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Stefano Pelaggi, L’isola sospesa: Taiwan e gli equilibri del mondo, Rome: LUISS University Press, 2022, 231 pp. (ISBN: 9788861058453)

Stefano Pelaggi’s book offers a thorough yet concise geopolitical and historical analysis of Taiwan’s position in the contemporary international system, exploring both political and social dimensions. Pelaggi covers a wide historical spectrum, tracing Taiwan’s indigenous origins and its socio-political transformations through a few key historical phases: the Japanese Occupation, the return of the Kuomintang, the party’s retreat to the island after its defeat in the Chinese Civil War, the White Terror years, and Taiwan’s democratization process, which has led it to become one of the most efficient and stable democracies in the world. Beyond this, the author addresses Taiwan’s ongoing diplomatic, economic and political challenges. Its clarity and accessibility make the book suitable for a broader audience, extending beyond purely academic circles. Moreover, its interdisciplinary approach, which integrates geopolitical, historical, and political perspectives, provides a rich and multifaceted analysis of Taiwan’s evolving role in the world.

The book is divided into fourteen chapters. The author has adopted a chronological and thematic structure that spans from the 16th century to contemporary times in just 230 pages. The narrative begins with Taiwan’s early encounters with European colonization (Dutch and Spanish) and concludes with an exploration of the most recent grassroots movements opposing rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China, as promoted by the Kuomintang (KMT) leadership in the past decade. Each chapter focuses on a specific phase of Taiwan’s history or a critical aspect of its cultural, social, or political environment, offering readers a nuanced understanding of the island’s complex evolution. In the introduction and the first chapter, Pelaggi situates Taiwan within the current international system, analysing its geopolitical significance in the Taiwan Strait dispute, and exploring the island’s role in US-PRC relations. This section provides a comprehensive background for understanding Taiwan’s precarious position in global geopolitics, highlighting its strategic importance in the East Asian region. The second chapter delves into Taiwan’s history prior to the Japanese occupation, with a focus on the island’s indigenous heritage and its interactions with the early European colonial powers, such as the Portuguese, Dutch, and Spanish. The chapter also explores the influence of the Chinese Qing Dynasty, which shaped Taiwan’s early socio-political structures. This discussion is crucial to understanding the heritages of Taiwan’s shifting identity, which continues to influence its internal development and its responses to external affairs. The discussion then moves into the third chapter, that analyses the fifty years of Japanese rule (1895-1945), highlighting its transformative impact on Taiwan’s infrastructure, economy, and society. This chapter focuses on how this period laid the background for Taiwan’s earlier modernization, including developments in agriculture and infrastructures.

The return of the Kuomintang and its retreat to Taiwan following their defeat in the Chinese Civil War are examined across thematic chapters – from the fourth to the ninth – which explore the political and sociological trajectories undertaken by Taiwan’s civil society during this transformative period, particularly after the establishment of the martial law. These in-depth thematical analyses are seamlessly integrated into the book’s overarching historical narrative, adding interdisciplinary dimensions that deepen the reader’s understanding. The political and historical legacy of Chiang Kai-shek is explored through the issue of his monumental political statues, alongside the White Terror era and the tensions between the authoritarian governance and civil society (chapter 4). Additionally, Taiwan’s transformation into the industrial and entrepreneurial hub we recognize today is explored through the role of family-led small and medium enterprises in driving the island’s growth during that period (chapter 6). Furthermore, the diplomatic role of Song Meiling – Chiang Kai-shek’s wife – and the political legacy of his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, in shaping Taiwan’s subsequent democratization and reforms are discussed in chapters 5 and 9, respectively, contributing to a more in-depth description.

The subsequent section, covering chapters 10 to 14, addresses the events of the last thirty years, characterized by Taiwan’s gradual democratization and its evolving role within the global political landscape. These chapters provide a dual focus. On the one hand, they analyse Lee Teng-hui’s presidencies and his pivotal role in steering Taiwan’s democratisation process (chapters 9 to 12). On the other, they delve into economic and geopolitical issues, including Taiwan’s critical role in the global semiconductor industry (chapter 10) and the dynamics of cross-Strait relations following the deaths of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo (chapters 12 to 14). As for the economic perspective, the author emphasizes the island’s pivotal role in the global technology supply chain, particularly as a critical player in the US-PRC competition over technological dominance. Furthermore, this analysis is framed within a broader discourse on national identity and civil society, approaching them both from an historical and geopolitical perspective. He examines the role of Hakka and Hokkien indigenous minorities in shaping the identity of native Taiwanese people, particularly in the context of the predominance of Han people in public office following the Kuomintang’s retreat in 1949. From a political and geopolitical standpoint, Pelaggi explores the contrast between the island’s democratic stance and the authoritarian governance of the Communist party in the mainland. Chapter 14 focuses on the most recent grassroots civil movements, analysing their implications within the context of the Taiwan Strait dispute. These events, such as the 2014 «Sunflower Movement», underscore the growing importance of Taiwan’s evolving political and social identity. The author provides a detailed account of the «Sunflower Movement» and its reception by Taiwanese civil society, illustrating how ideological concerns, particularly among younger generations, play a critical role in shaping Taiwan’s domestic and international policies. This analysis aims at highlighting how Taiwan’s identity and values are increasingly becoming decisive factors in discussions about potential rapprochement between the two sides of the Strait.

Pelaggi’s research methodology is synthetic, as his goal seems looking to analyze the major events that have shaped Taiwan’s history. His approach integrates geopolitical perspectives with historical accuracy. While relying primarily on existing academic literature rather than archival research, Pelaggi successfully constructs a comprehensive and cohesive narrative. He offers a broad overview of the pivotal phases in Taiwan’s history and its evolving role within the contemporary international system – an issue of critical importance in today’s international dynamics.

The book stands out for its comprehensive scope and its ability to merge historical, geopolitical and cultural dimension of Taiwan into a single, concise narrative, despite being no longer than 230 pages. Indeed, one of the book’s key strengths is its interdisciplinary approach, which enables the author to connect Taiwan’s internal developments with its external relations in the context of cross-Strait relations with the People’s Republic of China and, more broadly, with the United States and Europe. The book examines the evolution of Taiwan’s civil society, offering a multidimensional perspective on the island’s journey from the «White Terror» era to democratization. A noteworthy example is the thematic exploration of Taiwan’s business sector, which was driven by civil society actors who were excluded from the bureaucracy during Chiang Kai-shek’s presidency. Furthermore, the chapter dedicated to Taiwan’s semiconductor industry is seamlessly integrated into the historical narrative, emphasizing its vital role in the contemporary economic and political international system. Finally, the thematic chapters that delve into political and cultural elements, such as the monumental political statues of Chiang Kai-shek (chapter 4), the diplomatic of Madame Chiang (chapter 5), and the days of the Yuan occupation during the 2014 Sunflower Movement (chapter 14) – to name just a few – skilfully intertwine historical events with the personal stories of key historical figures.

On the other hand, a few weak points can be detected. Firstly, the historical narrative ends with the Sunflower Movement of 2014 and his consequences both nationally and internationally but does not delve into the developments of Tsai Ing-wen’s first and second administrations. The author only mentions about recent events in the introductory chapter, where he had briefly summarized the island’s latest history, focusing primarily on its international relations disregarding its internal dynamics. Secondly, the sources Pelaggi relies on are predominately from Italian and Anglo-American scholars. While these provide a valuable basis, incorporating Chinese-language sources would have significantly enriched the work, offering a more nuanced perspective on Taiwan’s history and its complex identity. Finally, the author’s informative approach broadens the book’s appeal beyond the Italian academic sector, but the absence of original source research represents a missed opportunity. Taiwan’s history, its geopolitical significance in the current international system, and the emergence of a new political and social identity – particularly across the younger generation – are critical areas that need deeper investigations. A more detailed exploration of these elements would provide a better understanding of Taiwan’s role as a pivotal actor in contemporary global affairs, especially in the context of its complex relationships with key players such as the People’s Republic of China, the United States and, by extension, the European Union.

Nevertheless, L’isola sospesa, Taiwan e gli equilibri del mondo is an appreciable contribution to the Italian field literature. While it does not rely on original archive research and instead draws on pre-existing works – primarily from Western scholars – the book’s structure and the themes it explores make it a valuable starting point for engaging with Taiwan’s history. L’isola sospesa, Taiwan e gli equilibri del mondo serves as a well-crafted foundation for further developing a debate on Taiwan’s history, culture and politics.

ISSN 2385-2526

Asia Maior, XXXV / 2024

© Viella s.r.l. & Associazione Asia Maior

ISSN 2385-2526

ISSN 2385-2526

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When and how the Gaza Strip started to be perceived by an increasing number of Israelis as a «demographic threat»? Which were the main plans to «thin» its population? To address these questions, the first part provides a brief historical background, lingering on pre-1948 Gaza, its inhabitants and the conflictual claims regarding its agriculture. The second part brings in the origins of Gaza’s demographic (un)balance post-1948, and the plans to expel a large part, if not most, of the local inhabitants. The final section discusses whether or not Zionism has always aimed at «diluting» the number of the inhabitants of Gaza and, more in general, in historic Palestine.

Keywords – Israel; Palestine; Demography; Gaza Strip; Hamas; Zionism.

1. Introduction

An official report drafted by the Israeli Ministry of Intelligence endorsed a plan for the forced and permanent relocation «of the civilian population from Gaza to Sinai».1 It was leaked to the Israeli press on October 12, 2023. In the months that followed, – in the context of the debates which ensued after the attack carried out by Hamas on 7 October 2023 and the obliteration of Gaza by the Israeli army2 – a number of Israeli journalists, diplomats and political leaders have suggested similar solutions.3 The latter came often together with proposals in favour of the establishment of Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip, almost 20 years after the unilateral withdrawal of all Israeli forces and settlers promoted by the then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.4

This article, largely based on primary sources, aims at providing academic depth to the debates around these issues. A particular attention is devoted to the dynamics through which the Gaza Strip started to be perceived – in the eyes of a growing number of Israelis – as a «demographic threat», as well as on the main plans aimed at «diluting the [local Palestinian] population» [Aderet 2024, 5 December]. The first part provides the historical background, and sheds light on Gaza, its inhabitants and the conflicting claims regarding the local agricultural sector in the period before 1948. The second section discusses the origins of Gaza’s demographic imbalance in the post-1948 phase as well as plans to expel a large part, if not the majority, of the local inhabitants. The third part focuses on the Zionist movement, with the aim of assessing whether or not the latter aimed at «thinning out» the population in Gaza and, more in general, in historic Palestine. The conclusions turn the attention on the role of the «vanquished» in relation to the benefits of historical knowledge.

2. The creation of a «Strip» of Gaza

Gaza is cited in the inscriptions of the Egyptian pharaoh Thutmose III (1481–1425 BCE).5 When the Tangerine explorer Ibn Battuta (1304-1368 CE) visited Gaza some 2700 years later, he noted that «it is a place of large dimensions […] it has no wall around it [lā sūr ʿalayhā]» [Ibn Battuta 1958, p.73].

The creation of a «Gaza Strip» is far more recent and the result of the tragic events of the last 77 years [Halevy 2016; Abu Salim 2016]; in fact, it has no precedent in the decades, centuries, or millennia prior, when Gaza was, among other things, part of a strategic intersection known as «the way of the Philistines», which connected the land of Canaan with ancient Egypt.

The tragic history mentioned above might be summarized in one data: about 70% of those living in the Gaza Strip, which is a 360 square kilometer area, are refugees who were driven out of Majdal, Huj, Simsim, Najd, Abu Sitta, and dozens of other villages. On the ashes of a number of them were later built Sderot (whose population doubled in the 1990s with the influx of immigrants from Russia), Or HaNer and several other Israeli cities and villages (in addition to Ashkelon, Ashdod, and some areas of the Western Negev, where Nirim6 and other villages were founded, Gaza was one of the 16 districts that made up the British-controlled Mandatory Palestine).

Palestinians call these expulsions and the destruction of 418 of their villages al-Nakba («the catastrophe»). It must be clarified that, for the Palestinians, the Nakba represents a process and not a phenomenon linked to a single event or year. Just to limit ourselves to three examples, in February-March 1949, following the signing of the armistice between Egypt and Israel, the Israeli forces expelled over 3,000 Palestinians from their homes in the villages of Iraq’s al-Manshiyya and al-Faluja. On 27 June of the same year, approximately 1,500 Palestinian refugees living in Baqa al Gharbiya were removed. On 14 January1950, 2,600 Palestinians were expelled from their homes in al-Majdal (Ashkelon).

It should also be noted that the Palestinians were not the first to use the expression al-Nakba. While the expression itself was already existing in Arabic, it was first utilized in reference to Palestine in leaflets that the Israeli armed forces dropped on al-Tira (near Haifa) in July 1948, with the aim of convincing Palestinians to abandon their homes and communities and surrender [Kamel 2022a]. At that point in history, Gaza emerged as the primary location for Palestinian refugees, transforming itself from Qadāʾ to Qitāʿ (from an Ottoman «administrative district» to a «strip» of land) [Al-Nimal 1979]. In Ursula Lindsey and Toufic Haddad’s words:

Gaza City was a major city in Palestine prior to 1948. It is also one of the few Palestinian cities that survived the 1948 Nakba, given that most Palestinian were lost in the creation of the state of Israel-West Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, etc. Gaza City became a city that was teeming with all these refugees who were displaced from their lands, and subsequently it became the seat of the first attempt to try and form an all-Palestinian national government [Hukūmat ‘Umūm Filastīn] after 1948 [Haddad and Lindsey 2024, 13 June].

It is worth mentioning that the Palestinians are not simply «Arabs», a term through which they are often described in Israel and in Western countries: the thesis according to which, as «Arabs», they can easily be relocated to any other «Arab country» is highly problematic from an historical perspective, beside being in clear violation of international law. To refer to the local populations from the Strait of Hormuz to the Strait of Gibraltar as «the Arabs» is akin to calling those living in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, the United States, Ireland, and Britain «the English»: they all speak the same language but exhibit distinctly different historical traditions, heritages and identities [MacKintosh-Smith 2019].

More than a millennium ago, Jerusalemite geographer Muhammad ibn Ahmad Shams al-Dīn Al-Maqdisī (946-1000) made it clear that he identified himself as a Palestinian: «I mentioned to them [workers in Shiraz] about the construction in Palestine and I discussed with them these matters. The master stonecutter asked me: Are you Egyptian? I replied: No, I am Palestinian» [Al-Maqdisī 2003, p.362].7 About 1.000 years later, on 3 September 1921, an op-ed published on Falastīn (which was printed from 1911 until 1948) highlighted that «We are Palestinians first and Arabs second» [MDC 1921, 3 December], thus echoing what was expressed a few years earlier by several Palestinian intellectuals such as Khalīl Baydas (1874–1949) and Salīm Qub’ayn (1870–1951).

In the 1870s the terms «Palestinians» and «Palästinenser» were also used, in explicit reference to the Arabs of Palestine, by a number of Western observers, including the British consul in Jerusalem James Finn (1806-72) [Finn 1878, p.248] and the German Protestant missionary Ludwig Schneller (1858-1953) [Schneller 1905, p.107]. These few examples, among others (the word Filastīnī, «Palestinian», was increasingly used in books and publications in the early 20th century), are there to remind us that, although all identities are ultimately «constructed», there are contexts in which the available sources confirm peculiar backgrounds that are too often omitted or unacknowledged [Kamel 2025].

«Who are they?», asked the Palestinian poet Mahmūd Darwīsh (1941-2008) in his Une rime pour les Mu‘allaqāt about the local populations under Ottoman rule: «That’s someone else problem» [Darwīsh 2000]. In many ways it was indeed a problem of the «others», of people external to the region. For the «locals», that is the «insiders», what made the difference was, on top of religion, the origin from a certain village (which often represented a sort of «protonation in the protonation»), the belonging to a certain hamūla (family clan), a way of dressing, a product of the earth, the use of a specific dialect, a particular dance (like the dabkeh, which in Palestine had its own peculiar characteristics), a festival [Kamel 2016, p.14].

A peculiar aspect of Palestinian culture and a glaring example of «protonational cohesion» was the annual Nabī Mūsā festival, which drew thousands of people from all across Palestine to the Jericho area [Al-‘Asalī 1990]. The purpose of the festival was to honor the traumatic events associated with the Crusades. Another example, among several others, was the festival known as «The Valley of the Ants». It took place once per year in the area around al-Majdal (Ashkelon). In the words of the Palestinian historian ‘Arif al-‘Arif (1891-1973), on that special occasion, many of the people who lived in Gaza, al-Majdal, and the nearby villages used to dressing up, bringing food, singing songs until the sun sets, waving flags, and riding horses [Al-‘Arif 1943].

3. How it was

In 1859 the American Protestant missionary William M. Thomson (1806-94) noted that: «the first time I came into this region I was agreeably surprised to find it not flat, barren country […] The country is equally lovely and no less fertile than the very best of the Mississippi Valley» [Thomson 1859, p.347]. One decade later, the British consul in Jerusalem James Finn (from 1846 to 1863) made it clear that he did «not know where in all the Holy Land I have seen such excellent agriculture of grain, olive-trees, and orchards of fruits, as here at Ashdod [still in 1945, Ashdod was inhabited by 4620 Arabs and 290 Jews]. The fields would do credit to English farming» [Finn 1868, p.162].

In the 1870s, there were around 468 hectares of irrigated citrus groves in the Gaza area [Badran 1972, p.126]. In 1899, two decades later, John Dickson, the British Consul to Jerusalem (from 1890 to 1906), pointed out that the area of Gaza was «under cultivation, crops of wheat and barley being raised by the Arabs» [ISA 1899, 30 November].

In a Hebrew publication from 1918 titled Eretz Yisrael ba-‘avar u-ba-hove («The Land of Israel in the Past and Present»), David Ben-Gurion (1886-1973) and Yitzhak Ben-Zvi (1884-1963), who would later become, respectively, the prime minister and second president of Israel, strived to demonstrate the Jewish origins of the local fellahin [Ben-Gurion and Ben Zvi 1980, p.196]8 (in their opinion, the local population made no contribution in the previous twelve centuries) [Ben-Gurion and Ben Zvi 1980, p.151-5 and 210]. Ben Gurion and Ben Zvi went so far as to undermine the very basis of the thesis of the mass expulsion of Jews – a narrative which have been rejected by many leading scholars of Jewish history [Yuval 2006, p.19; Bartal 2008, 6 July; Aldeman and Barkan 2011, p. 159]9 – which allegedly took place after the destruction of the Second Temple (70 CE):

To claim that following the conquest of Jerusalem by Tito and the failure of the revolt of Bar Kokba the Jewish people ceased to work the soil of Palestine means to show one’s complete ignorance of Jewish history and literature of the time […] Despite the oppression and suffering, the people of the country remained that which it always was [Ben Gurion and Ben Zvi 1980, p.198].

This final quotation clearly contradicts the language of the Declaration of Independence that Ben-Gurion himself read on 14 May 1948, under a portrait of Theodor Herzl (1860-1904) at the Tel Aviv Museum. «After being forcibly exiled from their land», to quote the precise words contained in the Decalaration, «people kept their faith during the diaspora» [Kamel 2015, ch. 2].

The reason for the existence of two theses in such strong contrast on a crucial topic such as the galut (the «diaspora») can be found in the events that occurred in the three decades between the publication of Ben-Gurion/Ben Zvi’s book and the birth of State of Israel. The rising of Palestinian nationalism, the Hebron massacre (1929) and the Great Arab Revolt (1936) had indeed shown, once and for all, the firm opposition of the local majority to any process of assimilation [Kamel 2015, ch. 2]. Such an awareness would soon create the conditions for the development of a new myth, that of the midbar shemama10 («the barren desert»). The hint is to the attempts to present Palestine as a desolate place,11 with a tiny, recently arrived Arab population. The region’s subsequent development has been significantly impacted by this perception:

From that moment on, [i.e., since the abandonment of the thesis of the Jewish origin of the fellahin] the descendents of the Judean peasantry vanished from Jewish national consciousness and were cast into oblivion. Very soon […] the modern Palestinian fellahin became, in the eyes of the authorized agents of memory, Arab immigrants who came in the nineteenth century to an almost empty country and continued to arrive in the twentieth century as the developing Zionist economy, according to the new myth, attracted many thousands of non-Jewish laborers [Sand 2008, p. 417].

In the historical phases prior to when the Crusaders destroyed a large part of the Gaza area in the 12th century, the latter was home to a limited yet thriving and well integrated Jewish community (in the context of the «Arab conquest» of the 7th century, the Arab conquerors did not expel the Jews and Christians who lived in the area).12

A limited presence also persisted in the following centuries, and until the revolts of 1929, when the Jewish neighborhood of Gaza was destroyed by local Palestinians and all the Jews who were living in Gaza at the time (51 people) fled the city. It the space of just two decades, the 1920s and 1930s, a far greater number of cases of intercommunal violence were recorded than in the previous four centuries combined. Although the ethnic-religious equilibria in the Gaza Strip were significantly influenced by the dynamics linked to the rising of Zionism and the First World War – when Gaza suffered also attacks with chemical weapons13 – and other related historical trajectories [Rafeq 1980], it is only as a consequence of the 1948 war that the entire area recorded, from a demographic point of view, an unprecedented shift.

4. Gaza’s demographic unbalance

Following Operation Yoav, carried out by the Israeli forces in the Negev (Naqab) Desert in mid-October 1948, the number of refugees in the Gaza Strip rose from 100,000 (which arrived in the previous months) to 230,000. Michael Gallant, father of Yoav Gallant (several times minister in the years 2018-2024), named his son Yoav to commemorate the military campaign that, more than any other, altered Gaza’s demographic equilibrium.

In our days, Yoav Gallant and, more in general, some other key political figures and institutions in Israel, are attempting to close the circle of history, this time by reducing the population in Gaza. This objective is scarcely unprecedented. To stick to the period right after 1948,14 and more precisely to 5 years later (1953), the «Free Officers Movement» which overthrew Egyptian King Farouk in 1952, together with the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA), and the US (under President Harry Truman) agreed to relocate 12,000 Palestinian families from the Gaza Strip to the Sinai Peninsula [Kamel 2024b, 28 October].

Egyptian newspapers first published details on the plan in May 1953. To facilitate its implementation, an Israeli military unit led by Ariel Sharon attacked al Bureij Camp in August 1953, killing about 30 Palestinians. Back then, Egypt was experiencing major internal problems, and Nasser, one of the «Free Officers», who served as prime minister (1954-56) and then president (1956-70) of Egypt, had little interest in taking any responsibility for managing the problem of Gaza’s large refugee population, beside also being aware that his country was not ready to confront Israel militarly.

It is indeed only after Israel’s «Black Arrow» operation in February 1955 – which targeted the Egyptian forces in response to their active role in providing various forms of support for Palestinian fedayeen activity – that Nasser’s approach became more confrontational with Israel and supportive of the Palestinians. A cable sent from Israel to Moshe Sharrett (at the time in Bombay) on 4 November 1956, decried: «The dangers inherent in the expansionist and imperialistic policies of the Nasser regime, whose declared aim is Egyptian hegemony both in African and Western Asia».15

The «Sinai plan» for the expulsion of 12,000 Palestinian families was foiled after two years of massive protests throughout the Gaza strip, when Palestinians – which, according to the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s liason officer with the army Arieh Eilan, were experiencing «real hunger» [ISA 1955, 27 March] – chanted slogans such as: «No settlement. No relocation. Oh, you American agents» [Bisīsū 1980, p.31]. These protests played a seminal role in twarting a goal that was discussed and cherished already during the war of 1948. In Elisha Efrat’s words:

Yigal Allon, a military commander during the War of Independence, used to say that, if he and his men had had another day or two, they would have captured Gaza in 1948. He supposed that, if Israel had captured the Gaza Strip then, there would not have been so many refugees living there, and they would have fled. That was also what David Ben-Gurion thought when he proposed capturing the Gaza Strip in 1955 [Efrat 2006, p.183].

One year later, in October 1956, the Israeli army invaded the Sinai and Gaza,16 maintaining the direct control of both areas for four months, before being forced to evaquate them due to mounting international (including from the US) pressure [Masalha 1996, p.55-68]. Back then, the new Israel’s foreign minister, Golda Meir (1898-1978), argued that «the Gaza Strip is an integral part of the land of Israel»,17 while Menahem Begin (1913-1992), the head of the Herut party at the time, maintained that Gaza «belonged to Israel by right» [Begin 1956, 28 November].

During those same months, Levi Eshkol (1895-1969), Israel’s finance minister, set aside half a million dollars to drive thousands of Palestinians to the Sinai. Ezra Danin (1903-1984) was given responsibility for this plan, known as the «Al-‘Arīsh option»,18 which was gaining popularity at the time. Incidentally, Danin was the same person who in 1962 sponsored «Operation workers», which sought to relocate Palestinians to West Germany [Sharett and Rivlin 1987]. It might be useful to add that in the very same historical phase in which Levi Eshkol was advocating for the emigration of the Gazawis in exchange for economic benefits, Avraham Tamir (1924-2010), on request of Ben-Gurion, outlined a plan – known as Hafarperet («The Mole») – for the expulsion of 40,000 Palestinians from Israel to Jordan.19

After 1967, also thanks to the influential role played by Ada Sereni (Mossad’s chief operative in Italy), Yosef Yariv (the head of the Mossad’s special operations arm) and others, the Israeli forces intensified their attempts to forcibly relocate Gaza’s refugees to Jordan and South American states. To encourage this goal, which was firmly opposed by the Egyptian and Jordanian authorities, they set up «emigration offices» throughout the Gaza Strip and offered financial incentives. In the 1970s, Israel’s transfer policies continued to intensify – 38,000 refugees were moved to the West Bank and Sinai in 1971 alone) – and prominent figures such as Yitzhak Rabin (1922-1995) strived to reach an agreement with King Hussein bin Talāl (1935-99) to implement the expulsion of thounsands of Palestinians from Gaza to Jordan [Shragai 2025, 15 February].

In the following years and decades, the plan for the relocation of Palestinians from Gaza (mainly) to the Sinai Peninsula, while being offered less assiduously, remained rather popular. A number of Israeli right-wing figures and parties (such as Moledet, established by Rehavam Ze’evi in 1988) have continued to openly advocate for the expulsion of the Palestinians through population transfer. Just to provide a particularly meaningful example, the 2004 «Eiland plan» envisioned that Egypt would cede land roughly five times the size of Gaza to settle there the majority of the Gazawis. The plan was named after Giora Eiland, who served as the head of the Israeli National Security Council between 2004 and 2006.

The 2004 Eiland plan was never implemented, and in 2005, just before a stroke left him permanently incapacitated, Ariel Sharon drove 7,000 settlers out of Gaza while also resettling tens of thousands more in settlements throughout the West Bank [Kamel 2024b, 28 October]. As noted by Justin Alexander:

Gaza’s very existence, with its dense, impoverished and growing population, the majority of whom are refugees from what is now Israel, is perceived by some Israelis to pose a demographic threat to the maintenance of a Jewish-majority state next-door, indeed this was a major motivation for the Disengagement [decided by Sharon] [Alexander 2007, p.6].

The unilateral disengagement from Gaza was in violation of the Oslo Accords, and, not by chance, exacerbated and prolonged hostility and violence rather than tackling them.

5. Demography and Zionism(s)

«Diluting» the Palestinian population was a political goal already before 1948? To answer to this question, it might be useful to start from a specific date, that is 12 June 1895, when the founder of political Zionism, Theodor Herzl (1860-1904), wrote that «we shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border» [Herzl 1960, p.88-90]. Benny Morris [2004, p.40-41], Edward Said [1992, p.13], and numerous other academics have misquoted (cutting some key sentences) this passage to support the claim that Herzl was aiming at driving the Palestinians out of their land. Yet, Herzl did not have Palestine and its people in mind when he wrote those remarks. The geographical frame of the «expropriation» process to which he was alluding was South America: «I am assuming that we shall go to Argentina», Herzl wrote in that same diary on 13 June 1895 [Herzl 1960, p.134].

Herzl never used the terms «Arabs» or «Palestinians»,20 and presented Zionism as an «outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism» [Herzl 2006, p.28]. However, there is no «proof» that he intended to drive out the local inhabitants. It is only from the 1930s onwards,21 – when the tensions between the three local communities (Palestinian Jews, Arab-Palestinians and Zionists) sharpened [Kamel 2015, ch. 4; Kamel 2021, 19 August], and after that the 1937 British Peel Commission proposed the simultaneous forced transfer of about 225,000 Palestinians and 1,250 Jews22 – that the subject began to attract increasing attention. It was only then that opinions such as the ones voiced in 1940 by the director of the Department for Land in the Keren Kayemeth LeIsrael (KKL), Yosef Weitz, emerged: «There is no other way», argued Weitz, «but to transfer the Arabs from here to neighbouring countries» [Weitz 1969, 29 September]. Weitz, later on (1949-54), outlined a plan for the expulsion of thousands of Galilee’s Christians to Argentina and Brasil [Masalha 1999].

The fact that the Zionist authorities did not aim at expelling them, at least until the 1930s, does not mean that Palestinians, as a general tendency, were treated fairly. For instance, Asher Ginsberg (1856-1927), one of the most influential Zionist thinkers of the time, arrived in Palestine in 1891 and, after spending a few months in the area, wrote an article entitled Emet me-Eretz Ysrael («Truth from the Land of Israel») in which he pointed out that «They [Ginsberg was referring to the new settlers who were arriving from Europe] deal with the Arabs with hostility and cruelty, trespass unjustly, beat them shamefully for no sufficient reason, and even boast about their actions. There is no one to stop the flood and put an end to this despicable and dangerous tendency» [Ginsberg 1981].23

The same year (1891), Moshe Smilansky (1874-1953), a well-known writer from Kiev, arrived in Palestine and, a few years later, recounting is experience, wrote that: «During the thirty years we have been here, it is not they [the Palestinians] who have remained alien to us but we to them» [Mendes-Flohr 1983, p.5]. Yitzhak Epstein (1862-1943), – a Russian writer who immigrated in Palestine in 1886 – spoke to the delegates of the 7th Zionist Congress in 1905, stressing that «in our beloved land lives a whole people which has lived there for many centuries and has never considered the idea of leaving it» [Epstein 1907, p.193-206]. In 1929, renowned historian Hans Kohn (1891–1971), who had been involved in the Zionist movement since 1909, wrote that «we pretended that the Arabs did not exist and were glad when we were not reminded of their existence» [JNUL 1929, 21 November].24

These few examples are there to remind us that the Zionist movement was anything but a monolith, and that many critical aspects concerning the relations with the Palestinian population were visible and relevant already at that time.

6. The past’s future

In late January 2025, on an Air Force One flight from Las Vegas to Miami, US President Donald Trump outlined a plan to «clean up» Gaza. «We are talking about probably a million and a half people, and we just clean out that whole thing», Trump told reporters, adding that the move «could be temporary» or «could be long-term» [Cuddy and Donnison 2025, 26 January].25 Jordan’s King Abdullah II and Egypt’s President al-Sisi – two dictators who heavily depend on US funding – have been asked, so far to no avail, to take in Palestinians from Gaza, despite the fact that this represents a clear violation of international law, which prohibits «individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country» [IHL Database 1949, 12 August]. The Jordanian King, in particular, was aware that the moment he would accept to host thousands of Gazawis, the next (very likely) step would be – in line with far-right Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich’s plans [Khalil and Shamala 2025, 10 February] – the request to host hundreds of thousands of Palestinians expelled by the Israeli army from the West Bank to Jordan.

A few days after proposing his plan for the mass expulsion of the Gazawis, while speaking at a White House news conference, Trump pointed out that Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip should be relocated, and added that they would be «thrilled» to live elsewhere and were only staying because they had «no alternative» [Gregorian 2025, 4 February]. Right after this, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announced the establishment of a new directorate in the Defense Ministry to facilitate the «voluntary emigration» of the Gazawis.

Yet, in light of the epochal catastrophe still raging in Gaza (and, to a more limited but very visible extent, in the West Bank), Palestinians’ resistance to expulsions and relocations is today more tenacious than ever. Palestinians are aware that – as in the past – there is nothing «temporary» in their forced removals from their homes. They know that for them there is not, nor will there be, any «right of return».

It is therefore hardly surprising that Palestinians are willing to pay a high price to remain on their land. Equally eager are of course also the Israelis and this is a further reason why anyone caring about this land and its inhabitants must contribute to finding a solution that would allow these two people to coexist. How to do so? A comprehensive answer would require much more space,26 but, also in light of what has emerged in this article, an element appears evident. This is the necessity of knowing and recognizing the tremendous historical cost that the Palestinians have paid so that the aspirations of their counterpart could be realized, bending the arc of history towards an idea of justice and greater understanding, without this affecting the rights and aspirations of any of the involved parties. Reinhart Koselleck (1923-2006), the founder of Begriffsgeschichte (conceptual history), noticed that «History may be made, in the short term, by winners, but historical knowledge comes, in the long run, from the vanquished» [Koselleck 2000, p.68].

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ISSN 2385-2526

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Conflict, competition and cooperation were evident during 2024 across maritime Asia; the waters running from the Red Sea across the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, the North-west Pacific and the Arctic Ocean. During the year two different combinations were noticeable around the Asian littoral, in geopolitical terms a flexible geometry of alignments. On the one hand, Russia, China, North Korea, Iran and the Houthis in various ways cooperated much more closely with each other during 2024, against the West in general and the US in particular. On the other hand, during 2024 South Korea, Japan and India also moved closer together with each other, with Australia and above all the US. European powers also appeared in maritime Asia in greater force during 2024. A common thread running through these developments was China’s growing maritime presence around Asia, reflecting its wider competition regionally with India and globally with the US.

Keywords – Indo-Pacific, China, India, naval, geopolitics, geo-economics, maritime.

1. The broader picture

2024 proved a challenging time for Maritime Asia. Ongoing structural competition across the Indo-Pacific, something of a new Great Game at sea between India and China in the Indian Ocean (the Arabian Sea in the north east, and the Bay of Bengal in the north-west) and between the US and China in the Western Pacific continued to deepen, and be reflected in competitive groupings. These broader realignments in the global security order spill over across all the waters of maritime Asia.

Two ongoing China-related maritime issues, the South China Sea and Taiwan, continued to cause problems, and indeed increased in tension. In the South China Sea, ASEAN and China failed to conclude any Code of Conduct, despite being mooted since 2018, while direct confrontation between the Philippine and a more assertive China was particularly evident during 2024 as was increasing Chinese pressure against Taiwan in and around the Taiwan Strait.

New outside issues also impacted on Maritime Asia during 2024. First, blowback from military conflict in Gaza between Israel and Hamas, sparked by the Hamas attacks in South Israel in September 2023 brought Iran, China and Russia together in varying degrees behind the Iranian-backed Houthis, who had intervened in support of Hamas. Second, further blowback from the Ukraine War, ongoing since February 2022, brought Iran, China and North Korea in behind Russia during 2024. The US Deputy Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs noted in Japan in November that Europe and the Indo-Pacific were to be acknowledged as «a single theater of consequence» in which «therein we will see further adjustments in the relationships between Pyongyang, Moscow, Beijing, Tehran» [Campbell 2024, 18 November].

In turn, relationships between the four QUAD members of Australia, India, Japan and the US, joined at various points by South Korea were intensified, as shown by their various meetings and exercises arranged and conducted through the year. The QUAD Leaders Summit in September denounced Houthi disruption in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden; announced measures for increasing their own maritime cooperation, and specifically condemned Chinese «coercive» and «intimidating» hhmanoeuvres in the South China Sea [White House 2024, 21 September]. In October 2024, as designated «Partners» Australia, Japan, South Korea and Japan participated for the first time in a NATO Defense Ministers meeting; which labelled Iran, China and North Korea as «security spoilers» [NATO 2024, 17 October]. On the maritime front it is worth noting that Italy deployed its Carrier Strike Group (CSG) for the first time across the Indo-Pacific during 2024, carrying out military exercises with India, Japan and the US, but avoiding any contact with China.

2. Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden

Houthi attacks on shipping, which started in November 2023, were condemned on 10 January 2024 in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2722, though China and Russia abstained.

Airstrikes by US and UK forces ensued two days later on Houthi bases in Yemen, and were immediately denounced in the Chinese state media [Global Times 2024a, 12 January]. Subsequently the US continued to use its carrier strength in the Red Sea to launch air strikes and interceptions throughout the year. Israeli attacks on Houthi bases in Yemen in late September 2024 were a direct response to Houthi drone attacks earlier in the month. Houthi attacks on Israel’s Red Sea port of Eliat on 17 November represented a further escalation, as did their seizure of an Israeli ship. Houthi missile attacks on Israel on 13 December were met with air strikes by Israel on 19 and 26 December on Houthi-controlled ports of Hudaydah, Salif, Ra’s Isa and the capital’s Sana’a International Airport.

Various responses ensued to contain the Houthi attacks. The Gulf States, with the exception of Bahrain, kept relatively quiet over the Houthis, with Qatar instead facilitating discussions during 2024 to broker a ceasefire in the Gaza strip. Operation Prosperity Guardian was set up in December 2023 by the US, which involved US and UK ships. However, the only Arab state involved was Bahrain, like Singapore sending some personnel. The other Gulf states of Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were absent. Operation Aspides was set up by the European Union in February 2024 and involved naval contributions from France, Germany, Italy, and Belgium. The Aspides operations were limited to interception at sea of Houthi drones and missiles, avoiding military strikes on land. The Indian navy dispatched three destroyers in January 2024 to beef up surveillance in the Gulf of Aden, and rescued the Philippine crew members of MV Confidence, hit by Houthi missiles, in the Gulf of Aden on 6 March.

Even as Western shipping companies switched routes from the Red Sea and the Suez Canal to the circumnavigation of Africa, the Houthis announced in March 2024 that Russian and Chinese ships would be exempt from attacks. With this exemption China was able to direct its own state shipping companies into picking up more of the Red Sea trade. News emerged, in September, that Iran had brokered ongoing secret talks between Russia and the Houthis for Russia to transfer anti-ship missiles to the Houthis [Irish 2024, 24 September], and, in October, that Russia was providing targeting information to the Houthis [Faucon and Grove 2024, 24 October].

India reached out to Saudi Arabia in 2024. Saudi Arabia’s Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Fahd bin Abdullah Al-Ghufaili held talks with his Indian counterpart Admiral R. Hari Kumar on maritime security in the region on 11 January, with particular reference to the Red Sea, the Gulf and the Arabian Sea. India’s Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar inaugurated the first India-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Ministerial Meeting for Strategic Dialogue in September. The first EU-GCC Cooperation Council took place in October, reiterated support for UN Security Council Resolution 2722, put out their «demand that the Houthis halt attacks against vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden», and recorded specific appreciation of the Aspides operation «with the aim of safeguarding freedom of navigation in the international waters in the Red Sea» [EU-GCC 2024, 16 October].

3. Arabian Sea and Western Indian Ocean

Oman, a GCC member, continued to show its strategic significance for the UK and for India during 2024. The UK Littoral Response Group (LRG) arrived in the Arabian Sea in April 2024, headquartering at port city of Duqm. The LRG is made up of RFA Argus and RFA Lyme Bay, carrying landing craft, helicopters and marine commandos. It was immediately dispatched to carry out the Konkan exercise with India in the Arabian Sea. In February, India was also granted specific zonal space at the port of Duqm, which in turn helps both the general Indian imprint around the Arabian Sea and its operations in the Gulf of Aden/Red Sea. The Naseem Al Bahr exercise between India and Oman in October reaffirmed the close relations between these two littoral states.

The France-India-UAE trilateral formed in 2022 followed its naval exercises of 2023 with two Desert Knight aerial exercises over the Arabian Sea in January and December 2024, topping and tailing the year.

Growing trilateral cooperation between Iran, Russia and China was on show with their naval exercises Security Bond—2024 carried out in February in the Gulf of Oman. The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium Marine Exercise (IMEX) 2024, organized by Iran, involved naval drills held by Iran, Oman and Russia ships in October 2024 with Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Thailand observing.

On Iran’s coast, in May 2024 Indian Ports Global Limited (IPGL) was given 10-year running rights at Chabahar in return for investments of around US$ 370 million. From India’s point of view, this opened the way for the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) which would by-pass the China-Pakistan corridor and leapfrog over Gwadar, Pakistan’s China-run port. The India-UAE Virtual Trade Corridor Deal, signed in September, represented an important step towards the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). IMEC, linking India’s Western-facing ports with the Gulf and over to the Mediterranean, is an important alternative to China’s Maritime Silk Road initiative.

Pakistan’s quest for sixth-generation advanced submarines was on show as China delivered the first of eight diesel-electric Hangor-II advanced submarines to Pakistan in April 2024. Pakistan’s attempts to keep pace with India were evident in November with its successful flight test of the indigenously developed Ship-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM). India’s Western Fleet was significantly augmented in September with allocation to it, in September, of INS Vikrant, an aircraft carrier. She joined its sister aircraft-carrier ship INS Vikramaditya at Karwar Port, on the Western Coast of India (Karnataka).

The Lakshadweep islands played an important role for India in 2024. Narendra Modi’s first visit of the year, on 2 January, was to these little-visited islands. INS Jatayu, the second Indian naval base on the Lakshadweep Islands was opened in March at Minicoy Island, with India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh traveling there with India’s two Carrier Strike Groups, altogether 15 ships. In July, India cleared major plans from the Department of Military Affairs to build two military airfields in Lakshadweep, involving a new airbase on Minicoy and an extension of the existing air field on Agatti.

Amid competition with China, India recovered its position among the island states of the Indian Ocean. In the Maldives the pro-Chinese administration of Mohamed Muizzu, in power since September 2023, performed something of a U-turn from an «India out» to a «closest ally» position, a somersault highlighted by Jaishankar’s visit in August 2024 [Naish 2024, 14 August]. The India-Seychelles relationship was upgraded to a Comprehensive Economic and Security Partnership when Modi met Muizzi in October. In Sri Lanka, elections in September delivered the Presidency to the leftist Anura Kumara Dissanayake, with the Chinese state media looking forward to his tenure, as the new President was «expected to boost ties with Beijing» [Global Times 2024f, 22 September]. Nonetheless, Dissanayake’s visit to India in December saw Sri Lanka re-emphasizing security cooperation with India.

The Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) advanced during 2024 in membership and structure. Already made up of India, Maldives, Mauritius and Sri Lanka, the membership of Bangladesh was approved in July. The National Security Advisers of the member countries, tasked with assuring «maritime safety and security», met in August to formally sign the CSC Charter and a memorandum of understanding for the establishment of a Secretariat [Government of India 2024, 30 August].

4. Bay of Bengal and Eastern Indian Ocean

India’s Eastern Fleet, was also significantly augmented in August with the induction of India’s second nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), INS Arighat, which joined its sister-vessel INS Arihant in the port of Visakhapatnam (Andhra Pradesh). In November, the Arighat carried out India’s first firing of a K-4 nuclear-capable 3,500-mile range ballistic missile.

The Milan exercises organized by India in February from its bastion of the Andaman & Nicobar Islands attracted record numbers. 51 delegations were present; naval assets from Australia, France, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Mauritius, Myanmar, Russia, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the United States and Vietnam were present. Neither China, nor Pakistan, were invited; with China denouncing the event [China Military 2024a, 28 February]. Deliberately on show were India’s two aircraft carriers INS Vikramaditya and INS Vikrant.

In October, at India’s Eastern Command at Visakhapatnam, India hosted the four-way Malabar exercise involving Australia, India, Japan and the United States; exercises condemned in the Chinese state media [Qian 2024, 17 October].

Finally, the 43rd India-Indonesia Coordinated Patrol (CORPAT) exercise took place on 10-18 December as an expression of further «deepening maritime ties in a transforming Indo-Pacific». Its timing overlapped with India’s Admiral Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS) Dinesh Tripathi’s official visit to Indonesia from 15-18 December [Siddiqui 2024, 14 December].

Port control rivalries remain evident. In Myanmar, China’s control of Kyaukphyu deep water port had been re-affirmed in November 2023, but was overtaken when India Ports Global Ltd. (IPGL) gained complete operational control of Sittwe in May 2024. However, at Coco Islands (which are part of the Yangon region of Myanmar), where the Chinese have been present since 1994, when they seemingly leased one of them, in April, high resolution imagery showed the completed construction of a military hangar alongside a reconstructed airstrip and jetty. This re-ignited earlier fears of a Chinese intelligence-gathering facility looking across to India’s sensitive Nicobar and Andaman Islands.

Indonesia was involved in different-pointing naval exercises in 2024. The largest ever Super Garuda Shield was hosted by Indonesia from 26 August to 6 September; a multi-domain exercise involving Australia, Brazil, Brunei, Canada, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, the U.K. and the US. China was a notable absentee. Following talks in Moscow in July by Indonesia’s new February-elected President, Prabowo Subianto, the first ever Russia-Indonesia joint naval exercise, Orruda 2024, took place in the Java Sea from 4-8 November. This involved KRI I Gusti Ngurah Rai and KRI Franz Kaisiepo from the Indonesian navy and the RF Gromky, RF Rezky and RF Russian Federation Hero Aldar Tsydenzhapov from the Russian Navy. The largest amphibious exercise held to date between Indonesia and Australia, Keris Woomera, took place in the Java Sea from 13-17 November; it involved HMAS Stuart and HMAS Adelaide from the Australian navy and KRI Raden Eddy Martadinata and KRI Makassar from the Indonesian navy.

5. South China Sea

China’s naval shadow was prominent in the South China Sea during 2024. Live fire joint naval drills were held with Russia in the South China Sea in July. China’s own naval strength was apparent in October with the first joint appearance in the South China Sea of the Liaoning and Shandong Carrier Strike Groups. Friction between China and the Philippines dominated 2024 in the South China Sea, with particular flashpoints at Second Thomas Shoal, Scarborough Reef, Escoda Shoal and Sabina Shoal.

Defence of Philippine waters was encapsulated in the legal «push back» announced by Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos jr. in March 2024 against threats from China to «our sovereignty, sovereign rights, and our jurisdiction in the West Philippine Sea [South China Sea]» [Marcos 2024, 4 March]. President Marcos’ Executive Order no. 57 on 25 March Strengthening the Philippines Maritime Security and Maritime Domain Awareness set up a National Maritime Council. Towards the end of the year, the Philippine Maritime Zones Act and the Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act were signed into effect by Marcos on 8 November. Two days later, China responded with formally drawing expansive territorial baselines around Scarborough Reef. Marcos also announced in December that the Philippines was seeking a further arbitration award against China, to match the 2016 findings by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), which considered that Beijing’s «nine-dash line» enclosing most of the South China Sea based on «historical rights» provided no legal basis for sovereignty.

The Philippines spent much of 2024 seeking and gaining external support, immediately denounced in the Chinese state media as the Philippines’ misguided attempt to build a «united front» against China. [Liu 2024, 26 January].

Marcos, during his state visit to Vietnam in January 2024, asserted: «Vietnam remains the sole strategic partner of the Philippines in the ASEAN region …. maritime cooperation is the foundation of our Strategic Partnership» [Marcos 2024, 30 January]. The visit brought a Maritime Cooperation Agreement to increase coordination on South China issues, whose details were left vague, but tacitly aimed at China, and triggered warnings in the Chinese state media that Philippine-Vietnam cooperation might be to «the detriment of China’s interests in the South China Sea» [Wang 2024, 29 January]. The first ever joint drills involving Coastguards ships from the Philippines and Vietnam were organized in 9 August, followed by Letters of Intent between their defence ministers on 30 August engaging to sign a formal defence cooperation agreement.

However, the ASEAN Summit in October brought no direct support for the Philippine position in the South China Sea, and studied silence from other states like Malaysia, whose chief of navy instead stated that «when our ships meet them, their response have been positive; they do not act aggressively» [Bernama 2024, 18 October]

Support was also sought by the Philippines from India. India’s Minister for External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar visited Manila in March 2024, where he stressed that «as two seafaring nations of the Indo-Pacific, our maritime cooperation holds great potential». Subrahmanyan briefed his Philippine counterpart about «the Indian Navy’s deployments in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea to counter ongoing threats» and reiterated «India’s support to the Philippines for upholding its national sovereignty» [Jaishankar 2024, 26 March]. This latter point was immediately denounced in the Chinese state media, under the headline: «India is naive to interfere in South China Sea issue» [Global Times 2024b, 27 March]. Indian support for the Philippines became tangible with the arrival of shipment of Indian-made BrahMos supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles in April.

Various India-Philippine talks were held in September. Foreign Office officials held the 14th India-Philippines Policy Consultation Talks and the 5th Strategic Dialogue on 9 September in New Delhi. The 5th Joint Defense Cooperation Committee (JDCC) meeting held on 11 September in Manila focused on maritime security, including joint exercising, and was upgraded from joint secretaries to defence secretaries level.

Marcos’ tilt back towards the US and other associated security partners like Japan and Australia was particularly noticeable during 2024. US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s discussions with his Philippine counterpart on 1 April spelt out firmer US commitments to the Philippines «which extends to armed attacks on Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft – to include those of its Coast Guard – anywhere in the South China Sea» [White House 2024, 1 April].

7 April witnessed four-way naval exercises by the Philippines with the US, Japan and Australia, for the first time ever in the South China Sea, explained as being in support of «freedom of navigation» in a «free and open Indo-Pacific», and affirming the validity of the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal Award [US Department of Defense 2024, 5 April].

The first ever trilateral leader’s summit between Marcos, Biden and Kishida was held on 11 April; their Joint Vision Statement emphasized their being «equal partners and trusted friends, united by the vision we share of a free and open Indo-Pacific» [White House 2024, 11 April]. This leadership summit format was repeated in August. It was denounced in the Chinese state media [Ding 2024, 17 April].

The Balikatan «Shoulder to Shoulder» Philippine-US exercise, run from 22 April to 10 May, was the largest ever with 17,000 troops from both sides, and joined by Australia and for the first time France. On the one hand, the Philippine Armed Forces stated that «the key event» would be «the sinking of the adversary’s vessel», a former Chinese-owned ship [Armed Forces of the Philippines 2024, 16 April]. On the other hand, the event was denounced in the Chinese state media, which pointed out «using Chinese-made ships as targets for military exercises is a ridiculous stunt by Philippines» [Global Times 2024c, 20 April].

Philippine Defence Minister Gilberto Teodoro met his Australian, Japanese and US counterparts in Hawaii on 3 May. Their Joint Readout stated their general «shared vision for a free, open, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific» interspersed with «serious concern over the PRC’s repeated obstruction of Philippine vessels’ exercise of high seas freedom of navigation and the disruption of supply lines to Second Thomas Shoal». The Joint Readout also «called upon the PRC to abide by the final and legally binding 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal Award» [US Department of Defense 2024, 3 May]. This was immediately denounced in the Chinese state media under the headline «US assembles ‘Squad’ of allies to counter China» [Global Times 2024d, 5 May].

On the 8 July the Japan-Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) was signed, with the Philippines described as «a strategic partner located at a strategic juncture on the sea lanes» [Government of Japan 2024, 8 July]. It was immediately denounced in the Chinese state media [Xu and Guo 2024, 8 July].

Joint US-Philippine patrolling carried out on 31 July in the Philippine’s Exclusive Economic Zone in the South China Sea was followed on 2 August with the first ever joint Philippine-Japan drills in the South China Sea, duly denounced in the Chinese state media as «provocative» [Leng, 2024, 17 August]. Further support for the Philippines was on show with the quadrilateral operations carried out by Australia, Canada, the Philippines and the US and denounced as «absurd» in China [Siow 2024, 17 August]. The operations, which took place in the Philippine EEZ area from 7-8 August, were tailed by three Chinese naval units, and denounced in the Chinese state media as «Philippines’ provocations» [Global Times 2024e, 9 August].

Five-way joint patrolling was carried out by Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines and the US in the Philippine’s Exclusive Economic Zone in the South China Sea on 28 September. This was denounced in China, which responded with its own drills around Scarborough Shoal [Liu 2024, 28 September].

Sama Sama naval exercising commenced for two weeks in the waters off Northern Philippines facing Taiwan, running from 7-18 October. The high-intensity exercise focused on anti-submarine, anti-surface and anti-air warfare, and involved a widest ever participation. Almost 1,000 personnel from Australia, Canada, France Japan, the Philippines and the US, as well as observers from the UK, practised anti-submarine warfare techniques and the patrol of contested waters.

Later that month, the Kamandag island amphibious exercises hosted by the Philippines from 15-25 October, saw the largest number of participating countries; with troops from Australia, France, Japan, South Korea, the UK and the US alongside the Philippine Marine Corp. It was immediately denounced in the Chinese state-media as South China Sea-related, and aimed against China [Zhang and Guo 2024, 16 October].

The Australia-Philippine Defense Ministers Meeting mechanism, inaugurated on 15 November, stressed the common concerns over the situation in the South China Sea, reiterated the need there for freedom of navigation, and agreed that the Philippines would participate in the Exercise Talisman Sabre next year [Government of Australia 2024].

The General Security of Military Information Agreement signed on 18 November between the Philippines and the US was aimed at enhancing Manila’s maritime awareness in the South China Sea through access to US satellite imagery.

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s visit to the Philippines included public disclosure on 19 November that at Palawan he «met with some American service members deployed to US Task Force Ayungin». «Ayungin» is the Philippine name for Second Thomas Shoal, the source of particular Philippine-China friction. Hence Lloyd Austin’s statement revealed the existence of a previously unknown US Task Force involved in a previously unknown operation which seemed to reflect intelligence gathering work by the US military. The fact was immediately denounced in the Chinese state media [Liu 2024, 21 November; Hu and Fan 2024, 26 November].

A five-way defence minister’s format was inaugurated on 21 November where the Defence Ministers from Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and the US recorded their «vision of a free, open, secure, and prosperous Indo-Pacific, where international law and sovereignty are respected» [US Department of Defense 2024, 21 November].

Trilateral Japan-Philippine-US naval patrols mounted on 6 December in the Philippine’s EEZ in the South China Sea, were immediately denounced in the Chinese state media [Wang 2024, 6 December].

Finally, a new trilateral Japan-Philippine-US Maritime Dialogue mechanism was inaugurated on 10 December, and recorded their «serious concerns about the PRC’s dangerous and unlawful behaviour in the South China Sea» [White House 2024, 10 December]. An inaugural Philippine-India Maritime Dialogue was inaugurated on 18 December, with agreement to deepen naval collaboration.

6. Taiwan Strait

Rising tension in the Taiwan Strait was palpable in 2024, as there continued to be speculation on how far successful Russian aggression on Ukraine would embolden China to strike against Taiwan. The victory of the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leader Lai Ching-te in the Presidential Elections held in May 2024 heightened speculation over Beijing’s intentions [Insisa 2024, pp. 147-157].

The formal Joint Sword exercises, initiated in 2022, were expanded in numbers during 2024. «Joint Sword 2024A» and «Joint Sword-2024B» were respectively carried out in May and October. The exercise carried out in October 2024 included the deployment of the Liaoning Carrier Strike Group, which carried a record total of 125 aircraft and included 17 destroyers. Taiwan’s President Lai also carried out a successful Pacific tour to Hawaii-Marshall Islands-Tuvalu-Guam-Nauru from 30 November to 6 December. However, this was immediately and deliberately followed by unprecedented Chinese drills, in effect a Joint Sword 2024C, initiated on 9 December, which involved nearly 90 navy vessels and coast guard ships in the East and South China Seas, in waters near Taiwan and the southern Japanese islands.

What was also noticeable in the second half of the year was the transit situation in the Taiwan Strait, claimed by Beijing as Chinese waters. The US had been unilaterally transiting on a regular basis, but, in 2024, other Western nations joined the US in challenging China’s sovereignty on the Strait. Taiwan obviously welcomed such transits, while China, equally obviously, denounced them.

An instance of this new development was joint US-Canada transits. After carrying out trilateral Noble Stingray exercises with Japan in the East China Sea, the USS Ralph Johnson and HMCS Ottawa transited together through the Taiwan Strait on 7 September, to then carry out Noble Wolverine Exercise in the South China Sea. Another joint transit was carried out by the USS Rafael Peralta and HMCS Ottawa on 1 November. New Zealand’s MNZS Aotearoa and Australia’s HMAS Sydney jointly transited on 25 September, indeed simultaneously with Japan’s transit, for the first time, by JS Sazanami. As far as the Europeans were concerned, the Netherlands for the first time deployed through the Taiwan Strait one of its warships, the HNLMS Tromp, on 31 May. Germany sent through the Taiwan Strait the FGS Baden-Württemberg and the support ship Frankfurt, on 13 September. France’s FS Prairial passed through on the 29 October.

7. North-East Asia

Japan has felt threatened by Chinese warships increasingly navigating through the Ryukyu Islands via the Miyako and Ishigaki Straits; with Japan placing Type 12 anti-ship missiles on Miyako Island for the first time in March 2024, a move promptly denounced by China as having «obvious offensive characteristics» aimed at China [Wong 2024, 8 April]. The US Marine Corps also set up a new unit at Okinawa in June, the Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR), tasked to lend support along the first island chain, up to the Japanese home islands and down to the Philippines. September saw a further escalation as the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning transited through the Ryukyu Islands for the first time, between Yonaguni and Iriomote Islands. The Japanese government responded by declaring it was «utterly unacceptable from the perspective of the security environment of Japan and the region» [Parry 2024, 18 September].

Japan, like India, is in an aircraft carrier race with China. Since 2022 Japan has been converting its two helicopter carriers JS Kaga and JS Izumo into fully-fledged fixed wing aircraft carriers, carrying F-35Bs. The first stage of the converted aircraft carriers was unofficially unveiled in April 2024, and successful test flight landings were carried out in October off the coast of South California on JS Kaga. Both helicopter carriers were sent on Japan’s 2024 Indo-Pacific Deployment (IPD), the longest to date and the most powerful, including as it did both of these carriers.

As part of Ocean-2024, two nuclear submarines, the Krasnoyarsk and the Imperator Aleksandr III, commissioned in December 2023, were transferred from the Northern Fleet on the Kola peninsula to the Pacific Fleet at Vladivostok. Japan’s distrust of Russia and its Pacific Fleet was exacerbated in November 2024 by Japan’s first sighting of a Russian Yasen-class nuclear-powered submarine transiting La Perouse Strait between Japan’s Hokkaido and Russia’s Sakhalin islands, the first time Tokyo has observed this advanced Russian submarine.

Russia-China naval cooperation has also been manifest in North-East Asia where naval exercise Ocean 2024 saw Russian vessels joined by Chinese vessels in September 2024 in the Sea of Japan, with the combined Russia-China flotilla then proceeding around both sides of the Japanese archipelago. North-Joint 2024 to the north saw further exercising in the Sea of Okhotsk. Russian and Chinese coast guard vessels sailed together for the first time up to the Bering Sea on 28 September.

South Korea’s distrust of Russia was similarly heightened by North Korea’s strengthening its military ties with Russia, which involved the danger of potential transfer of nuclear technology from Russia to North Korea. An unexpected development was the dispatch of around 10,000 North Korean troops to fight alongside Russian troops in the Ukraine war in autumn 2024. This followed the supply of North Korean missiles to Russia and Putin’s own summit with Kim Jong Un in June 2024. A formal defence cooperation pact was signed in 2024.

North Korea has pushed forward with its own submarine program. A first was the test, in January 2024, of the Pulhwasal-3-31, a new generation of nuclear-capable cruise missile, which was launched by a submarine, its previous testing in 2023 having been carried out from a fixed submerged platform. South Korea’s riposte was immediate, and consisted in the launch of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from an underwater fixed platform. In April, the newest and largest submarine, a 3500-ton KSS-III diesel submarine, was delivered by Hyundai Heavy Industries and judged a «milestone» as it was able to fire SLBMs [Bergmann 2024, 4 April]. A further twist was that in August news became public that North Korea had started building a nuclear-powered submarine. According to some analysts, this represented North Korea’s «biggest threat» yet to South Korea [Newdick 2024, 9 October].

The increasingly tight cooperation between Russia, China and North Korea brought Japan, South Korea and the US still closer together. 2024 started with them setting up an Indo-Pacific Dialogue mechanism on 5 January in Washington. In this occasion, the three countries denounced the «recent dangerous and escalatory behaviour supporting unlawful maritime claims by the PRC in the South China Sea», reiterated the commitment to freedom of navigation, «opposed any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion anywhere in the waters of the Indo-Pacific», condemned North Korea’s «unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs, growing military cooperation with Russia» and reaffirmed «the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as indispensable to security and prosperity in the international community» [US Department of State 2024, 7 January]. This new mechanism was immediately denounced in the Chinese state media as «a collective attempt to restrain China» [Zhang 2024, 7 January]. The year ended with a formal Secretariat set up in December to further align Japan-South Korea-US policies and actions for the Indo-Pacific, as well as the second meeting of their Indo-Pacific Dialogue mechanism, which was held in Tokyo on 11 December.

Trilateral drills were carried out in April 2024, in the waters between South Korea and Japan, and, according to a South Korean spokesperson, «the participating forces conducted anti-submarine warfare drills to improve their responses to North Korean underwater threats including from submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles» [Shin 2024, 12 April]. In June in the East China Sea, Freedom Edge, a first time multi-domain exercise, was followed in July by the initialization of a Memorandum of Trilateral Security Cooperation. In November, a second exercise multi-domain exercise was carried out by Jeju Island, and was denounced in the Chinese state media as a «dangerous sign» for the Indo-Pacific [Global Times 2024g, 13 November].

A parallel trilateral was the inauguration of the first Policy Planning Dialogue in Seoul on 21 October, involving officials from India, Japan and South Korea, tasked to discuss situations in the Indo-Pacific region.

8. Arctic Ocean.

The final part of the Asian littoral is Russia’s lengthy Arctic shoreline, running along from the Bering Strait. October witnessed China’s Coast Guard entering the Bering Sea as part of a joint patrol with Russian forces.

The long-term climate features, the gradual warming of Arctic waters opening up ice-free navigation, is becoming another field for China-Russia cooperation. The meeting between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping in May 2024 saw agreement to set up a subcommittee within the Russia-China Commission for the development of the Northern Sea Route. In June 2024, a joint venture was announced between Russia’s Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom and the Chinese shipping company Hainan Yangpu New Shipping to cooperate on operating an Artic container route all year round. The agreement involves building five ice-class container ships and investing in infrastructure along the Northern Sea Route to overcome the logistical challenges of operating an all-year container route. In September the first Working Group Talks took place, including Rosatom officials and India’s deputy Minister of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, to discuss similar Russia-India collaboration. However, as part of a wider European distancing from China, Finland withdrew from China’s Polar Silk Road project in October 2024.

Towards 2025

The basic take-away is that the year ended with both loose groupings having strengthened their cooperation in varied formats. Of course, this could be seen as good news for Russia, which gained the help of North Korean troops in its war in Ukraine. However, this was bad news for China, which faced the strengthening and creation of various anti-China-focussed trilateral, and quadrilateral formations. Thus, on 31 December, the Quad Foreign Ministers issued a Joint Statement commemorating the 20th anniversary of Quad cooperation between Australia, India, Japan, and the US and reiterating their «shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific» [Government of Japan 2024, 31 December]. This was immediately denounced in the Chinese state media as «failing anti-China operations» [Deng and Shen 2025, 1 January], which, however, did not conceal Beijing’s hope that, under the new US administration, some distancing could occur between India and Japan on one side and the US on the other.

Certainly, the end of 2024 was increasingly overshadowed by the results of the US elections in November where Donald Trump won the Presidency, with inauguration on 20 January 2025, and his Republican Party won both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Whether the Biden administration’s more multilateral coalition-seeking approach in 2024 will survive under Trump in 2025 remains to be seen. The President’s comments that the US was shielded by both the Atlantic and the Pacific reflected a geopolitical truth but it left open the issue of how far the US would seek to maintain its strength and position across the Pacific, and indeed Indo-Pacific, waters; and if so alongside who and against who? The China-Russia naval cooperation in South-East Asian/East Asian/West Pacific/Arctic waters was one feature emerging in 2024 that particularly irked Washington.

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The paper focuses on the economic roles and geopolitical positioning of China and India on the international stage. It analyses the relationship between these two Asian giants by examining their often-controversial interactions within the BRICS coalition. The paper is divided into threasiamaior.org/…/20-AM2024-SA-ChinaIndia-1.pdfe parts. The first part explores the sectors in which cooperation occurs at different levels, alongside the areas where competition is most intense. The second part examines the relationship between China and India within the BRICS coalition, evaluating the impact of the expansion to selected Global South countries initiated at the 2023 Johannesburg summit. The third part analyses the positions and roles of China and India within the UN system and international financial institutions. As the two most populous countries in the world, China and India wield significant influence that cannot be overlooked in international organizations. The concluding section assesses whether the intensifying competition between the two Asian giants on the global stage outweighs their limited cooperation within BRICS.

Keywords – China-India relationship; China-India Conflict and Cooperation; BRICS coalition; BRICS Plus; UN system; international financial institutions.

1. Introduction

This paper explores the relationship between China and India to assess whether cooperation or competition prevails in their interaction. The analysis focuses on economic roles and geopolitical positioning of the two Asian giants on the international stage.

A convenient framework for observing these relations is the BRICS coalition, an alliance where the specific characteristics and individual interests of the two countries must interact with the coalition’s shared goals and strategies.1 The BRICS coalition was established as a platform for cooperation among member states and draws strength from the Bandung spirit.2 The BRICS coalition fosters strong partnerships through regular meetings and holds an annual summit, culminating in a document that outlines future goals and strategies. Over time, the number of meetings between ministers has increased, broadening the areas of cooperation. Competition also arose within the coalition, particularly in terms of individual members’ relationships with external partners in Africa, Asia, and South America. So, BRICS serves both as a venue for cooperation – addressing urgent issues such as climate change – and for competition, especially concerning leadership within the coalition and global geopolitical alignment.

My argument is that, despite the significant differences between China and India and owing to their ever-closer economic ties, the two countries depend on one another to counter Western hegemony internationally and within the globalized economy.

The paper is organized in three parts. In the first part, I look at the sectors in which forms of cooperation are manifested at different levels together with the sectors for which competition is most severe. I show that trade cooperation is modest due to India’s subordinate position to China, while several cooperation agreements bring the technological development of the two countries closer together in scientific and academic collaboration. Another important area of cooperation concerns the support to multilateral institutions and their actions. However, while it is true that scientific research unites the two countries, the industrial sectors linked to technology and innovation appear to set China and India in clear competition with significant repercussions on international markets. A sensitive issue in which signs of competition emerge is geopolitical positioning. China is clearly focused on supporting developing countries through economic cooperation, characterized by significant investments and respect for sovereignty. By contrast, while continuing its international cooperation efforts, especially in Africa, India is more concerned with maintaining close relations with the West – particularly with the United States.

The second part of the paper examines the relations between China and India within the BRICS coalition. Following the expansion to selected Global South countries initiated at the 2023 Johannesburg summit, the coalition has drawn increasing scrutiny from the West. This is largely due to the coalition’s growing economic weight – now surpassing that of the G7 – and its potential challenge to the existing world order established after World War II. Even within BRICS, moments of conflict coexist with shared interests, creating significant opportunities for China-India cooperation. These primarily involve the development of new technologies for information management and the digitalization of economy and finance. Additionally, collaboration is expanding in renewable energy, emissions reduction, and climate change mitigation. Despite strong efforts to foster cooperation, underlying competition for leadership remains a major challenge to strengthening BRICS’ global influence [Cochrane & Zaidan 2024; Mooradian 2024].

The third part analyses the position and role of China and India within the UN system and international financial institutions. As the two countries with the largest populations in the world, China and India hold significant influence that cannot be overlooked in international organizations. Moreover, as emerging powers, they represent the needs and aspirations of the largest group of developing and emerging nations within these organizations. Within the UN, China is already recognized as a prominent member through its permanent seat on the Security Council, while India is only occasionally admitted. In this context, India asserts its right to a permanent seat. Similarly, in financial institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China and India operate under the rules established at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 by the industrialized countries of the Western world. Given the economic importance of these organizations and the growing economic weight of China and India, 70 years after their founding, the two Asian giants are calling for reform. Their efforts are supported by countries with emerging and developing economies. In this way, the BRICS coalition challenges the West to redefine the global order, although Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa have different reasons to do so.

The concluding section assesses whether the intensifying competition between the two Asian giants on the global stage outweighs the limited cooperation within BRICS. Based on the most recent developments, we observe the fragile relationship of trust between the two Asian giants and the limited long-term shared objectives which signals the difficulty of maintaining unity within the coalition. However, the need to work in a common way, at least in the immediate future, explains the solidarity that China and India show on many occasions.

2. Economic interdependence and geopolitical competition

While political and military tensions over the border remained significant obstacles until the early 21st century, China and India have developed strong economic ties. These ties emerged and expanded as both countries opened to international trade from the 1980s onward. However, during the first three decades of their economic liberalization, China and India pursued markedly different paths in international relations. Their mutual recognition of the benefits of trade was formally acknowledged only at the first BRICS summit in 2009. Since then, the rapid economic growth of both nations has led to a steady increase in trade flows and a series of cooperation agreements.

2.1. Domestic and international cooperation

Trade relations between China and India have grown steadily in the most recent decade, between 2012 and 2023. India’s imports from China have more than doubled, thus bringing China to the first place among India’s importing partners (122.0 US Billion $; in 2023); India’s exports to China also grew, although they remained at relatively low level (16.2 US Billion $; in 2023). Thus, since 2024 China has become India’s main trading partner, overcoming the trade flows with the United States. By contrast, India is a marginal trading partner for China, although it represents a significant outlet/ market for products such as electronics, machinery, chemicals, and active pharmaceutical ingredients.

Despite Prime Minister Modi’s Make in India initiative, which aims to reduce dependence on Chinese imports, India continues to rely heavily on China for manufacturing inputs, as evidenced by the high and growing levels of material goods imports.3

Beyond trade, China and India engage in extensive multilateral and regional cooperation [Bondre 2021, 8 April; Tellis & Mirski 2013]. On the global stage, both countries support each other within United Nations initiatives on climate change, technology transfer, and debt relief for developing nations. They also advocate for financial reforms in institutions such as the IMF and the WB to enhance the representation of emerging economies in decision-making processes. These efforts not only strengthen bilateral ties but also align both nations with underrepresented countries.

Environmental cooperation is another significant area. While both nations face criticism for high pollution levels, they argue for a phased transition to clean energy, emphasizing that industrialized countries should bear a greater responsibility due to their historically higher emissions. They jointly endorse the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and collaborate on clean energy research, ranking among the world’s leading producers of solar panels and wind energy components [Basile & Cecchi 2019].

During the COVID-19 pandemic, China and India cooperated by exchanging medical supplies and engaging in global health discussions at the World Health Assembly (the decision-making body of the World Health Organization) [Sen & Das 2024]. Despite India’s prominence as a producer of generic drugs, more than 70% of its active pharmaceutical ingredients still originate from China.4

Cultural cooperation between the two countries is facilitated through institutions such as Confucius Institutes, which promote Chinese language learning in India, and India’s initiatives to highlight its Buddhist heritage. However, these exchanges often take place in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion rather than genuine partnership [Shavlay 202; Das 2022].

In recent years, collaboration in digital and financial technology (FinTech) has become more complex. Until 2020, India welcomed Chinese investments in its digital economy. However, it has since restricted access to Chinese applications deemed harmful to national security and public order [India Today, December 5, 2023].

In summary, China-India cooperation is shaped by mutual recognition of their differing needs and production capacities.

2.2. Domestic and international competition

Competition between China and India is often more pronounced than their cooperation, spanning territorial disputes and global geopolitical positioning.

A key point of contention is their long-standing border dispute. The 3,440-km-long border, which remains undefined, follows the Line of Actual Control – unilaterally established by China in 1959 and confirmed after the 1962 war. This has led to multiple localized clashes over the years. However, at the 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan (Russia) China and India reached an agreement on patrolling arrangements along their disputed border, which may ease tensions between the two nuclear-armed neighbours [Reed & White 2024, 21 October].

Another area of rivalry is control over the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). China has pursued its String of Pearls strategy for decades, expanding its presence through infrastructure projects linked to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).56 In response, India leverages the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) with the U.S., Japan, and Australia to counter China’s regional influence. Additionally, India has strengthened trade and labour agreements with Taiwan, a move China perceives as a challenge to its territorial integrity. However, given the limited economic scope of these agreements, further escalation appears unlikely.

Technological and space-related competition is also intensifying. Both nations are advancing in information technology, following divergent yet ambitious strategies. China leads in technological investments, including space programs under the BRI, while India seeks to counterbalance China’s dominance by strengthening partnerships with countries wary of dependence on Chinese technology. Since 2023, India has launched several satellites, including collaborations with NASA [Bhattacharjee 2025, 16 January]. Meanwhile, China continues expanding its space program, including human spaceflight and satellite networks, while indirectly competing through projects such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, which is attracting growing global interest.7

Ultimately, China-India relations remain defined by pragmatism. China maintains economic and commercial dominance, while India seeks to curb China’s influence and position itself as a strategic partner to Western nations, which are gradually losing ground in Southeast Asia [Zha, 2023.

3. Global leadership and partnership with emerging countries

The story of the birth and expansion of the BRICS coalition is now widely known [Basile and Cecchi 2018, 2019, 2023], making even a brief introduction unnecessary – especially considering the 2023 summit and the recent developments in 2024. However, it is useful to highlight a few key features of this coalition and review the major milestones in its evolution.

The first notable aspect concerns the composition of BRICS and the characteristics of its member countries. When the BRIC group (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) was established in 2009, each founding country held significant economic and political weight individually. However, the potential to form a cohesive economic and political alliance capable of addressing the 2008 global financial crisis was not immediately evident. At that pivotal moment in international relations, major financial institutions largely ignored the crisis’s impact on developing and emerging economies.

The Yekaterinburg Summit (Russia) in 2009, attended by the leaders of Brazil (Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva), Russia (Dmitry Medvedev), India (Manmohan Singh), and China (Hu Jintao), was held in a spirit of demanding not only greater attention but also shared support for countries that had been largely excluded from negotiations on international financial relations. The summit concluded with the Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries’ Leaders, in which the coalition expressed its aspiration to play a more prominent role within the G20. In this statement, the BRIC leaders positioned themselves as advocates for greater representation of emerging and developing economies in international financial institutions. They also emphasized the need for a stable, predictable, and diversified international monetary system.

Within just five years, significant changes occurred with the rise of new political leaders who would shape the future trajectory of the coalition. By the 2014 summit in Fortaleza (Brazil), the key figures were Vladimir Putin for Russia, Narendra Modi for India, and Xi Jinping for China. These leadership changes had a profound impact, solidifying BRICS as a coalition increasingly focused on expanding its global economic and political influence.8 The Fortaleza Summit marked the beginning of the second cycle of BRICS summits, with participants committing to the theme Inclusive Growth: Sustainable Solutions. Over the following decade, the coalition’s ambitions to play a more dominant role on the international stage grew significantly.

A major turning point came in 2023 at the Johannesburg Summit (South Africa), when BRICS expanded to include 10 member states. This enlargement drew intense media attention due to its strategic significance. Until 2023, the coalition’s regional composition seemed designed to include representatives from continents historically excluded from the development of contemporary capitalism. However, the admission of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Iran marked a significant shift. It moved the coalition’s centre of gravity further toward Asia and underscored the increasing importance of oil- and energy-producing nations. More than ever before, this expansion required closer global attention. Furthermore, the enlargement reflects an ongoing strategic approach – not only to amplify the voices of emerging and developing nations in international fora but also to challenge the leadership of established international organizations, particularly within the United Nations.

BRICS+ strategy evokes the spirit of the Bandung Conference. Key similarities include the inherent challenge to the Western-dominated world order and the explicit goal of establishing alternatives to Western institutions such as the IMF, WB, and G7. The BRICS+ coalition aims to foster a multipolar order, emphasizing cooperation among developing countries and reducing their economic dependence on the West. However, there are also significant differences. While the Bandung Conference was rooted in a strong anti-colonial and anti-imperialist ideology, BRICS+ takes a more pragmatic approach. Some members, such as India, maintain cooperative ties with the West, while others, like Russia and China, actively challenge it. Moreover, in 1955, China was still a developing country seeking alliances within the Global South, whereas today it is an economic powerhouse that largely drives the BRICS+ agenda – creating a potential imbalance within the coalition. Another key distinction is that while the Bandung Conference primarily focused on developing nations in Asia and Africa, BRICS+ includes Middle Eastern and South American countries that play crucial roles in global economic and political affairs [Adem and Thomas 2017].

The significance of the BRICS+ coalition becomes clear when comparing its global economic and political weight to that of the G7 (Tables 2a and 2b).

China and India together account for a significantly larger share of both the global population and GDP compared to the G7. While the G7 represents 30% of global GDP but less than 10% of the world’s population, the expanded BRICS alliance in 2024 includes 45% of the global population and accounts for more than 36% of global GDP. This disparity underscores how the representation of countries in international organizations, as established under the Bretton Woods system, no longer reflects contemporary demographic and economic realities.

3.1. Convergent and divergent interests of China and India in the BRICS coalition

A shared priority among BRICS members is countering US-led Western dominance in international relations. Both China and India support a new multipolar world order, advocating for reduced Western control over institutions such as the UN Security Council, the IMF, and the WB. A key motivation for reforming the Bretton Woods financial system is the perceived excessive influence of Western nations in the IMF’s governance, particularly its outdated quota system, which does not adequately reflect the rising economic power of emerging markets. BRICS members argue that they should receive a larger share of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) to align with their growing economic weight [Arnold 2024; Tran 2024, 28 March].9

A major initiative within BRICS is the process of de-dollarization, aimed at reducing dependence on the US dollar for international transactions. Russia and its allies have accelerated this shift in response to Western sanctions following the invasion of Ukraine. The de-dollarization process, once a long-term goal, is now being actively pursued as an alternative to the US-dominated financial system and the BRICS are embarking on this process making intra-BRICS international payments with their own currencies [Arnold 2024; Greene 2023].10

The issue of financial transactions is also central to BRICS cooperation. The BRICS Cross-Border Payment System is being developed as an alternative to SWIFT, the Western-dominated financial messaging system.11 This initiative has gained momentum following the sanctions on Russia, which have encouraged BRICS countries to create mechanisms that bypass external financial controls. Institutions such as the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) and the New Development Bank (NDB) were established before the Ukraine crisis but have now become critical tools for circumventing Western financial restrictions. The Kazan Summit (2024) emphasized the importance of expanding these financial alternatives, with new BRICS+ members playing an active role in their implementation [Arnold 2024; Sithole and Hlongwane 2023].

Within the BRICS coalition, China plays a dominant role, positioning itself as the leading power of the Global South and a counterweight to US hegemony. However, this dynamic creates tensions with India, which resists subordination to Chinese leadership, as it has long aspired to be recognized as a global leader itself. On the one hand, China often presents itself as a champion of multipolarity rather than outright dominance, emphasizing “win-win cooperation” and “peaceful development.” While it may not openly declare ambitions for global leadership in the way some Western powers have, its actions strongly indicate a drive to shape the international order in ways that align with its interests. On the other hand, India asserts a leading role both globally and in Indo-Pacific region. The aspiration for recognition of its leadership was already evident in the actions of previous leaders but it has become particularly significant under Modi. Yet, the roles India’s president has secured on the international stage appear more limited compared to his predecessors [Kesgin & Wehner 2021; Palladio 2025, 17 February; Upadhyay 2022, 12 July; Vinodan & Kurian 2024].

While recent geopolitical crises have shifted global attention away from economic and environmental issues, BRICS remains engaged in addressing climate change. Both China and India have been active participants in international climate agreements, reaffirming their commitment to the principles of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement [Basile and Cecchi 2018; Basile and Cecchi 2019; Prys-Hansen 2022].

Ultimately, while China and India share a commitment to reshaping the global order, their conflicting geopolitical interests and economic strategies introduce challenges to achieving deeper integration within the coalition. As the above considerations suggest, within the BRICS coalition, China and India are stakeholders of economic and political interests that are partly convergent and partly divergent. Relying on the Kazan Final Declaration (2024), it is possible to summarize the areas of convergence and divergence between the two Asian giants, offering insights into the evolving dynamics of political relations within BRICS.

Areas of convergence:

1. Commitment to multilateralism and a multipolar world: both China and India seek a more representative and equitable international order. However, while China aims to diminish US influence, India primarily seeks a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
2. Economic cooperation and de-dollarization: both countries support initiatives like the BRICS Cross-Border Payment System to facilitate trade in local currencies and reduce reliance on Western financial institutions.
3. BRICS Expansion: both nations recognize the strategic importance of expanding BRICS membership, though their approaches differ.

Areas of divergence:

1. Geopolitical tensions: despite diplomatic efforts to ease border disputes, unresolved territorial conflicts continue to create friction between China and India, potentially affecting BRICS cohesion.
2. Strategic priorities in BRICS: China advocates for rapid expansion to bolster its vision of a new world order, while India favours a more measured approach. Additionally, India opposes China’s BRI, viewing it as a violation of its sovereignty.
3. Developmental differences: China’s economic dominance within BRICS creates disparities in policy direction, with India seeking a more balanced and inclusive approach.

4. The international world order

The UN system and the financial institutions established at Bretton Woods cannot ignore the growing influence of China and India. Their increasing economic power, strategic ambitions, and shared vision of a multipolar world order underscore their significance. While their objectives sometimes align – such as advocating for greater representation of developing countries – their methods and aspirations often diverge due to geopolitical competition. The UN serves as a crucial platform for both nations to assert their global influence, particularly within the UN Security Council, while the Bretton Woods financial institutions regulate economic transactions in the global economy.

4.1. China and India in the UN System

China has been a permanent member of the UN Security Council since 1971, when it replaced the Republic of China (Taiwan). As one of the five permanent members, alongside France, the United Kingdom, Russia, and the United States, China exercises veto power. It is also one of the largest contributors to UN peacekeeping operations, particularly in Africa, strongly supporting development and humanitarian aid initiatives. China consistently opposes US influence in setting the agenda of both the Security Council and the General Assembly [Batman et al. 2024].

India, a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for 16 non-consecutive years, has actively sought a permanent seat. Alongside Japan, Germany, and Brazil, India argues that its economic strength, population size, and contributions to peacekeeping missions justify its inclusion. Within the General Assembly, India promotes initiatives focused on climate change, counterterrorism, and sustainable development.

While China and India are both influential within the UN system, their engagement is marked by both competition and cooperation. Their rivalry is evident in three key areas: Security Council membership, voting patterns, and influence within UN institutions. China’s veto power grants significant leverage in global security decisions, while India continues to push for permanent membership. China has consistently opposed India’s bid, making this a major point of contention. Moreover, China has frequently blocked India’s initiatives, particularly those related to Pakistan, while India has resisted Chinese proposals that undermine its own strategic interests [Gowan 2024]. Additionally, China wields substantial influence over UN agencies, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, whereas India, though influential, does not command the same level of institutional control.

Despite these tensions, both nations share common interests in reforming global governance and advocating for the Global South. They support multilateralism, South-South cooperation, and Sustainable Development Goals. Both contribute to UN peacekeeping missions and collaborate on climate negotiations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. As already said, they emphasize the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and call for greater financial and technological support from developed nations to meet Paris Agreement targets [Qin 2024]. While security and geopolitical conflicts persist, their mutual interest in restructuring global governance ensures that cooperation remains a fundamental aspect of their UN engagement.

4.2. India and China in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund

The WB provides loans and development finance to low- and middle-income countries, while the IMF supports financial stability. China and India, as major emerging economies, play critical roles as recipients, lenders, and decision-makers within these institutions. However, decision-making processes in these organizations are still influenced by post-World War II economic and political structures that favour Western dominance.

China has voting rights in the IMF and has pushed for broader recognition of emerging economies’ economic weight. However, its influence remains constrained by existing governance mechanisms that allocate voting power based on a formula established in 1944 (with subsequent adjustments), considering GDP, economic openness, transaction variability, and reserve contributions. Despite these limitations, China continues to advocate for greater representation of developing countries and leverages the growing influence of its financial sector to bolster its demands.

China has also become a major global lender, providing loans through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank AIIB and the BRI. Along with the NDB, these institutions serve as alternatives to the WB and IMF, positioning China as a key competitor in global finance.

India plays a dual role in the international financial system. It is a significant recipient of WB loans, particularly for infrastructure, health, education, and poverty reduction projects, while also advocating for increased representation of emerging economies in global financial decision-making. Through its participation in the NDB, India supports developing countries in reducing reliance on Western-dominated financial institutions and promotes South-South cooperation.

Tensions between China and India within these institutions manifest on three levels. First, in the IMF, both nations advocate for increased voting power for emerging economies. However, China also engages in bilateral agreements that sometimes limit India’s influence within the organization [Asmus-Bluhm et al. 2024]. Second, through BRICS, China and India have jointly established the NDB and participate in the AIIB. While these institutions challenge Western dominance, China holds a stronger leadership position, with India playing a secondary role [Humphrey & Chen 2021; Zhu 2024]. Third, China’s financing of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects has sparked Indian opposition, as India views these loans as creating debt dependencies that could compromise the sovereignty of recipient nations [Papa & Petry 2024; Patrick 2024].

Despite these tensions, China and India share key interests in financial governance reforms. Both advocate for restructuring the IMF and WB to grant greater influence to developing nations. They also collaborate within the G20 to challenge Western financial dominance and push for de-dollarization by increasing international transactions in local currencies. Furthermore, both nations support debt relief for developing countries and climate finance initiatives [Maglia et al. 2024].

In conclusion, while China and India compete for leadership and influence within global financial institutions, they also cooperate in reducing dependency on the US dollar and strengthening economic alliances with the Global South. Their roles within the UN, WB, and IMF reflect a complex interplay of competition and collaboration, driven by their evolving economic priorities and geopolitical aspirations.

5. The BRICS coalition and the challenge to Western hegemony

As discussed above, within the BRICS coalition, China and India hold economic and political interests that are partly convergent and partly divergent.

Moreover, BRICS – particularly with its expansion through BRICS+ – actively challenges the Western hegemony that has dominated global politics since the end of World War II. It does so through mechanisms that differ significantly from those underpinning the existing world order. While China remains central to this challenge, and despite the growing divergences among BRICS members with each enlargement, the coalition seeks to build broad consensus by reinforcing multilateralism.

BRICS’s positioning in the international arena – particularly in its engagements with the Global South – is characterized by the following principles of international cooperation:

1. Respect for national autonomy and sovereignty
2. Trade policies that do not impose external conditions
3. Economic cooperation based on equity
4. Financing of infrastructure investments
5. Establishing itself as a new leader in global institutions

At first glance, BRICS presents itself as a unified bloc committed to non-alignment. This stance is evident in the principles that members are expected to uphold – particularly the emphasis on sovereignty and autonomy – that contrast sharply with the governance frameworks established under the Bretton Woods system.

However, as discussed in previous sections, the alignment between China and India is largely superficial. Their ability to maintain cooperation depends on systematically managing internal and external competition without allowing tensions to escalate. While the BRICS coalition frequently emphasizes unity, this unity exists only to the extent that it does not challenge the leadership ambitions of either China or India in specific domains.

Alongside the reasons for cooperation, competition also plays a significant role. As examined earlier, China and India systematically avoid direct confrontation on the international stage. China positions itself as a dominant supplier of goods and services, while India benefits from Chinese technological leadership by engaging only in trade sectors where it does not compete directly. Even in long-standing territorial disputes – such as the Himalayan border issue – the two countries have, in recent years, prioritized de-escalation over confrontation. Rather than resolving these disputes, they have chosen to minimize tensions and maintain a façade of diplomatic stability.

In contrast, economic and strategic initiatives such as China’s BRI and the India’s IMEEC remain distinct and competitive, despite involving different participants and operating on vastly different scales.

Another shared interest between China and India is their role in international financial institutions. While China is a full voting member of the IMF, India remains a second-tier participant. However, both nations advocate for reforms that would reduce the disproportionate influence of founding Western economies and increase the representation of emerging markets. Additionally, China and India have pursued alternative financial mechanisms, including the CRA and the NDB. However, these institutions have yet to pose a significant challenge to the Bretton Woods system, primarily because the governance structures of Western-led financial institutions remain adaptable to global financial shifts – though at a slower pace than many emerging economies desire.

The much-discussed de-dollarization process, often framed as a primary objective for China and an initiative supported by India, appears to be progressing slowly. Rather than representing a concrete strategy, it currently functions more as a geopolitical signal than as an imminent transformation of global financial transactions.

As we have seen, the areas of convergence between China and India outweigh their differences. However, while their divergences are limited, they remain significant enough to shape BRICS dynamics. One key finding in this paper is that within the UN system, China – due to its economic scale, geopolitical influence, and leadership in global affairs – emerges as the de facto leader of BRICS, while India, despite its aspirations, plays a more secondary role within the coalition.

Given these dynamics, several critical questions remain regarding BRICS’s future in global economic development:

Will resource competition lead to economic or geopolitical conflicts among BRICS members?

Can China sustain its role as the “wealthier relative” in the coalition?

Will BRICS’s approach to global governance gain precedence over the G7 framework?

Can reforms in international institutions accommodate a new multipolar world order?

Despite their geopolitical rivalry, China and India share strategic and economic interests within BRICS and in other global organizations. Both nations seek to counterbalance Western dominance, reduce dependence on the US dollar, and advocate for a greater role for emerging economies in global decision-making. However, their motivations differ: while China pursues hegemony and global leadership, India seeks strategic autonomy, balancing its foreign policy between East and West.

Within BRICS, both countries leverage their influence to defend Global South interests, push for financial institution reforms, and develop alternatives to Western-led economic structures. Yet, their bilateral relationship remains tense, with competition in global markets outweighing their cooperation within BRICS. Recent developments indicate that China-India relations are shaped by pragmatic, selective cooperation driven by mutual economic interests rather than trust or shared long-term strategic goals.

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ISSN 2385-2526

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The last stage of the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh shook Southern Caucasus politics at its very foundation. The traditional parameters used for assessing and deciphering regional politics have been upended, as the alliances and alignments developed over the previous thirty years have collapsed and, in many ways, have being overturned. Moreover, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine only adds uncertainty to an already unpredictable regional scenario. At the heart of the regional upheavals lies the crisis of the decades-old alliance between Armenia and Russia, around which Yerevan had built its entire security policy. As a consequence, its failure to function during the Karabakh war left the country almost defenseless in the face of Azerbaijan’s military might. As over-dependence on Moscow turned into vulnerability, the diversification of Armenian foreign and security policies became an imperative with a view to ensure the country’s resilience to external shocks. The article examines Yerevan’s attempt to escape from the multifaceted «Russian trap» and explores the consequences and constraints of this endeavor on both international and domestic levels.

Keywords – Armenian foreign policy; Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; Southern Caucasus; Russia; European Union.

1. Introduction

The recent evolution and the epilogue of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh has profoundly altered the parameters of regional politics in the South Caucasus. In the phase between the 2020 «44 Days War» and the September 2023 Azerbaijan’s recapture of the enclave with an «anti-terror operation», resulting in the masse escape of the local Armenian population and in the dissolution of the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh, the alliances and alignments developed over the previous thirty years have collapsed or, in many ways, have being overturned. Moreover, the upheaval in South Caucasus regional politics resulted from the shifting parameters of cooperation between local actors and external powers as much as from the altering patterns of interactions among external powers themselves. That is, upheavals in the year under review cannot be fully understood if not viewed in relation to the broader framework defined by the conflict in Ukraine, which rekindled power competition in the EU-Russian «shared neighborhood» and enhanced local actors’ strategic value along with their ability to extract benefits from competing powers. The regional upheavals went as far as suggesting to observers the end of Moscow’s «near abroad» [de Waal 2024] or the end of «post-soviet» era and studies [Pilibossian & Nersisyan 2024, 17 December; Aslund 2023, 4 January].

The turmoil in the Armenian-Russian alliance provides a prime illustration of the above-described trend. A traditional keystone of regional politics, with deep historical roots [Frappi 2022; Suny 1993], the alliance entered a spiral of crisis as a result of the war in Karabakh and, particularly, of Moscow’s lack of support during the last stage of the conflict. As a matter of fact, Russian inaction in the face of Azerbaijan’s military initiative – if not complacency with the aggressor, as some suggest [Sukiasyan 2024, p. 10] – was one of the key ingredients in Baku’s recipe for success [Frappi 2021, p. 26]. Russian inaction, in turn, exposed the contradiction inscribed in Yerevan’s over-dependence on a markedly asymmetric alliance or, as the chief of the Security Council, Armen Grigoryan, put it, the mistake of «putting all the security eggs in one basket» [Civilnet 2024, 20 May]. Thus, the last stage of the war finally showed how Yerevan’s overreliance on the alliance with Moscow had made Russia simultaneously the main guarantor of and the highest threat to Armenian national security [Shirinyan 2019].

On this backdrop, the present article aims at deciphering Yerevan’s attempt to escape the «Russian trap», understood as the all-encompassing asymmetric yet unreliable alliance to which Armenia had long delegated the primary responsibility for its own security. In particular, the article aims at framing the scope and the limits of the current spat in Armenia-Russia relation. It posits that, consistently with Armenia’s minor power status, escaping the Russian trap chiefly entails the effort to enhance the country’s resilience to external shocks by downgrading the over-dependency on Moscow and the resulting vulnerability. Consequently, escaping the Russian trap essentially means investing in the diversification of foreign and security policies. In no way does this mean breaking off relations with Moscow, something that would be unfeasible due to both the close interrelation among the various layers of regional politics and the striking systemic uncertainties. After all, Armenia decisionmakers seem to be aware of the limitations inscribed in the country’s positioning in the international hierarchy of power as well as the dangers caused by the increasing degree of systemic unpredictability. In Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan words: «Small states strive to navigate the rough ocean [of unpredictability] as safely as possible, having in front of them the imperative to protect and preserve their own statehood, sovereignty, and territorial integrity» [RA 2024, 10 September]. Borrowing words from the chairman of the Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies in Yerevan Benjamin Poghosyan, the new course of Armenian policies walks a difficult tightrope, as it entails being «anti-Russian enough to get something from the West and not anti-Russian enough to burn all the bridges with the Kremlin» [The Economist 2024, 1 August].

The article proceeds as follows. In the next section it introduces the diversification attempt pursued by the Armenian government by scaling down the ties with Russian Federation, on the one hand, and by enhancing dialogue and cooperation with the newly discovered partners in the Euro-Atlantic area, on the other. In the successive sections, it takes stock of the external and internal repercussions and limitations that constrain the diversification attempt. Accordingly, in the third, fourth, and fifth sections focus respectively on the regional, economic, and domestic domains of Armenia’s policy.

2. Armenian spat with Russia and the search for alternatives

The September 2023 Azerbaijani military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh represented a clear watershed in Armenian perception of the alliance with Russia. Already on the eve of the «anti-terror operation», Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan had denounced the «strategic mistake» Armenia had made in depending on just one partner in security matters [Osborn 2023, 3 September]. After that, the alliance started to be portrayed not only as ineffective, but also as a «threat to the national security and territorial integrity of Armenia», due to the failure to meet its responsibilities [Armenpress 2024, 28 February]. Thus, while Yerevan’s complaints against Moscow’s non-compliance to the alliance’s duties had occurred regularly since the 44 Days War – and particularly after the September 2022 attack on Armenian territory, vainly invoked by the government as a causus foederis [JAMnews 2022, 13 September] – it was only over the course of 2024 that Yerevan took the first concretes steps aimed at distancing Armenia from Russia both at bilateral and multilateral level, progressively closing the doors of cooperation which has previously left open.1

On a multilateral level, scaling back the security ties with Moscow meant primarily «freezing the relations» with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) [Perelman 2024, 22 February]. CSTO, the traditional cornerstone of Russia-driven security cooperation in the former Soviet Union territory, had been joined by Armenia since its very inception, in 1992. Freezing the relations with CSTO meant, in turn, not contributing to the Organization’s budget, not joining its summits, and not taking part in its activities, including military drills [RFE/RL 2024, 8 May]. Moreover, confronted with CSTO legal argument for non-intervention in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict,2 by the end of the year Pashinyan declared that the relations with the Organization had passed the «point of no return» [Civilnet 2024, 4 December], signalling the de facto withdrawal from the organization.

At a bilateral level, security ties with Moscow were chiefly curtailed by downsizing the presence of Russian troops in Armenia. Consistently with a request issued by Yerevan in early March, by the summer Russian border guards completed the withdrawal from the Zvartnots Airport, ending a 32-year period of controlling Armenia’s air border [JAMnews 2024, 1 August]. Moreover, following a Pashinyan-Putin meeting at the Kremlin in early May, an agreement was reached for the withdrawal of Russian border troops deployed without a clear mandate after the 44 Days War along the border with Azerbaijan – i.e., in the Vayots Dzor, Tavush, Syunik, and Gegharkunik regions – as well as in the Ararat region [JAMnews 2024, 6 June]. The move was highly symbolic in nature, as the common patrolling of the borders has been one of the key drivers of Moscow’s policy in its near abroad ever since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Yet, the merely symbolic nature of the withdrawal results from the enduring presence in Armenia of Russian military contingents. Besides Federal Security Service guards still patrolling Armenia’s border with Turkey and Iran, Russian contingents are still deployed at the Russian 102nd military base in Gyumri, and 3624th Airbase in Erebuni Airport, in accordance with a 2010 agreement due to expire in 2044 [Nazaretyan 2021, 4 March].

The loosening of Armenian-Russian security ties has been also accompanied by symbolic misalignment gestures in relation to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Reversing a balanced approach kept since the outbreak of the hostilities, at the end of May Armenia’s Ambassador to Ukraine paid a visit to Bucha where, besides delivering medical assistance, he lit candles at a memorial to the city residents killed following the invasion, in a gesture dubbed by Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as «overtly unfriendly» [Azatutyun 2024, 10 June]. As an «unfriendly step» was also decried by Russian authorities Armenia’s decision to join the International Criminal Court [France24 2024, 1 February], which had previously indicted Russian President Vladimir Putin for alleged war crimes and issued an arrest warrant. The gesture, while primarily motivated by the need to provide Yerevan with international legal tools aimed at holding Azerbaijan responsible for potential war crimes [Martirosyan 2023, 4 October], was nonetheless interpreted as symptomatic of the dramatic weakening of the close and consensual relationship previously enjoyed with Russia [Fridrichová & Kříž 2024, pp. 2, 5].

Actors in the Euro-Atlantic area have been quick to respond to Armenian foreign policy diversification needs and calls for improved cooperation. This was particularly the case with the European Union, as Yerevan started flirting with the idea of joining the block in the future. «Many new opportunities are largely being discussed in Armenia nowadays – Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan declared in early March – and it will not be a secret if I say that includes membership in the European Union» [TRTWorld 2024, 8 March]. Just few days after Mirzoyan’s overture, the European Parliament – which in fact never failed to make its political support for Armenia explicit – approved by an overwhelming majority a resolution welcoming Yerevan’s expression of interest for EU membership as setting «the stage for a transformative phase» in bilateral relations. Significantly enough, the resolution also praised Yerevan’s resolve «to decrease its security dependence on the Russian Federation and include new players in its security mix», while decrying Moscow’s attempts «to undermine Armenian democratic credentials» and «spreading chaos and destabilization» [EP 2024, 13 March, p. 5, 2]. Just one month before, Josep Borrell, at that time EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in a press briefing with Mirzoyan, had announced the decision to launch work on an «ambitious» new EU-Armenia Partnership Agenda aimed at sending «strong signal of our mutual interest in a new strategic phase in our relations», including, inter alia, visa liberalization talks [EEAS 2024, 13 February]. The visa liberalization talks, saluted as «a recognition of Armenia’s efforts in strengthening its ties and shared values with the EU», started in September 2024 in accordance with the decision taken by the Council in mid-July [EC 2024, 9 September]. Overall, the so called «resilience and growth plan for Armenia» entailed a € 270 million grant to the country for 2024-2027 [EU 2024, p. 1].

EU was not alone in its attempt to support Armenian diplomatic diversification and economic development strategy. In April a trilateral high-level meeting with Pashinyan was jointly hosted by the EU and the US, exhibiting significant alignment on the effort «to stand shoulder to shoulder by Armenia» [DoS 2024, 5 April]. On its part, the US, besides increasing the level of bilateral assistance aimed at supporting the country’s economic resilience and strengthening democratic institutions, announced in June the intention to upgrade the status of the US-Armenia Strategic Dialogue launched in 2022 to the level of Strategic Partnership, as to enhance a structured approach to multifaceted bilateral cooperation [DoS 2024, 11 June].

Quick responses from western interlocutors came also in the security cooperation domain, thereby addressing the most urgent Yerevan’s need for diversification of international partnerships. That is, addressing the need to fill a «security gap» resulting from two main causes. The first was the failure of the «Diplomatization of Security» strategy pursued after 2022, aimed to resort to diplomatic pressure to deter Azerbaijani military initiatives [Kopalyan 2022]. The second was the de facto cessation of arms supplies from Russia, despite the procurement deal signed in 2021 [Reuters 2023, 24 November].

France has been at the forefront of Euro-Atlantic efforts aimed at supporting Armenia’s military deterrence needs – which also benefited from an increased cooperation with India.3 In February, in parallel with a Pashinyan’s highly symbolic trip to Paris,4 French Minister of the Armed Forces Sébastien Lecornu paid an unprecedented visit to Yerevan. Following up an agreement signed in October 2023 for the supply of anti-aircraft radar systems and a memorandum of understanding on the future delivery of French-manufactured military equipment [Armenpress 2023, 24 October], during Lecornu’s visit an arms procurement contract was signed, while an agreement aimed at training Armenian military personnel was reached [Bedevian 2024, 22 February]. In addition, since a June visit to France of a delegation led by Defence Minister Suren Papikyan – when a new agreement on the purchase of a modern artillery system was signed – Yerevan and Paris started discussing the possibility to widen the scope of military-technical cooperation with a view to support Yerevan’s plans for reform of the defence sector [JAMnews 2024, 19 June]. Eventually, bilateral cooperation reached its apex in December 2024, with the signing of a Defence Cooperation Program for 2025 covering «several dozen measures in almost all spheres of the armed forces’ operation». They included defence planning, military education, advisory support, and military training [JAMnews 2024, 12 December].

A significant widening of security cooperation also took place in Armenian relations with the EU, which thereby confirmed the latter’s reversal of its earlier «visibly invisible» role in South Caucasus conflict resolution [German 2007]. Indeed, the EU followed up on its 2022 decision to deploy a monitoring mission on Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan by providing Yerevan with military aid meant to strengthen the country’s resilience. On the same day the Council opened visa-liberalisation talks with Yerevan, it also approved the sending of military aid worth €10 million through the European Peace Facility instrument. It was a first-ever assistance measure to Armenia aimed at enhancing the logistical capacities of its armed forces, at fostering interoperability, and at improving protection of civilians in crises and emergencies [CoEU 2024, 22 July].

Finally, a limited in scope yet highly symbolic initiative also came on the US-Armenian side. In mid-July an 11-day joint military exercise was organized in the proximity of Yerevan. The «Eagle Partner 24» exercise, whose opening ceremony was attended by the US Ambassador to Armenia and Armenian Defence Minister Papikyan, was designed to increase interoperability of armed forces during peacekeeping and stability operations or, more pragmatically, to «deepen the friendships, deepen the partnership and move the ball forward ten yards», in the words of the US deputy director of the exercise [Miller 2024, 17 July]. Pushing the ball forwarder, in December Papikyan visited the US and met Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin for an «historic» meeting – as it was dubbed by the latter – whereby the US reaffirmed its resolve to continue supporting reforms in Armenia’s armed forces and include security cooperation in an enhanced bilateral partnership [Armenpress 2024, 6 December].

3. The unintended consequences of the diversification process: the regional «insecurity spiral»

Yerevan’s overtures to dialogue and cooperation with Euro-Atlantic partners have been as significant as cautious, at least in public statements. This caution may be explained either by the consciousness of the difficulties inherent in the process of integration in the West [Krikorian 2025] or, more generally, by the awareness of the multifaceted negative repercussions that such openings can have on Armenian security itself [Sukiasyan 2024]. After all, as Armen Grigorian put it, the depth of Armenia’s ties with Russia combined with the systemic uncertainties cannot but suggest a careful «step-by-step» approach to the diversification strategy [Civilnet 2024, 20 May].

Although dictated by contingent defence needs and by a wider attempt to broaden the spectrum of the country’s international relations, Armenian overtures to Western interlocutors have had significant negative repercussions on relations with Russia and Azerbaijan. Both promptly and punctually reacted to most of the abovementioned steps toward an increased Armenian-Western cooperation with harsh declaration and not-so-veiled threats of retaliation. Moscow manifested a tendency to interpret Yerevan’s engagement with Euro-Atlantic partners under the lenses of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, as a «confirmation that the West is trying to turn Armenia into an instrument of its policy […] against Moscow» [Azatutyun 2024, 11 March]. This view, in turn, resulted in the not-so-veiled warning to Yerevan to avoid a «Ukrainian scenario» [Bedevian 2024, 25 July]. As evidence of a wider rapprochement between Moscow and Baku, Azerbaijan shared Russian view about Armenia’s Western partners’ selfish aims, accusing the latter of pursuing «unilateral and biased» policies [Eruygur 2024, 22 July] and «undermining stability» in the South Caucasus [Azatutyun 2024, 17 April]. The Azerbaijani government press agency went as far as saying that Western – and particularly French – support to Yerevan’s rearmament policy made a new war in Karabakh «inevitable» [APA 2024, 22 June]. Armenian-Western growing security cooperation, in turn, provided the formal reason for the perpetuation of Azerbaijan’s rearmament policy, a «number one priority» for Baku since – in President Ilham Aliyev’s words – «Armenia does not want peace; rather, it seeks to buy time and use this period to strengthen its military potential with the support of its foreign patrons» [PRAz 2024, 23 September].

Ultimately, the Armenian security diversification strategy generated a dangerous «insecurity spiral», i.e. a spiral of power and security competition that feeds on the fear that the opponent’s defensive moves are actually aggressively motivate and, consequently, require strategic countermeasures [Snyder 1984, p. 477]. Besides testifying the ongoing overturning of traditional regional alignments, the insecurity spiral contributed to an atmosphere of mutual mistrust among regional actors – and, particularly, between Armenia and Azerbaijan – which, in turn, didn’t help the Nagorno-Karabakh pace process to move forward. On the contrary, undermining Armenia’s most important foreign policy objective, it ended up in adding new hurdles on the path leading to the signing of a peace treaty, despite the positive signals registered during the year.

As far as the Armenia-Azerbaijan relationship was concerned, 2024 had opened with encouraging indications. In December, Azerbaijan and Armenia had agreed to an exchange of prisoners, while Yerevan also greenlighted Baku’s bid for hosting the UN Climate Change Conference (COP 29) [PMRA 2023, 7 December]. These signals, in turn, justified widespread optimism among analysts and decision-makers about the possibility of signing a peace treaty by the COP29 meeting, set for November 2024. Furthermore, the belligerents agreed to sign a concise document outlining key principles for lasting peace while postponing the resolution of most contentious issues, such as reopening communications between Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan exclave and delimitating borders. This decision seemed to ease the way to the normalization of bilateral relations. [Borshchevskaya 2024, 19 March]. Encouraging signals also came in the form of an April agreement on the delimitation of the borders in the Tavush area – a point of contention with the potential to trigger new military clashes. Following the 8th meeting of the bilateral State Commission tasked with the delimitation issue, representatives of the two countries agreed to restore the borders as set by the most recent Soviet maps with the consequent return to Azerbaijan of four border villages in the Tavush area that remained under Armenian control [MFA 2024, 19 April].

The positive atmosphere surrounding Yerevan-Baku talks progressively dissolved over the year, while Pashinyan no-show at COP29 certified the failure of finalizing a peace agreement and the renewed stalemate in negotiations. The regional strategic polarization and resulting spiral of insecurity bore a significant part of the responsibility for the failure, under two perspectives both related to Baku’s new negotiating conditions. The first had to do with the negotiating format and the refusal of third-party mediation. Long opposed to the continuation of the thirty-years-old OSCE Minsk Group mediation mandate [PRAz 2022, 12 January], Azerbaijan clarified in January that, despite Armenia’s preferences, Yerevan and Baku «don’t need any guarantors» and should instead solve their problems bilaterally avoiding the negotiations «to become a geopolitical issue» [PRAz 2024, 10 January]. Thus, despite the hopes raised in February by a German attempt to initiate a mediation [JAMNews 2024, 19 February], the trilateral meeting organized by Chancellor Olaf Scholz was a mere exception to what seemed to have become a mandatory negotiating principle.5 In turn, the refusal to accept third-party mediation widened the already broad asymmetry in bargaining power between Armenia and Azerbaijan, leaving the former more vulnerable to the latter’s maximalist approach to the peace process. This helped framing the second ground where the insecurity spiral intersected with the negotiations, which has to do with their contents.

With a view to finalize a peace agreement, Baku added two more principles and two preconditions [PRAz 2024, 18 December]. The first principle, ostensibly resulting from the ongoing strategic polarization, was the non-deployment of third countries’ forces on the mutual border, and the consequent withdrawal of the EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA), deployed on the Armenian side of the border with Azerbaijan. The second was the cessation of the ongoing «lawsuit warfare», i.e. the mutual commitment to refrain from filing international lawsuits against each other. The preconditions to this commitment on Yerevan’s part was the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group, on the one hand, and, on the other, the amendment of the Armenian Constitution as to eliminate its supposed territorial claims against Azerbaijan. In fact, while Prime Minister Pashinyan repeatedly reaffirmed that «Armenia fully recognizes the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan» [Sahakian& Musayelian 2023, 18 April],6 the first article of the Constitution still recalls the fundamental principles enshrined in the September 1990 Declaration of Independence [PRAr 2015], which in its preamble calls for the «Reunification of the Armenian SSR and the Mountainous Region of Karabakh» [GRA 1990, 23 August]. Such conditions and preconditions represented the main stumbling block for the finalization of the peace agreement in 2024. While the parties shared the view that its text was 80% complete, nonetheless they proved unable either to compromise on the abovementioned points [AIR 2024, 4 November], or to remove them altogether postponing their solution – as it was unsuccessful proposed by Yerevan at the end of August [Eruygur 2024, 10 September].

As a demonstration of the difficulties inscribed in the attempt to untie the regional security knot, the stalemate of the peace process had negative repercussions on Armenia-Turkey normalization process launched in 2022. This, in turn, represented a key priority for the Pashinyan government, with a view to open the border between the two countries and gain a lifeline to regional and international markets. Notwithstanding progresses in the bilateral talks,7 the overall process confirmed to be closely intertwined with the parallel Yerevan-Baku negotiations, as the unyielding Azerbaijani-Turkish axis stands as the main exception to the upheaval of regional alignments. For all the «no-precondition rhetoric» which surrounds the Armenian-Turkish talks, not only did Ankara make the normalization of relations conditional on the signing of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan [Frappi 2023, p. 468], but also aligned itself with the demands and preconditions put forward by Baku. This is particularly the case for the latter request to amend the Armenian Constitution [Barseghyan 2024, 9 December], which meets Ankara’s analogous aversion to the document’s indirect claims on «Western Armenia» – namely, Eastern Turkey – as well as to «the task of achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide» [GRA 1990, 23 August].

4. Security vs. economy: Armenian diversification dilemma

In escaping the Russian trap, Armenian government is facing a «diversification dilemma». While there is an urgent need to broaden the spectrum of international relations, the overwhelming weight exerted by Russia on Armenian economy makes diversification difficult to achieve and, in many ways, unprofitable – especially in the short term and with a view to the 2026 parliamentary elections. Indeed, much of the record GDP growth experienced after 2021 owes to the increased trade relations with Russia which, in turn, benefited from Armenia acting as a conduit for international trade flows aimed at circumventing the sanctions imposed on Moscow. Such a «middleman role» resulted in the Armenia-Russia bilateral turnover skyrocketing from US$ 2.6 billion in 2021 to 12.4 in 2024 [ARMSTAT n.a.], making Russia by far the first trade partner of Armenia. Moreover, the recent growth in Armenian GDP benefited significantly also from the relocation of Russian citizens to Armenia, which boosted domestic consumption [Chervyakov & Giucci 2023].

In comparison to Armenian-Russian turnover, the one with the EU paled,8 as a result of both normative and logistic disadvantages. From the first perspective, Armenia’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) ensured tax-free exchanges of goods and services, facilitating the trade flow both with its participants and with its trade partners – such as China [WB 2024, pp. 32-33]. Quite on the contrary, as Armenia progressed from lower middle-income country status to an upper middle-income one for three consecutive years since 2018, in 2022 it lost the tariffs benefits granted by the EU under the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus [EC 2023, 21 November] and, therefore, trading goods became more costly. Moreover, Armenian exports towards the EU were also hampered by the set of rules and standard required to access the EU market, which Armenian companies have difficulty complying with, adding administrative and legal layers to the difficulties of improving trade relations with the EU [Terzyan & Grigoryan 2024, p. 14-15]. This, in turn, was one of the main impediments to grasp the full yet limited potential of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement which, into full force in 2021, set the priorities to strengthen bilateral relations with the EU within the limits imposed by Yerevan’s participation in the EAEU. Moving from normative to logistic obstacles, Armenia suffered from an impactful «connectivity gap» resulting from both regional geography and politics. Here the disadvantages stemming from a landlocked condition are compounded by the closure of the borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey because of the Nagorno-Karabakh war. The connectivity gap severely narrowed the trade flows to routes through Iran and Georgia, limiting overall Armenian integration into global economy [WB 2024]. Moreover, it resulted in an increase in overall transportation costs, with a detrimental effect on the competitiveness of national products [Terzyan & Grigoryan 2024, p. 5].

Turnover with Russia was significant not only in quantitative terms but also in qualitative ones, exposing the overall degree of Yerevan’s dependence. This was particularly true for Russia’s lion share in the country’s total imports of key commodities, which decisively impinged upon the Armenian food and energy security.9 In turn, the risk of over-dependency on key imports turning into vulnerability to Moscow’s pressures or blackmails was not only high but has also been recurrent in regional politics. Hence, in the current environment, economic leverage was an instrument in the Russian hybrid warfare toolkit aimed at retaining influence in the South Caucasus [Meissner and Leitner 2024]. In 2024 there was no lack of examples of its use. For instance, in criticizing Armenian participation in a conference dedicated to Ukrainian Food Security in the context of the Kiev-sponsored «Ukraine Peace Formula» initiative, Maria Zakharova, the spokeswoman of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, issued a veiled threat recalling Armenian dependence on Russian grain [Barseghyan 2024, 23 September]. Similarly, in outlining the potential repercussions of opting for EU membership over the EAEU one, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk warned Armenia that this would lead to higher energy and food prices, while exports could drop by 70-80% [Ananyan 2025, 16 January]. Making vulnerability worse, the connectivity gap significantly increases Armenia’s exposure to the risk of disruption of trade flows either for political or technical reasons. Since fall 2023 and over the course of 2024 this has been the case with Armenian exports to Russia, which were either hit by import bans from Russian health authorities or stuck by adverse weather conditions at the Russian-Georgian border crossing of Upper Lars [Saribekian 2024, 31 July; Aravot 2024, 10 August].

At a wider look, Russian overwhelming weight on Armenian economy has a deeper and structural dimension, because of the control still exerted on key national assets – from energy to transport, from telecommunications to mining, finance, and insurance. This overdependency, in turn, came as a byproduct of the military alliance, consistently with the logic of inseparability of security and economic cooperation, which also led Armenia to join the EAEU instead of pursuing cooperation with the EU [Frappi 2023, p. 455-7]. Moreover, the wide presence of large Russian companies in Armenia’s economy makes them a key taxpayer and contributor to Armenian coffers [Eurasianet 2024, 17 May]. Also, Russia is still by far the first source of foreign investments to the country – accounting for 17% of the total net stocks at the end of 2023, worth € 2.4 billion [ARMSTAT 2024, p. 590]. Finally, another significant source of dependence on Russia, which may arguably be considered as structural, lies in the remittances from Armenian migrant workers. While the influx of personal remittances has been shrinking over the last few years, in 2023 it still accounted for a 6% of the GDP [WBDB n.a.], while the remittances from Russia in 2024 made up for the 42% of its total amount [CBA n.a.].

5. The domestic side of the coin: increasing polarization, decreasing consensus

The overlapping of the external and internal dimensions of the governmental attempt to escape the Russian trap goes well beyond the economic domain. The urgency to reinvent foreign and security policies also affects the domestic political-institutional environment by exacerbating a trend toward polarization originating from the 2018 Velvet Revolution and worsened by the Karabakh military debacle.

In 2024, the clearest manifestation of the polarization trend came from «Tavush for the Sake of Homeland», a protest born out of the April agreement on border delimitation and gathered around the figure of Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan. Its aims, scope and evolution highlighted the then ongoing polarization trend under four perspectives. The first and foremost was the accusation leveled at the government, to bear «a defeatist mindset and a commitment […] to serve the Turkey-Azerbaijan tandem» [Nazarian 2024, 20 August]. It was an accusation which went up to the point of considering the Prime Minister as a «traitor» or a «Turkish agent» [Pambukhchyan 2024, 23 July]. Similar accusations were made against the government after the initiation of a process aimed at adopting a new Constitution, to be drafted by the end of 2026 and approved by referendum in 2027 [Armenpress 2024, 29 August]. While a constitutional reform plan is as old as Pashinyan’s tenure as prime minister, in its current stage the process of adopting a new constitution is manifestly influenced by the need to sign a peace agreement with Baku and normalize relations with both Azerbaijan and Turkey. Thus, a new Constitution stands as a prerequisite for the diversification of the country’s foreign policy and economic development or, in Pashinyan words, as a key tool to make Armenia «more competitive and more viable in the new geopolitical and regional conditions» [PMRA 2024, 19 January].

Secondly, the Galstanyan’s protest movement clarified both the nature of the institutional opposition to the government and its transnational links. Started as an alleged apolitical movement aimed at impeding «the unacceptable process of border demarcation» [JAMNews 2024, 7 May], the Archbishop’s initiative quickly took on anti-government connotations, requesting the Prime Minister’s resignation while marching from Tavush to Yerevan. In doing so, it attracted institutional supporters both from the highest ranks of the Armenian Apostolic Church and among the representatives of the power structure ousted by the Velvet Revolution, namely two political forces which used to enjoy an informal alliance before 2018 [Atanesian 2018, 20 July] and never spared harsh criticism of Pashinyan ever since. Moreover, the traditionally strong links between Russia and this reactionary faction – the so called «blacks» in Pashinyan narrative, as opposed to the reformist «whites» [Pambukhchyan 2024, 23 July] – enlarged the scope of anti-government opposition well beyond the country’s borders. These links expose yet another layer of the internal-external short-circuit affecting Armenian politics, built upon the accusations levelled against Moscow of running a «campaign of threats and disinformation» against the leadership in Yerevan [Azatutyun 2024, 8 August]. Considering wide coverage of the Galstanyan movement given by Russian-controlled media, it is not surprising that accusation of exploiting «fifth columns» in the country for the sake of weakening the government were made by media close to the ruling party [JAMNews 2024f], just a few months before an alleged coup attempt with links to Russia was thwarted by the National Security Service [Armenpress 2024, 18 September].

Third, the evolution of the protest movement served as a mirror to the opinions of the Armenian public amid the ongoing political and institutional struggle. Started as the largest anti-government movement since the war, it progressively lost momentum and supporters until its de facto failure. Far from being the result of the consensus around the government, the movement’s implosion was rather the demonstration of a widespread disaffection from politics among the Armenian public. The latest poll carried out in the country by the International Republican Institute accurately capture this trend. On the one hand, it showed a sharp decline in consensus for Pashinyan and his government. While still being the most trusted political figure, the leader of the Velvet Revolution’s rating stands at a mere 16% – a figure falling to 7% among the respondents between 18 and 35 years. Moreover, between 2018 and fall 2024 the degree of satisfaction with the government fell from 82% to 46% [IRI 2024, pp. 14, 26]. On the other hand, as trust in the government diminishes, there is no corresponding boost in support for the figures or parties in the opposition, exposing the growing degree of public disaffection. All in all, 61% of the respondents – and 76% of the youngest ones – declare not to trust any politician or public person. The dissatisfaction affects also the Armenian Apostolic Church, whose approval rate fell by 26% over the last five years. [IRI 2024, pp. 14, 29].

Lastly, and arguably most importantly, the Tavush movement and the wider border demarcation issue reflected both tangible and intangible aspects of the struggle between the government and its critics, along with the challenges of the diversification path then walked. In defending the decision to return the border villages to Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister used to hold a map of the «Real Armenia», as opposed to the «Historical Armenia». While the former is understood as the country falling within the internationally recognized borders, the latter is a broader imagined homeland built upon historical memories of lost lands [PMRA 2024, 25 May; PMRA 2024, 10 April]. Thus, the demarcation process does not merely entail re-drawing the borders of the state, but also re-imagining the boundaries of the nation and the resulting national interest. Juxtaposing the real country with the imagined homeland, Pashinyan opened a new chapter in the long-standing ideological struggle between a reductionist and an holistic understanding of the nation, as well as between the promoters of a national mission aimed at rectifying historical injustices and the advocates of an «Armenian-first» approach to national interest, which shaped the formative years of the «Third Republic» – i.e., the one born on the ashes of the Soviet Union [Frappi 2023, p. 451-2]. Moreover, the process aimed at redefining the borders of the state and the boundaries of the nation intersected the attempt at diversifying the country’s foreign and security policies. In fact, in the government view and narrative, the confusion between the Real and Historical Armenia resulted in adverse effects at international level. On the one hand, with a reference to Azerbaijan and Turkey, it brought about «a permanent guarantee of [Armenian] enmity with a group of countries, and a guarantee that those countries will have a reason and an explanation for pursuing an aggressive policy». On the other, and with a clear reference to Russia, the attempt to restore the Historical Armenia allowed «some countries […] to put a collar on the Republic of Armenia and constrain its actions as an independent state» [PMRA 2024, 25 May]. In its attempt to push a new state and national narrative, the government delves into the polarization fault lines.

Pashinyan’s rhetoric targeting the pillars of the «Historical Armenia» ideology – which has been a constituent part of the sense of patriotism which developed up to the Genocide [Sassounian 2024] – is striking a raw nerve of national consciousness. And this happens not only within the country but especially among the diaspora, widening the ranks of his detractors and deepening the divide between the government and the opposition.

6. Conclusions

The last stage of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict dramatically exposed the vulnerability resulting from Armenia’s over-dependence on Moscow’s security guarantee. The proven unreliability of the latter urged Yerevan to escape the Russian security trap by means of diversification of the country’s foreign and security policies. While in its drive towards diversification Yerevan benefited from the support of France, the EU, and the US, the overall path was still hampered by a multidimensional set of external and internal obstacles, limitations, and contradictions.

The first «diversification dilemma» resulted from the clash between security and economic needs. While the search for security pushed the country away from Russia, economic necessity kept it steadily in Moscow’s orbit. Breaking economic ties with Russia was not only concretely unfeasible, but also unprofitable, at least over the short-term. The government’s answer to the dilemma seems to come from a hybrid strategy blending compartmentalization of security and economic relations with Russia with a tailored and flexible cooperation with Western partners. Yet, in the mid- to long-term the incompatibility between the membership in the EAEU and the integration path in the EU may result in hard choices to Yerevan, whose repercussions may go well beyond the mere economic domain. In addition, for a landlocked country suffering from the closure of its eastern and western borders, diversifying foreign economic relations entails first and foremost the need to normalize relations with both Azerbaijan and Turkey. This, in turn, highlights once again the close interrelation between the various layers of regional politics and takes the overall assessment back to the wider diversification attempt.

The second contradiction of the diversification path walked by Armenia during the period under review lies in its unintended yet close correlation with the Russian-Western confrontation over Ukraine. On the one hand, the correlation increases Yerevan’s capability to extract benefits from its partners in the Euro-Atlantic area; on the other, it potentially leaves the outcome of Armenian diversification process open to the still unpredictable result of the current power confrontation in Eastern Europe. That is, much of the outcome of the diversification effort falls beyond Yerevan’s control. Consistently with the limited resources available to a small power, Armenia cannot but pursue external balancing strategies, built upon increased cooperation with the West. This, in turn, means that the attempt to escape the Russian trap depends to a great extent on the continued support of the Euro-Atlantic partners. As Armenia’s capability to extract benefits from Western partners is largely dependent on the ongoing confrontation with Russia over Ukraine, the overt support coming from the former may prove to be short-lived and, in any case, limited.

The close correlation with the Russian-Western confrontation resulted in a third and crucial contradiction – or unintended consequence – of the attempt to escape the Russian trap, namely the «insecurity spiral» unfolding at regional level. As a matter of fact, the wider diplomatic tensions engendered a short circuit between the Armenian government’s main foreign policy objectives, namely diversifying its security policy on the one hand and finalizing a peace agreement with Baku on the other. Escaping the Russian security trap and normalizing relations with Azerbaijan – and consequentially with Turkey – are two sides of the same coin. It is impossible to effectively pursue the former without achieving the latter. Yet, the greater is Armenian cooperation with the West, the deeper is its isolation vis-à-vis Baku. Here, the end of the decade-old «pax Russica» and Baku’s refusal of a third-party mediation involving «biased» Western actors, deprives Armenia of the former negotiating mechanisms without substituting them with new ones. Consequentially, Yerevan stands alone in face of Azerbaijan’s maximalist conditions for peace, forced to make concessions that are hardly acceptable at home.

The domestic picture is neither rosier nor less thorny than the external one. Here, the main contention points in the peace process – namely the delimitation of the state borders and the requested changes to the Constitution – has rekindled the political and institutional polarization between «blacks» and «whites» in a scenario shaped by a growing public disaffection from politics. What’s more, the polarization trend is exacerbated by the immaterial facet of the current national debate. In its attempt to put forward a new vision for the country’s development, the Government, acting domestically much less cautiously than in the foreign domain, has been rhetorically targeting the key pillars of national self-identification at home and in the diaspora, thereby widening and tightening the ranks of the opposition. Arguably, this stands as the main challenge to the diversification effort. The path out of the Russian trap toward a diversified foreign policy entails significant tangible and intangible sacrifices. Lacking adequate national cohesion, not only the process risks derailing but also endangers the wider transformation path walked since the 2018 Velvet Revolution.

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[WB 2024] The World Bank, 2024, Armenia. The Second Systematic Country Diagnostic. Beyond Boundaries: Unlocking Potential for a Sustainable Tomorrow, Washington: The World Bank.

ISSN 2385-2526

This article examines Kyrgyzstan’s key historical and geopolitical features, along with the main political, economic, and international developments during Japarov’s presidency (2021-2024). The analysis contextualises the country’s domestic evolution throughout 30 years of turbulent post-Soviet independence and illustrates its main foreign relations under the slogan of a «multi-vector diplomacy». The article further analyses how under Japarov Kyrgyzstan has rapidly transitioned towards an autocratic model of governance, marked by populist undertones and personalist rule. Three key aspects of Japarov’s domestic governance are examined: the expanding role of security services under his ally Tashiyev; systematic restrictions on media freedom and civil society; and efforts to re-traditionalise national symbols. While the Japarov leadership has implemented economic reforms to strengthen state control over the economy with some success, the Kyrgyz economy remains highly vulnerable to international fluctuations, as witnessed by its dependence on remittances. Finally, the article explores changes in Kyrgyz foreign policy under Japarov, who has focussed on strengthening relations with Russia and China primarily. This analysis reveals that relations with Russia remain solid despite ongoing changes, while the growing ties with China still present complex challenges.

Keywords – Kyrgyzstan; authoritarianism; Japarov; Russia; China.

1. Introduction

The least populated state in Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan is a mountainous landlocked country, nested between Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and China. As the other states in the region, Kyrgyzstan acquired sovereignty just over three decades ago. However, its history and culture run much deeper, developing at the crossroads of an indigenous, millennia-old nomadic tradition, the Russian imperial domination (1876-1917), the following Soviet century (1917-1991), and various other influences that were drawn into the region by its strategic relevance [Jacquesson 2021].

As it happens, Kyrgyzstan’s peculiarities are often lost within a mainstream discourse that portrays Central Asia as a monolithic entity and only lingers, if anywhere, on Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – the most prominent states in the region [Omelicheva 2014; Lottholz 2022]. Language barriers, geopolitical dynamics, and the small niche reserved to Central Asia in International Studies further contribute to the scarcity of works produced on Kyrgyzstan.

Yet since its newly found independence, Kyrgyzstan has exhibited distinctive characteristics. At the international level, due to its geographical positioning and with a long border shared with China, Kyrgyzstan has been at the centre of the new patterns of cooperation and competition between Russia and China. Far from being a mere pawn on the Great Powers’ chessboard, Kyrgyzstan has strived to use its limited resources creatively, to balance between different international pressures [Godehardt 2014]. On the domestic front and until 2020, Kyrgyzstan was the one Central Asian state embarking on a democratic trajectory, up to being labelled an «island of democracy» in the region. Although there has been no shortage of political turbulence over the last thirty years, the country allowed for active political opposition, a pluralistic media landscape, and a vibrant civil society [Nourzhanov & Peyrouse 2014].

In 2020, however, Kyrgyzstan entered into a new phase of authoritarianism. In October that year, opposition parties denounced as fraudulent the outcomes of parliamentary elections, which saw the significant victory of the pool of social-democratic parties supporting then-President Jeenbekov; as a result, violent street demonstrations erupted in the capital, Bishkek [Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2020, 4 October]. The most radical members of the protest attacked the White House, stormed the prison to free Sadyr Japarov – a popular and charismatic opposition leader – and hailed him as Kyrgyzstan’s future president. Legitimised by new elections in January 2021, Japarov and his most important political ally Tashiyev (head of the State Committee for National Security and deputy head of the cabinet of ministers) have since dominated the Kyrgyz political scene. Over the last four years, they have imprinted a decisive authoritarian drift to the country’s governance system.

In light of the above, this article pursues two main objectives. First, it sketches the main features of the historical and geopolitical context that surrounds Kyrgyzstan. This is particularly important given that no prior article on Kyrgyzstan has been published in the pages of Asia Maior. Section two is devoted to such objective. Then, we will analyse the main political, economic and international developments that have characterised Japarov’s presidency (2021-2024). In particular, section three delves into Kyrgyzstan’s domestic politics, providing an assessment of the most significant reforms and changes introduced by President Japarov and his government. It also examines the country’s main economic data, policies, and trends. Section four overviews Kyrgyzstan’s most recent foreign policy decisions. Besides questioning whether Bishkek still pursues a «multi-vector diplomacy», the article dives deep into a key contemporary dynamic: the «three game» among Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and China. The concluding section summarises the main findings and analyses possible developments over the near future.

2. Historical and geopolitical background: Kyrgyzstan before the Japarov presidency

The territory of present-day Kyrgyzstan has experienced a complex historical trajectory marked by successive waves of conquest, migration, and cultural transformation. While some historical accounts simplicistically suggest that the region once fell under the dominion of the Achaemenid, Seleucid, and Parthian Empires, such claims must be approached with caution. These empires were primarily centred in West and Southwest Asia, and their influence on the territories of modern Kyrgyzstan, if any, was likely limited and indirect – facilitated more through transregional trade routes, such as the Silk Road, than by direct administrative or military control. Nevertheless, the region’s strategic location along these routes rendered it a site of cultural and commercial exchange across Eurasia [Beckwith 2009].

In the early medieval period, Central Asia became a dynamic arena for the expansive movements of Turkic-speaking peoples, as well as Arab and later Uyghur populations. These interactions contributed significantly to the gradual Islamisation of the region [Barthold 1956]. The ethnonym «Kyrgyz» has traditionally been associated with a confederation of forty nomadic clans, said to have been unified under the legendary hero Manas. While the Epic of Manas constitutes a foundational narrative of Kyrgyz national identity and holds considerable cultural significance, scholarly consensus regards Manas as a mythological rather than historical figure. Furthermore, the supposed etymological connection between the term «Kyrgyz» and the number forty remains debated and unsubstantiated within historical linguistics [Gullette 2010].

Following the Mongol conquest of 1207, the region came under the rule of the expanding Mongol Empire but, in the post-Mongol era, experienced intermittent autonomy under various tribal confederations while facing frequent incursions by neighbouring powers, including the Kalmyks, Manchus, and Uzbeks. By the early eighteenth century, portions of present-day Kyrgyzstan fell under the authority of the Uzbek Khanate of Kokand (1709–1876). However, this control was neither territorially uniform nor politically uncontested [Golden 2011].

Kyrgyzstan’s modern history is inseparable from Russian imperial and Soviet rule. The region was incorporated into the Russian Empire in 1876, initiating a period of profound transformation. Russian colonisation significantly altered local population’s lifestyle, weakening the nomadic tradition while selectively preserving certain cultural and religious practices. The influx of Russian and other Slavic settlers, who were frequently granted access to the most fertile lands, exacerbated tensions within the local population. These tensions culminated in the 1916 uprising, which was triggered by Tsarist policies mandating the conscription of Central Asian men into labor battalions to support the Russian was effort in World War I. The revolt was brutally suppressed, resulting in mass casualties and forcing many Kyrgyz to flee to neighboring Afghanistan and China [Chokobaeva 2014]. Following the Russian Civil War, the region was gradually absorbed into the Soviet state. However, it is important to clarify that a distinct Kyrgyz state did not exist prior to the Soviet national delimitation process of the 1920s and 1930s. It was through this process that the Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast was established in 1924, later upgraded to an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1926, and finally to the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic in 1936.

The early Soviet period was marked by sweeping policies of collectivisation and political repression, particularly during the 1930s. These policies brought severe hardship to the local population, including widespread famine, forced sedentarisation of nomadic groups, and purges of intellectuals and political elites. Despite these disruptions, the Soviet era played a central role in shaping Kyrgyz statehood and initiating structural development. Under the leadership of Razzakov – who served as head of government in 1945-1950 and secretary of the Kyrgyz Communist Party between 1950 and 1961– important industrialisation policies were initiated in the mining, energy, and transportation sectors, in addition to modernising agriculture [Boron 2024]. Two additional aspects characterised this era: the evolution towards greater religious tolerance of Islam, following the initial persecutions of the 1920s and 1930s; and cultural development. In the 1940s and 1950s, a universal secondary education system was introduced, the Academy of Sciences was founded, and the country’s first universities were established, including the Kyrgyz State University [Chotaeva 2016].

The first among Central Asian states to declare independence from the Soviet Union on 31 August 1991, Kyrgyzstan was the only country in Central Asia to elect a new President, Akayev, who was not a direct expression of the country’s communist party. In this atypical transition, the new Kyrgyz national identity was shaped by Kyrgyz demands for ethnically-based nationalism, on the one hand, and the desire of ethnic minorities – including many Russified Kyrgyz – to maintain the civic nationalism that had been a hallmark of Soviet identity, on the other hand [Huskey 2003] This tension played out in language policy, where Kyrgyzstan chose a compromise: Kyrgyz became the state language while Russian retained official language status. Additionally, the relatively liberal policies promoted during Akayev’s fifteen-year presidency (1991-2005) contributed to giving the country a pluralistic socio-political landscape and initiating a small, albeit weak, market economy.

This notwithstanding, post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan has experienced a fair share of turbulences throughout its 30 years of independence [Laruelle & Engvall 2015]. It is worth noting that, of the six Presidents who have governed Kyrgyzstan since its independence (namely Akayev, Bakiyev, Otunbayeva, Atambayev, Jeenbekov, and Japarov), half of them have taken or lost power as a result of protests in Bishkek – such as the Tulip Revolution of 2005, the April People’s Revolution of 2010, and the political upheaval of October 2020 [Ivanov 2022]. Each turning point brought with itself significant institutional changes, but notable differences set these events apart. To begin with, the Tulip Revolution saw opposition leaders call for uprisings, united by the objective of ending Akayev’s fifteen-year presidency.1 His successor was identified in a consensus figure, Bakiyev, then leader of the People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan. However, Bakiyev soon proved more interested in marginalising his opponents rather than protecting political pluralism, and soon established himself as the country’s new autocrat. The Revolution of April 2010, conversely, emerged as a series of spontaneous and violent demonstrations, with opposition party leaders participating only at a later stage. Once in power, they promoted a constitutional reform that attributed centrality to the parliament, guaranteeing freedom for all political parties to participate in the elections. The reform also set a six-year limit to the presidential term [Marat 2016].

Indeed, in the ten years following these reforms (2010-2020), Kyrgyzstan was characterised by particularly vibrant parliamentary dynamics, such that both the 2010 elections and the subsequent 2015 elections were unpredictable in their outcomes. Finally, the October crisis in 2020 saw a combination of spontaneous protests and organised participation by opposition leaders [Doolotkeldieva 2021, 2023]. The reasons for unrest were rooted in three factors: inadequate management of the Covid pandemic by official authorities, the growing power of organised criminal groups, and President Jeenbekov’s underestimation of the crucial role of elections in the Kyrgyz context [Bawa & Singh 2022]. Japarov, emerging as the new leader, demonstrated that he had learned lessons from both the 2005 and 2010 revolutions. Although he presented himself as a figure of national unity, he immediately manifested his intention to promote constitutional reforms aimed at strengthening presidential powers [Engvall 2021, 21 January].

In terms of external relations, throughout Akayev’s presidency (1991-2005), Kyrgyzstan implemented a so-called «multi-vector diplomacy» – aimed at balancing between a structural relation with Russia and the cultivation of productive relationships with other international actors, especially the United States and China [Swanström 2014]. The US, for example, maintained a presence in Kyrgyz territory through the Manas air base in Bishkek, operational from 2001 to 2014 [Wang 2019]. Although in the first decade of the new millennium the dynamics of great power competition appeared to be quite strong in this part of the world [Kim & Indeo 2013], a decade later the gradual abandonment of the Afghan dossier by the United States caused Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan, to descend in Washington’s priority list, determining the descalation of tensions among great powers [Leksyutina 2024]. Moreover, the global economic crisis of 2008-2009 severely affected the weak Kyrgyz economy through reduced foreign investment and falling commodity prices. This economic vulnerability represented a crucial turning point for the projection of a greater economic presence of Russia and China in the region [Yau 2020, 17 September].

In the mid-2010s, both Russia and China developed various instruments to increase their engagement with the area. Russia focused on economic and security structures, and promoted the Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU)– which Kyrgyzstan joined in 2015– as part of its effort to consolidate regional economic integration. In the security domain, Russia had already re-established its military footprint in Kyrgyzstan in 2003, through the Kant air base, which it continued to develop as a key outpost under the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) [Dzhuraev 2022, 30 August]. For its part, China launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The launch of the BRI in 2013 coincided for Kyrgyzstan with a visit by President Xi (September of the same year) during which the parties elevated their relations to the status of «strategic partnership» [MOFA of the PRC 2013]. In terms of timing, it is therefore unsurprising that Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the Chinese project was almost immediate, taking place in December 2013.2 Within this framework, it is important to note that already during the 1990s, and throughout the 2000s, Beijing already provided substantial economic incentives and concessional loans for infrastructure projects in Bishkek in exchange for adherence to its security objectives [Chokobaeva & Ninnis 2014].

3. 2021-2024: Kyrgyzstan’s authoritarian drift and vulnerable economy

Having sketched a brief political history of Kyrgyzstan, the article now moves on to more recent developments, focussing on the first years of Japarov’s presidency (2021-2024). In particular, this section discusses the main domestic political developments and economic trends. It will emerge clearly that, under Japarov, the country rapidly slid towards an autocratic model of governance, characterised by populist undertones, personalist rule, and a gradual crack down on freedom of expression. Economically, Bishkek appeared more interested in granting stability rather than promoting development – a policy choice shared across Central Asia and autocratic regimes at large. The main macroeconomic indicators show a positive trend, but structural challenges persist.

3.1. Domestic politics

Japarov’s first years in power have been characterised by authoritarian reforms and populist overtones. The most significant event was a constitutional referendum held in April 2021, which ushered into the restoration of a presidential system after a decade of parliamentarism. The new Constitution significantly expanded the powers of the president, eliminating the previously established one-term limit and several other checks-and-balances [Government of Kyrgyzstan 2021, 11 April]. In this process, both local officials and the parliament were stripped of autonomy and authority. While the former are now directly appointed by the president, the latter cannot «speak on behalf of the people anymore» – as the Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, Edil Baisalov, put it [Masalieva 2023, 21 June]. Furthermore, the new Constitution contained numerous vague and primordialist concepts — such as rule of people, spiritual and cultural values — and concealed an integrated system of censorship, contemplating the possibility of prohibiting events to protect traditional moral values [Toktogazieva 2021, 7 April]. The speed and way this new Constitution was adopted highlighted the persistent fragility of Kyrgyz national institutions, judicial system included. Later in 2021, parliamentary elections saw the majority of votes cast in favour of pro-Japarov parties – thereby strengthening the latter’s control [Central Commission for elections and referendums of the Kyrgyz Republic 2021, 15 December].

Three further elements have characterised Japarov’s presidency so far: the increasing centrality of security services, particularly the State Committee for National Security, led by the President’s closest ally Tashiyev; the crack-down on media freedom and civil society [Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2024, 10 October]; and the re-traditionalisation of national symbols [Bekmurzaev 2023, 21 December].

The enhanced importance of security services has manifested in the killing and imprisonment of various actors, from political opponents to organised crime figures. For instance, in September 2023-March 2024, crime boss Kolbayev was killed while broker Matraimov and nationalist Maduramov were arrested [24.kg 2024, 26 March]. In some cases, the Japarov-Tashiyev duo appears to have employed a «catch and release» tactic to intimidate the opponents and restrict dissent; with increasing intensity since 2023, numerous arrests have been made of individuals allegedly suspected of planning coups, who were subsequently released [Government of Kyrgyzstan 2024, 12 November]. More recently, the arrest of the Social Democratic Party leader Sultanbekov on vote-buying corruption charges has caused controversy [Government of Kyrgyzstan 2024, 14 November].

By leveraging power structures, the Japarov-Tashiyev tandem has also consolidated its patron-client network and granted greater financial inflows in support of state and private activities. A flagrant example of this falls under the label of «kusturizatsia»: branded as an anti-corruption initative, de facto it is tantamount to state-led extorsion [Ismailbekova 2024]. The practice of kusturizatsia allows corrupt officials and businesses to make amend for their crimes by paying a fee to the regime or ceding control over illicit resources to the tandem. Far from being implemented in a transparent manner, this practice ends up institutionalising corruption and informal networks, to the detriment of healthy business practices.

Kyrgyz media, which had distinguished themselves in the region for plurality and freedom, have also been subject to persecution by the secret services and state institutions at large. Since the inception of Japarov’s presidency, a Law on «Mass Media», a Law on «Protection from False and Inaccurate information», a Law against «LGBT propaganda» and changes to the Law on «Non-Commercial Organizations» have been emanated, providing the legal background for the repression of free press and public gatherings [Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2023, 14 August]. In September 2024, the Ministry of Culture issued a formal warning to Radio Free Europe’s Kyrgyz branch for allegedly spreading false information; during the same period, the Supreme Court upheld the decision to dissolve the public foundation behind Kloop, an investigative news agency [Committee to Protect Journalists 2024, 29 August]. A group of journalists working for Temirov Live channel was convicted in October 2024 on charges of inciting public disorder [Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project 2024, 11 March]. Notably, since March 2022 Bishkek has issued a ban on public protests, following pro-Ukrainian demonstrations in front of the Russian Embassy.

Increasingly tense relations between official authorities and radical Muslim communities, primarily concentrated in the country’s South, are also worth noting. In 2024, the State Committee for Religious Affairs decreed that religious figures can no longer run in local elections, and religious venues cannot be used for political events without prior approval from authorities. A ban on wearing the Niqab in offices and public places has sparked further tensions [AKI Press 2024, 2 September]. These positions may indicate Japarov’s apprehension regarding the growing support for the Islamic centre-right Iyman Nuru party.

Finally, although older generations still express a certain degree of nostalgia for Soviet times [Ercilasun 2010], President Japarov has initiated a campaign of re-traditionalisation of nationalist sentiments. In January 2024, not without protests, a new version of the Kyrgyz flag was presented, while an update of the national anthem was underway at the closing of this essay, giving less prominence to the independence process of the 1990s in favour of greater emphasis on the millennial history of Kyrgyz culture [Bekmurzaev 2024, 7 November]. Within this process, in July 2024 the President officially recognised five victims of Soviet repression as founders of the modern Kyrgyz state [Kabar 2023, 2 October]. Such decisions took place within a broader effort by Japarov to present himself a «native son» of Kyrgyzstan, respectful of traditional obligations, kinship networks, and the nation’s historical greivances [Ismailbekova 2021].

3.2. Economic policy

Between 2020 and 2023, Kyrgyzstan’s economy experienced significant fluctuations. In 2020, the GDP contracted by 7.15% due to the global pandemic. However, the economy rebounded with growth rates of 5.51% in 2021 and 8.97% in 2022; by 2023, GDP growth slowed to 6.2%. Also GDP per capita saw a recovery from US$ 1,257 in 2020 to US$ 1,970 in 2023. Inflation rates varied, starting at 6.33% in 2020 and peaking at 13.92% in 2022 before easing to 10.75% in 2023 [‘Kyrgyz Republic’].

These changes have taken place within the framework of economic reforms spearheaded by Japarov, focused on two priorities: strengthening state control over the economy and improving fiscal sustainability. Regarding the former, a landmark decision was the nationalisation of the Kumtor gold mine, one of the largest in Central Asia, which initially boosted state revenues but raised concerns about long-term sustainability [Putz 2022, 28 May]. In terms of fiscal policies, a mix of revenue collection and tax enforcement led to a temporary surplus in 2023. However, projections for 2024 indicate a return to a deficit due to large social spending to support key sectors such as agriculture and energy [Balabushko et al. 2024, 7 June].

The Kyrgyz economy was severely affected by the Covid pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Facing these crises, the government implemented price controls and export restrictions on essential commodities, including coal and meat. In particular, the Ukrainian conflict precipitated a severe currency crisis in March 2022, with the Kyrgyz currency (som) depreciating by 30% against major currencies. Subsequently the exchange rate remained rather stable, thought concerns emerged regarding market manipulation and informal currency trading [International Monetary Fund 2024]. A further factor facilitating economic recovery was Bishkek’s readiness to take advantage from Western sanctions on Russia. Leveraging its position as a transit country, Kyrgyzstan has become a hub for the re-export of European goods to Russia and vice-versa, across a variety of sectors that span luxury goods, agricultural products, industrial machinery, and dual-use technologies [Lahiri 2024, 30 September]. This has allowed for a significant 70% increase in EU exports towards Kyrgyzstan during 2021-2023, which coupled with the growth in value of Kyrgyz exports to Russia from US$ 393 million (2021) to US$ 1.07 billion (2022), then peaking at US$ 823 million the following year [Trading Economics; Brooks 2024] .

During the same timeframe, Bishkek has resumed long anticipated infrastructural projects. These include the Kyzyl-Ompol titanium-magnetite project in the Issyk-Kul region, the Uzbekistan-financed auto assembly plant in Northern Kyrgyzstan and the implementation of two solar power plant projects in the country’s Batken and Talas regions [Government of Kyrgyzstan 2024, 30 September]. More recently, Kyrgyz officials have publicly stated that the work on building the long-planned BRI project, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, is scheduled to begin construction. A wind farm investment agreement has been reached with Russia’s Rosatom [‘Rosatom Renewable Energy’ 2024, 23 December], adding to the many transport and energy projects already under way.

Against such generally positive background, structural challenges continue to affect the Kyrgyz economy. By the end of 2023, the country’s public debt reached 60.3% of its GDP – with China remaining the largest creditor, holding 40% of the external debt [International Monetary Fund 2024]. In addition, Japarov’s administration has experienced difficulties balancing social welfare commitments with the need to attract foreign investment and improve economic transparency [OECD 2023, 13 December]. Moreover in 2024, the country’s energy sector experienced challenges. Due to rising costs and supply shortages, Kyrgyzstan’s dependence on regional imports increased significantly, with trade volumes rising by 28% from neighbouring countries in 2023-2024. Kazakhstan became the largest source of imports (35%), followed by Russia (27%) and Uzbekistan (22%) [Cornell and Shaffer 2024, 4 December]. Finally, the economy remains dependent on gold exports, a growing tourism sector, and remittances from migrant workers in Russia. In the context of tourism, the government enacted measures to liberalise investment regulations in the vicinity of the Lake Issyk-Kul region. This enabled foreign nationals to purchase recreational facilities, while maintaining restrictions on land ownership [Government of Kyrgyzstan 2023, 14 August]. Remittances have remained a crucial part of the economy, contributing around 20.4% of GDP in 2023. However, their share of GDP has fallen considerably since 2021 (32.6%), largely due to a reduced migrant workforce in Russia (see next section).

4. Kyrgyzstan’s evolving foreign policy under Japarov

Under Japarov, Kyrgyzstan’s «multi-vector diplomacy» was significantly recalibrated, refocussing primarily on strengthening relations with Russia and China. Bishkek continued to engage pragmatically with other actors — as evidenced by the signing of an «Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement» with the European Union in July 2024 and a series of strategic agreements with Turkey; but Kyrgyzstan’s primary diplomatic focus has narrowed, compared to before 2021. This reorientation is particularly evident when looking at the participation of Bishkek in various multilateral fora – with Kyrgyzstan playing an active role predominantly within the Central Asian Heads of State Summit, the BRICS group, the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). President Japarov’s speeches at recent gatherings of these forums have underscored this strategic realignment [24.kg 2023, 19 May; 24.kg 2024, 24 May]. At the regional level, significant progress has been made in border demarcation agreements, with Kyrgyzstan signing treaties with Uzbekistan in January 2023 and Tajikistan in September 2024 [Imanaliyeva 2023, 27 January; Government of Kyrgyzstan 2024, 4 December]. Given the strengthening of ties with Russia and China in recent years, the remainder of this section provides an analysis of Kyrgyzstan’s relations with these two powers.

4.1. Changing but solid: Kyrgyzstan-Russia relations

Japarov’s rise to power was originally looked at with scepticism by the Kremlin, which granted generous support to his predecessor. Japarov did not have any meaningful pre-existing ties with Moscow, and the way he ascended to power triggered Russian anxieties of a new «colour revolution». Notably, the Kremlin did not invite Japarov to the 2021 Victory Day celebrations in Moscow, while extending a formal invitation to the President of Tajikistan, who was the only Central Asian leader officially in attendance. In a context where border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan had just reignited, such choice resonated in Bishkek as a clear message of disapproval. In retribution, Japarov did not attend a series of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) events throughout 2022 [Mashrab 2023, 1 June].

This rough start, however, did not compromise relations irredeemably. Several statements from both sides have stressed the desire to hold mutually beneficial relations. Since the onset of his term, Japarov has emphasised the importance of Russia as Kyrgyzstan’s main strategic partner, particularly in the security domains [Sharshenova 2021, February]. Likewise, the Kremlin has tributed Bishkek with high regards, showing its appreciation for Japarov’s work to grant stability to his country, and often referring to Kyrgyzstan with words belonging to the semantic group of «family» and «friendship» [Keyword search]. Rhetoric aside, two main factors contributed to the stabilisation of bilateral relations.

First, Russia’s deep penetration into Kyrgyzstan’s social, political, and economic spheres forced Bishkek to downsize its criticism of Moscow. Russia remains Kyrgyzstan’s main trade partner and source of foreign direct investment [Data]. The Russia-Kyrgyzstan Development Fund continued pumping Russian money into a range of local projects. Moscow owns Kyrgyzstan’s principal gas company, is the main supplier of oil products and operates in the country with more than 800 companies. Notably, Kyrgyzstan’s GDP is composed up to one third by the remittances of migrants working in Russia [International Monetary Fund 2024]. Furthermore, Russia maintains a military presence in Kyrgyzstan through the Kant Air Base, which hosts the air component of CSTO’s Collective Rapid Deployable Forces. Together with the base in Tajikistan, the Kant infrastructure grants Russia a power-projection foothold in the wider Central Asian region, up to the Middle East. It also reassures Kyrgyzstan vis-à-vis potential domestic and international threats, while facilitating the training of Kyrgyz armed and security forces by Russian specialists. Finally, Kyrgyzstan is kept steadily within the Moscow-centred russkij mir (Russian world) from a cultural perspective. A host of public diplomacy initiatives, encompassed by the Russian colonisation of the Kyrgyz media space, contribute to keeping societal relations tight; institutions such as the Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots in Kyrgyzstan provide platforms for consolidating a positive image of Russia.

Second, from the Russian side, the repercussions of the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 imposed the need to foster new relations across the Global South, while reinforcing ties with traditional partners [Averre & Fasola 2024, May]. In Central Asia, Russia’s war-mongering behaviour raised diverse reactions, with Kyrgyzstan being a peculiar case [Arynov & Sharipova 2024]. In February 2022, Japarov made cautious statements about the outbreak of the war, emphasising that «Perhaps [the Russian invasion] was a forced measure to protect the peaceful population of the territories of Donbas, where a large number of Russian citizens live» [Japarov 2022, 22 February]. He also declared Kyrgyzstan was ready to stand by Moscow «for 300 more years» [Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2023, 20 August]. One month later, when it became clear that Russia would not achieve a swift victory, Bishkek declared its neutrality [24.kg 2022, 9 March]. Though the Kyrgyz population seemed not to blame Russia for the war [Chapman & Zhandayeva 2023], the volatility of Japarov’s position reconfirmed the urgency to Moscow to reinforce its authority in the country. Consequently, Russia doubled down on its diplomatic efforts. Almost all members of the Russian Security Council have visited Central Asia since 2022 and Putin personally visited all five countries in 2023 – for the third time since he became president. Notably, Putin’s trip to Kyrgyzstan in October 2023 marked his first foreign visit since the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a warrant for him, thereby sending a clear message of pacification to Bishkek. Besides reconfirming economic and security ties, Moscow has increased its support in the socio-cultural field. In early 2024, Russia announced plans to construct nine Russian-language schools in Kyrgyzstan by 2029, at an overall cost of US$ 5.5 million [TASS 2024, 16 October].

Overall, Russia appears to have strong «staying power» in Kyrgyzstan. However, two critical issues might impact the relationship between Moscow and Bishkek. First, since the Ukraine war and especially due to the terrorist attacks in Moscow (Krokus City Hall, March 2024; killing of General Kirillov, December 2024) – both allegedly involving Central Asian citizens – a new wave of discrimination has impacted on Russian relations with the region. As a security measure, Russia has decided to limit free movement within the Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU), banning many Central Asian migrants, including Kyrgyz ones, from entering Russia and further complicating bureaucratic procedures for legal work. Moreover, labour migrants from Central Asia are also experiencing a new wave of police abuse [Pannier 2024, 13 August]. As a consequence, Central Asian migrants have become more exposed to poverty, crime, and radicalisation, and for many Kyrgyz people Russia is not a viable work destination anymore. Bishkek estimated that about 587.000 Kyrgyz citizens lived and worked in Russia in 2022; by the summer of 2024, that number had gotten down to 411.000 individuals [Rickleton 2024, 18 December]. Should this trend continue over the long term, not only the role of Russian remittances in the Kyrgyz economy would shrink, but also the social bond between Russia and Kyrgyzstan could weaken.

Second, the Ukraine war facilitated the spread of a powerful decolonisation narrative across Central Asia. For instance, Kyrgyz and Kazakh elites have made public attempts to move the narrative of the Great Patriotic War away from its traditional Russian focus, underlining the sacrifice of their peoples, too. In the summer of 2024, Kyrgyzstan announced the demolition of the Soviet-era Panfilov Division Museum – provoking Russian ire, albeit the monument had been abandoned decades earlier [Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2024, 13 October]. Most notably, Kyrgyzstan’s National Commission for the State Language and Language Policies recently announced that Kyrgyzstan could switch from Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet. Perceived as a move to distance Kyrgyzstan from Russia, Moscow retaliated by suspending the import of select Kyrgyz products [Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2023, 21 April]. Such decolonisation narrative has not compromised bilateral relations yet. Significantly, surveys show that Kyrgyzstanis are less inclined than Kazakhs to consider Russia’s actions in Ukraine as unjustified [Chapman & Zhandayeva 2023]. However, over the long term, these issues could create fractures with Russia, facilitating the reorientation of Kyrgyz foreign policy towards China.

4.2. Booming yet difficult: Kyrgyzstan’s relations with China

In the 32 years since the establishment of their diplomatic relations in 1992, China and Kyrgyzstan have gradually enhanced the status of their relationship. Four key moments stand out during this period. In 2007, the two countries signed a declaration expressing their intention to invest in further deepening their relations. In 2013, the two countries established a «strategic partnership» [MOFA of the PRC 2007]. In 2018, they elevated their relations to a «comprehensive strategic partnership» [MOFA of the PRC 2018]. Finally, in 2023, they signed a «comprehensive strategic partnership in the new era» [MOFA of the PRC 2023]. In recent years, on multiple occasions, delegations comprising local political leaders from various regions (Osh, Talas, Issyk-Kul, and Chuyh Oblast) visited China and signed twinning and friendship agreements with Beijing [Chengdu Daily 2023, 26 October].

The strategic rationale underlying China’s interest in Kyrgyzstan can be summarised as follows: firstly, to promote security and development in areas adjacent to the Uyghur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang (XUAR); secondly, to gain access to the country’s resources; and, thirdly, to develop new markets for infrastructure construction by Chinese companies [Godehardt 2014]. This is particularly evident in the wake of the BRI’s inception in 2013, when Beijing sought to position itself as Kyrgyzstan’s primary diplomatic partner [Muratalieva 2023]. On 9 July 2024, the Chinese state-controlled news outlet People’s Daily published a 20-minute documentary in which the Chinese Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, Du Dewen, articulated the significance and potential of the BRI in Kyrgyzstan with considerable emphasis [People’s Daily Online 2024, 9 July]. Indeed, even prior to its accession to the BRI in 2013, Kyrgyzstan had already demonstrated its support for China’s strategic priorities, including Taiwan and Xinjiang [AKI Press 2007, 14 August]. Nevertheless, since Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the BRI, Bishkek has augmented the vigour and unreserved nature of its support [AKI Press 2019, 13 June; People’s Daily 2023, 25 October].3

China often characterises Kyrgyzstan as a politically unstable and anarchic state, where ethnic tensions, endemic corruption, and terrorism continue to pose potential threats [Leksyutina 2024]. However, an examination of Chinese scholarly analyses and media coverage reveals two important developments. Firstly, it can be observed that Chinese media has consistently and increasingly invested in covering both international and domestic political developments in Kyrgyzstan [Xinhua Daily Telegraph 2005, 28 March; Guangming Daily 2006, 6 July; People’s Daily 2021, 28 November]. In recent years, Beijing has initiated a targeted campaign to integrate its content into Kyrgyz media, establishing agreements for an enhanced local media presence (including Xinhua and Weibo) and increasing its content sharing on Russian and Kyrgyz social media platforms [Yau 2022;Yau 2023]. The second observation is derived from China’s apparent objective to expedite the development of Sino-Kyrgyz relations, particularly following Japarov’s ascension to power in the wake of the 2021 elections. This is corroborated by a plethora of Chinese academic journal publications that have highlighted Japarov’s implementation of political, economic, and social reforms [Tao 2021; Guo & Jia 2023] and his interviews in Chinese media outlets [People’s Daily 2022, 5 September].

Nevertheless, China continues to encounter obstacles in its efforts to cultivate favourable perceptions and understanding among both the Kyrgyz elite and the general population [Owen 2018; Deng 2022]. To illustrate, data from the Central Asia Barometer (CAB) indicate a steady decline in positive public opinion towards China among respondents in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan over the five-year period between 2017 and 2021 [Muratalieva 2023]. As noted by a Kyrgyz researcher, there appears to be a schism within Kyrgyzstan: while political leaders espouse a growing affinity for China, opposition leaders, traders, and large segments of the public tend to hold more sceptical or negative views [Shailoobek 2021].

The outbreak of the war in Ukraine in February 2022 represented a further significant turning point. As some scholars have observed, it may represent an opportunity for China to increase its interference in the region. As reported by the General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China, the trade turnover between Beijing and Bishkek increased by 26.8% during the initial six months of 2023 in comparison to the corresponding period of the previous year [Ozat 2023]. Conversely, the diminished Russian presence in the region gave rise to two distinct concerns for Beijing. Primarily, it represented a potential source of instability in an area of vital importance to China as far as security and stability are concerned [Sun 2023]. Secondly, it created an opportunity for other actors, including Western states, to intervene and offer an alternative to China [Zeng & Pan 2023].

5. Conclusions

The political history of post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan reveals a striking duality – whereby distinctive features, such as a pluralistic political system, a relatively free press, and a dynamic civil society have coexisted with traits shared across Central Asia, including political path dependence4 and limited resources to enact socio-economic change. Since Japarov’s rise to power in 2021, the latter traits have gained prominence. Kyrgyzstan has shifted away from the previous democratic path, expanding presidential powers while reducing civil and political rights. Increased control over state institutions, restrictions on media freedom, and suppression of political opposition have been the hallmarks of this authoritarian turn. Japarov’s populist governance has also attributed an unprecedented centrality to secret services, whose control over society is tightening. Moreover, religion and culture have become points of contention and triggers of protest. Highlighting the enduring volatility of Kyrgyz politics, on 16 December 16 Prime Minister was dismissed amid a fraud scandal [President of Kyrgyz Republic 2024, 16 December].

This article has also pointed out that, although the economy has recovered from the pandemic and benefitted from the Ukraine war, structural fragilities persist. National debt has remained substantial, as much as Kyrgyzstan’s dependency on external actors for basic needs (e.g., energy supply). Importantly, the downward trend of remittances from Russia was providing ground for mid-term macro-economic instability. Regarding foreign policy, this article has noted that, under Japarov, Kyrgyzstan has abandoned or at least reduced the scope of its traditional «multi-vector diplomacy» – favouring ties with Russia and China primarily. The analysis of Kyrgyz relations with these two powers reveals the solidity of the relationship with Moscow despite some significant changes, while the partnership with Beijing has been growing but was still facing important challenges.

Over the mid-term, it will be important to monitor the ability of Japarov’s administration to keep social peace via stabilising economic reforms and institutional control, amidst a crackdown on political freedom and civil rights. The dismissal of the Prime Minister due to an alleged fraud scandal, in December 2024, seems to point to the continuation along an authoritarian path, wherein the President reshuffles other institutions in accordance with self-serving interests. Historically, however, civil unrest and regime change have erupted swiftly in Kyrgyzstan, so the consequences of individual policy choices might defy Japarov’s assessment and trigger political instability, rather than tightening his grip on power. Internationally, the key dynamic for Kyrgyzstan will remain «three game» with Russia and China. Whether the two actors will engage in greater competition over Central Asia or cultivate complementary roles depends largely on factors exogenous to the region. Bishkek does not have either the political will or the structural resources to break established dependency relations; however, it might have the chance to play on the rivalry between Russia, China, as well as Turkey, the US, and the EU to exact greater concessions from each one of these players.

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ISSN 2385-2526

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Pakistan’s general election, held on 8 February 2024, was marred by allegations of vote manipulation and delays in the ballot counting process. International observers called for thorough investigations to assess the integrity and fairness of the electoral process. Reports indicated the detention of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party leaders, including the ousted Prime Minister Imran Khan, along with their supporters. There were allegations of harassment targeting their relatives and journalists by the military, and the PTI was prohibited from utilising its symbol on ballot papers. Despite these coercive measures, independent candidates affiliated with the PTI secured 101 parliamentary seats. In contrast, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), led by Shehbaz Sharif, did not secure the requisite parliamentary majority to form a government, obtaining only 75 seats. The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), led by Bilawal Zardari Bhutto, secured 54 parliamentary seats, which were insufficient to combine with Sharif’s faction to form a government. Protracted negotiations culminated in the formation of a larger government coalition, purportedly endorsed by the military establishment. While alleged military efforts were successful in preventing Khan from returning to power, they were unsuccessful in countering the growing popularity of the PTI and the widespread criticism directed at the treatment of the former Prime Minister and his party.

Protracted negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for an additional bailout programme further exacerbated Pakistan’s severe economic challenges. The agreement was contingent upon commitments to implement austerity measures, which adversely affected citizens’ everyday lives and contributed to the diminishing popularity of the new government. Pakistan also faced security issues, particularly the resurgence of the Pakistani Taliban in the Northwestern border regions and ethno-nationalist unrest in Baluchistan. Geopolitical tensions arising from cross-border skirmishes with Iran and extensive Chinese investments in the region have compounded these issues. US concerns about proliferation have triggered sanctions on suppliers of Pakistan’s ballistic missile program, particularly Chinese firms.

Keywords – China; elections; Iran; non-proliferation; PTI.

1. Introduction

Pakistan’s general election was held on 8 February 2024. The electoral campaign presented disturbing similarities to the one in 2018, which resulted in the victory of Imran Khan. At that time, it was alleged that Imran Khan’s led Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) had secured the elections with the support of the military. It is widely believed that Khan’s removal in 2022 followed a rift with the army’s top ranks, which turned against the former cricket player due to flaws in his governance, poor economic performance, and open confrontation with the military [Corsi 2024, pp. 393-95]. Khan accused the military of orchestrating his removal through a parliamentary vote of no-confidence in April 2022. Following an assassination attempt in November 2022, he intensified his campaign against the military establishment [Corsi 2024, pp. 358-61]. Similarly, in 2024, it was reported that the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) had secured the support of the military. PTI supporters accused the military of marginalising PTI’s key leaders through criminal measures driven by political motives [Schorzman 2018, 6 June; Bukhari 2018, 16 July; Zahra-Malik 2018, 21 July].

The election was marred by widespread public distrust regarding its transparency [The Guardian 2024, 6 February; Tharoor 2024, 7 February]. Thousands of PTI candidates had their nomination papers rejected. Khan’s allies reportedly encountered significant pressure to dissociate from the party under threat of sanctions on the part of the military, with some being apprehended on various charges. Simultaneously, PTI supporters faced detention and harassment. Court decisions compelled the PTI to nominate independent candidates and revoked the party’s electoral symbol [Abbasi 2023, 9 September]. Imran Khan was arrested on charges that rendered him ineligible to run in the election, and media coverage of his trial was severely restricted.

PML-N leader Nawaz Sharif stood a strong chance of securing a fourth term.1 He returned to Pakistan in October 2023 after spending four years in self-imposed exile in the United Kingdom to avoid serving prison sentences on corruption charges [Corsi 2018, 353-56]. On 8 January 2024, the Supreme Court overturned his conviction and sentence on appeal and waived the lifetime ban on politicians with criminal convictions from contesting elections [The Express Tribune 2024a, 9 January].

The electoral race was chiefly dominated by the rivalry between Shehbaz Sharif, Imran Khan, and Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, the leader of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and son of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and former President Asif Zardari [Niaz 2024, 28 January; The Nation 2024, 27 January; Chughtai & Hussain 2024, 3 February; Peshimam 2024, 6 February]. Two days after the election, the PML-N nominated Nawaz’s brother and previous premier, Shehbaz Sharif, as the party’s candidate for the prime ministerial position [Khan 2024, 15 February]. Khan and the PTI maintained significant popularity for their stance against a perceived corrupt elite. The party and its imprisoned leader used artificial intelligence-generated footage of Khan in their electoral campaign to encourage supporters to vote. However, the PTI faced challenges in fielding candidates after the Supreme Court ruled against the use of its electoral symbol on ballots. Consequently, many PTI politicians ran as independents and secured more parliamentary seats than any of the other major parties. Lacking a party with a clear majority, the PML-N and PPP formed a coalition government, which also included several minor political parties.

Pakistan is grappling with severe economic stress and has reached a new agreement with the IMF for a fresh US$ 7 billion bailout program, contingent upon the implementation of various economic reforms. The recent austerity measures introduced by the newly elected government have fuelled growing discontent among the populace, amplifying the PML-N’s concerns about the political threat posed by the PTI and prompting further attempts to neutralise Imran Khan and his party.

In a potentially dangerous development in foreign policy, Iran conducted missile strikes in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province, reportedly targeting militant strongholds. While Pakistan responded promptly with military action, diplomatic efforts successfully prevented further escalation of the situation.

In June 2024, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif met with Chinese President Xi Jinping to seek additional investments; however, no new commitments were made. China expressed concerns regarding the suboptimal execution of its investments, ongoing political instability in Pakistan, and the rising number of militant attacks targeting Chinese workers. In response to these challenges, Pakistan heightened security around the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CEPC), a crucial infrastructure and economic initiative designed to enhance connectivity and cooperation between the two countries. Launched as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the CPEC has frequently been targeted by militant groups.

Since the Taliban assumed control of Afghanistan in 2021, Pakistan has experienced a surge in militant violence, primarily from the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an extremist coalition supported by Taliban leaders that frequently conduct cross-border attacks. Islamabad has repeatedly urged Kabul to take action against these groups; however, the Afghan government denies any involvement or responsibility.

Meanwhile, the US has distanced itself from Pakistan, shifting its focus toward strengthening relations with India and imposing sanctions on Pakistan’s missile program. These actions have further strained diplomatic relations, particularly in the context of Pakistan’s growing connection with China and Iran.

2. The elections and the coalition government

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s term concluded on 9 August 2023, paving the way for the establishment of a caretaker government. According to Pakistan’s constitutional guidelines, elections are mandated to be held within 60 days following the dissolution of parliament under normal circumstances and within 90 days in the case of an early dissolution. However, citing the latest census data, the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) postponed the elections to allow for the redrawing of electoral boundaries. As a result, the elections were rescheduled for 8 February 2024 [Corsi 2024, pp. 262-63]. The opposition and its supporters expressed concerns about the timing of the census data release, suggesting it was being used as a pretext to delay the elections, potentially granting the government – and the military – additional time to influence the electoral environment.

In early January 2024, the ECP announced the status of candidates’ nomination papers. Of nearly 26,000 applicants, 3,240 individuals, primarily from the PTI, were disqualified from participating for various reasons [Waqar & Gabol 2023, 30 December; The News 2024, 2 January].

Initially, Shehbaz Sharif chose not to run as the PML-N candidate in this election, passing the role to his brother, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Like Imran Khan, Nawaz Sharif had been barred from political activities for life due to a 14-year corruption sentence [Voice of America 2023, 29 November], and only his absence from the country prevented his arrest. In 2023, legislation was passed under Shehbaz Sharif’s government, stipulating that disqualifications would only be valid for five years [The News 2024, January 2; Herald Tribune 2024, 18 May]. The PML-N successfully appealed against Nawaz Sharif’s conviction, rendering him eligible for the 2024 elections and resulting in the acceptance of his nomination papers [Meakem 2024, 2 January].

In December 2023, the PTI appointed Gohar Ali Khan as its interim party Chairman, a temporary position designated by Imran Khan pending his release from prison [Hussain 2023, 2 December; Hayat 2023, 2 December]. Gohar Ali Khan, who transitioned from the PPP to the PTI, was previously part of Imran Khan’s legal team [Samaa 2023, 29 November]. However, his nomination faced criticism from other founding members of the PTI, who questioned the process and claimed that the selection procedure lacked transparency. As a result, on 22 December 2023, the ECP annulled the intra-party elections and ruled that the PTI could not use its traditional electoral symbol, a cricket bat. The ECP-imposed restrictions prevented PTI candidates from contesting elections under the party’s name. Following Khan’s ousting, the PTI experienced significant internal discord, leading to the expulsion or departure of many members. Some of those individuals – who remained loyal to Imran Khan – chose to run in the elections as independents [Business Recorder 2024, 13 January].

The PTI complained about the perceived unfairness of the electoral environment and alleged biases in the scrutiny process, citing the rejection of almost 3,000 nomination papers from PTI candidates, including its leader Imran Khan, who had been incarcerated since August 2023 [Corsi 2024, pp. 356-61; Reuters 2023, 30 December; The Guardian 2023, 30 December; The Express Tribune 2024, 2 January; The Express Tribune 2024b, 9 January; The Express Tribune 2024, 15 January; The Express Tribune 2024, 16 January; Waraich 2024, 12 February].

Khan continued to galvanise his supporters and lead the PTI from his prison cell. A 2024 Gallup pre-election survey indicated that the PTI held a commanding lead with 42% support, outpacing the PML-N at 20% and the PPP at 12% [Gallup 2023]. Khan’s campaign utilised digital technologies to target young Pakistanis, who comprised most of the country’s population and a large portion of the PTI’s voter base [Jan 2023, 3 November; Shahzad 2023, 18 December; Davies 2024, 4 February]. Additionally, the PTI capitalised on citizens’ frustrations with the previous coalition government of the PML-N and the PPP, which had struggled alleviate the escalating economic distress and rampant inflation [Hussain 2023, 31 August]. As a result, PTI supporters turned out in large numbers to vote [NBC News 2024, 8 February].

The elections were marred by violence, allegations of military-orchestrated rigging, intimidation against PTI candidates, and nationwide mobile phone and internet shutdowns. PTI leaders, candidates, and supporters faced a nationwide crackdown in the lead-up to the election, and the results announcement was delayed [Gul 2024, 28 June]. Imran Khan vigorously contested the credibility of the PML-N, leading to international calls for an investigation into potential irregularities [Shweta et al. 2024, 11 February]. The PTI disputed the election results, claiming electoral fraud, and presented documents highlighting discrepancies between initial vote counts at polling stations and the official results. A senior Rawalpindi official also admitted to manipulating results [Rehman 2024, 18 February; Shaikh 2024, 22 February; PTI 2024]. In response, the United States House of Representatives passed a resolution urging Pakistan to conduct an independent investigation into claims of irregularities and interference in its 2024 general election [United States Congress 2024, 25 June]. However, Pakistan’s lower house of Parliament rejected the US request, viewing it as an attempt at interference [Gul 2024, 28 June].

PTI-backed independent candidates prevailed over those from mainstream political parties, securing 101 seats, while the PML-N obtained 75 seats and the PPP secured 54 seats [‘Election Pakistan 2024’; Election Commission of Pakistan 2024; Government of Pakistan 2024a]. At the provincial level in Punjab, out of 297 general assembly seats (plus 66 seats for women and eight for non-Muslim candidates), independent candidates won 138, the PML-N won 137, and the PPP secured ten seats. In the Sindh Assembly, out of 130 general constituencies (plus 29 seats for women and nine for non-Muslims), the PPP secured 84 seats, while the independent candidates won 14 seats. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, out of 99 general seats (plus 22 for women and three for non-Muslims), independent candidates secured 91 seats, with the PML-N securing five seats and the PPP four seats. Lastly, in Baluchistan, out of 51 general seats (plus 11 for women and three for non-Muslims), the PPP and the PML-N obtained 11 and 10 seats, respectively, while independent candidates won six seats [‘Election Pakistan 2024’; Pakistan Today 2024, 10 February; Election Commission of Pakistan 2024].

With no clear majority winner, the PML-N and PPP – having secured the second and third-highest number of parliamentary seats – formed a coalition government with several smaller parties. On 10 February 2024, senior PML-N leaders announced Shehbaz Sharif as their candidate for prime minister. This choice was attributed to his strong relations with the PPP and his familiarity with the establishment. However, the PML-N won fewer seats than anticipated, with Nawaz controversially losing one seat and winning another, which left him with little option but to withdraw [Khan 2024, 10 February; Dawn 2024, 13 February]. The coalition agreement between the PML-N and the PPP was finalised after the PML-N consented to support the PPP’s efforts to secure all the top constitutional positions, including a second five-year term for its leader, Asif Ali Zardari, as president, as well as the roles of speaker of the National Assembly and chairman of the Senate [AP News 2024, 9 March; Shehzad 2024, 9 March; Malik 2024, 10 March; Herald Tribune 2024, 10 March]. The finance portfolio was assigned to Muhammad Aurangzeb, a former J.P. Morgan executive who had previously served as the president of Habib Bank Limited. Ishaq Dar, the former minister of Finance, was appointed minister of Foreign Affairs. Despite Dar’s lack of formal diplomatic experience, his appointment highlighted the new government’s emphasis on securing financial assistance from international partners as a key foreign policy goal. The new 19-member cabinet officially took office on March 2024 [AP News 2024, 12 March].

3. The sidelining of the PTI and the rise of political tensions

After being largely absent in the 2008 general election, the PTI captured 17% of the votes in 2013 and increased its share to 32% in 2018. As already pointed out, Imran Khan’s 2018 electoral victory was widely perceived as being supported by the military apparatus, and during his tenure from 2018 to 2022, he initially aligned with the military establishment. However, tensions with the army surfaced during Khan’s term, particularly regarding his foreign policy and economic decisions, ultimately leading to the ousting of his administration through a no-confidence motion in April 2022 [Corsi 2024, pp. 391-97].

Since Pakistan’s inception, the military has governed directly or exerted significant political control. Following General Pervez Musharraf’s resignation in 2008, the military establishment facilitated a transition to civilian rule. However, senior generals have since become increasingly involved in crucial government decisions. Many believe the army seeks to uphold a democratic framework through elections while maintaining substantial influence over civilian institutions. Consequently, prime ministers have been appointed when favoured by the military and removed from office when they lose the establishment’s support [Goldbaum 2024, 21 February]. The military’s influence intensified further under the PTI administration after 2018 [Siddiqa 2024, 23 February]. Khan asserted that he was removed from office when he began to challenge the military’s arrangement that had facilitated his rise to power, and claimed that, after his removal, the new government perceived him as a significant political threat [Behera 2024, 5 February; Yousuf 2024, 5 May; Goldbaum & Masood 2024, 12 July; Corsi 2023, pp. 397-99]. in fact, since his ousting from office, Khan has remained a persistent challenge to the military-dominated political landscape in Pakistan. Allegations of military-backed election interference, the sidelining of the PTI, and Khan’s purportedly politically motivated imprisonment have fuelled a growing anti-establishment sentiment [Corsi 2024, pp. 361-68; Ellis-Petersen 2024, 31 January; Campbel 2024, 5 February].

On 20 January 2024, a special court sentenced Khan to 10 years in prison for mishandling a sensitive diplomatic document from Pakistan’s then-ambassador to the United States in 2022. On 31 January 2024, Khan and his wife were each given 14-year sentences for corruption related to the retention and sale of state gifts and violations of government regulations during his tenure [Corsi 2024, p. 360]. On 3 February 2024, they received an additional seven-year sentence for violating the country’s marriage laws, based on allegations that, under Islamic law, their 2018 marriage had occurred too soon after her divorce [Astier 2024, 3 February].

Khan was subjected to multiple allegations of corruption and administrative mismanagement during his tenure in office; however, many of these accusations were either inadequately supported by evidence or effectively challenged by his legal team. Following his arrest, the judiciary suspended Khan’s jail sentences in June and July 2024 related to the illegal acquisition and sale of state gifts, the leaking of state secrets, and the unlawful conviction regarding marriage [Shahzad & Shahid 2024, 4 June; Al Jazeera 2024, 13 July]. However, Khan remained incarcerated on other charges, including those linked to violence against Pakistani military facilities following his arrest in 2023. The frequent alternation between rulings against and dismissals of charges involving Imran Khan underscores the complex interplay between Pakistan’s legal, political, and institutional frameworks [Davies 2024, 5 August]. These patterns reflect the highly polarized nature of Pakistani politics, where allegations of corruption or abuse of power targeting prominent figures, such as Khan, are often perceived as politically driven. Analysts have often argued that these charges were unfounded, while the United Nations has stated that Khan had been unjustly imprisoned in violation of international law [Dawn 2024, 3 June; Al Jazeera 2024, 1 July; Janjua 2024, 12 July].

On 12 July 2024, the Supreme Court upheld the PTI’s eligibility for additional seats allocated to women and minorities proportionate to the number of general seats the party secured. In line with the court’s ruling, the PTI was awarded 23 seats, marking a significant setback for Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s ruling coalition and positioning the PTI as the largest party in parliament. While the coalition government retained a simple majority, it lost the two-thirds majority necessary for constitutional amendments [Momand 2024, 12 July; Dawn 2024, 15 July; Afzal 2024, 25 July]. Pakistan’s judiciary faces a delicate balance between demonstrating independence and responding to external pressures. The court’s acquittals and rulings emphasised the judiciary’s assertion of independence from Pakistan’s military and intelligence structure, highlighting its role as the last line of defence in a country where the civilian government is perceived to maintain an accommodating relationship with military leadership [Gul 2024, 27 March; Haqqani 2023, 9 August]. On 21 October 2024, the government enacted the 26th constitutional amendment, which expanded its judiciary oversight. Under the amendment, the chief justice of Pakistan is no longer required to be the most senior judge of the Supreme Court. Instead, a Special Parliamentary Committee, which includes proportional representation from parliamentary parties, recommends one of the three most senior judges, allowing the government to influence the selection process significantly. Additionally, the Supreme Court’s suo motu powers and those of the High Court have been removed. The amendment permits the ruling coalition to appoint the chief justice, leading critics – including opposition parties led by the PTI and legal experts – to argue that it undermines judicial independence and strengthens political power [Shabbir 2024, 16 September; Hussain 2024, 17 September; Ashfaq 2024, 30 September; The Express Tribune 2024, 30 September; Baloch and Ellis-Petersen 2024, 21 October; Khan 2024, 22 October].

Political tensions escalated on 10 September 2010, following a large rally organised by the PTI in Islamabad, demanding Khan’s release from prison. In response, the government ordered the arrest of several PTI leaders and members of parliament while they were attending house sessions, citing a law prohibiting public gatherings in the capital. PTI leaders faced charges of violating rally regulations, deviating from the designated route, and engaging in confrontations. They threatened to resort to force if Khan was not released promptly [Ahmed 2024, 7 September; Iqbal 2024, 10 September; Hussain 2024, 10 September]. On 27 November 2024, the PTI organised another protest march to Islamabad with similar objectives, which resulted in violent clashes with law enforcement agencies [Regan 2024, 27 November].

4. The economy

In April 2024, the IMF approved the disbursement of US$ 1.1 billion to Pakistan, marking the final tranche of a package finalised in 2023 that provided much-needed financial relief. Inflation, which stood at 38% in May 2023, halved to just over 17% in May 2024 [Business Recorder 2023, 1 June; Khan 2024, 3 May]. Import control measures helped to ease the external account deficit and attract interest from foreign investors [Davis 2024, 13 May]. However, with looming debt repayments, Pakistan’s economic and financial situation remained precarious. Credit rating agencies indicate that out of US$ 130 billion in external debt, approximately US$ 20 billion was due for repayment in the fiscal year beginning in July 2024. According to the IMF, half of the government’s income in 2024 will be required to service this debt [Aamir 2024, 17 July].

Pakistan generates approximately US$ 50 billion annually from exports and foreign remittances but spends around US$ 70 billion annually on fuel and other imports. The salaried class faces heavy taxation. The struggling economy has sparked demonstrations in Pakistani-administered Kashmir, and farmers protesting the decision to import wheat despite record harvests have forced Islamabad to seek another agreement with the IMF [Kiani 2024, 17 April; Masood 2024, 13 May]. Without reforms to address structural weaknesses and relying solely on external assistance, Pakistan has pursued various strategies to manage its economic crises, including increasing the tax-to-GDP ratio, privatising state-owned enterprises, boosting exports, enhancing remittances, improving the business environment, and attracting foreign direct investment [Dunya News 2023, 20 November; The Express Tribune, 2024, 17 April; Haider 2024, 28 April].

The new government’s swift action in initiating negotiations with the IMF for another loan program – the 24th bailout in six decades – demonstrated the urgency of addressing the external financial deficit and preventing a recurrence of a default scenario [Corsi 2024, pp. 355-58; The Express Tribune 2024, 16 April]. In June 2024, the new Pakistani government approved its first budget [Government of Pakistan 2024b; Shukla 2024, 18 July]. The budget was crafted with an awareness of ongoing negotiations with the IMF and the austerity measures necessary to control debt and inflation and secure a new bailout package [Jamal 2024]. The US$ 68 billion budget aimed for an ambitious target of approximately US$ 44 billion in tax revenue for the upcoming fiscal year, representing a 40% increase over the previous year. It also included salary increases of up to 25% for government employees, in alignment with austerity goals [Ahmed 2024, 12 June; The Express Tribune 2024a, 12 June; Ibid, 2024b, 12 June; Ibid, 2024c, 12 June; Ibid, 2024, 13 June]. Base income tax rates were increased, and reduced subsidies led to power charges for consumers which increased as much as 50% [DW 2024, 13 July]. The ongoing economic hardship significantly impacted citizens’ everyday lives, resulting in public discontent and a gradual decline in the coalition government’s popularity.

In July 2024, the IMF announced its agreement to sign another Extended Fund Facility (EFF) of approximately US$ 7 billion for 37 months, following an emergency loan in the summer of 2023 that averted a sovereign debt default amid numerous other challenges [Corsi 2024, pp. 355-58].

Assistance from the IMF comes with specific conditionalities, including raising taxes, reducing subsidies, and increasing interest rates. Consequently, Shehbaz Sharif’s government was compelled to commit to implementing several reforms to secure the deal, including a substantial effort to increase the country’s tax revenue. To fulfil the IMF’s requirements for additional financial support, Pakistan also requested three key funders – China, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates – to reschedule its US$ 12 billion debt for up to five years [Rana 2024, 4 September; Ansari 2024, 5 September]. The US$ 7 billion IMF loan announcement bolstered foreign investor confidence, prompting Moody’s to upgrade Pakistan’s local and foreign currency ratings, citing improved macroeconomic conditions and external liquidity [Salman 2024, 29 August]. The new bailout package was approved on 27 September 2024, with an immediate disbursement of US$ 1 million [International Monetary Fund 2024, 27 September].

5. Foreign affairs

5.1. Relations between Pakistan and Iran

The relationship between Iran and Pakistan has become increasingly strained, further exacerbating the Sunni–Shia sectarian divide that emerged following the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and during Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s leadership in Pakistan in the 1980s [Fraioli 2024, 6 March; Hijazi 2024].

Sistan-Baluchistan is a province in Iran that borders Pakistan’s Baluchistan and southern Afghanistan. The Baloch, a predominantly Sunni minority group in Pakistan, constitute the majority in both Baluchistan and Iran’s Sistan-Baluchistan. Despite substantial investments from China and India in the ports of Gwadar and Chabahar, the Baloch provinces remain politically marginalised on both sides of the border.

Since the 2000s, Iran has focused on targeting the Sunni militant group Jaish al-Adl («Army of Justice»), which is based in Pakistani Baluchistan. This group, which advocates for Sunni rights and has links to al-Qāʿida, evolved from the terrorist organisation Jundullah after its leader was killed in 2010. Jundullah had been active in Sistan-Baluchistan, conducting attacks on Iranian security forces and civilians.

Pakistan has been grappling with Baloch insurgencies since its independence in 1947. As a result, Islamabad has targeted the hideouts of the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Baluchistan Liberation Front (BLF), both of which are militant groups with ethnic and, at times, separatist agendas [Chandran 2024, 30 January]. For years, both countries have accused one another of harbouring Baluchi separatist groups along their shared border [Vatanka 2014, 24 October].

On 3 January 2024, during a state commemoration in Kerman for General Qassem Soleimani – who was killed in an American air raid at Baghdad Airport in 2020 – two suicide bombings resulted in over 80 casualties. This attack prompted Iran to launch missile strikes against strongholds of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in northern Iraq and, on 16 January 2024, against bases of the militant group Jaish al-Adl in Pakistani Baluchistan [Adams & Davies 2024, 17 January; ABC News 2024, 17 January; Daily Pakistan 2024b, 17 January; The Frontier Post 2024, 17 January; The Frontier Post 2024, 19 January]. Pakistan condemned the violation of its air space, recalling its ambassador in Tehran and suspending all high-level engagements with Iran. Iran reciprocated by recalling its ambassador [Momand 2024, 17 January; Daily Pakistan 2024c, 17 January]. Islamabad subsequently launched an intelligence operation named Marg Bar Sarmachar, targeting the BLA and BLF hideouts around the Iranian city of Saravan, near the border with Pakistan [Yousaf 2024, 17 January; The Frontier Post 2024, 18 January; The Nation 2024, 18 January].

The unprecedented escalation raised concerns; however, Pakistan and Iran quickly reached a rapid de-escalation agreement [Daily Pakistan 2024a, 17 January; Dawn 2024, 17 January]. The Pakistani Foreign Minister at the time, Jalil Abbas Jilani, and his Iranian counterpart, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, agreed to restore diplomatic relations, with representatives from both governments giving speeches highlighting the close ties between their nations. Reports suggest that China was mediating in this process, while the regional security landscape was a significant deterrent to further escalations, as indicated by official statements [Chandran 2024, 30 January].

As Pakistani–Iranian relations improved, Islamabad approved its natural gas pipeline segment in February 2024. The 2,775 km pipeline linking Gwadar to the Iran border has been in the planning stages for over a decade. While Iran has completed its 900 km section, Pakistan has struggled to secure funding for its 80 km portion and now faces a US$ 18 million penalty for violating US sanctions on Tehran [Jamal 2024, 26 March]. In fact, despite a commitment to complete the project by 2024, progress has been hampered by the threat of US sanctions [Zofeen 2024, 19 April].

The late Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi visited Pakistan from 22 to 24 April 2024, to strengthen regional and bilateral relations. During this visit, the two countries signed eight agreements and several Memoranda of Understanding focusing on security, judicial assistance, and establishing a special economic zone [The Nation 2024, 22 April].

5.2. The impact of militancy on Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan and China

Over the past three years, since the Taliban regained power in Afghanistan in 2021, militant violence has surged in Pakistan. The TTP has escalated its attacks on Pakistani security forces and civilians from its bases in Afghanistan [Janjua et al. 2024; Hijazi 2024; Hussain 2023, 21 December; Gul 2024, 11 July]. Islamabad’s repeated calls for Kabul to rein in TTP-led cross-border terrorism have been largely ineffectual. In fact, the Afghan government did intensify its ongoing repression of terrorist groups within its borders, but this had the perhaps unintended result of pushing these groups to seek refuge in Pakistan. In response, Pakistani authorities bolstered security for the CPEC, inaugurated in 2013 as part of the BRI, and continued to pressure the Afghan government to act against the TTP [Adeney & Boni 2024, 24 June]. On its part, Pakistan has been implementing a range of additional measures to address this issue, including negotiations with the TTP, domestic counterterrorism operations, the construction of a border fence, and the expulsion of thousands of Afghan refugees to increase pressure on Kabul [Kugelman 2023, 1 November]. Additionally, in March 2024, Islamabad’s security forces conducted anti-terrorism operations against militants based in Afghanistan following an attack on a military post in North Waziristan [Gul 2024, 18 March; DW 2024, 16 March; Government of Pakistan 2024, 18 March; Pakistan News Express 2024, 18 March; Deccan Herald 2024, 1 April; Rehman & Goldbaum 2024, 10 July]. The new government of Pakistan escalated the issue by bringing it to the attention of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). During the summit held on 4 July 2024, in Astana, Prime Minister Sharif delivered a speech emphasising the urgent need to address the threat of regional terrorism, advocating for a more proactive role on the part of regional countries. He also announced a counterterrorism campaign, Azm-e-Istehkam («Resolve for Stability»), aimed at combating the escalating threat of militancy by seeking support from neighbouring countries [Jamal 2024, 8 July]. This military operation focused on revitalising the implementation of the revised National Action Plan against terrorism, which was originally launched in 2014 to eradicate militancy [Jamal 2024, 25 June]. In December 2024, the Pakistan Air Force conducted airstrikes in Afghanistan’s Paktika province, targeting suspected TTP hideouts. Pakistani officials reported that these precision strikes destroyed insurgent training facilities and neutralized key TTP commanders. However, Afghan authorities condemned the attacks, asserting that 46 civilians, predominantly women and children, were killed. This incident escalated tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan, with the Taliban warning of potential retaliation and emphasizing the intangibility of Afghanistan’s territorial sovereignty [Politico 2024, 25 December].

In June 2024, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif met with China’s leader, Xi Jinping, in Beijing to seek additional support for energy and infrastructure projects. However, no future investments were pledged, as confirmed by the joint statement issued on 8 June 2024 [Cash 2024, 7 June; Zaman 2024, 10 June]. While China has not threatened to suspend its investments, concerns have been raised regarding continuing projects in vulnerable areas [Government of Pakistan 2024, 8 June]. Beijing has expressed disappointment with Islamabad over the CPEC due to unexpected delays and poor execution. Although Chinese companies swiftly completed the first phase, progress in the second phase has stalled since 2019. This slowdown can be attributed to Pakistan’s political instability, epitomised by four different governments since the inception of CPEC, as well as corruption allegations, bureaucratic inefficiencies, natural disasters, the COVID-19 pandemic, and a balance-of-payments crisis from 2017 to 2023.

The volatile security situation also poses a significant challenge [Shoaib 2024, 28 June; Rafi 2024, 16 July; Janjua 2024, 14 August; The Express Tribune 2024, 27 August; Hussain 2024, 28 August; Najam 2024, 29 August; Jawad & Ahmed 2024, 7 October]. Chinese-funded development projects and investments under the BRI have increasingly become targets of militant violence. Since its initiation in 2015, the CPEC has brought thousands of Chinese workers to Pakistan, who have faced escalating attacks from various groups, including the Islamic State, the Pakistani Taliban – often in retaliation for the repression of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang – and the BLA [Hussain 2024, 20 March; Gul 2024, 25 March; Saifi & Gan 2024, 27 March; First Post 2024, 26 March; Haider 2024, 24 April; Kugelman 2024, 26 June].

5.3. Pakistan and the US administration

The US Indo-Pacific strategy serves as the cornerstone of US policy in Asia, first emerging under Donald Trump’s first presidential term and primarily targeting India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan [‘Remarks by President Trump’ 2017, 21 August; Government of the United States 2019, 1 June]. The Biden administration has continued this approach to strengthen relations with most South Asian countries, particularly India, while countering China’s expanding influence in the region [The White House 2022, February]. This shift has led to a distancing of the US from Pakistan, especially following the 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan and the perceived role of Islamabad in the Taliban’s resurgence. As a result, diplomatic ties have cooled, and strategic disagreements have emerged, particularly concerning counterterrorism, regional security, and Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs. In response, Pakistan has increasingly turned to China for military and economic support through initiatives like the CPEC [Mohan 2024, 6 September].

In April 2024, the US imposed sanctions on several entities linked to Pakistan’s ballistic missile program, citing concerns over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction [US Department of State 2024, 19 April]. These sanctions resulted in freezing their assets and interests within the US, requiring reporting to authorities, and extended to any entity that is 50% or more owned by the frozen entities [Ibid.]. This action followed a history of US measures against entities engaged in missile technology transfer to Pakistan, which Washington views as destabilising to regional security, particularly in the context of Pakistan’s rivalry with India. This situation highlights a complex and challenging policy environment, especially in light of recent US sanctions on Pakistan concerning its connections with Iran and related missile proliferation issues. Notably, during President Raisi’s visit to Pakistan, the Pentagon issued warnings of possible sanctions for those engaging in business with Iran [Khan 2024, 22 April; The Nation 2024, 24 April].

In September 2024, the US announced sanctions on Chinese companies involved in supplying missile technology to Pakistan, explicitly targeting the Shaheen-3 and Ababeel missile systems, both capable of carrying nuclear warheads. According to a spokesperson from the Department of State, the Beijing Research Institute of Automation for Machine Building Industry collaborated with Pakistan to acquire equipment for testing rocket motors in these missile systems, with potential involvement in larger missile systems. Similar sanctions had been imposed on other China-based companies in October 2023.

While these sanctions are part of a broader US policy aimed at preventing the proliferation of missile technology, they have further strained diplomatic relations with Pakistan. In Islamabad, the sanctions were perceived as aimed to strengthen Washington’s partnership with India while undermining Pakistan’s defence ties with China and Iran.

During a press briefing, US Department of State Spokesperson Matthew Miller reaffirmed Washington’s commitment to opposing support for Pakistan’s ballistic missile program through sanctions and other measures, as well as to strengthen international non-proliferation efforts [The News 2024, 18 September].

6. Conclusions

The 2024 general elections in Pakistan highlighted a nation grappling with significant political, economic, and security challenges. Allegations of vote rigging and military interference marred the electoral process, effectively sidelining Imran Khan’s PTI. Despite facing restrictions, PTI-affiliated independent candidates emerged as a notable parliamentary force. However, the coalition government formed by the PML-N and the PPP, which allegedly received the military endorsement, struggled to secure public trust due to its association with austerity measures and lacklustre economic performance. Meanwhile, Khan’s enduring popularity highlighted a persistent divide between the political elite and the general populace.

The military’s pervasive influence in political affairs continued to be a defining characteristic of Pakistan’s governance, as evidenced by the military-sponsored marginalisation of Imran Khan and its role in shaping electoral outcomes. Economically, the country remained fragile, heavily reliant on IMF bailouts and stringent austerity measures. Rising inflation, mounting debt burdens, and growing public dissatisfaction further compounded the coalition government’s political vulnerabilities.

Security issues, including the resurgence of the Pakistani Taliban and unrest in Baluchistan, contributed to the nation’s instability. Strained relations with Iran, Afghanistan, and China exacerbated regional tensions, while the United States continued to sideline bilateral relations with Islamabad.

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ISSN 2385-2526

As 2024 unfolded, Sri Lanka stood at a crossroad. While economic stabilization efforts showed some progress with the last months showing deflation for the first time since 1961. The challenges of unemployment, debt restructuring and social impact remained pressing concerns. Politically, Sri Lanka witnessed a historic shift in its leadership reflecting the public desire for change in governance. On the geopolitical front, Sri Lanka’s ability to navigate the complex web of strategic interests balancing global and regional powers was tested.

Keywords – Elections; system change; democratization; foreign policy; governance.

1. Introduction

As Sri Lanka entered 2024, the country found itself at a pivotal crossroads, grappling with the lingering economic repercussions of its 2022 financial crisis, ongoing political upheavals, and mounting geopolitical pressures in the Indian Ocean region. The economic downturn of 2022, which led to Sri Lanka’s first-ever sovereign default, continued to shape the government’s policy trajectory. Meanwhile, the elections held in September and November 2024 reflected an increasing public demand for reforms, accountability, and decentralization.

Politically, 2024 marked a historic shift in Sri Lanka’s leadership. The presidential election, held on September 21, ushered Anura Kumara Dissanayake into office as the new president. His party, the National People’s Power (NPP) – a centre-left coalition – secured a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections on November 14, 2024, forming the new government. The defeat of long-entrenched political elites signalled a public rejection of traditional governance models, underscoring widespread calls for greater accountability and transparency. This electoral outcome reflected the continuation of public demands, voiced during the 2022 crisis, for deeper structural reforms, anti-corruption initiatives, and enhanced social welfare policies.

Economically, Sri Lanka’s recovery remained precarious. Up until his defeat in the September elections, President Ranil Wickremesinghe had steered the country’s recovery efforts under the guidance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other key bilateral creditors. However, following his ousting, President Dissanayake and his administration chose to continue the IMF reform agenda without renegotiating its terms and conditions—despite campaign rhetoric suggesting otherwise [Bandara 2024, 7 March; France 24 2024, 7 March]. Given the NPP’s history as a centre-left alliance with Marxist-Leninist roots, the new government is likely to face significant challenges in balancing its populist economic promises with the structural reforms demanded by international financial institutions.

On the geopolitical front, Sri Lanka continued to navigate a complex and shifting landscape, balancing the strategic interests of regional and global powers. The year tested Colombo’s ability to maintain a delicate equilibrium between influential actors, particularly India and China, while accommodating the growing strategic engagement of the United States and its allies.

Against this backdrop, this article examines the interplay between Sri Lanka’s domestic political dynamics, economic reforms, and foreign policy strategies as the country responds to both internal challenges and external pressures. Through a multidimensional analysis, the article aims to offer a comprehensive overview of Sri Lanka’s political and economic landscape in 2024, while assessing the strategic implications of its foreign policy choices. Specifically, it explores how domestic political developments and economic reforms have shaped Sri Lanka’s foreign policy orientation and regional alliances. It will analyse key political reforms, shifts in party dynamics, and leadership changes that unfolded in 2024, evaluating their impact on governance structures and democratic processes. The article will also highlight major economic policies and recovery efforts under the Wickremesinghe administration and assess how these policies influenced the daily lives of citizens – ultimately contributing to the political transition. Finally, it will evaluate the new government’s foreign policy initiatives, with particular focus on evolving relations with key players including India, China, and the United States.

2. Political Developments in 2024

The 2024 elections marked a further weakening of Sri Lanka’s established political parties, accelerating the erosion of liberal democratic institutions and reinforcing the rise of populist politics in the country’s post-war context [Peiris 2022]. This trend in the political party system can be traced back to 2018, when the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) fractured, leading to the formation of a new political party under the leadership of Mahinda Rajapaksa [Uyangoda 2018]. This development effectively ended the decades-long dominance of the UNP-SLFP-led two-party system that had persisted since independence. The newly formed Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) initially enjoyed resounding electoral victories, but the economic crisis of 2022, coupled with widespread public demands for political overhaul, delivered a severe blow to the prevailing political order [Ruwanpura & Saleem 2025].

Sri Lanka’s democratic institutions have been steadily eroded by political interference and corruption, fostering deep public distrust. A survey conducted in January 2024 by the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), involving 1,350 participants, revealed increasing disillusionment with parliament and political parties – a trend evident since 2011. Notably, while trust in these institutions waned, authoritarian rule and confidence in the military and judiciary remained comparatively higher [CPA 2024]. Successive governments’ efforts to consolidate power for self-serving purposes have particularly delegitimized the executive and legislative branches.

The anti-establishment sentiment that fuelled the 2022 mass street protests, known as the Aragalaya, was successfully harnessed by the National People’s Power (NPP) to secure political dominance in 2024. Positioned as an outsider to the mainstream political landscape, the NPP – led primarily by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP – capitalized on this discontent. Historically, the JVP had never garnered more than 5% of votes in national elections. Yet in 2024, the NPP achieved unprecedented victories in both presidential and parliamentary elections, securing a supermajority with 159 parliamentary seats. Alongside tapping into anti-establishment sentiment, the NPP’s campaign featured populist promises, including increasing public sector salaries and reducing taxes [Devapriya 2025].

However, the surge in populist and anti-establishment sentiment represented by the NPP is not without precedent. Similar themes were evident during the 2015 elections, which centred on anti-corruption and good governance, as well as the 2019 elections, which emphasized restoring national security and a disciplined, effective political system [Dassanayake & Gamage 2024]. The election of President Gotabhaya Rajapaksa in 2019, by an overwhelming majority, highlighted the continuing appeal of populist politics in Sri Lanka and raised questions regarding the role and resilience of liberal democratic institutions [Köpke 2022].

The 2019 elections also showcased the increasing influence of professional associations, such as Viyathmaga, in legitimizing fragmented political entities [Dissanayake 2020]. This trend is mirrored in the composition of the current NPP government, which brings together a coalition of civil society groups, trade unions, and the JVP. Historically marginalized due to its association with communist insurgencies in the 1970s and 1980s, the JVP has gained newfound legitimacy through the NPP’s broader, more inclusive appeal.

With an overwhelming legislative mandate, public expectations for the NPP government are exceptionally high. However, balancing these expectations while implementing necessary structural reforms—without succumbing to populist pressures—remains a significant challenge. Despite the government’s strong parliamentary majority and capacity to enact progressive political reforms, economic constraints severely limit its policy options [Perera 2023]. The IMF program initiated in 2023 requires politically costly reforms, which had previously sparked widespread opposition during the Wickremesinghe administration. While the new government possesses the mandate to carry out such reforms, clear public communication regarding these constraints has, thus far, been largely absent

2.1. Creating a National Space

While the NPP’s presidential candidate experienced some setbacks in minority-dominated regions such as the North, East, and hill country, the party’s strong overall performance in the 2024 parliamentary elections signalled noteworthy gains even in these traditionally pro-UNP/SJB (as a national political party option) areas. A particularly historic achievement was the NPP’s success in securing six seats in Jaffna – a first for a ‘national party.’ This breakthrough was the result of the NPP’s deliberate outreach efforts and its anti-corruption narrative, which resonated not only with local voters but also among diaspora communities [Gamage & Kaur 2025]. The fragmentation of traditional ethnic coalitions, particularly the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), further contributed to this outcome.

The general elections of 2024 underscored that voter disillusionment with established political parties extended to ethnic minority communities as well [Wedagedara and Jayasinghe, 2024]. While the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK – the main political party within the TNA – managed to perform relatively well in the Eastern district of Batticaloa, other minority parties struggled. Specifically, the principal Muslim political parties, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and the All Ceylon Muslim Congress (ACMC), suffered notable electoral losses [Uyangoda 2024].

A significant factor behind the NPP’s appeal among minority communities was the relative decline of majoritarian nationalist rhetoric (Srinivasan, 2024). The anti-establishment stance of the Aragalaya protests momentarily weakened the exclusionary Sinhala Buddhist nationalism that had gained prominence in the post-war period. However, the global resurgence of right-wing conservatism – exemplified by the re-election of Donald Trump – has rekindled nationalist discourse both online and in mainstream media. This ideological space is increasingly being occupied by left-nationalist groups such as the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), led by the Rajapaksa family, and the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP), which includes members formerly aligned with the Rajapaksa political camp. These groups present a potential challenge to the NPP government.

Although public support for the NPP remains strong (Verité Research, 2025), any failure to deliver on its ambitious campaign promises could create opportunities for nationalist factions to re-emerge as viable political alternatives.

2.2. Managing Populist Politics with Pragmatism

The new government has quickly encountered significant challenges in reconciling its populist campaign promises with fiscal realities. While it pledged to lower fuel prices, raise public sector salaries, and increase tax thresholds, delivery on these promises has so far been partial. Fuel prices were slightly reduced, and subsidies for farmers and fishermen were maintained – both measures previously approved by the outgoing administration [EconomyNext, 2024a]. Additionally, the government authorized a 2,000 km rural road renovation project in the Northern and Eastern provinces. However, the inaugural budget for February 2025 suggests that capital expenditure will remain constrained (PublicFinance.lk, 2025).

Ideologically, the NPP government faces a delicate balancing act between the IMF-driven liberal economic policies it has inherited and the expectations of its left-leaning base [Skanthakumar, 2024; Gamage & Dassanayake, 2025]. The government’s 2025 budget adheres to fiscal discipline measures mandated by the IMF and enshrined in the Public Finance Management Act, notably aiming for a primary budget surplus of 2.5% of GDP. Despite IMF-imposed restrictions on state sector expansion, the government approved the recruitment of 7,500 new public employees and increased salaries for state sector workers [Ada Derana, 2025; Newswire, 2025]. Key budget allocations also included an LKR 20 billion bailout for SriLankan Airlines – a loss-making state-owned enterprise – and a 3% increase in military expenditure, bringing it to Rs. 442 billion [PublicFinance.lk, 2025]. Welfare spending rose to Rs. 232.5 billion, reflecting the government’s inclusion-focused agenda and its commitment to enhancing social welfare, particularly in health and education sectors. However, the increase, while symbolically significant, is modest in relative terms.

Central to the NPP’s electoral success was its focus on anti-corruption, accountability, and recovering stolen state assets; elements of kleptocracy that it characterized the past governments to be. Public support was driven by widespread perceptions that nepotism and elite patronage networks played a central role in precipitating the 2022 crisis. Since taking office, the government has prioritized anti-corruption efforts, institutional efficiency, and accountability, positioning itself as a “government of the people”—committed to austerity and simplicity, in sharp contrast to the mismanagement and excesses of prior administrations. Key actions have included publicized arrests of and confiscation of illegally acquired assets owned by politicians from previous governments, demands for the eviction of former President Mahinda Rajapaksa from his official residence, and the establishment of an Independent Prosecutor’s Office – a significant institutional reform aimed at enhancing transparency and accountability [EconomyNext, 2025; Samaraweera, 2025]. Public procurement reforms have also been proposed to prevent misuse of state resources [EconomyNext, 2024b]. Nevertheless, emerging critiques point to a lack of high-profile corruption prosecutions, raising questions about the effectiveness of these initiatives and the limits of political rhetoric.

The NPP has further promised substantial constitutional reforms during, including the abolition of the Executive Presidency, widely criticized for its centralization of power and its role in the country’s political and economic crises. While the President has announced plans to introduce a new constitution within three years, public consultations are yet to commence.

Economically, the NPP government has largely maintained continuity with the policies of the previous administration, retaining key officials in influential decision-making roles, such as the Central Bank Governor and the Secretary to the Ministry of Finance. This suggests a deliberate effort to sustain the IMF program and prior economic reforms. In line with its clean governance platform, the NPP also pledged to ensure meritocratic appointments. Critics have observed, however, appointments where there is conflict of interest, and of political loyalists that have been appointed to various positions where there are concerns that these moves might contribute to bureaucratic resistance by disrupting established institutional hierarchies and traditions [Bandara, 2025].

2.3. Opposition Political Parties and the Election Aftermath

The performance of opposition political camps in the 2024 parliamentary elections reflected the growing delegitimization of the major political parties (or factions) that had previously governed Sri Lanka. The Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) and the New Democratic Front (NDF)—informally led by former President Ranil Wickremesinghe and comprising political actors from both the SLPP and UNP – were increasingly unpopular in the lead-up to the elections. Both were widely viewed as part of the entrenched ‘old political guard’ [Uyangoda and Peiris, 2024]. This prevailing anti-establishment sentiment, combined with infighting between the two camps, contributed significantly to their defeat. The SJB, the main opposition party, particularly struggled to differentiate itself ideologically. Despite its leader’s pro-poor political rhetoric, it found itself squeezed between the NPP’s centre-left stance and the NDF’s centre-right, liberal positioning, making it difficult to present a distinct political alternative.

Following the elections, speculation has grown over a potential alliance between the SJB and UNP to form a liberal front to counterbalance the NPP, especially in light of upcoming local government elections in May 2025. However, such a coalition has not been forthcoming, largely due to personal rivalries of the two parties’ leaders and, to some extent, evolving political and ideological differences among the two parties.

Beyond these two major opposition blocs, several smaller parties also underperformed but remain noteworthy due to their potential for future mobilization. Chief among these is the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), now led by Namal Rajapaksa, son of former President Mahinda Rajapaksa. Despite being the governing party in the 2020 elections, the SLPP secured only three seats in 2024. While now diminished, the SLPP still embodies a ‘left’ nationalist position that has historically resonated with the Sinhala majority. In parallel, Dilith Jayaweera’s Mawbima Janatha Pakshaya (MJP) – which holds one parliamentary seat – also seeks to lead the nationalist discourse. Both parties are attempting to capitalize on the global resurgence of right-wing and nationalist politics, seen prominently in the US and Europe, to regain relevance.

The recent spike in drug-related violence in Sri Lanka has also provided an opportunity for certain opposition groups, particularly those aligned with the Rajapaksa camp, to reignite a national security discourse. Leveraging this issue, they have sought to undermine the credibility of the current government. This strategy has reignited public anxieties surrounding safety and law enforcement, casting some doubt on the NPP’s capacity to maintain order [Jayawardena, 2025]. Addressing drug usage and related violence was one of the NPP’s key campaign promises, but the increase in incidents has allowed opposition actors to question its effectiveness and commitment. This mirrors political tactics used after the 2019 Easter bombings, when similar fears over national security were instrumental in bringing Gotabaya Rajapaksa to power. The current discourse not only exploits public fears but also aims to reshape the political narrative by portraying the NPP leadership as weak or ineffectual in safeguarding the nation.

With local government elections scheduled for the first half of 2025, and following some setbacks in cooperative-level elections, the NPP faces growing pressure to deliver on its campaign promises in order to sustain its post-election momentum. Particularly in light of the structural reforms initiated by former President Ranil Wickremesinghe under the IMF program, the government’s ability to meet public expectations is crucial. The economic hardships endured since 2022 have heightened these expectations, making tangible progress essential for extending the NPP’s honeymoon period.

2.4. Social Challenges and Government’s Response

The economic crisis of 2022 had a devastating impact on living standards in Sri Lanka, leading to a sharp and sustained rise in poverty. According to the World Bank, over 6 million people (30% of the population) were pushed below the poverty line by the end of 2022. By 2023, poverty levels remained alarmingly high at 25.9%, compared to 11% in 2019, and are projected to stay above 22% until at least 2026 [Gunadasa, 2024; World Bank Group, 2024]. Household coping mechanisms, such as cutting spending on health, education, and nutrition, further exacerbated vulnerabilities [Skanthakumar, 2024]. Women, in particular, bore the brunt of the crisis, as reflected in the surge in female emigration for domestic labour. In 2022, out of over 311,000 registered migrant workers, more than 124,000 (40%) were women [Kotalawela, 2024].

The crisis also deepened multidimensional poverty, affecting sectors like education, healthcare, food security, and basic infrastructure [Athukorala, 2024; UNDP, 2023]. Regional disparities widened, disproportionately impacting rural and estate sector communities [Department of Census and Statistics, n.d.]. As of December 2024, the National Poverty Line stood at LKR 16,619 (US$ 56.94), with significant variation between urban and rural areas. The rural roots of the crisis were evident during the farmers’ protests in the second half of 2021, following the government’s decision to ban chemical fertilisers. This shift to organic fertilisers significantly worsened the economic crisis by causing a 20% drop in rice production within six months and an 18% decline in tea production which is the country’s main agricultural export (Torrella, 2022).

In response to the increasing economic hardships, the government introduced safety net programs, most notably Aswesuma, launched post-crisis to reform poverty alleviation mechanisms and address the inefficiencies of the long-standing Samurdhi program [Wanigasinghe, 2023]. However, while Aswesuma provided some financial relief, its scope was limited, and implementation challenges hampered its effectiveness. Critics contend that Aswesuma failed to tackle structural inequalities in employment, education, and healthcare, and that the financial assistance offered was inadequate, especially amid persistent inflation.

The NPP government has proposed replacing Aswesuma with the Prajashakthi program, aiming for a more targeted and participatory approach. Key features include using updated indicators like electricity consumption to identify beneficiaries, enhancing community involvement, and increasing the minimum cash grant to Rs. 10,000 per family. The program also seeks to create pathways for long-term independence and ensure fiscal sustainability through digital integration [Hurulle, 2024].

Food insecurity remains a significant concern, closely linked to poverty. The 2024 Global Hunger Index ranked Sri Lanka 56th out of 127 countries, with a score of 11.3, indicating a moderate level of hunger. According to the Index, 4.1% of the population is undernourished, 12.6% of children under five are stunted, and 10.8% are wasted [Concern Worldwide and Welthungerhilfe, 2024].

Despite some improvements in key economic indicators, labour market participation and overall social well-being remain pressing challenges. Although unemployment dropped to 4.5% in the first quarter of 2024, down from the same period in 2023 [Department of Census and Statistics, 2024], labour force participation also declined – from 49.9% in early 2023 to 47.1% in early 2024 [World Bank Group, 2024]. Persistently high unemployment, coupled with increased poverty, contributed to falling household incomes, exacerbating food insecurity and reflecting in Sri Lanka’s declining Hunger Index ranking [Vipulaguna et al., 2025].

These indicators underscore the long-term effects of the 2022 economic crisis and structural dismantling of the welfare system since the 1980s, and highlight the urgent need for comprehensive social policies that move beyond short-term relief to address underlying structural issues—particularly in employment, education, and healthcare—to ensure sustainable recovery and inclusive growth.

3. Economic Landscape and Key Policy Changes

Sri Lanka’s economic landscape in 2024 presented a mixed picture, marked by signs of recovery alongside persistent challenges. The country’s trajectory was shaped by policy reforms and global economic conditions. Although key macroeconomic indicators showed stabilization, deep-seated structural weaknesses and socio-economic disparities persisted. Fiscal stability and debt restructuring were top government priorities, yet economic growth remained fragile and unevenly distributed, with high debt levels, fiscal constraints, and the need for structural reforms still posing significant hurdles.

The Central Bank of Sri Lanka introduced major policy measures aimed at enhancing monetary stability, controlling inflation, and supporting economic recovery. These included fiscal consolidation, revenue mobilization, and social safety net programs. Despite these efforts, concerns remained over Sri Lanka’s reliance on remittances and tourism rather than diversifying into high-value sectors.

In 2024, Sri Lanka’s economy showed encouraging growth. The first quarter recorded a 5% expansion, reversing a -10.7% contraction in the same period of 2023 [Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2024a]. Growth continued, reaching 5.5% by the third quarter, up from 1.6% in 2023 [Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2024b], largely driven by improved domestic economic activities.

Tourism and worker remittances were key contributors to the external account. As of December 2024, tourist earnings stood at US$ 3,169 million and workers’ remittances at US$ 6,675 million [Economic Research Department, 2025]. Additionally, non-tourism services contributed US$ 304 million by November 2024 [Economic Research Department, 2024a]. These positive developments, bolstered by IMF support, helped stabilize foreign exchange reserves and the exchange rate.

3.1. Debt Restructuring and Fiscal Reforms

A milestone achievement was the completion of Sri Lanka’s foreign currency debt restructuring by the end of 2024. The process involved exchanging defaulted bonds for new bonds, providing significant debt relief. On June 26, 2024, Sri Lanka reached a final Debt Treatment Agreement with the Official Creditor Committee and the Exim Bank of China [Ministry of Finance, Economic Stabilization and National Policies, 2024]. By December, Colombo finalized restructuring talks with investors holding International Sovereign Bonds (ISBs) worth US$ 12.33 billion, offering them new bonds in exchange [Daily Mirror, 2024]. This facilitated Sri Lanka’s emergence from default and an upgrade in its sovereign credit ratings [Fitch Ratings, 2024].

The IMF played a pivotal role, guiding the debt restructuring strategy through its Extended Fund Facility (EFF). Compliance with the EFF required strict fiscal consolidation, debt sustainability targets, and structural reforms. However, the social cost was high. Austerity measures disproportionately impacted lower-income households.

One of the more controversial policies was the revised Value Added Tax (VAT), which aimed to boost revenue but had adverse social effects. The VAT rate was increased from 15% to 18%, and exemptions were removed on 97 items, including essentials like gas and stationery [Ada Derana, 2023]. Consequently, lower-income households now pay about 10% of their income in taxes, compared to 6% under the previous system [Jayawardena, 2024].

To control spending, the government rationalized public sector employment, reviewed subsidies, and prioritized essential expenditures—all measures heavily influenced by IMF recommendations. Though these policies improved fiscal balance and market confidence, the burden fell unequally on vulnerable populations.

Initially, the Central Bank maintained a tight monetary stance with high interest rates, later easing gradually to support growth [The World Bank Group, 2024]. This policy shift, aligned with IMF advice, balanced inflation control and economic recovery, following a data-driven approach.

Inflation declined steadily, eventually turning into deflation between September and December 2024 – the first time since 1961 [The Hindu, 2024]. Factors such as currency appreciation, improved supply conditions, and reduced administered prices contributed to this trend [Economic Research Department, 2024b; The World Bank Group, 2024]. IMF technical assistance strengthened Sri Lanka’s inflation-targeting framework, ensuring greater transparency in monetary policy decisions.

However, deflation posed risks, potentially discouraging consumption and business profitability. While currency appreciation lowered import costs, it also risked slowing economic momentum [Baig, 2003; Slater, 2020; Thesing, 2023].

Completing the debt restructuring and securing better credit ratings improved investor sentiment. Despite concerns over political transitions, the NPP government’s commitment to continuing economic reforms and the IMF program boosted confidence. By late 2024, Sri Lanka’s Business Confidence Index rose to 118 points, surpassing the neutral threshold [Statistics Department, 2024].

Nevertheless, investments remained concentrated in sectors like tourism, real estate, and textiles [ICC Construct, 2023; International Trade Administration, 2024; Port City Colombo, 2024; US Department of State, n.d.], limiting diversification and job creation.

Yet, Sri Lanka holds significant untapped potential. According to the World Bank, the country’s export potential is estimated at US$ 10 billion annually, with the capacity to create 142,500 new jobs. Diversifying exports beyond traditional products like tea and apparel and integrating deeper into global value chains could bolster resilience. Additionally, leveraging Sri Lanka’s strategic location as a regional logistics and trade hub presents promising opportunities.

Expanding FDI in manufacturing, services, and agriculture also could drive long-term growth. Achieving this, however, requires stronger governance, consistent policy-making, and greater investment in research, technology, and human capital.

4. Interplay between Domestic Factors and Foreign Policy

Domestic dynamics have consistently played a pivotal role in shaping Sri Lanka’s foreign policy, guiding its diplomatic engagements and strategic choices [Eudon, 2024]. In 2024, Sri Lanka navigated a complex international landscape, balancing longstanding alliances with emerging global challenges. The aftershocks of the 2022 economic crisis prioritized economic recovery, driving Colombo to seek financial stability and investment opportunities. Simultaneously, Sri Lanka’s strategic location in the Indian Ocean elevated its importance amid intensifying great power competition.

The ambitions of regional powers like India and China, coupled with external disruptions – such as the global pandemic, Russia-Ukraine war, Israel-Palestine conflict, and global recession – have heightened Sri Lanka’s vulnerability to external pressures [Padmakumara, 2023; Singh, 2023; TASS, 2024]. Notably, in 2024, reports surfaced of ex-military personnel joining both Russian and Ukrainian forces as mercenaries, testing Colombo’s diplomatic dexterity as it sought to balance relations with Moscow while addressing concerns from other international actors over the Ukraine conflict [Agence France-Presse, 2024; Jayasinghe, 2024; Jayathilleka, 2024; Sapkota, 2024]. Additionally, escalating tensions in Gaza triggered security concerns in Sri Lanka, particularly regarding potential threats to Israeli tourists and Israeli-linked interests [Ellis-Petersen & Wipulasena, 2024; Theverajah, 2025]. Despite these pressures, Sri Lanka has continued to assert a degree of strategic autonomy, carefully balancing external influences while preserving core diplomatic relationships [Kugelman, 2024].

4.1. Balancing India and China

In 2024, Sri Lanka deepened its engagement with India and the West, carefully navigating its economic vulnerabilities and strategic imperatives. Balancing ties with India and China, however, remained central to Colombo’s foreign policy, with active engagement from both actors shaping its decisions.

India maintained a vital role as a key partner, with robust economic and political cooperation. New Delhi’s timely assistance during the 2022 economic crisis – amounting to US$ 4 billion in financing – reshaped its public image in Sri Lanka and helped reaffirm its influence amid China’s growing footprint. High-level diplomatic visits underscored these strengthened ties. Indian External Affairs Minister visits in June and October 2024, along with National Security Advisor Ajit Doval’s August visit for the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) founding documents, highlighted deepening cooperation. In reciprocation, former President Ranil Wickremesinghe visited India in June 2024 for Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s swearing-in ceremony. Prime Minister Modi is scheduled to visit Sri Lanka in April 2024.

Bilateral initiatives expanded to infrastructure and financial connectivity. In February 2024, Sri Lanka and India launched Phase IV of the Indian Housing Project, “Bharat-Lanka,” constructing 10,000 homes for plantation workers. The same month, India’s Unified Payment Interface (UPI) system was introduced in Sri Lanka, boosting financial integration (Media Centre, 2024). Further cooperation spanned energy and port development, including the renovation of Kankesanthurai Port with an Indian grant of USD 61.5 million and a trilateral energy pipeline agreement with India and the UAE signed in December 2024 [Asian News International, 2024; The Economic Times, 2024].

Conversely, China maintained a lower profile following Sri Lanka’s economic crisis but remained crucial to the country’s recovery. High-level visits, such as former Prime Minister Dinesh Gunawardena’s March 2024 trip to China – meeting President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Qiang, and Zhao Leji – reinforced economic and diplomatic ties. President Xi’s congratulatory message to President Anura Kumara Dissanayake in September further highlighted enduring relations. A significant milestone was the successful debt restructuring agreement with China’s Export-Import Bank and China Development Bank, easing Sri Lanka’s financial burden and stabilizing ties.

China also demonstrated its continued engagement through major projects and defence diplomacy. Discussions advanced on the proposed US$ 3.7 billion Sinopec oil refinery, a key energy initiative. On the humanitarian front, China’s hospital ship “Peace Ark” visited Colombo in December 2024, delivering medical aid. China’s engagement in Sri Lanka is also seen to move towards smaller-scale, community-based projects.

However, Colombo’s balancing act has been tested by maritime issues. In January 2024, Sri Lanka imposed a one-year moratorium on foreign research vessels, driven by regional security concerns – particularly India’s apprehensions regarding dual-use vessels like China’s Xiang Yang Hong 3 [Behera, 2025; Moorthy, 2024a, 2024b]. As the moratorium neared expiration in December 2024, the newly elected government faced the critical decision of whether to extend, lift, or revise port access protocols – complicated by Sri Lanka’s ties to both India and China.

Similarly, disputes arose over resource competition. India’s January 2024 application to the International Seabed Authority (ISA) to explore cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts in the Afanasy Nikitin Seamount clashed with Sri Lanka’s claim to the area under its proposed extended continental shelf (Attanayake, 2024). While Sri Lanka eventually allowed the moratorium on research vessels to lapse, the incident highlighted its delicate diplomatic tightrope between fostering partnerships and safeguarding sovereignty. The unresolved cobalt dispute further underscored the maritime dimension of India-China competition and Sri Lanka’s strategic dilemmas.

4.2. Relations with the West

Throughout 2024, Sri Lanka actively strengthened ties with Western nations, focusing on security, economic stabilization, and governance reforms. Relations with the United States notably advanced, highlighted by the Fifth US-Sri Lanka Partnership Dialogue in Washington D.C. [July 2024], which reaffirmed commitments to regional security, democratic governance, and economic cooperation. Military collaboration expanded via the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise in April 2024, enhancing maritime coordination.

Governance and anti-corruption remained core elements of US engagement. In December 2024, Washington imposed sanctions on individuals implicated in corruption, including a former SriLankan Airlines CEO, emphasizing accountability [Agence France Presse, 2024; Reuters, 2024; Tamil Guardian, 2024]. Earlier, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Verma’s February visit to Colombo reinforced US support for Sri Lanka’s economic recovery and Indo-Pacific maritime stability (U.S. Embassy Colombo, 2024). The return of the Peace Corps after 26 years also marked a significant boost to people-to-people ties.

Sri Lanka maintained active diplomatic engagement with other Western partners. In September 2024, Foreign Secretary Aruni Wijewardane visited London to discuss economic stabilization and follow-up on Sri Lanka-UK Strategic Dialogue initiatives, signalling continued UK support.

Financial ties with international institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF), remained pivotal. The IMF’s July-August 2024 mission, led by Peter Breuer, reviewed Sri Lanka’s macroeconomic progress under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF), underscoring the centrality of multilateral engagement to Sri Lanka’s financial strategy.

Sri Lanka benefits from the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) scheme, which grants duty-free access to the EU market for 66% of its tariff lines. Sri Lanka’s exports to the EU are value at around US$ 1.23 billion. Sri Lanka’s human rights records, over alleged human rights violations during the civil war and since, including legislation such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act, continue to be potential issues which could derail this access. This occurs in a context where issues over the differential treatment of Israeli and Russian aggression within the West and international organizations, and President Trump’s decision to abruptly terminate USAID program and impose 44% ‘reciprocal tariffs’ on Sri Lanka, have led to questions over the legitimacy of Western political engagement and human rights discourse in Sri Lanka.

4.3. Foreign Policy Direction of the NPP Government

Sri Lanka’s 2024 political shift under President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and the National People’s Power (NPP) prompted speculation about the new administration’s foreign policy direction. Given the JVP’s historical criticism of foreign influence and the lack of a major foreign policy focus during the election campaign, uncertainties surrounded its approach.

Contrary to expectations, the NPP government quickly reaffirmed its commitment to a neutral, non-aligned foreign policy, seeking to balance ties with major global and regional powers [Muthukutti, 2024a; Vidanage, 2024]. President Dissanayake’s early visits to India and China reflected this strategy. His first official visit to India adhered to longstanding tradition, reaffirming Sri Lanka’s strategic relationship with New Delhi. His subsequent January 2025 visit to China underscored Colombo’s intent to maintain equilibrium between the two regional giants.

Historically, the JVP criticized India’s growing influence, particularly in infrastructure projects like the East Container Terminal and Sampur Project, warning of potential sovereignty erosion. However, following the 2022 crisis, the NPP has adopted a pragmatic approach. Dissanayake’s February 2024 visit to India signalled a shift toward cooperation, and India’s acceptance of the new government was evident [Muthukutti, 2024b; Ratnayake, 2024]. The joint statement following Dissanayake’s December 2024 visit outlined a comprehensive strategic partnership, spanning economic, security, and cultural dimensions – though concerns linger regarding overdependence, especially in energy, digital infrastructure, and security sectors. The President had pledged to revoke the US$ 442 million Adani wind power project in Sri Lanka during election campaigns; in February 2025, the Adani Group formally announced its decision to leave the project citing reasons of financial unviability. In April 2025, the Indian PM made his first official visit to Sri Lanka and Sri Lanka subsequently completed a bilateral debt restructuring of US $1.4 billion, which included converting hundred million dollars of loans into grants and India lowering the interest rates on loans extended to Sri Lanka. Several memoranda of understanding (MoU) were signed, including ones on the implementation of HVDC interconnection for the import/export of power and cooperation in the development of Trincomalee as an energy hub. The latter project may intensify competition between India and China, as China’s state energy company Sinopec secured a deal to construct a US $3.2 billion oil refinery in Sri Lanka’s southern Hambantota port. A bilateral defence pact was also signed, indicating deepening strategic relations.

Similarly, the JVP had voiced strong opposition to projects perceived as compromising transparency and sovereignty, such as the Colombo Port City Economic Commission Bill, fearing it could effectively create a “Chinese province” in Sri Lanka. However, recent developments suggest a softening stance. President Dissanayake’s visit to Beijing emphasized “win-win cooperation” and, notably, included Sri Lanka’s explicit endorsement of the One China policy – hinting at a deeper strategic alignment. This raises questions about potential overdependence on China.

The maritime cooperation agreement signed with China further complicates Sri Lanka’s balancing act, addressing maritime security, environmental protection, and personnel training. While intended to diversify partnerships, it also reignites concerns over how Sri Lanka will navigate India’s sensitivities regarding Chinese naval access to its ports [Pethiyagoda, 2025].

5. Conclusion

Sri Lanka’s political, economic, and foreign policy trajectory in 2024 reflects a period of significant transformation, shaped by both emerging opportunities and persistent challenges. The electoral victory of the NPP marked a decisive departure from the traditional political establishment, propelled by widespread public discontent with entrenched governance failures and economic mismanagement. However, the NPP’s capacity to translate its anti-corruption platform and reformist rhetoric into concrete policy outcomes remains to be fully tested. While initial measures toward promoting accountability have been introduced, deeper structural reforms—particularly in the constitutional and institutional spheres—face delays and political complexities. The weakening of rival parties has consolidated the NPP’s political dominance, but the potential resurgence of nationalist could pose significant challenges to its long-term hold on power.

Economically, Sri Lanka’s trajectory has been characterized by a cautious but fragile recovery under the framework of IMF-led structural adjustments. Progress in debt restructuring, fiscal reforms, and monetary stabilization has helped restore a measure of confidence in the economy. However, these gains have come at a social cost. Vulnerable communities continue to bear the brunt of austerity measures, while inflation, unemployment, and income disparities persist [Sultana, 2024]. The continued reliance on remittances and tourism underscores the urgency for economic diversification and investment in high-value sectors. For Sri Lanka to achieve sustainable growth, the government must prioritize inclusive development strategies, enhance the ease of doing business, and invest in sectors that foster innovation and long-term economic resilience.

On the foreign policy front, Sri Lanka has adeptly manoeuvred a complex geopolitical environment, balancing economic dependencies with an emphasis on strategic autonomy. Relations with India, China, and Western powers reflect Colombo’s pragmatic approach to securing financial assistance, investment, and security cooperation while attempting to safeguard national sovereignty. India’s role as a key economic and security partner has grown, while China remains a critical player in Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring and infrastructure projects. Engagement with Western powers has centred on governance, economic stabilization, and broader Indo-Pacific strategic considerations. However, Sri Lanka’s ability to maintain an independent foreign policy amidst intensifying global rivalries will be a defining factor in its regional positioning and long-term stability.

Looking ahead, Sri Lanka’s future trajectory hinges on its ability to consolidate democratic governance, implement meaningful economic reforms, and navigate an evolving geopolitical order. The NPP’s tenure will be judged by its capacity to deliver tangible political and economic outcomes, particularly in addressing public expectations for systemic change. Failure to do so may trigger renewed political instability or realignments in the coming years. Likewise, sustaining economic recovery will require balancing fiscal discipline with social equity, fostering investor confidence, and promoting strategic investment in growth sectors. The effectiveness of the NPP government’s reforms, the durability of economic recovery, and the resilience of Sri Lanka’s diplomatic engagements will together determine its trajectory in the years ahead.

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India’s politicians spend almost half of 2024 focused on the general election held over seven weeks in April, May and June. But once the results were announced, energy returned to India’s foreign policy, and the re-elected Modi government moved to deal with a series of pressing issues. This article discusses four of these challenges: stabilising India’s relationship with China; working with Russia; developing the strategic partnership with the United States; and sustaining influence in a dynamic neighbourhood. It argues that over the year New Delhi made some in-roads with each but struggled to make substantive progress with any of them. India struck a deal to disengage forces on part of the contested frontier with China, but broader de-escalation was not achieved. India re-engaged Moscow, but at the cost of adding a further irritant into a relationship with the US under growing scrutiny by the Hindu Right. And India sought to maintain and build influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, but suffered significant setbacks, notably in Bangladesh.

keywords – India; Indian foreign policy; China; Russia; United States; South Asia.

1. Introduction

After a frenetic year of diplomacy in 2023, India’s attention returned to domestic issues in 2024. With a general election looming and the first of seven rounds of voting scheduled to start in mid-April, campaigning began early. Growth, jobs, welfare, and identity politics were the main topics of discussion. International relations were barely mentioned, aside from claims by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his allies that after ten years of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) rule, India was more highly respected in the world than ever before [Kaushik 2024, 12 April]. Throughout this period, Modi spent most of his time electioneering, turning only occasionally to foreign affairs. In January, for example, he spent no fewer than 11 days visiting Ram temples around India, before finally arriving in Ayodhya to inaugurate a controversial mandir built on a site of a mosque demolished by Hindu activists in 1992 [Sharma and Rajesh 2024, 23 January]. His only significant foreign engagement that month was a meeting with French President Emmanual Macron, whom he hosted in New Delhi as the Republic Day guest of honour [de Lage 2024, 9 January]. During the following four months, Modi welcomed just one more visitor – the Greek prime minister – and left the country only twice: once in February for a trip to the United Arab Emirates and Qatar and then in March to Bhutan. This pattern of behaviour – intense concern for domestic politics and little involvement in international relations – persisted until the election results were announced on 4 June.

Yet in the background, several complex foreign policy challenges loomed. The biggest was finding an acceptable modus vivendi with China. In 2024, relations with Beijing remained tense and testy, after years of armed confrontation on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the wake of the bloody Galwan clash in June 2020 [see Gokhale 2021]. Barely mentioned in election manifestos, this issue nonetheless overshadowed the campaign [Krishnan & Jacob 2024, 24 May]. Three other challenges were less pressing but still tricky to manage. One was calibrating ties with Moscow, without alienating others angered by Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine [Panda 2024, 22 February]. Another was developing the strategic partnership with the United States (US) in a way that enhanced India’s autonomy and avoided dependence – a challenge complicated by a growing list of irritants, including the allegations that had emerged in 2023 that Indian officials had plotted the targeted killings of Sikh separatists in Canada and the US [see Hall 2024, pp. 301-302]. And the last was no less vexed: the challenge of maintaining influence in India’s near abroad, in South Asia and the island states of the Indian Ocean [Ranjan 2024, 8 May].

India made some progress on all four fronts, but not much. In October, New Delhi and Beijing finally struck a deal to facilitate military disengagement at two key points in Ladakh where Indian and Chinese troops remained in proximity. This agreement promised to restore to Indian forces access to areas effectively closed since the Galwan clash, but it neither restored the wider status quo ante 2020 nor substantively improved India’s strategic position [Joshi 2024, 28 October]. With Russia, New Delhi tried to walk a fine line, re-engaging Moscow after a couple of years in which it had tried to keep some distance from the Russian leadership, while claiming that India still favoured a peaceful settlement to the Ukraine war [see Ganguly 2024]. This approach played well inside India – especially on the Hindu Right – but irritated others outside the country, without delivering obvious rewards. It did nothing to lift India’s stock in the US, for example, where policymakers were unimpressed by Modi’s decision to go to Moscow for his first bilateral summit after the election [Nakashima & Shih 2024, 11 July]. When the Indian prime minister visited Washington in September, the US and India reaffirmed their strategic partnership, but throughout the year it was clear that the Modi government and President Joseph R. Biden’s administration did not see eye-to-eye on many issues, including Russia [Singh 2024, 6 June]. Internal debates within the Hindu Right about the merits of the relationship also spilled into the public domain. In parallel, New Delhi laboured to maintain working relationships with its neighbours. Here too India struggled, especially with Bangladesh, following the ouster of New Delhi’s preferred leader, Sheikh Hasina.

This article analyses each of these challenges in turn. It argues that in 2024 India found it hard to consolidate the gains it made in 2023, during which time it chaired the Group of 20 (G20) and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), reenergised its diplomacy with Global South, deepened defence and security cooperation with the United States and the other Quad partners, and successfully frustrated several Chinese initiatives [see Hall 2024]. The election complicated matters. It distracted India’s leaders, as we have seen, but also showed some of them in an unflattering light. The use of divisive and derogatory language to mobilise voters, such as Modi’s description of Muslims as «infiltrators» in a speech in Rajasthan, dismayed some foreign observers [Travelli & Raj 2024, 26 April]. Then there was the result itself, which involved sizable losses for the BJP and only a slim majority for its coalition [Palshikar 2024]. This surprised many analysts and prompted some to speculate about the strength and longevity of the Modi government, despite a post-election push to project an image of stability and policy continuity [Markey 2024, 11 June].

However, the election was not the only factor complicating India’s international relations. Matters well beyond New Delhi’s control continued to cause headaches. The Modi government faced instability and unpredictability caused by wars in Europe and the Middle East, ongoing strategic competition between the US and China, technological change, and multiple political upheavals in states important to India. In short, it had to deal with a «much tougher world» than those confronting its predecessors [Jaishankar 2024, p. 1]. The US Presidential election generated even more disruption, producing one of the closest contests in modern history [Montanaro 2024, 3 December] and preventing Biden from travelling for the Quad summit India was due to host [Haidar 2024, 6 February]. But as we shall see, the Modi government was buoyed by the prospect of a second Donald J. Trump administration, convinced that it would better suit the interests of India and the BJP than another Democrat president in the White House.

2. Stabilisation without normalisation

In 2023, India restored some channels of communication with Beijing that had been cut off or disrupted after the Galwan incident, while sustaining a broad set of trade and travel sanctions and working with other partners to undermine China’s influence in multiple minilateral and multilateral forums [Hall 2024, pp. 308-310]. This approach reflected the ongoing «abnormality» of the Sino-Indian relationship, as India’s External Affairs Minister (EAM) Subrahmanyam Jaishankar described it [2024, p. 3], following the series of armed clashes on the LAC in 2020 and 2021 [see Tarapore 2021, 5 May]. In 2022, the two sides had managed to calm the situation, concluding agreements to disengage their forces at some of the so-called ‘friction points’ in Ladakh, but fell short of restoring the status quo ante. And in September of that year, as Saheb Singh Chadha [2024] notes, China and India arrived at another impasse, with Beijing refusing to permit India to resume patrols in contested areas around Depsang and Demchok, and New Delhi insisting that their resumption was the necessary precondition for talks on de-escalation and the draw-down of forces.

This disagreement persisted into 2024, despite several discussions between Modi and Xi Jinping at multilateral summits and multiple rounds of diplomat- and military-led talks [Chadha 2024]. Things began to change only after India’s election, amid a debate in New Delhi about the need to stabilise and perhaps strengthen the relationship [see Madan 2024, 2 July]. In July, Jaishankar twice met his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, once at an SCO summit in Kazakhstan and then at an ASEAN meeting in Laos. New Delhi’s diplomatic language also softened, becoming more upbeat about the possibility of a deal on some points of difference [see, for example, Ministry of External Affairs 2024, 25 July]. Further meetings – including one between National Security Advisors in Russia in mid-September – generated more positive statements [Ministry of External Affairs 2024, 12 September]. Then in October India’s Foreign Secretary, Vikram Misri, announced that New Delhi and Beijing had struck a deal on the complete disengagement of forces in Ladakh, as well as the restoration of patrolling rights [Ministry of External Affairs 2024, 21 October].

This agreement promised to end a dangerous standoff that had lasted for four years and four months and brought China and India closer to war than they had been since 1962. But it fell well short of a normalisation of the relationship. The October deal left large numbers of a troops deployed along the LAC all year round, where earlier lighter forces had been present only in the warmer months [International Crisis Group 2023, 14 November]. A wider agreement to withdraw some or all these troops – which New Delhi terms «de-escalation» – is yet to be made, as Jaishankar and other Indian officials have made clear [Ministry of External Affairs 2024, 4 December]. Moreover, the deal left in place a series of other punitive measures imposed on China by India during and after 2020, including the suspension of direct flights to and from China and the issuing of electronic tourist visas; restrictions on Chinese foreign direct investment and the use of Chinese technology in areas of critical importance; and bans on dozens of Chinese apps, including TikTok [Madan 2022, 4 October].

At best, the deal improved the situation on the ground in eastern Ladakh, reduced the risk of another clash between Indian troops and the People’s Liberation Army, and removed an obstacle to further talks. Yet China and India remain far from the pre-Galwan status quo. In India’s view, at least, the presence of large forces near the LAC is «not in accordance with the 1993 and 1996 Agreements» [Ministry of External Affairs 2024, 4 December] on maintaining peace on the disputed border and sustaining confidence building measures. It is not clear that China – or indeed India – will draw down and redeploy these forces any time soon. Both sides have built new infrastructure in these areas since the Galwan clash and they might be reluctant to relinquish whatever advantage they might offer in a future conflict [Swartz 2023, 17 October; Jun & Hart 2024, 16 May].

More worryingly for New Delhi, it is not obvious that India is now in a stronger position vis-à-vis China now than it was before the Galwan clash. It is possible – but by no means certain – that the robustness of India’s actions in 2020 and 2021 restored conventional deterrence on the LAC [Set & Pant 2023, pp. 148-150]. It is also possible – but again, not certain – that New Delhi’s economic sanctions and soft balancing changed Beijing’s strategic calculus and brought China back to the negotiating table. There is some evidence to suggest that Beijing is more concerned about India as an emerging challenge than it was before, but whether that view will translate into a softer or harder policy towards India is not clear [Deb & Jiayue 2024]. But the bigger problem is that New Delhi has not made substantive progress in closing the economic and the military gaps with its northern neighbour since 2020. In 2024, India’s economy was still only about 20% and its defence budget perhaps 30% the size of China’s – about the same as they were five years earlier [Inamdar 2024; Hooda 2024, 2 July]. The Modi government continues to struggle to implement the reforms needed to stimulate higher rates of growth [Subramanian & Felman 2022] and to direct funds to necessary military modernisation [Mukherjee 2022].

Of course, India can and does also make use of partners to manage the threat, and in recent years New Delhi has forged stronger ties with the US and others for that reason [see Tarapore 2023]. But in 2024 the Modi government tested those relationships, most notably with a determined effort to re-engage Moscow.

3. Perceptions and misperceptions

India’s close ties with Russia date back to an earlier effort to balance Chinese assertiveness. In the 1960s, the Sino-Indian border war, the Sino-Soviet split, and signs of a possible rapprochement between Washington and Beijing drove New Delhi to look to Moscow for arms and economic support [Singh 1984]. In 1971, they formalised this tacit partnership with a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation that provided India with access to the latter’s markets, capital, universities, defence technology, and diplomatic support [see Subrahmanyam 2021]. This arrangement annoyed the West but worked – at least in part – for India. Soviet assistance helped to alleviate some of the pressure on India exerted by China during the latter part of the Cold War, allowing New Delhi to modernise the military, if not the economy [see Clark 1977].

The logic of this strategic partnership dissipated, however, with the normalisation of Sino-Russian and Sino-Indian relations at the end of the Cold War and with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. In the 1990s, neither Moscow nor New Delhi needed the other to balance China, and for India a weakened post-Soviet Russia looking to build better ties with the West was anyway far less useful. But the Cold War strategic partnership left three enduring legacies. One is India’s long-term dependence on the Russian defence industry for maintenance, spares, repairs, training, know-how, and in some cases ammunition, as well as armoured vehicles, aircraft, and ships. As a result, more than fifty years after the Indo-Soviet Treaty was signed, about 85% of India’s large weapon systems are today Soviet or Russian in origin [Lalwani & Sagerstrom 2021, pp. 152-154]. Another legacy is the perception – widely held in New Delhi – that Russia is a reliable friend that respects India and India’s concerns. Jaishankar’s assessment, made in June 2024, that the Soviet Union / Russia has «never done anything to impact our interests negatively» [NDTV 2024], is shared by many in India’s strategic elite. And the last is the conviction or perhaps misperception – also widely held – that Russia is and will remain a «great power», a pole in an emerging multipolar order, which deserves the respect of others, despite past and present economic, social, and political problems [see Sikri 2024, pp. 183-202].

These legacies have shaped India’s approach to Russia since the end of the Cold War and especially since the revival of Russian fortunes in the 2000s under Vladimir Putin. They have made New Delhi reluctant to loosen ties with Moscow, despite the development of new and (for India) arguably more advantageous strategic partnerships with others and Putin’s increasingly erratic behaviour. They help to explain why the Modi government has maintained a dialogue with Moscow after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and refused to condemn Putin’s aggression. But they do not provide a complete explanation. In recent years, two more factors have also played in part in New Delhi’s calculations. The first is India’s growing thirst for cheap hydrocarbons, needed to fuel the economy, control inflation, and to aid post-COVID recovery. The other is a new but acute anxiety in New Delhi that Moscow is being both lured and forced into a Sino-Russian alliance detrimental to India’s interests [Ganguly 2024, pp. 63-64; pp. 57-58].

For all these reasons, India has walked a fine line on the Ukraine war. From early in the conflict, it has taken advantage of Russia’s inability to sell oil by buying up large quantities, some to use locally and some to refine and sell on to others [Vickery Jr. & Cutler 2024, 3 September]. At the same time, the Modi government has repeatedly urged all concerned to settle their differences at the negotiating table, lamenting the impact of the conflict on the global economy [Ministry of External Affairs 2022, 22 September]. Not long after the war began, the prime minister opined in Putin’s presence that «today’s era is not the era for war» – though he went no further than this mild rebuke [Lau and Saeed 2022, 16 September]. Indeed, New Delhi has gone to considerable lengths to avoid actions that might signal either support or criticism for Russia. In 2022 and 2023, Indian officials sustained dialogue with their Russian counterparts in both bilateral meetings and multilateral gatherings, at the BRICS and the SCO, and Jaishankar met the Russian foreign minister on multiple occasions. But limits were also placed on India’s engagement with Moscow. New Delhi was reluctant, for instance, to facilitate a bilateral summit between Modi and Putin, despite a longstanding commitment to hold annual leaders’ meetings, a long hiatus since the Indian prime minister’s last visit to Russia in 2019, and several personal invitations from the Russian president [see, for example, President of Russia 2022, 16 September].

However, India’s approach began to change towards the end of 2023. In late December, Jaishankar went to Russia and stayed for an unusually long five days. He called on Putin, as well as the Deputy Prime Minister Dennis Manturov and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. The trip raised questions about the Modi government’s intentions, and when they were asked, New Delhi’s answers were surprisingly defensive. Shrugging off suggestions the West might be unhappy about the visit, Jaishankar declared that a «country which has maximum friends and minimum adversaries is obviously one with smart diplomacy. Why would a country restrict its friends?» [quoted in Bhaumik 2024, 3 January]. He followed up on these remarks at the Raisina Dialogue in February 2024, observing that «a lot of doors have been shut to Russia», that Russia was turning to Asia as a result, and that «it makes sense to give Russia multiple options» [Hindustan Times 2024, 23 February]. These comments – combined with National Security Ajit Doval’s bilateral with his Russian counterpart at a BRICS meeting in Moscow in April – suggested that India was becoming more openly supportive of Russia [Hindustan Times 2024, 25 April].

At the time, exactly why India might make sure a move was contested. Some argued that following several turbulent months in US-India relations, New Delhi wanted to show Washington that it had other partners on which it could rely [Bhaumik 2024, 3 January]. Others thought that after a couple of years of relative diplomatic neglect, the Modi government was merely trying to reassure Moscow that New Delhi respected Russian concerns and interests and to ensure outstanding defence orders were met. They noted Russian unease about India’s deepening ties with the US and about the terms of trade with India, especially in oil [Zakharov 2024, 23 January]. They also pointed to New Delhi’s anxiety about ongoing delays to much needed arms supplies, including air defence systems and frigates [Panda 2024, 22 February].

Modi’s trip to Moscow on 8-9 July, immediately after the election, intensified and broadened this debate. Critics in the West complained not just about the symbolism and the timing of the visit – it was the first bilateral summit for the re-elected prime minister, and it took place on the eve of NATO’s 75th anniversary summit – but also to its optics, which seemed designed to maximise its propaganda value to Russia [Ethirajan 2024, 9 July]. A smiling Modi was greeted by Russian president with a hug; the two were filmed driving in a golf cart and taking tea in the garden of one of Putin’s dachas; and the Indian prime minister was awarded the Order of St Andrew the Apostle in an elaborate ceremony [Hall 2024, 10 July]. To Kyiv, this suggested that India’s neutrality regarding the Ukraine war was a sham [Giordano 2024, 9 July]. To others, it was taken as a sign that the Modi government might be losing its way in foreign policy [Rehman 2024, 30 July].

These impressions were reinforced by three things. The biggest was that Modi’s embrace of Putin did nothing to slow progress in the Sino-Russian «no limits» strategic partnership. In May, Putin and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping agreed to expand bilateral military exercises, conduct maritime patrols, and cooperation on space technologies [Zhen 2024, 17 May]. In July, the Russian leader met Xi again and lauded their partnership [Al Jazeera 2024, 3 July]. The second was that the Modi-Putin summit produced little in the way of fresh agreements or solid commitments to honour existing deals, including overdue arms transfers. These meagre outcomes contrasted with recent gains made not just by China but also by North Korea, which appears to be much more adept at exploiting Russia’s relative weakness and securing advanced defence technologies from Moscow [Kim 2024, 21 November]. The last was that the summit inadvertently highlighted Russia’s disregard for some Indian interests, notably the safety of its citizens overseas. In February, New Delhi acknowledged that almost 100 Indians had been duped into joining the Russian army. Some had been sent to Ukraine; some had died in combat. At that point, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) confirmed that it had «strongly» conveyed its unhappiness to Moscow and expected the Russian authorities to return the men soon [Bhaumik 2024, 27 February]. But by the time Modi went to Moscow six months later, several Indians were yet to be released. And although he secured a personal promise from Putin to facilitate their swift return, as late as mid-December, 19 men were still in Russian military service [Hindustan Times 2024, 13 December].

In August, Modi made a surprise visit to Kyiv to meet Volodymyr Zelensky, and – some analysts argued – to respond to India’s critics in the West [Markey & Ruppert 2024, 29 August]. And at the close of 2024, his government was still insisting that India would not take a side in the Ukraine conflict [The Times of India 2024, 7 December]. Yet its behaviour suggested otherwise. In mid-December, for example, within days of a reaffirmation that New Delhi supported a negotiated end to the war, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh went to Moscow to take delivery of a new ship and to urge Russia to speed up the transfer of air defence systems. But Singh he also delivered a message, telling Putin that despite «enormous pressure» from others, Indo-Russian «friendship» remains «higher than the highest mountain and deeper than the deepest ocean» [Sharma 2024, 11 December]. These comments – reinforced by an anonymous briefing pointing to the «immense potential» of the bilateral partnership – were taken by commentators as evidence that India was determined to «stand by» Russia [Pandit 2024, 11 December].

What drove the Modi government to do this, despite the meagre gains and the substantial risks involved, in terms of the strain the re-engagement of Russia placed on other partnerships? India’s need for arms and mounting concern about Moscow’s ability to deliver them, were clear drivers [Pandit 2024, 11 December]. So was the nagging worry that a cornered Russia might throw in its lot with China, forming an alliance that would dominate Eurasia and restrict India’s strategic autonomy in that region and beyond [see Tellis 2022, 25 April]. And New Delhi’s unshakeable – but far from incontrovertible – beliefs that Russia respects India’s interests and deserves respect as a ‘great power’ in an emerging multipolar order, likely played their parts too [see Chivvis & Geaghan-Breiner 2023, 9 November]. But it appears that the revival of the Modi government’s enthusiasm for Russia was also related to tensions in the US-India relations – and to a desire to demonstrate New Delhi’s unhappiness with the West and its independence of mind. Certainly, what one analyst termed «Modimania in Moscow» [Turayanova 2024, 15 July] was celebrated as such not just in Russia, but also by the Hindu Right in India [Talukdar 2024, 14 July].

4. Non-West and Anti-West

In 2023, Washington and New Delhi took significant strides forward in developing their strategic partnership, reaffirming their commitment to Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies and approving the manufacture of General Electric-designed jet engines in India [Hall 2024, p. 303]. Modi’s State Visit in June was widely acclaimed as a success, despite differences of opinion on the Ukraine war and human rights [Lalwani et al. 2023, 20 June]. Yet from September onwards the allegation that New Delhi was running a targeted killing programme, first levelled by Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, cast a shadow over the relationship. This shadow darkened when in November US authorities unsealed an indictment against an Indian citizen accused of plotting to murder the New York-based head of the «Sikhs for Justice» group, Gurpantwant Singh Pannun [Hall 2024, p. 302]. Both accusations were denied by New Delhi, but this did not stop Indian commentators from suggesting that such covert action might be justified and from complaining that some Western governments, including the US, were not doing enough to manage threats to India’s national security by elements of its diaspora [see, for example, Kapur 2023, 28 September].

This issue festered in 2024, with neither New Delhi nor Washington seemingly able to find a mutually acceptable way to manage it. At the same time, Canada also struggled to establish a working relationship with India to identify who was responsible for the killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar and for the alleged intimidation of other Sikh separatists [Miller and Shih 2024, 14 October]. In October 2024, media speculation then forced Trudeau to go public with Ottawa’s belief that Indian diplomats had been involved in both activities [Falconer 2024, 15 October]. It was also leaked that Canadian authorities suspected India’s Home Minister, Amit Shah, had directed the operation [Reuters 2024, 30 October]. Amid the furore that followed, Canada expelled six Indian diplomats, including the Head of Mission, and India retaliated in kind [Sebastian 2024, 15 October].

In parallel, other irritants emerged in the US-India relationship. Together, these fed narratives popular on the Hindu Right that the Biden administration was not giving India the respect it was due. Some even suggested that Washington’s «Deep State» was determined to undermine Modi and the BJP. The US President’s inability to travel to New Delhi for Republic Day or for a Quad summit; the Pannun attempted murder case; unflattering reports about the state of democracy, human rights, and religious freedom in India; supposed US involvement in a change of government in Bangladesh; and finally the indictment of the Gujarati billionaire – and Modi ally – Gautam Adani for alleged fraud were all seized upon as evidence of American perfidy [see, for example, Talukdar 2024, 23 December]. In early December, anger about this issue spilled over with a series of social media posts from the BJP official account accusing the State Department of being «behind» a campaign to «target the BJP and India» [Roy 2024, 8 December].

This outburst provided insight into internal debates within the Hindu Right – into arguments rarely aired in public – about the merits of the Modi government’s decade-long effort to deepen the strategic partnership with the US. That effort, it must be remembered, was not predetermined, and remains contentious. Large parts of the Hindu Right – including the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (‘National Volunteer Association’ or RSS) to which Modi devoted much of his life before entering politics – are deeply anti-Western. Indeed, since the 1920s the RSS has committed itself to purging all remaining elements of Western thought and practice from India, in favour of what they consider authentically Indian alternatives [see Sharma 2011]. When Modi took power in 2014, it was not clear how much of this ideological agenda he intended to pursue, in domestic or foreign policy, nor how affected he had been by US and European criticism of his conduct as Chief Minister in Gujarat, before, during and after the communal violence in that state in 2002 [see Marino 2014, pp. 103-146; Hall 2019, pp. 1-10].

Once in office – and to the surprise of many observers – Modi pushed hard for closer ties with the West and especially the US [see especially Pant 2014]. Yet significantly, Modi’s strongest ally in this enterprise – Jaishankar, initially as ambassador to Washington and then as Foreign Secretary – was a bureaucrat, not a BJP politician nor an RSS activist. It was Jaishankar who facilitated a strong working relationship with President Barack H. Obama’s administration and with Congress, and who provided a rationale for the strategic partnership – first internally, and then, after retirement from the MEA, publicly [see Jaishankar 2020]. It was Jaishankar who crafted a narrative that reassured Western partners that, whatever qualms they might have about working with a Hindu nationalist government, Modi’s Naya Bharat («New India») was determined to be a «rule-abiding and responsible player» in the world [Jaishankar 2020, p. 55]. In 2019, Jaishankar’s success in these endeavours convinced the prime minister to make him foreign minister [Iyengar 2024, 5 April]. This allowed the government to push ahead with deepening the strategic partnership with the US and with the Quad [Mukherjee 2023]. But Jaishankar’s appointment and his agenda did not settle the debate within the BJP – let alone within in the RSS – about the kind of relationship India ought to have with the West [see Sengupta 2022, 10 October]. They did not win over anti-Western elements of the Hindu Right sceptical about New Delhi’s closer ties with Washington.

A sense of this internal disagreement – and of the implications for the Modi government and the US-India strategic partnership – can be found in Jaishankar’s second book, Why Bharat Matters [Jaishankar 2024], published just before the election. Despite the title, the book is aimed at a domestic audience than an international one. It really seeks to explain why foreign policy matters to Bharatis (Indians), rather than why Bharat (India) matters to the world. For that purpose, it includes a lengthy discussion of how Indians ought to think about the West and why India ought to work with it – not against it, as some on the Hindu Right would prefer. Jaishankar concedes that the West’s misguided universalism and enduring hypocrisy continues to grate on the Rest. But he observes that its relative power is waning, amid an «emerging multipolarity», and its ability to influence what happens outside the West is declining [Jaishankar 2024, p. 44]. Moreover, he argues – pointing to China’s experience – that partnership with the West is the sure pathway to rapid development. There is, Jaishankar argues, «little profit in being anti-West» and a strong pragmatic argument for cooperation [Jaishankar 2024, p. 98]. India must recognise that the optimal strategy combines «[d]eveloping affinities» with the West while remaining confidently «non-West» [Jaishankar 2024, p. 98].

The fact that Jaishankar found it necessary to make this argument speaks to the doubts that persist within the Hindu Right about the Modi government’s tilt to the West. And the upsurge of criticism of the US and the Biden administration towards the end of 2024 – including some coming directly from the BJP, as we have seen – suggests, however, that it had limited impact on the sceptics. But by that point in the year, the outcome of the US Presidential election had already changed the rules of the game. In Trump, both the Modi government and the Hindu Right perceives an ideological ally [Madhav 2020, 24 February]. They have enthusiastically adopted his rhetoric, as the BJP’s attack on the «Deep State» shows. They are convinced that the earlier Trump administration did more for US-India ties than others, despite evidence to the contrary [see, for example, Singh 2024, 19 September]. They believe that the incoming administration will be tough on China and on Islamist terrorism, reject economic and cultural «globalism», mute criticism of India’s democratic backsliding and handling of human rights, and deliver new economic opportunities [Hebbar 2024, 8 December]. They think that Trump will cut some deal with Putin to bring the Ukraine war to an end – and perhaps also bring Russia back in from the cold [Das 2024, 1 December]. And some also believe that a fundamentally transactional and India-friendly Trump will make some of New Delhi’s other recent troubles – including the pending court cases concerning targeting killings – go away [The Economic Times 2024, 5 November].

These hopes for a «Trump bump» might be fulfilled, or might not [see Madan 2024, 5 December]. Either way, the past year highlighted irritants in the US-India relationship that could prove difficult to remove regardless of who sits in the White House. One is the growing tendency in New Delhi – apparent in the Modi government’s response to the result of the Presidential election – to see US-India ties through an ideological lens, downplaying the bipartisan commitment to the partnership on the American side, and casting the Democrats as somehow inimical to India’s interests. The other is the resurgence of a wider mistrust of the US and American intentions more broadly. In 2024, this became obvious in an unexpected way, in the aftermath of the fall of the Bangladeshi leader, Sheikh Hasina.

5. Sisyphean labours

In early January, in an election marred by protests, violence, a low turnout, and a boycott by the main opposition party, Sheikh Hasina and her Awami League was returned to power for a fourth term [Riaz 2024, 11 January]. India – which had backed Hasina since 2008 – was happy, but international observers were not. Nor, as it turns out, were many Bangladeshis, who were soon back on the streets, only to be met by armed Hasina supporters and elements of the security forces. Finally, after weeks of violence in which hundreds were killed, Hasina resigned and fled on a military aircraft to India, where she found refuge in a New Delhi bungalow [Riaz 2024, 6 August].

The arc of Hasina’s triumph and fall was mirrored by India’s broader experience in its immediate region during the year. It had successes but they were offset by failures. To be sure, there was little or no change in some regional relationships. There were no substantive conversations between India and Pakistan [Faisal & Rehman 2024, 15 October]. Tentative approaches were made to the Taliban in Afghanistan [Krishnan 2024, 14 November] and to Myanmar’s ailing military junta [Laskar 2024, 8 November] but neither made progress. But in some of the relationships where New Delhi was more active, India’s fortunes fluctuated.

With Nepal, for example, the Modi government had succeeded in 2023 in stabilising the relationship with the historically India-sceptic prime minister, Pushpa Kamal Dahal (known as Prachanda), striking some important deals to import electricity from the land-locked state [Ranjan 2023, 5 June]. In March 2024 Prachanda’s coalition collapsed, however, and he was replaced by the traditionally India-friendly K. P. Sharma Oli – a development initially welcomed in New Delhi [Mazumdar 2024, 13 July]. But then Oli went to Beijing for his first visit in office, where he signed a significant agreement for deeper economic cooperation with China under the Belt and Road Initiative [The Kathmandu Post 2024, 4 December]. By the end of the year, it appeared that Nepal was determined to pivot away from India, not towards it [Woo 2024, 3 December].

With Maldives, India also experienced ups and downs but ended the year in a better position. President Mohamed Muizzu was elected in November 2023 on an anti-India platform. In 2024, he succeeded in expelling India’s small military presence on the islands but then shifted back towards a more friendly posture. In June Muizzu attended Modi’s swearing-in ceremony and returned to India for another visit in October, this time seeking a debt bailout that New Delhi was willing to facilitate. By the end of the year, the bilateral relationship had stabilised, albeit with lingering ill-feeling caused by a social media spat over criticisms made of Modi by Maldivian ministers and a short-lived tit-for-tat boycott of Maldives resorts by Indian tourists [Yadav 2024, 26 November].

Only with Sri Lanka did India’s position get markedly stronger during 2024. Bilateral ties had been improving since the fall of the China-leaning Gotabaya Rajapaksa government in July 2022 and India’s generous economic assistance the wake of that crisis. New Delhi continued to make gains in 2023 and the early months of 2024, securing commitments from Colombo to block Chinese research ships from operating in Sri Lanka’s Exclusive Economic Zone and starting talks about the possibility of Indian firms running Sri Lanka’s airports [Gamage 2024, 1 March]. Then came the election of the erstwhile Marxist Anura Kumara Dissanayake as the new President of Sri Lanka in September and the landslide victory of his National People’s Party in the parliamentary poll in November. Some Indian analysts responded to these developments with concern, pointing to Dissanayake’s past criticisms of India [see, for example, Sharma 2024, 26 September]. But the early signs suggested the new Sri Lankan leader was committed to a measured relationship with New Delhi and that India was keen to maintain mutual goodwill. Indeed, in mid-December Dissanayake made a State Visit and was warmly received by Modi, and the two promised to deepen the bilateral partnership [Kugelman 2024, 18 December].

The contest between this situation and the one that developed in India’s relationship with Bangladesh after the change of government in Dhaka is stark. Hasina’s fall prompted an extraordinary outburst of anger in India and a seemingly uncontrolled deterioration in bilateral ties. Jaishankar’s statement to parliament immediately after the change of government placed the blame for the upheaval squarely on the protesters, whom he alleged had attacked the police and the properties of people associated with the government, as well as «minorities» [Ministry of External Affairs 2024, 6 August]. India’s media went further. The opposition was denounced as militant Islamists; the Bangladeshi army was accused of orchestrating a coup; and news of attacks on Hindus, Hindu property, and Hindu temples dominated the coverage [Mahmud & Sarker 2024, 8 August; Ethirajan 2024, 4 December]. Amid this cacophony, some also accused Washington of instigating «regime change» in Bangladesh and suggested that the US was working with Islamists, China and Pakistan to humiliate India, seize an offshore island for an airbase, and carve a Christian state out of Bangladesh, Myanmar, and India’s Northeast [Aneja 2024, 12 August; see also Bajpai 2024, 8 August].

New Delhi did eventually engage the new interim government, sending Foreign Secretary Misri to Dhaka in early December [Ministry of External Affairs 2024, 9 December]. But by that point, it seems reasonable to say that damage had been done, to bilateral ties with both Bangladesh and the US. In Dhaka, the head of the interim government, Mohammed Yunus, complained of a coordinated campaign of «propaganda» coming from India designed to undermine the new regime [The Times of India 2024, 4 December]. Meanwhile, Washington was forced to publicly reject claims that the US had played in role in the change of government [Singh and Pitas 2024, 13 August]. Equally pointedly, the US urged New Delhi and Dhaka to resolve their differences peacefully [Hindustan Times 2024, 11 December].

6. Conclusion

India’s foreign policy changed during 2024 as the Modi government addressed various external challenges in the aftermath of the election. As we have seen, New Delhi moved to stabilise the relationship with China, re-engage Russia, recalibrate the strategic partnership with the US, and react to developments in the neighbourhood – with mixed success. Of course, it did other things too. In the second half of the year, Modi travelled unusually widely, going to Europe three times, Russia and Southeast Asia twice each, and to Africa, South America, and the Middle East. In parallel, India sustained its outreach to the Global South, begun while G20 chair in 2023, holding a third virtual summit in August 2024 [Ministry of External Affairs 2024, 14 August]. These and other initiatives, like the CARICOM meeting in Guyana that Modi attended in November, were presented as efforts to make India what Jaishankar called a vishwa bandhu – a close friend or brother to the world [Indian Express 2024, 6 May].

It remains to be seen if others accept this benign view of India and India’s role in the world. After all, in 2024 Bangladesh and Canada, and the Biden administration, saw a different avatar – an angry India, animated by religious nationalism and right-wing populism. Indeed, it is possible that this year marked a turning point towards a more assertive and less friendly Indian foreign policy, and an approach to international relations in which the boundary between «non-West» and «anti-West» is increasingly blurred.

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ISSN 2385-2526

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To understand how India’s internal politics changed in 2024, it is necessary to consider diverse topics. They include the main aspects of the authoritarian system that Prime Minister Narendra Modi had created during a decade in power, and the surprising setback that he faced at the national election in April-May despite huge unfair advantages over rival parties. His loss of a parliamentary majority at that election led some to expect that he would moderate his drive for autocratic rule and religious polarization, but that did not happen. Aspects of the economy that affected politics also mattered: economic growth, widening inequality and persistent poverty, the government’s surprisingly unhelpful treatment of the middle classes, and its welfare provisions. India under Modi suffered deeply embarrassing downgrades to dismal places in numerous international rankings. Its efforts to address this problem bore little fruit. A fundamental social change – the refusal of so called «lower» castes to accept caste hierarchies – had long been seen at the grassroots. But in 2024 it finally had an impact in national politics, to the disadvantage of Modi’s party. He had succeeded in gaining control of nearly all of India’s once-vibrant media, and they helped to promote his extravagant personality cult. Partly as a result of it, he relaxed into a self-satisfied complacency which led him to believe and to announce that he is of divine origin. This monumental complacency also led to three startling excesses that have damaged India’s international ties – especially with the West and most crucially with the U.S. as Donald Trump takes power.

Keywords – General election; de-institutionalisation; authoritarianism; personal rule; personality cult; divinity; complacent excesses.

1. Modi’s drive for authoritarian control and religious polarization

Between 2014, when he became prime minister, and early 2024, Narendra Modi had made great progress in promoting religious polarization – leading a hard-line Hindu nationalist assault to demonise and brutalise minorities, especially India’s 172 million Muslims. That effort continued during the national election campaign in April and May 2024 when Modi and others made much use of anti-Muslim rhetoric. He had also made great strides in radically centralising power and in hollowing out democratic institutions in order to impose one-man control of the political system.

The only institutions that escaped his effort at disempowerment and control were the prime minister’s office (PMO) and eleven investigative agencies. They were kept strong but were flagrantly misused to mount raids and probes, often on dubious charges, to intimidate or subdue actors in government institutions and in civil society, the media, etc. – to bring them to heel. The aim here was to create an authoritarian government dominated by one man exercising personal rule.

The list of institutions that were hollowed out and controlled is long. They included India’s central bank, the election commission, the central information commission, the national statistical organisation, universities, research centres, the comptroller and auditor general’s office, the offices of speaker in both houses of parliament, state governors in the federal system, the federal system itself [Kailash 2021, 5 March], etc.

No significant power centre was omitted from Modi’s drive for top-down control. And very prominently, parliament suffered. As early as 2015, deep anxiety was evident even among members of parliament from the Prime Minister’s own Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) because no consultation was undertaken by Modi. An economist who had advised the BJP told an eminent journalist of his surprise at the amount of «hatred» privately expressed towards Modi by several party leaders.1 During his first decade in power, numerous bills were rammed through parliament without time being allowed for scrutiny or discussion. By 2019, this disempowering had gone so far that one opposition legislator asked «Are we delivering pizzas or passing legislation?» [PTI 2019, 31 July].

Even cabinet ministers were starved of influence amid Modi’s radical centralising. They learned what their policies were from their civil servants who were told by the prime minister’s office (PMO). This led to serious delays.

With ministers interminably waiting for instructions from the PMO and unwilling to stick their neck out, decisions are taking much longer. According to sources in the PMO the highest number of files pending has gone up from 1,500 in Manmohan Singh’s tenure (before 2014) to 6,000. ‘The Prime Minister, being a control freak and travel freak at the same time, compounds the problem’, says a former cabinet secretary [Srivastava 2022, 5 February].

The firm control over cabinet ministers from on high may have diminished a little over the last ten years, but Modi’s soaring personality cult (discussed below) has ensured that the top-down grip remains tight.

2. A surprise result of the national election, and Modi’s uncompromising response

In April and May, a national election was held for a new parliament. It was not a fair election. The ruling BJP had vastly more money to spend than all other parties put together. But that was not enough. The bank accounts for the Congress Party, the BJP’s main rival, were frozen. The leader of another prominent rival party was jailed on dubious charges. Modi had gained full control of the election commission which is supposed to ensure fairness. It helped him. On 110 occasions, it took no action when his words – religiously polarising dog whistles and blatant remarks – violated its model code of conduct. Modi also controlled most print, television and online news outlets.

He and his party entered the campaign in high spirits, hoping that his consecration of the Ram temple at Ayodhya on 22 January would provide an electoral boost. He asked voters to give him 400 seats in a house of 543 – even more than had been won in his thumping victories of 2014 and 2019. Other BJP leaders explained that 400 would enable the new government to change India’s constitution.

But when the votes were counted, the result came as a shock. Despite all of its unfair advantages, Modi’s party won only 240 seats – embarrassingly short of a majority of 272. It was only able to form a government by relying on two regional parties which were its allies. Modi’s personal vote share in his Varanasi constituency fell from 63.62% in 2019 to 54.2%.

This confirmed what has long been known: Indian voters are not mindless sheep who are easily led. They have thrown out ruling parties at roughly 70% of national and state elections since 1977 – internationally, a very high rejection rate. In this election, despite the huge unfair advantages enjoyed by his party, it suffered a reversal.

The causes of this outcome are complex. Most opposition parties coalesced in an imperfect but reasonably successful alliance to prevent the fragmentation of anti-BJP votes. Reliable opinion surveys revealed widespread discontent over inflation and the lack of employment opportunities about which Modi had long made what Indians call «tall promises». The use of anti-Muslim rhetoric failed to generate the expected levels of support.

Many activists in the ruling party’s hard-line Hindu nationalist sister organisation, the RSS, sat out the campaign. They were unhappy with Modi for two reasons. His drive for one-man government and his personality cult offended them because they had always believed that their organisation and their cause should take precedence over individual leaders. They also objected to Modi’s tendency to seize power by any means. After he had lost state elections, he had repeatedly used threats and inducements to persuade legislators from other parties to defect to the BJP, so that he welcomed turncoats with no commitment to the Hindu nationalism that was so dear to the RSS.

The BJP also suffered from a decline in support from disadvantaged groups – most crucially, the Scheduled Castes (ex-untouchables) and the Scheduled Tribes (tribal people or adivasis) – see Table 1 below. Many of them were alarmed by the prospect of a large enough majority for the BJP to alter the constitution in ways that could lead to the weakening or removal of reservations for them in educational institutions and government jobs. By loudly appealing for 400 seats, Modi had blundered.

Some expected that the disappointing election result would make Modi less aggressive in pursuing autocratic rule by consulting the two regional parties on which he depends for his majority, and by toning down Hindu extremism because those two parties have cultivated support from minority voters. He offered financial concessions to those parties, but little else changed.

Soon after the election, he intentionally outraged opposition parties by re-nominating as speaker of the lower house a man who had suspended 110 of their legislators in a single day in the previous parliament. New harsh criminal laws were proposed which broadened the definition of terrorism and, after claiming to abolish sedition, retained it under a different name – and increased punishments to life sentences.

A tough new broadcasting bill was introduced to strengthen the government’s grip on digital media. Modi unilaterally lifted the ban on government employees joining the BJP’s sister organisation, the RSS. Loud protests from the opposition claimed that this would let RSS members assume powerful roles, and that it was a threat to reservations for disadvantaged castes. But the change survived. Without consulting allies, Modi announced changes in a Waqf bill to take a tough line on provisions for Muslims, to end what he called the «appeasement» of the minorities.

He also vowed to persist with forceful «anti-corruption» efforts, which meant the persistence of widespread raids and arrests by investigative agencies on questionable pretexts. There are eleven such agencies, including the Income Tax Department, the Intelligence Bureau, the Central Bureau of Investigation, and the Finance Ministry’s Enforcement Directorate. They have been brazenly misused against opposition politicians, media outlets, India’s once hugely constructive civil society organisations (including two Nobel Peace Prize winners), universities and research centres (starting with vengeful attacks on the best), and independent voices. After the election, his right-hand man, Amit Shah, drove the message home: Modi would have total power to act without consulting allied parties [Raman 2024, 30 September].

The only significant change was an effort to repair the damage done among Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe voters by his call for a huge majority. New initiatives to benefit these groups were developed. Analyses of the election result indicated that their anxiety over reservations (see section VI) – along with rising inequality and the severe shortage of jobs – outweighed religious polarization which Modi had stressed during the campaign. But after the election, Modi, Shah and other BJP leaders continued to promote religious intolerance and the brutalization of the vast Muslim minority [Singh 2024, 5 December].

The incendiary BJP Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, warned repeatedly – and preposterously – that if Hindus were not united, they would be slaughtered. He promised that more Hindu temples would be built on the sites of mosques. He and some other BJP state-level leaders continued, without due process, using bulldozers to destroy the homes and businesses of Muslims whom he called the «mafia». This triggered an objection from a UN Special Rapporteur in a submission to the Supreme Court. One reporter wrote that «Anti-Muslim Crimes (Have) Become the Norm» [Puniyani 2024, 11 September]. Another noted «continuing – even growing – impunity and confidence» by violent Hindu extremists [Halarnkar 2024, 2 September]. A fresh spate of beatings and murders of people, mainly Muslims, occurred based on inaccurate allegations that they were in possession of beef [DHNS 2024, 6 September].

Opposition parties had gained enough new seats in parliament to increase pressure on the government, but Modi continued to treat them with disdain. As in the previous parliament, he refused to answer a single question that they raised. He continued to show contempt for opposition parties – evident in Amit Shah’s description of them as snakes, rats, cats and dogs. Modi re-tweeted a BJP leader’s post that included opposition leader Rahul Gandhi in a list of «traitors» and said that he has the «brains of a child». He falsely accused the Congress Party of «cheating» and «embezzling» – and so the caustic diatribes continued [Ghose 2024, 6 August].

3. The economy: growth, inequality, poverty and the middle class

3.1. Concealing data to control the political narrative

As we turn to India’s economy, it is important to note a problem with discussions of it – and of much else. The Modi government has gone to great lengths to conceal or to avoid collecting important data.

This is apparent on many fronts. The most startling is the refusal to conduct a census. For 140 years, Indian governments have held censuses every decade during years ending in the number one. A census was due in 2021, but none occurred. This was perhaps understandable because of the COVID crisis, but none has taken place in the following three years.

That was no isolated example. 16 datasets covering key sectors have not been made available. The sectors include police organisations, law and justice, defence, railways, food security, consumer expenditure, the household consumption survey, youth affairs, educational institutions, livestock, chemicals and fertilisers, and civil aviation [Salve 2024, 31 December]. With concealment on so many fronts, one witty Congress Party leader, Rajeev Gowda, said that Modi’s NDA (National Democratic Alliance) was actually a «No Data Available» regime.

It clearly preferred not to reveal – or even to collect – information. It allowed vacancies to proliferate in many national and state-level information commissions, until the Supreme Court ruled that they must be filled [Singh 2024, 5 December].

The government also manipulates to its advantage the few key sources of data that are available. In 2018, it stopped publishing the National Sample Survey until it could change the way statistics are calculated to paint a happier picture. It also takes advantage of gaps in the available data to make false claims about analysts’ findings. An important example was the assertion, re-tweeted 2,500 times, that the International Monetary Fund had projected India as the fastest growing economy on earth. This was untrue. It was based on old IMF data [Mehta 2020, 29 August].

3.2. Growth

A more detailed analysis of India’s economy appears elsewhere in this volume, but certain aspects of it have implications for politics, the main concern here. Growth rates are disputed, but by international standards, the economy grew in 2024 at a respectable rate. However, there were also worrying signs. Between July and September, it slipped from pace of the 8% of gross domestic product that it reached in much of 2023 to a two year low of 5.4% [Dhoot 2024, 29 November].

Other things also gave cause for concern. Foreign direct investment had been declining for years, and in 2024 it fell by 64%. In October, India experienced the world’s greatest exodus of foreign portfolio investment. This has continued: foreign investors withdrew $ 8.3 billion in January 2025. A Bloomberg report found that manufacturing output had declined sharply to 2.2% from 14.3% the previous year – which was seen by one analyst as «dismal» and «grim» [Narendra 2024, 5 December]. A Wall Street Journal study blamed that poor performance on excessive regulations and red tape [Li and Mandavia 2024, 23 November]. This contradicted Modi’s much hyped claims to have improved the ease of doing business.

We often hear that the economy that has emerged under Modi is a partnership of the government and big business. But the state has retained immense powers over the economy, so that what has emerged is a somewhat liberalised but far from neoliberal economic order, [Manor 2020, 31 October]. The Modi government holds the upper hand in that relationship and uses it to dominate corporate leaders. That is clear from statements by two iconic captains of industry that the authorities have subjected big business to an «environment of fear», and from the comment by a third that corporations are being treated like «pariahs»[The Wire Staff 2019, 25 December].

Modi’s drive for utter dominance on every front is apparent even in ties to such leaders. He and Amit Shah are equal opportunity authoritarians. No one is excluded from their drive for control. What we see here is not classic form of crony capitalism. Their cultivation of «fear» indicates that they are not seeking alliances with all – or many – corporate leaders.

3.3. Inequality

During Modi’s first decade in power, inequality soared. One analysis drawing on the work of Thomas Piketty’s World Inequality Laboratory stated that the economic order has become «more unequal than the British Raj» [Maya and Kumar 2024, 28 October]. Prabhat Patnaik notes that the World Inequality Database shows inequality to be at its worst in 100 years [Dasgupta 2024, 13 November].

3.4. Poverty

Analyses of poverty are complex, in part because large numbers of people fall into and out of poverty all the time [Desai et al. 2024]. But it is fair to say that economic growth, which in recent times has greatly benefited rich people, has left poorer groups struggling – as the section above on inequality indicates. The Global Hunger Index [DHNS 2024, 20 October] ranked India much lower than all of its neighbours except Pakistan – at 105th among 127 countries. The Modi government disputed these findings, but the Index was developed from its own official statistics. A Bloomberg report found signs of «desperation» among lower income groups [Mukherjee 2024, 11 December]. It added that, as in 2018-19, India’s policy makers were not facing up to the problem and taking action to tackle it. Instead, they were «tinkering».

200 million Indians were found to be undernourished, despite growth. One alarming aspect of this was the high level of child stunting – low height for age. The damage done to the bodies and brains of children who suffer from stunting as a result of malnutrition during their first five years is permanent – it cannot be repaired later in life. These incapacities prove costly to those who suffer them and to the good of the nation. A study covering 2019-2022 found that 36% of children in India suffer from stunting – higher than the 34% in sub-Saharan Africa [The Lancet 2019, 1 December]. This is a shameful indicator of the toll of increasing inequality amid economic growth.

3.5. The strange inattention to the middle classes

The increasing inequality under Modi has also left the middle classes «reeling from income stagnation». A «demand slump among them has recently become worse, reaching levels “not seen in a long time”». An industrialist spoke of the «shrinking middle class» [Venu 2024, 27 October]. Tax rates paid by the middle classes have not been adjusted for inflation, which worsens their situation [Mukherjee 2024, 11 December]. Growth had greatly benefited the rich, but the middle classes, once Modi’s bed rock supporters, had been disregarded.

This might appear to be a risky gamble, but at the national election, middle class voters largely continued to support the BJP – in part because communal polarization had taken a strong hold among them. And since the election, the government has taken some steps to benefit them.

4. Welfare provisions: encouraging passivity among recipients

The Modi government has provided poor – and indeed non-poor – people with abundant benefits. Among these are five kilograms of food grains per month given to no less than 800 million recipients. The government may have done this because it is aware of something important that its suppression of data has concealed: that despite economic growth, inequality has increased sharply so that large numbers of citizens have made few or no gains. But it has also seen these provisions as a way of attracting votes. They often entail the use of IT systems to send cash payments direct to the bank accounts of recipients [Aiyar and Sircar 2024, 30 November].

This approach to welfare has important political implications. These payments flow directly from the Prime Minister himself to beneficiaries, without middle men. Modi has seized upon this by energetically claiming personal credit, to inspire gratitude among recipients to him – enhancing his personality cult and his drive for one-man government. He stresses that he is preventing intermediaries from corruptly skimming off percentages, and from favouring only some of those who need the benefits. But many, perhaps most of the middlemen who have been cut out of the system are members of his own party. So, this aspect of his relentless drive for personal dominance has irritated BJP activists (former middlemen) and weakened the BJP’s organisation, just as he has undermined a huge array of other institutions within the democratic order. This reminds us of how thoroughly he has pursued de-institutionalisation, a central theme in his politics.

This approach to welfare provisions has often, although not always, paid handsome dividends at election time. Many state governments, including some headed by opposition parties, have adopted it [Kailash 2024, 7 June]. But in numerous cases, this has led to a near-crippling of governments’ ability to fund basic services and badly needed infrastructure projects [see for example Ranade 2024, 27 November].

Another implication of this strategy is crucial. It becomes clear when we contrast this system to the approach used by the previous national government between 2004 and 2014, which was led by the Congress Party. Its most important pro-poor programme (there were several others) was the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA). It gave every rural household the right to demand and receive up to 100 days work, manual labour, per year on development projects. It was shrewdly designed with strong transparency mechanisms to prevent corruption. Wages were paid not through intermediaries but directly via an IT system into workers’ bank accounts which were opened anew on an enormous scale. Vast numbers of poor rural dwellers found work under this programme so that it became the world’s largest poverty initiative.

A key feature of the MGNREGA was that it sought to make poor villagers active participants in public affairs at the local level. They had to take the initiative in seeking work, and in performing labour. It drew many of those people – actively – into the public sphere for the first time. That was especially true of rural women, many of whom had seldom left the household in the past. And in recent years, women have outnumbered men among labourers in the programme.

A major aim of the MGNREGA as it activated poor villagers, was to strengthen their «political capacity». That consists of four things: poor people’s political awareness, their confidence as political actors, their political skills, and their connections to other poor villagers and to allies among the non-poor [Jenkins and Manor 2017]. The contrast with Modi’s approach to welfare provision is stark. He seeks to make recipients passive and to allow their political capacity to atrophy, while the MGNREGA seeks the opposite: to make them more active with greater political capacity.

5. A fruitless attempt to respond to India’s dismal global rankings