fanteria ovvero il corpo di guardia della regina.[25]

Un fedelissimo dell’istituzione monarchica, considerato uno dei più strenui difensori, nel 2012 il generale Prayuth ocha, quando un gruppo di intellettuali propose una revisione della legge sulla lesa maestà, dichiarò che chiunque avesse voluto criticare tale legge avrebbe fatto bene ad andarsene dalla Thailandia.[26] Già l’anno prima, il generale aveva denunciato e fatto perseguire il parlamentare Jatuporn Promphan, uno dei principali esponenti delle «Red Shirts», il movimento dei sostenitori di Thaksin Shinawatra. In quell’occasione Prayuth aveva dichiarato che la sua azione non aveva motivi politici ma solo l’obiettivo di difendere la monarchia.[27]

5. 5. Diritti umani

Amnesty International in apertura del suo dossier sui primi 100 giorni di dittatura ha riportato una dichiarazione del vice commissario di polizia incaricato di rispondere ad una richiesta della nota organizzazione internazionale. L’ufficiale afferma che le persone vengono invitate secondo la legge marziale per dei colloqui finalizzati a correggere il loro modo di pensare. Prosegue affermando che le persone con un pensiero differente hanno la tendenza a creare violenza. L’ufficiale, quindi, ha spiegato che dopo aver corretto il loro modo di pensare tali persone sono restituite alla società e non vengono sottoposte ad alcun successivo controllo.[28]

Tale affermazione è estremamente indicativa dell’incapacità degli uomini del regime militare di comprendere la gravità delle loro azioni.

Il rapporto di Amnesty International elenca una lunga serie di violazioni e di abusi oltre ad almeno due casi di tortura e di scomparsa. Sono stati ritirati 11 passaporti di cittadini tailandesi che si trovavano all’estero. Tali atti, secondo l’organizzazione internazionale, non sono giustificabili né proporzionati all’esigenza di sicurezza nel paese. Gli arresti e le detenzioni ingiustificati sono quasi 600. Questo in base a notizie ufficiali; in realtà i numeri sono più alti, in quanto i militari agiscono senza mandati e le convocazioni spesso sono fatte in modo informale.

Nel rapporto non è mancata una stigmatizzazione della legge sulla lesa maestà, che, sempre di più, è diventata strumento per mettere a tacere avversari politici, poiché è stata utilizzata in modo pretestuoso e grottesco. Sotto la legge marziale, ad occuparsi delle denunce riferite all’articolo 112 del codice penale (cioè alla legge sulla lesa maestà) sono funzionari di polizia. In base a tale articolo i funzionari incaricati sono obbligati a procedere, poiché, in caso contrario, potrebbero essere perseguiti per aver infranto la stessa legge.[29]

6. Dagli USA verso la Cina

Alcuni stati hanno ufficialmente condannato il colpo di stato e hanno chiesto il ripristino delle libertà democratiche nel paese. Gli Stati Uniti[30] hanno preso una posizione molto dura che non ha precedenti nelle relazioni tra i due paesi.[31] Tra l’altro, l’amministrazione americana ha tagliato tutti i fondi non ancora erogati per gli aiuti militari per un totale di tre milioni e mezzo di dollari. Ha inoltre annullato la partecipazione delle sue truppe all’esercitazione multinazionale denominata «Cobra Gold», che si svolge ogni anno in Thailandia.[32]

Il Consiglio europeo[33] ha rimesso in discussione le relazioni con la Thailandia, sospendendo ogni visita ufficiale tra rappresentanti dell’Unione Europea e dello stato tailandese. Il Consiglio, inoltre, ha disposto che nessuno stato membro possa firmare accordi con il governo di Bangkok, fino a quando la Thailandia non sarà guidata da un governo eletto. Infine, ha chiesto la liberazione dei prigionieri politici.[34]

Il governo australiano ha duramente condannato il colpo di stato e ha sospeso quasi completamente ogni collaborazione con la giunta militare. Inoltre, Canberra ha posto il veto all’ingresso in Australia dei rappresentanti della giunta tailandese e ha posposto alcune attività di difesa congiunta già programmate.[35]

La condanna da parte degli alleati storici come USA, Australia e Unione Europea ha provocato uno spostamento delle relazioni estere. La Cina, infatti, non ha espresso condanne e ha continuato a mantenere rapporti commerciali con la Thailandia. Secondo il professor Pavin Chachavalpongpun, è stato un caldo abbraccio quello che la Thailandia ha ricevuto da parte della Cina.[36]

Il generale Min Aung Hlaing, comandante supremo dell’esercito del Myanmar, è stato il primo rappresentante di un paese membro dell’ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nation) a compiere una visita ufficiale in Thailandia, dopo il colpo di stato. Min Aung Hlaing ha espresso apprezzamento alla giunta militare per aver fatto la cosa giusta; si è trattato di un appoggio di grande importanza in quanto Myanmar nel 2014 aveva la presidenza dell’ASEAN.[37]

In ottobre, il generale Prayuth Chan-ocha ha partecipato al decimo incontro EU/ASEM che si è svolto a Milano. Arrivato in Italia alla ricerca del consenso dei paesi occidentali, Prayuth Chan-ocha ha ricevuto un’accoglienza estremamente fredda e non ha avuto la possibilità di incontri bilaterali. Oltre a questo, si sono verificate proteste nelle strade di Milano da parte di giovani tailandesi ed anche di italiani che chiedevano giustizia per la morte del fotografo Fabrizio Polenghi, avvenuta nel 2010 a Bangkok.[38]

Il generale Prayuth Chan-ocha non ha ricevuto una buona accoglienza nemmeno nel Regno Unito, a seguito del terribile omicidio nell’isola di Koh Tao di due cittadini inglesi e della modalità con cui sono state condotte le indagini. Inoltre aveva suscitato grande indignazione la dichiarazione del generale che, in riferimento al grave fatto di sangue, ne aveva attribuito la responsabilità al fatto che le ragazze straniere si mostrano in bikini.[39]

7. Economia

L’economa ha subìto un rallentamento, con una faticosa ripresa nel terzo quadrimestre, nonostante la fine dei disordini politici. Durante questo periodo, il PIL (Prodotto interno lordo) è cresciuto solo dello 0,6% su base annua, mentre la crescita nei due quadrimestri precedenti era stata soltanto dello 0,2%. Le esportazioni hanno continuato ad essere deboli, mentre la ripresa della domanda interna è risultata essere graduale. La previsione di crescita per l’intero anno è stata rivista all’1,0%, mentre precedentemente era stata calcolata all’1,4%.[40]

In agosto, l’assemblea legislativa, che ha funzioni di parlamento «fantoccio», ha approvato il bilancio dello stato, presentato dal generale Prayuth Chan-ocha. Senza alcun voto contrario è passato un deficit del 10%. Tutta l’operazione è stata svolta in poco più di mezz’ora.[41]

Il settore del turismo ha risentito in modo particolare della situazione venutasi a creare dopo il colpo di stato. Il calo degli arrivi all’aeroporto di Bangkok è stato del 15,61%. La perdita in termini economici è calcolata in 200 miliardi di baht (6,1 miliardi di dollari USA).[42]

Un discorso a parte riguarda il riso. A causa del populistico, quanto fallimentare, schema di sussidi per i produttori del riso, adottato dal governo Shinawatra, nei magazzini di tutto il paese sono conservate milioni di tonnellate di riso di pessima qualità.[43] L’ex primo ministro Yingluck Shinawatra è finita sotto inchiesta per corruzione proprio a causa di questo programma di aiuti pubblici. La Thailandia non ha ancora recuperato il primo posto nelle esportazioni e il calcolo delle perdite, per quanto riguarda la credibilità sul mercato, è molto difficile.[44]

La mancata vendita del riso aveva fatto mancare al governo Shinawatra i fondi per erogare i sussidi ai coltivatori.

Per questo motivo, uno dei primi provvedimenti del generale Prayuth Chan-ocha, in questo settore, è stato proprio il sequestro di milioni di baht presso le banche legate allo stato per pagare i sussidi ai coltivatori, in attesa da oltre un anno[45]. In questo modo, il generale ha messo subito in atto una politica molto elementare per accattivarsi le simpatie di chi gravitava in un’area vicina al governo appena deposto.

8. Il conflitto separatista

Il conflitto separatista che sconvolge il Sud della Thailandia ha fatto ormai 6.000 vittime.[46] È evidente l’assoluta incapacità dei governi che si sono succeduti nell’interpretarne le cause e nel voler realmente trovare una soluzione condivisa. Nonostante che le tre province di Pattani, Yala e Narathiwat siano in uno stato di militarizzazione da anni, (sono circa 150.000 i militari dispiegati sul territorio), quasi quotidianamente si registrano attentati ed omicidi.[47]

Il generale Prayuth Chan-ocha ha proclamato l’intenzione di continuare il dialogo di pace con la principale organizzazione dei separatisti, il Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), grazie alla mediazione della Malaysia. Nel contempo, però, il nuovo governo militare ha distribuito tra i civili lealisti 2.700 fucili d’assalto a scopo di autodifesa; un provvedimento sulla cui pericolosità sono stati espressi molti dubbi, dato che esso favorisce la possibilità di realizzare vendette personali e incoraggia i conflitti armati fra civili.[48] Secondo i programmi della giunta, entro un anno sarà riportata la pace nella zona; molti osservatori hanno però fatto notare che un approccio più repressivo rispetto ai precedenti governi civili non ha la possibilità di una ripresa dei colloqui di pace.

Le cause del lungo conflitto sono da ricercare nel desiderio della maggioranza della popolazione di etnia malese di separarsi dalla Thailandia e di unificarsi alla Malaysia. La miopia dei governi centrali di Bangkok ha fatto sì che il conflitto abbia assunto sempre più un carattere religioso su basi integraliste. I ribelli sono arrivati ad ipotizzare la formazione di un califfato islamico; ma va sempre tenuto in considerazione che la motivazione originale e principale dei ribelli rimane il separatismo e non l’islamizzazione della zona.

L’efferatezza degli omicidi e la crudeltà delle rappresaglie da entrambe le parti in conflitto possono essere considerate pari all’indifferenza della comunità internazionale. La maggioranza delle vittime è costituita ancora una volta dai civili: monaci, insegnanti e rappresentanti delle forze di sicurezza sono stati colpiti in quanto simboli dello stato Tailandese. Human Rights Watch ha dichiarato che i ribelli hanno diffuso il terrore colpendo soprattutto le donne, decapitandole e bruciandone i corpi.[49] Non sono mancate denunce di abusi perpetrati dall’esercito, come l’uccisione per vendetta a Narathiwat di tre bambini e il ferimento dei loro genitori, che hanno evidenziato il tragico e «naturale» ciclo della violenza.[50]

In 2014, the fragile Thai democracy saw the saddest of the epilogues. On 22 May the army took power in a coup. The supreme court had already dismissed the then Prime Minister, Yngluck Shinawatra. However, the coup of 22 May did not arrive unexpected, being announced by a series of developments, part of a long-term strategy.

The main reason for the coup was the need to keep the country under control during the King’s succession, an event widely recognized as imminent.

General Prayuth, commander of the army, placed himself at the head of the military junta. The junta also appointed the members of the legislative assembly. This body then appointed General Prayuth head of government. All these moves were ratified by the signature of the King.

 

1. Introduction

In late 2013 and early 2014, a lengthy series of working class protests broke out in several Cambodian towns and violent clashes with the police were the order of the day. The most serious episode occurred during the demonstration on January 4, 2014, when four protesters were killed, a countless number injured, and 23 workers, trade unionists, activists, and monks were also arrested. The workers, who mainly came from the textile and garment industries, were demanding better pay and working conditions and also complaining about discrimination against their organizations and trade union representatives.[1] The police used disproportionate force to stop all these spontaneous and unauthorized marches and to curb the attempts to damage factories or street furniture.[2]

The protesters immediately received strong support from the main opposition party, the CNRP (Cambodian National Rescue Party), whose leader, Sam Rainsy, hoped to discredit Prime Minister Hun Sen and force him to resign.

The violence also gave the western press their chance to re-voice their complaints against the Cambodian leader, Hun Sen. At best, he was labelled as an «authoritarian leader»,[3] while in the worst cases, he was the «long-serving prime minister-dictator».[4] The Asian and national press opted for a more cautious approach and made use of milder sounding expressions such as «the strong men leader».

In recent years, the Cambodian Prime Minister has undoubtedly maintained stubborn control over the main nerve centres of power. The Cambodian power issue and Hun Sen’s iron-fist rule are amply discussed in Sebastian Strangio’s latest biography about Premier.[5] Moreover, evidence suggests that Hun Sen has actively lobbied to restrict freedom of information and to marginalize the opposition parties. Indeed, a number of reasons make it probable that Hun Sen will maintain his firm grip on the country for many years to come. First of all, he has placed his most trusted men – and his sons – in key positions in the armed forces, and his reform of the justice system also appears to have been designed to keep him in power. Furthermore, he has also recently managed to cut the hostile factions within his own party, the Kanakpak Pracheachon Kampuchea(Cambodia Peoples’ Party, CPP) down to size. And finally, in 2014, during the clamorous absence of the party chairman, Chea Sim, Hun Sen took over party leadership on the 63rd anniversary of the founding of the CCP.[6]

Nevertheless, already back in autumn 2013, after his narrow victory in the July 2013 elections, the Prime Minister had had to deal with strong parliamentary opposition from the CNRP, which could count on international political and economic backing, especially from the United States and European Union. The main opposition party started to actively support the major unions and the workers’ protests. No doubt, these protests were caused by the workers’ precarious working conditions; the CNRP, however, did their best to push these protests to the limit, less with the aim to improve the workers’ conditions than force Hun Sen to resign.

All in all, the workers did manage to get a pay increase, but little has changed as regards their working conditions in general. For their part, the opposition parties have never been able to dent the legitimacy of Hun Sen’s power. In fact, even during the difficult 2014 period, the Prime Minister could always count on two unquestionable advantages. First of all, the country was making clear progress and seemed to be in a phase of apparently unstoppable economic development, as shown by the exceptional reduction in poverty rates in the period between 2004 and 2012, which gradually went down from 53.2% to 18.6%,[7] and had already reached the threshold of the Millennium Development Goals in 2011.[8] In addition, even though 2014 was such a difficult year, there was a continuous growth in national and per capita wealth (GDP + 7.2%)[9].

A number of analysts have used these data to try and explain the relationship between economic development and the Cambodian authoritarian drift. Two main schools of thoughts have arisen regarding the issue: the first offers a culturalist explanation, while the other considers tradition as having little or nothing to do with the rise of authoritarianism. For the former school, the authoritarian regime is the result of Cambodia’s long history of monarchical tradition and centralized power,[10] which makes it difficult for democratic forms to develop within the Cambodian system. On the contrary, the latter group suggests that the regime has taken its present shape as this is functional to the in loco implementation of neoliberal policies.[11] In fact, this system has given birth to a development model, largely based on foreign investment and on export oriented manufacturing, which needs «order» and «stability» to be effective. In other words, investors must be able to count on an environment where production costs are low and there is little danger of social conflict.

With this introduction in mind, our analysis begins with the origins of the workers’ protests and the resulting consequences for Cambodian politics and society in 2014. The second part of the present chapter deals with international relations, with particular regard to Cambodia’s increasingly strong links with China. Finally, the tensions that arose with Thailand, after the coup of May 2014, and the differences with Australia, following Canberra’s decision to transfer political refugees to Cambodia will be discussed.

2. The origin of the protests and the political consequences

There are basically two motives behind the protests carried out by Cambodian workers from Autumn 2013 onwards: the poor working conditions in the garment factories,[12] and the strong support the workers received from the main opposition party, after the July 2013 election campaign.

In order to illustrate just how these protest movements gathered momentum and eventually erupted in the epiphenomenal violence of January 2014, the first part of the present section studies working conditions in Cambodia, while the second part focuses on the political exploitation of workers.

2.1. The textile industries and social conflicts

From the mid-nineties onwards, in the aftermath of the peace agreements of 1991 and after the so-called UN-led peacekeeping mission in 1992-93, Cambodia became a political laboratory of neoliberalism. The government that was established in the post-Pol Pot era was headed not by one but by two Prime Ministers: Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen. Under the auspices of the IMF (International Monetary Fund), the WB (World Bank), and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD), it set up an institutional framework that was capable of creating the perfect environment to attract foreign investment. As a result, over the next few years, the Cambodian government created several special economic zones, where many of the leading garment manufacturers based their factories.

Cambodia soon achieved a substantial FDI (Foreign Direct Investment), since it had a lot to offer investors, not least the low wages and practically non-existent trades unions. Then, there were numerous benefits and sizeable tax exemptions, as well as the liberalization of the country’s economy and its entry into the WTO (2004). Over 85% of Cambodian garment factories are controlled by overseas investors (Singapore, China, Malaysia, Taiwan)[13] and produce clothes for several major international brands.

In fact, any manufacturers who set up a company in Cambodia are entitled to tax exemption for the first five years. Most of these factories have either been built in the central provinces or near to the port city of Sihanoukville.

However, although the creation of these industrial districts has allowed Cambodia to increase its national wealth, it has also given rise to a number of social problems that the government has found difficult to control. For example, the country has to face the challenges of uncontrolled urbanization, the massive and sudden depopulation of the countryside, and also deal with a welfare system that offers no rights to workers when they stop working. The situation further deteriorated in 2008 and 2009, when the international economic crisis caused a slowdown in exports that led to the dismissal of 60,000 workers, while a further 30,000 had their working hours reduced. When one realizes that the number of workers employed in the textile/clothing industries in 2008 was just over 360,000, it follows that, in less than a year, a quarter of the workforce had been affected. Today, the garment industry remains a key pillar of Cambodia’s economy. There are approximately 558 garment factories, employing over 475,000 people.[14]More than 95% of the workers are young women, who send 30-50% of their wages home to their families, and hence it is estimated that about 1.7 million Cambodians depend on these industries.[15]

In such a context, it is easy to see that any export fluctuations or, more generally, any turbulence in international markets has immediate consequences for the workers. This was one of the reasons underlying the continual demonstrations by workers in the crisis years (2008/2009), which, by the way, were normally quite peaceful affairs (Table 1). Moreover, as mentioned before, the protests always brought the government to take some kind of perfunctory action in favour of the workers, although the minimal pay rises and the introduction of new legislation actually did very little to improve the welfare system.

Table 1 Number of strikes in the textile / clothing industry
year	strikes
2008	105
2009	58
2010	45
2011	34
2012	121
2013	147
2014	86 till October 2014
Source: Garment Manufacturers Association in Cambodia (http://gmac-cambodia.org/strike).

The data regarding the number of strikes provide a clear picture of the unrest in the country. This not only intensified in periods of economic crisis, like 2008, but also between 2012 and 2013, when production and employment levels were not really such a cause for concern. This suggests that the increase in outbreaks of trouble was linked to a worsening in working conditions. Although the figures in the table only refer to the period up to the month of October 2014, local papers reported that the protests continued until mid-November, when the government announced a new minimum wage increase to be effective from 1 January, 2015.

The news reports describing the Cambodian strikes reveal the numerous reasons behind the protests: the exhausting shift work; pressure from employers; forced redundancy for pregnant employees; the different terms of employment from factory to factory, and the general lack of decent working conditions. Furthermore, many problems were also due to the division in the trades unions, which was a repercussion of the split between the major political parties. Of the 362 garment factories monitored by the ILO, 29% had no registered union, 42% only one union, a further 17% two unions, 12% three or more unions.[16]

The workers’ protests and demands placed the Cambodian government in a difficult position.[17]Despite its willingness to take its seat at the bargaining table, it now had to deal with international pressure to guarantee the workers’ right to trade union representation, and also tackle the threats from the multinational corporations to outsource production.

2.2. CNRP mobilization against the CPP

The CNRP leader Sam Rainsy and his populist promises certainly conditioned the campaign for the 28 July 2013 elections, and, from this time onwards, the workers’ protests received backing from the opposition parties. Opposition leader Sam Rainsy had only returned to Cambodia on the eve of the election, after a time spent abroad to avoid serving a prison sentence imposed in 2010. During his exile, he had managed to gain the support of Catherine Ashton, the European Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, as well as the European Parliament, and the Congress in Washington. The moral suasion used by the great Western powers against the government in Phnom Penh resulted in an unexpected pardon for the opposition leader on 12 July 2013, and his immediate return to Phnom Penh. Although he had very little time to organize his campaign, Sam still managed to mobilize his supporters by making a series of electoral promises. These included the doubling of the minimum wage for all workers, a pension increase, reduced fuel, fertilizer, and electricity costs, and also medical care for the poor.

National and international observers monitored the elections on 28 July 2013, which were held in a peaceful manner. Hun Sen’s party was declared victor,[18] with 48.8% of the vote. However, this was less than a decisive victory, as the CNRP gained almost as big a share of the popular vote, namely 44.6%, which was a mere four percentage points less than the winner.

Immediately after the election, the CNRP questioned the validity of the vote. They denounced cases of electoral fraud and irregularities and staged a parliament walkout, calling on voters to take to the streets in protest. Meanwhile, on 23 September 2013, Hun Sen was asked by the King to form a new government, and, on 24 September, obtained the vote of confidence from the Lower House.

September 2013, therefore, marked the start of a long protest by the CNRP, who refused to sit in the National Assembly. They also did their best to instigate the workers to take to the streets to demand higher wages and force the government to resign. Demonstrations started to spring up in every town and especially in Phnom Penh, the scene of huge protest marches and ever-increasing tension between the police and the protesters. In December 2013, the CNRP announced that the protests would not end and that there would be non-stop demonstrations, with permanent sit-ins in the town squares, until Hun Sen handed in his resignation.[19] The various attempts on the part of the Prime Minister to meet with Sam Rainsy all came to nothing, until the tentative offer of the CNRP to sit down and negotiate with the CPP, on 1 January 2014.[20]

Over the next few days, the news was filled with reports of the army’s use of violence to repress the demonstrations and the deployment of a special fully armed unit to arrest protestors. Indeed, this was the first time the Special Forces Airborne Unit 911 had been used against demonstrators, when it arrested, among others, five monks.[21] In answer to the ensuing public outcry, a police spokesman said that the arrested protesters had been caught trying to destroy some factories.[22]

In the face of this violence, the CNRP refused to take part in negotiations with the CPP, and the political stalemate continued.[23] On 2 January, 2014 the workers returned to work, putting an end to a long and tiring week of strikes.[24] However, a large group of protesters continued to occupy Phnom Penh’s Freedom Park, the scene of the permanent sit-ins, and they never stopped organizing protest marches or traffic blocks in all the main streets of the town. On 3 January 2014, the police attacked a march organized near a factory on the outskirts of Phnom Penh, and things came to a dramatic end. Three or four people were killed (although police sources give the number as being just one[25]), 23 activists were arrested, and a significant number of people were injured. The body of one wounded man now presumed dead has never been found.

2.3. The political stalemate after the violence

The days immediately following the violence were tension-filled. Several diplomats, including those from China[26] and Japan[27], asked the two conflicting parties to resume talks. On 4 January 2014, the army dispersed the permanent rally in Freedom Park and removed the protesters.[28]

The whole situation was extremely embarrassing for many of the big-name brands, whose clothes and shoes were manufactured in Cambodia, and they agreed to adopt major wage concessions.[29] This was also the period when thousands of activists, with the help of the social media, organized protests against Cambodian violence in all parts of the world (in Bangkok and Hong Kong on 10 January 2014, and in London on 13 January 2014).

Sam Rainsy, along with Kem Sokha, member of parliament and deputy chairman of the CNRP (an experienced democratic politician who founded the Human Rights Party in 2007), organized a number of sit-ins to commemorate the workers who had died in the struggles. However, it was not long before they were summoned to court on charges of inciting the protests and encouraging the use of violence against the police. Naturally enough, these accusations only served to increase tensions.[30]

While the government hastened to announce that 85% of the workers had returned to work,[31]the United States officially declared its outrage over the events. Furthermore, the Chinese government expressed its hope for a peaceful solution to the conflict between the two Cambodian parties.[32] In the days following the violence, despite several reports of a series of more or less secret meetings between Hun Sen and the opposition leaders, nothing concrete ever happened.

A situation of extreme tension between the government and the opposition forces came into being. On several occasions, the CNRP announced the organization of further sit-ins and protests, while the government’s answer was to close Freedom Park and ban demonstrations. The media, mostly in line with the government, tried to lighten the mood in the country, by highlighting news about other events that had nothing to do with the protest movements. For example, ample space was given in all the papers, both before and after his trip, to the Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung’s two-day official visit from January 12 to 14. Then again, the benefits Cambodia would receive from the strengthening of bilateral relations with Vietnam, including the construction of a new bridge across the Mekong, close to the border, filled the newspaper, trying to convey a picture of everyday normality. Hun Sen used the National Bank of Cambodia’s announcement of an improved GDP growth rate of 7% in 2013 to remind the people that this increase was thanks to his government. Also, in most of his many public speeches, Hun Sen never failed to mention, among other things, the 69% increase in domestic and foreign investment projects, as compared to 2013, valued at 4.9 billion US dollars.[33]

As regards the clampdown on violence, Hun Sen declared on more than one occasion that he had no intention of relinquishing his mandate or resigning. At the same time, he accused the members of the CNRP of conspiring to destabilize the country.[34]

2.4. Small steps towards an agreement between the CPP and the CNRP

The stalemate between the CPP and CNRP parties became even more worrying in the next few months. Both groups seemed intent on pursuing a policy of brinkmanship, which would have gradually brought them to a point of no return. If they were to return to parliament, the CNRP required a series of their demands to be unequivocally met: vice-presidency of the National Assembly; their own TV channel; and a joint Committee on electoral reform.[35] But, according to unofficial sources – records of the meetings were never made public – any eventual concessions made by the CPP were continually met with further demands from the CNRP, with their ultimate request being for new elections, which was totally unacceptable to Hun Sen and his party.[36] At the same time, CNRP supporters continued to demonstrate, which led to the enforcement of crowd control measures and, in some cases, further episodes of police brutality.[37]

For his part, Hun Sen officially asked the UN to appoint a mediator to negotiate with the opposition and convince the CNRP to discuss reforms in parliament and not on the streets.[38] In the eyes of analysts like Kem Ley, Hun Sen’s request for a UN envoy was a politically risky move, because he did not involve the King.[39] From a constitutional point of view, the King was responsible for settling all disputes of a political nature.

On February 5, against an extremely complex backdrop, with the two parties unable to come to an agreement, Hun Sen promoted 29 officers to the highest rank of 4-star generals. This brought the Cambodian armed forces to count around 2,200 generals, and indicated Hun Sen’s desire to give further strength to the military leaders within the existing delicate political context.[40] In fact, the Prime Minister was sending a very strong message to the armed forces and all his possible opponents, following Sam Rainsy’s repeated attempts to induce the soldiers to side with the workers during demonstrations.[41] It is worth remembering that Hun Sen had only had full control over the army for a relatively short time; in fact, until 2009, the army had been under the command of the Generals who were close supporters of Chea Sim and Sar Kheng, two of Hun Sen’s leading opponents inside the CPP.[42]

This being the situation, the deadlock could not be broken. The CPP wanted to go beyond the other party’s call for early elections and, only if this hurdle could be overcome, were they willing to tackle the CNRP’s other requests, such as the reform of the NEC (National Election Committee), the body responsible for overseeing the legality of electoral processes.

Months passed before an agreement was reached on who should be part of the NEC, and the event was overshadowed by several disputes in the national and international courts. In fact, on 21 March 2014, around 20 Cambodian human rights groups and victims filed a complaint against Hun Sen at the International Criminal Court in The Hague.[43] On his part, on 7 April 2014, Hun Sen accused Sam Rainsy of having insulted the King, an offence which carried a year’s prison sentence.[44] Meanwhile, the demonstrations and workers’ protests went on, notwithstanding the ban imposed by the authorities. On 15 July 2014, the police dispersed the demonstrators, several people were injured[45] and seven members of parliament were arrested for insurrection, namely a charge which could carry up to 30 years in jail.[46]

Ultimately, when it seemed that nothing could break the impasse, July 22, 2014 saw the announcement of the historic agreement between the two parties and the CNRP ending its boycott of the National Assembly.[47] The CNRP obtained the release from prison of seven politicians and an activist,[48] Freedom Park was re-opened, and the ban on demonstrations was lifted. According to the agreement, Kem Socka, the No. 2 of the CNRP, became the first vice-president of the National Assembly, and his party obtained the chairmanship of five of the ten parliamentary commissions, including the one on anti corruption.[49] Finally, the two sides managed to agree on the composition of the NEC, with four members from the CPP, four from the CNRP, and another to be chosen by mutual agreement between the two parties. [50]

2.4. What the workers achieved

The long series of protest movements during these struggles brought the workers a small number of quite important benefits:

– Wage increases; [51]

– A government pledge to revise the minimum wage system;

– Suspension of union registration by the government;

– Renewed push for a trade union law;[52]

Wages: on May 1, 2013, when the electoral campaign was in full swing, Hun Sen’s government established the Labour Advisory Committee and set up a tripartite bargaining system to negotiate wages with unions and companies.[53] This led to a minimum wage increase equivalent to US$15 in 2013, which brought minimum wages up to the equivalent of US$80 a month; Moreover, a further increase in minimum wages, which brought them up to the equivalent of US$95 was assured starting with December 2013. The promise was maintained, and an extra $5 was added for health care benefits, to be effective as of February 2014. Despite this concession, the Ministry of Commerce’s statistics show that garment and footwear exports from Cambodia grew by $560 million or 12% in 2013.[54]

The workers, who never completely put an end to their protests, managed to elicit a further 28% increase in November 2014, bringing the minimum wage to the equivalent of US$128, as of January 1, 2015.[55] In actual fact, this increase was not to everyone’s liking as some unions had asked for as much as $140. Moreover, the repression of the demonstrations in January 2014 led to the spontaneous formation of several unions, especially on the social networks. Many of these unions also have the backing of NGOs and international solidarity groups and have continued to pressurize the government to bring the threshold to $177. [56]

Apart from these wage increases, little has changed regarding the other parameters that measure the quality of the working environment and the recognition of workers’ contracts by the factories.[57] Furthermore, trade union legislation has yet to be discussed in Parliament.

2.5. Increased support for the CNRP and the budget

Urban workers and rural population continued their protests in the months following the agreement between the CPP and CNRP. The former group was intent on gaining further wage increases, while the latter challenged the state’s illegal expropriation of land. Then there were the CNRP supporters who never stopped lobbying the government to ensure that the agreements reached in July 2014 were put into force. The farmers whose lands had been expropriated staged a sensational protest at Phnom Penh airport on the eve of Hun Sen’s departure for the Myanmar summit of ASEAN countries. They turned up with huge banners that expressed their message of SOS to the whole world.[58] This was much the same protest as the one in 2012, when the US President Barack Obama came to the capital. Two years later, the problem of illegal expropriation had still to be solved.

Once again, in early November 2014, numerous activists, monks, and CNRP politicians were arrested for having taken part in unauthorized demonstrations or for resisting a public officer.[59]

From a political point of view, the 2014 protests undoubtedly allowed the CNRP to strengthen its status and brought about a democratic rebalancing in parliament. In fact, in November, the process of approving NEC regulations was set underway at the National Assembly, and a decree was issued that assigned a TV channel to the CNRP. The CNRP also played an essential role in the elaboration and approval of two important laws: an amendment to the constitution and the 2015 budget. The former elevated the country’s opposition party leader to a legislative rank on par with Prime Minister Hun Sen, and National Assembly lawmakers voted to allow Sam Rainsy to become the house minority leader with 102 votes in favour of the move from members of both the CPP and CNRP.[60] The second important matter was the approval of the 2015 budget, which the opposition’s votes helped to pass at the end of November. The new budget had a radically different allocation of expenses compared to the previous one. The overall 2015 budget amounts to $3.9 billion compared with the 2014 budget of $3.4 billion.[61] Some $536 million of the total budget will be allocated to defence and security, an increase of $68 million from this year’s $468 million. However, the main change in the budget regards the areas of Education and Health. Education will receive $453 million, an increase of $118million from the current $335 million, while the health sector will receive $324 million, up from this year’s $244 million.[62]

3. International relations

When Hun Sen’s aspirations of getting a permanent seat on the UN Security Council went up in smoke in 2013, the Cambodian government’s international policy in 2014 was to follow two main directions. First of all, it adopted a policy of non-alignment with the major powers and the main donor countries (China, Japan and US), in line with a tradition that dated back to the policies of Norodom Sihanouk. Then, there was the attempt to further relations with the ASEAN countries and, in particular, with the reinvigorated CLV development triangle (Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam).[63] Moreover, ever since 2014, when Cambodian foreign relations were at their weakest, on account of the international outrage over the violent repression of the workers’ protests, the country has always been able to count on increasing political and economic support from China. In addition, during the months of political deadlock, the country was also faced with two international crises. The first was caused by the difficult relations with the new Thai military junta which had seized power in Bangkok on May 22; the second was triggered by Australia sending its Rohingya refugees to Cambodia.

The following paragraphs will be limited to the analysis of the increasingly symbiotic relationship between Cambodia and China, the USA’s loss of appeal, and a description of the crises with Thailand and Australia respectively.

3.1. Relations with key donor countries, China and the USA

2008 marked the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations with China and the event was celebrated in great pomp and ceremony. Ever since, relations between Phnom Penh and Beijing have been growing hand over fist. Indeed, China has become Cambodia’s top foreign investor and most generous donor. As a result, the strong ties between the Cambodian government and the United States, established back in 1991, were weakened and, indeed, the latter gradually lost all its former appeal.

In 2014, Beijing was not only ready to offer Hun Sen economic aid and investments, but it also provided constant political backing, especially during the months of political deadlock, when Cambodia was under such harsh criticism from the West. China had also sent political and financial aid to the Phnom Penh government when 1,500 Chinese refugees had sought asylum in Cambodia to escape the threats and violence they had suffered in Vietnam. The anti-Chinese demonstrations and protests against employers and workers had been sparked off in several Vietnamese provinces in May, after the Chinese government had chosen to erect an oil rig in disputed waters off the Spratly islands.[64]

From an economic point of view, Chinese FDI, which in 2012 amounted to US$263 million, went up to the US$427million in 2013.[65] It appears that Chinese aid and investment were still in place in 2014, although there is a lack of official data. Chinese aid and loans have been used by the Cambodian government to support both private investment, especially in the garment and in the land and resource sector, as well as state owned enterprises (SOEs) in the hydropower sector.[66]

Expectations for Cambodia in 2015 are even more optimistic. In fact, after Hun Sen’s brief official visit to Beijing in November 2014, China made the decision to allocate aid and loans to Cambodia amounting to between US$500 and 700 million.[67] The first part of this aid was formalized during Chinese State Councillor Yang Jiechi’s visit on 31 December 2014, with the allocation of 700 million yuan aid (about US$112.7 million) in grants and 200 million yuan (US$32.2 million) in interest-free loans.[68] The sum is further increased by the aid that China intends to provide for the building of infrastructures and for poverty alleviation in the Great Mekong Subregion.[69]

In addition, military cooperation between the two countries was further strengthened on May 12, 2014, when Cambodia sent more than 400 of its military officials to China to receive training.[70] A few days later, on May 18, Hun Sen flew to Shanghai to attend the 4th Summit of Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). The alignment between China and Cambodia became all the more obvious on 20 November 2014, when the Cambodian delegation at the UN abstained from voting a historic resolution encouraging international action on the abysmal state of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.[71]

In recent years, Cambodia has accepted Chinese aid with open arms, because of China’s declared policy not to interfere in other countries’ internal policies. From this point of view, the US and Western donors have found it extremely difficult to exercise soft power on Cambodia, on account of the conditionalities that they pose.[72]

The US economic crisis also led to a reduction in financial aid from Washington. The amount funded by the Americans was far less than Chinese economic support, and therefore utilized for far smaller (compared to the Chinese) cooperation programmes in various sectors. In particular, one of these projects was the LMI (Lower Mekong Initiative), a cooperation program launched and funded by the US in 2009 to create an alternative platform to the GSM (Greater Mekong Sub-region), in order to counter the growing dominance of China in the region.[73]

In July 2010, the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cambodia provided an occasion to try and restore the American image in Cambodia. Accordingly celebrations were held with great pomp and ceremony at the US Embassy in Phnom Penh. The US authorities were convinced that the political and cultural events which they had organized would show the Cambodians that America was still close to their country. Moreover, this was a chance to regain at least a small part of the appeal that the USA had gradually lost under the onslaught of massive Chinese aid.[74] In the words of the US Ambassador Carol Rodley, the goal at that time was to «enhance the investments in infrastructure and in human capital that the United States had made in Cambodia in the fifties».[75]

At the same time, however, the US continued to put pressure on Hun Sen’s government by continuously demanding the repayment of loans that the Washington government had made to Marshal Lon Nol’s government in 1970. There was a widespread belief that Lon Nol, whose coup had ousted Sihanouk in 1970, had seized power with the help of the CIA.[76] He had incurred debts with his American patrons, whose interest rates had caused to rise from an initial $162 million dollars in 2010 to $321 million.[77]

On the subject of returning these loans, Hun Sen has always tried to postpone and sideline the issue. During a meeting with US Congressman Eni Faleomavaega, on January 7, 2010, to celebrate the end of the Khmer Rouge regime, Hun Sen said: «Cambodia is delighted to cooperate with the US in various sectors and welcomes Obama’s new commitment in Asia». «However, – he warned –, if the question of debt were to be revealed to the general public, it could lead to a number of real risks. It would, therefore, be necessary to devise a plan under which any loans returned to the US could be entirely reinvested in Cambodian development projects».[78]

During the Cambodian political crisis in 2013 and 2014, the US continually condemned Hun Sen’s authoritarian government, and even went as far as to stop all military aid.[79] On the other hand, however, it has never failed to lend support to the CNRP, its leader Sam Rainsy, and to the Cambodian community in the US, which is particularly linked to Sam. In this regard, it is also important to recall that the resolution to recognize the Khmer and Lao/Mong Freedom Fighters for supporting and defending the United States Armed Forces during the Vietnam War made rapid progress through US Congress in 2104.[80] It goes without saying that this American initiative will do little to improve trust in the relations between the USA and the Cambodian government.

3.2. Difficult relations with the new Thai Military Junta

On May 22, following the coup in Thailand, relations between the Cambodian government and the Thai Military Junta became extremely strained. The two neighbouring countries had been at odds for years over the border near the temple of Preah Vihear and the offshore one in the gas-rich Overlapping Claims Area (OCA)[81]. A further source of tension was provided by the Cambodian illegal immigrant workers in Thailand. Both issues had caused several diplomatic clashes, ever since the military junta had come to power in Thailand, and Cambodia had accused the Thai troops of erecting new barbed wire fences in front of the Preah Vihear temple.[82] For its part, the Bangkok junta had immediately condemned the Phnom Penh government for hosting a number of Thai political leaders, with the alleged purpose of forming a government in exile. The news, which was immediately denied by Hun Sen,[83] continued to circulate for much of the year, being made credible by the long-lasting friendship that existed between Hun Sen on one side and the Shinawatra brothers and some members of their entourage on the other.[84] Whatever the case may be, just a few weeks later, another even more serious problem occurred, with the mass exodus of Cambodian workers from Thailand. Thousands of immigrants returned home, afraid of the Junta’s clampdown on illegal immigrants in Thailand. Unconfirmed reports also indicated the death of some workers.

On 13 June, 2014, Cambodian government funds had already helped 40,000 workers to return home.[85] This number was to increase so rapidly, that, after a few days, sources spoke of 150,000-250,000 repatriated workers.[86] The immense size of this exodus brought the Cambodian government to lodge an official protest with the Junta, complaining about the persecution of Cambodian citizens, whatever their legal status, and also and, above all, because Phnom Penh had never been consulted in the matter.[87]

The first official meeting between the two foreign ministers took place on 1 July, 2014, when the Thai Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sihasak Phuangketkeow came to Phnom Penh to discuss the migrant situation. The negotiated solution was the issue of a temporary work permit to the illegal migrant workers (at a cost of 1,305 Bath, equal to about three months pay for a common labourer). This managed to put an end to the workers’ panic and an unknown number returned to Thailand. The agreement also foresaw the release of prisoners in both Cambodia and Thailand and a promise from Prime Minister Hun Sen to lend no support to the opponents of the Thai Junta.[88]

3.3. The difficult negotiations with Australia as regards political refugees in Cambodia

In May 2014, the Australian government started negotiations with the Phnom Penh government to bring around 1,100 Rohingya refugees from the camp on the Island of Nauru to Cambodia. Myanmar’s Rohingya are a Muslim minority, who, just like the Kaman, had never been recognized by the Myanmar government. In June 2012, both groups suffered persecution by the Arakanese Buddhists and 25,000-30,000 took refuge in neighbouring countries, such as Malaysia and Indonesia. Many of them then tried to reach Australia by makeshift boats, but the Canberra government often denied them entry and made them disembark on the Island of Nauru, which became an Australian funded refugee camp in 2001.[89]

The news of these negotiations infuriated several human rights groups and NGOs for two basic reasons. First of all, there was the Australian government’s restrictive refugee policy and the fact that no illegal immigrants had been accepted since 2008. And then, it was also true that Cambodia was a poor country, which could certainly not guarantee adequate care and protection for any refugees sent there.[90]

Ultimately, the issue of the Rohingya refugees reverberated on the already weakened Cambodian government, and Hun Sen came under further attack from the international press for his continued human rights violations and his inability to deal with the Vietnamese minority in Cambodia.[91] The police immediately suppressed the sit-in protest staged by a hundred Cambodians outside the Australian Embassy in Phnom Penh, on September 27, 2014. The next day, September 28, Australia’s Immigration Minister, Scott Morrison, and Cambodia’s Interior Minister, Sar Kheng, signed a Memorandum of Understanding stipulating that Cambodia was to resettle an unspecified number of refugees currently held in the Australian-run Nauru detention centre in exchange for an extra A$ (Australian dollars) 40 million (€ 27.49m) in aid over the next four years.[92] Negotiations between the two governments had been going on secretly for months, although the only news that transpired from a hastily-convened press conference was about the A$ 40 million the Cambodian government was to receive in return for its willingness to accommodate the refugees.[93] Eventually, under the relentless pressure from various human rights groups, during a bilateral meeting at the ASEAN summit in November 2014, Hun Sen and Prime Minister Tony Abbott signed an agreement that refugees would only be sent to Cambodia on a volunteer basis.[94]

Il 2014 in Cambogia è stato condizionato dall’acuirsi del conflitto sociale, alimentato dai lavoratori delle grandi industrie del tessile e dai contadini. I primi da anni portano avanti lotte per ottenere migliori condizioni di lavoro e garanzie sociali, mentre i contadini cercano, con difficoltà, di limitare il sistema pervasivo di espropri di terre da parte del governo, che vengono concesse alle multinazionali dell’edilizia o destinate alle culture intensive. Agli inizi dell’anno le proteste dei lavoratori venivano represse con la forza da parte dell’esercito e, il 4 gennaio, durante una manifestazione, alcuni attivisti rimanevano uccisi dalle forze dell’ordine e altri venivano arrestati. È stato questo l’apice di uno scontro politico tra il partito di maggioranza del primo ministro Hun Sen (CPP – Cambodian People’s Party) e quello di minoranza, CNRP (Cambodian National Rescue Party), guidato da Sam Rainsy, che era iniziato nel luglio del 2013 all’indomani delle elezioni legislative. Il CNRP, infatti, per contestare l’esito delle urne aveva deciso di non partecipare ai lavori parlamentari fino al momento in cui Hun Sen si fosse dimesso e si fossero decretate nuove elezioni. Di fronte a tali richieste, e per di più di fronte ai fatti luttuosi dell’inizio del 2014, lo stallo politico si è perpetuato fino al mese di luglio, quando i due partiti trovavano un insperato accordo. Gli operai, dal canto loro, riuscivano a ottenere, nell’arco di un anno, un incremento sostanziale dei loro salari, ma pochi miglioramenti dal punto di vista delle condizioni lavorative.

Anche nell’ambito delle relazioni internazionali, il governo di Hun Sen ha dovuto fronteggiare diversi elementi di crisi, ad iniziare dalle tensioni legate al colpo di stato in Thailandia, che ha deposto il governo amico di Shinawatra. In seguito alle minacce e alle pressioni della nuova giunta tailandese al potere, centinaia di migliaia di lavoratori cambogiani emigrati in Thailandia facevano ritorno in Cambogia. Tuttavia, Hun Sen, forte dell’appoggio politico ed economico del governo cinese, riusciva a trovare soluzioni diplomatiche per risolvere le tensioni e per instaurare con il governo militare tailandese rapporti di buon vicinato.

 

1. Introduction

In 2014, Malaysian politics were largely determined by the general election of the year before, in which Prime Minister Najib Razak’s governing alliance, the Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN), led by Najib Razak’s party, the United Malay National Organization (UMNO, or United Malays National Organisation), finally achieved a majority.

Yet despite its victory, the BN faced some serious challenges. The first of them was the matter of the popular vote. The Pakatan Rakyat (People’s Alliance, PR), an electoral coalition of three opposition parties, won 50.7% of the popular vote against 47.38% won by the BN.[1] The second challenge was the deepening rural-urban split. Whereas the former tended to vote for the opposition, the latter tended to support the ruling alliance. Third, there was another gap highlighted by the 2013 elections that was potentially even more divisive: ethnicity. The ethnic Malay majority (the Bumiputera or «sons of the soil») solidly supported the BN, but the economically powerful minorities in Malaysia, particularly the Chinese, were now solidly anti-BN.[2] In a country where 73% of the population lives in towns,[3] and where the minority communities’ dislike of the BN government is steadily growing, only two factors allowed the BN to retain the majority of seats in the federal parliament: the distribution of parliamentary seats, which are heavily weighted towards rural, as opposed to urban, areas, and the growing importance of Eastern Malaysia (Sarawak and Sabah), whose major regional parties are aligned with the BN.

With the votes of the rural Bumiputera and the support from the regional parties in Eastern Malaysia, the BN was able to win 133 seats, which were 22 more than the «magic number» necessary to rule in a parliament of 222 seats.[4] Although the election provided Najib with electoral legitimacy, protests arose from the opposition and from many civil society organizations, particularly in Kuala Lumpur. The protestors not only denounced the electoral system, but alleged electoral fraud and refused to accept the election results. Although these allegations could not be conclusively proven, they made the political situation extremely tense during the second half of 2013.

As a result of all of this, many Malaysians have lost faith in the political system. Although the first-past-the-post electoral system can easily lead to a disconnect between the popular vote and the seats won, in Malaysia, UMNO-dominated governments have caused this disconnect to occur more frequently by gerrymandering electoral boundaries.

The 2013 election also exacerbated ethnic divisions within Malaysia. For example, in the rural Malay heartland, the BN consciously branded itself as pro-Malay, and by extension, anti-minority. It seemed to be shaking off its commitment to ethnic harmony that had, in the wake of the bloody ethnic riots of the late-1960s, led the UNMO, in an attempt to mollify ethnic minority opinion, to form the BN in the first place.

This situation was not helped by the poor electoral showing of the ethnic Chinese parties within the BN. Increasingly frequent and vociferous anti-Chinese remarks now began to appear in Malay-language newspapers that actively supported the UMNO. Even Prime Minister Razak made no bones about blaming the Chinese for the BN’s electoral shortfall. Stoking ethnic politics in this way does not bode well for Malaysian political stability, as it might well revive tensions that have been dormant for the last 40 years or more. Besides the fallout of the 2013 election, in 2014, Malaysian politics was marked by the reemergence of the Anwar Ibrahim affair. The Kuala Lumpur Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal of the leader of the opposition, Anwar Ibrahim, on the charge of sodomy. Curiously, and conveniently for the BN, this decision came just as Anwar was about to contest an important by-election on 23 March. An Anwar victory would have paved the way for him to become the Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) of Selangor, thus giving him a power base in the richest state of Peninsular Malaysia, which was already an opposition stronghold.

Yet even this was almost immediately upstaged by breaking news of the mysterious disappearance of Malaysian Airlines MH370 en route from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing. While the whole MH370 incident is beyond the remit of this article, we must deal with it in passing, because it has had a considerable impact on Malaysia, both internally, and in the world arena. But first, let us examine the Malaysian economy in 2014.

2. The Economy: robust growth and reforms

The forecast for the Malaysian economy in the year 2014 was good, and the growth registered for the period was surprisingly high, particularly in the first two quarters. The Malaysian GDP grew at a rate of 6.2% in the first quarter, and the second quarter registered even higher growth – 6.4%.[5]Among Southeast Asian economies, Malaysia tied the Philippines for the highest growth in the second quarter of the year.[6] Third quarter growth, though lower, was still respectable, at 5.6%.[7]The Malaysian Central Bank thus predicted a growth between 5.5 and 6.0% for the whole of 2014 and between 5.0 and 6.0% for 2015. However, some independent observers think that this prediction is too optimistic. One of these experts, Michael Wan, of Credit Suisse in Singapore, said: «Our expectation is that [in] 2015 [the Malaysian] GDP will continue to disappoint the consensus. We are calling for a below consensus number of 4.8 percent next year».[8]

The good economic results of the previous years had a positive impact on the Malaysian economy as a whole. Decisions such as the removal of fuel subsidies, the pending roll-out of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) and the introduction of new social safety nets allowed more spending, which promoted sustainable and equitable medium-term growth. While private domestic demand is expected to remain strong, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) said the country would need «steadfast implementation» of some structural reforms to achieve high-income status by 2020.[9]On the whole, in recent years, the Malaysian economy has done relatively well, despite the global crisis.

Malaysia’s increasing national debt, however, concerned the Razak government. The national debt reached 53% of GDP in 2012, the highest level in 18 years.[10] In 2013, a central government program meant to reduce the debt was not completely successful, and Malaysian debt remained high, oscillating between 52 to 55% of GDP.[11] Meanwhile, in 2013, the deficit went down from 4.5% to 3.9%, in accordance with the government target. The goal was to further reduce the deficit to 3.5% or less in 2014 and to 3% in 2015, before achieving a balanced budget by 2020. Malaysia’s tax and subsidization reforms point to the likelihood of more deficit reduction in the coming years, an outcome that was not foreseen just a year ago.

The debt problem is partially due to the state’s unproductive and mainly politically-driven expenses, such as farm subsidies. However, the main problem is the narrow tax base. In October 2014, Razak announced that a new goods and services tax (GST), which had been debated by the Malaysian political élite since 1992, was going to be implemented by April 2015. This tax, initially set at 6%, is intended to modernize Malaysia’s tax system, thus sending a strong signal to international ratings agencies, such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. Najib announced the GST in the 2014 budget.

Under the current system, oil royalties and income tax payments make up the bulk of the annual federal revenue, accounting for 30% and 58%, respectively. The recent plummeting of oil prices has been a major cause of concern for Kuala Lumpur. There have been increasing calls for tax reforms aimed at reducing Malaysia’s dependency on fickle oil prices. Impelling these calls are some gloomy forecasts predicting the depletion of the country’s oil and gas reserves within a few years. Compounding this problem is the statistic that, out of a Malaysian workforce of about 12 million, only 14% (1.7 million) pay income tax. Of course, this points to a thriving ‘black’ economy, which is estimated to account for between 25% and 30% of the GDP.[12] It is hoped that the GST will help to broaden the government’s tax base as the economy expands. In addition, export items will be exempted from the GST, so that they can remain competitive in the international market.

Malaysian economic analysts are not generally in favor of the government’s projected increasing reliance on a regressive measure like the GST. This is because the income disparity between the rich and the poor in Malaysia is one of the highest in the world. Where 0 represents perfect equality and 1 represents perfect inequality, Malaysia ranked as high as 0.46 in 2012. This made Malaysia 36th in the world for inequality and first in Asia.[13]

The 2015 budget, which was unveiled on 10 October 2014, will be the last one under the 10th five-year-plan. It is seen as very important for paving the way to the next – or 11th – five-year plan. There is a lot riding on the 11th plan, because, by its completion in 2020, Kuala Lumpur hopes the country will join the ranks of the developed world. The Najib government also plans to reduce the overall bill for subsidies and cash assistance by 7% from RM (Malaysian Ringgit) 40.6 billion to RM 37.7 billion in 2015.[14] The IMF has repeatedly requested this cut. Furthermore, Najib announced that the bulk of the tax surplus generated by the introduction of the GST (RM 4.9 billion on a total balance of 5.6 billion) will be used for assistance and welfare programs aimed at poverty reduction. The government thus intends to mitigate the regressive nature of the new GST. Such a program is not new. In 2012, Najib launched «1Malaysia People’s Aid», which distributed RM 500 million to families earning less than RM 3000 monthly.[15] In February 2013, a revised scheme, 1Malaysia People’s Aid 2.0, was implemented, which aimed to distribute more than RM 2.5 billion to 5.7 million Malaysians.[16] These schemes, seen as an election ploy, constituted Najib’s attempt to lessen the impact of the rising cost of living on lower income Malaysians.

These programs are not without their critics. One of the most trenchant is the eminence grise of the Najib government: none other than former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed. To Mahathir, the schemes are ultimately unproductive, because they do nothing to equip people with the skills that could help them to look after themselves.[17] Progressive and non-Malay sectors have also criticized Najib’s pro-poor policies. They claim that 1Malaysia and the other connected schemes are just a way of distributing money to the UMNO’s potential electors.[18] Because most Malaysian poor people live in overwhelmingly Malay rural areas, these policies mostly favor the UMNO’s main vote bank. The states that stand to gain the most from the 1Malaysia People’s Aid policy are the two poorest – Sabah and Sarawak. Yet these states have become essential for the Najib government’s survival. The urban poor of the states of Kuala Lumpur, Selangor and Perak, however, have not benefited from 1Malaysia People’s Aid and have increasingly voted against the BN. The fact that most of them are ethically Indian or Chinese only heightens the ethnic divide in Malaysian politics.[19]

As has been already alluded to in this article, there has recently been a significant ramping-up of tension between the ethnic and religious communities in Malaysia. Bluntly put, the ethnic Malay majority is actively pursuing xenophobic policies. To quote a 2014 investigative report by the news network Al-Jazeera:

«Race and religion are used on a daily basis to rupture the relationships between the three ethnic groups. Today, unlike in the 1970s and 1980s, there is very little intermingling between Malays, Indians and Chinese. The country now has Malay teachers telling their third, fourth and fifth generation Malaysian-born Chinese and Indian students to go back to where their forefathers came from and as time goes by, the Chinese and Indians are finding themselves increasingly politically and economically crowded out of their home».[20]

3. The Judiciary vs. Anwar Ibrahim: the never-ending saga

Anwar Ibrahim, the leader of the Malaysian opposition, has been fighting charges of sodomy and corruption for more than 16 years. Once considered the rising star of Malaysia’s most influential political party, the UNMO, Anwar served as Finance Minister from 1991 to 1998 and was the deputy prime minister from 1993 to 1998. Thereafter, he began a political struggle against then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed. Due to his popularity among many sectors of Malaysian society, such as the urban middle class and minorities, Anwar represented a serious challenge to the undisputed power of the UMNO and its leader, Mahathir. This is why Mahathir engineered Anwar’s expulsion from the UMNO in 1998. Soon after his expulsion from the UMNO, Anwar Ibrahim was charged with the serious offences of corruption and sodomy. Many in Malaysia felt that these allegations were part of a UMNO plan to persecute Anwar.[21] The case triggered much criticism against Mahathir’s Government, both internally and abroad. Soon after his dismissal from the government and from the party, Anwar found himself in jail. He was later convicted and sentenced to 5 years of imprisonment for corruption and to another 6 years for having had sex with a male (homosexual acts are illegal in Malaysia). He spent 5 years in jail before an appeal court in 2004 partially overturned the sentence for sodomy. Anwar was free. However, his corruption conviction stipulated that he be banned from politics for an additional five years. Eventually, in 2008, he was able to return to the political arena. But now, he faced new allegations.

During his years of imprisonment and banishment from active politics, Anwar became the icon of a protest movement named Reformasi, which demanded that the institutional and political system of the country be substantially reformed. Anwar’s wife, Wan Azizah, launched a new party, the National Justice Party, which later became the People’s Justice Party (PKR). She contested the 1999 election, while her husband was in jail, and was able to retain the seat formerly held by him. After the formation of a broad coalition of opposition parties, the People’s Alliance or People’s Pact (Pakatan Rakyat, PR), she was able to run in the 2008 election before her husband returned to active politics.

On 29 June 2008, an allegation of sodomy was once again moved against Anwar Ibrahim, when his former aide, Saiful Bukhari Azlan, lodged a police report claiming that Anwar had sodomized him. Anwar emphatically denied the accusation and claimed that it was undoubtedly a government attempt to discredit and humiliate him, thereby removing him from the leadership of the opposition and trying to put a dent in PR’s growing popularity.[22] During the trial that followed, Anwar’s legal team produced medical reports discrediting the prosecution’s case, and these were sufficient to acquit Anwar. Finally free from legal proceedings, Anwar was now able to run in the 2013 general election as a prime ministerial candidate. With Anwar at the helm, the PR obtained the majority of the popular vote. But unfortunately, this did not translate into a majority of parliamentary seats. After the election results were announced, Anwar refused to acknowledge them and led a huge and loud, but ultimately ineffective, protest movement.

The most recent event in Anwar’s ongoing tribulations occurred in March 2014. At the time, Anwar was contesting a by-election in Kajang in Selangor state.[23] The ‘Kajang move’ was Anwar’s attempt to get elected to the Selangor state parliament. A successful bid could, Anwar felt, open up the possibility for him to become Selangor’s Menteri Besar, thereby replacing the current Menteri, Khalid Ibrahim, who was a PKR member, and Anwar’s political rival. During this campaign, however, Anwar disavowed the idea of replacing Khalid, going so far as to say that the PR was proud of Khalid’s sound and «frugal» administration of Selangor.[24]

But ill-luck dogged Anwar: On 7 March 2014, the Kuala Lumpur Court of Appeal overturned Anwar’s acquittal on the sodomy charge, and in the subsequent re-trial, convicted him again to a five-year prison term. According to the Court of Appeal, the judgement of the High Court was invalid, as it had unjustly excluded DNA samples taken from the aide allegedly sodomized by Anwar.

Anwar immediately appealed the sentence and avoided jail by posting a RM 10,000 bail. He also told the press in no uncertain terms that the re-trial was politically-motivated.[25] After the judges predictably convicted Anwar, he shouted at them: «You have got want you wanted».[26]

The guilty verdict provoked the predictable criticism by the Malaysian opposition. Soon after, Anwar and his wife launched the Reformasi 2.0 protests to decry the use of justice for political ends in Malaysia. Despite its initial popularity, this protest has had a more limited impact than in the past.

Internationally, as well, Anwar’s conviction has been met with skepticism. According to Phil Robertson, the Deputy Director of the Asia Division of Human Rights Watch, the trial was «politically-motivated…[and] all about  knocking Anwar Ibrahim out of politics and the government was prepared to do whatever it took to make that happen».[27] Robertson added: «Anwar and his family appear [to be] caught in a never-ending nightmare of his political adversaries’ making, with the courts [acting] as the instrument of his political execution. It’s truly a dark day for the Malaysian judiciary which has shown itself incapable of standing up straight when national political issues are in play in cases before them».[28] Former US Vice President Al Gore, who, on many occasions, had criticized the never-ending judiciary case against Anwar, now wrote an article sharply critical of this latest conviction. According to him:

«It is extremely disturbing that the government of Malaysia – by continuing to press this case beyond the bounds of reason, let alone the bounds of justice – has used the courts to short-circuit the political process. […] By behaving in the manner it did, the court has, of course, invited speculation by reasonable friends of Malaysia in the rest of the world that its independence of judgment and judicial temperament have been influenced by political fear of, and intimidation by, the individuals now in control of executive power in Kuala Lumpur».[29]

The appeal hearing, initially scheduled for 28 October 2014, was then postponed indefinitely. On 7 November, Chief Justice Tun Arifin bin Zakaria said: «In view of the facts submitted, we will require some time. We will postpone to a date to be fixed».[30] In the meantime, however, Malaysia is in a state of uncertainty.

4. The Kajang move and the future of the opposition

The Anwar case has huge ramifications for the Malaysian political opposition – the PR. This is due as much to its internal dynamics as to the continued persecution of its leader. The PR is an odd alliance of three parties representing different classes and having differing visions for the future of the country. Anwar’s PKR has a mostly urban and educated Malay following. The PAS (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party), on the other hand, is an Islamist Party with a strongly conservative base, and the DAP (Democratic Action Party) has a secular and Chinese following. Until now, Anwar’s charisma and his legal troubles have kept these parties together, despite their differences. However, their divisions are increasing. After the March sentence, Anwar was sidelined again, abruptly halting the ‘Kajang move’. This led to political infighting within the PR coalition in Selangor. Eventually, the PKR was able to put forward Wan Azizah as the PR candidate in the Kajang by-election, which she won with a majority of 5,379. In August, the Menteri Besar Khalid Ibrahim, of Selangor, was sacked by his own party due to corruption allegations. Khalid, with the support of the Sultan of Selangor, who is constitutionally the chief of the State, tried to resist this move. But Khalid was finally forced to resign on 26 August 2014. At that point, the PKR and the DAP proposed that Wan Azizah should be the next Menteri Besar. The Sultan resisted this move and was supported by the Islamist PAS. Eventually, the Sultan decided to appoint Azmin Ali, a PKR representative with PAS support. Azmin was also able to secure DAP support and duly became the new Selangor Menteri Besar.

This was a definite setback for Anwar, because it stymied his effort to gain the Selangor’s highest seat for his wife. More importantly, the outcome of the Kajang move highlighted problems within the PR, especially the increasing tensions between its constituent parties – the PAS, the DAP and the PKR. The PAS was not at all comfortable with the Kajang move, ostensibly because of its dislike of dynastic politics, but more probably, because it was uncomfortable that the PR’s candidate was a relatively liberal Muslim woman – Wan Azizah.[31]

Internally, the PAS has faced some serious issues. While it has a modernist leadership, the PAS depends on a conservative base. Moreover, this powerbase is concentrated in the northeastern states of mainland Malaysia. The party has governed Kelantan state since 1971, which has a mainly Malay population which is 95% Muslim.[32] Many laws enacted by the PAS government in Kelantan have been openly based on local interpretations of the sharia’a. These moves have been strongly resisted by the state’s ethnic minorities, especially the Chinese, as well as by secular parties, such as the DAP. Shari’a-type laws were also introduced in the years 2008-13 by the PAS-led PR government of Kedah state. The PAS’s coalition partners criticized these moves, and the ensuing disunity between them most probably led to the PK’s defeat in the 2013 State elections, which brought the BN back to power. The Chinese and Indian voters, who mainly support the DAP, are becoming increasingly worried about the rising Islamisation in Malaysian society.

However, the major fracture affecting the PR Pakatan Rakyat seems to be within the PAS itself, not only in Kelantan, but in Malaysia as a whole. After joining hands with the DAP and the PKR in the 2008 general elections, the fissures within the party came into the open. During the 2011 party convention, Mohamad Sabu, a moderate candidate considered close to Anwar, successfully challenged the conservative, ulama-backed leader, Nasharudin Isa. This lessened the rift between the PAS and the other two parties in the PR. Sabu also tried to attract the non-Muslim vote in the 2013 general elections. However, the divisions re-emerged after the Kajang episode. The new leadership has come under heavy fire from the conservative wing of the party and is in danger of losing part of the PAS’s traditionally rural support for the UMNO, which is mounting a concerted effort to win the Muslim vote.

A confirmation of Anwar’s conviction will probably signal the end of his political career, as he will be 77 by the time he can re-enter politics. Therefore, it is only natural that PR politicians are now jockeying for position, anticipating a leadership race in the event of Anwar’s eclipse as the chief of the opposition.

5. The strange case of flight MH370: political and diplomatic consequences

Like it or not, anyone who wants to analyze 2014 in Malaysian politics cannot ignore an event, that, at first sight, does not appear to be political at all. This is the mysterious disappearance of Malaysian Airlines flight MH370. It vanished on the night of 8 March 2014 en route from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing. At the time, the disappearance was headline news worldwide, and the fact that, even now, almost a full year later, there is no sign of it, only compounds the mystery. The MH370 affair has also severely dented the international image that Malaysia was trying to promote as a fast-growing and efficient country. Moreover, it exposed some of the inefficiencies of Malaysia’s administration, such as the lack of transparency in its institutional and political set-up, as well as the absence of an efficient official communication strategy. It also gave rise to many disturbing doubts about the political system as a whole. Although, given the absolute mystery that surrounds the case, no clear-cut convincing explanation of what happened has yet been formulated, the whole episode gave way to a general mood of suspicion and accusations, both internally and abroad. At the domestic level, the issue exacerbated the climate of conflict and suspicion that had been generated by the Anwar saga. At the international level, it has proven embarrassing to the Malaysian government, and it has caused diplomatic tension with China, since many of MH370’s passengers were Chinese. Moreover, the rumour-mill has been working overtime, giving rise to media stories that the disappearance is somehow linked to Islamist terrorism.

What we know is this: The plane took off at 00:41 Malaysian time on 8 March 2014. For the first half an hour of its flight to Beijing, radar recorded nothing wrong in MH370’s flight-path, nor in its altitude. At around 1:08, MH370’s flight deck acknowledged their handover from Kuala Lumpur radar to the Ho Chi Minh Area Control Centre (ACC). This was the last verbal contact they recorded.[33] The flight crew was now expected to contact the ACC in Ho Chi Minh City as the aircraft passed into Vietnamese airspace. But contact was never made. An attempt to contact the Malaysian airliner through the International Distress Frequency System yielded only a mumbled, indistinct answer.[34] Many calls were then made from different Air Traffic Control Units from 2:39 am until 7:13 am. All went unanswered, but were recorded by communication satellites. Kuala Lumpur radar recorded the last ‘normal’ signal from MH370 at 1:21 am. Then, the flight disappeared from Malaysian civil radar. At around the same time, the flight was recorded missing by Ho Chi Minh City radar. Air traffic control radar relies on signals emanating from an airplane’s transponder. After 1:21, no more signals came from MH370’s transponder.[35] This meant that MH370’s transponder had either malfunctioned or had been deliberately switched off.

Military radar, which does not rely on transponder signals, now joined in the search. This indicated that, soon after losing contact with civil air traffic control, the plane had turned sharply westward. It passed over Penang Island at a much lower altitude than when it had lost civil radar contact.[36]The last tracking of the flight by Malaysian military radar traced it back to the Malacca Strait around 200 Nautical Miles (370 km) off of the coast northwest of Penang. After that, only Thai radar could track the flight for a short period. This confirmed that it was headed northwest, on a completely different route from its flight-plan. Probably, flight MH370 ventured over Sumatra, although Indonesian authorities deny tracking the plane at any stage.[37]

At 7:24 am on 8 March 2014, after many futile attempts by air traffic controllers of Vietnam, Cambodia, and even China, to locate the missing jet, Malaysian Airlines issued a statement to the media saying that contact with MH370 had been lost at 2:40 am, Malaysian time.[38] The search was then resumed.

Only on March 24th, after 16 days of unsuccessful searching, did Malaysian authorities admit that the flight was now considered lost and that all passengers and crew on board MH370 were presumed dead. Prime Minister Najib Razak now issued a short statement to the media,[39] and Malaysian Airlines sent a text message offering condolences to the victims’ families.

At the beginning of April, after searching over a wide and watery area from the Anadaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal to western Australia, the multinational search effort – which, by then, had became the largest and most expensive in history – eventually limited their focus to a 60,000 km2search area in the Southern Indian Ocean, around 1,200 km west of Australia. In this area – which had been identified through an analysis of the possible flight paths – four unconfirmed signals were detected by some ships between 6 and 8 of April, after which the airplane’s distress beacon’s batteries were likely to have been dead. The underwater search of this area began on 5 October 2014 and was planned to last up to 12 months, at an estimated cost of around 41 million Euros. Up to the time of this writing, no trace of MH370 has been found.

In the days following MH370’s disappearance, the international community and the Malaysian government feared that it had been hijacked by Islamist terrorists who intended to either hold it for ransom or utilize it in a 9/11-style attack. However, by the third week of March, these scenarios became untenable. The airplane was nowhere to be found, and the Malaysian authorities went on record contending that it had surely crashed, and that there were no survivors. Nevertheless, the hijacking hypothesis, backed by several international media outlets, refused to entirely die. According to some hypotheses, the flight might have crashed after a fight on board between an indefinite number of hijackers and the crew members or the passengers. Some theorized that the plane might have gone down as a result of an on-board struggle between passengers and terrorist hijackers, such as that which had occurred on 9/11 on United Airlines 93, which had crashed in Shankville, Pennsylvania before it reached its intended target. The news that two passengers on MH370 were travelling on passports stolen in Thailand seemed to lend credence to this theory.[40]Later, it was discovered that the two passengers in question were actually two Iranians who had entered Malaysia using valid Iranian passports at the end of February. The authorities concluded that the two were probably asylum-seekers. Interpol was quick to rule out the possibility that these two Iranians were involved in any terroristic operation.[41]

Later, Malaysian authorities checked the backgrounds of all of the passengers, and similar screenings were conducted by US and Chinese authorities. American involvement in the investigation was probably motivated by the fear that the eventual target of terrorists might be a US military installation, such as Diego Garcia, or other American targets in South East Asia or elsewhere. Involvement by some radical Afghani or Pakistani Jihadi outfits was quickly ruled out. At the same time, the Chinese Government announced on 18 March that it had checked all of the Chinese citizens on flight MH370 and had not found anyone who might possibly have been a member of a terrorist group, such as the Uyghur separatists.

Although no evidence that terrorism caused the flight’s disappearance was uncovered, media sensationalism and other in-depth investigations had a definite impact on Malaysian politics, as well as on Malaysian society as a whole The simple fact that some of the passengers could use fake or stolen passports to board an aircraft in Kuala Lumpur generated sharp criticism from the Malaysian opposition and from within the Malaysian Government as well. Home Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi criticized border officials for allowing the two Iranian passengers with fake passports to pass through security check-points.[42] On the other hand, he engaged in a verbal debate with the Interpol chief over the use of a new Database System. Zahid suggested in parliament that the Interpol database was too slow to work with Malaysian systems, a statement that drew an unusually sharp rebuke from Interpol.[43] Apart from political mud-slinging and the Malaysian Government’s deep embarrassment over the evident flaws in the security system, the hijacking-by-passengers theory was dismissed. The same happened to the hypothesis of a simple malfunction or breakdown. After all, the airliner had continued to fly for several hours after the communication interruption, and there was evidence that the transponder had been deliberately switched off and that the route had deliberately been changed.

Investigators now began to work on a different theory, that MH370’s flight crew was involved. The pilot and co-pilot, in particular, were now subjected to in-depth investigations. The personal lives of the two men, their personal relations, political orientations, and psychological states were subjected to a fine-toothed-comb probe. A new theory, that the pilot or co-pilot had suffered a mental melt-down that had provoked either suicidal feelings or terrorist thoughts now came to the fore. The focus here was especially on the pilot, Zaharie Ahmad Shah. The police searched Zaharie’s house and interrogated his family members and friends. His financial records were seized. In his house, the police found a flight simulator. It was analyzed in-depth by the Malaysian Police, and then sent to the US to be investigated by a team of experts. Although the media claimed that some significant new evidence would be found,[44] nothing unusual ever emerged. Some sources insinuated that Zaharie had committed suicide for personal reasons. These allegations were strongly rejected by Zaharie’s family. Nevertheless, the police could not rule out that a suicidal tendency motivated by personal reasons might lead to an extreme act.

When it was discovered that Zaharie was a staunch Anwar supporter, the Malaysian media hotly debated whether Anwar might have another hypothesis to explain Zaharie’s possible deliberate and suicidal hijacking of MH370. At the beginning, this theory – based only on the simple proximity between the High Court verdict on Anwar Ibrahim and the disappearance of flight MH370 – was later strengthened by the fact that it was discovered that Zaharie Shah was a supporter of Anwar. Zaharie was described as fanatical in his support of Anwar’s PKR, and rumors were circulated that he had been deeply upset by the verdict which overturned Anwar’s acquittal. Later on, it was found that he was well known in party circles and was a close friend of the party vice-president, Sivarasa Rasiah. Speculation circulated that Zaharie’s intent was to down the plane as an extreme act of protest against Anwar’s conviction. Government members and the Malay pro-UMNO press cunningly fuelled these speculations.

This suddenly changed the situation for Anwar. Since the beginning of the story, Anwar had been very sharp in criticizing the government’s work. He had attacked the home minister for the failure of passport controls after the story of the Italian and Austrian fake passports had become public. Then, he criticized the Government for the lack of information and for the failure in its communication strategies. But later, in an interview, he went as far as to insinuate possible Government involvement in the disappearance of the aircraft. Anwar literally said: «[T]he Government knows more than us» because Malaysia has «one of the most sophisticated radar» systems in the world. Then, he stated: «They are privy to most of these missing bits of information critical to our understanding of this mysterious disappearance of MH370», adding that «the realm of possibilities is so vague, I mean, anything can have happened», and «[w]hether they [the authorities] are complicit in a terrorist act, I’m not in a position to comment».[45] These statements understandably caused a storm to break out against Anwar, with politicians belonging to the ruling majority and Malaysian press journalists accusing him of trying to manipulate the truth and exploit the tragedy for political reasons. An anonymous source close to Government was reported by ‘The Telegraph’ as stating: «The international media response, completely condemning Malaysia, is unfair. It’s been partly orchestrated by Malaysia’s opposition».[46] Anwar called for an international committee to take charge of the investigation «to save the image of the country and to save the country»[47].

After details emerged on Zaharie’s political affiliation, Anwar was suddenly forced to move into a defensive posture. At the beginning, he denied having ever met Zaharie. But later, he was forced to admit that he had met Zaharie many times. Anwar tried to hide the fact that the Captain of flight MH370 was a relative of his daughter-in-law. After one day, however, evidence of the relationship emerged, and Anwar admitted the family ties.[48] In a statement on 18 March, he wrote an article on his blog dismissing claims that Zaharie’s political affiliation and family ties had had an influence on the plane’s disappearance.[49] However, media close to the Government continued to ride this hypothesis. The attack on Anwar, especially at a time when he was politically vulnerable, insinuated that his inflammatory speech after the verdict condemning him might have influenced one of his supporters to commit a major terrorist act. In this case, at least a portion of the responsibility has been placed on Anwar.

On 23 June, an official Malaysian police investigation of the disappearance of the aircraft identified the captain as the prime suspect and proved that human intervention was involved. These conclusions, however, were not based on any firm ground, as the black box of the aircraft had not been found, and it probably never will be. Accordingly, there is no proof of Captain Zaharie’s role in the incident, but only hypotheses.

Apart from these speculations, the case of MH370 affected the political debate in Malaysia in another way. The day after the court’s verdict against Anwar, the opposition was getting ready to organize large-scale protests. Then, the news that the Malaysian Airways plane had disappeared put a halt to it. According to Wan Saiful Wan Jan, the chief executive of the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs: «The opposition was certainly planning to capitalize on the verdict against Anwar. But obviously with the disappearance of the plane, that derailed everything. It made Anwar completely disappear from the media».[50]

What has been clear since the beginning of this story was that it was a big setback for Malaysia at a diplomatic level. It was evident from the start that the Malaysian government and the airline released imprecise, inaccurate and incomplete information on the incident. Malaysian authorities were highly criticized by the international media for releasing contradictory information.[51] The lack of transparency was perceived as particularly stinging by Chinese authorities, mainly because 152 passengers of the total of 239 on board of the aircraft were Chinese citizens. Criticism was expressed on many occasions by the Chinese official Xinhua News Agency, and later, by the Chinese Foreign Minister, Xie Hangsheng. On 25 March, Chinese president Xi Jinping said he was planning to send a special envoy to Malaysia to consult with the local authorities over some unclear issues relating to the missing airplane.[52]

Relatives of the Chinese victims organized protests in Beijing in front of the Malaysian embassy on the same day, and they started a call for a boycott of Malaysian goods, demanding more transparency from the Malaysian government and demanding an official explanation of the poor initial handling of the disaster. The boycott was successful. In the following weeks, Malaysia registered a 50% drop in Chinese tourists, while bookings of Chinese citizens on Malaysian Airlines went down by 60%, resulting in a big financial loss for the company. Ironically, 2014 was the ‘Malaysian China Friendship Year’, designed to celebrate 40 years of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Tensions were still evident in May, when Najib visited Beijing to commemorate the anniversary. Chinese social media sharply criticized Najib’s decision not to visit any family members of the missing flight’s passengers. Even Chinese officials, who officially praised the ‘friendship’ between the two countries during Najib’s visit, found it necessary in their speeches to press Malaysia to continue to search for the truth regarding the missing airplane.

Notwithstanding, even during the chaotic search for flight MH370, China tempered the impact of the incident on China-Malaysia relations. Despite the domestic furor over the issue, Beijing ultimately limited its official response to a delay in the transfer of two giant pandas to a Malaysian zoo. Later, the Chinese Ambassador in Malaysia tried to minimize the impact of the MH370 case on Sino-Malaysian relations, saying: «[The ] radical and irresponsible opinions (of the Chinese relatives) [did] not represent the views of [the] Chinese people and the Chinese government».[53]At the same time, the Ambassador criticized the Western press for having «published false news, stoked conflict and even spread rumors»[54] to create problems in Sino-Malaysian relations.

The fact is that Malaysia is considered an important strategic partner in Beijing’s dialogue with ASEAN. Furthermore, China has a territorial dispute with Malaysia, similar to those Beijing has with other South East Asian countries. The Southern Spratly Islands are an archipelago of around 700 non-populated islands and atolls off of Borneo’s coastline, which are claimed by both China and Malaysia in a dispute that also involves Vietnam and the Philippines. In March 2013, four Chinese warships held an amphibious exercise in the waters near the islands. Kuala Lumpur reacted with an official protest to Beijing. In February 2014, the Chinese navy sent three other warships to exercise in the same place.[55] This was a kind of wake up call for Malaysia. Since then, Malaysia has begun a dialogue with the Philippines and Vietnam over the disputes in the South China Sea. Even so, Kuala Lumpur has no interest in fuelling the conflict with China over these islands. As a multi-racial State, Malaysia does not want to increase the ethnic gulf within its own population, at least not for an international issue. Furthermore, China is a powerful and important trade partner. Malaysia’s political elite has not yet been willing to completely abandon its traditional friendly approach to China, especially if there are economic benefits involved.

However, the MH370 affair seems to have put some changes in the bilateral Kuala Lumpur-Beijing relationship into motion. In April, at the apex of the MH370 diplomatic rift with China, Barack Obama visited Malaysia, receiving a very warm welcome. The American president signed an accord with Najib that elevated the American relationship with Malaysia to a «comprehensive strategic partnership», the same status given to China in 2013. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that Malaysia is one of the 12 countries that are involved in the TPP (Trans Pacific Partnership) negotiation, a treaty proposed by the US in a clear attempt to limit Chinese influence in the Asia-Pacific area.[56] In any case, a slow change of alignment in Malaysian foreign policy had probably begun to take place before the MH370 tragedy. Signals of a new partnership with Japan also emerged during the two visits to Kuala Lumpur of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2013. Indeed, the increasing Chinese presence in the South China Sea and Chinese claims over the Spratly Islands had possibly worried Kuala Lumpur long before the disappearance of the aircraft. In fact, if Malaysian foreign policy is going to change, this obviously will not happen because of flight MH370. Nevertheless, the MH370 affair has generated diplomatic rifts and has placed Malaysia at the centre of such a highly politicized issue that some media have described the whole sequence of events as the «geopolitics of MH370».[57]

The case of MH370 has slowly disappeared from the headlines, as another tragedy occurred to a Malaysian Airlines flight. This was the case of flight MH17, which crashed in Eastern Ukraine on 17 July 2014, while en route from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur. Although no clear-cut and undeniable evidence has surfaced related to the dynamics of the event, it is at least clear that the crash was not brought about by either a mechanical failure or a human error. In fact, the Western press immediately espoused the thesis that the plane had been shot down by an air missile that was probably launched by pro-Russian separatists. However, as noted above, at least up to the time when these lines were written, no undeniable evidence supporting this thesis has ever surfaced. The incident created a diplomatic rift between Malaysia and Russia. Also, the fact that Malaysia received solidarity from all over the world helped public opinion worldwide to be diverted from Malaysia’s dismal image of faults and reticence over flight MH370.

Il 2014 è stato un anno molto particolare per la Malaysia. Il governo di Najib Razak, confermato nelle elezioni politiche del 2013, nonostante la consistente erosione del consenso popolare si è apprestato ad affrontare le riforme a lungo ventilate e rimandate negli ultimi anni, prima fra tutte l’introduzione di una Goods and Service Tax. Nel 2015 l’economia malaysiana à cresciuta a ritmo sostenuto ed il deficit si è ridotto come previsto dal governo negli obiettivi enunciati nel 2013. L’opposizione, al contrario, dopo il grande sforzo che l’aveva portata nel 2013 ad ottenere la maggioranza del voto popolare ma a perdere comunque le elezioni per via dell’iniqua struttura delle circoscrizioni elettorali, si è dovuta confrontare con le crescenti divisioni al suo interno. Queste hanno trovato espressione in particolare nella sostituzione del Menteri Besar (primo ministro) dell’importante stato del Selangor, frutto di un aspro conflitto interno tra le sue diverse anime, conflitto in cui sono prepotentemente emerse le divisioni presenti in uno schieramento composito e potenzialmente disunito.

Due episodi hanno però contribuito in modo decisivo a caratterizzare il 2015 in Malaysia, verificatisi a distanza di meno di 24 ore l’uno dall’altro. Il 7 marzo 2014 l’Alta Corte di Kuala Lumpur ha annullato l’assoluzione di Anwar Ibrahim nel famigerato caso che lo vedeva accusato di sodomia. La decisione in questione prospetta la possibilità che le porte del carcere si riaprano per il principale leader dell’opposizione, scrivendo un nuovo capitolo nella saga apparentemente senza fine che lo vede contrapposto da anni alla magistratura. Nelle prime ore del giorno 8 marzo 2014, un aereo della Malaysian Airlines, impegnato nell’espletare il volo MH370, è misteriosamente e improvvisamente scomparso dai radar, suscitando apprensione in tutto il mondo. Dopo alcuni giorni, le autorità hanno dichiarato che il velivolo era certamente precipitato e che passeggeri ed equipaggio erano da considerarsi tutti deceduti. L’intera vicenda è subito apparsa misteriosa quanto inquietante. Da più parti si sono levate forti critiche e dubbi per la gestione da parte delle autorità malaysiane dell’intera vicenda. Il caso del volo MH370 ha aperto contrasti diplomatici in particolare con la Cina ed ha avuto ripercussioni anche nel dibattito politico interno, andando a surriscaldare un clima politico già arroventato dalla sentenza sul caso Anwar Ibrahim. L’intera vicenda ha aperto la strada a sospetti, dietrologie e accuse, ma ha anche sviato in modo decisivo l’attenzione dell’opinione pubblica dalla vicenda personale e politica di Anwar.

 

1. Premessa

In un’era di crescenti tensioni geopolitiche a livello internazionale, nel 2014 l’Indonesia affrontava un vasto processo elettorale che, non senza ostacoli, si concludeva in aprile con l’elezione democratica del nuovo presidente della repubblica, Joko Widodo (Jokowi). Per la prima volta, dalla fine del regime di Suharto, acquisiva la carica più importante dello stato una persona le cui origini erano estranee all’élite politica ereditata dal regime. Per questo motivo, l’elezione di Joko Widodo rappresentava sia un cambiamento radicale nella politica indonesiana post Suharto[1] e sia il consolidamento delle forme di rappresentanza democratica. Il presente capitolo è pertanto focalizzato sull’analisi della campagna elettorale e delle dinamiche che hanno portato alla vittoria di Jokowi. Alla trattazione di questi temi farà seguito l’analisi delle conseguenze politiche ed economiche delle elezioni.

2. Le elezioni legislative del 2014

Il 2014 si apriva con la preparazione del quarto appuntamento elettorale dell’Indonesia democratica dalla caduta del regime di Suharto. Il 6 aprile erano previste le elezioni legislative e, dopo, tre mesi, a luglio, le elezioni presidenziali.

Nei quindici anni di democratizzazione, due caratteristiche avevano accompagnato l’evoluzione politica indonesiana: l’assenza di dibattito ideologico tra i partiti e l’estrema personalizzazione della politica. Questi due fenomeni, alimentati dai mezzi di comunicazione di massa, che esaltavano le caratteristiche personali dei candidati, avevano contribuito a porre l’elezione legislativa in secondo piano rispetto all’elezione presidenziale. Di conseguenza, la campagna elettorale del 2014 si è incentrata sulle elezioni presidenziali e sulla personalità dei candidati, mentre poca attenzione veniva data ai partiti che avrebbero concorso nell’elezione legislativa.

Il 6 aprile, circa 185 milioni di indonesiani sono stati chiamati alle urne per votare i nuovi 692 rappresentanti nel parlamento nazionale, il Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR). L’MPR, infatti, è composto da 560 membri della Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR), la camera dei rappresentanti del popolo, e da 132 membri della Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD), la camera dei rappresentanti regionali. Oltre ai rappresentanti del governo centrale, lo stesso giorno, l’elettorato indonesiano è stato chiamato a scegliere i propri rappresentanti a livello locale. In totale dovevano essere eletti 2.112 rappresentanti delle assemblee provinciali, le Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah-I (DPRD-I), e 16.895 rappresentanti delle assemblee legislative distrettuali, le Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah-II (DPRD-II).

La legge elettorale indonesiana applicata a partire dal 2004 favorisce il mantenimento del potere da parte dell’élite politica esistente e rende difficile l’ingresso di nuove forze politiche attraverso due meccanismi. Il primo prevede che solo i partiti che ottengono almeno il 3,5% dei voti possano avere seggi nell’MPR. Questa soglia era stata incrementata dal 2,5% al 3,5% con un emendamento approvato nel 2012[2]. Il secondo meccanismo, invece, limitava la possibilità che i partiti minori potessero presentare autonomamente un candidato alla presidenza della repubblica. Infatti, tra i partiti presenti nel MPR, solo quelli che avevano ottenuto almeno il 20% dei seggi della DPR e/o il 25% dei voti totali potevano presentare un candidato per l’elezione presidenziale. Questo secondo vincolo, anche se implicitamente, limitava a due o al massimo a tre il numero di potenziali candidati alla carica di presidente. Anche considerando la possibilità dei partiti politici di raggrupparsi in coalizioni per raggiungere il quorum per la presentazione di un candidato, erano comunque i maggiori partiti all’interno di ciascuna coalizione quelli in grado di determinare la scelta del candidato. Non a caso, gli unici tre grandi partiti in grado di ambire al raggiungimento della soglia necessaria a designare un candidato alla presidenza rappresentavano le tre grandi famiglie che dominavano la scena politica indonesiana nell’era democratica[3]. Questi erano il PD (Partai Demokrat) dell’uscente presidente Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, il PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan) della ex presidentessa Megawati e il Golkar guidato dalla famiglia Bakrie, il partito dei gruppi funzionali fondato nel 1964 in opposizione al Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), vero veicolo elettorale del regime di Suharto.

Il 9 aprile 2014, 139,5 milioni di elettori, rappresnentanti l’82,9% dell’elettorato, si recavano alle urne in tutto l’arcipelago indonesiano[4]. Le votazioni si svolgevano nel rispetto dei regolamenti e, esattamente un mese dopo, il 9 maggio, la Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU), la commissione generale delle elezioni, rendeva noti i risultati ufficiali[5]. Dei 12 partiti che avevano partecipato alle elezioni, due non avevano raggiunto il quorum per l’accesso al parlamento, mentre nessuno aveva ottenuto il quorum per presentare, in autonomia, un candidato alle elezioni presidenziali del 7 luglio. Il PDI-P di Megawati conquistava una debole maggioranza (18,95%) al di sotto dei pronostici[6]. La scelta di voler presentare Joko Widodo come candidato del partito alle presidenziali era stata confermata troppo tardi per sortire un risultato decisivo sul voto.

Il Golkar dimostrava di essere ancora la seconda forza politica, conquistando il 14,75% dei voti[7]. Si trattava dell’evidente dimostrazione della persistenza delle forze conservatrici legate al «New Order» di Suharto. [8]

Altre forze conservatrici, legate all’apparato militare, erano quelle che avevano fatto guadagnare voti al Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra) dell’ex comandante delle forze speciali Kopassus, Prabowo Subianto. Il partito di Prabowo, infatti, otteneva l’11,81% dei voti, un risultato quasi tre volte maggiore rispetto alle precedenti elezioni del 2009, che lo portava al terzo posto tra i partiti più votati nel 2014. Questo risultato dimostrava il sostegno alla candidatura di Prabowo da parte dei partiti che volevano bloccare il processo democratico e che intendevano restaurare un regime militare.

L’evidente impopolarità nella quale era sprofondata la figura di Yudhoyono provocava invece la secca sconfitta del PD, che riceveva appena il 10,19% dei voti, meno della metà del risultato ottenuto nel 2009 (quando aveva ottenuto il 20,85% dei voti). Anche due nuovi partiti nati dalla scissione del Golkar, Hanura e Partai NasDem riuscivano ad ottenere seggi in parlamento. Infine quattro partiti islamici – il Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), e i più piccoli Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) e Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) -, pur conquistando una rappresentanza in parlamento ottenevano consensi minori che nel 2009.[9]

Risultati delle elezioni legislative del 2014 e del 2009

Partiti	Percentuale del voto popolare nel 2014	Seggi nel 2014
PDI-P	18,95%	109
Golkar	14,75%	91
Gerindra	11,81%	73
PD	10,19%	61
PAN	7,59%	49
PKB	9,04%	47
PKS	6,79%	40
PPP	6,53%	39
Partai Nasdem	6,72%	35
Hanura	5,26%	16
Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB	1,46%	0
Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia, PKPI	0,91%	0
TOTALE	75,11%	560

Fonti: Keputusan Komisi Pemilihan Umum, Nomor: 411/Kpts/Kpu/Tahun 2014, Tentang; Keputusan Komisi Pemilihan Umum, Nomor: 412/Kpts/Kpu/Tahun 2014, Tentang; http://www.kpu.go.id/

3. Elezioni Presidenziali: l’inizio di una nuova era?

Come già accennato, il sistema elettorale indonesiano prevedeva che solo i partiti o le coalizioni che avessero ottenuto almeno il 25% del totale dei voti o il 20% dei seggi in parlamento potessero presentare un candidato per l’elezione presidenziale. Dal momento che, dopo le elezioni del 6 aprile, nessun singolo partito rispondeva ai requisiti richiesti per presentare un candidato alle presidenziali, all’indomani dell’ufficializzazione dei risultati delle legislative, le forze politiche si sono mosse per formare delle coalizioni.

Le forze conservatrici puntavano sull’ex comandante Prabowo Subianto, che, dopo aver ottenuto l’appoggio del Golkar e dei partiti islamici PAN, PKS e PPP, riusciva a portare dalla sua parte anche il PD. Ultimo a schierarsi, il partito del presidente uscente, Yudhoyono dichiarava solo a giugno di condividere l’agenda politica di Prabowo e, di conseguenza, ufficializzava la candidatura della coppia Prabowo Subianto – Hatta Rajasa per la presidenza e la vice presidenza della repubblica[10].

Tra le forze progressiste, il PDI-P di Megawati ufficializzava, soltanto poco prima delle elezioni legislative, la sua scelta per Joko Widodo.[11] Questo ritardo smorzava l’effetto «volano» sui voti che la nomina di Jokowi avrebbe probabilmente potuto avere.[12] In ogni caso, il PDI-P, osteggiato dalle forze conservatrici, trovava l’alleanza con i nuovi partiti nati dalla scissione del Golkar, Partai NasDem e Hanura, oltre che del partito tradizionalista islamico PKB. Per la prima volta dopo le votazioni del 2004 e del 2009, quindi, lo schieramento politico si polarizzava solo su due candidati. Da un lato Jokowi, persona ritenuta incorruttibile e vicina al popolo, dall’altra Prabowo, figlio dell’oligarchia al potere durante l’era di Suharto, personaggio poco attento al rispetto dei diritti umani, nazionalista e legato a doppia mandata all’esercito.

Prabowo, sostenuto dalle forze conservatrici, riusciva a formare una coalizione fra partiti che avevano raccolto la maggioranza del voto popolare (59,12%). Questa coalizione prendeva il nome di Koalisi Merah Putih, coalizione rosso-bianca, dai colori della bandiera indonesiana. La speranza del candidato conservatore era quella che la maggioranza del voto popolare andata ai partiti che lo candidavano si traducesse in una maggioranza del voto popolare per la propria candidatura, nonostante la popolarità di Jokowi. La campagna elettorale di Prabowo, oltre ad esaltare le sue qualità di leader e a mettere in evidenza la componente islamica della sua coalizione, era mirata a minare la popolarità di Jokowi. Nonostante ciò e nonostante una campagna elettorale del PDI-P molto meno strutturata di quella degli avversari, la popolarità del giovane riformatore Jokowi è riuscita ad attrarre voti anche tra gli elettori dei partiti della coalizione che sosteneva Prabowo. Il 22 luglio 2014 la KPU annunciava la vittoria della coppia Joko Widodo e Jusuf Kalla con oltre il 53% dei voti contro il 46,8% della coppia Prabowo Subianto e Hatta Rajasa[13]. L’annuncio ufficiale non fermava però Prabowo, che iniziava una campagna di disinformazione, affermando che gli esiti delle votazioni erano state falsati da pesanti brogli elettorali, cosa che rendeva la vittoria di Jokowi del tutto illegittima.[14] Nonostante l’accanimento dalla campagna diffamatoria del candidato sconfitto, la corte costituzionale indonesiana vi poneva termine in modo decisivo, confermando con una votazione unanime la legittimità della vittoria di Joko Widodo[15]

Il 20 ottobre 2014 Joko Widodo assumeva infine la carica di presidente della repubblica. La sua vittoria rappresentava un netto segnale di cambiamento nella politica indonesiana. L’elettorato, stanco di essere rappresentato dai soliti nomi, aveva dimostrato di preferire una persona nuova, che, come Joko Widodo, non avesse legami né con il passato regime, né con l’esercito. La sua vittoria, inoltre, dimostrava il consolidamento di due processi politici: il primo era il carattere fortemente personale della politica indonesiana, ovvero il legame fortissimo tra l’elettorato e i personaggi politici, indipendentemente dal partito di appartenenza;[16] il secondo dimostrava la lungimiranza di una parte dell’élite politica che aveva visto nella popolarità di Jokowi l’elemento vincente per le elezioni del 2014.

Joko Widodo doveva la sua popolarità innanzi tutto alle umili origini della sua famiglia. Figlio di un venditore di legno nella città di Solo, in Giava centrale, era poi riuscito ad entrare in politica con il PDI-P, fino ad essere eletto, nel 2005, sindaco di Solo[17]. Da allora la sua popolarità era cresciuta grazie alle politiche riformiste da lui attuate nella propria città. Il sostegno ai poveri ed alle piccole imprese gli aveva dato un enorme consenso popolare che gli aveva permesso di vincere il secondo mandato di sindaco di Solo con oltre il 90% dei voti[18]. Compreso il carisma di Jokowi, il PDI-P lo aveva presentato come candidato alle elezioni governative di Giacarta, dove la sua fama si era già diffusa. Governatore della capitale dal 2012, Jokowi aveva continuato a portare avanti la sua politica a favore dei poveri. Questo particolare atteggiamento, unito alle sue origini popolari, l’aveva reso tanto famoso a livello nazionale da renderlo, appunto, un ottimo candidato per le elezioni presidenziali.

Tuttavia, la presidenza di Jokowi si avviava con evidenti debolezze, prima fra tutte, la minoranza parlamentare della coalizione che lo appoggiava. La coalizione avversa, capeggiata da Prabowo, deteneva infatti il 63% dei seggi, ciò che la metteva in condizione di bloccare il programma politico di Jokowi. Dal canto suo, Jokowi, nella sua condizione di “presidente di opposizione”, non poteva neppure bloccare coi soli parlamentari della sua coalizione il programma politico della coalizione rosso-bianca. In passato, in seguito alle elezioni del 2004, una simile situazione si era risolta col pragmatico passaggio del Golkar alla coalizione di Yudhoyono, permettendo così alla coalizione del PD di poter governare stabilmente il paese. Nel 2014, tuttavia, la coalizione rosso-bianca non dava segnali di voler aiutare Jokowi. Al contrario, le forze conservatrici sfruttavano la maggioranza parlamentare per varare in tutta fretta alcune riforme a garanzia del mantenimento dello status quo. Nel settembre 2014, per esempio, la maggioranza riusciva a far passare una legge per l’abolizione dell’elezione diretta dei rappresentanti amministrativia livello locale.[19] Con questa riforma la coalizione di Subianto toglieva alla popolazione il potere di eleggere direttamente i propri rappresentanti locali restituendo tale potere alle legislature regionali come avveniva prima del 2005. Dal 2005 infatti, il cosiddetto Pilkada system consentiva che i rappresentanti amministrativi a livello locale venissero eletti direttamente dall’elettorato. Era proprio questo sistema che aveva permesso a Jokowi di percorrere una carriera politica che lo aveva portato dal municipio di Solo alla presidenza della Repubblica. Se da una parte il Pilkada system comportava maggiori costi ed una proliferazione delle autorità locali, dall’altra aveva portato notevoli benefici alla democratizzazione del sistema politico a livello locale, costringendo i candidati a rivolgersi all’elettorato locale.[20]

Oltre a dover fare i conti con la maggioranza della coalizione rosso-bianca, Jokowi doveva anche difendersi dalle influenze conservatrici provenienti dalla sua stessa coalizione, a partire dal PDI-P, il suo maggiore supporto politico. La nomina dei ministri, per esempio, avveniva con indubbie tensioni tra Jokowi e la coppia Megawati – Jusuf Kalla.[21] La figlia di Megawati, Puan Maharani, infatti, veniva nominata ministro della Cultura e dello Sviluppo umano,[22] pur avendo accettato a fatica la scelta di Jokowi come candidato del PDI-P per la presidenza. L’ambiziosa figlia di Megawati, infatti, considerava il partito una proprietà della famiglia.

Oltre al PDI-P, altre forze all’interno della coalizione di Jokowi avevano forti legami con l’élite politica del regime e non vedevano di buon occhio i programmi riformisti del neo presidente. I fondatori dei partiti Hanura e NasDem, infatti – rispettivamente l’ex comandante delle forze armate Wiranto e Surya Paloh -, facevano parte dell’élite politica del regime di Suharto.[23] Inoltre, per compensare la campagna di Prabowo, che lo dipingeva come cristiano, Jokowi aveva stretto alleanza col PKB, in modo da ottenere i voti dell’elettorato musulmano. Vale la pena ricordare che il PKB era un partito islamico tradizionalista che, nelle precedenti legislature, aveva partecipato alle coalizioni conservatrici.

Infine, Jokowi aveva coinvolto sia nella sua squadra di consiglieri nel periodo di transizione,[24] sia nel suo governo, alte figure della gerarchia militare che incarnavano l’eredità del regime. Abdullah Mahmud Hendropriyono, ex comandante dei servizi segreti, veniva incluso nella squadra di transizione nell’agosto 2014, mentre l’ex gerarca militare Ryamizard Ryacudu veniva nominato ministro della Difesa. Queste scelte sollevavano preoccupazioni in certi ambienti della società civile. Harris Azhar, direttore esecutivo della Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan (Kontras), Commissione per le persone scomparse e le vittime di violenza, una delle ONG più importanti dell’Indonesia, metteva in guardia Jokowi, richiamandolo alla necessità di mantenere il proprio profilo di riformista incorruttibile, al fine di non perdere l’unico vero alleato che aveva: l’elettorato indonesiano.[25]

4. La sfida economica del nuovo presidente

Il nuovo presidente entrava in carica dopo un lungo stallo nelle scelte di politica economica da parte del suo predecessore, Yudhoyono. L’ex presidente, infatti, nonostante che nelle sue due campagne elettorali avesse promesso programmi di riforme per snellire la struttura economica e farla decollare, non aveva fatto nulla durante l’ultimo mandato per sviluppare una strategia di crescita.

L’instaurazione del nuovo governo, il 20 ottobre 2014, portava così una ventata positiva nell’economia indonesiana. Nonostante che, dopo la crisi del 1998, si sia registrata una progressiva crescita del prodotto interno lordo (PIL), la mancanza di riforme del secondo mandato del governo di Yudhoyono aveva portato ad un graduale rallentamento dell’espansione economica. Le previsioni di crescita del PIL per il 2014 venivano ulteriormente riviste verso il basso, dal 5,2% al 5,1%, a fine anno .[26] Questo ribasso era particolarmente significativo, se comparato ai tassi di crescita registrati gli anni precedenti: +6,5% nel 2011; +6,3% nel 2012; +5,8% nel 2013.[27]

L’assenza di riforme strutturali durante il governo di Yudhoyono era però stata compensata principalmente da due fattori che avevano mantenuto, per inerzia, un buon tasso di crescita del PIL. Questi erano, da un lato, le dimensioni del mercato interno, con oltre 252 milioni di abitanti, capace di garantire una costante domanda di beni di consumo; dall’altro, un costo molto competitivo della forza lavoro rispetto alla media dei paesi dell’area del Sud-est asiatico. Quest’ultimo fattore aveva favorito un notevole flusso di investimenti esteri diretti nel paese.[28]

Con l’obiettivo di aiutare gli strati poveri e la classe media, stimolando di conseguenza la crescita del mercato interno, il governo Yudhoyono aveva mantenuto una politica di sussidio sui carburanti. La politica di sussidio ai carburanti era iniziata in Indonesia a seguito della prima crisi petrolifera degli anni Settanta. Con questa politica il governo aveva fissato e mantenuto il prezzo dei carburanti ad un livello molto più basso del prezzo di mercato. Una quota del bilancio statale veniva quindi spesa per coprire la differenza tra il prezzo amministrativo e quello di mercato. Nel 2012 il prezzo di mercato della benzina era in media di 1,01 dollari al litro, mentre quello amministrativo era di circa 0,47 dollari per litro.[29] In totale la spesa per il sussidio dei carburanti, solo nel 2012, ammontava a circa 21 miliardi di dollari, ovvero il 21% del bilancio del governo centrale indonesiano.[30] Nel corso degli anni, il rapido sviluppo del mercato interno e il conseguente aumento della domanda di carburante aveva portato ad un incremento insostenibile della spesa pubblica. Sul lungo termine, la politica del sussidio ai carburanti, unita all’assenza di riforme in grado di reperire fondi per le opere infrastrutturali necessarie al paese per trasformarsi da un’economia di esportazione di risorse naturali ad un’economia di esportazione di prodotti lavorati, aveva portato a effetti negativi.

Di conseguenza, il 18 novembre 2014, Jokowi annunciava il taglio dei sussidi ai carburanti. Nei giorni successivi i prezzi della benzina e del gasolio aumentavano di oltre il 30%,[31] con un aumento di 2.000 rupie, pari a 0,16 dollari al litro.[32] Il taglio nei sussidi del carburante non era una sorpresa, in quanto parte integrante dell’agenda di politica economica di Jokowi.[33]Nonostante ciò, la popolazione reagiva con proteste e scioperi, mentre i mercati finanziari davano invece segnali positivi. In effetti, secondo stime ufficiali, il taglio ai sussidi avrebbe comportato, nel solo 2015, un risparmio di circa 120 mila miliardi di rupie (US$ 9,8 miliardi), che sarebbero stati reinvestiti nei settori produttivi.

Sulla base delle manovre decise dal nuovo governo, nel dicembre 2014 la Banca Mondiale rivedeva verso l’alto le sue stime sull’andamento macroeconomico dell’Indonesia, dal 5.1% nel 2014 al 5,6% nel 2015.[34]

5. I movimenti radicali islamici nella nuova Indonesia di Jokowi.

Nonostante che, dopo il 2002, non ci fossero più stati attentati terroristici di matrice islamica, il fondamentalismo islamico non era del tutto scomparso dall’arcipelago. Esistevano, infatti, ancora gruppi paramilitari che potevano vantare consensi e complicità nei livelli più alti delle istituzioni governative e che, grazie a queste complicità, potevano attaccare impunemente, in nome della legge islamica, i gruppi religiosi minoritari, come i cristiani e gli Ahmadiyya.[35] Nell’anno sotto esame, mentre le tensioni provocate dall’estremismo islamico tornavano a farsi sentire a livello globale, il nuovo governo indonesiano si trovava a fronteggiare le violenze, giustificate nel nome della ferrea applicazione della shari‘a, da parte di uno dei più noti gruppi radicali islamici del paese, formatosi durante la caduta del regime nel 1998, il Front Pembela Islam (FPI, “Fronte di difesa dell’islàm”).[36]

L’FPI si era costituito inizialmente a Giacarta e nella parte occidentale dell’isola di Giava, per poi diffondersi nel corso degli anni, affiancando, accorpando o sostituendosi a gruppi radicali islamici esistenti nelle varie regioni dell’arcipelago indonesiano. Strutturato come forza paramilitare, l’FPI, agendo in nome del rispetto della shari‘a, da un lato faceva oggetto di veri e propri attentati terroristici i membri delle minoranze religiose e, dall’altro, intimidiva con azioni violente anche la maggioranza musulmana. Durante le ore del giorno, nel mese del ramadan, anche i venditori di strada di cibo e di bevande erano diventati un bersaglio dell’FPI.[37] Nonostante che queste azioni fossero contro la legge e in fondamentale contrasto con quella libertà di espressione religiosa che era uno dei pilastri della Pancasila (la fondazione filosofica ufficiale dello stato indonesiano), né le due maggiori organizzazioni musulmane dell’Indonesia, la Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) e la Muhammadiyah, né la polizia e l’esercito, né, tanto meno, il governo avevano mai preso posizione contro l’operato dell’FPI. Tale silenzio non poteva che dimostrare il tacito assenso sia delle istituzioni musulmane sia di quelle pubbliche per l’operato dell’FPI. Se da una parte la NU non accompagnava le violenze di strada dei membri dell’FPI, dall’altra i suoi vertici non ne criticavano le violenze. Questo confermava anche le tesi basate su documenti pubblicati da WikiLeaks, dai quali si evinceva l’appoggio istituzionale della polizia agli atti di violenza dei paramilitari del FPI.[38] Nonostante che fosse risaputo che l’FPI si autofinanziava con atti di estorsione ai danni di nightclub e dei bar di Giacarta, questa non era di certo l’unica fonte di finanziamento dell’organizzazione.[39]Ancora una volta, dunque, come all’epoca dei massacri dei membri del partito comunista indonesiano tra il 1965 e il 1966, le forze islamiche radicali venivano usate come mano d’opera da parte delle forze militari e di polizia con l’appoggio o il mandato dell’élite politica conservatrice indonesiana.

Il fatto che l’FPI si fosse particolarmente sviluppato e diffuso a partire dal 2004 dimostrava il tacito consenso della presidenza Yudhoyono all’operato di tale organizzazione. L’ex presidente, infatti, spinto dal timore di perdere l’appoggio dell’elettorato musulmano, aveva evitato di condannare o di dichiarare fuori legge l’organizzazione. In questa situazione, l’influenza dell’FPI si era dimostrata particolarmente forte perfino nella capitale, come dimostrato dal fatto che, nel maggio 2012, tale organizzazione era riuscita a vietare lo svolgimento di un concerto della cantante pop statunitense Lady Gaga a Giacarta.[40] Il fatto aveva avuto una notevole risonanza nei media di tutto il mondo ed era stato giustificato dalla polizia indonesiana in base alla necessità di «preservare la cultura della nazione», come dichiarato dall’ispettore capo della polizia di Giacarta, il Generale Untung S. Rajab.[41]

Una possibile svolta per quanto riguarda la capacità di intimidazione dell’FPI è stata rappresentata dall’elezione di Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, il 14 novembre 2014, come nuovo governatore di Giacarta, succeduto a Joko Widodo. Il neo governatore, nato in una famiglia di origini cinesi di fede cristiana, veniva subito criticato da parte dell’FPI per il fatto di non essere musulmano. In risposta, Ahok, come veniva soprannominato il neo governatore, dichiarava la necessità di porre fine all’esistenza di tale organizzazione, chiedendone lo scioglimento al governo centrale.[42]

Con l’acuirsi del pericolo di attentati a sfondo religioso, il nuovo governo doveva dunque prendere una posizione chiara sull’annosa questione della libertà di religione, un pilastro che – come si è già accennato – è, da sempre, alla base dell’ideologia della pancasila, sulla quale si fonda l’idea di nazione indonesiana. In questo contesto bisogna anche sottolineare che, come rivelato dalla Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT), l’agenzia nazionale indonesiana del contro terrorismo, negli ultimi mesi del 2014 veniva registrato un allarmante aumento nel supporto all’IS, il sedicente stato islamico capeggiato dall’autonominato califfo al-Baghdadi, con un forte aumento di cittadini indonesiani imbarcatisi per raggiungere la Siria o l’Iraq.[43]

Sebbene Jokowi avesse portato una ventata positiva nel processo di rafforzamento delle istituzioni democratiche, tuttavia la maggioranza delle strutture del governo centrale era rimasta nelle mani dei poteri conservatori, legati ai militari ed alle forze di polizia. Anche sul tema del radicalismo islamico la lotta doveva essere giocata tra Jokowi, il nuovo presidente riformatore, popolare e democratico, e la nuova maggioranza conservatrice del parlamento indonesiano.

L’anno si concludeva con il nuovo governo in carica da appena due mesi, un lasso di tempo troppo breve perché fosse possibile esprimere un giudizio sulla capacità o meno di Jokowi di rompere le resistenze del vecchio regime. Solo il futuro avrebbe potuto rivelare la capacità d’incidenza del nuovo presidente sui temi caldi della politica economica, della politica estera, dei diritti umani, della libertà di stampa e del trattamento delle minoranze etnico-religiose. In questa prospettiva, particolarmente importante rimaneva la questione dello status delle province periferiche del Papua Occidentale, a cui i governi indonesiani dell’era democratica avevano negato libertà civili.

2014 was election year in Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim country and the most populated in South East Asia. More than 250 million people were called to vote for more than 235.000 candidates in the national, regional and local elections across the archipelago. The 2014 elections were the fourth since Suharto’s fall in 1999, a period of democratic transition which, however, has hitherto been dominated by political forces strictly linked with Suharto’s old “new order” regime. In 2014, however, for the very first time, the front runner for the presidential elections, Joko Widodo, was a politician without any personal connections with the Suharto era. The ensuing electoral campaign was dominated by the presidential election, seen both as the most important among the many electoral races and a decisive contest between the old Suharto-related political élites and the representatives of a completely new pro-democratic political front.

After a long and harshly contested electoral campaign, the pro-democratic forces won the presidential election thanks to Joko Widodo’s popularity. Nevertheless the conservative forces, headed by former army general Prabowo Subianto, conquered a parliamentary majority, potentially able to halt the reformist presidential agenda. While Widodo’s victory represents a break with Suharto’s “new order” legacy, the fact remains that the conservative political forces seemed to have become stronger than during the mandates of Widodo’s predecessor and, accordingly, fully ready to face Widodo’s challenge. Hence, Indonesia’s political future cannot but be the result of a harshly contested political struggle which, at the end of the year under review, appeared to be in the offing.

 

1. Premessa

Il 2014, che avrebbe dovuto rappresentare la definitiva consacrazione della presidente sudcoreana Park Geun-hye, si è invece rivelato come uno spartiacque in negativo per la sua presidenza, complici alcuni disastri nazionali, fra cui la tragedia del traghetto Sewol. In seguito a questi disastri emergevano in maniera ancora più clamorosa radicate pratiche negative: corruzione, collusione tra privati e funzionari pubblici, scarso funzionamento di alcuni meccanismi di controllo. Nel complesso, questi avvenimenti hanno messo in evidenza le difficoltà di Park sia nella gestione delle emergenze e sia nella lotta contro la corruzione sommersa, con conseguente calo dei consensi nell’opinione pubblica.

In Corea del nord, uno degli eventi chiave era invece rappresentato dalle elezioni per l’assemblea suprema del popolo (ASP), le prime dopo la successione fra Kim Jong-il e Kim Jong-un, utili per valutare gli assetti di potere del regime nordcoreano. Inoltre, poiché sulle schede era presente un solo candidato, tale appuntamento veniva utilizzato come una sorta di «censimento» politico della popolazione, utile per verificarne l’ubicazione esatta, ma soprattutto per testarne il livello di fedeltà al regime. Dal punto di vista delle dinamiche di potere, si trattava del primo evento in cui si sarebbe concretizzata la guida del nuovo leader, dopo le epurazioni degli anni precedenti. In realtà, non avevano luogo grossi cambiamenti nella composizione del parlamento. L’anziano Kim Yong-nam veniva confermato alla presidenza del Presidium – l’organo ristretto che fa le veci dell’assemblea quando essa non è in seduta – mentre Park Pong-ju manteneva la carica di primo ministro. Alla guida del ministero degli Esteri veniva invece nominato Ri Su-yong, ex ambasciatore in Svizzera durante gli anni in cui il nuovo leader vi si trovava per motivi di studio. Ri, nel corso dell’anno, assumeva un rilievo sempre maggiore, grazie al grande attivismo diplomatico che contrassegnava la politica estera del paese. Altrettanto interessante, per quanto attiene alla ripartizione del potere a Pyongyang, era l’avanzamento di altri due personaggi sotto la guida di Kim Jong-un, ovvero Choe Ryong-hae e Hwang Pyong-so.

Relativamente alle relazioni intercoreane, dopo un parziale disgelo contrassegnato dai ricongiungimenti familiari all’inizio dell’anno, esse si assestavano, come di consueto, su un’altalena di alti e bassi, di aperture clamorose (come la visita all’«ultimo minuto» di una delegazione composta dai più alti dignitari del regime nordcoreano a sud, in occasione della cerimonia di chiusura degli Asian Games a Incheon) e rapidi irrigidimenti delle rispettive posizioni.

Sotto il profilo delle relazioni internazionali, a sud si consolidava una linea di tendenza già avviata durante il primo anno di mandato di Park, che vedeva una diplomazia molto attiva compensare in buona parte i rovesci sul fronte interno. Tra le varie visite ufficiali che vedevano impegnata la presidente sudcoreana, tutte più o meno guidate da una matrice economica, di particolare rilevanza appariva quella effettuata in Asia centrale, che contribuiva a rafforzare l’«iniziativa euroasiatica». Quest’ultima era stata proposta dalla presidente nell’ottobre del 2013, nel discorso di apertura alla conferenza internazionale sulla cooperazione globale nell’era dell’Eurasia, tenutasi a Seoul. Nel frattempo, continuava, e anzi sembrava rafforzarsi, il sodalizio con Pechino, contrassegnato dalla «storica» visita di Xi Jinping a Seoul, la quale, per la verità, contribuiva a fare emergere anche alcuni limiti dell’alleanza; i rapporti con il Giappone, invece, per quanto sempre molto tesi, vedevano qualche piccolo segnale di disgelo, con grande sollievo di Washington, che alla fine dell’anno incassava una grande «vittoria». Il 29 dicembre 2014, infatti, veniva siglato un accordo per lo scambio di informazioni militari tra gli Stati Uniti e i suoi due principali alleati asiatici: Giappone e Corea del sud. La firma giungeva in un particolare momento di rinnovata tensione con la Corea del nord, accusata dall’FBI di aver orchestrato gli attacchi hacker ai sistemi informatici della Sony Pictures, nel tentativo (inizialmente riuscito) di bloccare l’uscita della commedia satirica sul leader nordcoreano, The Interview. Nel corso dell’anno in esame, anche il Nord registrava un insolito attivismo diplomatico che vedeva tra i suoi protagonisti, oltre al nuovo ministro degli Esteri Ri Su-yong, anche il segretario per gli affari internazionali del Partito dei lavoratori coreano (PLC), Kang Song-ju, e il presidente del Presidium del parlamento, Kim Yong-nam. Ri, a settembre, effettuava una visita di 10 giorni in Europa, recandosi in Belgio, Svizzera, Germania e Italia, mentre Kim, a fine ottobre, partiva per una missione in Africa, visitando Etiopia, Sudan e Congo. Le motivazioni che contribuivano a spiegare quella che alcuni osservatori hanno battezzato «offensiva dello charm» o «offensiva della pace» erano sostanzialmente due: da un lato, aprire una breccia nell’isolamento internazionale del paese, soprattutto in un momento in cui si trovava nel mirino della comunità internazionale a causa di un rapporto pubblicato nel mese di febbraio da una commissione di inchiesta dell’ONU che accusava il regime nordcoreano di gravi violazioni dei diritti umani; dall’altro, rafforzare alleanze vecchie e nuove al fine di controbilanciare l’inarrestabile deterioramento dei rapporti con Pechino, che, nel corso del 2014, apparivano ridotti ai minimi termini. Gli sforzi diplomatici di Pyongyang erano rivolti soprattutto verso il Sud-est asiatico, la Russia e il Giappone.

Sul fronte dell’economia, il 2014 non presentava cambiamenti significativi rispetto all’anno precedente, a sud come a nord. Le previsioni di crescita della Corea del sud, fissate dalla Banca di Corea nel corso del 2013 al 3,8%, risultavano perfettamente rispettate,[1] confermando il paese nella rosa delle economie asiatiche più solide. Per quanto concerne la Corea del nord, la maggior parte delle analisi confermavano l’esistenza di una linea di tendenza positiva, in corso negli ultimi anni, sebbene l’inesorabile deterioramento dei rapporti con Pechino portasse alcuni analisti a domandarsi se, e per quanto tempo, Pyongyang sarebbe riuscita a sopravvivere. Il dubbio nasceva in relazione ai dati forniti da un gruppo di esperti della penisola coreana del Peterson Institute for International Economics e poi assemblati dalla CNBC, secondo cui il 90% degli interscambi commerciali di Pyongyang avveniva con soli tre paesi – Cina popolare, Corea del sud e Russia – e dove la parte del leone era giocata naturalmente da Pechino.[2]

2. Politica interna

2.1. La politica interna sudcoreana: l’anno delle tragedie nazionali

Come si è visto nel precedente volume di Asia Maior, nel corso del 2013 i buoni risultati nel comparto economico e la gestione attiva ed intraprendente della politica estera da parte della presidente Park avevano contribuito a garantirle un tasso di approvazione molto elevato presso l’opinione pubblica. Dopo un inizio di mandato difficile, a causa di alcune controverse nomine ministeriali, nel corso dell’estate del 2013 il tasso di approvazione aveva superato il 60%, per poi assestarsi ad oltre il 50% durante tutto l’autunno, fino agli ultimi giorni dell’anno.[3] Anche la gestione delle tensioni con la Corea del nord, che avevano caratterizzato tutta la prima parte del 2013, aveva avuto l’approvazione dell’opinione pubblica sudcoreana. Seppure considerate all’inizio deboli e reattive, le iniziative messe in campo dalla presidenza per la riapertura del parco industriale di Kaesong e per i nuovi ricongiungimenti familiari avevano fatto salire la popolarità della presidente Park fino a risultati quasi mai raggiunti dai suoi predecessori.

Il 2014 si apriva, dunque, sotto i migliori auspici da questo punto di vista. In occasione del primo anniversario dall’inizio del mandato ufficiale, il 25 febbraio, un sondaggio realizzato da «Gallup Korea» stabiliva, infatti, il tasso di approvazione per la presidente Park al 56%, mentre un’analoga ricerca, commissionata dal quotidiano «Hankook Ilbo», portava addirittura il dato al 61,6%.[4]Anche in questo caso le principali motivazioni date dagli intervistati per spiegare la propria approvazione facevano riferimento alla buona gestione dell’economia e della politica estera, in particolare nel caso dei rapporti con Pyongyang e di quelli con Tokyo (in quest’ultimo caso, veniva approvata la fermezza dimostrata verso le velleità revisioniste del Giappone di Abe Shinzō. A questa valutazione positiva dell’operato di Park aveva anche contribuito, con ogni probabilità, l’incapacità, dimostrata dai principali partiti di opposizione durante tutto l’arco del 2013, di creare una vera alternativa politica, ciò che aveva contribuito al rafforzamento della posizione del governo in carica.[5]

In realtà, il 2014 è destinato, con ogni probabilità, ad essere ricordato in Corea del sud come l’anno delle tragedie nazionali. Infatti, nel corso dell’anno si è susseguita una serie di incidenti e di sciagure che hanno messo a dura prova la capacità di resistenza della popolazione sudcoreana e hanno minato in maniera cruciale il cammino, fino a quel momento coronato da successo, della presidente Park.

Sebbene la tragedia più grave e significativa, sia per quanto riguarda il numero di vittime sia per le conseguenza che ha avuto sulla vita politica e sociale della nazione, fosse costituita dal naufragio e dal successivo affondamento del traghetto Sewol, quest’ultimo non era però stato il primo incidente a colpire il paese nell’anno sotto esame. Il 17 febbraio, infatti, il tetto di un auditorium, che ospitava un evento di orientamento per le matricole della Busan University of Foreign Studies, a Gyeongju, crollava, uccidendo dieci persone e ferendone oltre un centinaio.[6] La causa principale veniva, in seguito, identificata nelle forti nevicate che avevano sottoposto la struttura a un carico straordinario nei giorni precedenti. Ciò nonostante, le indagini successive mostravano come, oltre alle cause naturali, avessero giocato un ruolo l’errore umano, in particolare, l’indifferenza e il mancato rispetto delle norme di sicurezza. Il tetto dell’auditorium non era stato ripulito dall’abbondante neve caduta in precedenza; vi era una sola uscita di sicurezza, presa d’assalto dagli studenti in fuga subito dopo il crollo; inoltre non erano stati effettuati controlli di sicurezza sulla struttura dal 2009.[7] Questa miscela di eventi naturali, incuria e mancato rispetto delle regole era alla base del crollo e della morte di nove studenti e di un dipendente della struttura. La stessa concomitanza di cause doveva poi essere alla base del più grave incidente avvenuto nel paese negli ultimi 44 anni: l’affondamento del Sewol.

La mattina di mercoledì 16 aprile 2014, il traghetto MV Sewol, di proprietà della compagnia di navigazione Chonghaejin Marine, naufragava e affondava, dopo essersi capovolto, a largo dell’isola sudcoreana di Byeongpungdo. Il traghetto, operante la tratta fra il porto di Incheon e l’isola di Jeju, trasportava a bordo 476 persone, la maggioranza delle quali studenti della scuola superiore Danwon della città di Ansan, situata nell’immediata periferia della capitale Seoul. Nell’incidente morivano 304 persone, fra cui moltissimi studenti in gita scolastica.

La causa principale del naufragio, secondo il rapporto della guardia costiera sudcoreana, rilasciato il giorno successivo, andava ricercata in una manovra ordinata fra le 8,48 e le 8,49 dal terzo ufficiale in comando, la giovane Park Han-gyeol. Il rapido cambio di direzione aveva reso ingovernabile il traghetto soprattutto a causa dell’eccessivo carico a bordo e dell’incuria con cui era stato sistemato. Il Sewol trasportava, infatti, 3.608 tonnellate di carico, a fronte del limite di 987.[8]

Fin da subito appariva chiaro come questa tragedia avrebbe segnato in maniera indelebile il panorama politico e sociale del paese. La presenza a bordo di un gran numero di giovani studenti, e la loro preponderanza fra le vittime, aveva reso ancora più tragico il bilancio finale dell’incidente. Infatti, in una società con crescenti problemi demografici, caratterizzata da nuclei familiari con un unico figlio e in cui tutte le risorse e le energie della famiglia venivano indirizzate verso la massima realizzazione delle nuove generazioni, l’impatto di tale evento aveva un carattere dirompente. A rendere la situazione ancora più tragica e tesa contribuiva l’enorme quantità di messaggi che i passeggeri, in particolare gli studenti a bordo del traghetto, erano riusciti ad inviare alle proprie famiglie durante quasi tutto il naufragio. Alcuni struggenti messaggi venivano ampiamente ripresi tanto dalla stampa sudcoreana quanto da quella internazionale, contribuendo così ad aumentare l’empatia per le vittime e lo sdegno per i responsabili, oltre che a gettare nuova luce sulle discutibili procedure di emergenza a bordo dell’imbarcazione.[9]

Il primo esempio arrivava solo due giorni dopo la tragedia, quando il vicepreside della scuola Danwon, uno degli accompagnatori salvato dai soccorritori, si suicidava a pochi passi dalla palestra di Jindo, la città portuale presso cui erano stati portati i superstiti e si erano raccolti i parenti delle vittime e dei dispersi.[10]

Le gravi e diffuse responsabilità umane nell’accaduto venivano riscontrate fin da subito e scatenavano la rabbia e l’indignazione non solo dei parenti delle vittime, ma anche di larga parte dell’opinione pubblica del paese. Il comportamento del capitano del traghetto Lee Jun-seok, assente dalla plancia di comando nel momento dell’incidente e fra i primi a mettersi in salvo, veniva considerato criminale. La situazione si aggravava ancor di più non appena appariva chiaro come l’equipaggio del Sewol avesse comunicato ai passeggeri di non agitarsi e rimanere fermi ai propri posti. Secondo molti superstiti, infatti, ci sarebbe stato tempo sufficiente per evacuare la nave in maniera più rapida e completa, se fossero tempestivamente state date le informazioni corrette e se la situazione critica fosse stata gestita in maniera più responsabile dai membri dell’equipaggio.

Un’ulteriore fonte di durissime critiche era costituita dalla gestione dei soccorsi in mare e dal ruolo del governo e delle sue diverse emanazioni. Durante il rovesciamento della nave e nei momenti seguenti, gli annunci del governo sembravano testimoniare la mancanza di capacità di gestione della crisi, con resoconti inaccurati che cambiavano di minuto in minuto, tanto che, durante la mattinata, veniva diffusa la notizia, rapidamente smentita dai fatti, che tutti gli studenti erano stati tratti in salvo.[11] Inoltre, l’intervento della guardia costiera sudcoreana, così come il suo ruolo nelle comunicazioni radio durante i minuti immediatamente successivi al naufragio, ne dimostravano in maniera chiara l’inadeguatezza nella gestione di situazione di così grave emergenza.[12]

Infine, con il passare dei giorni appariva evidente il ruolo svolto nella tragedia dalla compagnia di navigazione proprietaria del traghetto, la Chonghaejin Marine, e dalle pratiche di collusione e di corruzione esistenti fra tali società private e gli organi statali deputati al controllo delle regole. Come detto in precedenza, infatti, nonostante che il carico sopportato dal traghetto fosse di oltre tre volte superiore il massimo di sicurezza previsto e nonostante che fossero state apportate modifiche strutturali alla nave – quali ad esempio l’aggiunta di ulteriori cabine – il certificato di sicurezza era stato comunque rilasciato dall’autorità competente.[13] Il disastro portava sotto i riflettori le mancanze del sistema sudcoreano di regolamentazione dell’attività marittima, lasciato al controllo della Korean Shipping Association e del Korean Register of Shipping, entrambi supervisionati dalla guardia costiera. La mancata o imperfetta comunicazione fra questa molteplicità di enti aveva fatto sì che non venissero effettuati i dovuti controlli sui traghetti della Chonghaejin Marine, fra i quali il Sewol, che viaggiavano regolarmente con carichi eccessivi e stivati in maniera approssimativa.[14]

Anche in questo caso, quindi, come già accaduto con il crollo del tetto dell’auditorium di Gyeongju, la scarsa capacità di controllo delle agenzie governative, unita all’incuria dimostrata dai proprietari delle strutture, era stata la causa della tragedia. L’incidente del Sewol, però, a causa della portata del disastro, non poteva non avere conseguenze politiche importanti.

La rabbia dei familiari delle vittime si era scagliata fin da subito sia contro i diretti responsabili – il comandante e gli ufficiali al comando del traghetto e i proprietari della compagnia di navigazione – sia contro il governo, considerato corresponsabile per la mancata opera di controllo e per la lentezza nei soccorsi. Il 27 aprile il primo ministro Chung Hong-won, aspramente criticato durante una sua precedente visita al centro di accoglienza e soccorso di Jindo,[15] si assumeva la responsabilità dei fallimenti del governo e presentava le proprie dimissioni alla presidente Park.[16] La stessa presidente, però, non era stata risparmiata dalla dura contestazione dei familiari delle vittime. In particolare, veniva attaccata la mancata presenza di Park Geun-hye nei momenti più acuti della crisi, così come la sua mancanza di leadership e di guida del governo del paese. Park, in definitiva, riceveva le medesime critiche che le erano state rivolte durante i passaggi più spinosi della crisi con la Corea del nord nel corso della primavera del 2013.[17] Soltanto il 29 aprile 2014 la Park offriva le proprie scuse al popolo coreano per il disastro del Sewol. Si trattava di un atto formale considerato di grande rilevanza per l’opinione pubblica sudcoreana, che, però, era fatto dalla presidente in maniera indiretta, parlando dell’«avidità» come una delle cause del disastro e promettendo cambiamenti radicali, per evitare il verificarsi di tragedie simili in futuro.[18] A distanza di pochi giorni, però, un reportage della KBS – Korean Broadcasting System, la piattaforma televisiva pubblica sudcoreana con una forte influenza governativa – in cui si definiva il numero di vittime del naufragio come: «non molte, rispetto al numero di persone uccise dagli incidenti stradali ogni anno» – scatenava nuove proteste contro la sede della televisione nazionale e il palazzo presidenziale.[19] Per cercare di porre nuovamente un freno alla tensione sociale, la presidente Park decideva quindi di offrire nuovamente le sue scuse ufficiali, questa volta in maniera diretta alla popolazione, assumendosi la responsabilità finale del disastro e promettendo nuove misure, fra cui lo smantellamento della guardia costiera, così come era esistita fino a quel momento.[20]

Il naufragio del Sewol rappresentava la prima vera sfida affrontata da Park Geun-hye dal punto di vista della politica interna, dato che la presidente non era stata direttamente toccata dai vari scandali che, nel corso del 2013, avevano coinvolto i servizi segreti nazionali (NIS – National Intelligence Service). Da questa ardua prova la presidente uscita decisamente indebolita. I ritardi, gli errori e le responsabilità governative avevano intaccato fortemente la sua popolarità, facendo crollare l’indice di approvazione presso l’opinione pubblica.[21] Anche i tentativi di recuperare il terreno perduto, compiuti durante i mesi di maggio e di giugno, non arrivavano ad ottenere i risultati sperati. Il piano per sciogliere il corpo della guardia costiera si bloccava all’assemblea nazionale, mentre la nomina del nuovo primo ministro incontrava numerosi ostacoli. Il candidato individuato da Park Geun-hye, l’ex procuratore e giudice della corte suprema Ahn Dae-hee, veniva attaccato a causa degli elevatissimi guadagni ottenuti dal suo studio legale in un lasso di tempo estremamente breve. Sebbene non vi fosse alcuna prova di corruzione, le indiscrezioni sulla possibilità che Ahn avesse violato norme etiche – se non legali – si facevano sempre più insistenti. All’indomani dell’incidente del Sewol, in cui la connivenza e la corruzione di organi governativi era stata individuata come una delle concause, e con un primo ministro dimissionario proprio in ragione di tale tragedia, un candidato attorno al quale si stessero addensando ombre di questo genere non poteva più essere preso in considerazione. Per questi motivi, il 28 maggio 2014 Ahn decideva di ritirare la propria candidatura, infliggendo un duro colpo alla credibilità sia del governo sia, in particolare, della presidente, la quale aveva personalmente scelto e difeso l’ex giudice della corte suprema.[22] In questa situazione, dopo quasi un mese di stallo, veniva deciso di non accettare le dimissioni di Chung, riconfermandolo nella carica di primo ministro.

Sfortunatamente per la presidente Park, e per tutto il paese, il crollo del tetto dell’auditorium di Gyeongju e il naufragio del Sewol non erano destinati a rimanere gli unici gravi incidenti per il paese nell’anno sotto esame. All’inizio di maggio, infatti, due treni della metropolitana di Seoul si scontravano, causando diversi feriti; a metà luglio un elicottero, impegnato nelle operazioni di recupero dei corpi all’interno del traghetto affondato, precipitava nella città di Kwangju, causando cinque morti; durante l’estate diversi casi di omicidio coinvolgevano l’esercito (un soldato uccideva cinque suoi commilitoni sul confine con la Corea del nord; un militare di leva subiva un pestaggio mortale da parte di commilitoni più anziani; due soldati perdevano la vita durante un’esercitazione); infine, il 18 ottobre, 16 persone rimanevano uccise durante un concerto pop a causa del crollo di una grata di ventilazione. L’eco di questi eventi veniva sicuramente amplificata dal trauma collettivo nazionale causato dalla morte delle oltre 300 persone vittime del naufragio del Sewol; ma non vi è dubbio che molti di questi casi dimostrassero come settori deviati (come nel caso dell’esercito) o corrotti dell’apparato governativo condividessero parte della responsabilità per la morte di propri concittadini. L’etichetta per la Corea del sud di «Repubblica dei disastri» o «Repubblica degli incidenti» iniziava a diffondersi su internet, in un misto di rabbia e d’indignazione verso un apparato statale che non veniva considerato all’altezza nella difesa dei propri cittadini e indegno di fiducia.[23]

La corruzione delle strutture statali, ma ancor di più la collusione fra pubblico e privato, rappresentavano un problema di lunga data nel paese. Il processo di industrializzazione dall’alto, concepito dal regime autoritario di Park Chung-hee negli anni Sessanta, comportava, infatti, un legame a doppio filo fra stato, imprese private e banche. La crescita esponenziale delle dimensioni dei conglomerati industriali (chaebol) aveva però creato una situazione in cui, anche dopo l’avvento della democrazia nel 1987, il potere di influenza del privato sulle istituzioni pubbliche risultava ancora fortissimo. Diversi presidenti – a partire da Kim Young-sam, con la cosiddetta «legge sul nome reale»,[24] per giungere alle riforme di Kim Dae-jung e di Roh Moo-hyun – avevano cercato di regolamentare le relazioni fra questi due mondi, tentando di rendere più credibili e più affidabili soprattutto le agenzie pubbliche di controllo. In realtà, come dimostrato dalle tragedie nazionali del 2014, i risultati pratici erano ancora scarsi e la questione era ancora molto sentita dall’opinione pubblica nazionale, tanto da diventare uno dei cavalli di battaglia del movimento di opposizione formato nel 2012 da Ahn Cheol-soo.

Dal punto di vista socio-politico, nelle ultime settimane del 2014 aveva luogo un ulteriore episodio, emblematico delle difficoltà vissute dal paese. Dopo che il leader del PPU (Partito Progressista Unificato,un partito di sinistra), il parlamentare Lee Seok-ki, era stato condannato per tradimento e rimosso dal suo incarico il 18 febbraio, nelle ultime settimane di dicembre la corte costituzionale sudcoreana si pronunciava a favore della definitiva dissoluzione del partito e della rimozione dei cinque parlamentari rimasti all’assemblea nazionale.[25] Come riportato nel precedente volume di Asia Maior, il PPU era stato accusato di complotto contro la sicurezza dello Stato e di attività di sostegno alla Corea del nord.[26] Le condanne definitive del leader e del partito, entrambe emesse sulla base della legge di sicurezza nazionale, retaggio del periodo autoritario, suscitavano scalpore, soprattutto all’estero, e gettavano un’ombra sul consolidamento democratico del paese.

2.2. La politica interna nordcoreana: i nuovi assetti di potere nell’era di Kim Jong-un

Se il 2013 aveva rappresentato l’anno del cambiamento ai vertici delle strutture di potere del regime nordcoreano, il 2014 vedeva i personaggi appartenenti alla cerchia più ristretta del nuovo leader imporsi a capo dei principali organi decisionali. Dopo l’affermazione alla guida del paese, Kim Jong-un aveva avuto la necessità di consolidare il proprio potere, tanto dal punto di vista interno quanto da quello internazionale. L’epurazione pubblica e plateale dello zio Chang Song-thaek, considerato da molti come il numero due del regime, ed eminenza grigia del giovane leader, avvenuta nel dicembre 2013, aveva concluso un periodo, durato quasi due anni, in cui molti personaggi legati alla leadership precedente erano stati esautorati.[27]

Il primo evento chiave del 2014, per valutare gli assetti di potere del regime di Pyongyang, era rappresentato dalle elezioni per l’assemblea suprema del popolo, il parlamento nordcoreano, tenutesi il 9 marzo, le prime dopo l’ascesa al potere di Kim Jong-un. Vista la presenza di un solo candidato nelle schede elettorali, tale appuntamento aveva essenzialmente due valenze. La prima era data dal fatto che esso rappresentava una sorta di «censimento» politico della popolazione, utile a stabilirne l’ubicazione esatta, oltre che il livello di fedeltà al regime.[28] La seconda, riconducibile al fatto che è la leadership a decidere chi viene nominato in ogni collegio, era che l’appuntamento elettorale avrebbe dato un’indicazione sul modo in cui, dopo le epurazioni degli anni precedenti, si sarebbe mosso Kim Jong-un.

In realtà, non avevano luogo grossi cambiamenti nella composizione dell’assemblea nordcoreana. L’anziano Kim Yong-nam manteneva la presidenza del presidium – l’organo ristretto che fa le veci dell’assemblea quando essa non è in seduta – mentre Park Pong-ju manteneva la carica di primo ministro. Fra le poche novità degne di nota vi era la nomina di Ri Su-yong alla guida del ministero degli Esteri. Nel corso dell’anno, come diremo più avanti, Ri Su-yong, ex ambasciatore in Svizzera durante gli anni in cui il nuovo leader vi si trovava per motivi di studio, avrebbe giocato un ruolo di sempre maggior rilievo nei rapporti internazionali.[29]

La questione sicuramente più spinosa, per ciò che concerne la ripartizione del potere a Pyongyang, era costituita dalle traiettorie politiche in ascesa di due favoriti di Kim Jong-un: Choe Ryong-hae e Hwang Pyong-so. Al termine della prima sessione dell’assemblea, tenutasi ad aprile, Choe era emerso come nuovo vice presidente della potente commissione di difesa nazionale. Poche settimane dopo Choe perdeva però l’importantissima carica di direttore dell’ufficio politico generale dell’esercito (Korean People’s Army), a favore del nuovo «astro nascente» dell’organigramma di potere nordcoreano, Hwang Pyong-so.[30] Dopo l’epurazione di Chang, si era pensato dapprima che il suo ruolo come numero due del regime sarebbe stato ricoperto da Choe, salvo poi riconsiderare la valutazione a causa della rapidissima ascesa di Hwang. Durante i primi mesi del 2014, infatti, quest’ultimo era stato visto sempre più di frequente fra gli accompagnatori del leader nelle sue diverse apparizioni pubbliche. Questo era un segnale importante, in base alla teoria secondo cui, in Corea del nord, più si è vicini al leader e più si stanno scalando posizioni nella gerarchia. Durante il mese di aprile, Hwang veniva nominato prima vice-maresciallo dell’esercito – un’altissima carica, superiore a quella di generale a quattro stelle – e, poco dopo, capo dell’ufficio politico dell’esercito. L’ascesa di Hwang era quindi rapidissima, se si considera che la sua carica precedente era quella di vice direttore del dipartimento per l’organizzazione e per la guida del partito e che era stato nominato generale a quattro stelle solo nel mese di marzo. Al termine della seconda sessione dell’assemblea, tenutasi a settembre, Hwang veniva nominato vice presidente della potentissima commissione nazionale di difesa, completando così il suo percorso in sostituzione di Choe.[31]

Nonostante che l’ascesa di Hwang sia da considerare rapidissima e apparentemente inarrestabile, la sua peculiarità sta nel fatto che essa sia stata accompagnata dal mantenimento di un ruolo di rilievo per Choe. La caduta dai piani alti in Corea del nord risulta solitamente molto dolorosa e con scarsissime possibilità di reinserimento. In realtà, però, Choe, per quanto non più il numero due del regime, manteneva alcune cariche ufficiali, seppur di minor rilevanza, quali quella di presidente della commissione statale per l’educazione fisica e per lo sport e quella di membro del politburo del partito. Inoltre, agli inizi di ottobre, Choe veniva incluso nella delegazione inviata alla cerimonia di chiusura degli Asian Games in Corea del sud e, successivamente, veniva inviato in Russia come rappresentante di Kim Jong-un.[32]

Tutti questi movimenti all’interno delle gerarchie del potere nordcoreano assumevano ancora maggior rilievo quando, subito dopo l’estate, iniziavano a girare voci insistenti su presunti problemi di salute di Kim Jong-un o, addirittura, sulla possibilità che fosse stato messo da parte da alcuni alti esponenti delle gerarchie politico-militare. Il giovane leader, infatti, aveva fin da subito deciso di costruire un rapporto più diretto con la popolazione – a differenza di quanto fatto dal padre, ma in linea con la personalità politica del nonno – attraverso frequenti apparizioni e discorsi pubblici. Durante il mese di settembre, però, non era stato visto a nessun evento pubblico per diverse settimane, alimentando così le speculazioni riguardo al suo stato di salute e alla sua presa sull’establishment nordcoreano. In realtà, tali voci si rivelavano esagerate ed erano presto smentite prima dall’ammissione ufficiale di lievi problemi di salute del leader, attraverso una televisione di stato, e in seguito dal suo ritorno alla partecipazione agli eventi pubblici, seppur all’inizio con l’aiuto di un bastone.[33]

Un’ulteriore figura emergente nel panorama di potere nordcoreano, potenzialmente di grande rilevanza grazie alla sua appartenenza familiare, era costituita dalla sorella di Kim Jong-un, Kim Yo-jong. La giovane figlia di Kim Jong-il aveva iniziato ad apparire a fianco del fratello nelle occasioni ufficiali già negli anni precedenti; nel marzo del 2014 veniva per la prima volta menzionata ufficialmente dalla televisione di stato, durante le operazioni di voto per l’assemblea del popolo, e identificata come alto funzionario del partito. Durante il periodo di degenza del fratello, nel mese di settembre, si intensificavano le voci, non confermate, di una sua possibile presa in carico di alcune funzioni centrali fino al ritorno di Kim Jong-un. La sua più recente investitura risaliva alla fine di novembre, quando veniva indicata dai media di stato come il vice direttore del dipartimento della propaganda del partito[34]. Al di là delle possibili speculazioni sul ruolo della giovane Kim Yo-jong nella gerarchia nordcoreana, resta il fatto che l’appartenenza alla famiglia Kim rappresenta una caratteristica di fondamentale importanza per un regime che può essere definito etno-nazionalista come quello di Pyongyang.[35]

3. Le relazioni intercoreane

3.1. La consueta dinamica di apertura-chiusura

Se il 2013 si era caratterizzato, fin dall’inizio, per le forti tensioni fra le due Coree, tensioni poi proseguite per tutta la primavera, il 2014 si apriva invece sotto auspici decisamente migliori. Dopo aver risolto l’impasse sul parco industriale congiunto di Kaesong e dopo aver iniziato a discutere sulla possibilità di nuovi ricongiungimenti familiari, fin dai primi discorsi ufficiali dei leader dei due paesi appariva chiaro come vi fosse una volontà comune di dialogo e di passi avanti verso la riconciliazione. Il discorso del nuovo anno di Kim Jong-un faceva esplicito riferimento ad un miglioramento delle relazioni intercoreane,[36] così come veniva fatto dalla presidente Park nel discorso di apertura della conferenza stampa di inizio anno.[37]

La prima realizzazione concreta di questa predisposizione al dialogo avveniva alla fine di gennaio, quando il regime nordcoreano rispondeva positivamente alla proposta proveniente da Seoul di tenere nuovi ricongiungimenti familiari, congelati oramai dal 2010. La medesima richiesta era stata diverse volte lasciata cadere nel vuoto nel corso del 2013. Anche in questo caso, nonostante la disponibilità di entrambe le parti, si era rischiato di vanificare gli sforzi a causa della concomitanza fra i ricongiungimenti e l’inizio delle esercitazioni militari congiunte fra Stati Uniti e Corea del sud. I ricongiungimenti, infatti, dovevano avere luogo dal 20 al 25 febbraio, mentre le esercitazioni congiunte sarebbero dovute iniziare il 24. Nel corso di un incontro inter-governativo di alto livello, il 12 febbraio, la delegazione nordcoreana aveva chiesto di posticipare l’inizio delle esercitazioni, nel caso in cui la cancellazione non fosse stata possibile;[38]un atteggiamento caratterizzato da grande moderazione, se si pensa alla retorica utilizzata solitamente e all’intransigenza del regime nordcoreano nei confronti delle esercitazioni militari del vicino meridionale. Nonostante che la risposta da parte degli Stati Uniti fosse di segno negativo, con il rischio di far deragliare i ricongiungimenti, la Corea del nord decideva di rispettare l’impegno assunto e portare avanti i due round di incontri previsti per la fine di febbraio.[39]

Purtroppo, dopo una partenza incoraggiante, le relazioni fra i due paesi ricadevano ben presto nella solita dinamica per cui ad una fase di apertura faceva seguito un inasprimento dei toni e il venire in essere di una nuova fase di tensione. Nel 2014, quanto meno, non venivano raggiunti i livelli di guardia della primavera del 2013. Già il 27 febbraio 2014, in risposta all’inizio delle esercitazioni annuali Key Resolve/Foal Eagle fra USA e Corea del sud, Pyongyang ordinava un nuovo lancio di missili a corto e medio raggio. Tale test era l’inizio di uno stillicidio di test missilistici e di colpi di artiglieria verso il Mare dell’Est, durato fino all’autunno e calibrato in maniera strategica come risposta a prese di posizione di altri paesi e della comunità internazionale sui temi sensibili riguardanti la Corea del nord. Tra il 22 e il 26 marzo, ad esempio, in contemporanea con il summit sulla sicurezza nucleare svoltosi all’Aia, il regime nordcoreano decideva di testare nuovamente due missili a medio raggio ed oltre 30 a corto raggio. Significativamente, durante il summit dell’Aia, una delle questioni più calde era proprio il programma nucleare di Pyongyang, oggetto anche di un incontro a tre fra Barack Obama, Abe Shinzō e Park Geun-hye. Pochi giorni dopo si aveva uno scambio di colpi di artiglieria lungo il confine marittimo conteso fra le due Coree (la cosiddetta Northern Limit Line).

Ulteriori scambi di artiglieria e lanci di missili a corto raggio si verificavano a maggio, proprio quando si iniziava a parlare della possibilità di aprire un ufficio a Seoul per ospitare la commissione di indagine dell’ONU sulle violazioni dei diritti umani da parte della Corea del nord. Altri sporadici episodi si registravano in piena estate, in concomitanza con le nuove esercitazioni militari congiunte fra Seoul e Washington ed in prossimità della visita del papa in Corea del sud, in programma dal 13 al 18 agosto 2014.

3.2. Il discorso di Dresda

Un evento particolarmente rilevante per la luce che gettava sul futuro delle relazioni intercoreane aveva luogo alla fine di marzo. Il 28 marzo 2014, infatti, la presidente sudcoreana Park Geun-hye, in visita ufficiale in Germania, dopo aver presenziato al summit sulla sicurezza nucleare, pronunciava un importante discorso all’Università della Tecnologia di Dresda. Dato il carattere altamente simbolico del luogo, vi era una grande attesa per il contenuto del suo intervento. Dresda, infatti, era una delle principali città dell’ex Repubblica Democratica Tedesca e risultava quindi altamente probabile che in tale contesto venisse sollevata la questione dei benefici della riunificazione tedesca e, mutatis mutandis, quella delle ricadute negative della persistente divisione fra le due Coree. Inoltre, il discorso di un presidente sudcoreano in una università tedesca non poteva non far tornare alla mente, ed essere quindi foriero di comparazioni, con il discorso tenuto dal presidente Kim Dae-jung alla Freie Universität di Berlino il 9 marzo del 2000. In quell’occasione, durante il suo intervento il presidente Kim aveva proposto un’ampia e chiara argomentazione della propria politica intercoreana: erano stati diffusamente esplicati i principi e le pratiche del suo approccio di engagement verso la Corea del nord – la cosiddetta «Sunshine Policy» – ed era stata prefigurata la possibilità di uno storico incontro fra i leader dei due paesi, materializzatosi poi nel giugno dello stesso anno.[40]

In realtà, il discorso di Dresda smorzava gli entusiasmi e frenava le aspettative per un deciso cambio di passo verso una più attiva politica di Seoul nei confronti del regime nordcoreano. Se è vero che, nel discorso di Park, i riferimenti al caso della riunificazione tedesca e alla loro applicabilità o meno alla questione coreana erano numerosi,[41] è un dato di fatto che in esso non veniva presentata una chiara e credibile road map volta ad impegnare seriamente la Corea del nord in un percorso di dialogo.[42] La maggior parte delle proposte inserite nel discorso, infatti, risultava di marginale importanza.[43] Tra queste, si può citare la possibile apertura di un «parco della pace» all’interno della DMZ (la zona demilitarizzata che segna il confine fra le due Coree), la cui realizzazione appariva quantomeno improbabile. Altri esempi erano rappresentati dall’enfasi sulla denuclearizzazione dell’arsenale nordcoreano, come condizioni vincolante per la ripresa della cooperazione e dal richiamo al nebuloso progetto, lanciato nel 2013, denominato «Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative».[44] Tali progetti non andavano però concretamente ad incidere sui principali nodi del contendere delle relazioni intercoreane, quali: la ripresa della cooperazione economica, l’ampliamento del parco industriale congiunto di Kaesŏng, l’agevolazione di scambi culturali e commerciali fra nord e sud, la concreta attuazione di Confidence Building Measures, volte a ridurre le tensioni militari sul confine.

Come era prevedibile, la risposta di Pyongyang non si faceva attendere. Il regime nordcoreano, infatti, attraverso un comunicato della commissione nazionale di difesa – l’organo più potente del paese – denunciava il discorso della presidente Park con una dichiarazione durissima, a tratti offensiva. Uno dei principali punti di polemica era costituito dai molteplici riferimenti alla riunificazione tedesca, dato che quest’ultima era interpretata da Pyongyang  non tanto come l’unificazione di una nazione divisa quanto come l’inglobamento e l’assorbimento della Repubblica Democratica Tedesca da parte della Repubblica Federale di Germania.[45]

La reazione della Corea del nord al discorso di Dresda mostrava, ancora una volta, come il processo di riavvicinamento e di (ri)costruzione della fiducia reciproca fra le due parti della penisola fosse ancora irto di ostacoli. La mancanza di chiarezza su alcuni punti chiave – primo fra tutti, la questione nucleare – così come la mancanza di costanza e di un atteggiamento propositivo da parte del governo sudcoreano rendeva difficile il consolidarsi di un atteggiamento costruttivo da parte di Pyongyang. In conclusione, nel 2014, anche sotto la presidenza di Park Geun-hye, l’usuale spirale di limitate aperture e subitanee chiusure, in risposta a comportamenti di Seoul, considerati ostili da Pyongyang, continuava a consolidarsi così come era già avvenuto un ventennio prima con il presidente Kim Young-sam.[46]

3.3. Qualche debole apertura

A dispetto del fallimento della proposta di Dresda e del venire in essere delle schermaglie militari estive, con l’inizio dell’autunno sembravano aprirsi nuovi spiragli per il riaffiorare di qualche speranza di dialogo fra le due Coree. Il 4 ottobre, infatti, alla cerimonia di chiusura degli AsianGames, svoltisi nella città sudcoreana di Incheon, partecipavano in maniera imprevista alcuni fra i più alti dignitari del regime nordcoreano. La delegazione era composta dal numero due del regime, considerato il nuovo braccio destro di Kim Jong-un, Hwang Pyong-soo, da Choe Ryong-hae, in qualità di presidente della commissione statale per l’educazione fisica e per lo sport, e da Kim Yang-gon, direttore del North Korea’s United Front Department, l’organo del regime incaricato di gestire le relazioni con la Corea del sud.[47] Prima di presenziare alla cerimonia, la delegazione si incontrava con alcuni membri del governo sudcoreano, fra cui il ministro della Riunificazione, Ryoo Kihl-jae, ed il responsabile della sicurezza nazionale, Kim Kwan-jin; successivamente i rappresentanti del regime di Pyongyang si incontravano anche con il primo ministro Chung Hong-won. L’incontro, annunciato con sole 24 ore di preavviso, si svolgeva in maniera costruttiva, in un clima di cordialità e con un atteggiamento conciliatorio da ambo le parti. I nordcoreani accettavano di riprendere al più presto i colloqui governativi ad alto livello, interrottisi a febbraio in concomitanza con i nuovi round di ricongiungimenti familiari, ipotizzando la fine di ottobre o i primi giorni di novembre come date possibili. La delegazione portava anche una lettera per la presidente Park, da parte del leader nordcoreano Kim Jong-un, oltre ai «cordiali saluti» di quest’ultimo per il capo del governo di Seoul, un segnale importante dopo mesi di propaganda e di retorica fortemente offensiva da parte di Pyongyang.

La maggior parte degli osservatori interpretavano questo improvviso passo avanti nelle relazioni intercoreane come un chiaro segnale della volontà di Pyongyang di migliorare i rapporti fra i due paesi.[48]

L’incontro che aveva luogo poche settimane più tardi fra le delegazioni delle due Coree non portava però ad alcun risultato tangibile; ciò nonostante, considerati i tempi piuttosto lunghi caratteristici delle relazioni intercoreane, l’importante apertura rappresentata dalla visita di personaggi chiave, quali Hwang e Choe, potrebbe non aver esaurito la propria spinta e, quindi, potrebbe concretizzarsi nei mesi a venire.

4. Le relazioni internazionali

4.1.  Il consolidamento della diplomazia multilaterale di Park Geun-hye. Il viaggio in Asia Centrale e l’«iniziativa eurasiatica»

Sul fronte delle relazioni internazionali della Corea del sud, nel corso del 2014 si assisteva al consolidamento di un trend già avviato durante il primo anno di mandato di Park Geun-hye, che vedeva un certo dinamismo in politica estera compensare in buona parte i rovesci sul fronte interno. Tra le innumerevoli visite di stato che vedevano impegnata la presidente sudcoreana, tutte più meno guidate da una matrice economica, di particolare rilevanza appariva quella compiuta in Asia centrale tra il 16 e il 22 giugno. Oltre a rafforzare i legami politici ed economici esistenti e ad aprire nuove prospettive per gli investimenti sudcoreani, soprattutto nel settore energetico ed agricolo, essa contribuiva a rafforzare vigorosamente l’«iniziativa euroasiatica», lanciata dalla Park nell’ottobre dell’anno precedente, durante il discorso di apertura alla conferenza internazionale sulla cooperazione globale nell’era dell’Eurasia, ospitata nella capitale sudcoreana. Si trattava di un ambizioso piano di collegamento tra l’Europa e l’Asia, per fare dell’Eurasia «un unico continente, un continente di creatività, un continente di pace».[49] In particolare, l’«iniziativa» prevedeva il collegamento di infrastrutture logistiche – reti ferroviarie, oleodotti e gasdotti, reti elettriche – al fine di ridurre le barriere fisiche (ma non solo) tra i due continenti. Questa integrazione avrebbe poi dovuto essere seguita dalla progressiva eliminazione delle barriere commerciali, che avrebbe dovuto portare, in definitiva, alla creazione di una vasta zona di libero scambio, con il coinvolgimento di circa il 40% della superficie terrestre, il 70% della sua popolazione e il 60% del PIL globale.[50] Nel lanciare l’«iniziativa», la Park aveva parlato soprattutto dell’intenzione di rinvigorire l’antica via della seta, attraverso la creazione di una nuova «silk road express» (altrimenti definita «transiberian express»), cioè una rete interconnessa multiruolo, ferroviaria e stradale, che da Busan sarebbe dovuta giungere a Londra, passando attraverso la Corea del nord e la Russia, in soli 14 giorni, soppiantando così il tradizionale tragitto via mare, attraverso il canale di Suez, che ne richiedeva ben 45.[51]

Il tour centro-asiatico della presidente sudcoreana interessava tre paesi – Uzbekistan, Kazakistan e Turkmenistan – non a caso i tre principali della regione, con i quali Seoul aveva avviato rapporti diplomatici fin dal 1992. In particolare con Tashkent, Seoul intratteneva solidi rapporti commerciali. L’Uzbekistan era, di fatto, il principale partner commerciale di Seoul nell’area centroasiatica, mentre la Corea del sud rappresentava per l’Uzbekistan il quarto partner commerciale in assoluto, dopo la Russia, il Kazakistan e la Repubblica popolare cinese (RPC). Per quanto concerne i rapporti con il Kazakistan, questi erano stati consolidati soprattutto dalla precedente amministrazione, guidata da Lee Myung-bak, che, durante gli anni del suo mandato, aveva effettuato numerose visite nel paese centroasiatico; dal canto suo, Park era in assoluto il primo presidente sudcoreano a recarsi in Turkmenistan. Il viaggio della presidente Park si inseriva perfettamente nella «sales diplomacy» che, come si è visto nel volume precedente di Asia Maior, mirava a sfruttare gli incontri diplomatici per promuovere gli interessi di natura economica del paese.[52] Nel corso della visita, la presidente sudcoreana, accompagnata da una delegazione economica di ben 92 persone, siglava infatti numerosi accordi volti sia a rafforzare la cooperazione bilaterale in aree quali il commercio e il settore energetico, sia a creare un ambiente favorevole agli investimenti sudcoreani.[53] Ciò detto, l’aspetto che emergeva in maniera preponderante dai comunicati stampa ufficiali era quello relativo alla sponsorizzazione dell’«iniziativa eurasiatica», sulla quale Park Geun-hye si era soffermata soprattutto in Uzbekistan, durante la visita all’antica città di Samarcanda, una delle soste lungo la leggendaria via della seta.

In effetti, l’obiettivo principale del viaggio di Park era quello di cercare il sostegno di altri partner al suo progetto di creazione di più efficaci collegamenti ferroviari e stradali tra l’Europa e l’Asia orientale, al fine di poter giungere ad un futuro trasporto via terra delle merci sudcoreane nel vecchio continente. Di fatto, Park Geun-hye incassava il fondamentale sostegno dei tre paesi centro-asiatici, senza il quale un’iniziativa di tal fatta non avrebbe alcuna possibilità di esistere.[54]Il valore reale dell’iniziativa sudcoreana stava, infatti, nel riconoscimento del fatto che, per garantire alla Corea del sud una crescita stabile, fosse indispensabile sviluppare la cooperazione con i paesi euroasiatici, che stavano diventando sempre più importanti ed influenti. Un altro obiettivo era quello di tentare di garantirsi uno spazio di manovra indipendente da Washington, ampliando i propri contatti con l’Europa (pur senza uscire dall’«ombrello USA»); ancora, la Park puntava ad internazionalizzare la questione della penisola coreana, così che la Russia e gli altri paesi euroasiatici avessero l’interesse a creare un continente «unito e pacifico», esercitando a tal fine una certa pressione su Pyongyang per coinvolgerla nel processo di integrazione.[55]

L’iniziativa della presidente Park veniva ripresa dai media, che ne evidenziavano potenzialità e limiti. Tra tutti, particolarmente interessante era un articolo di «The Korea Herald», a firma di Park Sang-seek, ex rettore del Graduate Institute of Peace Studies presso la Kyung Hee University di Seoul. Quest’ultimo si soffermava sulla fattibilità del progetto, alla luce di proposte simili sponsorizzate da altri paesi, a partire dagli Stati Uniti, per giungere alla Russia, passando per la Cina. L’autore si domandava se tutti quei movimenti di integrazione eurasiatica potessero convivere armoniosamente, o se, addirittura, potessero essere integrati in un unico progetto. Soprattutto, nel riprendere il senso più profondo dell’iniziativa sudcoreana – il tentativo di legarla cioè alla pace e alla sicurezza in Asia orientale, nella convinzione che Russia e Cina sarebbero state capaci di spingere Pyongyang ad unirsi al progetto – esprimeva notevoli perplessità circa la sua reale praticabilità.[56]

4.2. L’«esitante» sodalizio tra Seoul e Pechino e il parziale disgelo tra Seoul e Tokyo

Nell’ambito delle relazioni tra la Corea del sud e l’RPC, una grande rilevanza veniva attribuita alla visita di stato compiuta da Xi Jinping a Seoul, la prima di Xi nel paese, ma soprattutto la prima volta in cui un capo di stato cinese si recava in visita al Sud prima che al Nord. Buona parte degli osservatori e degli analisti era concorde nell’interpretare la scelta di Xi come un chiaro segnale dell’inarrestabile isolamento del regime di Pyongyang e dell’intenzione di Pechino di abbandonare una volta per tutte il suo tradizionale, ma quanto mai imprevedibile, alleato. Tuttavia, vi era anche chi sosteneva che questa scelta andasse intesa nel contesto di una crescente fluttuazione della politica nel nord-est asiatico. In questo senso, secondo Cho Han-bum, senior researcher presso il Korea Institute for National Unification, la politica di Pechino verso Pyongyang non era affatto cambiata, così come non era cambiato il valore della Corea del nord per Pechino.[57] Dello stesso avviso era anche l’analista Scott Snyder, secondo il quale, per quanto si potesse concordare che la visita di Xi a Seoul fosse un evidente segnale di disapprovazione del governo cinese nel confronti del regime nordcoreano, soprattutto in un momento in cui quest’ultimo si stava «aprendo» al Giappone, tuttavia era quantomeno prematuro concludere che Pechino avesse «abbandonato Pyongyang per Seoul».[58] Peraltro, il vertice tra Xi Jinping e Park Geun-hye (3-4 luglio 2014) aveva contribuito a far emergere, al di là degli ottimi rapporti personali tra i due leader alcuni limiti nelle loro relazioni bilaterali, su questioni sia politiche che di sicurezza.[59] Il primo di tali limiti risultava evidente nel tentativo di Seoul di respingere molte delle iniziative cinesi che implicavano una scelta tra l’alleanza con Washington e l’intesa con Pechino,[60] fra queste il mancato sostegno all’iniziativa cinese di costituzione di una banca asiatica per gli investimenti infrastrutturali (AIIB), vista come un modo per «controbilanciare» la banca asiatica per lo sviluppo (ADB), a guida giapponese e statunitense.[61] Altrettanto evidente era la volontà del governo sudcoreano di respingere tutte le avances di Pechino volte alla creazione di un «fronte unito» contro il Giappone, declinando pertanto la proposta cinese di organizzare una commemorazione congiunta in occasione del settantesimo anniversario della fine della seconda guerra mondiale. I suddetti limiti emergevano chiaramente anche dal diverso modo con il quale veniva riportato il vertice dai media dei rispettivi paesi. Laddove i media cinesi esaltavano la visita di Xi, mettendo in evidenza i risultati tangibili, soprattutto in termini economici e di cooperazione culturale, nei rapporti tra i due paesi, i media sudcoreani, dal canto loro, riportavano l’evento in termini assai più controllati. In particolare, accoglievano con un certo scetticismo il discorso tenuto del presidente cinese alla Seoul National University, con specifico riferimento alla sua interpretazione unilaterale della passata aggressione giapponese della penisola, che ignorava completamente il complesso ruolo giocato anche dalla Cina.[62]

Ad ogni buon conto, il vertice di Seoul si era chiuso con un comunicato congiunto che ribadiva la cooperazione per la denuclearizzazione della penisola coreana, dichiarando che «le due parti hanno ribadito la loro ferma opposizione allo sviluppo di armi nucleari nella penisola coreana», pur senza menzionare direttamente la Corea del nord. Nel comunicato si faceva riferimento altresì all’intenzione di proseguire nei negoziati economici per la costituzione di un’area di libero scambio tra i due paesi, prefissandosi l’obiettivo di raggiungere l’accordo entro la fine dell’anno.[63] Di fatto, il 10 novembre 2014, in occasione del vertice APEC riunito nella capitale cinese, Seoul e Pechino giungevano alla firma di una bozza di accordo di libero scambio, con l’obiettivo di concludere un accordo definitivo entro il 2015.[64]

Al di là del vertice di luglio, nel corso dell’anno in esame progressi importanti venivano compiuti sia nell’ambito della comunicazione strategica – con l’obiettivo di istituire entro la fine dell’anno una «linea telefonica diretta» tra i rispettivi ministeri della Difesa[65] – sia in quello del coordinamento strategico, soprattutto nell’ambito della lotta contro la pesca illegale.[66]

In definitiva, dunque, per quanto il vertice tra Xi e Park avesse costituito un punto di svolta importante nei rapporti tra Seoul e Pechino, fornendo un ulteriore impulso alle relazioni tra i due paesi, soprattutto in ambito economico, esso aveva al contempo fatto emergere alcune divergenze evidenti nei rispettivi punti di vista. Tali divergenze, in ultima analisi, rappresentavano ostacoli potenziali per un ulteriore consolidamento ed avanzamento dell’intesa fra i due paesi fino al livello di partnership strategica. In particolare il vertice aveva rilevato posizioni differenti su come gestire sia la Corea del nord, in particolare per quanto riguardava la ripresa del «dialogo a sei», sia il Giappone; analogamente erano emerse delle tensioni tra le priorità di difesa e di sicurezza di Stati Uniti e Corea del sud da un lato e quelle cinesi dall’altro.[67] In definitiva, mentre la leadership cinese aveva manifestato una forte riluttanza ad abbandonare Pyongyang una volta per tutte, risultava altrettanto chiaro come Seoul, fondamentalmente, fosse intenzionata a restare legata alla sua alleanza con Washington. In altri termini, secondo Scott Snyder, ciò che risultava mancante nella relazione tra Seoul e Pechino era un «senso strategico di propositi comuni e di interessi condivisi».[68]

Con il Giappone, i rapporti continuavano ad essere sostanzialmente tesi, soprattutto negli atteggiamenti personali tra i due leader, come era apparso chiaro in occasione dell’incontro organizzato da Barack Obama, a margine del Nuclear Security Summit dell’Aia, quando Park Geun-hye era rimasta impassibile davanti al tentativo di Abe di salutarla in lingua coreana.[69] Tuttavia non mancavano segnali dell’avvio verso un parziale disgelo. Fra i più evidenti vi era, senza dubbio, la positiva evoluzione delle trattative avviate nel 2012 per la creazione di un’area di libero scambio destinata ad abbracciare Corea del sud, Cina e Giappone, come rivelavano i tre round di incontri di marzo, settembre e novembre, rispettivamente a Seoul, Pechino e Tokyo.[70] Un analogo segnale di disgelo era l’entrata in vigore, a fine dicembre, di un importante accordo trilaterale tra Stati Uniti, Giappone e Corea del sud per la condivisione di informazioni militari e di altre informazioni sensibili riguardanti soprattutto il programma nucleare e balistico di Pyongyang. Si trattava di un accordo che contribuiva, in parte, ad alleviare le «ansie» di Washington in merito al cattivo stato di salute dei rapporti tra i suoi due maggiori alleati in Asia orientale.[71] In effetti, si trattava di un passo in avanti notevole nei rapporti tra i due paesi, che sembrava tenere conto delle crescenti critiche dell’opinione pubblica sudcoreana alla presidente Park per la sua ostinazione nel non voler incontrare il premier giapponese Abe Shinzō in un vertice bilaterale formale, nel bel mezzo del disgelo tra Tokyo e Pechino.[72] Al contempo, la firma dell’accordo contribuiva a sanare la rottura dovuta alla mancata firma del General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), del quale si è già avuto modo di parlare nei volumi precedenti di Asia Maior. Tuttavia, i termini dell’accordo per la condivisione delle informazioni militari prevedevano che i due paesi asiatici si servissero dell’intermediazione di Washington, anziché rapportarsi direttamente tra loro (come sarebbe avvenuto nell’ambito del GSOMIA).

In effetti, nessuno dei processi appena ricordati poteva essere dato per scontato, visto e considerato che l’anno sotto esame risultava contrassegnato anche da alcuni «incidenti diplomatici» tra i due paesi. Il primo si verificava nel mese di giugno, a seguito della decisione del governo di Abe di pubblicare un rapporto di 21 pagine contenente un resoconto sugli scambi diplomatici tra Seoul e Tokyo, sfociati nel 1993 nella storica «dichiarazione Kono», contenente le scuse del Giappone per le vicende relative alle cosiddette «donne di conforto». Tale espressione fa riferimento alle decine di migliaia di donne asiatiche (spesso e volentieri bambine, o adolescenti) obbligate alla schiavitù sessuale dall’esercito giapponese prima e durante la seconda guerra mondiale. Il riesame della «dichiarazione Kono» era il frutto di un’improvvida iniziativa del governo di Tokyo finalizzata a placare alcuni elementi conservatori-nazionalisti vicini al primo ministro che, al pari dello stesso Abe, avevano messo in discussione la «dichiarazione», sostenendo che non esistessero prove certe di una «coercizione» ufficiale alla prostituzione.

Secondo lo studio, frutto di un lavoro di indagine svolto da una commissione di cinque esperti (fra cui 3 donne), la dichiarazione in questione – con la quale l’allora capo di gabinetto Kono Yohei aveva riconosciuto, per la prima volta, scusandosi, il coinvolgimento delle autorità militari nipponiche nella costrizione di migliaia di donne asiatiche (in buona parte coreane) a lavorare nei bordelli al seguito dei soldati giapponesi – era stata il frutto di un accordo tra i due governi.[73] In particolare, il rapporto sottolineava come, nella determinazione del linguaggio della dichiarazione di scuse, erano stati accettati degli «input» da parte del governo di Seoul. In aggiunta, il rapporto sollevava alcuni dubbi sulle testimonianze rese da alcune delle «donne di conforto» ancora in vita, essendo mancata una verifica puntuale della veridicità delle loro dichiarazioni.[74] Dal punto di vista di Seoul, già il solo riesame della «dichiarazione» era da ritenersi deplorevole di per sé; mentre il tentativo di «annacquarla» – sollevando dubbi oltre che sulla procedura, anche sulla sostanza – risultava come un’ennesima dimostrazione dell’indisponibilità del Giappone a fare i conti con il proprio passato imperialista. Né le rassicurazioni del portavoce del governo Suga, né il gesto di Abe, che aveva affermato di non voler ricusare formalmente la «dichiarazione», soprattutto per le conseguenze che un gesto di tal fatta avrebbe potuto avere nei rapporti con Seoul – e con gli Stati Uniti – erano però sufficienti a calmare gli animi.[75]

Il secondo incidente «diplomatico» fra Giappone e Corea del sud era relativo alla denuncia da parte di un gruppo civico conservatore sudcoreano e alla successiva incriminazione per diffamazione del giornalista giapponese Kato Tatsuya, allora a capo della redazione di Seoul del quotidiano di destra «Sankei Shimbun». Il 3 agosto, la versione online del «Sankei Shimbun» aveva pubblicato un articolo di Kato Tatsuya sulla presunta irreperibilità della presidente Park Geun-hye nel giorno del disastro della Sewol. Nell’articolo si riportavano alcune voci circolate in Corea del sud – e riprese in primis dal quotidiano «The Chosun Ilbo», senza che vi fosse stata la benché minima smentita – secondo le quali la presidente si trovava in una località non definita in compagnia di un uomo (un ex assistente della presidente Park, fresco di divorzio).[76] Il giornalista veniva formalmente incriminato, senza essere arrestato, l’8 ottobre 2014 e sottoposto ad una limitazione nei movimenti, incluso il divieto di lasciare la Corea del sud (divieto che era ancora in vigore alla fine dell’anno sotto esame). L’intera vicenda, oltre ad incidere sui già delicati rapporti con il Giappone, sollevava numerose critiche sull’effettiva libertà di stampa nel paese, che già negli anni passati era stata fatta oggetto di attacchi e di restrizioni.[77]

4.3 L’offensiva dello charme di Pyongyang

L’anno sotto esame vedeva la diplomazia nordcoreana insolitamente molto attiva, a tratti frenetica, su molteplici fronti grazie all’attivismo di diversi esponenti del governo nordcoreano, ma, in particolare, del nuovo ministro degli Esteri, Ri Su-yong. Fin dal principio Ri si era rivelato come un ministro degli Esteri un po’ fuori dagli schemi: non una semplice figura di rappresentanza come tanti altri che lo avevano preceduto, ma un abile politico che si faceva apprezzare per le sue doti diplomatiche. Le prime missioni lo vedevano impegnato in Africa (Etiopia e Sud Africa) e in Medio Oriente (Kuwait, Qatar e Siria). In particolare, a Damasco Ri incontrava, tra gli altri, il presidente siriano Bashar al-Assad, in un evidente tentativo non solo di aumentare la cooperazione tra i due paesi in svariati campi (in primis quello economico), ma anche e soprattutto di rafforzare lo storico sodalizio tra i due paesi.[78] Ben più impegnativo era senza dubbio il tour estivo effettuato nel Sud-est asiatico, che prevedeva tappe in Laos, Vietnam, Indonesia e Singapore, oltre che in Myanmar, per presenziare all’incontro dell’Asean Regional Forum a Nay Pyi Taw, il 10 agosto 2014. Il summit dell’ARF costituiva in assoluto il primo appuntamento di carattere multilaterale al quale prendeva parte Ri dalla sua nomina. La presenza di Ri aveva due motivazioni: la prima era quella di presenziare ad una discussione in cui si parlava del programma nucleare nordcoreano, essendo questo incluso tra i punti all’ordine del giorno del Forum; la seconda era la necessità di ampliare il raggio d’azione della diplomazia nordcoreana, come rivelavano gli incontri bilaterali a margine dell’ARF – almeno dieci, secondo quanto riportato dall’agenzia di stampa di stato della Corea del nord «KCNA».[79]

Il corteggiamento dell’ASEAN – da sempre ritenuta «neutrale» e «amichevole» verso il regime nordcoreano – poteva tornare utile al fine di espandere il raggio d’azione della diplomazia di Pyongyang. In effetti, al di là della Cina Popolare (pre-Xi Jinping), l’ASEAN era uno dei pochi interlocutori con cui la Corea del nord potesse ancora ricevere il «benvenuto», grazie soprattutto ai solidi legami con buona parte dei paesi che ne facevano parte, costruiti nei decenni precedenti.[80] Peraltro, Pyongyang intratteneva con l’ASEAN dei legami robusti anche sotto il profilo economico-commerciale, che, senz’altro, il viaggio di Ri aveva intenzione di rafforzare ulteriormente.[81]

Una delle tappe più interessanti del tour nel Sud-est asiatico era quella in Indonesia, dove il ministro degli Esteri nordcoreano presentava una «proposta concreta» al suo omologo indonesiano che includeva, tra l’altro, la disponibilità per una ripresa del «dialogo a sei». I resoconti della visita a Giacarta lasciavano intendere che l’Indonesia avrebbe potuto agire da intermediario tra la Corea del nord e gli altri paesi partecipanti al «dialogo» (Corea del sud, Stati Uniti, Cina, Russia e Giappone), date le ottime relazioni che l’Indonesia intratteneva con ognuno di essi.[82] Nell’accogliere la proposta di Ri, l’Indonesia si prefiggeva dunque di perorare le ragioni della Corea del nord in Asia e di cercare di integrarla nella comunità internazionale, avvantaggiandosene soprattutto in termini di prestigio internazionale.[83]

Altrettanto impegnativo per la diplomazia nordcoreana era il mese di settembre, che vedeva, da un lato il segretario per gli affari internazionali del Partito dei lavoratori coreani, Kang Sok-ju, impegnato in un raro tour europeo[84] e, dall’altro, il ministro degli Esteri in visita prima a Teheran (per presenziare alla 53a sessione dell’Organizzazione legale consultiva Asia Africa) e, successivamente, a New York, dove Ri teneva un discorso in occasione della 69a sessione dell’assemblea generale dell’ONU (il primo di un ministro degli Esteri nordcoreano dopo 15 anni). Quest’ultima mossa da parte del governo di Pyongyang era da intendersi come un tentativo di rompere l’isolamento diplomatico in cui versava il paese, anche e soprattutto in seguito alle accuse dell’ONU di violazione dei diritti umani da parte della Corea del nord. Le accuse erano state fatte in un rapporto di ben 372 pagine, redatto dal comitato per i diritti umani dell’ONU, pubblicato il 17 febbraio 2014. Secondo il rapporto, la Corea del nord «aveva commesso e stava commettendo abusi sui diritti umani dei propri cittadini» e che la «gravità, la scala e la natura di quegli abusi non aveva paragoni nel mondo contemporaneo».[85]

Il ministro degli Esteri nordcoreano cercava di impedire l’approvazione di una risoluzione sponsorizzata dalla UE e dal Giappone di condanna della Corea del nord, basata sul rapporto appena citato, attraverso un abile discorso. Questo era articolato in diversi punti che andavano dal modello di riunificazione per la penisola coreana, al rifiuto di ogni tentativo di strumentalizzazione della questione dei diritti umani per favorire un cambio di regime.[86] Ciò nonostante la risoluzione veniva approvata dapprima, a novembre, dal comitato per i diritti umani dell’ONU (con 111 sì, 19 no e 55 astensioni)[87] e, successivamente, il 16 dicembre, dall’assemblea generale con 116 sì, 20 no e 53 astensioni.[88] Vale la pena di osservare come, da un decennio a questa parte, l’assemblea generale dell’ONU abbia più volte approvato risoluzioni contro le violazioni dei diritti umani in Corea del nord; tuttavia, quella approvata il 16 dicembre 2014 era senza dubbio la più dura. Quest’ultima raccomandava, infatti, al consiglio di sicurezza l’adozione di sanzioni mirate contro i presunti responsabili degli abusi e addirittura caldeggiava l’ipotesi di deferimento alla corte penale internazionale dei leader nordcoreani. Ipotesi, tuttavia, quanto mai remota, visto e considerato che, all’indomani della pubblicazione del rapporto, sia la Russia che la Cina avevano assunto un atteggiamento di difesa nei confronti del regime nordcoreano, votando «no» in entrambi i casi.

Per quanto non vincolante, l’approvazione della risoluzione costituiva un chiaro messaggio circa la preoccupazione della comunità internazionale per la condizione dei diritti umani nella Corea del nord. A sua volta, l’approvazione della risoluzione era sufficiente affinché il regime di Pyongyang potesse essere sottoposto a ulteriori pressioni su molteplici altri fronti. La riprova era contenuta nel fatto che già il 22 dicembre 2014, appena sei giorni dopo l’approvazione della risoluzione dell’assemblea generale, la questione dei diritti umani nella Corea del nord veniva inserita nell’ordine del giorno della riunione del consiglio di sicurezza. Anche in questa occasione si registrava la forte opposizione di Cina e Russia, secondo le quali la competenza spettava al consiglio per i diritti umani dell’ONU e non al consiglio di sicurezza.

L’intera vicenda della messa sotto accusa della Corea del nord in sede ONU vanificava, in un certo qual modo, gli sforzi diplomatici profusi dal governo di Pyongyang in quella che alcuni studiosi avevano ribattezzato «offensiva della pace». Questa «offensiva» si era concretizzata con l’annuncio di Ri Su-yong all’ONU che il suo paese era pronto ad intavolare un «dialogo sui diritti umani con paesi non ostili ad esso»,[89] e con quella analoga di Kang Sok-ju, all’UE, espressa durante la visita da lui fatta a Bruxelles in ottobre.[90] E ancora, sempre nell’ambito dell’«offensiva», si è potuto registrare l’ammissione da parte di un funzionario nordcoreano del ministero degli Esteri, specificatamente incaricato di gestire le questioni relative all’ONU, dell’esistenza nel suo paese di «campi di riforma attraverso il lavoro», all’interno dei quali «le persone vengono migliorate attraverso la loro mentalità e guardando alle proprie malefatte».[91]

Analogamente, l’«offensiva della pace» del governo di Pyongyang aveva interessato anche gli Stati Uniti d’America, concretizzandosi nel rilascio, tra ottobre e novembre, di tre cittadini statunitensi detenuti nel paese, due dei quali venivano consegnati l’8 novembre nelle mani del direttore del National Intelligence americana, recatosi a Pyongyang.[92]

Se è vero che gli sforzi diplomatici profusi dal governo di Pyongyang nel corso del 2014 avevano avuto lo scopo di aprire una breccia nell’isolamento del paese, al fine di evitare una presa di posizione dura da parte della comunità internazionale in merito agli abusi sui diritti umani, denunciati nel rapporto dell’ONU, appare chiaro però come lo scopo dell’«offensiva dello charm» nordcoreana fosse anche un altro. Vi era, infatti, il tentativo di diversificare i propri rapporti internazionali politico-economico-diplomatici, rafforzando alleanze vecchie e nuove, al fine di controbilanciare l’inesorabile deterioramento dei rapporti con Pechino.[93] Secondo John Delury, della Yonsei University, la Corea del nord stava uscendo, infatti, da un periodo in cui era stata «esageratamente» dipendente da Pechino sotto ogni punto di vista; e, per realizzare tale obiettivo, necessitava di trovare nuove sponde a cui potersi appoggiare.[94] Ciò era particolarmente evidente, oltre che nel corteggiamento dei paesi ASEAN, anche e soprattutto nel notevole rafforzamento dell’alleanza con Mosca, nonché nella grande apertura nei confronti di Tokyo.

4.4. L’abbandono di Pechino e il corteggiamento di Mosca e Tokyo da parte di Pyongyang

All’indomani dell’esecuzione di Chang Song-thaek, avvenuta nel dicembre del 2013, i rapporti tra Pyongyang e Pechino avevano conosciuto un drastico peggioramento. Per la verità, tale peggioramento era solo una svolta particolarmente evidente in un percorso di deterioramento già avviato negli anni precedenti, ma che, dopo il dicembre del 2013, sembrava essere diventato sempre più rapido. Nel corso dell’anno in esame, i rapporti tra Cina e Corea del nord sembravano essersi ridotti al minimo, come emerge da alcuni episodi di secondaria importanza, ma carichi di significato simbolico, verificatisi soprattutto a ridosso e a seguito della «storica» visita di Xi Jinping in Corea del sud. Fra questi vi erano: la mancata pubblicazione da parte di Pyongyang del messaggio annuale di commemorazione dell’anniversario del trattato di amicizia con la Cina del 1961 (che cadeva l’11 luglio); la mancata partecipazione da parte degli ufficiali di stanza presso l’ambasciata nordcoreana a Pechino alla cerimonia commemorativa della nascita dell’Esercito popolare di liberazione (1° agosto);[95] l’omissione (per la prima volta), nel messaggio di auguri inviato da Pyongyang ai vertici di Pechino per l’anniversario della fondazione dell’RPC, del riferimento all’«amicizia speciale» che lega le due nazioni (una frase coniata dal padre della patria, Kim Il-sung, e da allora sempre inserita nei messaggi formali fra Pechino e Pyongyang);[96] il mancato invito alla Cina di prendere parte alla cerimonia di commemorazione del terzo anniversario della morte di Kim Jong-il (tenuta il 17 dicembre).[97]

Altri segnali inviati dalla Corea del nord a Pechino avevano il medesimo significato. In un editoriale comparso a luglio sul «Rodong Sinmun», un giornale ufficiale che rifletteva le vedute del governo nordcoreano, la Cina veniva definita a chiare lettere «un Paese senza più principi, borghese e decadente».[98] La critica, inserita in un editoriale ad ampio raggio sullo «stato del mondo», rifletteva molto probabilmente la delusione del regime per la decisione di Xi di recarsi in vista di stato a Seoul, prima ancora che a Pyongyang; ma, di fatto, faceva seguito ad un’altra presa di posizione analoga da parte del governo di Pyongyang. Di significato analogo era quanto riportato dal «News Focus International» il 2 giugno 2014, secondo cui il comitato centrale del Partito dei lavoratori coreano aveva emesso un decreto interno ordinando ai funzionari nordcoreani di «abbandonare il sogno cinese», e alle compagnie di stato colpite dalle sanzioni di ridurre la loro dipendenza dalla Cina e di accelerare i loro scambi con la Russia e con altre nazioni.[99]

La Corea del nord sembrava quindi prendere atto della «scelta» di Xi Jinping, facendo a sua volta le proprie scelte, che la portavano ad avvicinarsi sempre di più a Mosca e a riaprirsi al Giappone. Così facendo, si assicurava, dal fronte russo, aiuti e investimenti, oltre alla cancellazione del 90% del proprio debito; dal fronte nipponico otteneva, invece, un alleggerimento delle sanzioni, in cambio della ripresa del dialogo circa la sorte dei giapponesi rapiti da agenti segreti nordcoreani tra gli anni Settanta e Ottanta.

4.4.1. Le relazioni Pyongyang-Mosca

Con la Russia, il 2014 era iniziato nel migliore dei modi. Il 18 aprile, infatti, la Duma ratificava un accordo siglato tra Mosca e Pyongyang il 18 settembre del 2012, che prevedeva la cancellazione del 90% del debito nordcoreano (pari a circa 10 miliardi di dollari) accumulato in epoca sovietica e la ristrutturazione e reinvestimento del rimanente 10% in progetti russi in Corea del nord.[100] Tra i progetti previsti, in primis vi era la costruzione di un gasdotto che sarebbe dovuto arrivare fino in Corea del sud, del quale i due paesi avevano iniziato a parlare già dall’agosto del 2011, in occasione del vertice di Ulan-Ude tra Kim Jong-il e Dmitri Medvedev.[101]

Nel corso dell’anno, fatto alquanto inusuale, erano ben tre i dignitari nordcoreani di alto livello che compivano delle visite ufficiali in Russia. La prima, quella del presidente del Presidium del parlamento, Kim Yong-nam, in mera funzione di rappresentanza in occasione della cerimonia inaugurale delle Olimpiadi invernali di Sochi, costituiva un’occasione per rinsaldare l’amicizia tra i due paesi. Tra l’altro, i due paesi erano in procinto di festeggiare il 65° anniversario delle loro relazioni diplomatiche ufficiali. Vale la pena notare che la notizia dell’anniversario veniva riportata dai media di stato nordcoreani, mentre quella relativa alle relazioni con la Cina veniva taciuta.

La seconda visita, nel mese di settembre, da parte del ministro degli Esteri, Ri Su-yong, aveva lo scopo, oltre che di rafforzare i legami e sviluppare ulteriormente la cooperazione economica bilaterale, anche e soprattutto di discutere potenziali opportunità di investimento, in primis nel settore dell’agricoltura. In questo senso la visita si rivelava particolarmente fruttuosa. Ri Su-yong si incontrava sia con esponenti di spicco del governo di Mosca (incluso il suo omologo russo Sergei Lavrov), sia con alcuni rappresentanti e governatori delle remote regioni orientali, siglando numerose intese, tra cui un protocollo d’intesa con il ministro dell’Agricoltura e accordi di investimento per lo sviluppo delle regioni orientali.[102]

La terza visita, ben più importante, vedeva Choe Ryon-hae recarsi in Russia in veste di «inviato speciale» di Kim Jong-un. Si trattava di una mossa rara da parte del governo nordcoreano (circa un anno e mezzo prima, Choe era stato inviato nella medesima veste a Pechino), che veniva interpretata come il tentativo di preparare il terreno per una possibile visita dello stesso Kim a Mosca, la prima in assoluto del giovane leader nordcoreano all’estero. Di fatto, l’anno si concludeva con un invito ufficiale da parte di Vladimir Putin al leader nordcoreano, per recarsi a Mosca nel maggio 2015, in occasione delle cerimonie di commemorazione del settantesimo anniversario della fine della seconda guerra mondiale.[103] L’iniziativa di Mosca contribuiva a mettere ancor più in evidenza le distanze tra Pyongyang e Pechino, soprattutto in considerazione del fatto che, fino ad allora, la Cina non aveva preso in considerazione una simile ipotesi e che un eventuale viaggio di Kim Jong-un a Pechino fosse da escludersi nell’immediato futuro.[104]

Nell’incontrare il presidente russo, il 19 novembre 2014, Choe gli consegnava una lettera personale del presidente nordcoreano e si faceva latore dell’intenzione del governo di Pyongyang di promuovere la partnership con Mosca al livello più elevato entro il 2015.[105] La visita di Choe dava adito inevitabilmente a numerose speculazioni sulle reali motivazioni che si celavano dietro la scelta di Pyongyang. Le spiegazioni che venivano fornite erano almeno tre. La prima era che Pyongyang stesse tentando di contrastare il suo isolamento sulla scena internazionale, in un momento in cui l’assemblea generale dell’ONU era intenta a votare la risoluzione che denunciava i suoi presunti abusi della Corea del nord contro l’umanità; in secondo luogo la visita appariva come un tentativo evidente da parte di entrambi i governi di indurire il rispettivo atteggiamento nei confronti di Washington. La Russia di Putin, infatti, era esposta anch’essa alle sanzioni internazionali a causa delle vicende ucraine. Infine, si trattava per Pyongyang di un’occasione importante per discutere della questione del nucleare con Mosca. Molto probabilmente Choe aveva chiesto il sostegno di Mosca per il riconoscimento del suo paese come «stato nucleare» e aveva discusso sulle misure da adottare per favorire la ripresa senza precondizioni del «dialogo a sei». In breve, la missione di Choe aveva sia l’obiettivo di aprire una breccia nell’isolamento internazionale della Corea del nord sia di esprimere un certo livello di insoddisfazione del proprio governo nei confronti degli Stati Uniti. Inoltre, costituiva una chiara conferma della determinazione di Pyongyang di continuare a sviluppare il proprio programma nucleare.[106]Viceversa, per Mosca, il rafforzamento dei legami con Pyongyang era parte integrante del cosiddetto «pivot to Asia» di Putin, una strategia che si prefiggeva di fare pressioni sui paesi dell’UE e degli Stati Uniti al fine di ammorbidirli sulla crisi ucraina.[107]

4.4.2. Le relazioni tra Pyongyang e Tokyo

Per quanto attiene alle relazioni della Corea del nord con il Giappone, si assisteva ad una grande apertura nei confronti del governo di Abe Shinzō, che si concretizzava in una serie di incontri per la ripresa del dialogo (interrotto alla fine del 2012) sulla delicata questione dei cittadini giapponesi rapiti da agenti segreti della Corea del nord, a cavallo tra gli anni Settanta e Ottanta. Come è noto, l’esistenza del programma in questione era stata ammessa per la prima volta da Pyongyang solo nel 2002, in occasione dello «storico» viaggio del primo ministro Koizumi Junichiro in Corea del nord (con Abe Shinzō al suo fianco in veste di capo di gabinetto) e, da allora, la soluzione del problema aveva rappresentato la condicio sine qua non per il miglioramento dei rapporti tra i due paesi. La questione riguardava le sorti di ben 17 persone (12 secondo il governo nordcoreano), 5 delle quali erano ritornate in Giappone all’indomani della visita di Koizumi; le altre, secondo Pyongyang, erano in parte decedute, in parte non risultavano essere mai entrate nel paese.

La ripresa del dialogo era stata anticipata da un importante avvenimento verificatosi nella capitale mongola tra il 10 e il 14 marzo, quando i genitori di Yokota Megumi – la più giovane tra le vittime del programma, rapita nel 1977 a soli tredici anni mentre usciva da scuola – potevano incontrarsi con la nipote Kim Eun-gyong, nata da una sua relazione con un sudcoreano, anch’egli rapito e portato nella Corea del nord.[108] L’incontro aveva richiesto una lunga preparazione ed era stato reso possibile grazie all’intercessione della Mongolia, che confermava così il suo ruolo di intermediario nei rapporti tra Giappone e Corea del nord.[109] Esso era stato preceduto da una serie di incontri preparatori informali, che avevano avuto luogo fin dall’ottobre dell’anno precedente, in Cina e in Vietnam.[110]

A fine marzo, i rappresentanti dei due paesi avevano l’occasione di riavviare il dialogo per la risoluzione della questione, a margine di un incontro tra le rispettive società della Croce Rossa. In un successivo appuntamento, a Stoccolma, tra il 26 e il 28 maggio, le due parti siglavano un accordo (cosiddetto «accordo di Stoccolma»), in base al quale Pyongyang si impegnava a favorire la ripresa delle indagini sulle sorti dei cittadini giapponesi rapiti, partendo dalla creazione di un «comitato investigativo speciale»; dal canto suo, il Giappone acconsentiva a revocare alcune delle sanzioni imposte unilateralmente alla Corea del nord nel 2006, all’indomani del primo test nucleare. Tokyo, però, non cedeva alle richieste nordcoreane di bloccare la vendita dei locali che avevano ospitato la sede dell’associazione generale dei coreani residenti in Giappone – cosiddetta Chongryon – che aveva funzionato per lungo tempo come una sorta di ufficio di rappresentanza dei nordcoreani in Giappone.[111]

È interessante osservare come l’accordo siglato nella capitale svedese ampliasse il raggio delle indagini, dalle «vittime dei rapimenti» e dalle «persone scomparse», come previsto in un precedente accordo dell’agosto 2008, a «tutti i giapponesi, inclusi i resti e le tombe dei cittadini di nazionalità giapponese, i giapponesi rimanenti, le spose giapponesi, le vittime dei rapimenti e le persone scomparse»,[112] portando il numero ben oltre le 17 presunte dei rapimenti.

L’accordo in questione diventava effettivo il 1° luglio, in coincidenza con il summit tra Xi Jinping e Park Geun-hye, quando Tokyo revocava alcune delle sanzioni «simboliche» imposte unilateralmente nel 2006. Tra queste figuravano le restrizioni ai viaggi da e per la Corea del nord, il trasferimento di fondi, il divieto alle navi nordcoreane di fare scalo nei porti giapponesi per motivi umanitari. In particolare, Tokyo alzava il tetto sui trasferimenti di denaro tra i due paesi da 3 a 30 milioni di yen, consentendo alla comunità nippo-coreana di aiutare i connazionali bisognosi nella propria terra d’origine; eliminava il divieto di ingresso nel paese dei titolari di passaporto della Corea del nord e consentiva la ripresa delle spedizioni di beni umanitari, quali cibo e medicine.[113] Come si può notare, quelle revocate erano sanzioni con un impatto economico minimo, la cui eliminazione era giustificata da motivazioni di carattere umanitario. Per questo motivo, la decisione di Tokyo contribuiva a rassicurare, almeno in parte, quanti, soprattutto negli USA e in Corea del sud, avevano temuto che l’accordo indebolisse la partecipazione del Giappone all’azione di diplomazia collettiva, volta a contrastare la proliferazione nucleare nella penisola coreana. In ogni caso, la mossa di Tokyo aveva evidenziato il mancato coordinamento fra le parti coinvolte nella gestione della questione della penisola coreana, tanto più che un accordo analogo era già stato siglato nel 2008, senza portare a risultati concreti.[114]

Una seconda riunione, ai primi di settembre in Cina, che avrebbe dovuto fornire maggiori informazioni sugli esiti delle indagini da parte della commissione speciale istituita da Pyongyang, attraverso la consegna di un primo rapporto, si concludeva invece con molti interrogativi (e molte critiche), da parte giapponese, per la mancata consegna del rapporto, ma con un «importante» invito per una delegazione ufficiale giapponese a Pyongyang. Abe Shinzō, superate le remore, che derivavano dalle forti pressioni da parte di una componente del governo, oltre che da parte delle famiglie interessate, sceglieva di accettare l’invito e inviava una delegazione, capeggiata da Ihara Junichi, direttore generale dell’ufficio per gli affari dell’Asia e dell’Oceania del ministero degli Affari Esteri. Il segretario generale del gabinetto giapponese, Suga Yoshihide, si esprimeva in maniera molto chiara a proposito della visita, la prima del genere in dieci anni, mettendo in evidenza quelle che erano le aspettative di Tokyo: «Cercheremo di usare questa visita a Pyongyang per dire con forza a chi di dovere che questa questione è per noi una priorità. Vogliamo che la Corea del nord spieghi a che punto sono le indagini sui nostri concittadini. Vogliamo che siano sinceri nella risposta».[115] In effetti, nei due giorni di incontri (28-29 ottobre 2014), la delegazione giapponese aveva modo di apprezzare i notevoli passi in avanti compiuti dal governo nordcoreano e, soprattutto, l’apparente serietà nella conduzione delle indagini. Durante la prima giornata di incontri, ai media giapponesi era consentito di riprendere i primi momenti dell’incontro e di riportare così la partecipazione di So Tae-ha, il vice ministro dei Servizi per la Sicurezza dello Stato, che, a detta di alcuni osservatori, era di per sé sufficiente ad avvalorare la determinazione di Kim Jong-un nella risoluzione della questione. Ai media giapponesi venivano inoltre mostrati gli uffici che ospitavano la sede della commissione d’inchiesta e a la targa, che, in coreano e in inglese li identificava come tali, a riprova del fatto che, questa volta, il governo nordcoreano era intenzionato a condurre un’indagine sistematica e, se necessario, prolungata nel tempo sull’intera questione.[116]

Sul finire dell’anno, tuttavia, il processo sembrava arenarsi, oltre che a causa del rallentamento determinato dalla mancata presentazione da parte di Pyongyang del primo rapporto, rimandata sine die,[117] anche e soprattutto per via della condanna della Corea del nord da parte dell’assemblea generale dell’ONU sulla questione della violazione dei diritti umani (fra i cui sponsor, come già detto, vi era il Giappone).

Vale la pena sottolineare come nel rapporto della commissione di inchiesta dell’ONU, alla sezione Abductions and enforced disappereances from other countries, veniva dichiarato che: «Al di là dell’ammissione del rapimento di 13 cittadini giapponesi da parte di agenti dello Stato, la Repubblica popolare democratica di Corea non ha mai adeguatamente sconfessato la pratica dei rapimenti internazionali».[118] E, ancora, nel rapporto si sosteneva che «la vasta maggioranza dei rapimenti e scomparse forzate è legata alla guerra di Corea e al movimento organizzato (di rimpatrio) dei coreani dal Giappone che ha preso avvio nel 1959».[119]

La reazione delle autorità di Pyongyang trovava espressione in dure parole di condanna e di minaccia contro il Giappone da parte della commissione di difesa nazionale nordcoreana. «Il Giappone – affermava quest’ultima – dovrebbe tenere a mente che se continua a comportarsi così, sparirà una volta per sempre dalla mappa del mondo».[120] Tuttavia, significativamente, la commissione nordcoreana non menzionavano il dialogo sulla questione dei rapimenti e, soprattutto, non minacciava l’interruzione delle indagini in corso. Il che lasciava ben sperare per la prosecuzione della collaborazione bilaterale in questo ambito.

In 2014, in South Korea, the year under review turned into a negative watershed for Park Geun-hye’s presidency. In part, this was not only the consequence of national disasters, but also of deep-rooted bad practices of South Korean political leadership, such as corruption, collusion between public and private officials and the failure of control mechanisms. In North Korea, one of the key events was represented by the elections of the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), the first since Kim Jong-un’s ascent to power. The elections were useful in evaluating the new power structures of the North Korean regime. Furthermore, considering their peculiar characteristics, with only one name in each ballot, they became a sort of political ‘census’ of the population, useful to test the level of loyalty to the regime.

Regarding inter-Korean relations, these followed a pattern which, by now, has become usual: after a partial thaw marked by family reunions at the beginning of the year, they suddenly worsened.

As for international relations, in the South a trend of very active diplomacy, already started in the first year of Park Geun-hye’s administration, was consolidating, and partly compensated for the difficulties on the domestic front. Among the various official visits made by the South Korean president − all of which had mainly economic goals – the one carried out in Central Asia was of particular relevance, helping to strengthen the ‘Eurasian initiative’ proposal, presented for the first time in October 2013, during the international conference on Global Cooperation in the Era of Eurasia. Meanwhile, Seoul continued to strengthen its cooperation with Beijing, marked in 2014 by Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ‘historic’ visit, which, although successful, also highlighted some limitations in the China–South Korea partnership. Relations with Japan continued to be very tense, even if the year under review registered a few positive signs, to the relief of Washington.

On December 29, an important agreement for the exchange of military information was signed by the United States and its two main Asian allies: Japan and South Korea. Interestingly, 2014 also witnessed North Korea’s unusual diplomatic activism, thanks especially to the newly appointed Foreign Minister, Ri Su-yong. There were basically two reasons behind this charm offensive or peace offensive, as some observers named it. First, Pyongyang needed to breach the international isolation which affected the country, especially after it was accused by the international community of serious human rights violations because of a report published in February by a UN investigation committee. Second, the new activism aimed at strengthening old alliances and building up new ones, to counterbalance the continuing deterioration of Pyongyang’s relations with Beijing.

On the economic front, the year registered no major significant changes. The anticipated growth rate of South Korea’s GDP, fixed by the Bank of Korea at 3.8%, was fully respected, confirming the country’s place among the strongest Asian economies. As for North Korea, the positive trend of recent years continued, although the continuing deterioration in the country’s relations with Beijing puts in doubt whether, and for how long, Pyongyang will be able to sustain this positive trend.

* Marco Milani è autore dei paragrafi 2 e 3, mentre i paragrafi 1 e 4 sono di Barbara Onnis

 

1. Introduction

Events in 2014 confirmed the centrality of Prime Minister Abe Shinzō in Japan’s political landscape, in line with the expectation of the previous year’s analysis.[2] Following the landmark Cabinet decision allowing the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, much-coveted by the Prime Minister, and the insistence on expansive monetary and fiscal measures under the rubric of Abenomics, Abe secured his place in post-war Japanese history as one of the country’s longest-lasting and most consequential Prime Ministers by calling and winning snap elections for the Lower House in mid-December. In all likelihood, Abe’s mandate at the helm of Nippon-maru (the Japanese ship of state) will continue until late 2018, when his second consecutive, and traditionally final, term as LDP President will coincide with the call for new general elections.

On the diplomatic front, Abe was able to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping without caving in on Chinese requests for Tokyo’s acknowledgement of the existence of a territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. At the same time, the joint statements accompanying that informal bilateral summit failed to resolve the multiple Sino-Japanese «games of chicken» over the disputed islands. Rather, Beijing merely signaled a tactical desire to avoid further escalation with China’s prosperous, powerful and increasingly assertive neighbor. In the author’s view, China’s softened stance also resulted from a hardening of the U.S. position and the forthcoming security guidelines governing the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Through an extensive use of primary source materials including official documentation, first-hand interviews with Japanese and foreign policy-makers, and original analyses this article concentrates on the Sino-Japanese rivalry, focused on the standoff over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and beyond. It will explore how a rising and assertive China has shaped Japan’s strategic options, not only in the realm of foreign and security policy, but in the domestic politico-economic landscape as well. After all, Abe’s desire to build a strong Japan and to confront China’s ascent, explicitly rested on an appreciation of the cross-fertilization between the domestic and international realms. As Abe said in a December 2014 interview with The Economist: «for the past 20 years, [Japan] has stagnated. During that time, we’ve seen the emergence of other strong global players. And so there is no way that we can separate our domestic policies from our diplomacy. We have to have a strong economy to have a strong diplomacy; and with strong diplomacy and a strong foreign policy, we can in turn ensure peace and stability in the region. And in the international community, our stronger influence will ensure smoother progress in [building relations and] getting things done».[3]

Notwithstanding veiled references to Beijing in official statements, I argue that Japanese policymakers were almost obsessively driven by the need to balance China’s ascendance, as a means to mollify Beijing’s position at the negotiating tables. As recounted last year, the Prime Minister was the driving force to bring about consistent and successful policy change.

This essay devotes attention to the Abe administration’s international and domestic responses to the China challenge. The first section introduces the nature of the ongoing Japan-China spat over the contested islands through a brief historical account. The second section analyzes the evolution of the Japanese government’s foreign and security strategy in 2014, tracing back the origins of this strategy not just to Abe’s and Yachi Shōtarō’s worldviews, the original subject of last year’s essay, but also to their past responses to and encounters with Beijing. Here I also analyze Abe’s major security reforms, such as the highly consequential Cabinet-led constitutional reinterpretation allowing the exercise of collective self-defense (CSD). Consequently, I evaluate Japan’s foreign policy, and focus on Japan’s relations with the U.S. and Australia, with whom it enjoys the closest security relations. The third section introduces an extensive and original analysis of the Japanese government’s increased international and domestic public relations efforts vis-à-vis China, partly in reaction to Beijing’s own attacks on Japan. Here I also provocatively claim that a «governmental-institutional-media complex» preoccupied with Japan’s territorial claims and China’s assertive behavior deliberately facilitated an increasingly hostile tone towards China. Finally, the last section briefly assesses the significance of Japan and China’s negotiated parallel statements, which paved the way to the Abe-Xi APEC meeting, and addresses the tenability of a Sino-Japanese «cold peace» in light of the previous insights.

2. A Fistful of Rocks: The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute, Mirror of Shifting Axes of Power

In order to contextualize the heated Sino-Japanese standoff, this section provides a brief historical account of the island dispute with concomitant attention given to the broader structural changes affecting bilateral relations. The Senkaku Islands, known in China as Diaoyu Islands, consist of five islets and three barren rocks in the East China Sea contested by Japan, the People’s Republic of China (henceforth China) and the Republic of China. Neither China nor Japan’s sovereignty claims based on history are rock-solid and the historical grey zones help corroborate the respective national narratives, although Japan presents a stronger claim on the basis of international law, given its consistent effective control of the contested archipelago.

In January 1895, during the tumultuous final stages of the first Sino-Japanese war, the victorious Meiji government quietly incorporated the Senkaku as terra nullius (vacant territory), and placed them under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture. However, China claims that Japan surrendered the Diaoyu as part of Taiwan following World War II, in line with Tokyo’s acceptance of the 1943 Cairo Declaration. According to its provisions, territory acquired by Japan from the Qing dynasty shall be restored to China. Thus, China claims that Japan obtained the archipelago only in April 1895, under the Treaty of Shimonoseki, with the island of Formosa, or Taiwan. Documentary evidence disproves that the Senkaku have been Japan’s «inherent territory», since the Meiji government had waited for the final stages of the Sino-Japanese war to secretly incorporate the islands, and since the Japanese government had never made the act of incorporation public. Indeed, Japanese documents prove that prior to late December 1894 Tokyo exerted caution over asserting its claims over the Senkaku Islands for fear of provoking Qing China.[4] The Meiji government’s caution and its calculated silence over the act of incorporation weakens Japan’s historical claim over the islets.

On the other side, protracted and effective administration by Japan throughout most of the 20thCentury vindicates Tokyo’s claims in light of international law. Since it excluded the Senkaku Islands from Chinese maps, China implicitly acknowledged Japanese sovereignty until 1971. This was one year before the end of the U.S. exclusive lease over the Okinawan archipelago, which Washington had obtained through the post-World War II San Francisco Peace Treaty. In 1972 the U.S. returned the Senkaku to Japan along with the Ryukyu Islands. As mentioned, China’s late claim to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 1971 was partly a response to the end of the lease by the U.S., but it was also a reaction to the recognition of possibly rich hydrocarbon reserves in the East China Sea around the Senkaku Islands. Strengthening Japan’s claim, according to the provisions of a 1972 U.S. Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) the Japanese government has been granting the U.S. a lease over two Senkaku islets to use as a firing range.[5] Together with the 1972 reversion, these facts seriously question Washington’s neutral stance over the territorial row, and corroborate the Japanese government’s claims on the basis of international law.

At the same time, the Japanese government demonstrated flexibility to facilitate the swift normalization of diplomatic ties with mainland China in 1972. Back then, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei responded to Premier Zhou Enlai’s call for «shelving» (tana-age) the issue of territorial sovereignty with an «unspoken understanding» (anmoku no ryōkai) that had continued to guide Tokyo’s stance over the territorial dispute. But, eventually the Japanese government refused to acknowledge the existence of this unofficial understanding or that this had guided Japanese policy since 1972. It used this denial to negate that there ever was, nor is, any territorial dispute. The islands were Japan’s. Period. However, evidence –including oral testimonies by former Japanese diplomats– has proven otherwise.[6] In late December 2014 a declassified British government document provided an authoritative confirmation of the existence of the tacit Sino-Japanese understanding over the disputed islands. In 1982, none other than Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō detailed the gentlemen’s agreement between the Japanese and Chinese leadership to Margaret Thatcher, who was seeking advice on the conduct of negotiations concerning the reversion of Hong Kong to China.[7]  Moreover in 1978 when the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Tokyo and Beijing was being reviewed, Japan reiterated this tacit understanding during the negotiations. It brought clear benefits to both sides. A weak China was content with Japan’s indirect acknowledgement of the existence of a dispute, while Japan would quietly extend its effective control over the Senkaku, cementing the legal foundations of its claim and avoiding a row with its economically attractive neighbor. More importantly, both states had a common interest, albeit not with the same priority, in countering the Soviet Union’s influence in East Asia. In other words, post-1972 Sino-Japanese cooperation reflected the imperatives of international politics, as both parties never seriously undermined the tacit agreement throughout the end of the Cold War.

Importantly, discreet efforts at maintaining the 1972 status quo progressively eroded due changes in the domestic and international environments taking place after the end of the Cold War in 1991. Japan’s slow growth as an advanced and mature economy contrasted with China’s ever-more confident rise in economic and political terms. Thus, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, China progressively enjoyed increased strategic latitude in East Asia. On the other side, Japan’s continued reliance on the United States’ support gradually gave way to a more assertive foreign policy concerned with defending core maritime interests. The changed strategic landscape also favored the resurgence of nationalistic tides, to such an extent that rising nationalistic waves of different intensity, origins, and impact had rocked bilateral relations since the early 1990s.[8]Thus, for instance, China’s 1992 Law on Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone explicitly included reference to the Diaoyu Islands as part of Chinese national territory. Tokyo sternly protested the claim, but consistently avoided a rupture to the status quo for the reasons mentioned above. Further on, the early 2000s witnessed a quiet bilateral standoff over the extraction of hydrocarbon resources in the East China Sea, the dispatch of a growing number of oceanographic research vessels there, and the November 2004 incursions of Chinese submarines in Japanese territorial waters.[9] These negative developments coincided with the progressive chilling of political interaction, brought on by mounting nationalistic outbursts and by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō’s repeated visits to the controversial Yasukuni shrine.

Conversely, in the mid-2000s, the consolidation of the Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao leadership coincided with China’s substantial openings to Japan, since they both favored stable good-neighborly relations. According to David Lampton, Hu and Wen were informed by a «cooperative internationalist» outlook, to concentrate on the adjustment of domestic inequalities while maintaining high economic growth. Thus, the creation of a «harmonious society (hexie shehui)» had to be linked with a «harmonious world (hexie shijie)», for pragmatic and realistic purposes. To this end, the most outstanding point of friction in China’s new diplomatic outlook, namely, its relations with Japan, needed to be corrected.[10]  The Japanese government took advantage of this window of opportunity to inaugurate in 2006 a Sino-Japanese détente that rested on a framework of tit-for-tat cooperation: the awkwardly named «Japan-China Strategic, Mutually Beneficial Relationship» (nicchū senryakuteki gokei kankei, henceforth SMBR).[11]  Within the SMBR framework, the Japanese government successfully pushed for an agreement in principle on the joint development of gas fields in the East China Sea, announced in June 2008. While not touching upon the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, this agreement constituted a major Japanese victory at the negotiating table, since it suggested China’s implicit acknowledgement of Japan’s claims over the demarcation of the two countries’ Exclusive Economic Zones in the East China Sea. In his memoirs, then Administrative Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Yabunaka Mitoji argues forcefully for the «significant importance of this agreement to Japan, in light of (China’s) acceptance of Japan’s long-standing claims».[12] A similarly proud account of the bilateral negotiations transpires from the biography of then Foreign Minister Kōmura Masahiko.[13] Yet, in what marked a setback for Sino-Japanese relations, the Chinese Marine Surveillance agency stationed two vessels in the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands for nine hours in December 2008.[14] This first ever such intrusion by Chinese official vessels into the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands probably represented a reaction by hawkish minority political factions and interest groups against the major concessions announced in June 2008. The vessels had appeared just before the inaugural Japan-China-South Korea trilateral summit that took place in Fukuoka, Japan, to the surprised consternation of Premier Wen Jiabao.

As the 2008 agreement failed to materialize into a bilateral treaty and tensions rose, the Japan-China SMBR framework progressively turned into an empty slogan. In fact, China’s assertive maritime policy, Japan’s mismanagement of the 2010 crisis and the badly-timed 2012 nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands – both at the hands of the Democratic Party of Japan-led (DPJ) administrations – gave the mortal blow to the status quo premised on the afore-mentioned «unspoken understanding». The Kan Naoto administration’s decision to press charges against a Chinese fisherman, who was responsible for intruding in the Senkaku/Diaoyu waters and ramming his boat against two Japan Coast Guard (JCG) vessels, constituted an important step backward for bilateral relations. This incident cornered the Hu administration down the pathway of economic and political retaliation. In fact, China’s muscle-flexing over the incident and its total misrepresentation in the state-run media, according to which it was the JCG vessels that rammed into the defenseless trawler, highlighted the growing clout of nationalistic hardliners in Beijing. [15] Indeed, Japanese and U.S. China-watchers trace back China’s assertive behavior to late 2009, when the country overtook Japan as the world’s second wealthiest economy. Sustained high-level economic growth in China and the dismal state of its post-financial crisis competitors, most notably the U.S., served only to strengthen Chinese policymakers’ confidence in regional security matters or, more simply, to embolden hardline interest groups that were previously a minority.[16] It is worth noting that Beijing’s retaliatory measures paid off: the Japanese government backed down by restituting the boat and by releasing the captain back to China without a formal indictment. More recently, on September 11, 2012 the Japanese government announced the acquisition of three of the Senkaku Islands from a private Japanese citizen. While the aim was to thwart plans to build on the islands launched by former Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintarō, the Noda Yoshihiko administration wholly mismanaged it and simply provoked the Chinese charge of aggressive nationalization – the more so since the announcement came just two days following a bilateral meeting between Hu and Noda on the sidelines of APEC, several days before the anniversary of the Mukden Incident (September 18, 1931), and only two months before the delicate leadership transition staged during the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As a consequence, the nationalization served only to legitimize bolder and more assertive Chinese action. Ever since September 2012, China has sent naval and aerial forces in the proximity of disputed waters on a regular basis, with the aim of challenging Japan’s effective control and pressuring Tokyo publicly to acknowledge the existence of a territorial dispute. This stance was symptomatic of China’s new-found willingness to abandon a cautious foreign policy course and make fuller use of the leverage provided by its might and its wealth, to maintain its territorial integrity. Japanese policymakers would not accede to Chinese demands to reverse to the status quo ante or acknowledge the existence of a dispute and instead embarked, under the new Abe administration, into a quiet «game of chicken» characterized by steady reciprocal escalation.

3. Standing Up to China: Abe and Yachi’s China Strategies

Within the above-sketched broader structural changes, I posit that Abe’s political leadership effectively stirred the rudder of Japan’s foreign and security policy into a definite course. I find that the late 2012 comeback of Abe Shinzō witnessed the re-enactment of security strategies aimed at balancing China’s rise, strategies that were almost identical to those pursued under his first administration and under his oversight as Koizumi’s Chief Cabinet Secretary.[17] The Abe administration’s foreign policy executive centered on the figure of Yachi Shōtarō, who had served as Administrative Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs between 2005 and 2008, and subsequently as special advisor to the Cabinet and Japan’s first National Security Advisor.[18] The impressive consistency and impact of their foreign and security initiatives, which I will detail below, underlines the undisputed role of human agency, with its idiosyncrasies and cognitive structure in the Japanese decision-making process. In addition to Abe and Yachi’s own personal leaning, the subject of last year’s essay, this section demonstrates that their earlier personal interaction with Beijing in the mid-2000s informed the same maneuvering following their ascendance to power. For this reason, I sketch an original, brief and preliminary historical reinterpretation of the road to the 2006 Sino-Japanese political détente on the basis of new documentary evidence and first-hand accounts.

Given Abe and Yachi’s shared conservative colors, their self-confidence in the management of diplomatic affairs, their ill-concealed preference for a strategic Realpolitik, and their almost presidential conduct of foreign policy – one that was often clouded in secrecy and premised on room bias – to me the relationship appears similar to the historical collaboration of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, although Abe likely depended more than the former U.S. President on the input provided by his external advisors.[19]  Diplomatic propriety required Abe and Yachi to insist publicly on the «(international) rule of law», «engaging China» and «leaving the door open for dialogue with» China, but Abe and Yachi’s writings indicated a clear preference for power politics, deterrence and coercive diplomacy as useful tools to mollify Beijing’s positions.[20] The late Japanese diplomat Okazaki Hisahiko, whose traditional strategic and geo-political thinking impacted greatly on both Abe and Yachi, once remarked: «[take] the 2006 Arc of Freedom and Prosperity (detailed below), it does not mention China, but clearly aims at encircling China. [That’s] just like the 1907 Triple Entente, which aimed at encircling Germany, but has no explicit reference to Germany».[21] Like Nixon and Kissinger’s overtures to the USSR, Abe and Yachi were the unlikely candidates for inaugurating the 2006 détente with Japan’s main strategic adversary; the Japan-China SMBR détente had its own set of linkage policies, but rested on the solid foundations of power politics. Both the English and Japanese literature fail to appreciate the undercurrents of power politics behind the inauguration of the SMBR, with the partial exception of China scholar Anami Yūsuke, who nonetheless joins the chorus of scholars who identify Japan’s China policy back in 2006 as mainly a policy of China engagement.[22] In fact, if there ever was engagement, it came from a conciliatory Hu administration.

Indeed, China’s conciliatory stance towards Japan in the mid-2000s I see as an attempt to soothe tense political ties in response to Japan’s increasing resort to Realpolitik – the progressive hardening of the Japanese government’s foreign and security policy in tandem with the U.S. government. This was evident from the landmark February 2005 joint statement of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (also known as 2+2 meeting) where Japanese negotiators had insisted on including repeated reference to China.[23] Wording there encouraged the «peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue», as well as «improving transparency of its [i.e. China’s] military affairs».[24] According to a former U.S. State Department official, language in those February and October 2005 joint statements «was considered significant and somewhat provocative».[25] In addition, the U.S. aimed by then at enhancing cooperation among its regional security partnerships, by linking the bilateral alliance spokes to one another.  In response to these developments, China’s 2006 White Paper on defense noted: «The United States and Japan are strengthening their military alliance in pursuit of operational integration. Japan seeks to revise its constitution and exercise collective self-defense. Its military posture is becoming more external-oriented».[26] As the environment became more hostile towards China, Chinese openings in the mid-2000s thus aimed at: i) driving a wedge between a progressively conciliatory second George W. Bush administration and a less accommodating Abe administration; ii) deterring the development of a security architecture in the Asia-Pacific that targeted China, such as the nascent U.S.-Japan-India-Australia quadrilateral entente. This proposed entente was an Abe initiative that Canberra, Delhi and Washington would eventually nip in the bud to avoid provoking Beijing;[27] and iii) assuaging a growing sense of Japanese wariness that would have allowed swift passage of Abe’s bold security agenda. In short, China’s overtures were tactical remedies to a more ominous security environment: a behavior that somewhat reflected Beijing’s progressive softened stance with its neighbors since mid-2014.

As a consequence, China agreed to what was called the 2006 Japan-China «Strategic Mutually Beneficial Relationship» framework. As mentioned, this was premised on tit-for-tat cooperation, but China made substantial concessions in the negotiations towards the afore-mentioned agreement in principle on joint development of gas fields in the East China Sea. Abe, in return, needed to assuage China’s historical sensitivities and, above all, abstain from Prime Ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine on an ambiguous «don’t ask, don’t tell» fashion that avoided politicizing the issue. That is, Chinese policymakers agreed to a face-saving solution that entailed silence on the Yasukuni issue and public praise for post-war Japan’s peaceful path. Leaked U.S. State Department cables shed partial light on the nature of the bilateral understanding leading to the establishment of the SMBR.[28] At the same time, the second Bush administration quietly expressed its concerns over Abe’s revisionist credentials and sent veiled warnings directly to soon-to-be Prime Minister Abe about the negative impact of history-related issues on U.S.-Japan relations.[29] This important detail – revealed for the first time in last year’s essay[30] – highlights Washington’s earlier concerns on the negative spillover effects of the history issue in Japan’s relations with both South Korea and China; these concerns prompted the second George W. Bush administration in playing a brokerage role to defuse and avoid entanglement in potentially explosive Sino-Japanese animosities. Thus, while Tokyo had traditionally pursued a more sympathetic China policy compared to its ally, Japan and the U.S. have often traded roles in the early 21st Century, even before the Japan-China standoff over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

At any rate, China was likely unaware of U.S. pressure and as a result Abe de facto renounced his visits to the controversial war shrine during his first mandate. It is worth noting that Yachi was in charge of negotiations that brought about the Japan-China SMBR and that his trusted diplomatic task force negotiated the agreement in principle on gas fields, announced in June 2008, but agreed upon several months earlier. [31] China’s resumption of summit diplomacy and deepened political cooperation with Japan on Tokyo’s terms, confirmed the beliefs of Yachi and his team about the effectiveness of power politics.

Hence, Abe and Yachi later acted on the seemingly vindicated conviction that a «resolute stance» (kizen to shita taido) was conducive to taming Chinese power, thus bringing Beijing to the negotiating table on favorable terms. They also thought that minor concessions on the territorial dispute would only whet Beijing’s appetite, and favored a policy of resolute «strategic patience», accompanied by a Realpolitik designed to balancing the Chinese threat.[32] In short, Abe’s foreign and security posture tackled China’s rise through external and internal balancing: the former aimed at deepening Japan’s security relations with strategic states, first and foremost the U.S., the latter centered on expanding the scope of Japan’s power projection and augmenting the centralized policymaking capabilities centered in the Kantei, the Prime Minister’s office. A high-ranking Australian diplomat in Tokyo commented in 2013 «Japan has been seriously advancing a China strategy in the past year».[33] Yet, an almost identical strategy was at play several years earlier. In the mid-2000s a Yachi-led MOFA inaugurated overtures to maritime states in the peripheries of the Eurasian continent, most notably India and Australia, often through the interested intercession of the United States. Yachi’s grand strategy presented a clear geo-political footprint that referred to the founding fathers of modern geo-politics, such as Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman. In fact, his attempt at establishing a network of Sea Powers along the Eastern portion of the Eurasian rimland reflected, as he explicitly recalled, the thought of Alfred T. Mahan, according to whom naval powers were essential in keeping in check a continental power’s advancement into the seas.[34] Similarly, in 2006-2007 Abe pushed through sweeping security reforms and would later resuscitate all of the initiatives, which did not succeed back then, under the same handpicked foreign and security policy executive.

As opposed to the situation in the mid-2000s, both Japan and China engaged in a bilateral standoff following Noda’s 2012 nationalization of the Senkaku Islands, since both parties expected their counterpart to make a concession first. The highly sensitive nature of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute and China’s new-found confidence as the world’s second wealthiest economy led the newly-inaugurated Xi Jinping administration to similar strategies, premised on identical assumptions: nominally, that Japan will «chicken out» and make concessions, since it needed China more than vice-versa. As a consequence, the Sino-Japanese «game of chicken» brought along a slow but steady escalation in the two states’ moves in the security, economic and communication chessboards. Since my previous year’s essay highlighted Japan’s economic statecraft and the domestic and international implications of Abenomics, the following sections will focus mostly on Tokyo’s security and communication efforts in the year under review.

3.1.Longing for «Normality»: Abe’s Quest for a Powerful Japan 

Although scholars usually assess Abe’s earlier one-year mandate as a half-baked failure, his prime-ministerial leadership was responsible for substantial policy changes in the security field then as it was in 2013 and 2014. This reflected Abe’s personal distaste for the traditional bottom-up process of policy-making, in particular the meddling of the bureaucracy. Back in 2006-2007 Abe set the security agenda and shepherded through the Diet three pieces of legislation that reflected his security priorities: the first bill upgraded the Defense Agency into a Ministry; the second spelt out the administrative details in preparation for a confirmatory referendum on Constitutional amendments; the third facilitated the implementation of the 2006 U.S.-Japan roadmap for realignment of U.S. forces. The Cabinet was not responsible for drafting these laws, as was the case in the Kantei-led legislation pertaining to Japan’s participation in the «War on Terror». [35] Yet, Abe placed the bills high on the Diet agenda, and pressure from the Prime Minister’s office favored smooth passage in the Diet. Read the testimony of the then-U.S. Ambassador Schieffer’s glowing secret report card on Abe’s security agenda in his first six months: «Abe’s successes in passing legislation and implementing policies that strengthen Japan’s security and defense posture are unprecedented. Abe and his LDP team have smoothly passed bills that would have been virtually impossible even 10 or 15 years ago».[36]  Following his comeback, Abe consistently pushed through with his security agenda with the same intensity. So much so that former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, the leading U.S. impresario for  Abe’s security reform package, echoed Schieffer’s excitement seven years later: «No democratically elected leader, in 550 days, has ever achieved the changes in security policy that  Abe has achieved».[37] Abe’s aims were consistent throughout: recovering Japan’s «normality» as a Great Power that does not shy away from playing a larger role in the international arena, and that is able to more autonomously address the challenges posed by a rising China.

The rapidly evolving international environment reinforced Japan’s security renaissance, as evident in the explicit and consistent reference to U.S. decline and China’s ascendance in key official security documents. At the same time, the very pace of Japan’s updating of its Japan’s National Defense Policy Guidelines (NDPG, formerly NDPO) – 1976, 1995, 2004, 2010 and 2014 – was indicative not only of the ever-changing security challenges resulting from an increasingly multipolar post-Cold War regional order, but also of the greater say enjoyed by political leaders in the security policy-making process. Thus, similarly to the Advisory Panel on National Security and Defense Capabilities (henceforth NSDC) in charge of formulating Japan’s National Security Strategy (NSS), the 2010 NDPG reflected the input of politically-appointed advisory groups, rather than the more traditional decision-making process centered on bureaucratic politics and U.S. pressure.[38]Shortly, a changing international structure and the gradual structural change in Japan’s policy-making machine facilitated Abe’s imprint in formulating his domestic security agenda.

In late 2013 and 2014 the Abe government successfully implemented major initiatives that would drastically change Japan’s security policy. In December 2013, it established its first National Security Council modelled after that of the United States and passed a new and strict State Secrecy Protection Law that was enacted in December 2014.[39] In the same month, the Japanese government issued new National Defense Policy Guidelines (NDPG, formerly NDPO), and Medium-Term Defense Program (MTDP): the former defines Japan’s longer-term defense policy, the latter details its defense policy and development of military capabilities for 2014 to 2018. In addition, the NSDC panel chaired by Kitaoka Shinichi, with Yachi as deputy chair, produced Japan’s first-ever National Security Strategy.[40] In particular, under the banner of Japan’s «proactive contribution to peace» (sekkyokuteki heiwa-shugi) Tokyo would step up its efforts not only in UN-led security activities, but, more importantly, in safeguarding regional security in tandem with the U.S. and key Asia-Pacific states. For that purpose, the NSS provided a comprehensive account of the government’s objectives, the perceived security environment and the foreign and domestic policy means to achieve said-objectives.

In other words, the NSDC in charge of the NSS effectively produced a Grand Strategy, which attempted to concert domestic and international efforts towards coherent national goals: concretely this entailed a more muscular security policy in strong coordination with Japan’s Trans-Pacific ally and, possibly, other relevant regional actors. Observers should not have confused Japan’s foreign policy new mantra, «proactive contribution to peace», with a liberal vision for Japan in the 21st Century: virtually all members of the panel were proponents of a balancing policy that was in line with Abe’s vision. The positive, liberal-sounding branding was intended to render palatable to international and domestic audiences Japan’s more muscular security posture. After all, the concept of «proactive pacifism» clashed with the Prime Minister’s earlier insistence on «breaking away from the post-war regime» (sengo rejīmu kara no dakkyaku), a concept that implied the rejection of the notion that Japan’s «pacifism» made it exceptional and declaring Japan to be a Great Power like any other autonomous Great Power. In fact, Abe had to be convinced of the merits of using the slogan «proactive contribution to peace»,[41] since he thought of it as diluting his rejection of traditional «pacifism». Away from the public stage Abe confirmed his appreciation for power politics.

Another major reform that reflects both the structural imperatives and the imprint of the Abe administration was the government’s April 2014 decision to substantially relax Japan’s arms exports’ control system. In fact, while the Noda government’s 2011 relaxation of Japan’s 1976 (quasi) total ban on arms export issued a set of comprehensive exemptions, the 2014 guidelines altogether ditched the total ban. The Abe government’s «Three Principles Concerning Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology» underplayed the scope of change from their very name. These promised to: 1) prohibit arms transfers to states involved in international conflicts and to those that breach U.N. Security Council resolutions; 2) allow exports following NSC-led government screenings; and 3) require Japan to vet any diversions of destination or different end-use of the technology. In this, the Japanese government was particularly sensitive about  diversions to China, as highlighted by the failed tank sale to Turkey.[42] The new guidelines will certainly increase Japan’s profile through joint development with key strategic partners and empower its indigenous defense industry. Yet, specialists on arms export controls agree that insuring proper end-use and preventing diversion has always proved arduous, if not altogether impossible.[43] The decision to assign licensing responsibility for sensitive cases to the newly-established NSC may also prove problematic. Given the NSC’s strong affiliation with Kantei, political factors will cloud its export decisions; all the more so since decisions will be taken behind closed doors, and without any obligation to record its minutes.[44] Moreover, Japan’s relative inexperience and seemingly limited overseas intelligence-gathering capabilities may hamper accurate assessments. At any rate, a comparison with the arms export regulations and practices of other states, including those with similarly minimalistic security postures, such as Germany and Sweden, showed that common practice often resulted in the sanctioning of exports to controversial destinations. This depended also on the structure of the arms export market following the global financial crisis, where most of the new demand for advanced weaponry came from new middle-income economies and rising powers with an imperfect track-record on human rights, and trade diversion.[45] Since domestic norms and identity still curtailed full-blown «normality» in the security field,[46] there existed the possibility of a domestic backlash against the newly formulated guidelines. For this reason, Japanese policy-makers had to walk a fine line between enduring domestic sensitivities on one side, and economic and strategic interests on the other. For all of the above reasons, Japan’s arms export decisions throughout 2014 were limited to reliable import countries, who provided solid guarantees on end-use and control, and with whom Japan often enjoyed a strategic relationship.

Finally, the July 1, 2014 Cabinet decision that allowed Japan’s exercise of the right of collective self-defense was the most consequential security-related reform undertaken by the Abe administration. The Italian Constitution has a similar pacifist complexion, but Italy’s rejection of war as a means for the settlement of international disputes had the qualification that it should not impede the deployment of its military force to maintain «a world order ensuring peace and justice among the Nations», usually with the mandate of «international organizations furthering such ends».[47] Abe’s new interpretation of the Constitution’s war-renouncing Article 9 arguably brought Japan in line with Italy’s position. But this is not exactly the case. Tokyo’s reinterpretation limited Japan’s involvement in collective security and endowed the country with the universal, inherent right of collective self-defense, enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. In an even narrower sense, it allowed a limited use of force to aid friendly countries under attack, and when said-attack threatened «Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness (sic)». At the same time, the Cabinet decision calls for «legislation which enables necessary support activities to armed forces of foreign countries engaging in activities for ensuring Japan’s security or for peace and stability of the international community».[48] This major change will grant greater integration and cooperation between Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and the military forces of friendly countries, mainly the United States. Arguably, it also aims at increasing Japan’s appeal as a reliable security partner to strategic states such as Australia and India, by allowing greater military engagement in regional, if not global, non-combat security activities. The decision had substantial implications for U.S.-Japan relations: it paved the way for seamless defense cooperation, and «jointness» between the two military machines, thus enhancing Japan’s deterrence vis-à-vis China.

3.2. Longing for «Normality» II: Washington’s Quest for Alliance Burden-Sharing

Away from the limelight, U.S. alliance handlers and official government policy certainly pushed for and facilitated smooth passage of Abe’s major security package. U.S. prudence vis-à-vis Beijing (detailed below) and budget cuts to U.S. military spending implied that Japan had to chip in with an ever greater share of the joint defense «burden» of the alliance. In fact, according to former assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management Yanagisawa Kyōji, it was indicative that U.S. military cuts for fiscal 2015 vis-à-vis 2012 corresponded to more than one year and a half of Japanese defense budgets, which contributed to Abe’s sense of urgency.[49]   Thus, given mounting dependency on its ally’s military protection throughout the post-Cold War, the Japanese government faced ever more serious incentives to «hug» the U.S. and concede to its requests for alliance burden-sharing that went beyond substantial cash contributions.[50] U.S. active involvement in directing the Japanese policy debate towards that particular direction was evident from the inception of the second Abe administration, although most of it was understandably not done in public. There was a rare instance of overt public acknowledgement to that effect, when in January 17 2013, U.S. Ambassador John Roos delivered a speech which stressed that Japan’s inability to come to the rescue of its ally, due to constitutional impediments, would have de facto entailed an end to the U.S.-Japan alliance.[51] U.S. government and pro-government activists also pushed forward Abe’s quest for collective self-defense (CSD). A key question was whether the government coalition’s «pacifist» member, the Komeitō, would accept it. One of its Diet Members revealed the flurry of personal visits by prominent American U.S.-Japan alliance handlers to convince the party leadership to be «on board» the July 1 Cabinet decision. Also included were informal meetings with the Embassy Deputy Chief of Mission.[52] These examples testified to Washington’s consistent push for greater Japanese military support to the bilateral alliance.

Yet, the Center for Strategic and International Studies-sponsored Armitage-Nye reports were the policy documents that had the greatest impact on Japan’s security agenda. Their bipartisan consensus and their authors’ prestige endowed these reports with great authority. They publicly spelled out the U.S. government’s policy desiderata, without being a U.S. government publication and, free from diplomatic protocol that demanded respect of another state’s sovereignty, the reports’ tone veered on the patronizing. Thus, on August 15, 2012 the third Armitage-Nye Report, U.S.-Japan Alliance, Anchoring Stability in Asia, wrapped its policy recommendations into a dramatic wake-up call: «In our view, tier-one nations have significant economic weight, capable military forces, global vision, and demonstrated leadership on international concerns. [Does] Japan desire to continue to be a tier-one nation, or is she content to drift into tier-two status? If tier-two status is good enough for the Japanese people and their government, this report will not be of interest».[53]  In a personal interview, Richard Armitage, trustee to the Center of Strategic and International Studies was conscious of its successes: «Joe [i.e. Joseph Nye] and I took a lot of satisfaction [from the three Armitage-Nye Reports]. Here is a Republican and a Democrat who worked through this thing seamlessly, never had a cross word between us, debated all the issues, and published our report. I don’t think any other civilians ever, non-governmental people, ever had reports that had that much effect on policy».[54]  In other words, the U.S. government’s desire for greater burden-sharing was so much the overwhelming consensus in Washington, that the CSIS report did not need be a government document: it merely reflected the U.S. taken-for-granted consensus. Yet, the fact that the two «Japan hands» had been in top government positions under the Clinton and Bush administrations, and kept acting as U.S.-Japan alliance handlers for different governments, including the Obama administration, gave the two documents a quasi-governmental allure, an aspect recognized by Joseph Nye: «I think the Japanese may have read more into this being a government wish list than was really the case».[55]By the mid-2000s, the reports were so influential that a recently-elected Abe had obtained, through the intercession of CSIS-based U.S.-Japan alliance manager Michael Green a delaying of publication of the second Armitage-Nye report to early 2007.[56] In an interesting historical twist, the same Abe would later push for a security agenda that reflected the mainstay in the bipartisan reports, the key elements of which remained the same throughout. Prime Minister Abe’s 2013 delivery of a public speech at CSIS following a bilateral summit with Obama further underlined the para-governmental allure given to the reports and the think-tank that sponsored them. Abe’s insistence then on Japan’s status as a «tier-one nation», a message that was also tailored back home, was testimony of the reports’ influence.

3.3. The Tenability of Abe’s Security Agenda and the Demographics Problem

The verdict on the endurance of Abe’s security agenda is unclear. The previous sections have highlighted the impact of political leadership in foreign and security policy-making, as manifested by Abe’s consistent and successful passage of his idiosyncratic security agenda, beginning in 2006-07. This was evident with regard to the earlier vagaries to endow Japan with the right of collective self-defense. Yanagisawa Kyōji, a former Defense Ministry official seconded to the Kantei as Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary, recalled being presented in 2007 with a ready-made set of recommendations of the blue ribbon advisory panel in charge of devising the legal framework for allowing collective self-defense. This was the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security. Yanagisawa would later attend all the panel meetings as rapporteur and lament the lack of legal experts on the Constitution.[57] However, Abe’s first administration ended before the committee’s final report and was succeeded by a considerably more prudent and milder Prime Minister, Fukuda Yasuo. When Fukuda was presented with the panel’s prescriptions for allowing the exercise of CSD he decided altogether to stonewall them, to the consternation and anger of prominent panel members.[58] Only in 2013 would Abe resuscitate the advisory panel with almost the exact same composition.

In fact, the markedly more restrained stance of previous DPJ and LDP-led administrations, such as the Fukuda administration’s (2007-2008) conscious decision to ignore and therefore kill (mokusatsu) Abe’s earlier CSD and NSC initiatives, left the door open for further policy change following Abe’s departure.[59] On one side, Abe’s extended political mandate following the December 2014 snap elections will allow him to consolidate earlier changes. In 2015, pertinent domestic legislation and the subsequent U.S.-Japan Security Guidelines – the equivalent of a ratification-free new security treaty – will enshrine and de facto institutionalize Abe’s security reforms. On the other side, low popular support for Abe’s changes of Japan’s defense policy was symptomatic of an enduring popular allergy against security issues, and a well-rooted antipathy against international military intervention, even only in non-combat activities. Perhaps more importantly, an evident gap between Abe’s objectives of turning Japan into a Great Power and the country’s actual material capabilities, such as demographic (hence long-term economic) capabilities, seriously questioned the long-term resilience of Abe’s agenda.

Indeed, Japan’s serious shrinking population problem remained unresolved. According to forecasts at the time of writing, Japan’s population will shrink by a third by 2064, while less than 2% of Japanese citizens and permanent residents were of foreign origin in 2014, an incredibly small figure compared to other rich economies.[60] The substantial increase of foreign residents needed to halt sinking natural population change (i.e. the number of births minus the number of deaths) implied a revolutionary immigration reform: in 2013 alone the population shrank by 244,000 while the number for new foreign citizens/permanent residents was around 10,000. In other words, the government needed to welcome more than 200,000 immigrants per year to keep pace.[61] A Herculean task the Japanese government demonstrated no intention of tackling. In fact, immigration remained a social taboo. Interviewed on primetime TV, Abe was unwavering when he held up a NO (batsu) signboard to throw open Japan’s doors, and added: «In countries that have accepted immigration, there has been a lot of friction, a lot of unhappiness both for the newcomers and the people who already lived there».[62] In fact, Japanese authorities still understood immigration as a temporary measure tied to particular economic circumstances, for instance in preparation of the Olympic Games in 2020. For these reasons, there were no incentives for companies to integrate and train foreign human resources employed in Japan, implying scant innovation and low human capital. On the demand side, short-term contracts and a short stay also meant low consumption, since foreigners would save for remittances and business activities back in their country of origin. Pundits often mention an increased use of robots as a possible remedy, but forget that a market economy thrives on supply and demand, that is, consumption is equally important to maintain the business cycle.

The lack of responsiveness on immigration policies is explained by a variety of factors. According to Atsushi Seike, five main reasons and popular fears work against a relaxed immigration policy:  i) the high costs connected with integration policies; ii) the loss of social stability and worsening of public security; iii) the likely decrease of the overall salary levels; iv) the formation of a closed society with immigration ghettos; v) and the ever-present anxiety over the dilution of Japanese culture.[63]In the author’s view, these anxieties rang particularly true in Japan, given the susceptible perceptions of its risk-adverse society, which is proud of its «particularism».[64] For these reasons, the Abe administration diverted attention from the sensitive topic and pushed, instead, for relaxed measures for highly-skilled immigrants to gain permanent residence and for greater participation of women in the workforce. The economic impact of these measures, however, will be limited.

In the author’s view, domestic concerns with the principal country of origin of immigration, China, reinforces the taboo. Paradoxically, one of the most integrated communities in Japanese society was the Chinese one. An overhaul in immigration policies would have entailed a substantial intake of Chinese immigrants, thanks to the incentives they faced. It makes perfect economic sense to employ domestically a cheap Chinese labor force that hailed from one of Japan’s biggest trade and investment destinations. Since the Chinese community is the largest foreign group in Japan, (674,230 as of June 2013),[65] relocation of new immigrants from continental China is made easier by extensive family networks. However also because   of diffuse national animosity against China, the demographic issue was altogether jettisoned from the national agenda. Abe’s intention to re-build Japan’s military strength recognized the perils of a Japan caught between the Scylla of a rising China and the Charybdis of a declining U.S., whose commitment to its ally’s security cannot be taken for granted indefinitely. However, overt governmental debate about immigration did not dwell either on the need for, nor on Japan’s long-term ability to deploy its military strength.  Comprehensive and detailed long-term policy and strategic documents, such as the National Security Strategy, simply did not refer to the issue.

3.4. The Logic of Playing Chicken:  Japan’s External Balancing and Economic Statecraft

In tandem with bolstering their own military capabilities and defense posture, Japanese policymakers sought to confront China by deepening and widening the net of Japan’s security ties with other states. The new Abe administration took up the geo-political strategy inaugurated by a Yachi-led MOFA in 2005 and 2006: the so-called Arc of Freedom and Prosperity was briefly rebranded as Japan’s «Asia Security Diamond». Later it was raised, at least in name, to the level of a global rather than regional strategy as the «Foreign Policy based on a Panoramic Perspective of the World-Map» (chikyū zentai o fukan suru gaikō).[66] It is here worth reminding the reader of the importance of Yachi’s previous interaction with Beijing: his belief that a powerful Japan that extended its network of strategic partners to deter assertive Chinese behavior, would succeed in softening Beijing’s posture.

For this and economic reasons, Abe travelled extensively and became the Prime Minister with the highest number of states visited on official diplomatic missions, hitting the record of 49 countries visited by September 2014.[67] There were multiple strategic overtures. The one strategic opening that promised the highest returns was between Russia and Japan: Abe’s five personal summits with Vladimir Putin aimed at finding a solution over the disputed territories, known as the Southern Kuriles in Russia and as Northern Territories in Japan. An eventual Peace Treaty would, in fact, have increased Japan’s leverage and allowed Tokyo to reorient more of its military forces towards its South-Western flank, to counter China’s advancement into the seas. Yet, the Ukrainian crisis forced Japan to side with the U.S. government’s sanctions policy. It did so, however, with much limited enthusiasm, leaving the door for a landmark agreement still ajar.[68] At the same time, many of these diplomatic missions were merely symbolic, if not altogether cosmetic. An instance of the latter was the display of supposedly strong personal bonds of trust between ‘Shinzo’ and other foreign leaders, including notoriously aloof ‘Barack’.[69] Similarly, Japan’s granting of prestigious ‘heads of state’ receptions to key foreign heads of government did not necessarily translate into concrete results. This was the case, for instance, in Japan’s relationship with India. After all, in 2014 the regional presence of the Chinese economy, both as an investor and as a trading state, had risen to formidable levels. India’s new Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, had China’s market and investment in mind when he courteously refused to inaugurate a Ministerial-level 2+2 Japan-India Strategic Dialogue between the countries’ Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministries. The failure to conclude a Japan-India civil nuclear agreement and a deal on Japan’s export of a search-and-rescue aircraft further testified to the summit’s limited results. Still, Modi’s visit was high on the media-hyped «bromance» between fellow nationalist state leaders, and led to a not properly-defined Japan-India «Special» Strategic and Global Partnership, whose major effect as of late 2014 was a resumption of joint military exercises.

What was new in Japan’s 2013-2014 China strategy was its economic component. Abe’s insistence on the perceived economic strengths of Abenomics and of an eventual China-less Trans Pacific Partnership aimed at proving both to Beijing and Japanese public opinion that China needed its neighbor more than vice-versa. As former moderate Ambassador to China, Niwa Uichirō stated in a 2014 book: «We should absolutely not look down on China, but at the same time Japan ought not to be too shy. […] It is still possible for Japan to improve its position in the Chinese market, because China would also find itself in a dire situation had it not received technology and assistance from Japan».[70] According to this reasoning, Japan need not make political concessions to safeguard its economic interests with China; on the contrary, it could take advantage of China’s ill-concealed economic problems. This view attracted a great deal of attention among the Japanese public and informed the second Abe administration’s economic «game of chicken» with China.[71]In addition to the security nexus implicit in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, Japan also aimed at revising its Official Development Assistance (ODA) charter to allow a more strategic use of official government aid, for instance to training foreign armed forces.  At any rate Tokyo was already making a strategic use of its ODA policy, by targeting key regional Middle Income Economies and providing yen loans for constabulary equipment. In 2015 Japan will provide the Philippines and Vietnam, two states that faced heated standoffs with China over disputed islands in the South China Sea, with Japanese patrol boats, already agreed to be funded from the ODA budget.[72] At the same time, China’s parallel and historic inauguration of huge and China-centered international development banks, such as the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and the «BRICS Bank», clearly signaled Beijing’s interest in challenging the Bretton Woods model based on the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

Economic statecraft aside, Abe and Yachi’s diplomatic strategy consistently followed the earlier one. Its first pillar consisted in the restoration of strong coordination and cohesion with its U.S. ally to augment the coercive tools at Tokyo’s disposal. To that effect, although the Obama administration’s pivot to Asia lost steam following the 2013 departure of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell, on April 24, 2014 Abe secured a clear statement from the U.S. President confirming that «[the] treaty commitment to Japan’s security is absolute, and Article 5 covers all territories under Japan’s administration, including the Senkaku Islands»,  as well as official support for Japan’s exercise of collective self-defense.[73] These signals were a manifestation of the Obama administration’s willingness to fully reassure its most important Trans-Pacific security partner, after some evidence of Washington’s ambivalence towards Tokyo throughout 2013.

The U.S. gave ostensible military support for Japan over the disputed islands in the form of repeated statements by Secretary of Defense Hagel, joint military exercises tailored at a Senkaku scenario, and symbolic gestures of resolve such as the flying of B-52 bombers there following China’s declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea. But the second Obama administration viewed Abe’s return to power with apprehension from its inception. Washington feared entrapment in a potentially explosive Sino-Japanese confrontation, as a result of both Tokyo’s and China’s stances. Washington was initially reluctant to update the Defense Guidelines and also refused to even discuss the merits of Japan acquiring offensive capabilities, a shift in Japan’s military doctrine that would have entailed an overhaul of the alliance framework – a refusal which testifies to U.S. doubts back in 2013.[74] Testimonies from American U.S.-Japan alliance handlers substantiate this view: in a Sankei Shinbun interview former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage was highly critical in pointing at «President Obama’s initial apprehension towards the Abe administration, although U.S.-Japan relations were much better than during the DPJ government».[75] A former high-ranking U.S. government official conceded that the Abe administration’s uncompromising stand vis-à-vis Beijing, peppered with both veiled and direct references to the history issue, was highly troubling to the Obama administration and other regional partners, to the point «that U.S.-Japan relations were in better shape under the Noda-led DPJ administration».[76] The Democratic Obama administration also fretted about Abe’s nationalistic stance and his revisionist views on history, fearing they might further damage Japan’s relations with China and South Korea – a U.S. treaty ally. Washington’s stance became evident on the occasion of its public condemnation of Abe’s December 2013 visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine.[77] Arguably, Abe misread Obama’s increasing resolution against China following Beijing’s November 2013 unilateral declaration of its East China Sea ADIZ.

Convergence with Japan’s position depended on Washington’s gradually-hardened posture vis-à-vis Beijing in 2014. In early 2014 U.S. government officials dropped reference to Beijing’s calls for a «New Type of Great Power Relations» (xinxing daguo guanxi), fearing it would have emboldened China and perplexed U.S. regional partners, first and foremost Japan. Washington’s stance against China seemingly hardened. Thus, the U.S. actively pushed back China’s attempt at declaring the ADIZ in the South China Sea.[78] Possibly due to the mid-term elections, the Obama administration brought criminal charges against five officers of the People’s Liberation Army for cyberattacks aimed at U.S. corporations. They were beyond the reach of American law, but their public naming and shaming was again a demonstration of Washington’s increasingly resolute stance towards China.[79] Assuming a smooth passage of Abe’s security agenda, the Japanese and U.S. governments also explored ways to reform the alliance’s operational guidelines to allow a greater Japanese contribution to regional security. Preliminary reports also speculated that the new U.S.-Japan Security Guidelines would have permitted joint patrols in the South China Sea with Japanese, U.S. and possibly Australian cooperation as well.[80] In addition, in 2014 Tokyo and Washington started discussing the merits for Japan to acquire offensive strike capabilities, although the issue was discussed on a track separate from the guidelines negotiations. Thus, while bogged down with the Ukraine crisis, the Obama administration was signaling its resolve to maintain stability in East Asia, in particular by providing incentives for the more active involvement of its security partners, such as Japan and Australia. The latter demonstrated proactive leadership and interest in joining Japan under the new conservative government of Prime Minister Tony Abbott.

3.5.   The Logic of Playing Chicken II: «Beefing Up» Japan-Australia Security Relations

The forceful neo-conservative premiership of Abbott responded with enthusiasm to Tokyo and Washington’s calls for enhanced security cooperation, as the U.S.-centered hub-and-spokes model was gradually giving way to «intra-spoke» cooperation. Former Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the U.S. NSC, Michael Green confirmed that Washington was in charge of the arranged-marriage (omiai) between Australia and Japan back in the mid-2000s. Security cooperation began between rotational Australian troops in charge of protecting relief JSDF operations in Iraq. Subsequently, the Australian government decided to build a security partnership with Japan under the leadership of Andrew Shearer, foreign policy advisor to then Prime Minister John Howard. U.S. efforts were reinforced when the U.S. former Ambassador to Australia, Thomas Schieffer, was subsequently seconded to Japan to smooth the road to security partnership between the United States of America’s closest security partners in the Asia-Pacific.[81]

However, after Abe and Howard signed the landmark Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in 2007, successive Australian Labor Party governments were typically more lukewarm. They understood the merits of not taking sides in the mounting Sino-Japanese dispute. A high-ranking Australian diplomat remarked that Australians were disconcerted to hear Tokyo’s repeated use of the word «quasi-alliance» (jun-dōmei) to define Japan-Australia relations.[82] That said, when Howard’s neo-conservative protégé rose to power in September 2013 and embraced deepened security ties with fellow conservative ‘Shinzo’, observers felt a strong sense of déjà-vu. In all likelihood, the further deepening of the Japan-Australia security partnership under the Abbott and Abe administrations, presented the same dynamics recounted above: active U.S. intercession, and top-down decision-making in both Tokyo and Canberra. This was another fascinating example of history repeating itself, not least because of the presence of the very same Japanese foreign policy executive.

The strategic partnership between Japan and Australia was repeatedly stated to be born out of shared values. The same foreign policy team under Abe’s first and second administrations had presented Japan’s foreign and security policy as based, on the primacy of universal values, democracy, the rule of law, and freedom of navigation – values not typically associated with Japan’s traditionally pragmatic approach to foreign policy. In fact, late Ambassador Okazaki’s response to an American journalist on the question of Japan’s foreign policy principles aptly summarized the endurance of Japan’s geopolitical imperatives: «The histories of our two countries are different. Your country was built on principles. Japan was built on an archipelago».[83] Again, it is worth noting that Okazaki was Abe’s mentor in security affairs and his thinking impacted greatly on Yachi. In turn, the public insistence on the rule of law and the like clearly sought to establish the legitimacy of Japan’s standing as a status quo Great Power, which consistently upheld the post-war liberal order. They also intended to undermine China’s unilateral claims in its multiple territorial disputes, as attempts to erode the foundations of such a liberal order and, finally, to legitimize the overtures to strategic partners. It did not matter that these principled claims meant condoning self-serving double standards, such as the 2005 U.S.-India civil nuclear deal, in contravention of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. At the same time, Abe and Abbott’s neo-conservative colors point at the reasons behind the qualitative differences in Japan’s two new special relationships: while Japan and Australia benefitted considerably from being stakeholders of the current international order, not so India whose leaders were more skeptical.

Thus, Tony Abbott’s visit to Tokyo with ‘head of state’-treatment – the first leg of the Australian prime minister’s North-East Asian tour – succeeded in capping bilateral negotiations for an economic partnership agreement (EPA) kick-started in 2007 under the first Abe Shinzō administration. This historical free trade agreement (FTA) opened Japan’s market to considerable competition from a large exporter of agro-alimentary products, most notably beef. Yet, Tokyo was able to retain its tariffs on frozen and chilled beef around a favorable twenty percent level and obtain tariff elimination on automobiles exported to the Australian market. Abbott’s prioritization of a trade deal favorable to Tokyo’s terms was welcome news for Japan, as the Australia-Japan EPA affected the stalled Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement. With the Japan-Australia EPA signed, U.S. negotiators were also under pressure to reach a compromise, rather than offer less to Japan’s requests in the TPP negotiations for tariff exceptions in the agricultural sector.

With regard to security cooperation the two sides agreed to «elevate the bilateral security and defense relationship to a new level».[84] To that effect Tokyo and Canberra resumed the Foreign and Defense Ministers’ «2+2» consultations in June 2014 and Abe made a highly significant state visit to Canberra. Unlike the Japan-India Special Strategic and Global Partnership, Tokyo’s expectations for greater security cooperation were met by the Australian counterparts and Abe and Abbott inaugurated a «special» strategic partnership that also had substantial consequences. Thus, the Abbott government pushed for a considerable refurbishing of Australia’s submarine fleet with ultra-quiet diesel-powered Japanese submarine technology. Prime Minister Abbott also displayed its appreciation of Abe’s security agenda by attending a meeting of the newly established Japanese NSC, and allowing joint training of amphibious forces stationed near Darwin, close to South East Asia. The Abbott government also opened up the possibility of Australia taking part in sea-borne tracking and intercepting operations through its ballistic missile capabilities.[85]Finally, Abe was granted the opportunity to address the Australian Parliament during his visit, the first ever for a Japanese Prime Minister. On that particular occasion he was able to showcase Japan’s humility over the wounds of history between Japan and Australia: «When we Japanese started out again after the Second World War, we thought long and hard over what had happened in the past, and came to make a vow for peace with [our] whole hearts. We Japanese have followed that path until the present day».[86] To the astonishment of his audience, Abe also did not shy away from spelling out the tragic encounters between Australian and Japanese troops: «Our fathers and grandfathers lived in a time that saw Kokoda and Sandakan».[87]

Why did nationalist Abe address Japan’s historical legacy? He certainly aimed at dispelling fears of a revisionist Japan in the eyes of Australian public opinion. In addition, the speech hinted at Abe’s willingness to look to the future, rather than the past. He cited the words of an Australian prime minister responsible for restoring Japan-Australia relations following WWII: «It is better to hope than always to remember».[88] I argue that Abe is yes a consistent revisionist nationalist, but he was also moved by a Nietzschean ressentiment, a psychological state based on suppressed feelings of envy and hatred precisely because it seemed impossible for Japanese nationalistic revisionists like himself, to be granted the status of  a «normal nation» (futsū no kuni), proud of its history. According to this particular understanding, Abe and the revisionist camp (wrongly) understood the ROK and China’s insistence on Japan’s past atrocities merely as a politically-oriented attempt to undermine the Japanese people’s natural patriotism and national pride.[89] By contrast, Abe was willing to acknowledge Australia’s forgiveness and willingness to move forward, a typically Christian approach to historical traumas. When he said: «We in Japan will never forget your open-minded spirit nor the past history between us» he implicitly was sending a message to his neighbors, but one with very little effect. China’s insistence on the history issue, coupled by Abe’s domestic display of his revisionist credentials, gave a much less promising picture of the prospects for historical reconciliation. Quite the opposite as Japan and China continued to engage in heated reciprocal accusations.

4. The «Propaganda Dilemma» and the Power Politics of Voldemort

As a result of the continued standoff over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the Chinese and Japanese governments found themselves embroiled in an additional type of «game of chicken», what I and China scholar Aurelio Insisa have labelled a «propaganda dilemma». Both sides feel vulnerable to the other’s hostile international and domestic public opinion warfare, respond by increasing their propaganda security, and thereby increasing the propaganda insecurity of the other. They respond by insisting on the righteousness of their position over the territorial row and by intensifying their negative campaigns against the other, thus, fostering a vicious circle of mutually reinforcing antagonistic criticism. This process is fuelled by the Realist logic that the standoff depended first and foremost on building up domestic resolve against the opposing state. At the same time, the Japanese and Chinese governments sought international support that would reverberate with their respective domestic audiences.[90] More simply, Tokyo and Beijing exchanged verbal fire to win the support of foreign governments and international public opinion.

Similarly to Abe and Yachi’s afore-mentioned security overtures, past-interaction with China shaped recent policy decisions in this sphere as well. For instance, and virtually unnoticed elsewhere, the propaganda wars coincided with Tokyo’s preliminary arrangements for its 2015 bid for a Non-Permanent Seat at the U.N. Security Council (UNSC), with the future prospect of reforming the UNSC altogether, an objective high on the Koizumi/Abe agenda back in 2005.[91]The Japanese government needed to reinforce its PR machine in preparation for the looming 70thanniversary from the end of World War II, given that ten years earlier, at the 60th anniversary, Tokyo was generally thought to have lost to Beijing’s propaganda campaigns. Back in 2005, the then-Japanese Deputy Permanent Representative  to the United Nations, Kitaoka Shinichi, who would later chair the commission in charge of the National Security Strategy (NSS), attributed to Beijing’s pro-active use of the «history card» its success in undermining Japan’s earlier bid for a seat as a UNSC Permanent Member.[92] China’s vehement opposition and media campaigns forced Japan to abort its plans, although the Italy-led United for Consensus initiative was, arguably, the driving force against the G-4 UNSC reform proposal. On the basis of enduring goals and past experience, the December 17, 2013 NSS dedicated a whole section to «Strengthening the Domestic Foundation of National Security and Promoting Domestic and Global Understanding» with two sub-sections entitled «Boosting Communication Capabilities» and «Reinforcing the Social Base». This foundational document paved the way to Tokyo’s major communication strategy and Tokyo’s giant neighbor was high on the Japanese government’s priority list.

Indeed, inflammatory Sino-Japanese public diplomacy characterized 2014 from its inception. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) seized upon Abe’s controversial pilgrimage to the Yasukuni Shrine of December 26, 2013 and immediately crafted an international campaign, which turned into Japan’s recently-formulated communication strategy’s baptism of fire. This campaign aimed at denouncing the dangers of a militarist and revisionist Japan that acted in defiance of the world order created after the victorious war against fascism. By early February, as many as 73 Chinese ambassadors had already penned editorials or granted interviews along the above lines, inviting stern Japanese rebuttals, and counter-criticism in favor of Japan at a global level: from the United Kingdom to the Republic of Fiji![93] Notably, in January 2014 the two governments’ ambassadors to the UK compared the counterpart in newspaper commentaries with «Voldemort» the root of all things evil in the famous Harry Potter series, and exchanged accusations on prime time TV on a popular BBC show devoted to current affairs.[94] The discussion was incredibly heated and, similarly to the above case, Japan’s campaigns were often in response to those initiated by China’s assertive propaganda machine.

Recent original scholarship has pointed to the spiraling nature of discursive animosity between the Chinese and Japanese governments. [95] Nonetheless, it fails to recognize the international power politics and domestic politics behind this progressive construction of antagonistic identities, that is to say the Realist underpinnings of discourse-making. Specific to Japan, previous research employed broad constructivist theories of International Relations to underline how domestic public discourses since the end of the Cold War have increasingly constructed Japan’s state identity in relation to an antagonistic or aberrant Chinese counterpart («Self» versus «Other»). Japan specialists have looked at antagonistic narratives taken from war memorials,[96] the media,[97] as well as political and public debates,[98] to contend that the sedimentation and active re-construction of such discourses eventually define Tokyo’s foreign policy options vis-à-vis Beijing. Contrary to the constructivist literature, I argue that an eminently political logic rooted on the very Realpolitik of Sino-Japanese competition, and on Abe’s worldview and previous interaction with Beijing, determined Japan’s widespread and often indirect denunciations of China when addressing international and domestic audiences. Thus, I contend that the diffusion of negative discourses is symptomatic of Sino-Japanese friction rather than an underlying cause of the same.

Importantly, the flaring up of the Japan-China battle for the sympathies of informed public opinion in turn cemented novel domestic institutions, which echoed the chorus of voices from the government and media organs lamenting Chinese behavior. Given practical, budgetary, institutional and ideational limitations to Japanese remilitarization, I contend that talks of a Sino-Japanese «security dilemma» let alone of an indigenous Japanese «military-industrial complex», are premature.[99] On the other hand, by 2014 a Sino-Japanese «propaganda dilemma» had already taken shape, with booming expenses and voices dedicated to strategic communication. Along with the «propaganda race», I argue that a «governmental-institutional-media complex» concerned with the neighboring «Other» was also slowly taking root. This section will provide evidence from 2014 to substantiate this novel insight, with specific reference to Japan. It will highlight the centrality of governmental and political actors as «identity entrepreneurs» involved in re-constructing Japan’s «Self» and the Chinese «Other».[100] While some scholars have pointed at the importance of identity politics behind Japan’s relations with China, they failed to notice the basso continuo of power politics, nor did they operationalize the active involvement of political actors in discourse-making. This section intends to better understand these dynamics and underlines the substantial role of the Prime Minister’s office in discourse-making.

I argue that the Japanese government devised novel strategies in reaction to Chinese propaganda warfare and assertive behavior, in turn shaping the politics of Japan. Without proffering Voldemort’s name, the 2013 National Security Strategy spelled out the broad rationale behind these strategies, with international and domestic audiences in mind: «At a time when the global security environment is becoming more complex and diverse, it becomes increasingly likely for countries to have conflicting interests» and «in order to promote its security policy from a medium-to long-term perspective, it is imperative that Japan proactively and effectively communicate its policy to the world and its people».[101] A former MOFA analyst’s plea for confronting China’s «public opinion/media, legal and psychological warfares» aptly summarizes the Japanese government’s rationale for beefing up its communication efforts in tandem with its hard power: «We must realize that soft counter-measures at the expense of hard capabilities will not solve the problems. At the same time, the ‘three warfares strategic’ concept teaches us that hard material capabilities alone will not suffice, […] we need both material and spiritual measures (to confront China’s strategy)».[102] Moreover, the surfacing of a «propaganda dilemma» soon after the nationalization of three Senkaku islets almost coincided with the inauguration of the Abe administration, and shaped the very domestic politics of Japan. In fact, the diffusion of parallel, mutually antagonistic discourses helped consolidate Abe’s power domestically and partly contributed to legitimizing the speedy passage of major reforms in Japan’s security policy. Almost identical dynamics shaped China’s domestic politics since late 2012, when Xi Jinping quickly rose to power and came to be regarded as China’s most influential leader since Deng Xiaoping.

This chapter provides extensive empirical evidence that substantiates this original framework to better understand developments in this fascinating, if worrisome, aspect of Sino-Japanese relations. Following a short outline of the Sino-Japanese negative discourses, I briefly sketch the Chinese government’s domestic and international initiatives. The next sections will then look at the Japanese government’s international and domestic communication efforts. Finally, I explore the role of Japan’s mass media in reproducing the China obsession at the domestic level.

4.1. Sino-Japanese Narratives of «Self» and «Other»

Prior to detailing the Japanese government’s communication efforts, I provide a brief outline of the discourses in question. It is possible to disentangle a set of mirror images that characterize Japan’s images of «Self» and the Chinese «Other»: i) the first paints Japan as a benign and peaceful power pitted against an assertive China, on the lines of the exchange between the two ambassadors to London; ii) the second stresses the revisionist nature of the counterpart as a challenger to the international liberal order, while depicting the «Self» as a status quo country that loyally abides by international law; iii) the third highlights Japan’s political modernization as the first Asian country to uphold universal values, such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, implicitly highlighting the differences with autocratic China, which had surpassed Japan’s economy in 2010.[103] Such themes were evident from Abe’s official statements throughout 2014, although references to China were typically oblique. In fact, the Japanese government carefully avoided naming China, not unlike the fictional Lord Voldemort, whose name should never be proffered. On the contrary, the Chinese government’s arguments were typically more negative in character and accusatory in tone, but somewhat mirrored the content of Japan’s narratives. In lieu of democratic values, Chinese discourses highlighted Japan’s historical amnesia as a mirror of its neighbor’s supposedly aggressive behavior.[104]

Both governments were active in constructing the above-mentioned converging negative images, albeit with important differences. China insisted on issues related to Japan’s imperial legacy, while the Abe administration highlighted China’s violation of the international rule of law. Reflecting the spirit of the «propaganda dilemma», China progressively insisted on war-related nationalism and narratives of victimhood for domestic and international political gains. This was evident from the Chinese government’s decision in early 2014 to institutionalize and memorialize the anniversaries of its victory against Japan and the Nanjing Massacre. On December 13, Xi Jinping became the first Chinese President to publicly commemorate the brutal events at the hands of the Japanese occupiers in Nanjing. Less noticed, the Chinese central and local governments re-opened historical wounds that did not previously figure in the state-sanctioned narrative of the second Sino-Japanese war.[105] For instance, in April 2014 a Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs official hinted at the new obstacles to bilateral reconciliation when he stated that: «There are three history issues left between Japan and China: the disposal of chemical weapons [dating back to the second Sino-Japanese war], forced labor, and the comfort-women issue».[106] In early 2014 Nanjing City’s decision to preserve its old comfort station, Asia’s biggest, pointed at China’s novel sensibility towards the issue of wartime sex laborers, not all of whom should, however, be identified as «sex-slaves».[107] Chinese authorities had also demonstrated a novel position with regard to plaintiffs who had been or whose relatives had been forced laborers. The Beijing district court agreed in 2013 to hear denunciations and petitions that had been rebuffed for decades. These domestic dynamics, undertaken both at the national and local level, contributed to crystallizing domestic antipathy against Japan.

China’s insistence on raising historical issues also had political implications in the international arena, as seen from its 2005 interaction at the UNSC. In the year under review, Beijing launched a global political campaign against Abe’s Yasukuni visit, and successfully lured into closer relations South Korea (ROK) a key neighboring state, traditionally highly sensitive to the legacy of Imperial Japan. In late 2013 a memorial was inaugurated in Harbin, in northern China, to commemorate a South Korean independence activist, responsible for the assassination of Itō Hirobumi, one of the founding fathers of modern Japan who later became Resident-General of the Korean protectorate.[108] The emergence of the China-ROK common front on history was a new development that had important implications for the regional balance, to the extent that it considerably worried Washington, prompting active U.S. intervention to mend ties between Seoul and Tokyo.[109] At the same time, China’s attempt to win the sympathies of international public opinion bore mixed results. After all, Western public opinion paid, at best, scant attention, and while Western governments viewed with concern the irresponsible escalation that the Abe government’s ambiguous revisionist posturing partly contributed to, these were well aware of China’s use of the «history card» for diplomatic gain. China’s failed attempt at pitting Japan against Germany, the model penitent state, during President Xi’s state visit to Berlin in March was a case in point.[110]At the same time, I argue that the Chinese media’s insistence on the righteousness of Beijing’s international propaganda war against an «unrepentant» and «revisionist» Japanese government indicated that these supposed PR victories were for a large part also tailored for its domestic audiences.[111] As a result, in 2014 history and its public remembrance became ever more vivid and inflammatory during the Sino-Japanese standoff. Abe’s own silences, half-hearted apologies and ambiguous statements and the December 2013 Yasukuni visit contributed in reigniting nationalistic and accusatory vicious spirals. In line with Abe and Yachi’s China strategy, Tokyo unwaveringly responded with its own set of accusations. The escalation of anger was becoming evident in the two governments’ communication efforts.

4.2.     Tokyo’s «Information Dissemination on the Offensive!»

Reciprocal bilateral accusations at major international venues have provided for the full display of the Sino-Japanese «propaganda dilemma» and of the afore-mentioned narratives. One case in point was the 2014 World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, where Prime Minister Abe was granted the honor of delivering the keynote speech; Abe extolled the merits of economic reforms under the rubric of Abenomics, but devoted the second-half of the speech to selling Japan’s more muscular security policy in conjunction with the need to «rigorously maintain the (international) rule of law», necessary for the preservation of regional public goods, which include «fundamental values like freedom, human rights and democracy».[112] In addition, over the Q&A session with media representatives, Abe warned those present that economic interdependence was no panacea for inter-state conflict, as proved by the exacerbation of antagonism between the UK and Germany one hundred years earlier.[113] Here Abe intended to make a veiled equation of China with Wilhelm II’s Germany, a revisionist and autocratic continental power, pitted against the United Kingdom, a maritime power that upheld the pre-World War I international order. Chinese delegates responded in kind with their own historical analogies: they lamented Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni shrine that hosted the spirits of 14 Class-A war criminals alongside those of about 2.5 million war dead, and lamented Japan’s history of imperialist aggressions against China.[114]Notably, Chinese participants in the 2014 Davos Summit outnumbered Japanese panelists and discussants two to one, and included heavyweights such as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, whereas hitherto Chinese government officials and representatives had tended to shun the winter Davos for China’s own Boao Forum and the summer Davos.[115] Sino-Japanese propaganda wars were on full display from the very beginning of 2014 and messages conveyed in prestigious international venues, such as Davos, had both international and domestic resonance. Exactly the same dynamics were at play five months later at the premier Asian security summit, the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ (IISS) Shangri-La Dialogue. According to IISS Director of Transnational Threats and Political Risks Nigel Inkster, China-Japan (and U.S.) finger-pointing replaced diplomatic speak for the first time in the Dialogue’s history.[116] In other words, the «propaganda dilemma» was a clear expression of the bilateral standoff.

In addition to a more declarative stance that defended Japan’s position, I note that the Abe administration oversaw the inauguration of novel institutions, budget provisions and legislation tailored explicitly at reinforcing Tokyo’s communication efforts on the questions of disputed territories, China’s aggressive behavior and the history issue. The existent academic literature fails to analyze the politics, intricate institutional webs and decision-making structures behind discourse-making in Japan, with the partial exception of textbook politics.[117] This essay aims to fill this important gap in the academic literature by highlighting the interplay between the international power politics of the Sino-Japanese «propaganda dilemma» and, in particular, Japan’s domestic politics.

Most importantly, Japan’s public relations’ efforts certainly benefitted from a massive budget allocation. In March 2014, the budget allocation for the sole Cabinet office with responsibility for the central government’s «public relations, public hearing activities and international PR» increased more than 50% from the previous year: from 4.4 to 6.5 billion yen. Moreover, the Cabinet office requested a 20% increase of its budget allocation for the new fiscal year.[118] In the same month the LDP established a Committee for the Assessment of International Information (kokusai jōhō kentō iinkai), and submitted a final report on June 17 with a rather eloquent title: «Information Dissemination on the Offensive!».[119] Finally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) inaugurated a new budget allocation, a new voice for «strategic information dissemination» which for the 2015 fiscal year amounted to a significant sum of 50 billion yen ‒ the equivalent of 421 million dollars (as per January 2014). To be sure, the money will be spent on new institutions devoted to cultural diplomacy, apart from explaining Japan’s positions on wartime history and its territorial disputes. At the same time, while the overall budget allocation grew by a meager 2,9%, resources devoted to MOFA-led cultural and public diplomacy more than tripled.[120] Five billion yen will be devoted to the establishment of «Japan Houses» in key cities with the aim of countering the rising tide of its neighbors’ initiatives, such as China’s «Confucius Institutes».[121] Japan Houses will first be established in São Paulo, London and Los Angeles, given their global reach, especially in content creation industries. Yet, this new initiative may suffer from elephantiasis and possibly politicization, since Japan already enjoyed massive firepower through pre-existing private Japanese foundations and governmental organs devoted to public diplomacy. For instance, London already hosted a small Japan Foundation office, and the successful and rich Daiwa Anglo-Japanese and Great Britain Sasakawa Foundations; the latter two institutions were all generous supporters of a variety of research projects and activities related to Japan and Asia in and outside academia. The key difference was that the new mega-institutions would have likely followed a centralized government-centered political agenda that risked excessive politicization.

In fact, similarly to other initiatives, the «Japan Houses» aimed at reinforcing the role of the Prime Minister’s office, in the diffusion of Japan’s public diplomacy. The decision to open six new embassies and two consulates abroad, the «most overseas facilities ever approved at one time» according to Foreign Minister Kishida, provided further evidence of the centrality of politics.[122]  In addition, the Prime Minister’s office was in the driver’s seat of external communication efforts, again in line with provisions contained in the National Security Strategy: «The Prime Minister’s office serving as the control tower, Japan will enhance its public relations in an integrated and strategic manner through a government-wide approach».[123] Specific to the afore-mentioned budget allocation to MOFA, a source close to the Prime Minister stated as follows to The Oriental Economist:  «This money is first and foremost for MOFA, but since the Prime Minister’s office is very interested in this topic, Prime Minister Shinzō Abe and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga will closely watch how this money is spent».[124] In fact, I find that lack of specifications of the type of activities to which the new Japan Houses will be devoted suggested not only the hastiness in establishing the new PR machine in 2014, but also the likelihood that the Prime Minister’s office will enjoy considerable freedom in deciding the content of the activities. The risk of excessive politicization of public diplomacy – an emphasis on defensive-revisionist campaigns in line with Abe’s thinking – was immediately proved by MOFA’s direct calls in early 2015 to the publishing company McGraw-Hill requesting revision of a U.S. history textbook   that briefly mentioned the so-called «comfort-women» issue.[125] This episode is strong evidence of the changed domestic balance of power on management of the history issue tilting in favor of Kantei. Only two years earlier, MOFA officials were quietly sabotaging revisionist policymakers visiting Washington by asking key U.S. handlers of the U.S.-Japan alliance to lecture their Japanese guests on the dos and don’ts of history.[126] Since then the evident outreach of the Prime Minister also in Japan’s communication campaigns has clearly been strengthened.

Further evidence of Abe’s proactive engagement in the Cabinet Secretariat was the establishment of a specific advisory group within the Cabinet Secretariat shortly after taking office, in March 2013. The so-called Advisory Panel on Communications Concerning Territorial Integrity aimed at strengthening the Japanese government’s domestic and overseas communication strategies over territorial disputes by offering key suggestions to improve outreach to domestic and international audiences through the diffusion of updated information on internet sites.[127] Interestingly, the panel included reference to the Takeshima Islands (disputed between Japan and the ROK) but avoided any mention of the Northern Territories/Southern Kuriles dispute between Japan and Russia, indicating a desire to enhance Tokyo’s flexibility at the negotiation table with Moscow in the talks about a possible Peace Treaty. Politics were clearly in command.

Japan’s active governmental public relations engagement was also discernable in the international academic and public policy worlds, not only at the domestic level. Firstly, the activities of major international, especially U.S., think-tanks were encouraged to reflect Tokyo’s messages, in return for donations, according to a Japanese diplomat.[128] Similarly, the Japanese government decided to endow three chairs in Contemporary Japanese Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Georgetown and Columbia Universities, in an attempt at fostering a new generation of Japan specialists within its strategic ally. Both initiatives aimed at countering the alarming decrease in international interest for Japan, compared with international interest for China and, to a lesser extent, South Korea. In fact, Obama’s National Security Council listed no «Japan hands» among its directorate. Finally, governmental efforts also aimed directly at the message. As soon as Abe rose to power the Kantei pushed for English translations of scholarly articles sympathetic to the official government’s line to boost Japan’s PR strategy.[129] One such case was the newly-established «Tōsho Kenkyū Jānaru» (The Journal of Island Studies), a selection of whose articles is also available in the sleek Japanese website and in its English equivalent: «Review of Island Studies». [130] The government-backed Ocean Policy Research Foundation started this publication in June 2013, as a result of the newly inaugurated Basic Plan of Ocean Policy, and its articles emphasized the leitmotivs enunciated earlier. At the time of writing the Japanese and English websites exclusively carried essays that reflected Japanese territorial claims against China, Taiwan and the ROK but, interestingly, with only passing reference to the Southern Kuriles/Northern Territories dispute with Russia. Politics were also in command of this scholarly initiative.

Finally, government officials legitimized the PR campaigns as necessary to catch-up with and respond to China’s massive firepower, thus highlighting the anxieties embedded in the Japan-China «propaganda dilemma». According to MOFA leaks to the conservative Sankei Shinbun, the Japanese PR machine was inadequate compared to its neighboring rival, since propaganda there rested on a rare synergy between the state-run media, academics and experts within the Chinese Communist Party apparatus.[131] In addition, interviews with U.S. and Japanese government officials confirm the newly intensified attention given to improving the appeal, and deepening the reach, of Japan’s public English-language broadcast channel, NHK World. In future it will be infused with a considerable amount of public funding to boost its programming in 2015. Both interviewees specifically pointed to the need to balance the global reach of the (unfortunately-called) CCTV News’ around-the-clock English broadcasting. An increased Japanese media presence was necessary.[132]

Again, these dynamics underscore the very nature of the «propaganda dilemma»:  the perception of Japan’s weakness vis-à-vis China’s communication strategy fed these public outcries for greater PR efforts. China witnessed highly similar wake-up calls, urging the merits of a more aggressive public opinion warfare – urgings based on the same feelings of inadequacy, and perceived weakness compared with its neighbor’s powerful machine.[133] As the above cases have demonstrated, 2014 saw the full-fledged ignition of the Japan-China «propaganda race», confirming the underlying power politics behind it.

4.3.           Toward a Patriotic Education

Finally, a moment needs to be spent on educational efforts. Abe’s educational and domestic agenda was primarily aimed at reviving Japanese citizens’ interest over disputed territories and awakening their lukewarm interest in national security, and gaining support for a more muscular security policy. Indeed, Japanese citizens consistently ranked national security legislation as of lesser importance than economic policy throughout the troubled period under review and viewed Abe’s security legislation with suspicion. Meager support for the July 1, 2014 Cabinet reinterpretation and a 10% decrease in the number of applicants to the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, as a result of increased sensibility to risk, were clear indicators of that trend.[134] This implied that diffuse popular wariness of China did not coincide with popular approval of Abe’s security agenda. Higher popular sensibility towards China did not necessarily imply an embrace of Abe’s security policy, since Japanese citizens kept prioritizing bread-and-butter issues over an unpalatable security agenda. For these reasons, the Abe administration spent energy and resources on strengthening domestic resolve, a factor seen as equally important as other hard capabilities. It did so also by making full use of new institutional leverage for idiosyncratic policies.

Thus, for instance, with regard to messages tailored at domestic audiences, in March 2013 the Japanese government established a new five-year Basic Plan of Ocean Policy through a Cabinet decision. According to one of the main authors, Terashima Hiroshi, the new Basic Plan enshrines «increased education on maritime issues» as a founding principle essential in the formation of human resources. This would entail: «complementing elementary to high school curricula with education on maritime issues, promoting interdisciplinary and specialized training in tertiary education, strengthening the development of basic and state-of-the-art research, and developing tripartite cooperation among state, academia and industry».[135] Secondly, in January 2014, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), revised the guidelines for middle and high-school classes on geography, history and social sciences. Specific to the Senkaku, excerpts of revised guidelines for various classes state the government’s afore-mentioned rock-solid stance: «the fact that these are an inherent part of Japan which are under its valid control, and there exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved have to be understood»; «the facts that Japan lawfully incorporated (…) the Senkaku Islands based on the international law should be touched upon», and the like.[136] The islands were Japan’s. Period.

Education reforms were also part of Abe’s own blueprint to instill patriotic feelings in Japanese schoolchildren, consistent with similar efforts during his first premiership and his efforts at turning Japan into a Great Power. After all, conservative ideational goals also dictated the agenda in favor of a more patriotic education, and these goals reflected Abe’s personal political philosophy, according to which individual rights rested on the primacy of a strong nation-state capable of safeguarding them. Thus, for the purpose of building a resilient Japan, state education had to awaken citizens’ social consciousness and pride in their «beautiful country» – an ill-defined concept that provided the title and leitmotiv of Abe’s 2006 manifesto, his book, Toward a Beautiful Country.[137] A «beautiful Japan» however implied a revaluation of the country’s historical and geographical contours in line with the Prime Minister’s brand of nationalism. Moreover, Abe’s notoriously revisionist personal views on Japan’s Imperial experience remained controversial and constituted an additional driver to the administration’s education policy changes.

4.4.Japan’s Mass Media: Reproducing the China Obsession

After detailing the Japanese government’s own international and domestic communication efforts and the newly-inaugurated institutions devoted to these purposes, I address the role of the country’s major media outlets, of some importance, given the record-high consumption of news media in Japan. The country presents the world’s highest per capita circulation of newspapers, and is one of the top-performing OECD countries in reading literacy.[138] The media consumption market is dominated by five big news media groups, the so-called «Big Five». Through share cross-ownership each of the biggest newspapers is affiliated with a particular broadcasting channel and, although direct control is prevented due to domestic regulations, there are strong financial, personnel and news reporting ties between the five national newspapers and their national broadcast stations, all based in Tokyo.[139] Recent studies have shown that the role played by the mass media in heated security issues is increasingly important in Japan, firstly in being more closely reflective of public opinion and secondly in pursuing more defiant and independent editorial stances away from the official governmental line.[140] Finally, as it is clear from the variety of editorial and critical articles, editorial boards have become more active since the late ‘80s, also as a response to the growing influence of television media’s more sensationalistic and «infotainment» style of reporting and political debate.[141] In other words, the state of affairs of the Japanese media is not very different from other developed countries.

Notwithstanding the variegated media landscape, I posit that major newspaper companies have echoed the Japanese government’s stance over the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute and Japanese discourses vis-à-vis China, as part of a «governmental-institutional-media» complex that fanned Japanese references to a rising and bullying China. As noted already by Suzuki Shogo, major newspapers from opposing political spectrums have coalesced in denouncing an aggressive and autocratic China that acts in disrespect of international norms.[142] One reason must be found in the economics of traditional media. For instance, faced with the rise of free digital media, Japan’s major newspapers have suffered a steep decline in sales. Between November 2013 and May 2014 Japan’s biggest newspaper, the Yomiuri Shinbun, lost about 7% of its market (i.e. minus 659,291 copies sold).[143] Thus, fiercer competition drove editors’ appetite for a more sensationalistic tone that was better attuned to growingly incensed general readership. The popularity of anti-China publications during the year under review confirmed the popular sentiment;[144] in fact, Japanese citizens’ impressions of China reached rock-bottom in the same year, as 93% of respondents to the yearly Genron NPO opinion poll reported unfavorable views of China, an all-time low.[145]While major Japanese dailies usually abstained from a sensationalistic tone more commonly found in their Western equivalents, the coalescence of the Japanese print media in focusing on a negative China image contributed to these dismal ratings: reinforcing a sense of contrast between a virtuous «Self» pitted against a hostile «Other».

Moreover, the year under review witnessed a major blow to the credibility of Japan’s main progressive news outlet, the Asahi Shinbun. The editorial stances of Asahi Shinbun were traditionally the most sympathetic to China’s positions and the most critical of historical revisionism among the five national dailies, drawing criticism from conservative and nationalistic circles. Prime Minister Abe had long considered Asahi his personal bête noire, and repeatedly attacked its former editor-in-chief Wakamiya Yoshibumi for his alleged «anti-Japanese writings», especially on the so-called «comfort-women» issue.[146] In the later summer of 2014 the newspaper admitted misreporting on two major stories – one related to wartime sex workers and the other on the behavior of Tokyo Electric Power Company in March 2011. These admissions invited fierce criticism not only from its competitors but also from the Chief Cabinet Secretary and the Prime Minister. The brouhaha caused by these retractions somewhat weakened the authority of those usually labelled as holders of shinpoteki, «progressive» views of history. It led to the resignation of the President of Asahi Newspaper, and to a surprising media campaign by the revisionist news outlet Sankei Shinbun, which had consistently claimed there never was coercion involved in wartime prostitution. In later September 2014, it appealed to new readers with a publicity stunt titled: «Sankei Shinbun: Reporting Based on Historical Facts» (Shijitsu ni motozuki hōdō).[147] Reflecting the blowing revisionist wind, in November the Yomiuri Shinbun apologized and retracted earlier articles that incorrectly used the term «sex slaves» for its English language newspaper.[148] Thus, evidence indicates that the Asahi blow fortified the revisionist camp, although decline in subscriptions to the Asahi Shinbun as at the time of writing was in line with general market trends.

Perhaps in response to the afore-mentioned market difficulties, evidence shows that the news media had closely reflected the broader structural trends of Sino-Japanese confrontation. For instance, in the early 2010s they all fell into line by always referring to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands as «the Senkaku Islands, in Ishigaki City, Okinawa-Prefecture», underlining the «inherently Japanese» nature of the disputed territories. A personal e-mail exchange with an editorial writer at Kyodo News details Japanese media’s reacting to Chinese bullying and how they correlate with popular sensibilities, transmitted to evermore self-conscious Japanese news producers through online criticism via Twitter and 2Channel. Thus, in late September 2010 Asia’s biggest newswire service sent an internal notice to its reporters days after a Chinese fishing boat rammed Japanese Coast Guard ships on September 7, 2010.[149] It demanded that they should no longer write «Senkaku Islands (Chinese name: Diaoyu Dao)» but simply «Senkaku Islands». These minor changes in appellation in newswires and articles are significant because they a priori negate the existence of a territorial dispute, and by implicitly ignoring Beijing’s position they render China’s assertive behavior totally gratuitous. Interestingly, these changes have reverberated in Xi Jinping’s China, where mention of «Senkaku» on national broadcasting channels would have led to immediate termination of employment. [150] At any rate, Chinese media traditionally never mentioned the Japanese name along the Chinese one.

Heavyweights such as Niwa Uichirō, the moderate former Ambassador to China under the government of the Democratic Party of Japan, also disclosed personal disappointment with Japanese media’s China bashing. He deserves to be cited in full: «All Japanese media share a bias: they over-report news that portrays China negatively, pandering to the general public. Articles detrimental to China are extensive and given high visibility. Articles that convey a positive image are short and have low visibility».[151] Counter-intuitively, in view of gross generalizations that depict the internet as a panacea empowering individuals and citizens’ journalism, Japan’s web negotiated with pre-existing structures of power and privilege, [152] only to inflame Japan’s sense of insecurity and obsession vis-à-vis China.  Thus, for instance, under the Abe administration governmental agencies have devoted a larger chunk of resources to publicity via social media and official internet websites, thus allowing them to directly reach their intended audience. In 2014, one only needed to navigate the sleek official webpage of the Prime Minister’s Office to appreciate the Japanese government’s publicity efforts. Moreover, whereas four of the five major Japanese dailies had set up paywalls for their content, the notoriously conservative and China-bashing Sankei Shinbun remains, as of writing, the only free online news provider. The lower number of sold paper copies masks the popularity of the Sankei Shinbun on the internet, where its news feeds are provided to the popular MSN portal. While beyond the scope of this brief account, it is worth noting that news carried by highly popular weekly magazines (shūkanshi) have also increasingly gravitated towards China-bashing.  See, for instance, the right-leaning SAPIO’s September 2014 cover story, entitled «The nasty things China does in Japan». [153]

Was the conservative Abe government, then, merely reflecting wider popular and media refrains on China? In my view, the Japanese government was acting in tandem with popular anxieties, but often had the upper hand in framing the public discourse. Government agencies and the Prime Minister’s office made full use of a savvy media strategy premised on direct influence, as well as carrots and sticks. The Prime Minister’s dominant intervention was particularly evident in the case of NHK. Abandoning the traditional practice of appointment by diffuse LDP-business-bureaucratic decision-making, [154]  the Prime Minister and his entourage were directly responsible for the December 2013 appointment of NHK’s new Chairman and of four new members of the board, whose stance strongly reflected Abe’s revisionist agenda. The new NHK Chairman Momii Katsuto confirmed publicly and privately his allegiance to Abe’s historically revisionist agenda and, if there ever was doubt of the influence he wielded within the company, a veteran NHK journalist testified to the Chairman’s enormous influence on broadcast content and internal appointments.[155]  Abe also wielded indirect leverage: the Kantei granted one-to-one interviews with the Prime Minister and powerbrokers from the Abe administration to newspapers in line with the government’s stance, such as the Sankei Shinbun and the Yomiuri Shinbun, while shunning others.[156] In addition, the Prime Minister’s office provided scoops to loyal reporters covering the Kantei, while keeping out of the loop those from antagonistic newspapers, such as the liberal Tōkyō/Chūnichi Shinbun. An LDP lawmaker provides evidence of this mechanism with reference to scoops about the new Cabinet team, during the September 2014 reshuffle.[157] Moreover, Abe himself often met with prominent media figures in an attempt to domesticate the media watchdog, with clear implications for the conduct of Sino-Japanese relations. For instance, Abe’s informal dinner meeting with major political editors and writers on the same day as his controversial Yasukuni Shrine pilgrimage successfully toned down Japan’s major news media’s criticism of Abe’s move.[158] Finally, the Abe government media strategy also targeted foreign journalists and news outlets. The last-minute cancellation of Abe’s press conference during to the 2014 ASEM summit in Milan due to the presence of one unsympathetic local journalist provides further evidence of the Kantei’s sensitive and successful media strategy. Confirming this trend, a well-respected foreign journalist noted that the LDP under the Abe government was particularly shy of press conferences at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan, since «questions are entirely unscripted, and evasions can be challenged».[159]

Finally, it should be noted that Japanese news media has traditionally relied on official sources because of the so-called «press clubs» (kisha kurabu). These are reporters’ offices set up within major government, political and business organizations for member media to gain access to information. Access is usually limited to journalists from major local media organizations. Since reporters are stationed in the premises throughout the working-day, the press clubs arguably constitute an institutionalized form of «embedded journalism»: they tend to feed bias to pack journalism, reporters’ self-censorship and, more importantly, an osmosis between official sources and reporters. Critics contend that Japanese press clubs differ from the few Western equivalents because of the greater proximity reporters enjoy with their sources and the consequent higher reliance on the same. While much of the criticism rings true, it should be noted that earlier studies have found that as much as 80% of reporting in Western media is dependent on government sources, thanks to the governments’ need for the media’s capacity to spin and set the media agenda, while in Japan the figure has gravitated around a slightly higher percentage.[160]  At any rate, reliance on official sources is ever more inevitable for sensitive information, such as the presence of Japanese and Chinese military and constabulary forces in the East China Sea. In fact, research on Japanese media reporting of the territorial dispute between Tokyo and Seoul has found that major newspapers reported almost identical content, likely coming from the same official sources.[161] In sum, the media were also acting as a sounding board for government-sponsored messages at a time of undeniable Chinese assertiveness.

All things considered, it did not matter that both the Chinese and Japanese governments fired up PR efforts mostly out of defensive instincts: the «game of chicken» over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the renewed attention to the history issue unleashed, if not quite yet an arms race, a Sino-Japanese «propaganda race». Japan’s tactics in that race were characterized by its own set of discursive insecurities, by the creation of new institutions preoccupied with the righteousness of Japan’s territorial claims and with campaigns against China. These developments resulted in a budding «governmental-institutional-media complex» that had slowly hardened Japan’s discourses over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and crystallized around a China obsession. It remains to be seen whether that complex can be disentangled or disbanded following an eventual Sino-Japanese détente. In the author’s view, this complex maze of initiatives and institutions may obstruct the restoration of serious political trust or, at the very least, the resumption of a meaningful «Sino-Japanese Strategic, Mutually Beneficial Relationship».

5. The Road to the APEC Summit and the Sino-Japanese «Cold Peace

As highlighted above, the Sino-Japanese standoff rose to new heights in the year under review. Quiet but steady escalation in the diplomatic, economic and communication arenas was paralleled by dangerously close encounters between the two countries’ military and constabulary forces. For instance, Chinese fighter jets flew within tens of meters of Japanese surveillance planes in the East China Sea twice in mid-2014.[162] Hardened popular animosity and the lack of a crisis communication mechanism, such as a bilateral hotline, amplified the risks that possible casualties might have led to serious confrontation. In addition, the standoff impacted on both the Japanese and Chinese economies: notwithstanding monetary easing and generous fiscal stimuli, a meager 3% increase of the consumption tax plunged Japan into a technical recession in the last two quarters of 2014. The resumption of a working relationship with China would have certainly favored Japanese exporters and multinationals. On the other side, Japanese investment to China shrank from $ 13.5 billion dollars in 2012 to $ 9 billion dollars in 2014. According to JETRO statistics, the final figure for 2014 investment would have entailed a further decrease of 40% from the previous year,[163] at a time of Chinese economic distress. For these reasons, the two governments sought ways to curtail further negative spillover effects and a possibly explosive incident in the high seas, leading to a set of joint, parallel statements and a frosty handshake between Abe and Xi on the fringes of the November APEC summit.

Quiet diplomacy paved the way for a compromise solution that saved face for both Abe and Xi. Two meetings, in particular, highlighted both governments’ efforts. The Chinese side communicated its willingness to halt the simmering escalation with Xi’s dispatch in April 2014 of Hu Deping, son of the former PRC’s former General Secretary of the Communist Party, Hu Yaobang, a leader known for holding views sympathetic to Japan. The Japanese side responded in kind by sending the moderate former Prime Minister, Fukuda Yasuo, who in 2008 oversaw the public announcement of the key China-Japan joint statement and the agreement in principle on joint development of gas fields in the East China Sea. Later, articles revealed that Abe’s diplomatic brain and head of the National Security Council, Yachi Shōtarō also took part in meetings with CCP leaders, including the July meeting between Fukuda and Xi Jinping.[164] Thus, quiet Sino-Japanese diplomacy eventually paved the way to joint bilateral statements.

For resuming political dialogue with Japan, China required Tokyo’s recognition that a territorial dispute existed, and an assurance that Prime Minister Abe would not make another visit to the Yasukuni Shrine.[165] The two statements were a masterpiece of diplomatic finesse aimed at saving the face of both governments, since they constituted a set of joint parallel statements with different wording and nuances in the respective languages (and English translations). Adam Liff’s extensive and detailed analysis of the wording of the statements reveals that major differences on the most important issues persisted: most importantly, China would have not stopped sending its forces to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and Japan would have not backed down.[166]

I posit that only one of the two conditions spelled out by the Chinese government was met: an understanding that Abe would not visit Yasukuni, possibly until the last days of his mandate. Employing as diplomatic envoy the milder Fukuda, whose public image as a pro-China statesman is untarnished, is evidence of such an agreement. In fact, Abe and Fukuda reportedly do not see each-other on favorable terms at a personal level, as evidenced by Fukuda’s antipathy for Abe’s maximalist stances on history and security. By going the extra mile to reset Sino-Japanese relations, I speculate that Fukuda should have received assurances from Abe that he will not lose face vis-à-vis the Chinese counterpart as a result of a sudden Abe pilgrimage to Yasukuni.  In fact, Fukuda maintained and likely wanted to hold considerable ties with the continent, including chairmanship of China’s Boao Forum. The presence of Abe’s diplomatic brain, National Security Advisor Yachi Shōtarō, to the July meeting with Xi likely reassured the Chinese leadership that the message came from Abe. Again, recent history between Japan and China aids the careful observer towards these conclusions. Through the so-called 2005-2006 «Japan-China General Policy Dialogue» (Nicchū sōgō seisaku taiwa), Yachi and his counterparts were able to defuse the Yasukuni issue by reaching a compromise solution, and, in exchange for what turned into a seven year-long quiet Yasukuni moratorium by sitting Prime Ministers, Chinese leaders conceded a public appreciation of Japan’s post-war path as a pacifist state. Interestingly, the wording of Xi’s statements during the informal bilateral summit implied recognition of the above, «I hope that Japan will squarely face the history issue and continue [emphasis added] to follow the path of a peaceful nation».[167] In other words, the two governments gave timid signs of reciprocity over the history issue, which was the premise to the 2006 post-Yasukuni détente.[168]

That said, the Abe government partially won this round of the Sino-Chinese «game of chicken». In the author’s view a Yasukuni visit would have been off limits in any case, given international condemnation in 2013 that included official U.S. «disappointment (shitsubō)» and because of the upcoming anniversary of the end of World War II. In fact, a prime ministerial visit to Yasukuni, at least around 2015, would seriously undermine Abe’s plans for a forward-oriented «Abe statement (Abe danwa)». The lack of clear Japanese concessions on the disputed territories, and concomitant signs of China’s decision to pull back from rows with its neighbors, indicated that President Xi partly followed in the footsteps of the Hu administration in the mid-2000s: it pursued a tactical decision to defuse confrontations in the face of a more ominous security environment, evidence of which has been provided throughout this essay. The lack of domestic political alternatives to the Abe administration –a conclusion reached also by Chinese Japan watchers seven years earlier–[169] convinced China of the need to compromise with its ever-more forceful neighbor. I stress this factor over other concomitant aspects that were likely at play. Certainly, after consolidating power within the CCP and the PLA President Xi enjoyed a freer hand for compromises on the international front, not unlike Hu’s more confident overtures to Japan back in 2006.[170] Yet, the proxemics and frosty atmosphere of APEC’s only «informal» bilateral summit, hinted at Xi’s concerns for playing down the event. After all, Abe was the political leader Chinese officials had previously labelled as persona non grata. At the same time, China’s apprehensive concern with the Umbrella movement in Hong Kong, and the November vote of protest in local Taiwanese elections against the China-friendly Ma Ying-jeou administration, fuelled Beijing’s quest for a «cold peace» with its powerful neighbor. Abe and Yachi’s decision to go «all in» in their poker match with China paid off with a summit, where Abe conceded little. The two governments decided to circumscribe the standoff, but it remains to be seen how tenable will the budding «cold peace» be.

6. Conclusion

This essay has underlined the Abe administration’s idiosyncratic responses to the China challenge and the broader changes in the international structure. Abe’s quest for a strong Japan showed his recognition of the precarious position of the country. Japan was caught between the Scylla of a rising China and the Charybdis of a declining U.S., whose commitment to its ally’s security could not be taken for granted indefinitely. Through an original historical reinterpretation of events in the mid-2000s, this essay has made the claim that previous personal interaction with Beijing informed the rationale of the policy stances of the second Abe administration’s strategy vis-à-vis China. Abe learnt from his previous government experience that he needed to focus on bread-and-butter issues to gain popular support at home, particularly given general antipathy for his security agenda. This essay has highlighted how the firm security agenda of Abe and Yachi –Japan’s equivalents of Nixon and Kissinger– premised not only on their worldview (the subject of last year’s essay), but on earlier personal interaction with Beijing. Since Beijing’s softened position in the mid-2000s was a result of Japan’s hardened stance, the more sensitive issue of disputed national territory required an ever more forceful reprise of earlier balancing strategies. Strong of its new-found leverage, China steadily raised its already high bets this time around.

As a consequence, the bilateral standoff spilled over also into the communication realm, with the Japanese government’s active engagement of the counterpart in what I have labelled a Sino-Japanese «propaganda dilemma»: acting on perceived weakness relative to the counterpart’s international and domestic public opinion warfare, both Chinese and Japanese governments upped the ante of negative campaigns and, in turn, fostered a vicious circle of mutually reinforcing antagonistic discourses. This section has pointed out the interplay between the broader international undercurrents of power politics and the forceful pro-activism of the Prime Minister’s office in promoting Japan’s domestic and international communication activities. The progressive formation of a Japanese domestic «governmental-institutional-media» complex, another original claim of this essay, contributed to the diffusion of negative narratives on Japan’s neighbor, also as an effect of growingly rock-solid stances in the public discourse over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

The November Abe-Xi summit and set of statements hinted at China’s somewhat softened stance vis-à-vis its prosperous, powerful and increasingly assertive neighbor under Abe’s stable leadership. Thus, a strong sense of déjà-vu permeated Abe’s China policy and Sino-Japanese interaction as a whole. However, Chinese intrusions in the waters around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands continued, and Tokyo continued to refuse to recognize the existence of a dispute. While bilateral accusations toned down from the early 2014 peak, public discourses were still heated at the time of writing. Furthermore, the tenuous understanding over history and Yasukuni, which facilitated the realization of the Xi-Abe summit, will be under stress in 2015. This will be the year of history, and among its many anniversaries, it is worth remembering the 70th anniversary from the end of WWII, and the 120th anniversary, that is two full Chinese sexagenary cycles, from the end of the first Sino-Japanese war, the war that de facto allowed Japan’s annexation of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Is a timid working agreement on history possible, given the new status quo of turbulent Senkaku/Diaoyu waters? In light of the afore-mentioned analyses, of the growing Japanese ressentiment and of the mutually reinforcing Sino-Japanese «propaganda wars», bilateral stability in this field can be successful only through reciprocity, timid signs of which were on display at the APEC summit. After all, China likely understood that Abe’s popularity depended primarily on lack of opposition and on his economic agenda, but also that reactive nationalistic ressentiment against China risked spilling over to the wider portions of society, thus crystallizing enmity. For these reasons, the broader international and domestic political underpinnings, and the reactive nationalisms underlying the history issue mandated active restraint and a temporary moratorium on official displays of history-related tensions, waiting for timid efforts at reconciliation in better times, once the dust had settled.

L’articolo si concentra sull’evoluzione delle relazioni nippo-cinesi in merito alla disputa territoriale delle isole Senkaku/Diaoyu, ripercorrendone la lenta escalation diplomatica e verbale, quindi la gelida stretta di mano tra Abe e Xi al summit APEC. Il capitolo, inoltre, ascrive il raggiungimento di una tenue «pace fredda» con Pechino alle strategie di Realpolitik perseguite dal Primo Ministro Abe Shinzō e dalla sua «task force» di politica estera, nell’ambito della quale un ruolo di primo piano è stato giocato da Yachi Shōtarō.

Sulla base di nuova evidenza documentale e di molteplici testimonianze orali, si dimostra come i precedenti successi della Realpolitik di Tokyo nel raggiungimento di un’autentica détente nel 2006 abbiano cementato l’ideologia di stampo marcatamente realista di Abe e Yachi, confermandoli nella convinzione che fosse necessario ammorbidire Pechino attraverso una decisa politica di potenza. Il saggio ascrive ad Abe un ruolo di primo piano nel determinare le riforme di sicurezza e le aperture diplomatiche del Giappone, pur se all’interno di una cornice strutturale basata non solo sull’ascesa della potenza cinese, ma anche sul malcelato incitamento di Washington affinché Tokyo ricoprisse un ruolo militare crescente.

Nel sottolineare l’inasprirsi dell’escalation verbale e propagandistica tra Cina e Giappone, ben visibile nel corso del 2014, si formula la tesi che questa possa essere letta come una «corsa alla propaganda», sostitutiva di una corsa agli armamenti. Si è trattato di una corsa che il governo Abe ha dimostrato di volere correre a perdifiato, con evidenti ricadute sul fronte interno. Sulla base delle suddette analisi, si prende infine in considerazione la tenuta della «pace fredda» sino-giapponese.

 

1. Introduction

Differently from the approach used in the previous essays on China in Asia Maior, concerned especially with domestic politics, we have chosen here to privilege some aspects of China-US relations in order to investigate Chinese domestic politics and political economy through such a prism. The reasons for this preference lie mostly in the growing centrality this relation has acquired in the international geo-political and geo-economic context as well as in regional contexts.

In the history of the two countries’ relations, China always represented a main pillar in what a part of literature close to the International Political Economy and the history of international geo-economic relations has defined as the United States’ long-term project of a capitalistic world order.[1] At the turn of the 1900s, China already represented a very high potential market, strongly limited by a powerful and authoritarian state. With the advent of the communist government in 1949, that market became a lost opportunity. Only after about 30 years of frozen relations, was that pillar regained since 1979, that is, since the recovery of US-China diplomatic relations. Nevertheless, the US free trade project continued to face Chinese barriers and to look for the best strategies to break them down.

In 2014, the relationship was marked by a substantial economic interdependence and by serious tensions at both economic and political levels. In a regional context already marked by maritime disputes (in the South and East China Sea) – which were still giving rise to high military tensions among the countries of the area – the United States gave new life to their Pivot to Asia while China pursued an assertive approach both on the geo-economic and geo-political level. Both countries were carrying on those foreign policy approaches that had already emerged in the previous five years.[2] There is no doubt the two approaches were self-perpetuating and it is not possible to establish a clear cause-effect connection between the two of them, unless we do not undertake very focused research. Nonetheless, the complexity of this relationship is well-mirrored in the then Deputy President Xi Jinping’s words in February 2012 during a speech in Washington. Xi defined Sino-American relations as «a new type of major-power relations» (xin xing daguo guanxi). His aim was to re-balance a relationship where an emerging major power aimed for equal treatment while the other, still dominant, superpower tried to defend its position by maintaining the asymmetric relationship the former wanted to challenge.[3] Xi Jinping’s idea was fundamentally based on four key points: 1) mutual understanding and trust; 2) respect for each other’s core interests; 3) cooperation for the benefit of both countries; 4) enhancement of cooperation and coordination in international affairs and global issues.[4]

The equal treatment issue also strongly emerged in the 2012 document by the then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cui Tiankao (now Chinese Ambassador to the United States) and Pang Hanzhao. The document refers to a mutual equality which does not necessarily challenge the United States’ position: «Equality does not mean China will sit with the United States on exactly the same status […] Instead, either of the two countries should […] regard the other as an equal partner of dialogue and cooperation, try to put itself in the other’s shoes, accommodate the other’s concerns in a reciprocal manner…».[5] On the other hand, in a 2013 paper by Wang Yusheng (former Chinese Ambassador to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Organization) the Pivot to Asia was perceived as an American attempt at maintaining its hegemony over China. According to Wang, the US did not accept not being able to interfere in China’s internal affairs anymore. China was indeed becoming so powerful that it was able to effectively defend its territorial integrity and its sovereignty. For that reason, the US needed to «[…] ‘re-balance’ so as to maintain their absolute superiority». Interestingly, in his above mentioned analysis of Xi Jinping’s definition, Andrew Nathan sees in the US’ use of international law and in their pressure on China to respect those norms an instrument aimed at defending their present hegemonic position.[6] In this regard, Wang Yusheng writes: «US leaders have repeatedly claimed that so long as China abides by international rules and act like a responsible large country, U.S.-China relations will get better, stable or even become partners. The question is: what are the ‘international rules’? […]».[7]

In a long interview with Steve Inskeep of National Public Radio on 28 May 2014, US President Barack Obama underlined again how important it was to respect international norms, with specific reference to maritime disputes in East Asia: «[…] what we [also] want is to be able to strengthen and constantly reinforce international norms because we believe, I believe, that America benefits when those norms are not only being upheld by us individually but where all countries buy in, where there is a sense that all of us benefit from some basic rules of the road. And China now as a rising power needs to be part of that responsibility of maintaining rules that maintain peace and security for a lot of countries». Later on, with regard to the countries involved in the disputes, he pointed out: «[…] China is going to be a dominant power in Asia, not the only one, but by virtue of its size and its wealth, it is going to be a great power in Asia. We respect that. And we’re not interested in containing it because we are in any way intimidated by China; we’re concerned about it because we don’t want to see constant conflicts developing in a vital region of the world that also, you know, we depend on in terms of our economy being successful. You know, those are a lot of markets out there, we sell a lot of goods out there, and, you know, we don’t want to see these conflagrations that can end up impeding, you know, our own interests».[8]

In 2014, the United States’ intention to propose the so-called Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) as a «model agreement» for all free trade agreements emerged with greater strength than previous years. This proposal could be considered as a part of a strategy to attract and discipline China by engaging it in a macro-regional neoliberal dimension as originally planned since the early 1900s.

2. The «Trade Issue» in US-China Relations: the US Perspective

Since US-China normalization, the extent of bilateral trade has significantly increased from $2 billion in 1979 to $562 billion in 2013. China has become the US’ second biggest trading partner, third biggest export market and main source of imports. Besides, China was the leading foreign holder of American bonds, which amounted to about $1 billion at the end of 2014.[9]

It is worth emphasizing that the incomparable growth of the Chinese economy was, from the perspective of International Political Economy, a transnational phenomenon of growing interdependence between the Chinese market and international corporations, leading to the deeper and deeper integration of China into a global economy dominated by US corporations. In the first ten years of the 2000s the US continued to dominate the strategic sectors of the global economy: the four biggest corporations in the fields of hardware and software technology, aerospace and military as well as oil production were American. And so were fourteen out of the sixteen biggest global corporations in the pharmaceutical and healthcare industry and services and nine out of ten corporations in the field of global financial services.[10] Between 1995 and 2005, China received a massive flow of foreign direct investments, as it was a favourite destination in the subcontract supply chain of global production networks and about two thirds of its export growth can be attributed to the Chinese subcontractors of the American corporations.[11]

According to the 2013 report of the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, in spite of a GDP drop below 8%, China still represented a growing market with a lot of potential for American companies. In 2012, the United States exported goods to China for a total of $111.8 billion, which is an increase of about 476% compared to 2001. According to the report, these exports led to the creation of about 544,000 jobs in 2012 and the extent of such exports could not but grow thanks to the progressive expansion of the middle class and, consequently, of consumption: «U.S. companies are well positioned and have an enormous opportunity to tap China’s explosion of consumer growth capturing billions of dollars […]».[12] The same potential was attributed to the services sector. American pharmaceutical companies in particular took a special interest in the Chinese market. They foresaw that by 2017 this market would be second only to the American one, for a number of reasons: the extension of health insurance to 95% of the population; the middle class growth; the aging of the population. The Chamber of Commerce stated that the Chinese government policies were «creating a larger pool of prospective customers for US healthcare products and services».[13]

The trade deficit was still strongly in favour of China. In the first eight months of 2014 it increased 4.1% compared to the previous year to a total of $216 billion.[14] With regard to the investment sector, American official data reported the foreign direct investment flow from China to the United States to be greater than the inverse flow for the first time in 2014, while according to Chinese official data this overtaking had already happened a few years earlier.[15]

From the viewpoint of US business and politics, the major issue concerning US-China trade relations was the Chinese incomplete transition to a free trade economy. China’s entry into the international neo-liberal system was thus unsatisfactory because of the pervasive role of the state. The Chinese economic system was still a hybrid model that was frequently defined as «state capitalism».[16] The main targets of these critiques were the Chinese state-owned companies (SOEs). Chinese SOEs were considered extremely and unfairly competitive both in the Chinese domestic arena and in the global market. Furthermore, as a result of Obama’s incentives on direct foreign investment inflows, more and more Chinese SOEs were active in the US domestic market and, as a matter of fact, constituted a direct threat to domestic enterprises.

The 2012 report by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) included a whole section on Chinese state-owned companies and their impact on the US economy. The report emphasized the contrast between privatization attempts over the course of the 1990s and the opposite trend which has been particularly evident since the beginning of the 2008 global recession. Therefore, in recent years Chinese SOEs were perceived more and more as political actors and strong and unfair global competitors.

The report mentions a 2011 speech by the then Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, which well illustrates the official US viewpoint on China’s economic system: «We confront a special set of strategic challenges from the growing wealth in state hands today. Governments are entering markets directly through their cash reserves, natural resources, and business they own and control and they are shaping these markets not just for profits, but to build and exercise power on behalf of the state».[17] Among the commission’s several witnesses, Washington lawyer Timothy Brithbill stated that China «more than any other country has created massive state-owned and controlled national champions that will compete unfairly with private enterprises […] the rise of state involvement in the global economic arena is a significant threat to pure free market system and the free flow of private capital».[18] Apparently, this system was to blame for a sort of Keynesian tendency: «State-owned companies may not be required by their government owners to pay taxes or dividends or even make profit if the primary goal of government owners is to provide employment […]».[19] Furthermore, the Chinese political system, state interventionism and autocracy were all equally considered a comprehensive global threat to neo-liberalism and democracy: «State capitalism is the most formidable foe that liberal capitalism has faced so far […]. Across much of the world, the state is trumping the market and autocracy is triumphing over democracy».[20]

The competitiveness of Chinese SOEs was regarded as unfair for a number of reasons: those companies had preferential access to Chinese national banks (low interest loans and debt forgiveness); they were easily allowed government grants; they bought land at a lower price than private companies; they had preferential access to and lower prices for raw materials; and they had preferential access to public procurement (China had not joined yet the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Government Procurement). Because of this, US corporations operating within China were left at a disadvantage. For instance, the public procurement sector was an exclusive territory of local companies, and strategic sectors like steel, telecommunications, oil and natural gas presented barriers to foreign investments. Basically, foreign goods, services and investments faced a general discrimination: «[…] there is typically no market of 1.3 billion [people] for American exports and firms operating within China; there is whatever the SOEs leave behind…[And] if considered strategic, an entire sector can be closed [to imports]».[21] The American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, for example, reported on the US pharmaceutical and healthcare industry. According to the 2013 report, China was trying to keep American companies out of its domestic market in many ways: with regard to medical devices, China required standards which were different from those recognized internationally; for what concerns drugs, many foreign treatments were not reimbursed and were thus not affordable to most of the population; clinics and hospitals could not hire highly qualified personnel unless they had a perfect knowledge of medical Chinese.[22]

These difficulties were also stressed in the report presented at the Congress by USCC in 2014 as well as in the reports presented by the US Trade Representative (USTR) on China’s compliances with WTO requirements. In particular in 2014, reference was made to an abuse of the Anti-Monopoly Law by Chinese authorities. This law had been introduced in 2007 and entered into force in 2008. However, it was in the year concerned that the representative institutions of the American as well as European business communities noticed an inappropriate use of it aimed at hindering foreign companies’ economic operations and at creating favourable market conditions for Chinese competitors.[23] Among the investigated companies there were Microsoft and Mercedes-Benz.[24]

A second fundamental reason for disagreement between the two countries, and a matter of concern for Obama’s government, was the intellectual property rights issue and relatedly, the one on cyber security. According to American analysts, cyber space was one of the mechanisms used by China to steal industrial secrets, intellectual property rights, information technology and other sensitive information. In May 2014, the Federal US government took legal action for cyber espionage against a Chinese state actor: five members of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army against which the US Department of Justice issued a 31-count indictment.[25]

3. China and the Pivot to Asia

During 2014, the US continued its Pivot to Asia, in spite of unavoidably devoting its main attention both to the Islamic State and the Ukrainian Crisis. This project emerged in the framework of the historical maritime disputes among the countries of the area in the East and South China Sea, which had gained a new impetus since 2010. The main goal of the Pivot is to widen and fortify the United States’ presence in Asia by strengthening established alliances with the countries of the region; negotiating for new economic and military agreements with potential allies; and strengthening multilateral initiatives.[26] The Pivot project had two main components, as in the best tradition of US foreign policy: the military and the economic factors.

3.1. An overview of the military factor

The Pivot called for a major shift of US military resources to the Asian region, for the expansion of defence alliances and for an increase in American defence industry exports together with a more radical circulation of US military training programmes. In particular, at the heart of the Pivot laid the decision to increase the presence of US Navy fleets in the Asia-Pacific area by 2020, concentrating more than half of naval resources in that area. This would have resulted, and in part already had, in a major increase of navy vessels, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and littoral combat ships. Their presence was already substantial in Singapore. The project also included an increased presence of the Navy Task Force, in particular in Darwin, Australia. The presence – expected to reach 2500 units – had already gone from 200 marines in 2012 to 1150 in March 2014. Together with naval forces, the Pivot also called for an increase in the presence of the air force with fighters, jets, tankers, and bombers. Military bases hosting US forces were situated in the following countries: India, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Australia, the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea.[27] In addition to these, there were countries generally collaborating with the US for the sake of regional military security (even at embryonic stages): Vietnam, Burma/Myanmar, New Zealand, and Taiwan.

In April 2014, during Obama’s tour of four Asian countries (Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines), the United States and the Philippines signed a ten-year defence agreement, which reaffirmed the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty.[28] In Japan, Obama made a public commitment to support Japan’s administration of the Senkaku islands (Diaoyu in Chinese), disputed between China and Japan in the East China Sea: such a declaration reassured Japan about the US’ willingness to defend the islands in the event of a Chinese incursion. Likewise, military cooperation agreements with South Korea were also strengthened in defence against North Korea’s nuclear threats. A new military base for both South Korean and American naval forces had already been established on the Jeju island at 500 km from China’s coasts.[29]

Moreover, the US and Vietnam’s defence cooperation was also significantly strengthened: almost forty years after the Vietnam War, the US announced they would lift their embargo on selling lethal arms to Vietnam with the clear intention to improve its maritime security.[30]

On the Chinese side, the country’s assertiveness on a strategic-military perspective had been clear since November 2013, especially on three occasions: the creation of an Air Defence Identification Zone in the East China Sea in the context of the dispute with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu’s islands (November 2013); the attempts to block the Philippines’ supplies to its outpost (warship Sierra Madre) grounded on Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea (March 2014); and the placement of a drilling platform, which was removed sooner than planned, in the South China Sea waters disputed with Vietnam (May 2014). Ely Ratner, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the Asia Pacific Security Program at the Centre for New American Security interpreted China’s actions as follows: «[…] China is changing the status quo in Asia because it wants and thinks it can. Xi Jinping is a confident and powerful leader […] Mix in an economic slowdown and a healthy dose of nationalism and you have a recipe for revisionism».[31]

Air Defence Identification Zones (better known with the acronym ADIZ) are publicly-declared areas under state control for national security issues. They are established in international airspace adjacent to a state’s national airspace, where any foreign aircraft is located and controlled. ADIZs are not clearly regulated by international law and cannot impose any legal obligation on other states and their aircraft. However, most states tend to accept requests by new zones. The Chinese Ministry of Defence announced the establishment of an ADIZ in the airspace over areas claimed by China, Japan and South Korea (Senkaku/Diaoyu islands) in November 2013.[32] The spokesman for the Ministry of Defence explained the establishment by stating that: «[…] the Chinese government sets up the East China Sea Air Defence Identification Zone with the aim of safeguarding state sovereignty, territorial land and air security, and maintaining flight order. This is a necessary measure taken by China in exercising its self-defence right. It is not directed against any specific country or target […]».[33] China’s decision was followed by the Secretary of State John Kerry’s statement, describing China’s action as a «unilateral action attempting to change the status quo in the East China Sea and thus to increase tensions in the region». Two B-52s were then sent over the claimed waters, ignoring the brand new ADIZ’s rules.[34]

A few months later, China attempted to block Philippine marines’ resupply of the Sierra Madrelocated in disputed waters with the Philippines and placed an oil platform (Haiyang Shiyou 981) in waters also claimed by Vietnam. The latter action in particular caused Vietnam’s strong reaction against China. The placement of the Haiyang Shiyou 981 – owned by the China’s state-run China National Offshore Oil Corporation, but placed by another state-run oil company, China National Petroleum Corporation – was considered illegal by Vietnam because it was placed within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone without its permission. The situation became even more serious after the collision between a Chinese coastguard vessel and a Vietnamese ship.[35] Again, China’s action was defined by the US Department of State as «unilateral and provocative» and part of a Chinese attempt at undermining peace and stability in the region.[36] According to the 2014 report by the US-China Economic and Strategic Review Commission, the last case demonstrated how the People’s Republic of China was using state-owned companies (oil companies in this case) to pursue political and strategic objectives.[37]

3.2. An overview of the economic factor: TPP and China

In the course of 2014 negotiations on the agreement on free trade, services and investment in the macro-region of the Asia-Pacific, also known as TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership), were going on. China was clearly more and more interested in joining it.[38] As already mentioned in previous Asia Maior volumes, the negotiations involved some APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) countries: Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, the United States, Australia, Peru, Vietnam, Malaysia, Mexico, Canada, and Japan. Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines were also potentially interested. The initial draft originated in 2005 from a joint initiative by Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore. However, since their accession in 2008, the United States seemed to guide the negotiations.

The ultimate objective was to increase liberalization over the limits provided and regulated by the World Trade Organization (WTO) so as to dismantle all tariff as well as non-tariff barriers on the flow of goods, services and capitals. TPP should also have contained rules going beyond mere access to markets. Not only were they in the WTO’s Uruguay Round agreements but they also represented the base of US free-trade agreements: protection of foreign investors’ interests (anti-discrimination rules, expropriation rules and investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms); workers’ rights; environmental protection; intellectual property rights; and financial markets rules, to name but a few.[39]

The Indian economist Palit Amitendu interprets the recent bilateral and regional agreements but even more macro-regional agreements such as TPP or TTIP (Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership), as clever defence mechanisms set up by a hegemonic West seriously challenged by large emerging markets. Amitendu states that emerging economies (such as China and India) – even though still far from being able to dominate global negotiations and to make their rules globally accepted – had the power to resist the global trade rules forged by Western countries on the base of their interests, making the WTO’s liberalization mechanisms a dead letter.

TPP seemed to overcome such resistance, as it included matters which had been left unresolved by the WTO (norms on work, environment and intellectual property, to name but a few). Its composition, without China and India’s input, seemed to reintroduce those conditions of economic hegemony which the US was losing at a global level. The dimensions of the US economy exceeded more than half the countries of the whole block: US economic output constituted 3/5 of the total output of the involved countries. This made the US regain the negotiating power it was losing mostly because of the growing Chinese and Indian competition. Within TPP negotiations, it enjoyed a stronger position than in the global context: it could use access to its market as a bargaining practice for pushing other economies to speed up the neo-liberal process. It goes without saying that the definition of TPP’s terms, the conditions of negotiations, the regulation of trade and even of the political economy of each country, were modelled on the US global trade agenda, often at odds with the trade interests and with the needs of emerging markets.[40] This is why the American accession to TPP in 2008, significantly coinciding with the beginning of the global economic crisis, can be considered the economic factor of the Pivot: «[…] The TPP’s most important aims, [however], are strategic. A deal would solidify U.S. leadership in Asia and, together with the negotiations over a free trade pact in Europe, put the United States at the center of a great project: writing the rules that will govern the global economy for the next century…».[41] We find the same strategic vision of the TPP in an essay by Michael Froman, US Trade Representative since 2013, entitled The Strategic Logic of Trade. In the essay, Froman identified the TPP as one of those strategic mechanisms aimed at re-balancing the global trade system, upset by emerging economies which were re-modelling the international stage. With reference to Obama’s sentence «Just as the world changed, this architecture must change as well», Froman pointed out that rules needed to be updated and that the TPP represented an «unprecedented opportunity» to do so.[42]

At the end of 2014, the agreement had not yet been finalized and many issues were still outstanding due to the concerns of involved countries and of the members of the US Congress as well. The latter, in particular, were puzzled by the fact that negotiations’ documents were still being kept secret. Indeed, the Congress would not grant the US president the so-called «Fast-Track» authority to negotiate free trade agreements (also known as Trade Promotion Authority), which would have led to expedited and non-amendable legislative procedures. The outstanding issues included intellectual property rights, regulation of state-owned enterprises, liberalization of finance services, disciplines on agricultural production and export subsidies, and the textile industry.[43]

The last TPP meeting in 2014 was held at the US Embassy in Beijing, on the margins of the APEC summit which took place from 8 to 10 November (the last meeting of ministers would then follow in December). From a diplomatic point of view, it was an occasion for the US government to explicitly stress its global leadership.

In the framework of the APEC summit and of one of its major scopes – the making of an integrated economic community in the Asia Pacific and the liberalization of trade and financial services – China put even more emphasis than it had done before on the realization of the so-called FTAAP (Free Trade Area of Asia-Pacific). For a long time, regional economic integration had followed several pathways, including the TPP, the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, with negotiations guided by China and involving ASEAN countries, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand) and the FTAAP itself. None of them precluded the other; however, China’s President Xi Jinping seemed to endorse the realization of the bigger and more inclusive FTAAP which involved all the twenty-one APEC members.[44] On the other hand, in his speech, Obama, while confirming that the FTAAP was to be the ultimate objective of the process, pointed out that the APEC members had chosen the TPP as one of the pathways to that objective; therefore, the TPP had to be given priority over the other pathways: «[…] And I just met with several other members of the TPP who share my desire to make this agreement a reality, we’re going to keep on working to get it done. For we believe that this is the model for trade in the 21st century». APEC’s final statement, the Beijing Agenda for an Integrated, Innovative and Interconnected Asia-Pacific, mentioned the FTAAP as «a major instrument to further APEC’s regional economic integration agenda».[45] The statement also set forth the need for a further two-year «collective strategic study» on the FTAAP, to report by the end of 2016.[46]

Broadly speaking, in the 2014 APEC summit and in Obama’s speech in particular, US references to China seemed to come from a hegemonic authority. Obama stated that «[…] the one constant – the one global necessity – is and has been American leadership» and, almost in a patronizing tone, that: «We want China to do well». He also took the chance to reiterate the importance of a potential bilateral agreement on capital flow liberalization between the two countries.[47]

The relationship between the economic Pivot and China was complicated. To summarize, in a way which does no justice to the complexity of facts, we could say that the US was setting the conditions for China’s isolation – so that it could lose large portions of market share to the benefit of competitors from its own area, such as Vietnam or Malaysia – in order to achieve their ultimate goal: China’s incorporation into the TPP and its adherence to much more binding rules than in the WTO, with significant effects on the internal regulation of its own political economy. However, all this would not be without consequences. According to Palit, China’s accession to the TPP would have reduced the US’ negotiating power and, from the inside, would have determined a necessary transformation of the agreement’s perspectives and terms.

Several documents express the interest in China’s incorporation into the TPP with the aim of regulating a situation which was detrimental to the US’ economic interests. This is particularly clear in the 2012 USCC report in the above mentioned section on state-owned companies. The report states that, in order to press China to carry out a thorough reform of Chinese state-owned companies, Obama’s administration had adopted the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) principle of «competitive neutrality», and that such a principle was to be included in the TPP accession criteria, in the expectation that China would join: «While China is not a participant, the Obama Administration plans to invite China to join, providing that Beijing is willing to comply with the terms of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement». The principle required state-owned companies to be ruled as private companies, so as to eliminate their competitive and unfair advantages.[48]

In her works on the TPP, Jane Kelsey, professor of Law at the University of Auckland, suggests that it was the first time that the SOE’s issue was part of the negotiations for a free-trade agreement and that the ultimate target was to lay the foundations for a new global set of rules applying to all free-trade agreements, including bilateral or multilateral negotiations with the People’s Republic of China. In this respect, the author referred to a statement by Obama’s spokesperson at the TPP leaders’ meeting on the fringe of the APEC leaders’ meeting in Honolulu in 2011: «[…] the President talked about establishing international norms that would be good for the United States, good for Asia, good for the international trading system – good for any country in dealing with issues like innovation and the discipline of state-owned enterprises, creating a competitive and level playing field».[49] She also pointed out that most of the TPP’s rules on state-owned companies were still secret and that six trade associations were working on the text together with the American Chamber of Commerce. As pointed out by Michela Cerimele,[50] information on the treaty’s text was made available by WikiLeaks, which, between 2013 and 2014, published the drafts of some chapters on intellectual property and environmental protection. At the end of 2014, no draft was available on state owned companies’ discipline. According to Kelsey, the reform model was based on models from Australia, New Zealand and the US. It was not a reform aimed at a rapid privatization; however, in order to pave the way for this last scope, the proposed rules would transform state owned companies into private corporations.[51]

As we will see in the next section, and as it is clear from the previous essay on China in the previous volume of Asia Maior,[52] Beijing did not have a unanimous position on the TPP, as well as on the general guidelines for the domestic political economy. However, in the course of 2014, the Chinese government’s official stance expressed deep interest on the agreement, provided that a fair trade environment was ensured and that the WTO’s central role in a multilateral trade system was preserved. These were the key-points of a speech made by the Premier Li Keqiang, in Hainan, at the Boao Forum opening ceremony in April 2014. Besides declaring his interest in the TPP, he also stressed that the structural adjustments put forward by developed countries in the context of the economic crisis, had added uncertainty for developing countries. Furthermore, he reiterated the fundamental importance of solidarity in Asian regional economic integration in a joint effort to build a mutual support system for the emerging economies of the area. According to Li, one of the macro-regional agreements which could grant such an evolution was the RCEP because it was based on a purely Asian industrial, economic and social model.[53]

The same interest in the TPP was shown in October 2014 by the Deputy Minister of Finance, Zhu Guangyao, in a talk at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington. Zhu stated that China «understood» and «welcomed» the high standards of the TPP and that such a stance matched the economic goals of the structural internal reforms pushed through by Xi Jinping and confirmed in the statement of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. As happened in the 1990s when the interest in joining the WTO had galvanized economic reforms under Jiang Zemin, in 2014 advocates for reforms believed that the possibility of joining the TPP would boost structural reforms, including SOEs’ reform. In these official communications, international trade negotiations and internal economic reforms seemed thus to be strongly linked and complementary. Besides, Zhu reiterated China’s commitment to a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). However, he also underlined that the key question for the BIT as well as for the TPP was on «how high those standards would be». China was facing serious domestic challenges and was therefore forced to keep some key economic sectors off-limits to foreign and/or American investment.[54]

3.3. China’s «peripheral diplomacy» (zhoubian waijiao)

In an overview of the dynamics which linked the US Pivot to Asia and China, we should not omit a reflection on China’s «peripheral diplomacy», which cannot be dealt with in a single section because of its wide, complex and deep-rooted developments in several fields and countries. Therefore, here we will only consider some issues that emerged between 2013 and 2014.

«Peripheral diplomacy» has been officially adopted by the People’s Republic of China – with more emphasis than in the past, when China, however, already paid a great deal of attention to neighbouring countries – since October 2013. Between 24 and 25 October 2013, China’s Communist Party organized the first Work Forum on Chinese Diplomacy Toward the Periphery. Such high-profiled and wide forums on foreign policy had not been held since 2006. All members of the Politburo Standing Committee, several authorities of the Central Committee, State Councillors, the Foreign Affairs’ Working Leading Group, and some Chinese ambassadors took part in the forum. Basically, the Forum’s official objective had been to improve Beijing’s relations with neighbouring countries from different points of view: economic, political and cultural. These intentions had been already expressed at the 18th Party Congress in 2012 and reiterated on several occasions by the Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, who stated that relations with countries on China’s periphery had become the «priority direction» for foreign policy.[55]

At the Forum, Xi Jinping outlined the objectives and guidelines of such good neighbourhood foreign relations. Xi stressed the necessity to strengthen good neighbourhood relations and cooperation; he also stressed the importance of national sovereignty, security and development; and he reiterated the necessity to consolidate political and economic relations with countries on the periphery. To achieve such objectives, Xi provided the following guidelines: 1) enhancing political good will; 2) deepening regional economic integration; 3) increasing China’s cultural soft-power; and 4) improving regional security cooperation.[56] Michael Swaine points out that in the framework of Xi’s policy guidance the economic sphere was actually given a particular emphasis.[57]

A number of PRC’s foreign policy actions can be described as zhuobian diplomacy: these include of course the «Silk Road Economic Belt» and the «21st Century Maritime Silk Road». The public announcement of the two projects dates back to the end of 2013. The first project was started during President Xi Jinping’s trip to Kazakhstan in September 2013. On that occasion, in a speech delivered at Nazarbayev University in Astana, Xi proposed the establishment of a new Silk Road along the old trade routes which could connect the coasts of North China and Europe through Central Asia and the Middle East, in a joint effort to enhance regional economic and cultural integration. For that purpose, representatives from 24 cities in China, from Georgia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Turkmenistan signed an agreement to establish the Silk Road Economic Belt.[58] One month later, Xi introduced the «21st Century Maritime Silk Road», joining in a cooperative effort the maritime interests of China and ASEAN countries in particular, reaching to the Mediterranean Sea and the African coasts through the Indian Ocean. Among the implications connected to the establishment of these two commercial routes, there was the development of a variety of infrastructural projects shared by the nations involved: for the benefit of those countries, China launched the so-called Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. The Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of the bank was signed in October 2014 by 21 countries (Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, in West Asia; Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, in Central Asia; Pakistan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh in South Asia; Burma/Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia, Laos, Brunei, the Philippines and Vietnam in South-east Asia, China and Mongolia in East Asia) and Beijing was chosen as its headquarters. The bank was expected to start its activity by the end of 2015. One month later, at the APEC meeting, Xi announced the establishment of a special fund to finance the «Silk Road Economic Belt» and the «21st Century Maritime Silk Road», with a $40 billion initial contribution.[59]

The zhoubian waijiao diplomacy was further enriched by two other actions which aimed at favouring the development of involved countries’ rural zones, especially through the implementation of infrastructure projects such as: the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar economic corridor and the China-Pakistan economic corridor.[60]

Those projects complemented the above mentioned plans of regional economic integration and liberalization (RCEP and FTAAP), and with other integration and liberalization regional contexts pursued by China: ASEAN + 1 (China); ASEAN + 3 (China, Japan and South Korea); the East Asian Summit; the bilateral negotiations with South Korea; and the trilateral negotiations, including Japan.[61]

Clearly, China’s approach was well-rounded, to the point of making it problematic to define the boundaries of «peripheral diplomacy».[62] We should not forget China’s efforts to promote the international use of the renminbi for regional transactions on several levels and its contribution to the New Development Bank established in July 2014 by the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). The bank was intended to finance infrastructure projects in developing countries and Shanghai was chosen as its headquarters. China contributed 41% of the initial contribution, which amounted to $50 billion, thus gaining a significant negotiating and controlling power in this new international financial institution.[63]

4. Taiwan, Hong Kong and Beijing’s attitude: the Sunflower Movement and the Umbrella Movement

Beijing’s stance in relation to Taiwan and Hong Kong had different historical features from its stance in relation to the overall regional context; however, it fitted well into regional economic integration projects.

During the last five years, in Taiwan a strong opposition movement has started against the integration projects guided by Beijing. In particular, between 2013 and 2014 the so-called «Sunflower» movement (taiyanghua xieyun) led to the occupation of the Parliament and the Central Government between March and April of the same year.[64] At the end of the year, the Sunflower Movement obtained an important political result: the Guomindang’s (GMD) defeat in November’s local elections and the victory of the independence party (Democratic Progressive Party – DPP). The GMD only won six out of the 22 local seats and, what was even worse, lost Taipei, after having governed it for 16 consecutive years.[65] The movement saw Hong Kong as a negative example of economic integration with China. It was argued that since the signing of the free trade agreement between the special administrative region of Hong Kong and the PRC (known as CEPA – Mainland Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement) in 2003, there had been an increase in Hong Kong’s economic dependence on China, social-economic divide and the possibility for Beijing’s government to influence the composition of the Hong Kong political arena.[66]

The latter point was particularly clear in Hong Kong’s political dynamics and it was basically at the root of the Umbrella Movement that emerged in mid-2014. If at the heart of the principle «One Country-Two Systems» there had always been the CPC’s commitment to refrain from political intervention in the region, the CEPA provided an open and legitimate platform for a more intensive dialogue between the CPC and the region’s political and business elites, so as to allow Beijing a more direct control over the local political system.[67]

While Beijing has absolute authority in Mainland China, this is not the case with Hong Kong. Since 1997, the CPC has to comply with a multiparty political system and an active and independent civil society, which since the early 1990s has been organizing protests pushing for the democratization of the electoral system. The Hong Kong electoral system does not yet allow a direct election of the Chief Executive and Legislative Council. The Basic Law provided for the legal ground of such a democratic reform without establishing a fixed deadline. The main request of the so-called «Umbrella Movement», started in 2014 mainly by Hong Kong students, remained the call for universal suffrage.

Beijing’s strategy towards Hong Kong has always been based on the construction of a political-economic axis. Since the early 1990s, the CPC has been co-opting Hong Kong’s trade and financial corporations, thus giving rise to a loose pro-China political alliance, whose main expression was the 10,000 members strong Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB). Such corporations were also the main components of the Preparatory Committee set up in 1996, which then created the Electoral Committee, currently with 1,200 members. The distinctive feature of the Electoral Committee is its representative composition divided between geographical constituencies and functional constituencies. The latter represent professional interest groups, granting big commercial and financial corporations a privileged position in the electoral arena, while allowing the CPC to control a large number of seats. The calls for universal suffrage aim at reforming such a system as it does not represent the majority of the population. Alongside a call for merely procedural democratic reforms, some see the need to resist the advance of China and its economic integration process, thus keeping a certain degree of business autonomy.[68]

During protests in 2014, Beijing strengthened its bond with Hong Kong’s business community through an intensive exchange of visits. In particular, Xi Jinping welcomed the larger Hong Kong delegation since the signing of the CEPA (2003). Among the 60 members of the delegation, there were the President of the Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce, the Chairman of the Federation of Hong Kong Industries, and Li Ka-shing, the richest businessman in the whole of Southeast Asia.[69]

The strengthening of control over Hong Kong also took place on a more formal basis. In March 2014, in Li Keqiang’s Work Report delivered to the National People’s Congress, references to Hong Kong’s special autonomy were removed. Not to mention the fact that in June, the State Council issued a White Paper on the «One Country-Two Systems’ Principle», stating that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region was under China’s sovereignty and stressing the importance of a closer economic cooperation.[70]

Finally, in August the National People’s Congress took a decision on universal suffrage, prompting further protests. The decision provided for universal suffrage to be adopted in the 2017 Chief Executive elections, reaffirming, however, a hypothesis already partially made in 2007: the establishment of a nominating committee, with the task of nominating a shortlist of candidates by qualified majority voting. In choosing the candidates, the Committee should give priority to an effective and proved «love for the country».[71]

5. Authoritarianism, economic reforms and rule of law

On the domestic level, the situation reflected the same conditions and trends registered before 2014: high social conflict; authoritarian and repressive rule; an emphasis on the unity of the Party and on the rule of law; very gradual structural economic reforms.[72]

Under the big cover of the «rule of law», in an institutional form, three main tendencies of Chinese politics seemed to melt together: economic liberalization, authoritarian means of control and repression, centralization of powers in a single person.

5.1. Conflict and control

In terms of social conflict, although it is very difficult to refer to reliable and updated figures, it will suffice to rely on the report by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences on the year 2012, mentioned in the 2014 USCC report, to state that each year there were about 100,000 social protests.[73]

No or low compensations for rural land expropriations, working conditions in factories, ethnic-religious issues, bad environmental conditions, and corruption, the latter seen as the primary cause of all other problems, were the main reasons for social protests.

For what concerns expropriation, a recent report by the World Bank states that, in China, compensation for land requisition was no more than 15-20% of the market price.[74] At the same time, labour protests, also in the wake of a greater awareness of labour rights resulting from the 2007-2008 Labour Contract Law, were a constant concern in industrial China. The main reasons for the several illegal strikes were low salaries, the demand for overdue payments and social security, factory closures and production reallocations, and bad working conditions. In April 2014, one of the largest strikes in the history of China’s labour movement took place in Dongguan, against the Yue Yuen Industrial Holdings – the giant Taiwanese manufacturer of sport shoes and supplier of big brands such as Nike and Adidas. The protest involved about 40,000 workers and was organized by non-governmental labour rights organizations with little involvement of the official trade union. The protests ended with the fulfilment of some requests, but also with the detention of the main organizers.[75]

In the course of 2014, tension was also very high among ethnic minorities. Starting from October 2013 until September 2014, a series of violent episodes took place, officially or unofficially attributed to Uighur separatism. In October 2013, a car exploded in Tian’anmen Square; in March 2014, a group of knife-wielding people killed about 30 people; in April a bomb went off in a train station of Urumqi, in Xinjiang; the same thing happened one month later, in a market; in July, violent clashes between police forces and the local population took place in a Xinjiang county; finally, in September, a number of explosions occurred in one single day in different places in Bugur, in the Xinjiang province.[76]

As it had been for a long time, the serious environmental situation, mainly attributed to local corruption, was another reason for several social protests. In early 2014, particularly violent protests took place in the city of Maoming in the Guangdong province, against the local government. The Maoming government had allowed some petrochemical companies to expand their projects for the production of paraxylene, a chemical extracted from petroleum, used in the manufacture of plastic bottles or polyester. The protests involved more than 10,000 people and were violently repressed by the local police.[77]

Two further aspects fomented and increased social protests: on one hand, the increasingly significant growth of the middle class; on the other hand, the extreme proliferation of social networks’ users among young Chinese. The enlarging of the middle class produced higher life education standards’ expectation and also higher levels of education which could not find a good match in the domestic labour market in terms of adequate job offers. This led to high levels of unemployment and discontent among young graduates who usually canalized and organized their discontent throughout social networks.[78]

Xi Jinping dealt with social conflicts by tightening social control. The political institutions dealing with internal security – namely the Ministry of Public Security and the police – were brought together with the military, in a newly formed and pervasive social control apparatus. For its part, the CPC Propaganda Department dealt with media censorship, supported by a specific Internet control organization, the Central Internet Security and Informatization Leading Group  (zhongyang wangluo anquan he xinxi hua lingdao xiaozu). This working group had been created in February 2014 by Xi, who chaired it himself; a fact that witnesses to how destabilizing the Internet was perceived by the central leadership.[79]

For three years in a row, from 2011 to 2013, the increases in the internal security budget exceeded those in national defence. In March 2014, the National People’s Congress, differently from what had been the case in the previous years, did not make public the overall increase in the internal security budget. Of course, this by itself makes one suspect that it was indeed conspicuous.[80]

Furthermore, Xi chaired the Central National Security Commission, the highest body in the whole apparatus for social control, also established by his administration.

However, the PRC’s authoritarian regression was not the only strategy implemented by the Chinese leadership to face increasing social instability. A further instrument adopted by the government was the anti-corruption campaign. In last year’s chapter on China in Asia Maior, the fight against corruption had already been defined as a «CPC political instrument»; a judgment which cannot but be confirmed by the 2014 political dynamics. The fight against corruption enthusiastically carried out by Xi, represented an instrument for political legitimacy as well as for the internal party stability. On the latter level, it was a way to hold the Party together under Xi Jinping’s rule through the removal of members of rival political factions who did not adhere to Xi Jinping’s line. The Party’s unity was considered essential to maintain social stability. In December 2014, Zhou Yongkang, a leading member of the Party, holding important charges in both the national security apparatus and the state-run oil sector, was expelled from the Party and arrested on charges of corruption and disclosure of state secrets.[81] Before Zhou’s awaited expulsion, six high level officials were also expelled from the Party. Three of them belonged to the Central Committee: Li Dongsheng, Yang Jinshan (former Deputy Commander of the Army) and Jiang Jiemin (former executive of China Petroleum Corporation). The other three were alternate members: Wang Yongchun (former Vice-President of PetroChina), Li Chuncheng (former Party chief in the Sichuan province), and Wan Qingling (former Guangzhou Party secretary). As specified above, the main targets of this campaign were the leading exponents of the state companies’ network, which adhered to a state-controlled approach to political economy.[82]

5.2. Economic reforms and rule of law

Unlike the previous leadership generations which entrusted the prime minister in office with the leadership of political economy, Xi Jinping also took over the presidency of the so-called Reform Leading Small Group, constituted in 2013. However, at the end of 2014 Xi’s structural reform plan was still at an embryonic stage.[83]

One of the first among the very few reforms which, after having been set out in the 2013 Third Plenum Communiqué, were carried out in 2014 was the fiscal reform. In particular, the new rules provided for the taxation of multinationals’ profits, even retroactively, thus prompting a number of investigative procedures against international tax avoidance.[84] At the same time, albeit gradually, the controversial reform of state-owned companies continued to be implemented, even if these were still the subject of an intense internal debate. The reform aimed at bringing about the introduction of private investments in and the opening to private shareholders of public sector firms, creating a «mixed-ownership». The main advances in this direction were achieved at a local level, especially in Shanghai, Chongqing and Guangdong. Shanghai’s local government had already planned to open up about 60% of state-owned companies under its jurisdiction to private investments.[85] A similar reform plan, by way of pilot projects, also covered state-owned companies controlled by the central government operating in «strategic» sectors such as oil and pharmaceuticals, to name but a few.[86] The reform also provided for a set of rules which would make the scheme of state-owned companies much more similar to private ones, in line with international requirements, as specified above.[87] In 2014 the reform of the top executives’ salaries and extra-benefits in the state-owned companies was taken up and approved by the Politburo.[88]

The conversion of the Chinese economic model in 2014 was a long and complex process. On one side, the government was making use of the anti-corruption campaigns to pave the way for liberal reforms and to break the control on the public sector by those political factions which opposed the government. On the other side, the government was trying to build a new model on solid legal bases. At the end of the year, at the Fourth Plenum of the 18th Party Congress, the rule of law issue (yifa zhiguo – «governing the country by law») and the importance of the respect for the Constitution became central in the domestic political debate, after having been put aside in 2012 and 2013. Before 2012, the official debate on the rule of law and on the constitutional values had indeed brought the emergence and strengthening of liberal movements among Chinese intellectuals, demanding deeper political liberalization. However, between 2012 and 2013, the central leadership rejected these requests and launched a vehement campaign against the «polluting» influence of Western values and for the consolidation of the Party unity.[89]Nonetheless, in 2014, the official debate on the rule of law was back. On 23 October 2014, the Party approved the so-called Decision Concerning Some Major Questions in Comprehensively Moving The Country According To The Law Forward (zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian tuijin yifa zhiguo ruogan wenti de jueding), thus giving an immediate and great centrality in the reform plan to the restructuring of political institutions, a fact that was bound to trigger a process of formal and procedural emancipation from the Party.[90]

In an official release, the Chinese news agency Xinhua underlined that the rule of law was the key to liberal economic reforms. Apparently, this specific plan of reforms was aimed primarily at reducing the Party’s as well as the state’s intervention in economic matters. These measures were considered a valid deterrent against corruption which was seen as essentially a consequence of the excessive economic power wielded by political officials. Furthermore, the rule of law would pave the way for the effective action of the market. In fact, according to Xinhua:

«Facing mounting downward pressure and a painful economic transition, promoting rule of law has raised high hopes of an orderly and effective market that might offer new dividends for the Chinese economy. This is especially true since almost all the pains currently suffered by the Chinese economy – ranging from overcapacity, real estate bubbles, risks of local government debts and shadow banks, to restricted growth in non-public sectors and insufficient innovation – could find their roots in excessive administrative interference, corruption and unfair competition, all of which are the result of the lack of rule of law».[91]

In fact, the Decision Concerning Some Major Questions state: «To ensure that the market play a decisive role in the allocation of resources and to give rein to the role of government even better, we must make protecting property rights, upholding contracts, unified markets, fair exchange, fair competition and effective supervision into basic orientations […]». The text continues by stressing the need to protect both public and private forms of property rights.[92]

Nonetheless, the release continued: «past shadows of the ‘rule of man’ are not easily shaken off» both in the Party and in the state still tainted with that «obsolete ‘above-the-law’ privilege mentality».[93] Ironically and paradoxically, Xi’s ruling methods seemed like a new institutionalized version of the old Mao and Deng’s charismatic and informal authoritarian leadership. Xi already seemed far away from the new collective and impersonal leadership model started by Jiang Zemin and masterfully continued by Hu Jintao. Xi was taking the party from a depersonalized political power and a collective leadership model to a strong and marked political centralization, legitimized by a process of legal institutionalization. After becoming Party Secretary and President of the People’s Republic of China, he immediately took over the presidency of the Central Military Commissions of both Party and state, unlike his predecessors. He also chaired several important «Small Leading Groups», on political economy, on Internet security, on foreign affairs. At the same time, the Decision On Certain Major Questions In Comprehensively Moving The Country According To The Law Forward basically put the Party above the law. In the Beijing political rhetoric, the Party’s rule – strengthened by a radical anti-corruption campaign and a self-discipline process promoted since 2013 – was not in conflict with the establishment of a rule of law, promoted, after all, by the Party itself: «Persisting in the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. The leadership of the Party is the most essential trait of Socialism with Chinese characteristics, and is the most fundamental guarantee for Socialist rule of law […]», stated the Decision Concerning Some Major Questions.[94]

Il presente capitolo analizza l’evoluzione politica ed economica della Cina nel corso del 2014 prendendo come punto di partenza alcuni aspetti delle relazioni Cina-Stati Uniti. È attraverso tale prisma che vengono lette la politica interna e le scelte di politica economica del governo di Xi Jinping.

    Nel 2014 il rapporto tra i due paesi è stato contraddistinto da un’elevatissima interdipendenza economico-commerciale e da profonde lacerazioni sia sul piano economico sia su quello politico. In un contesto regionale già profondamente segnato dalle dispute marittime nel Mare Cinese Orientale e nel Mare Cinese Meridionale, gli Stati Uniti davano vigore al ridispiegamento della propria presenza nell’area Asia-Pacifico (il cosiddetto Pivot to Asia), mentre la Cina perseverava nel suo atteggiamento assertivo sul piano geo-economico e su quello geo-politico.

Da un punto di vista generale, il Pivot to Asia, in corso dal 2010, si è articolato nel rafforzamento delle alleanze già esistenti con i paesi dell’area, nel rinserrarsi dei rapporti economici e militari con nuovi e potenziali alleati, nel rafforzamento delle iniziative multilaterali. Sul piano militare, il Pivot ha trovato espressione nel ridispiegamento delle risorse militari americane nell’Asia-Pacifico,nell’espansione delle alleanze difensive, nell’aumento delle esportazioni di armi americane e nella diffusione dei programmi USA di addestramento militare. Sul piano economico, il Pivot ha trovato espressione nel tentativo di realizzare il Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP – il partenariato trans-pacifico di libero scambio). Proprio nell’anno in questione, emergeva con più forza l’intenzione da parte degli Stati Uniti di proporre il TPP quale «accordo modello» per tutti gli altri accordi di libero scambio con il palese tentativo di attirarvi la Cina (facendole temere di rimanere isolata), al fine di incardinarla, disciplinandola, in una dimensione totalmente neoliberista.

Da parte cinese, l’assertività del paese sul piano strategico-militare nell’area regionale asiatica si era manifestata, a partire dal novembre 2013. Tuttavia, al tempo stesso, Pechino, attraverso la cosiddetta diplomazia periferica, aveva anche cercato di ampliare e di rafforzare la propria rete di collaborazioni e alleanze, in particolare attraverso la costituzione sia della «cintura economica della via della seta», sia della «via della seta marittima del 21° secolo». Correlato alla nascita delle due vie commerciali, vi era, inoltre, lo sviluppo di diversi progetti infrastrutturali condivisi fra i vari paesi attraverso i quali si articolavano le due «vie della seta».  Sempre su iniziativa cinese, è nata l’Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Non mancavano tuttavia le resistenze interne ai progetti di Pechino, fra le quali il «movimento dei girasoli» di Taiwan e il «movimento degli ombrelli» di Hong Kong.

Benché il governo di Pechino non avesse una posizione unitaria sul TPP e stesse cercando di rafforzare la costituzione di partenariati commerciali alternativi, la posizione ufficiale, espressa nel corso del 2014, era di grande apertura e di grande interesse nei confronti dell’accordo. Questo a patto che si promuovesse un contesto commerciale equo e che si preservasse il ruolo centrale dell’Organizzazione Mondiale del Commercio in un sistema che rimanesse multilaterale.

Sul piano interno, infine, la situazione rispecchiava una forte continuità con gli anni precedenti al 2014 e faceva pensare ad un rafforzamento dell’orientamento neoliberista. Essa era caratterizzata dall’elevata conflittualità sociale, dal rafforzamento dei meccanismi autoritari e repressivi, dal consolidamento dell’unità del partito, dalla costruzione di uno stato di diritto e dai progetti di riforme economiche strutturali.

 

 

This short foreword is an introduction both to the «Asia Maior» project – namely a project which has been going on for a quarter of century – and to the contents of the present volume, which is the latest – but, hopefully, not the last – offshoot of this project.

At the end of November 1989, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, Professor Giorgio Borsa, then the doyen of Italian historians working on modern and contemporary Asia, became convinced that that momentous event was bound to have powerful repercussions not only in Europe, but also in the rest of the world, including Asia.[1] Accordingly, he gathered his pupils and some of the pupils of his pupils at the ISPI (the Italian Institute for the Study of International Politics) of Milan, and created an informal observatory which would keep track of the political and economic developments in Asia. The main task of the group was to publish a yearly volume examining the political, economic, and, if necessary, social developments of the main Asian countries and, periodically, of the Asian countries of lesser importance.[2]

Both the group and the yearly volume took the name of «Asia Maior» (which, for several years was spelled «Asia Major»).[3] The name was devised by Borsa with reference to the fact that the ancient Romans used the term «Asia Minor» to define modern-day Turkey. Accordingly, in Borsa’s conception, «Asia Maior» was that part of Asia extending beyond its Mediterranean portion. In fact, for many years, the part of Asia on which the attention of the Asia Maior observatory was focused was Monsoon Asia, or what Italian scholars of Asia define as «Asia Orientale (Eastern Asia)»; this is an area including not only China, Korea and Japan, but also South and South-East Asia. Only later did «Asia Maior» gradually extend the field of its analyses to encompass Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asia. At the beginning of the present century, Asia Maior (the group) came to define Asia Maior (the geopolitical space) as comprising that part of Asia which borders Turkey and the Arab countries on the eastern side, and the Caucasian countries and Russia on the northern side.

The method applied in the analyses included in the yearly volumes was that of the historian. Giorgio Borsa – who led the Asia Maior group until his death in 2002 – was not interested either in more or less pedestrian political and economic chronicles or the presentation of more or less exhaustive sets of statistical and economic data – the usual stuff of so many yearbooks analysing a given country. On the contrary, what he wanted the Asia Maior group to produce were analyses which distinguished from the sea of facts what were, from a historical viewpoint, the key ones for understanding not only the period under review, but also the long-term trends manifesting themselves in the country under examination. This, of course, was not an objective easy to reach, and, indeed, has not always been reached by Asia Maior’s analyses. However, the continuous endeavour to see the present as history in the making, and to understand it also by detecting its historical roots, has always been the distinguishing mark of the Asia Maior school. Not all the contributions published in Asia Maior in its 25-year history have come up to the exacting standards set by Giorgio Borsa; however, enough of them have been to retrospectively judge the Asia Maior endeavour as a success. Indeed, it is now possible to go back to analyses published 10 or 20 years ago and see how the political and economic trends then elucidated have played themselves out in the following years, up to the present. This is a feat that has been made possible also by the fact that – following a rule originally set by Giorgio Borsa, and scrupulously followed since then – in the Asia Maior chapters there are no predictions, no more or less sophisticated «scenarios» regarding the future, but, quite simply and quite humbly, though also quite importantly, the individuation of the relevant facts and their organization in historical sequences.

The first Asia Maior volume was published in 1990, and, since then, the publication of the yearly volumes has regularly been going on, the sole exception being that of the year 2006, when no volume was published. That gap, however, was closed the following year, when, in 2007, a double volume appeared, analysing the 2005-2006 biennium.[4]

Indeed, at the end of 2006, the informal group created by Giorgio Borsa was transformed into a regular think tank, by a notary act. In that occasion, the name «Asia Major» for both the think tank and the volume was officially changed to «Asia Maior». By then, the original group of scholars gathered by Giorgio Borsa in November 1989 had profoundly changed, only one of its members – the author of these lines – still being part of it. A new generation of younger scholars had come to the fore. Nevertheless, the structure of the yearly volumes, the basic philosophy of the group and the methodological approach had been kept unchanged.

When Giorgio Borsa conceived and launched the Asia Maior enterprise, his plan was to publish a yearly volume written by Italian scholars and aimed at Italian educated public opinion. In other words, Asia Maior’s target was made up of Italians, not only scholars and university students, but diplomats, journalists, entrepreneurs and, more generally, educated people interested in either Asian or international affairs. As a consequence, Borsa wanted the yearly volume to be written not only according to the most exacting scholarly criteria, but in a clear language, devoid of any academic jargon.

In course of time, Asia Maior, the yearly publication, came to be a reference point among Italian scholars and was increasingly categorized less as a yearbook than a scholarly journal. The process culminated in the decision by the ANVUR (the Italian authority in charge of evaluating the national system of higher education and research) to officially classify Asia Maior as a class A journal in the field of Asian Studies.

Although, as noted above, the Borsa guidelines have been strictly adhered to, in recent years, inside what had by then become a regular think tank, the opportunity or, rather, the necessity to shift from Italian to English as the medium of communication was debated. Eventually – and I dare say inevitably – the decision was taken to shift from Italian to English, in order to widen Asia Maior’s target from the Italian educated public to the Italian educated public plus the world scholarly community working on contemporary Asia.

For reasons which need not detain us here, it was decided that such a transition would be gradual, with the present volume being made up of chapters in English with an Italian abstract, and chapters in Italian with an English abstract.

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Asia is not even a valid geographical expression: there are no clear-cut geographical features which set Asia apart from Europe, something which most geographers are well aware of.[5] Much more important is the fact that Asia has historically been the seat of several refined and complex cultures/civilizations. Each of them is as close to or distant from the other Asian cultures/civilizations as they are close to or distant from Western culture/civilization.[6] «Asian values», apart from being squarely based on the Confucian tradition – and therefore alien to many Asian civilizations – are nothing more than a felicitous catchword, a rhetorical device, without much basis in the ground realities of Asia, not even in those parts of Asia where, in the past, the Confucian tradition flourished.

To the lack of geographical and cultural unity we must add the lack of economic unity. Asia Maior, as defined by the Asia Maior group, although more limited than geographical Asia, can nevertheless be divided into at least two main areas: that part which is rich in natural resources and scarcely populated, and the other part, which is poor in natural resources and densely populated. This division is strengthened by the fact that the latter part is characterized by the presence of states with strong and growing economies.[7]

Finally, to the lack of geographical, demographical and economic unity characterizing Asia, one must add the lack of unity as far as the political systems of the several Asian countries are concerned. In this perspective, there is no similarity between India and Iran; China and Japan; the Philippines and Vietnam; Malaysia and Thailand, and so on. Indeed, one could claim that practically all kinds of political regime are nowadays present in Asia Maior, ranging from the biggest democracy in the world, India, to the most bizarre dictatorship on the planet, North Korea.

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All the above, although well known, has been said to point out the difficulty of finding a unitary theme which can characterize the political and economic developments in Asia, even in that lesser portion of Asia which is Asia Maior, during the short period of time which is the chronological framework of a single Asia Maior issue. However, although difficult, to find a unifying theme for the yearly Asia Maior issues can be useful in conveying a clear image of the strongest political and economic forces at play in the Asia Maior area during the period under review. For the present issue, covering the year 2014, this unifying theme has been found with reference to China.

Thanks to its economic weight, China exercises a powerful pull on most Asian countries. This makes it imperative for the other Asian countries to adjust themselves to this pull. In each case, this adjustment is a function of an uneasy blending of two contradictory strategies: engaging China and containing China.

Engaging China means to become part of the China-centred economic space; which brings obvious and, generally speaking, conspicuous economic advantages for those nations willing to do it. But China’s increasing assertiveness, a function of its growing economic and military power, is seen as a danger by many of its neighbours. Indeed, it is a danger that many Asian countries bordering with China or, in any case, subject to its economic pull, want to minimize by a policy of containment, based on armed might and the building of a network of either formal or informal political and military alliances. This already complex situation is made even more complex by the fact that there are two major powers, from outside this area, which exercise a powerful gravitational pull on most (in one case) or many (in the other case) of the Asia Maior countries: the USA and Russia respectively.

The USA, at least since Nixon’s opening to China, have appeared to be constantly uncertain about engaging it, considering it as a «responsible stakeholder»[8] in the world order and an indispensable economic partner, or, by contrast, containing it, by building around it a powerful inhibitory framework, a function of the redeployment of US military might in the Asia-Pacific area (a strategy which has lately taken shape in the «Pivot to Asia» doctrine), and the building of a complex network of military agreements with the Asian countries neighbouring China and with Australia. One part of this same containment strategy is usually considered to be the US-sponsored attempt to implement the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement (TPP), creating a new free trade economic space encompassing most of the Asia-Pacific countries, and excluding China. However, it can be argued[9] that the final objective of the whole TPP exercise is less to isolate China than to induce it to eventually enter the agreement, becoming part of a US-centred system.

Russia, for its part, has an equally complex relationship with Asia Maior. This relationship is organized around two axes: one is the necessity to maintain or reassert its influence in that part of Asia formerly belonging to the USSR; the second is the necessity to avail itself of the support of China, avoiding the danger of becoming over-dependent upon it.

Of course, engaging China/containing China are the two contradictory forces which have been moulding the system of international relations in Asia Maior for quite some time, and not only in the year under review. However, the choice to highlight the working of these forces in the title of the 2014 issue of Asia Maior is justified by the fact that some of its most important chapters are firmly focused on the examination of the relevance of the China-centred dynamics characterizing international relations in Asia. Indeed, this theme is dealt with particularly in the chapters focused on China and Japan, but also – even if to a lesser extent – in those dealing with North and South Korea, Malaysia, Cambodia, India, Kirghizstan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.    But, of course, international relations, although important, are only part of the picture. As always in the Asia Maior issues, a great deal of attention is given to the domestic reality of the single Asian countries, both at the political and economic level.

At the political level, the analyses included in this issue reveal that two contradictory trends are apparent. On one side, 2014 has witnessed the military coup which has put an end – at least for the time being – to democracy in Thailand. On the other side, limited but concrete progress on the path to a full blown democracy has been seen in Myanmar and Nepal. More significant, as far as democracy is concerned, have been the general elections in India and the general and local elections in Indonesia. In both cases, the elections have marked a turnaround in the existing political situation, even if, at this stage, it is not yet possible to accurately judge the full extent of a change which, nevertheless, appears conspicuous.

Finally, at the economic level, this issue’s various chapters show that, by and large, economic growth is once again on the rise. Although decidedly less impressive than before the beginning of the world crisis, the economic growth of the major Asian countries is much faster than that characterizing Western countries. This means that Asian economic growth, in spite of being much slower than before, appears bound to alter the economic – and therefore political – relationship between Asia and the West.

M.T.