ISSN 2385-2526

ISSN 2385-2526

ISSN 2385-2526

ISSN 2385-2526

ISSN 2385-2526

ISSN 2385-2526

ISSN 2385-2526

This article traces the intellectual genealogy of the analysis of Zionism as a form of settler colonialism, arguing that its core concepts were first systematically developed in the mid-1960s and early 1970s within Palestinian anti-colonial thought. Focusing on the contributions of the Palestine Research Center and, in particular, on the work of Fayez A. Sayegh, who first conceptualized Zionism as a «colonialism of a dual nature», it shows that ideas later central to settler colonial theory, such as the logic of elimination, the primacy of land over labour, the permanence of settler structures, and the racialization of sovereignty, were already clearly articulated within the Palestinian liberation movement. It further examines how this framework shaped Palestinian diplomatic efforts at the United Nations, including Resolution 3379 (1975), and underpinned the proposal for a single democratic state in historic Palestine. The article calls for a reassessment of settler colonial theory’s genealogy, recognizing Palestinian thought as a foundational contribution to the field.

Keywords – Fayez A. Sayegh; Palestine; Zionism; settler colonialism; anti-colonial thought; PLO Research Center; Resolution 3379; decolonisation; racial ideology; Palestinian political thought.

1. Introduction

In recent years, settler colonial studies have emerged as a distinct interdisciplinary field, marked by the proliferation of conferences, scholarly works, and a dedicated academic journal. Settler colonialism is understood as a specific colonial domination that operates not primarily through the extraction of Indigenous labour or resources, but through the elimination of Indigenous presence and its replacement with incoming settler populations who assert exclusive claims to land and sovereignty.1 The settler colonial «turn» has proven particularly influential in the study of Israel/Palestine, where Zionism has increasingly been understood as a form of settler colonialism characterized by land appropriation, the displacement and elimination of the Indigenous Palestinian population, and the establishment of a racially exclusive settler state [Busbridge 2018; Sa’di and Masalha 2013]. Such a reading helps account for both the foundations and recurrent patterns of Zionist violence, the structural asymmetry between settlers and natives, and the persistent failure of diplomatic agendas premised on parity or partition, which portray Israeli Jews and Palestinians as equivalent actors rather than as embedded in a hierarchical settler-colonial relationship [Salamanca et al. 2013].

However, this analytical framework did not originate within the contemporary academic field of settler colonial studies. From the early twentieth century through the post-1948 period, Arab and Palestinian intellectuals clearly identified the structural aspects of Zionist colonization of Palestine that contemporary scholarship now recognises as defining features of settler colonialism [Pappé 2015; Bhandar and Ziadah 2016; Sabbagh-Khoury 2021]. In the early twentieth century, as European powers partitioned Arab territories after World War I and Zionist settlement consolidated under the British Mandate, many Palestinian intellectuals increasingly characterized Zionism as a European-backed colonial project. Land transfers from absentee landlords, resulting in the displacement of Arab tenant farmers, the policy of «Hebrew labour» favouring Jewish workers over Arab labourers, and the establishment of autonomous Jewish institutions were all interpreted as mechanisms for creating a separate settler society, intentionally distinct from the indigenous Arab population. Although the formal terminology of settler colonialism had not yet developed, Palestinian writers at that time effectively described the particular form of colonialism they were witnessing, one characterized by foreign imperial backing, permanent settlement of Jewish settlers, exclusive land ownership, and economic and social separation, with the ultimate goal of altering the demographic balance of Mandatory Palestine.

While these early Palestinian reflections on Zionism remain significant, they largely focused on the immediate consequences of Jewish immigration. They did not yet conceptualize Zionism as a distinct form of settler colonialism. It was only with the emergence of an independent Palestinian national liberation movement in the mid-1960s that Zionism began to be systematically analyzed through a settler colonial lens. This was also part of a broader effort to develop a strategic discourse aimed at securing international solidarity by linking the Palestinian struggle to global anti-colonial movements, thereby transforming the Palestinian cause from a localized nationalist movement or a regional dispute over borders and refugees into part of a broader anti-imperialist framework. In this context, the Palestine Research Center, founded in Beirut in 1965 as the main research arm of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), played a major role in organizing and facilitating the intellectual effort to define Zionism as a form of settler colonialism and provided Palestinian scholars with a platform to conduct a systematic examination of the various aspects of Zionism and Israeli society.2 Early publications of the Research Center and the journal Shu‘ūn Filasṭīniyya contributed to the development of the vocabulary used to describe the Palestinian anti-colonial struggle and the specific colonial enterprise it confronted. Their influence extended far beyond academic circles, influencing the intellectual and ideological underpinnings of the PLO’s political discourse and international strategy during the 1960s and 1970s.3

This article seeks to contribute to the reconstruction of an intellectual genealogy that has received limited scholarly attention so far. Within this genealogy, Fayez A. Sayegh (1922-1980) stands out as one of the earliest and most rigorous theorists of Zionist settler colonialism. The article places Sayegh’s work within the context of the Palestine Research Center, explores the affinities between his conceptualisation of Zionism and later settler-colonial theory, and assesses how this framework influenced legal and diplomatic efforts at the United Nations (UN). The article further examines how Palestinian resistance organizations framed Zionism as a form of settler colonialism and how this understanding informed a political vision of decolonization through the establishment of a single democratic state in all of historic Palestine. It argues that Palestinian anticolonial discourse not only prefigures key ideas later developed in settler colonial theory but also provides conceptual tools for understanding the enduring and structural dynamics that continue to sustain Zionist settler-colonial violence in Palestine. While much research on this topic remains to be done, this study suggests that many of the concepts and terminology later formalized within settler-colonial studies had already been articulated with remarkable clarity in mid-twentieth-century Palestinian anti-colonial thought.

2. «Colonialism of a dual nature»

Fayez A. Sayegh, founder and first director of the Palestine Research Center, was the key figure in this intellectual development.4 Through his combined work as a scholar, educator and diplomat, he exercised significant intellectual influence in shaping the PLO’s political discourse and diplomatic strategy during the late 1960s and 1970s, a formative period for Palestinian national institutions. Acting as a diplomatic advocate of the Palestinian cause in international forums, he also left an enduring mark on how it was perceived worldwide. Sayegh was one of the earliest scholars who offered a comprehensive interpretation of Zionism as a form of settler colonialism rooted in racial exclusivism. Undoubtedly, his understanding of Zionism was influenced by the global wave of decolonization struggles that defined the 1950s and 1960s and by the anti-colonial theory emerging from international forums such as the Non-Aligned Movement. Writing during the height of Asian and African liberation movements, he placed Zionism within the same analytical categories used to critique other European settler projects, such as Algeria under French settler rule, and South Africa and Rhodesia under white minority domination. In particular, the struggle against apartheid in South Africa allowed for drawing parallels between racial separation policies there and Israeli practices toward Palestinians.5

In his seminal work, Zionist Colonialism in Palestine [Sayegh 1965], he formulated what can now be recognized as an ante litteram definition of settler colonialism.6 Long before the consolidation of contemporary settler colonial theory, Sayegh recognized its fundamental logic: the inherent drive to eliminate the Indigenous presence and replace it with a settler polity claiming exclusive sovereignty on the land.7 According to Sayegh, Zionism represents a specific form of colonialism characterized by a «dual nature»: on the one hand, it entails the expulsion and eradication of the Indigenous population; on the other hand, it involves the establishment and solidification of a racially exclusive settler polity. The colonization of Palestine, he argues:

Took the combined form of forcible dispossession of the indigenous population, their expulsion from their own country, the implantation of an alien sovereignty on their soil, and the speedy importation of hordes of aliens to occupy the land thus emptied of its rightful inhabitants. The people of Palestine have lost not only political control over its country, but physical occupation of its country as well: it has been deprived not only of its inalienable right to self-determination, but also of its elemental right to exist on its own land. [Sayegh 1965, p. v]

Sayegh identified three core features of Zionist settler colonialism. The first one is its racist character. In his view, racism lies at the heart of Zionist colonialism, serving as both its ideological justification and the driving force behind the displacement of the Indigenous population. The Zionist racist character gives rise to three interrelated principles that form the core of its ideology: «racial self-segregation, racial exclusiveness, and racial supremacy» [Ibid., p. 22]. The Zionist project of building a society grounded on the principle of Jewish racial supremacy could only be realized under conditions of Jewish self-segregation and exclusive possession of the land. The expulsion of non-Jews (that is, of Palestinians) thus emerges as a fundamental premise of Zionist racial supremacism: «If racial discrimination against the ‘inferior natives’ was the motto of race-supremacist European settler-regimes in Asia and Africa, the motto of the race-supremacist Zionist settler-regime in Palestine was racial elimination» [Ibid., p. 27]. Through his reading of Zionism as a form of European race supremacism, Sayegh was able to draw comparative parallels with other racially exclusive regimes, anticipating what would later emerge as «the apartheid analogy» [Fischer 2020]. In his perspective, the dominance of a logic of racial elimination over a logic of racial discrimination renders the Zionist project distinct from, and in several respects more brutal than, the apartheid regimes of South Africa or Rhodesia.

The second defining feature of Zionism is its «dependence on violence» against the Arab population, who become targets simply by virtue of their continued presence on the land. Violence here is not incidental but constitutive, a systematic tool for clearing land and displacing populations, aimed at securing and perpetuating settler rule: «The perennial aim of Zionism was and still is statehood in all of Palestine (called by Zionists “Eretz Israel”, or the Land of Israel), completely emptied of its Arabs» [Sayegh 1965, p. 33].8 The third feature of Zionism is considered to be its «expansionist orientation», consistent with the historical Zionist objective of establishing a Jewish state in Eretz Israel, that is, across the entirety of the biblical «Land of Israel», encompassing the territory of Mandate Palestine, the Kingdom of Jordan, southern Lebanon, and the southern and southeastern regions of Syria [Ibid., pp. 21-35].9 This understanding of sustained, structural violence is now echoed in the concept of al-Nakba al-Mustamirra (the ongoing catastrophe), central to Palestinian contemporary political discourse, which interprets the 1948 Nakba not as a historical event confined to the past but as a continuing process of dispossession and displacement.

Unlike colonial systems based on economic or resource extraction, which may allow for the coexistence of colonizer and colonized, Sayegh clearly understood that settler colonialism is intrinsically eliminationist. Zionism poses an existential threat to the Palestinian people. Since Indigenous claims to land and sovereignty contradict the settler narrative of exclusive entitlement, Zionist colonialism is «essentially incompatible with the continued existence of the ‘native population’» [p. 5]. Coexistence, therefore, is structurally impossible: «by its very nature, racial self-segregation precludes integration or assimilation» [Ibid., p. 22].

In sum, Sayegh argued that Zionist settler colonialism, characterized by racial supremacy, systemic violence, and expansionism, renders the erasure of the Palestinian presence an inherent feature of its project. The «dual nature» of Zionism that Sayegh identified served as the basis for a collective intellectual effort within the Palestine Research Center, where Palestinian scholars looked at Zionism through a racial and settler-colonial lens and integrated those analyses into a larger comparative framework. The following section considers two of the main contributions of the Palestine Research Center on this topic.

3. «How to get the land and get rid of the natives»

Building on Fayez A. Sayegh’s examination of the structural aspects of Zionist colonialism, Hasan Saab extended the analysis to its ideological and racial dimensions. In Zionism and Racism, written in 1968 under the auspices of the Research Center, Saab looks at how Zionist thinkers, influenced by European racial doctrines, developed the concept of a coherent, exclusivist Jewish «race». Saab argues that Zionist ideology conflates nationalism with a racialized perspective, in which Jews are not merely a religious or cultural group, but a distinct, biologically defined race with a unique destiny tied to the land of Palestine. This ethno-national understanding of Jewish identity supports Zionism’s claims about land and people, making the building of a Jewish state inherently linked to the racial exclusion of Palestinians and other non-Jewish groups. Israel is often seen as a safe haven for Jews from antisemitism; nevertheless, the country actually enforces differences between Jews and Arabs, Zionist and anti-Zionist Jews, and even between Western and Eastern Israeli Jews, revealing its structural and ideological commitment to a racial hierarchy.

Zionism should therefore be regarded as part of the broader history of modern racial ideologies, rather than as an exception to European racism; it is, in fact, one of its historical expressions. Saab drew explicit comparisons between Zionism and antisemitism, emphasizing how Zionist racial doctrines mirrored Nazi Aryanist principles through analogous racialized notions of collective identity:

The concept of a «chosen race», in Zionism, differs from the concept of a «chosen race» in Nazism, only in the identity of the race – the Zionists speaking of a «Jewish race», and the Nazis of an «Aryan race». Racial consciousness led the two ideologies to the belief in a super-race or super-nation, which is endowed with a special historic destiny and called upon to fulfill a unique cultural mission. [Saab 1968, p. 9]

Saab’s Zionism and Racism laid the basis for successive Palestinian critiques that depicted Zionism as a form of racism, drawing parallels with other systems of racial exclusion and discrimination. His portrayal of Zionism through a racial perspective also contributed to the PLO’s international advocacy by aligning the Palestinian cause within the same analytical framework used to critique apartheid and colonial racism. This framing would prove particularly relevant in UN debates during the 1970s.

Another substantial contribution from the PLO Research Center was George Jabbour’s Settler Colonialism in Southern Africa and the Middle East [Jabbour 1970], one of the first scholarly works to explicitly use the term «settler colonialism» and apply it within a comparative analytical framework. It argues that Zionism is part of the same family as the white-supremacist settler states in Southern Africa. In the introduction of his essay, Jabbour states:

There is a pattern of behavior which is identical in its general lines exhibited by those European settlers who have formed political entities in non-European lands; that this pattern of behavior is quite recognisable in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and Israel; and that it is therefore warranted to study those experiments within the framework of this behavior. [Ibid., p. 7]

With striking analytical clarity, Jabbour advanced ideas that would later become key pillars of settler-colonial theory, namely the distinction between «traditional» and settler colonialism, and the argument that, in settler-colonial contexts, the primary objective is the control of land rather than the exploitation of labour. Settlers are «land-hungry people» [Ibid., p. 38], claims Jabbour; they are «permanently there» and «invariably pre-occupied with the question of acquiring land» [Ibid., p. 7]. While many traditional colonial systems were primarily focused on the extraction of labour (the exploitation of Indigenous or imported populations for economic purposes), settler colonialism is motivated by the need to secure land, reshape it, and establish a permanent and exclusive colonial order:

The settlers’ systematic acquisition of land enabled them to secure the material (geographic) basis of their states. As to the natives, they were either pushed away to parts of their original lands «reserved» for them (South Africa and Southern Rhodesia) or else driven out of their lands rather completely (Israel). [Ibid., p. 39]

The emphasis on the permanence of settlement anticipates the later understanding of settler colonialism as a distinct, self-perpetuating system of domination that continues to shape Indigenous-settler relations (including land ownership, access to resources, and political representation) long after the initial acts of colonial conquest. This perspective aligns Israel with the white supremacist settler states of Southern Africa:

Declared espousal of discrimination, on the basis of race, colour or creed, without the need to feel apologetic about it, is the distinguishing feature of settler colonialism. Because the settlers are well-entrenched in the lands they acquire, settler colonialism is not as easy to dismantle as traditional colonialism. The colonialists here were not overseas agents who came to the colonies on duty; they were permanently stationed in the colony, permanently in control of the natives and permanently fortifying their positions of strength. [Ibid., p. 8]

Settler colonialism is inherently violent, argues Jabbour, with indigenous populations subjected to systematic and inhumane treatment that surpasses what is typically observed under classical colonial regimes: «when the settlers were confronted with the natives, they treated them almost as a subhuman species» [Ibid., p. 57]. Settlers consistently assert a position of superiority (racial, cultural, or religious) reinforced through conquest and domination. While similar attitudes toward the native population can be observed in South Africa and Rhodesia, the Palestinian situation was considerably harsher. In this case, «the «ordinary» European superiority toward the natives is reinforced by the Zionist ideology and the whole religious-historical concept of the Jews being a chosen people» [Ibid., p. 59].

As Jabbour points out, violence and terror are structural features because «the Zionists want the lands empty» [Ibid., p. 54]. Unlike in Southern Africa, where indigenous populations were exploited as a labour force, in Palestine the settlers sought removal rather than exploitation: « they did not want them as cheap labor but as evacuees» [Ibid., p. 62]. Zionist settlers were mainly concerned with maintaining their own purity and showed little interest in engaging with the Indigenous population: «For them the question was essentially how to get the land and get rid of the natives of the land» [Ibid., p. 201]. It is clear that this is not only a matter of taking control of the land, but of transforming its very nature.

In retrospect, the work of these authors laid much of the conceptual groundwork that would later be formalized within contemporary settler-colonial studies. Developing their analyses from the specific context of Palestinian dispossession and exile, they outlined the fundamental characteristics that continue to define the academic field: the structural nature of colonization, the logic of eradication underpinning settler expansion, the racialization of sovereignty, and the intrinsic impossibility of coexistence under settler dominance. Subsequent scholarship drew directly on these seminal contributions.10

The intellectual efforts of the Palestine Research Center soon acquired political relevance as the analytical framework developed by these authors, most notably Sayegh himself, was translated into legal and diplomatic arguments at the UN, particularly in the debates that culminated in Resolution 3379. We now turn to the making and meaning of this Resolution.

4. «A form of racism and racial discrimination»

The comparison between Zionism and other settler and racist regimes extended beyond analytical inquiry; it also carried strategic weight, anchoring the Palestinian question within the anti-colonial and anti-racist discourse that dominated international legal debates in the 1960s and 1970s.11 In this context, Fayez A. Sayegh’s interventions in the UN constitute one of his most enduring legacies. His analysis of Zionism, combined with his diplomatic engagement, shaped the discourse that led to UN General Assembly Resolution (UNGA) 3379, of which he was one of the main architects, stating that «Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination» [UNGA 1975]. While his role as Rapporteur of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) provided a formal platform to frame Israel’s policies toward Palestinians in terms of racial discrimination, his position as representative of the Kuwaiti mission at the UN enabled him to work closely with other Arab states’ delegations in drafting, presenting and advocating for UNGA 3379 before the General Assembly plenary [Erakat 2025].

Between 1973 and 1975, Sayegh delivered four statements on Zionism before the UN’s Third Committee and the Special Political Committee [Sayegh 1976]. In these speeches, he linked Zionism to the basic ideas of settler colonialism and racial domination. He argued that Zionism was not simply a nationalist movement but an exclusionary, racist ideology that institutionalized Jewish superiority. By defining Jewish identity in ethnic-national rather than religious terms, Zionism sought to establish an exclusivist state (a Jewish state, or Judenstaat) based on the displacement and exclusion of the indigenous Palestinian population.

The Zionist program aimed to accomplish its goals through two interconnected processes. First, it sought to gather Jews from around the globe into a designated territory. Second, it aimed to remove as many non-Jews as possible from that same territory to accommodate the incoming Jewish populations. Sayegh used a powerful metaphor to make this point, comparing the Zionists’ logic of replacement to the heart’s rhythm of coordinated inflow and outflow. Just as the heart functions through the simultaneous actions of pumping blood in and pumping it out, this interpretation suggests that Zionism relies on both the influx of Jews and the outflow of non-Jews to establish a Jewish state:

As in the beating of the heart two rhythmic operations – a pumping-in and a pumping-out operation – are indispensable for the heartbeat, so in the heartbeat of Zionism the pumping-in of Jews and the pumping-out of non-Jews are indispensable for the fulfillment of the goal of Zionism: the establishment of the Judenstaat. [Ibid., p. 8]

Moreover, under racially discriminatory policies, Palestinians who were expelled are not permitted to return, while those who were not «pumped out» suffer unequal treatment due to non-Jewish identity. Sayegh contends that Zionism instituted a system of «distinctions, exclusions, restrictions, and preferences» [Ibid., p. 11] grounded on descent and ethnic origin, as defined by the UN, thereby aligning it with apartheid and white settler regimes in Southern Africa.

As this article suggests, the arguments presented here emerge from a decade-long effort by Palestinian scholars at the Palestine Research Center to develop a coherent body of ideas on the nature of the Zionist colonization of Palestine. In his earlier writings, Sayegh depicted Zionism as a racial and settler-colonial regime that combines the demographic goals of settler colonialism with the ideas of racial superiority. In diplomatic international forums, and particularly at the UN, he translated these arguments into the language of international law, describing Zionism as a form of racism deserving the same moral and legal condemnation reserved for the crime of apartheid. It is no coincidence that UNGA 3379 was passed at a crucial moment in history, when many newly independent states from Africa, Asia, and the Arab world were redefining the moral and legal language of international politics. Indeed, it was part of a global campaign to define racial discrimination and apartheid as violations of international law and threats to international peace and security, particularly through the adoption of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) and the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973), and that culminated with the UN’s Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination (1973-1983). The Non-Aligned Movement, the Organisation of African Unity, and the Soviet bloc united to launch this international campaign aiming to oppose South Africa’s apartheid system. Building on this global anti-racist and anti-colonial momentum, UNGA 3379 linked the Palestinian struggle to the broader fight against institutionalized racism and colonial domination, proving both moral legitimacy and a legal foundation for Palestinian claims. In fact, it begins by citing Resolution 3151, passed on 14 December 1973, which condemned the «unholy alliance between South African racism and Zionism» [UNGA 1973]. Later, other UN documents that condemned both apartheid and Zionism used the same language.

Nevertheless, compared with earlier UN resolutions condemning South Africa’s apartheid regime, which were lengthy, detailed, and called for concrete measures such as sanctions or arms embargoes, Resolution 3379 was remarkably brief and purely declaratory. It labelled Zionism as a form of racism but recommended no specific actions or enforcement mechanisms. This reflected political necessity: a short, symbolic formulation made it easier to maintain a broad coalition within the General Assembly, avoiding divisive debates over sanctions or implementation that might have eroded support, especially in the Non-Aligned Movement and among African countries, some of which were cautious about escalating tensions with Western powers and Israel. Its significance, therefore, lay less in practical enforcement and more in symbolic and ideological impact: it sought to place Zionism within the UN’s growing body of resolutions addressing racism, apartheid, and colonialism, making a moral and political determination rather than initiating a program of action.

Sayegh’s involvement with the UN marked the concrete realisation of his earlier theoretical work. He succeeded in translating his theoretical framework into the legal language of international law, thereby giving his argument both intellectual coherence and diplomatic leverage. Zionist Colonialism in Palestine and Four Speeches provided much of the conceptual basis that informed Resolution 3379. His framing of Zionism through the lens of settler colonialism and racism made Palestinian dispossession legible within the UN’s anti-racism conventions and its broader legal architecture opposing colonialism, allowing the Palestinian cause to be connected to the growing tide of global decolonization movements and anti-apartheid struggles. For the PLO, this was a strategic chance to not only question the ideological legitimacy of Israel but also to set the stage for its diplomatic isolation. Even though the Resolution was repealed in 1991, the idea of Zionism as a racial and settler-colonial project continues to influence both academic research and decolonial practices today.12

5. «The worst type of occupation»

The Palestine Research Center maintained a close and continuous relationship with the resistance movement, serving as an ideological bridge between scholarly production and the ideological and strategic development of the Palestinian liberation movement. Palestinian resistance groups drew on the settler-colonial framework developed by the Palestine Research Center’s intellectuals to conceptualize Zionism as a form of settler colonialism. One of the first articulations of this framework appears in Fatah’s Studies and Revolutionary Experiences pamphlet «The Liberation of Occupied Countries and the Method of Struggle Against Direct Colonialism» [Fatah 1967], part of a series aimed to educate cadres and sympathizers on the anti-colonial nature of the Palestinian struggle. While in this study, as well as in other early documents, Fatah does not explicitly employ the exact term «settler colonialism», its analysis of Zionism clearly reflects an understanding consistent with the core ideas of settler colonial theory. For Fatah, Zionism was not merely a form of «direct colonialism» (al-istiʿmār al-mubāshir), which typically entails temporary military occupation by a foreign power, but rather a more comprehensive and enduring system based on the permanent implantation of settlers, the displacement of the indigenous population, and the reorganization of land and social structures to serve settler interests:

The worst type of occupation (iḥtilāl) is that which takes the form of settler colonialism (al-istiṭān), when the invading countries attempt to bring groups of their own populations to replace the indigenous people of the land, carrying out an aggressive role of dispersing, exploiting, or exterminating them. The French settlement in Algeria was a vivid example of this, and an even worse example is the Zionist occupation of part of Palestine, the usurpation of that territory, and the displacement of its people. This colonial plague has spread to many parts of the world, such as Rhodesia and South Africa. [Ibid., p.4]

The Arabic term al-istiṭān literally denotes the act of settling or the permanent colonization of land. Within modern Palestinian and Arab anti-colonial discourse, however, it carries a more specific meaning: it refers to a form of colonialism based on displacing the indigenous population from the land and establishing permanent settler sovereignty, rather than simply exploiting resources. In this sense, al-istiṭān corresponds to what is now termed in contemporary scholarship as «settler colonialism», and its use marks an early recognition of this distinct colonial form based on dispossession and replacement, one that fundamentally differs from other types of foreign domination, such as direct military occupation or indirect colonial control.13

Fatah viewed Zionism as a form of settler colonialism that went beyond the narrower bounds of traditional colonial rule, resulting in structural, demographic, and territorial transformations that permanently altered Palestinian society and its relationship to the land. The problem is not just occupation, but a colonial structure aimed at replacement:

History has witnessed a new and particularly brutal form of colonisation, whose depth and violence were manifested in the expulsion of an entire people from their homeland, the occupation of their land, the fragmentation of their social structures, and the imposition of extermination (ibādah) upon them. […]. The Zionist invasion, in reality, represents an occupation in the harshest form, for our people have been replaced by a group of alien elements who came from various human societies. The Zionist movement gathered them together, and their invasion represents a colonialist movement (ḥarakat isti‘māriyya) with a racist character [Ibid., p. 17].

In this formulation, Zionist colonialism is described as a project that builds a new society on the ruins of the indigenous one, «removing the social imprints of the oppressed population and severing it from its natural environment». Thus, the liberation struggle is conceived not only as the overthrow of an imperial presence but also as the dismantling of the entire settler-colonial structure, including its military, political, and economic institutions, to prevent their re-emergence. The goal, then, goes beyond military defeat. It includes the «comprehensive de-Zionisation of the territory».

Whether Marxist or nationalist, Arab and Palestinian thinkers depict the Zionist project primarily through their lived experience of exile and dispossession: Israel is frequently described as an externally imposed colonial project, a settler base directly tied to Western imperialism, aiming at the usurpation of land and the eradication of the Palestinian presence. While at this stage the exact terms «settler colonialism» or «al-istiʿmār al-istiṭānī» were not always employed, their analysis clearly reflected the notion that Israel constituted a settler-colonial project operating according to the logic of demographic replacement. For example, already in the Palestinian National Charter (1964; revised 1968) Zionism is explicitly defined as «a movement organically linked with international imperialism, racist and fanatical in nature, aggressive, expansionist, colonialist in its aims (ʿudwāniyya, tawassuʿiyya, istīṭāniyya), and fascist in its methods» [PLONC 1968, Art. 22]. Here, the settler-colonial framing is carried by the expression istīṭāniyya. In Fatah’s publications of that time, Israel is often described as a «settler-state» [Fatah 1970, 2 April, p. 12]. In the analysis of the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Israel is defined primarily according to the role it plays within the global imperialist system: it is a colonial outpost implanted on Arab land, organically linked to the global Zionist movement, and used by U.S. imperialism to counter progressive Arab movements, thereby ensuring the exploitation of the human and material resources of the Arab world. In its 1969 programmatic manifesto, A Strategy for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP 1970], Israel is referred to as a «colonialist expansionist presence (wujūdan tawassuʿiyyan istīʿmāriyyan)» and as «an imperialist and colonialist base (qāʿidatan imbiriyāliyya wa-istīʿmāriyya)» and Zionism as «an aggressive racial movement (ka-ḥaraka ʿunṣuriyya ʿudwāniyya) connected with imperialism».14

A critical engagement with Palestinian anticolonial literature reveals that the concept of settler colonialism was clearly present, both semantically and conceptually, even before the terminology of the settler-colonial theory became standardized in later scholarship. By the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, both the English «settler colonialism» and the Arabic «al-istiʿmār al-istiṭānī» began to appear more frequently in analytical and political writings, including publications of the Palestine Research Center and other resistance organizations, gradually replacing earlier expressions such as «direct colonialism», «colonialism of a dual nature», and «settler-state». A notable example is the Political Statement issued during the Fifth Session of the Palestine National Council [PNC 1969], held in Cairo on 4 February 1969, at a time when the guerrilla organizations were consolidating their control over the PLO and electing Yasir Arafat as Chairman of the Executive Committee. The statement clearly describes Zionism as a settler-colonial project:

We have been forced to follow that road [of resistance and liberation] thanks to the Zionist movement which is a form of settling colonialism (al-ḥaraka al-ṣahyūniyya al-isti‘māriyya al-istīṭāniyya) and which is in collusion with the imperialist nations, particularly the United States, for there is no other way to repel the Zionist-imperialist invasion of the Arab homeland, which has established a bridgehead in Palestine.15

Starting in the early 1970s, these terms began to appear more frequently in the literature of the Palestinian resistance movement. For instance, the PFLP used this (or very similar) expression in the Political Report of its Third National Congress, held in March 1972, both in the original Arabic document and in its official English translation: «Firstly, ours is a difficult, complex and ruthless struggle. In addition to those general aspects of liberation struggle […], there is the specificity of our own struggle, where Zionist settler-imperialism (al-isti‘mār al-isti‘ṭānī, in the Arabic text) defends its existence in a life or death battle» [PFLP 1972, p. 84], and later in the same document, commenting on the Israeli policies of expansionism in the territories conquered in 1967, it reiterates that «Israel has gone a long way towards achieving this transfer from settler-colonialism to imperialist expansionism (min al-isti‘mār al-isti‘ṭānī ilā al-tawassu‘ al-imperiyālī)» [Ibid., p. 61].16

Other examples of its use by resistance groups can be found in the early political documents of the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DPFLP, later DFLP), such as the 1970 essay Towards a Democratic Solution to the Palestinian Question, which states that «the Israeli society was built up through a colonial settlement operation in the shadow of Zionist reactionary chauvinistic ideology» [DPFLP 1970, p. 11]. In the 1971 document Proposals to the 9th Palestinian National Congress [DPFLP 1971], Israel is described as «the Zionist colonial-settler state», a term that would be used more frequently in the Political Program of 1975 [DFLP 1975]:

Zionism is a reactionary racialist movement (ḥarakah ʿunṣuriyyah rajaʿiyyah) which is firmly tied to world imperialism and which constitutes a negation of the national existence of the Palestinian people […]. The Zionist project grew and developed under the aegis of British colonialism, and it now maintains its racialist and settler-colonial institutions (fī iṭār shūfīnī wa-istiʿmārī-istiṭānī) thanks to the wide-ranging support of American imperialism. [Ibid., pp. 23-24]

Elsewhere in the text, Israel is framed as a «racialist and settler-colonial project (al-mashrūʿ al-istiʿmārī al-istiṭānī al-ʿunṣurī)» [Ibid., p. 30].17

This clearly indicates that Arab and Palestinian intellectuals, as well as the PLO and the main resistance organizations, had already expressed the concept of «settler colonialism» via the Arabic phrase «al-istiʿmār al-istiṭānī», which explicitly conveys the notion of a distinct type of colonialism driven by a logic of population replacement. By the mid-1990s, as settler colonialism was developing into a distinct academic field with its specific analytical vocabulary, the Arabic term «al-istiʿmār al-istiṭānī» started to gain wider circulation among Arab and Palestinian scholars. This clearly reflected the growing influence of global settler-colonial theory and the scholars’ intention to employ this terminology to align the Palestinian case with indigenous struggles worldwide.

The analysis of Zionism as a settler-colonialism also has a normative dimension: Palestinian thinkers and resistance groups agreed that liberation required dismantling settler structures before building an egalitarian political order. The next section examines how this settler-colonial framing underpinned the proposals for a unitary, democratic state across historic Palestine.

6. «A New Palestine»

This analysis of Zionism reveals the impossibility of coexistence in a settler-dominated framework. This point was further elaborated in Jabbour’s Settler Colonialism in Palestine. Zionist settler colonialism, Jabbour argues, was based on the notion that the land should be uninhabited, or made so through displacement. Such commitment to racial purity left little willingness to accommodate the indigenous population, even as cheap labourers. Therefore, settlers’ «peace» is based on military dominance, not indigenous consent. The push for exclusivity, Jabbour maintains, is based on both racist ideas and strategic concerns. The challenges facing South Africa’s apartheid were evident when Israel was founded; this is why the Zionist leaders in Palestine believed that the large-scale removal of the native population was the only way to create an «internally secure» state, a process that was largely carried out in 1948 [Jabbour 1970, pp. 201-208].

Faced with the dilemma of remaining committed to annexing the occupied territories while avoiding integration with the native population, Zionist settlers have adopted a strategy similar to that of South African settlers: dominance without coexistence. Since mid-1967, this thinking has included proposals for a limited, internally autonomous Palestinian entity within Israel in parts of the occupied territories:

The idea of a small native «Bantustan» entity in Israel, in a greater Israel, is thus a corner-stone in the settlers’ visions of the future. Admittedly it will take a long time for the settlers to formally espouse such a solution, and longer to put it into effect. But again this course of events is inevitable since the settlers are determined to expand, and at the same time guard their racial and cultural exclusiveness. [Jabbour 1970, p. 207]

Viewed today, these words appear to foreshadow the underlying dynamics that would lead in the following decades to the signing of the Oslo Accords and the launch of the so-called «peace process», resulting in the further fragmentation of Palestinian territory and the consolidation of an apartheid system akin to or, in many respects, worse than that of South Africa. Yet no native movements call for the mass expulsion or destruction of settlers, concludes Jabbour. Their future vision is based on equal rights for all, regardless of race or nationality, and removal of discriminatory settler institutions: «Establishing a state on the basis of equality to all means simply that all present state structures based on discrimination have to be supplanted» [Jabbour 1970, p. 212]. To many settlers, this demand feels like a threat to their very existence, having long assumed their dominance is natural.

If coexistence under settler-colonial structures proves impossible, then the necessity of a political framework founded on equality and decolonial justice follows. For Sayegh, a just and lasting peace could only be achieved through a principled solution addressing the root causes of the conflict (namely, the dispossession of Palestinians and the exclusivist character of Zionism) within a unitary, democratic political framework in which all inhabitants would enjoy equal rights and common citizenship. As he puts it, not a «solution somewhere between», but a «solution above them both» [Sayegh 1970, p. 35]. In Palestine, Israel and Peace, an essay published by the Palestine Research Center in February 1970, Sayegh presents its vision for a single democratic state in Palestine as an alternative to both Zionist and Arab exclusivist national projects. Insofar as the rights of the Palestinian people and the claims of Israel are «mutually exclusive», leaving no room for genuine compromise, efforts to reconcile the two through negotiation or procedural formulas are ultimately illusory and risk imposing surrender on one side. As a result, continued confrontation is inevitable, with stakes as high as national survival and the potential for catastrophic outcomes.

Central to Sayegh’s argument is the rejection of any political arrangement based on ethnic or religious supremacy. He dismisses both the expulsion of Jews and the permanent exclusion of Palestinian refugees as morally indefensible and politically unworkable: «Neither an exclusionist “Jewish State”, existing in all or part of Palestine at the expense of deprived Palestinians, nor a restored Arab Palestine, in which the non-indigenous Jewish immigrants cannot aspire to have a place» [Ibid., p. 39], can meet the ethical and political requirements for a just peace. Anticipating the themes that would later shape contemporary debates regarding a one-state or binational solution, Sayegh critiques the idea of a binational state, arguing that it institutionalises and therefore also perpetuates communal divisions instead of overcoming them. The alternative is what he calls a «new Palestine», that is to say «a pluralistic, humanistic, secular and democratic state» [Ibid., p. 37] in which indigenous Palestinians, both Christian and Muslim, as well as non-indigenous Jews, can coexist and would freely intermingle to form an authentic human community, with all individuals as equal citizens and committed builders of a shared political future.

From the late 1960s onward, the Palestinian resistance movement began to discuss a proposal to establish a unitary, democratic, and non-sectarian state in Palestine. This solution was intended to secure Palestinian self-determination by ensuring the refugees’ right of return and ending the occupation of Arab lands, while also allowing Jewish settlers to remain as equal citizens alongside the indigenous Palestinians, provided they renounce Zionism. The aforementioned 1969 Fifth Session of the Palestinian National Council formally adopted this proposal, which eventually became the official policy of the PLO. It resolved to «reject all liquidatory resolutions and projects, including the Security Council Resolution [242] of 22 November 1967» and called for «establishing an independent democratic society in Palestine for all Palestinians, Moslems, Christians and Jews» [PNC 1969].

Within the Resistance movement, this idea was framed by the two main ideological currents: Palestinian nationalism and Arab nationalism [Abdul-Majid 1979]. The first, represented by al-Fatah, viewed the creation of an independent Palestinian state as a first step toward a federated Arab entity. The «democratic, progressive, and non-sectarian Palestine» would grant Israeli Jews full citizenship, equal access to resources, and the right to freely express their religious and cultural beliefs. The idea of a democratic, non-sectarian state is not equivalent to «surrender to Israel, negotiations with its racist government, or a proposed agent state for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip». Instead, it can only emerge «out of liberation and as a consequence of liberation: hence, it is not a substitute for liberation» [Rasheed 1970, p. 8]. Supporters of the second perspective, including pan-Arabist organizations like the Arab Liberation Front and al-Saiqa, as well as Marxist groups such as the PFLP and the DFLP, believed that a democratic Palestinian state could only emerge after the success of the Arab revolution, the dismantling of artificial states created by colonial powers, and the elimination of the Zionist presence in the region. The Palestinian anti-colonial struggle was thus connected to the broader struggle for Arab liberation and social change, as the Popular Fronts saw it. In their vision, a liberated Palestine would be an essential part of a unified Arab state that would remove the basis for economic exploitation and national, ethnic, and religious oppression [PFLP 1970].

However, from the mid-1970s onward, a series of regional changes gradually shifted the focus of the PLO’s political agenda from anti-colonial liberation to state-building without liberation.18 The PLO leadership moved toward the idea of establishing a Palestinian state in the territories occupied in 1967, as a step toward liberating all of historic Palestine [Gresh 1988]. The PLO’s 1974 «phased program» officially accepted this change. Over the following decades, the PLO worked toward this goal through negotiations that led to the 1993 Oslo Accords. This changed the structure and nature of the organization: what had been an anticolonial liberation movement in exile transformed into a self-governing body operating within the Israeli colonial structure [Yazid Sayigh 1997]. In other words, the solution of a single democratic state framed in anticolonial terms was gradually replaced by the «two-state, two-peoples» formula, which focused on state-building, territorial compromise, and (U.S.-sponsored) bilateral negotiations. It is precisely the kind of scenario Fayez A. Sayegh predicted would have failed.

Reflecting changes on the ground, the settler-colonial analysis has gradually declined in Palestinian political discourse since the mid-1970s, giving way to an interpretation of the conflict as one between two national movements [Pappé 2013; Hilal 2015]. However, after the failures of the Oslo period and the entrenchment of Israeli settler-colonial policies, many Palestinian, Arab, and international scholars returned to the settler-colonial paradigm as the most effective framework for explaining the persistence of colonial structures and for reconsidering Palestinian strategies for liberation. The rise of a new generation of critical scholars progressively transformed the discourse, and the settler-colonial framework has taken centre stage in academic and intellectual discussions of Palestine [Rouhana and Hawari 2023]. In a similar vein, renewed interest in the debate over a one-state solution has marked a decisive shift in discourse from partition, negotiations and statehood to decolonization, equal rights and justice.19

As these analyses suggest, the failure of Oslo and other negotiated solutions is not an accident of history. Rather, it reflects the impossibility of reconciling agendas based on «territorial compromise» or «coexistence» with a settler-colonial regime committed to exclusive, permanent control over the land and to the removal, if not the physical elimination, of the native population. The notion of a unitary democratic Palestine was not an abstract or utopian aspiration, but a conceptual framework grounded in anticolonial theory and developed as a response to the settler-colonial character of Israel. As discussed in the concluding section, this invites a more comprehensive reconsideration of the origins of settler-colonial analysis.

7. Reassessing the genealogy of the field

This article has suggested that the intellectual work of Fayez A. Sayegh and the Palestine Research Center offered an important, though often overlooked, early formulation of a settler-colonial analysis of Zionism. Sayegh’s writings represent one of the first systematic attempts to theorise Zionism as a form of settler colonialism, making him a central figure in Palestinian anti-colonial thought and a pioneer in settler-colonial theory. Moreover, his perspective provides powerful insight into Zionism as a system of racialized, settler-colonial domination, placing his analysis at the intersection of racial and settler-colonial theories [Erakat 2025].

However, Sayegh’s contributions did not emerge in isolation; rather, they formed part of the Palestine Research Center’s intellectual efforts to develop a systematic study of Zionism, in which Palestine was framed as a paradigmatic case of settler colonialism. These analyses influenced legal arguments in UN forums, where issues of racial discrimination and colonial domination were increasingly debated, and were adopted by Palestinian resistance organizations from the late 1960s through the 1970s. It was against the backdrop of exile, dispossession, and resistance that the concept of settler colonialism first assumed a coherent analytical significance, long before its revival in the late-1990s Anglophone academia.

As discussed above, the first Arab and Palestinian formulations of settler-colonial analysis arose from within the liberation movement itself. They were used as political tools by intellectuals facing dispossession and actively participating in the national struggle. For Sayegh, as for many other intellectuals, scholarship was inseparable from politics. In this sense, their approach anticipates current discussions in settler-colonial studies that call for integrating theoretical analysis with decolonial ethics and for realigning our understanding of settler colonialism within an indigenous framework [Barakat 2018]. Decolonisation, for these authors, could not occur while settler-colonial structures remained in place; rather, it required the establishment of a new egalitarian order within a single democratic polity, achievable only after the dismantling of the Zionist state.

In conclusion, a re-examination of Palestinian anticolonial literature sheds new light on the genealogy of settler colonial theory. By the latter half of the 1960s, Arab and Palestinian intellectuals had clearly recognized the defining features of Zionist settler colonialism. Key concepts later systematized in academic scholarship, including the logic of elimination, the centrality of land over labour, the permanence of settler structures, the racialization of sovereignty, and the global interconnections of settler-colonial regimes, had already been formulated and widely debated within the Palestinian liberation movement. Reengaging with this literature provides contemporary scholars with analytical tools to better understand the persistence and resurgence of settler-colonial violence in Palestine, which today manifests in recurring ethnic cleansing campaigns in the West Bank and culminates in the ongoing genocide in the Gaza Strip. The «dual nature» of Zionism, as defined by Sayegh, reveals that the core of the Palestinian issue lies in the fundamental contradiction between the Palestinian presence on the land and the Zionist imperative to replace it with a new colonial order based on Jewish exclusivism. Striking evidence, to use Sayigh’s metaphor, that the Zionist «heart» continues its movement of «pumping in» and «pumping out», adapting its forms over time yet maintaining the same fundamental goal: the emptying of Palestine of its Indigenous inhabitants.

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ISSN 2385-2526

This article reconstructs the genealogy of the Iranian women’s movement, establishing a critical historical linkage between the «Women’s Uprising» of March 1979 and the «Woman, Life, Freedom» (Zhina) movement of 2022. While the mass protests of 1979 have been systematically erased from official state narratives, this study argues that the 2022 uprising is not an isolated phenomenon but the cumulative result of a forty-year struggle for bodily autonomy and political agency. The death of Mahsa (Zhina) Amini in September 2022 ignited unprecedented protests across Iran and the diaspora under the rallying cry: «Woman, Life, Freedom» (Zan, Zendegi, Azadi). While global media portrayed these protests as spontaneous, they represent the culmination of generations of feminist activism, resistance, and theoretical development within Iranian society. By employing a genealogical framework, the article analyzes the «intermediate episodes» of resistance that bridged these two eras, specifically the reformist press movement of the 1990s, the grassroots «One Million Signatures» campaign, and the «Girls of Revolution Street» movement in 2017. The findings demonstrate that the contemporary demand for regime change is deeply rooted in the unfinished business of 1979, having evolved from the initial defensive reaction against compulsory hijab into a proactive, autonomous political force that refuses to subordinate women’s rights to other political ideologies.

Keywords – Iranian women’s movement; 1979 revolution; compulsory hijab; Ayatollah Khomeini; feminist genealogy; Woman, Life, Freedom; Zhina Amini; political agency.

1. Introduction

On 8 March 1979, merely three weeks after the triumph of the Iranian Revolution, tens of thousands of women poured into the streets of Tehran in spontaneous protest against Ayatollah Khomeini’s first declaration regarding the imposition of hijab (Islamic modest dress) in government workplaces. This uprising, which continued for five days despite violent repression, represented the first major opposition movement to the nascent Islamic Republic and the largest women’s demonstration in Iranian history [Esfandiari 2022, October]. Yet despite its magnitude, this movement has been systematically erased from the official narrative of the Islamic Republic and remains inadequately documented in scholarly literature [Saberi 2025].

This article posits that the «Women, Life, Freedom» protests of 2022 cannot be fully understood without reference to this suppressed history. Rather than viewing 1979 and 2022 as disconnected historical bookends, this research argues they are linked by a continuous «genealogy of resistance». The 2022 movement represents the maturation of the seeds sown in 1979, nurtured through decades of evolving strategies, from the reformist attempts to work within the system to the radical bodily defiance of recent years [Sadeghi 2018, p. 45].

To reconstruct this historical trajectory, this research employs a qualitative, historical-sociological approach. It draws on extensive archival research and original in-depth interviews with thirty-six women who participated in the 1979 protests. Furthermore, it utilizes the comprehensive oral history documentation provided by Mahnaz Matin and Naser Mohajer to analyze the specific mechanisms of the 1979 mobilization. The analysis is further contextualized through data from recent doctoral research, which examines the «middle years» of resistance, integrating the narratives of contemporary activists involved in the «One Million Signatures» campaign and the «Girls of Revolution Street» movement to map the continuity of the struggle.

The two-volume work The Women’s Uprising in Iran in March 1979: Another Birth, authored by Mahnaz Matin and Naser Mohajer represents the first comprehensive academic examination of this critical episode. Their research, grounded in documents, newspapers, photographs, and collected oral histories, provides unprecedented insight into the uprising’s background, participants, and implications, as well as the international feminist solidarity it generated [Matin & Mohajer 2013].

Understanding the 1979 movement is essential to comprehending the structural continuities and historical consciousness that animated the recent «Woman, Life, Freedom» (Zan, Zendegi, Azadi) movement following Zhina (Mahsa) Amini’s death in September 2022 [Saberi 2025, 11 July]. The pattern established in March 1979, of women becoming the first organized opposition to the Islamic Republic’s gender policies, [New York Post 1979, 8 March] has recurred throughout the regime’s history. From Tehran to smaller cities across Iran’s diverse provinces, women in both 1979 and 2022 spontaneously mobilized against mandatory hijab, revealing shared political consciousness transcending geographical, ethnic, and class divisions [Saberi 2023, p. 29]. This article demonstrates how Iranian women, who had actively participated in overthrowing the Shah’s regime, became the first victims of the revolution [Moghadam 2004, 16-17 November] they helped achieve, establishing tensions that would define post-revolutionary Iran and find renewed expression in the 2022 nationwide protests.

2. From revolutionary agents to primary targets

Iranian women’s participation in the 1979 revolution was extensive and significant. During the revolutionary movement against Mohammad Reza Shah, women stood shoulder to shoulder with men in this political struggle against the regime and fulfilled their agency despite the entrenched traditions and regressive beliefs that had limited them in various aspects of life. They participated in demonstrations, strikes, and various forms of political mobilization across class backgrounds, workers, students, professionals, and housewives [Ahmad & Banuazizi 1985, p. 3].

However, the transition from revolutionary participant to regime victim occurred with remarkable speed. Shahla Badi’i, a founding member of the National Union of Women who had been in exile during the Pahlavi era, described her immediate sense of foreboding upon Khomeini’s return in February 1979. She recalled that «immediately after Khomeini’s arrival, concerns about the restriction of women’s rights had instilled fear and anxiety in the hearts of women» [Basiri 1999, pp. 130-156].

These concerns proved well-founded. Almost immediately after assuming power, the new regime moved to dismantle women’s legal protections. The Family Protection Law,1 which had provided women with minimal rights regarding marriage, divorce, and child custody through decades of advocacy by women’s rights activists, particularly Senator Mehrangiz Manuchehrian (1906-2000) [Ahmadi & Ardalan 2003] was repealed immediately on grounds of «opposition to Islamic law». Simultaneously, efforts began to impose compulsory hijab on women across Iranian society [Mir-Hosseini & Hamzić 2010, pp. 80-110].

A statement issued by women’s groups captured their disillusionment: Iranian women expected that after the victory of the 1979 revolution, all the humiliations and insults against women would suddenly come to an end. They believed that «all the laws of the monarchy that discriminated against women in society and placed the control of her life in the hands of others should be relegated to the dustbin of history with the collapse of the monarchical regime» [Najafi 1979, 1 April, p. 1]. This realization led women to understand that to achieve freedom and equal rights, one must fight.

As Mahnaz Matin explained in an interview, the women who led the initial protest movement were not opposed to the revolution itself. Many had actively participated in overthrowing the Shah, and quite possibly for this very reason, they had the courage to take to the streets and declare: «We oppose the anti-women policies of the new regime» [Sadeghi-Boroujerdi 2013, 11 June]. Shirin Ebadi, who would later become Iran’s first Nobel Peace Prize laureate, identified the precise moment of her political rupture with the regime. Speaking at the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony in Oslo on 11 December 2003, she stated that at exactly 8 a.m. on 8 March 1979, when she heard on national radio that working women had to come to work with Islamic hijab, she realized that Khomeini was a hypocrite and a liar, and from that moment separated her path from theirs [Iran International 2023, 11 December].

3. The emergence of independent women’s organizations

The fall of Mohammad Reza Shah’s regime precipitated a transformation in women’s organizing. The Women’s Organization, which had operated under state support during the Pahlavi era, ceased its activities. In its place emerged new independent women’s groups with diverse political perspectives [Najmabadi 1991]. A 28-year-old teacher who became an early member of a newly established women’s group recalled that questions about women’s future began «a month before Khomeini’s return to Iran». She explained that among women, «there was no tradition of organization at all, so women acted on their own, establishing women’s groups among friends and colleagues to reflect on the situation» [Matin & Mohajer 2013, pp. 8-27].

Recognizing International Women’s Day as an organizing opportunity, some women published a notice in a Tehran newspaper approximately three weeks before 8 March, signed by about 40 women, explaining the day’s significance. A subsequent meeting held on 24 February to prepare for 8 March demonstrations attracted between 200 and 250 women. By 8 March 1979, several women’s groups had declared their existence, including the Women’s Awakening Society, the Revolutionary Association of Women Fighters, and the Association of Women Fighters [Echo of Iran 1979].

Only a few groups from the Pahlavi era remained active, notably the Iranian Women’s Rights Union led by Mehrangiz Manuchehrian. The Iranian Women’s Rights Union took one of the earliest official stances, conveying its position in a letter to the new government on 1 March 1979 [Kayhan 1979, 1 March, p. 3]. Notably, this letter made only general references to enhancing women’s status and avoided directly objecting to the regime’s anti-women policies. Manuchehrian believed that Khomeini’s personal practice of monogamy demonstrated his respect for women’s rights. Mehrangiz Kar, a younger lawyer and women’s rights activist, approached Manuchehrian with concerns about the impending loss of women’s rights. Manuchehrian, who had a picture of Khomeini in her office, asked: «Why should we harbour doubts about him and prepare to oppose him?» [Kar 2018, ch. 4]. This faith in Khomeini’s intentions, shared by many at the time, would soon be shattered.

Shahin Navai, co-founder of the National Women’s Alliance, noted that 8 March had been prohibited from celebration during the Pahlavi era, which had instead designated Women’s Day on the anniversary of Reza Shah’s unveiling decree [Hoodfar 1999]. As Navai explained, when the 1979 revolution occurred, everyone was preparing to celebrate 8 March [Navai 1994].

4. The hijab decree and spontaneous uprising

The immediate catalyst for the uprising came in Ayatollah Khomeini’s speech on Wednesday, 6 March 1979, at the Feizieh Seminary in Qom. Speaking before clerics, religious students, and scholars, Khomeini declared that in Islamic ministries, «there should be no disobedience», and «women should not come to the Islamic ministries and workplaces unveiled» [Paidar 1995, pp. 339-342]. Women could participate in workplaces, but they must observe the hijab, «preserving the boundaries set by the Shari’eh» [Sadr-Hashemi ١٩٨٥].

The Ettela’at newspaper published an article on 7 March titled «Imam’s Decree Regarding Islamic hijab», quoting Khomeini: «Islamic women are not dolls. Islamic women should appear with hijab, not demean themselves» [Sadr-Hashemi, 1985]. This marked the first instance of Khomeini disparaging a specific societal group.

On 8 March, female employees who went to work were prevented from entering their workplaces and instructed to return home and wear headscarves. Rather than complying, these women poured into the streets. Those who did return home brought their families, notably their mothers, and joined the demonstrations [Jamileh Nedai, personal communication, Paris, 29 May 2022].

Figure 1. The woman holding a large placard with the message «Defend Freedom with and without hijab» is Jamileh Nedai.2 She participated in the first demonstrations on 8 March 1979, by women against the compulsory hijab law imposed by Khomeini. (Source: personal collection of Jamileh Nedai)

8 March 1979 witnessed two concurrent yet distinct events in Tehran. The first comprised planned celebrations of International Women’s Day organized by newly established women’s groups at the University of Tehran. The second event, the spontaneous uprising against compulsory hijab, emerged independently when working women, nurses, and schoolgirls who had been turned away from their workplaces converged on the streets [Moghissi 1996]. The Kayhan newspaper reported that fifteen thousand women who held a lecture session at the Faculty of Engineering decided to march, chanting slogans such as «We are against despotism» and «We don›t want compulsory veiling», moving toward the Prime Minister’s office [Foundation of Historiography 1979, 8 March, p. 3].

Figure 2. Photo from the personal album of Jamileh Nedai. The placard states: «We demand a government founded on the principles of equality and equity between all individuals Men and Women, regardless of gender».

It is crucial to recognize that many women protesting compulsory hijab were not acquainted with 8 March as International Women’s Day, and it is equally inaccurate to portray the initiators of the 8 March celebrations as the architects of the anti-hijab movement [Saberi 2025, p. 111]. However, the demonstrations of working women altered the predetermined plans of leftist women’s groups, and many women present at the university events left the lecture halls to join the street protesters [Fatehrad 2015].

Kate Millett (1934-2017), an American feminist who witnessed the demonstrations firsthand, wrote in her book Going to Iran that five thousand women marched from the gates of the University of Tehran towards the city centre and government offices, «facing guns, having initiated the revolution» [Millett 1982, p. 120]. In an interview, Millett expressed astonishment that in America, organizing a demonstration on such a scale would typically necessitate years of planning, yet in Tehran, approximately a thousand people had independently gathered seemingly overnight [Politique et Psychanalyse 1979, 8 March]. Beyond Tehran, women in other cities organized solidarity demonstrations. In Isfahan, Tabriz, Mashhad, and Shiraz, women staged sit-ins and street demonstrations echoing the democratic slogans emerging from the capital, demonstrating that women’s opposition to mandatory veiling transcended regional, class, and educational differences [Foundation of Historiography 1979, 8 March].

5. Democratic slogans and political consciousness

The women’s protests were characterized by the democratic nature of their slogans, which emerged spontaneously without prior preparation. The protesters chanted «We did not make a revolution to go backwards», «Freedom is neither Eastern nor Western; it is universal», «In the dawn of freedom, the place of women’s rights is vacant», «The freedom of women is the freedom of society», «An Iranian woman fighter will not be a slave», and «Women are hardworking; the hardworking are free» [Mulard 2010].

These slogans reveal sophisticated political consciousness that transcended immediate grievances. The assertion that freedom is universal directly challenged the Islamic Republic’s anti-imperialist framing, which positioned women’s rights as Western impositions incompatible with Iranian or Islamic identity. The slogan connecting women’s freedom to societal freedom articulated prophetic understanding: the suppression of women’s autonomy would inaugurate broader authoritarian repression. As Matin and Mohajer note, this was a time when reactionaries, with the cooperation of liberal, nationalist, religious-nationalist, and leftist currents, were imposing their political supremacy on the revolutionary movement, a time when the majority of society was pinning its hopes on Islamic forces and drawing lines against dissenters, and a time when hostility towards anything suggestive of free thinking and modernism were considered virtues [Matin & Mohajer 2013].

Tens of thousands of women rose up, motivated by humanistic ideas and relying on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, swimming against the mainstream with courage and without opportunism, undeterred by the risk of damaging the «unity» of «popular» forces. Women’s statements emphasized: «We must all make it clear to our brothers that attacking women’s rights is the beginning of an attack on freedom in society» [Najafi 1979, 1 April, p. 14]. This warning proved prescient, as the successful suppression of the women’s movement emboldened the Islamic Republic to proceed with systematic elimination of press freedom, political pluralism, and labour organizing.

6. Organized violence and repression

Despite the peaceful nature of the women’s demonstrations, they were met with organized violence from the first day. The newspaper headline read «Women’s Protests Turn Violent» [Ayandegan 1979, 8 March]. ITN’s Jon Snow reported on gunshots during demonstrations, documenting acts of aggression and verbal abuse by Hezbollah forces, as well as aerial shooting by Committee forces [ITN Archive 1979, 11 March].

The coordination and readiness of many Basij men demonstrated that disruption of the women’s march was thoroughly planned. Many formed lines in front of the university to prevent thousands of women from joining the protests, physically obstructing their passage with beatings. These assailants rushed at women with slogans such as «We follow the Quran, we don’t want immodest women», «Western doll, go away», and «Neither Eastern nor Western, Islamic Republic». They broke and tore women’s umbrellas and threw snowballs at them [Jamileh Nedai, personal communication, Paris, 25 May 2022]. It was in this context that the slogan «Either the veil or a hit on the head» (Ya rusari ya tusari) was introduced for the first time.3 Prior to this, extremist Shia groups had not dared to confront women; however, seemingly through Khomeini, they received permission, and the desecration of women’s dignity was mandated as Shari’eh law.

On 9 March 1979, the French newspaper Libération published an article with the headline «Iran: le foulard ou la raclée» (Iran: the scarf or the beating), stating that groups of men were lurking in the streets of Tehran, targeting women whose hair were free and whose neck and legs were visible [Libération 1979, 9 March].

Figure 3. Archives de Libération, Paris, «Iran: le foulard ou la raclée», Libération, 9 March 1979, cover page.

The Women’s Rights Defence Committee issued a statement questioning whether women have the right to decide for themselves how they want to dress, noting that many women have been injured by knives, chains, stones, and acid for the «crime» of being unveiled, and declaring that the issue of women’s freedom has become the focal point of freedom for all the oppressed [Women’s Rights Defence Committee 1979, 10 March]. Farideh Zebarjad recounts in her memoir Trembling her mother’s warnings on 8 March, predicting that the Mullahs would not stop at just putting headscarves on women but would cover their bodies with abayas and force them to stay at home, ruining women’s lives [Zebarjad 2008]. These predictions proved accurate over subsequent decades.

7. The abandonment by political forces

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the March 1979 uprising was the failure of secular and leftist political forces to support the protesting women. Although secular women with diverse political and ideological orientations were the driving force behind the uprising, they failed to find adequate support within the broad spectrum of male secular forces in society. The vast majority of revolutionary political groups of that era, from the left wing and liberals to religious and secular groups, abandoned the women who protested against compulsory hijab, either through direct opposition or by remaining silent, which facilitated the subsequent intensification of protestor suppression and the further erosion of women’s rights [Tabari 1982].

Anti-imperialism and nationalist movements often held simplistic views regarding women’s liberation. A key question was whether women should participate only as nationalists or also confront gender oppression alongside foreign dominance. The Algerian liberation movement was an early example of this challenge. Frantz Fanon believed that as women engaged in revolution, men would recognize their equality. However, the outcomes of the Algerian Revolution, as well as the Constitutional and 1979 Iranian Revolutions, showed that this belief did not hold true [Shahidian 1994, pp. 223-247]. Women realized that their agency was only acknowledged as long as it served male-dominated power structures. One bitter experience for women was the realization that political entities virtually disregarded women’s rights and did not prioritize them. Another painful truth was that despite the magnitude of their protests, women, devoid of meaningful influence within power structures, were incapable of instigating change.

Zhaleh Ahmadi explains in her article «Hijab and Islamic Totalitarianism and Opposition» that the hijab united thugs with Mullahs close to the centre of power. For both groups, women served as the screen onto which they projected their desires, anxieties, and obsessions about honour; as such, women had to be removed from public view and confined to the private sphere [Ahmadi 2003].

8. International feminist solidarity

Whilst domestic political forces abandoned the Iranian women’s uprising, it evoked substantial enthusiasm amongst European and American feminists. The movement that emerged in support of Iranian women can be considered the first manifestation of international feminist solidarity on such a scale. The Iranian women’s uprising resonated beyond Iran’s borders amongst women’s activists and feminists worldwide, receiving modest but symbolically significant support [Millett 1982, p. 120].

Kate Millett, an influential figure in women’s rights activism and author of Sexual Politics, travelled to Iran during this period. Her experiences were documented in Going to Iran [Millet 1982]. Millett was invited by the Committee on Artistic and Intellectual Freedom in Iran (CAIFI), based in New York. The International Committee for Women’s Rights, chaired by Simone de Beauvoir, was formed on this occasion and sent a delegation to Iran with the aim of supporting the Iranian women’s uprising. Global solidarity with Iranian women activists led to hundreds of gatherings, conferences, marches, and protests in major cities around the world, including Rome, Milan, Madrid, Barcelona, Montreal, Vancouver, New York, and Washington. Dozens of articles, statements, and pamphlets about the legitimacy of the Iranian women’s uprising were printed and distributed worldwide, with headlines such as «We Are All Iranian!» and «Women’s struggle for freedom knows no bounds!» [Chan-Malik 2011, pp. 122-125; Burns 1979, 27 March].

France demonstrated the strongest solidarity. Through the efforts of Iranian groups who accompanied the French team, a remarkable film, The Iranian Women’s Movement, Year Zero, was produced documenting the women’s march of 1979 [Boissonnas et al. 1979]. Simone de Beauvoir gave a speech at a press conference in Paris, underscoring the importance of feminists worldwide collecting information regarding the challenges Iranian women were facing. She urged them to forge connections and bolster the women’s cause, pointing out that it was crucial for feminists to comprehend the specific demands of Iranian women. De Beauvoir believed Western feminists should not impose their viewpoints upon others; rather, her approach was to extend support to Iranian women from their own perspective. She proposed that the initial step should be to understand the situation fully and establish direct communication with Iranian women, emphasizing that the task was fundamentally one of information gathering, «a mission to acquire knowledge so as to put themselves in touch with Iranian women, to understand their demands, and to comprehend the methods they intend to employ in their struggle» [de Beauvoir 2015, pp. 265-269].

However, whilst women’s rights activists around the world recognized and supported the legitimacy of this movement, most left, centre, and right-wing parties, politicians, and organizations, as well as many intellectual and political tendencies, both in Iran and globally, proved unable to comprehend the authenticity and potential of this movement and turned a blind eye to it.

9. The evolution of resistance: From despair to public defiance (1990s-2019)

While the 1979 uprising was suppressed, the movement for women’s rights did not perish; rather, it underwent a complex metamorphosis, evolving from acts of desperate refusal to organized legalism, and finally, to performative public defiance. This trajectory can be understood through three distinct phases that paved the way for the 2022 uprising.

Phase 1: The Politics of Despair (1990s) The post-war era of the 1990s was characterized by the consolidation of state control over the female body, creating an atmosphere of suffocation. In this period, resistance was often individual and existential. This desperation crystallized in the tragic figure of Dr. Homa Darabi, a brilliant academic dismissed from her university position for «improper veiling». In February 1994, Darabi committed self-immolation in a public square in Tehran. Her death was not merely a personal tragedy but a profound political statement, a «somatic protest» demonstrating that the state’s bio-political control over women had become a matter of life and death [Darabi & Thomson 1999].

Phase 2: Legal Reform and Civil Society (2000s) The 2000s witnessed a strategic shift toward pragmatism and civil society organization. Women activists attempted to work within the system to dismantle discriminatory laws through discourse and petition [Mir-Hosseini 2006]. The most significant manifestation of this was the «One Million Signatures Campaign», where activists like Rezvan Moghaddam utilized face-to-face engagement to educate women about their legal rights regarding marriage and inheritance [Saberi 2025, p. 29; Tohidi 2017]. Simultaneously, the era saw the rise of prominent human rights lawyers, such as Nasrin Sotoudeh, who faced imprisonment for defending dissidents. This period proved that Iranian women were not passive victims but politically sophisticated agents capable of organizing complex, grassroots networks despite the authoritarian context.

Phase 3: The Visual Turn and the Reclamation of Public Space (2010s) The 2010s marked a «visual turn» facilitated by the digital era. Campaigns such as «My Stealthy Freedom» and «White Wednesdays», initiated by Masih Alinejad, allowed women to document their defiance, effectively breaking the state’s monopoly on truth and shattering the wall of fear [Alinejad 2018]. This digital activism materialized into physical reality in December 2017 with Vida Movahed, the «Girl of Revolution Street». By silently waving her white headscarf on a utility box, Movahed transformed the female body from a site of repression into a flag of resistance.

However, the cost of this struggle remained high. The self-immolation of Sahar Khodayari (known as the «Blue Girl») in 2019, facing prison for attempting to enter a football stadium, served as a stark reminder of the continuity of oppression. Her death highlighted that the restrictions on women extended beyond clothing to a total «gender apartheid» that excluded women from public joy and social life. These cumulative traumas and acts of defiance created the combustible material that would eventually ignite the 2022 uprising.

10. Conclusion

The Iranian women’s uprising of March 1979 represents the foundational chapter of the current struggle, a critical yet systematically erased episode that holds the key to understanding the present. To comprehend the «Woman, Life, Freedom» movement of 2022, one must look back to this historical genesis. The resistance did not begin in 2022; it began on 8 March 1979, less than a month after the revolution, when tens of thousands of women poured into the streets of Tehran to challenge the immediate imposition of the hijab. They chanted a slogan that remains analytically piercing today: «We did not make a revolution to go backwards».

These women understood a fundamental truth that their male counterparts ignored: a society cannot be free if it enslaves half its population. However, their prescience was met with a historic betrayal. The political left, nationalists, and liberals, prioritizing «unity» against imperialism over human rights, effectively told women to «go home», arguing that the battle against the West took precedence over gender equality. This was the pivotal historical mistake. By sacrificing women’s rights for a monolithic anti-imperialist front, these political forces allowed the theocratic regime to consolidate its power, pushing the women’s movement into the margins and paving the way for decades of systemic repression.

This political abandonment allowed the state to enforce what constitutes a «Dual Patriarchy», a concept elaborated in my doctoral research. Following the suppression of the 1979 uprising, Iranian women found themselves entrapped by two converging forces of oppression: a Private Patriarchy, enforced by fathers and husbands within the domestic sphere, and a Public Patriarchy, codified and enforced by the state and its laws. The mandatory hijab became the symbolic and practical intersection of these two forces, granting the state intimate control over women’s bodies while reinforcing traditional male authority in the family.

Consequently, the 2022 uprising represents the shattering of this dual structure. The «Woman, Life, Freedom» movement is the maturation of the seeds sown in 1979, nurtured through the reformist debates of the 1990s and the civil society activism of the 2000s. It marks the moment where Iranian women refused to accept the «historical mistake» of 1979 any longer. By rejecting the subordination of their rights to other political ideologies, the women of 2022 are finally reclaiming the agency denied to their mothers and grandmothers, proving that the struggle against the «Dual Patriarchy» is the central axis of Iran’s fight for democracy. The legacy of 1979 persists not as a memory of defeat, but as a testament to an unfinished revolution that is finally being completed.

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ISSN 2385-2526

This article examines the evolution of Russian and Chinese influence in Central Asia through the conceptual framework of Patron-Client Relations (PCRs). While Moscow traditionally held the role of regional patron by leveraging a wide spectrum of legacy ties, Beijing’s rising economic power and political ambitions have led to speculations about Russia’s receding role. To shed light on this dynamic, the article operationalises key PCR properties across political, economic, and security domains. By comparing the 1991-2019 baseline of Russian primacy with the post-2020 era, we show that China has institutionalised its political and economic role, but Russia has retained a resilient patronal standing. Rather than a mere displacement of power, Central Asia is witnessing the transition towards a dual patronage system sustained by a broader Russian-Chinese strategic alignment and navigated by Central Asian clients leveraging their increased agency.

Keywords – Central Asia; Russia; China; patron-client relations; dual patronage; regional agency.

1. Introduction

Over the last decade, the intensification of tensions between Russia and the West, alongside the escalating rivalry between China and the United States, signalled the return of great power competition on the global scene. The Russia-Ukraine war and heightened attritions in the South China Sea epitomize such trend. Within this context, Russian and Chinese influence over Central Asia has attracted the interest of many researchers, who have scrutinized the comparative influence of Moscow and Beijing over the region to assess which one of them will ultimately consolidate its position as the region’s patron or hegemon.

Some observers contend that China is destined for regional primacy, given the steady increase of its economic power and declining Russian resources [Pizzolo & Carteny 2022]. Others, while noting that Moscow’s hegemony is challenged by resource constraints, the growing agency of Central Asian states, and the entry of external competitors, claim that Russia is likely to maintain a significant leadership role [Kuhrt 2025, 19 August]. A dominant strain of research sticks to the assessment that over the mid-term Russia and China will abide by a «division of labour» – with the former continuing to act as the main security provider, while China cements itself as the lead economic player [Larson 2020]. Finally, many area specialists approach the issue from a different angle, emphasising the increasing capacity of Central Asian states to pursue independent foreign policies, thereby limiting the influence of both Moscow and Beijing [Anceschi 2022]. While most of this scholarship is empirical, several studies have framed these dynamics conceptually – primarily through a Realist lens [Dursun-Özkanca 2025], but also emphasizing identity, history, and institutions [Krapohl & Vasileva-Dienes 2020].

This article contributes to the debate on Russian and Chinese influence in Central Asia by advancing a conceptually framed, empirically thick analysis that extends over the long-term. It does so in three ways. First, we examine the shifts in Russian and Chinese regional influence over the span of three decades, then focus on post-2020 dynamics. Differently from mainstream Western assessments, we do not identify the 2022 Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine as the single latest turning point and major cause of regional shift. Instead, and very much like Russian and Chinese commenters, we see it as a symptom of broader global instability that was already unfolding since at least the Covid-19 pandemic – which generated significant economic and political disruptions and prompted regional actors to recalibrate their postures. Second, we frame our analysis within the concept of Patron-Client Relations (PCRs). While the lexion of «patron» and «client» is used frequently in this debate, its application is superficial at best. Here, instead, we employ the PCR lens as a tool to organize empirical data and guide observations on the relational dynamics between Russia, China, and Central Asian states.1 Third, we draw on a wealth of Russian and Chinese primary sources to provide original insights and try mitigating Western mirror-imaging; reputable secondary sources and writings by Western and Central Asian analysts are leveraged to contextualize and add nuance to our observations.

The article is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the PCR concept and its constitutive properties. Section 3 provides the empirical baseline by analyzing the roles of China and Russia from 1991 to 2019 through the PCR framework. Section 4 repeates this analytical effort for the period 2020-25, looking closely at three empirical domains that help operationalize PCRs: national interests and strategic narratives; economic presence; security and military cooperation. The conclusion synthesizes our findings to assess the evolving influence of Moscow and Beijing in Central Asia, evolving patterns of competition and cooperation, and the agency of regional actors.

2. Patron-client relations in international politics

The PCR concept originated in the ancient Roman institution of clientela, where a patronus (protector) provided favours, legal, and material support to a cliens (dependent) in exchange for political loyalty. During the Middle Ages, this evolved into ecclesiastical and artistic patronage, while later on, in the 1960s, social scientists revived the concept to describe the hierarchical, informal ties between powerful landowners and peasants in the developing world. Throughout the Cold War, political scientists adapted the PCR framework to analyze the strategic competition between superpowers as they vied for global influence.

In this article, we follow Biermann’s [2025, p. 5] most recent conceptualization of a PCR – which he defines as an «asymmetric, enduring partnership of diffuse obligation among a patron and a client, which are engaged in a mutually valued, yet dependency-inducing resource exchange». This relationship is characterized by five constitutive properties.

1. Cooperative resource exchange: unlike purely coercive relationships, PCRs are voluntary and reciprocal. Both parties must perceive value in the exchange, whether the resources are tangible (military aid, FDI) or intangible (political legitimacy, prestige).

2. Asymmetric power dependence: PCRs are inherently unequal. The patron typically commands superior, issue-specific resources that the client requires for survival or stability. This imbalance grants the patron significant bargaining leverage, though this power is contingent on the patron’s continued willingness to provide those resources.

3. Diffuse obligation: these ties are often informal and flexible rather than strictly contractual. While they lack third-party enforcement, they are sustained by a sense of reciprocal duty and the expectation of long-term continuity.

4. Durability: PCRs are not fleeting or one-off transactions but persistent relationships characterized by iterative exchanges over time. This iteration fosters a promise-like bond, where debts and obligations are managed over a long-term horizon.

5. Specialness: this property reflects the exclusive nature of the bond. PCRs involve a unique relationship that distinguishes the client from other actors and prioritizes this connection in the eyes of both patron and client [Biermann, unpublished manuscript].

Motives for engaging in PCRs are multifaceted, encompassing instrumental, ideational, and affective factors. Instrumental motives are rooted in a «logic of consequences», where actors calculate rationally the (material) costs and benefits of their relations based on self-interest. Ideational motives follow a «logic of appropriateness», emphasizing shared norms, legimitacy, and solidarity as drivers of relations. Affective motives involve instead emotional ties and personal relationships in upholding relations.

Changes in the PCRs’ operating environment («critical junctures») are key to explain variations, such as erosion and termination of a PCR [Shoemaker & Spanier 1984]. Domestic and international crises may alter the resource base or motives of the parties to a PCR, forcing them to reassess their commitment to the relationship. On the one hand, a patron might signal dissociation from a client if the costs of support become too high or if other interests, beyond the PCR, prevail; a patron may also disapprove of a client’s behavior in the crisis context, leading to setbacks in the partnership. On the other hand, the lack of patron commitment can disappoint the client, leading them to search for alternative patrons, if any are available. The client may also want to disengage to avoid becoming fully dependent on a patron, which would ultimately lead to a loss of sovereign autonomy; or, conversely, if the perceived criticality of a patron’s support diminishes in the face of changed motives or resources available to the client.

Having clarified the conceptual framework that will guide our research, we now turn to empirics.

3. 1991-2019: setting the background of Russian and Chinese influence

To contextualize the recent shifts in the Russian and Chinese influence over Central Asia, it is useful to first establish the historical baseline of patronage. Assessing this nearly thirty-year period between 1991 and 2019 allows us to identify the relative regional positions of Moscow and Beijing, ahead of the shocks of the 2020s. The following analysis evaluates the regional engagement of Russia and China separately by resorting to PCR terminology.

Our analysis shows that the 1991-2019 period was defined by an enduring, albeit eroding, Russian primacy. Moscow remained Central Asia’s patron by virtue of its disproportionate role in regional security, economy, and culture. Meanwhile, China successfully transitioned from a cautious neighbour to an active player. While Beijing did not substitute Moscow as a patron, its provison of massive resources began hollowing out the traditional Russia-Central Asia PCR, setting the stage for the more evident competition that would follow after 2020.

3.1. Russian primacy

In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, Russia remained the primary political, military, economic and cultural partner of Central Asian states. Indeed, the relationship linking Moscow with the former Soviet peripheries of Central Asia displayed the typical characteristics of a PCR. Underpinning such relationship was a variegated set of motives.

For Russia, instrumental motives centred on maintaining direct (military) control over the region as a buffer zone between Western Siberia and the ‘Near East’ (blizhnij vostok) and China, while extracting economic rents and containing rival powers. This was complemented by immaterial motives, since Central Asia served as a primary theatre for validating Russia’s self-perceived Great Power status: by maintaining a sphere of influence in its «Near Abroad» (blizhnee zarubezhe), Moscow could project itself as a distinct regional pole in a (desired) multipolar world. Since the 1990s, Russian leaders have gone as far as claiming de facto owernship of Central Asian borders and recognizing a «blood relationship» between the region and Russia [Costa Buranelli 2018].

Central Asian states were driven to the PCR by the need for regime security and economic survival (instrumental motives). Moscow provided hard security and a backbone of stability for regimes navigating domestic transitions and the spillover risks of Islamist militancy in the Near East. Economically, the Russian labour market acted as a critical outlet for millions of Central Asian migrants, with remittance flows accounting at various points for nearly half of Tajikistan’s and a third of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP [World Bank-KNOMAD 2020]. On the immaterial side, the relationship with Russia provided Central Asian states a framework for legitimizing their newly won sovereignty. Moreover, Moscow’s diplomatic support offered a sense of continuity and a shield against perceived Western democratic encroachment and «color revolutions» [Omelicheva 2015].

These motives were reinforced by affective bonds rooted in the shared history between Russia and Central Asia. The Soviet-era socialization of leaders fostered a common political language and a personal rapport that facilitated informal deal-making, while the continued dominance of Russian language and media created a shared cultural and information space that bound populations together across borders [Laruelle 2015]. As former Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev epitomized in 2012, «we are entwined with Russia by a common history and destiny. We cannot have a future without Russia» [quoted in Costa Buranelli 2018, p. 380].

Within this framework, the parties engaged in a robust cooperative resource exchange. In the security realm, this was institutionalized through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and various bilateral agreements. This exchange included the installation of Russian military bases, the provision of arms at subsidized prices, joint exercises, and the consistent education of Central Asian military personnel in Russian academies [Stein 2021]. Economically, the transition from a common market to the Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU) in 2015 solidified Russia’s position as a primary trading partner, while ensuring the continued flow of labour and capital [Dragneva & Wolczuk 2017].

This relationship was characterized by a profound asymmetry. Russia inherited the vast majority of the Soviet empire’s military weight, economic power, and the monopoly over critical infrastructure – and this asymmetry was institutionalized within regional bodies. For example, Russian armed forces constituted around 80% of all CSTO armed forces in this period. Moreover, article 17 of the CSTO Charter ensures Russia’s preponderant position by tying Secretariat quotas to budget contributions and, since Russia contributes approximately 50% of the organization’s total budget, it maintains de facto control over it [Costa Buranelli 2018]. Similarly, the Russian economy constituted over 80% of the EaEU’s total GDP, and the Union’s agenda is largely shaped by Moscow, with external trade agreements often reflecting Russian geopolitical interests rather than the specific economic needs of the Central Asian members [Dragneva-Lewers 2019]. Moscow utilized these dependencies – encompassed by the vulnerability of migrant workers in Russia and leadership in the energy sector – as coercive leverage to ensuring a superior bargaining position and extract political concessions.

The Russia-Central Asia relationship was governed by a logic of diffuse obligation, where reciprocity was expected though not formally codified. This was most visible in regard to regime stability, with Moscow providing political legitimacy and protection against «color revolutions» and Islamist insurgencies in exchange for Central Asian support in international fora like the United Nations. In what scholars have described as a «league of authoritarian gentlemen», a mutual expectation formed that Russia would defend the political status quo, while regional clients would prioritize Russian interests and refrain from hosting long-term Western (military) presence [Cooley 2013, 30 January]. However, this obligation was not absolute: the Central Asian refusal to formally support or recognize Russian military operations and territorial claims in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014-onwards) signalled a clear limit to their clientelistic deference.

The durability of this relationship was ensured by geographic proximity and the century-long historical experience of Central Asian subordination to Moscow; but not only. After the Cold War, the parties jointly built an interlocking system of multilateral organizations, including the CSTO, the EaEU, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Reinforced by regular high level bilateral summits, this system provided a framework for iterative cooperation and policy-convergence. A shared political language, rooted in authoritarian proclivities and the Soviet experience, smoothened communication and ensured that Moscow remained the primary reference point for regional problem-solving.

Finally, the relationship was marked by a distinct specialness, anchored in the pervasive role of the Russian language as the region’s lingua franca and the continued dominance of Russian media. This sustained a «soft power», extricating cognitive and emotional ties that were difficult for any competitor to substitute. From Russia’s perspective, Central Asia – and Kazakhstan in particular – consistently featured in strategic documents as a priority area within the «Near Abroad», where Moscow claimed special rights and responsibilities vital to its national security and greatpowerness [MOFA RF 2008, 12 January; MOFA RF 2016, 30 November].

3.2. Chinese rise

As noted in the conceptual section, PCRs are sensitive to shifts in the operating environment. Between 1991-2019, four key changes began to empower Russia’s clients (Central Asian states) and invite patronal competitors (China).

First, the post-9/11 US intervention in Afghanistan accrued Western interest and military presence in the region, exemplified by the Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan (2001-14) [Kim & Indeo 2013]. This gave Central Asian states an opportunity to diversify their sources of security, increasing their leverage vis-à-vis Russia. Second, the 2008-9 global economic crisis exposed the limits of the Russian economy, weakening its patronal resource base (as well as the West’s). Third, over the course of the 2000s, Moscow’s increasing assertiveness and irredentist rhetoric triggered concerns over the reliability of the patron and its willingness to protect, rather than undermine, Central Asian sovereignty. Finally, and related to the previous points, by the 2000s Central Asian states had stabilized enough to pursue a «multi-vector diplomacy»: by diversifying their external relations, they sought to maximize resource intake while containing the risks of over-reliance on Moscow [Swanström 2014]. Overall, these shifts did not shatter the Russia-Central Asia PCR, but altered the Central Asian perception of this relationship, triggering concerns about sovereignty and over-dependence and opening the door to China.

Cognizant of Russia’s post-imperial sensitivies and wary of the expanding US military footprint, China did not immediately take advantage of regional opportunities [Guangming Daily 2003, 27 October; Chung 2004]. In fact, at that time, China was still an emerging rather than fully consolidated great power, prioritizing domestic development and cautious diplomacy over expansive geopolitical projection. However, under the presidency of Hu Jintao (2003-13), Beijing’s interest in Central Asia acquired substance: it extended to the region its strategy of «peripheral diplomacy» (周边外交) – giving renewed emphasis to neighbouring countries in Chinese foreign policy; and established the principle of «good neighbourliness» (睦邻友好) – intended to promote peaceful, friendly, and prosperous relations with Central Asian countries [MOFA PRC 2006, 15 June].

This policy was driven by instrumental motives: promoting security and development in areas adjacent to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) through cross-border initiatives; securing access to the region’s vast oil and gas resources, to fuel China’s domestic growth; and opening local markets to Chinese infrastructure companies [Pantucci & Petersen 2022]. On the immaterial level, and similarly to Russia, China’s engagement offered regional elites a model of «authoritarian modernization» that emphasized development without the liberalizing pressures often attached to Western aid, while simultaneously reinforcing Beijing’s nascent self-identification as a great power.

The decade 2010-19 catalyzed China’s regional projection. The ebbing of Western interest and the economic crisis generated a power vacuum and allowed Beijing to leverage its massive foreign exchange reserves [Cooley 2021, 23 August ; Leksyutina 2024]. In September 2013, the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Astana marked a watershed moment [Xi 2013]. By 2019, with over 261 projects valued at $136 billion, China became a crucial hub for regional infrastructure [CADGAT 2019, p. 15]. Beijing conceived the BRI as a tool to establish itself as the reference actor for the countries of the region, leveraging unprecedenting financial power to implicitly challenge Russia’s patronage on the resource side [Rolland 2017; Deng 2022]. Moreover, Beijing also focused on strengthening its leadership capacity vis-à-vis Central Asian states within multilateral frameworks. A significant example is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), a regional organization which Russia is also a member of. While acknowledging – and refraining from openly challenging – Moscow’s role within the SCO, China gradually enhanced its ability to shape the organization’s agenda and to leave an increasingly visible imprint on its activities [Seiwert 2025].

Precisely because of China’s expanding financial and political capacity, its relationships with the Central Asian states became increasingly asymmetric. However, the scale of Chinese lending and investment – as well as the proportion of external debt owed to China – varied considerably across the region, making these new patterns of dependence different from case to case. Such heterogeneity complicated any straightforward assessment of whether China’s nascent economic leverage translated into diffuse obligation at the regional level. Yet, clearly, the long-term nature of BRI projects and institutionalization of the SCO introduced a sense of durability in the China-Central Asia relationship, previously absent.

China also sought to confer specialness to this emerging relationship, stepping up ideational and affective links with regional elites via intense diplomatic outreach. In 2016 and 2018, for instance, China elevated the status of its relations with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to the level of a «comprehensive strategic partnership» [MOFA PRC 2016, 22 June; MOFA PRC 2018, 7 June]; while in 2019 China concluded a «permanent comprehensive strategic partnership» with Kazakhstan [MOFA PRC 2019, 12 September]. These partnership upgrades resonated strongly among political and business elites, many of whom have benefited directly from Chinese investments and infrastructure financing. However, this top-down move faced significant bottom-up friction. Unlike the soft power enjoyed by Russia, China’s presence triggered local anxieties regarding «debt-trap diplomacy», land ownership, labour practices, and corruption [McGlinchey 2019]. The anti-Chinese protests that erupted in Kazakhstan in 2016 and 2019 are emblematic of this dynamic: while China was becoming an indispensable economic partner, it lacked the cultural-historical «glue» that bound Russia to the region [Umarov 2019, 30 October].

4. 2020-25: changing patterns of Russian and Chinese influence

Having established the PCR baseline, the article now moves on to the post-2020 period – characterized by four critical shifts in the operating environment. First, the Covid-19 pandemic gave Central Asian elites the opportunity to consolidate their autocratic governance; more stable at home, they aimed at exterting greater agency internationally, continuing their «multi-vector diplomacy» [Anceschi 2026]. Second, the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war fuelled the perception that subordination to Russia did not necessarily guarantee security against competing regional powers, such as Turkey, and new ways of war. Third, the 2021 US/NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban takeover marked the end of Western military influence on nearby Central Asia, while accruing the threat of militant Islamism infiltrating the region. Fourth, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 – which, as we will see, generated ambivalent responses across Central Asia. While these changes have accellerated China’s political and economic penetration in Central Asia, also at the expense of Russia, the latter has retained a resilient patronal role.

We support such a view by examining three dimensions that substantiate the core relational properties of PCRs: national interests and strategic narratives; economic presence; security and military cooperation. National interests and strategic narratives frame Moscow’s and Beijing’s understanding of their changing influence on Central Asia over the previous decades; by looking at them, it will be possible to shed light on their shifting motives, relational diffuse obligations, and the specialness of their bonds with regional actors. Economics and security emerged in the preceding analysis as major venures for the extrication of Russian and Chinese patronage and have remained such. These are primary domains for assessing the PCR-relevant properties of resource exchange, asymmetry, and durability – thereby observing shifting patterns of agency and dependence.

4.1. National interests and strategic narratives

Since 2020, Russia’s strategic framing of Central Asia has fluctuated between neo-imperialist warnings and fraternal rhetoric. On the one hand, fringe yet high-profile statements by Duma deputy Vyacheslav Nikonov – claiming Kazakh territory was a «gift from Russia» – and former President Dmitry Medvedev – labelling Kazakhstan an «artificial state» – have reignited sovereign anxieties in Central Asia [Trotsenko 2021, 5 January; Sorbello 2022, 5 August]. These comments, echoing Putin’s 2014 remarks, acquired a sharper edge following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, catalyzing a «decolonization discourse» across the region, most notably in the tightening of national language policies in Astana and Bishkek, aimed at reducing the public footprint of the Russian language. Russian-language media still retain an overarching presence across the region [Dovery Vesterbye et al. 2023].

On the other hand, the Kremlin has doubled down on elite-level socialization. In October 2022, Moscow hosted the inaugural Central Asia-Russia Summit in Astana, signaling a shift toward more inclusive, multilateral engagement. Moreover, President Putin and other high level Russian officials have led an intensive agenda of bilateral meetings with their Central Asian counterparts. These efforts are designed to activate pre-existing ideational and affective motives and confirm the specialness of the relationship, framing it as an exclusive partnership that remains a priority despite global shifts. For instance, Putin [2024, 27 November] defined the relationship between Russia and Kazakhstan as a «genuine alliance», characterized by «bonds of similar cultural, spiritual and moral values … shared achievements and victories» and «strong good personal relationship» with Preisdent Tokayev. Similarly, Rashid Alimov [2024, 21 May], former Secretary General of the SCO, described Russian-Central Asian relations as «granite strong», empahsizing their «priviledged nature».

Overall, the Russian approach to Central Asia has shown awareness of the risk of loosing its patronal position in the region, in light of international and regional shifts as well as its own domesic constraints. As Niyazi Niyazov [2025, 15 April] suggests, the changing operating environment has increased the «subjectivity» of Central Asian states, allowing them to extract resources on more favourable terms from a distracted patron, such as Russia. This is not believed to structurally compromise Russia’s asymmetric advantages, but it does call for caution, so that local problems are not solved «at Russia’s expense, without providing anything in return» [Bordachev 2025, 4 August].

In response, Moscow has reconfirmed pre-existing motives for engaging with the region and its top priority in its foreign policy [MOFA RF 2023, 31 March; Trofimov 2025, 16 May], while accepting that direct, exclusive control of Central Asian dynamics is likely not possible anymore [Bordachev 2025, 30 May]. Recognizing conditions for a shift in the regional «balance of power», Russia primarily aims to ensure that Central Asia does not «represent a territorial base for other countries, whose intentions may contravene those of Moscow»; this conservative objective is to be pursued also cooperatively, by aligning with likeminded external players, such as China, and fostering the region’s connectivity with the broader Global South [Bordachev 2020, 30 September; Bordachev 2021, 8 November; Bordachev 2025, 20 May].

Russia’s project for a so-called Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) is emblematic of this recalibrated approach. Officially announced a decade ago, this framework was designed to address the material and political deficiencies of the EaEU, helping Moscow to maintain its influence on Central Asia and using it as a springboard for broader influence across a «Greater Eurasia». While the GEP remains characterized by a lack of material substance and a significant gap between strategy and implementation, it serves as a potent ideational umbrella for synergizing political, economic, and security approaches. This loose, flexible policy framework allows Russia to adjust its strategic objectives «on-the-go», positioning itself as an equal to other key regional players – chiefly, China. In fact, rather than subsuming itself into Beijing’s BRI, Moscow leverages the GEP narrative to «harmonize» Russian and Chinese projects, thereby signalling continued strategic independence and regional leadership [Silvan & Kaczmarski 2023; Trofimov 2025, 16 May].

If Russia saw policy adaptation as a necessary condition for the preservation of regional patronage, China doubled down on previous efforts. During the 2020-25 period, Beijing has particularly invested in strengthening three PCR dimensions vis-à-vis Central Asian states: specialness, durability, and diffuse obligation.

In addition to playing an even more prominent role within the SCO – as reflected in the Tianjin Declaration adopted in September 2025 [MOFA PRC 2025, 1 September] – and advancing an intensive agenda of bilateral visits [MOFA PRC 2025a, 2 September; MOFA PRC 2025b, 2 September; Xinhua 2025, 5 February], China hosted in Xi’an in May 2023 the first summit of a new, exclusively China-led format, the China-Central Asia (C5+China) framework, aimed at institutionalizing and deepening ties with all regional states [Ozat 2023, 22 August]. In 2024, a China-Central Asia permanent Secretariat was created and at the second Summit, held in Astana in June 2025, Uzbek President Mirziyoyev signaled a warming of rhetoric on both sides by referring to Xi Jinping as a «dear brother» [Xinhua Novosti 2025, 13 June]. China has also reinfroced the prominence of Central Asia within its new foreign policy conceptualizations. For instance, building a «China-Central Asia community with a shared future» (中国–中亚命运共同体) constitutes, alongside Indochina, one of the main regional clusters within the Chinese vision of a «community with a shared future for mankind» (人类命运共同体) [Wei 2025, 7 May]. Overall, these are fundamental steps towards the institutionalization of Beijing’s presence, which is moving beyond purely instrumental motives to cultivate a sense of a long-term, diffuse ideational alignment.

Several concepts and principles of Chinese foreign policy have now been incorporated into documents that further elevate the status of bilateral partnerships [MOFA PRC 2022, 15 September; MOFA PRC 2023, 18 May]. Notably, Beijing has invested significantly in so-called «peripheral communication» (周边传播) – the adoption of targeted communication strategies in neighbouring countries aimed at promoting a positive image of China and its strategic interests, as well as at penetrating the information environments of these states and shaping public opinion [Grant 2025, 13 August]. As observed by Yau with reference to the case of Kyrgyzstan, in recent years China has been able to insert its content effectively into Kyrgyz media, by signing agreements to expand the local presence of its own media outlets (including Xinhua and Weibo) and by increasing the circulation of Russian- and Kyrgyz-language content on its social media platforms [Yau 2022, 2023]. The pervasiveness of Chinese technological infrastructure in the region represents an additional enabling factor for this strategy: companies such as Huawei, Hikvision, and Dahua now dominate large segments of the telecommunications and surveillance technology markets in Central Asia [Dukeyev et al. 2023, 23 December]. While Russian-language media remain dominant, these developments pose a long-term informational challenge and set the ground for stronger Chinese influence across Central Asian populations.

4.2. Economic presence

Despite shifts in the operating environment, Russia remains an economic anchor for Central Asia and this, in turn, supports the continuation of Russia’s patronhood.

Trade turnover has increased consistently, now accounting for roughly one-third of the region’s total foreign trade. This expansion is largely driven by «sanction-busting» trade: several reports indicate that a significant portion of EU exports to Central Asia is rerouted to Russia, compensating for the drop in direct EU-Russia trade of sanctioned goods and turning the region into an «economic backdoor» to Russia [Cooley 2025, 16 April]. This represents a novel reconfiguration of the cooperative resource exchange between Russia and regional countries, wherein the latter (the clients) provide Moscow (the patron) with a critical resource – access to global markets – thereby mitigating the relationship’s original asymmetry and granting Central Asian more leverage.

Beyond trade, Russia’s economic influence in the region has mutated through two shifts in human capital [Cooley 2025, 16 April]. On the one hand, the flow of Russian relokanty to Central Asia. Following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, over 500,000 Russians, including 10% of the country’s IT workforce, moved to Central Asia. This influx catalyzed local FDI and banking sectors, with over 4,000 Russian companies registering in Kazakhstan alone by 2022. In Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, Russian programmers have helped establish entire IT sectors, though Russia now competes to «re-loyalty» these expatriates to preserve its own technological base and leverage them as source of human influence [Tkachenko 2024, 15 May].

On the other hand, migratory trends from Central Asia to Russia were not really affected, as the region’s socio-economic stability remains tethered to labour remittances. For instance, in Tajikistan remittances accounted for nearly 48% of GDP in 2024, up from just below 27% in 2020 [World Bank 2025]. However, the social underpinnings of this dependency are becoming weaker. The 2024 Crocus City Hall attack sparked a harsh Russia crackdown on Central Asian migrants (of Islamic faith), leading to ethnic profiling, deportations, and stricter regulations for migrant labour. Coupled with reports of migrants being coerced into military service, these events have fuelled regional resentment [Tahir 2025, 20 June].

Russia’s role as an energy gatekeeper is being erodedbut remains dominant thanks to the control of legacy infrastructure and sector-specific innovations. While Russia is no longer the sole intermediary for energy transit to Europe – partially substituted by the Middle Corridor and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline – it remains the primary outlet for Kazakh oil. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) and the Atyrau-Samara-Druzhba Pipelines still handle more than 90% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports via Russian territory [Wong 2025, 11 February]. Simultaneously, Russia has pivoted toward North-South connectivity to bypass Western sanctions, emphasizing the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) reaching Iran and the Indian Ocean via Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. In the high-tech sector, Russia is entrenching its influence through nuclear diplomacy: in June 2025 Rosatom was selected (against Chinese, French, and South Korean bids) to build Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant, alongside ongoing projects for small and large-scale reactors in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan [The Moscow Times 2025].

In terms of economic integration, the Russia-led EaEU has yielded mixed results. While it boosted trade, increased the efficiency of resource allocation, and promoted sectoral specialization, it affected negatively employment in low-skill sectors and had limited effects on overall GDP growth [Pomerlyan & Belitski 2024]. Despite holding some comparative advantages over alternative integratation projects like China’s [Cieślik & Gurshev 2024], the attractiveness of Russia-led economic integration has decreased over time as Russia, the bloc’s biggest economy, remains under heavy sanctions and the diverse economic interests of Central Asian states have made multilateral coordination difficult [Bordachev 2020, 28 December; Ostrowski & Malikov 2025].

The economic leg of Russia’s patronage over Central Asia finds in China its main challenge. By 2024, China emerged as the region’s leading trading partner, accounting for 33% of the total trade volume ($94.8 billion); it was followed by the EU with 24% ($65 billion) and Russia with 16% ($47 billion) [China’s General Administration of Customs 2025]. In the first ten months of 2025 alone, China’s trade with Central Asia increased on average by approximately 14% compared to the same period in 2024 – driven disproportionately by Kyrgyzstan (+35.6%) and with Turkmenistan representing the sole exception (-6.7%). Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan are all in a position of trade deficit vis-à-vis China, which continues to pursue an export-led strategy in the region [China’s General Administration of Customs 2025].

With regard to the value of the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Central Asia, Chinese sources already reported a figure of $63.9 billion in 2023, concentrated primarily in the energy, transport, and manufacturing sectors [National Development and Reform Commission 2023]. The presence of Chinese investments in the region is therefore tangible, as evidenced by projects such as the Astana Light Rail Transit (Kazakhstan), the Dushanbe-Chanak railway (Tajikistan), the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline, and, more recently, the port of Aktau, where the Chinese company Zhongyun International is set to act as a strategic partner [The Times of Central Asia 2025, 25 November].

However, the implementation of several Chinese projects has encountered difficulties. Beijing has increasingly made clear its willingness to invest in infrastructure primarily through interest-bearing loans and with extensive reliance on Chinese contractors and technologies. Central Asian states have begun to perceive these conditions as unfavourable, showing a growing inclination to wait for what they consider more advantageous offers. The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway is an emblematic case, as its implementation was postponed for many years and only approved in late 2024 [Kazinform International News Agency 2024, 21 December]. Particularly significant is the issue of debt, which for some states is becoming increasingly constraining. China holds, in fact, approximately 41% of Kyrgyzstan’s external debt. In other countries, however, such as Kazakhstan, this percentage drops to 5.9%.

Another relevant aspect to consider in assessing Chinese penetration is the growing number of Chinese enterprises operating in Central Asia. Although consolidated statistical data are not available yet, China’s Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, Du Dewen, stated in 2023 that nearly 700 Chinese-owned companies or joint ventures were operating in the country, spanning sectors such as mineral resource extraction, oil and gas processing, transport infrastructure construction, and energy [China BRI Network 2023, 22 September]. More recently, Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister stated that nearly 5,000 Chinese enterprises are currently active in the country [The Astana Times 2024, 23 December].

As the data and developments outlined above illustrate, China not only sustained but further intensified its exchange of resources (investments, loans, and FDI) with the Central Asian states during the 2020-25 period. However, the increase in material exchanges did not automatically or consistently translate into greater prestige or a blind sense of obligation vis-à-vis China, from a Central Asian perspective.

4.3. Security and military cooperation

The security dimension remains the most resilient pillar of the Russia-Central Asia PCR. To begin with, the August 2021 US/NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan offered Russia an early occasion to meet it clients’ enduring concerns about militant Islamism and regime stability, reasserting itself as the main regional security provider. As Charles E. Ziegler [2024] put it, «Central Asia’s autoritharian regimes fear the destabilizing potential of radical forces based in Afghanistan and expect Moscow to provide security for the region». Coherently, the reinforcement of the Russian contingent in Dushambe and joint Russia-Tajikistan-Uzbekistan drills near the Afghan border immediately followed the Taliban takeover.

Kazakhstan’s «Bloody January» in 2022 was similarly exploited by Moscow to reconfirm its patronal commitments. Marking the first time the CSTO ever activated its collective defence provisions, Russia sent approximately 2,500 troops to help stabilize President Toakyev’s government amidst civil unrest. In so doing, Moscow proved its continued willingness to act as the guarantor of its clients’ regimes – disputed in light of Russia’s restraint during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. While Moscow later refused to intervene in the border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in September 2022 – fuelling considerable but short-lived resentment from Bishkek – on this occasion there was no existential threat to be fought by Russia. Moreover, the Russian refusal to intervene is coherent with both the diffuse nature of the security onligations between Russia and Central Asian states, and the Kremlin’s decision to re-size its direct control over regional dynamics (discussed above).

Russia continues enjoying an asymmetric military position in Central Asia, thanks to the disproportionate number and quality of its forces vis-à-vis those of regional states, the retention of basing rights, and the coordination of security initiatives, such as regular military exercises and joint operations, throught the CSTO. Russia’s military position has faced relative setbacks only in terms of arms sales. Russian overall arms exports fell by 64% between 2020-24 compared to the previous five-year period – yet it remains the main arms provider in Central Asia, with Kazakshtan alone receiving 11% of Russia’s total arms exports [George et al. 2025]. While China successfully gained market share during the 2010s by selling advanced technologies, such as drones, Russia is now retooling its offer, leveraging innovative platforms developed during the war with Ukraine – on top of traditional weapons systems.

Notably, from the standpoint of internal security, Central Asian security services remain deeply entwined with Moscow. A June 2023 agreement between Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan established a comprehensive personal data-sharing framework. This allows the Russian and local intelligence agencies to exchange information on residence status, criminal records, and identity documents, effectively closing the «escape hatch» for Russian relokanty and activists. Kyrgyzstan launched a facial recognition system in Bishkek with Russian technical support: while officially for criminal apprehension, it was immediately utilized to identify, detain, and extradite Russian anti-war dissidents. Overall, between 2022 and 2024, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan consistently complied with Russian extradition requests for «extremism» and «discrediting the military», illustrating a shared interest in suppressing popular dissent [VOA News 2024, 22 October].

Security remains the least prominent dimension of the Chinese penetration in Central Asia – though Beijing has started expanding its footprint. Importantly, it has neither rolled out a vast spectrum of initiatives – as it did, for example, in the economic domain – nor sought to establish deep, institutionalized military-to-military links via the People’s Liberation Army. Instead, China has focused on internal security, tasking its own security and paramilitary forces – such as the Ministry of Public Security and the People’s Armed Police Force – and regime-affiliated private security companies (e.g., Zhongjun Junhong Security Group) to develop cooperation programmes with their Central Asian counterparts.

More specifically, Beijing has progressively expanded its engagement in the military domain through joint exercises, limited defence-industrial cooperation, and growing intelligence-sharing practices. This evolution can be understood as a strengthening of resource exchange dynamics, whereby China provides targeted security capabilities, training, and surveillance tools in return for enhanced stability, regime support, and the protection of its strategic and economic interests in the region. At the same time, China has fostered a degree of specialness also in this domain by developing differentiated and privileged bilateral security ties with different Central Asian countries.

To date, Tajikistan represents the only country in the region to host a Chinese military presence: since 2016, Beijing has operated a secretive security facility in the Gorno-Badakhshan province [The Washington Post 2019, 18 February]. In addition, since 2021 a Chinese company has been busy in the construction of a base in the Ishkoshim district, intended for use by Tajikistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs [Dodikhudo 2023]. This cooperation has deep roots dating back to the early 2000s: between 2002 and 2023, Tajikistan participated in 19 of the 36 joint military exercises conducted by China with Central Asian states, both bilaterally and within the framework of the SCO. Since 2015, moreover, China’s Ministry of Public Security has provided professional training programmes for officials from Tajikistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and border forces, accompanied by regular high-level meetings between the respective internal security agencies [Lemon & Norov 2025, 20 March].

In addition to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan – which borders Xinjiang – is one of the main recipients of Chinese security assistance. During a 2019 joint exercise, for the first time China deployed the People’s Armed Police Force outside national borders [Xinhua 2019]. Similarly, bilateral exercises have also been conducted with Kazakhstan, including the one held in Öskemen in 2019 [China Military 2019]. In parallel, China’s role as a supplier of weapons systems in Central Asia has increased: Kazakhstan, for example, has long procured advanced military equipment from China, including Wing Loong-1 strike drones and Y-8F-200 military transport aircraft [Voyennoye Obozreniye 2018, 18 June]. More recently, in 2024, Beijing reportedly supplied drones to Kazakhstan and sold anti-aircraft systems to Uzbekistan [Azimzhanova 2024, 16 August; Malyasov 2025, 25 February].

From Beijing’s perspective, Central Asia represents a testing ground for the security initiative launched in 2022 by President Xi Jinping, namely the Global Security Initiative (全球安全倡议). In this context, in September 2024 Beijing hosted the first meeting of ministers of Public Security and Interior with the Central Asian states [Xinhua 2025, 9 October].

5. Conclusion

This study has examined the shifting dynamics of Russian and Chinese influence in Central Asia at the turning point of 2020, utilizing the PCR framework to assess whether a fundamental displacement of patronage is underway. Our findings suggest that, over the course of three decades, China’s rise has consistently eroded Russia’s patronage: the latter transitioned from being an undisputed patron in the 1990s and early 2000s to accepting a «division of labour» with China by the 2010s. After 2020, telluric changes in the PCR’s operating environment have empowered Central Asian agency and given China increasing room for regional penetration. However, perhaps counterintuitevly, Russia has demonstrated a considerable «staying power», rooted in a sober assessment of its capabilities, the careful administraton of scarce resources, and military and diplomatic activism.

Central Asia’s asymmetric dependence on Moscow remains evident in the continued reliance on Russia’s labour market, the latter’s control of legacy infrastructure, and its status as the ultimate guarantor of security and regime stability – the most important resources for local elites. This notwithstanding, the specialness of the Russian bond, once anchored in a shared cultural and linguistic space, is increasingly strained by the Kremlin’s neo-imperialist rhetoric, prompting Central Asian clients to accelerate decolonization efforts. Conversely, China has transitioned from a cautious neighbour into a credible alternative patron. Through a vast array of incremental initiatives, Beijing has institutionalized a durable regional presence, moving beyond purely instrumental motives toward a more ideational and affective relationship with regional elites. China’s superior resource base in the economic and technological sectors is particularly challenging for Russia, whilst proving less of an adversary in military on overall political terms.

Besides individual motives and resources, the evolving patronal positions of Russia and China are also shaped by two more conditions. First, as shown throughout the analysis, the increased agency of Central Asian states. Far from being passive dependents, these clients are actively leveraging the competing resource bases and differing patronal styles of Moscow and Beijing to navigate flexibly global shifts. The result is a regional order where the asymmetry inherent to patronage is mitigated by the clients’ multi-vector diplomacy, ensuring that neither Russia nor China can claim an absolute monopoly over Central Asian dynamics.

Second, Russia’s and China’s engagement with the region does not occur in isolation but is shaped by their broader strategic alignment [Papageorgiou & Feklyunina 2025]. The absence of major tensions between Moscow and Beijing – despite shifts in their relative positions – has been facilitated by their shared pursuit of «a new model of international relations» – a multipolar system freed from Western/US hegemony and prioritizing post-liberal norms. Moreover, both Russia and China are interested in ensuring the stability of their neighbourhoods via some degree of direct control and the cultivation of friendly regimes; this holds true in Central Asia, too. While Beijing has vastly increased its regional influence, it recognizes Russia as a key enabler of the stability of Central Asian regimes. Conversely, for the time being Moscow views the influx of Chinese capital and infrastructure as a means to sustain regional development (also to Russia’s own advantage) without the political conditionality inherent in Western aid.

This is not to suggest that Russian and Chinese interests are perfectly congruent [Wilson 2021] – but they are sufficiently convergent to preclude the securitization of bilateral relations [Berloto & Fasola 2025]. As noted by one reputable Russian scholar during a Stimson Center event in February 2026, the Russia-China relationship is not regulated by the logic of deterrence – unlike their respective relations with the West. The consolidation of opposing blocs in the European and the Pacific theatres following the Ukraine war has further reduced the chances of Moscow and Beijing drifting or being pulled apart [McFaul & Medeiros 2025, 4 April]. Within this context, it is unlikely that they will allow (potential) regional or local divergencies of interest to undermine their global partnership.

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ISSN 2385-2526

Aircraft carriers continued at the apex of states’ maritime surface strength strategies in 2025, for national prestige, power projection, to deter and threaten, to cooperate and coerce. Maritime competition was evident during 2025 around maritime Asia, through the aircraft carrier strategy pursued by China and the response to this by India and Japan, as buttressed by their cooperation with the carrier deployments by France, the UK and the US. Part of this competition is demonstrated by the various carrier construction and carrier-conversion programmes being pursued around maritime Asia. Part of this competition was also on show with aircraft carrier deployments. With regard to China this is on show with its increasing range of carrier deployments and increasing stranglehold on Taiwan. With regard to India and Japan, but also the US, UK and France, their carrier deployments show not only a focus on maritime Asia but also a criss-cross flexible geometry of mutual carrier-support and cooperation. This reflects the wider maritime balancing taking shape towards China.

Keywords – Asia; geopolitics; maritime; naval; aircraft carriers.

1. Introduction

Across maritime Asia, aircraft carriers continued to dominate maritime security and maritime strategies during 2025. Aircraft carriers, and their Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs), remained at the apex of maritime surface strength, as a matter of national prestige, in construction and deployment. Despite the rival merits of submarines, and the carrier vulnerability posed by anti-ship missiles, aircraft carriers demonstrated an enduring military utility across Asian waters, and highly visible signalling devices for adversaries and allies. Their mobility made them particularly suitable for power projection across maritime Asia, bringing airforce capability to bear without the need for land bases, able to deter, threaten and coerce, and also able to cooperate with other navies in exercises and naval diplomacy. Aircraft carriers both reflected and affected wider regional order. Carrier technology continued to develop. Aircraft carriers range from super to heavy, medium, and light tonnage, manned air-wings have been supplemented by drones, and Landing Platform Docks (LPDs) have emerged, able to carry manned planes, helicopters and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), i.e. drones.

During 2025, only six states operated aircraft carriers in maritime Asia; namely France, the UK and the US, who deployed aircraft carriers across the Indo-Pacific, the underbelly of Asia; as well as resident powers China, India, and Japan, who were locked into regional carrier competition.

The political context was threefold. First, the still-troubled waters of the Red Sea, where the Houthis continued to threaten shipping for much of the year, until announcing their halt in November, following the fragile Gaza cease-fire agreement made in September. Second was India-Pakistan friction. Third, and perhaps most significantly, was China’s growing naval shadow in East Asia and the South China Sea, increasingly threatening Taiwan, effecting and affecting the wider maritime competition

2. Europe

Carrier-deployments by France and the UK across maritime Asia in 2025 reflected the European Carrier Group Interoperability Initiative (ECGII) «sequencing of more persistent European carrier strike group presence in the Indo-Pacific» [Government of the UK. Prime Minister’s Office 2023, 10 March]. In this vein, the preceding Italian CSG deployment in the second half of 2024 was followed by French CSG deployment in the first half of 2025 and UK deployment in the second half of 2025. National prestige with blue water naval power projection was on show by France and the UK, as well as signalling of their tacit balancing with other China-concerned states. Like Italy in the previous year, in each case France and the UK conducted exercises with India on both outward and return legs across the Indian Ocean; and like Italy, neither the French nor UK CSGs conducted any exercises with China in East Asian waters. However, they did conduct particularly pointed exercises with the US and Japan across these waters.

France’s carrier strike Group (CSG), a powerful seven-ship group, led by the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier commanded by Rear Admiral Jacques Mallard, and carrying 22 Rafale Ms, transited the Suez Canal on 24 December 2024 and returned on 10 April 2025. Various exercises were carried out with friendly countries as a very deliberate «strategic signal» [Mallard 2025]. Initially this was with India in January 2025. This was followed by the La Perouse exercise in mid-January, in which the French CSG led substantive maritime security and cooperation drills with the Indian, Australian, Canadian, UK and US navies. In addition to these established partners and allies, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore participated in La Perouse for the first time. The next major event for the French deployment was participation in the inaugural Pacific Steller 2025, a tri-carrier event in the Philippine Sea, in which the French CSG was joined by the Japan’s carrier JS Kaga and the US carrier USS Carl Vinson, and their CSGs. It came to light after the deployment was finished that, as the French CSG transited the Luzon Strait, a Chinese frigate followed and closely monitored the CSG [Manaranche 2025, 7 July]. The final substantive operation for Operation Clemenceau was the bilateral Varuna carrier-to-carrier exercise with India’s INS Vikrant in March.

Similar signalling to adversaries and allies was on show with the UK deployment, Operation Highmast, which went across maritime Asia from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Sea of Japan. High profile public stops in Singapore and Tokyo were interspersed with substantive carrier-to-carrier exercising by the Prince of Wales with US (Timor Sea, July), US and Japan (North Philippine Sea, August), Japan (Sea of Japan, September) and India (Arabian Sea, October) carrier counterparts. In another first, the Prince of Wales led the Bersama Lima exercise, reinforcing regional security arrangements, bringing together the navies from the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore in the Five Powers Defence Force Arrangement (FPDFA). Allied interoperability was enhanced with F-35Bs from the Prince of Wales engaging in trilateral exercises with US and Japanese planes east of the Okinawa chain in September, while the Prince of Wales bilaterally exercised with Japan’s carrier JS Kaga. In terms of wider European involvement, Norway’s HNoMS Roald Amundsen stayed with the British CSG from start to finish, while Spain’s frigate ESPS Méndez Núñez joined the CSG from the Mediterranean across the Indian Ocean.

3. The United States

For the US, in the Indo-Pacific «in 2025, aircraft carriers remain the indispensable backbone of its operational prowess» [Henry 2025, 2 September]. Five aircraft carriers (out of a total strength of 11), with supporting CSGs, were deployed at various times across maritime Asia during 2025: namely USS George Washington, USS Carl Vinson, USS Nimitz, USS George Washington and USS Abraham Lincoln. At times their focus was on West Asia (especially the Red Sea), coercive power with the Houthis and Iran in mind, and at other times their focus was on East Asia (especially the South China Sea) with competition with China very much in mind. Deployments were thus made between East Asia and West Asia, with further juggling through Caribbean commitments in late 2025. US carrier presence in maritime Asia was also supported by its America-class amphibious carriers, USS America and USS Tripoli, which carry F-35Bs, and are able to operate as medium-size aircraft carriers, with just over 45,000 ton displacement.

The Harry S. Truman started the year three months into an eight-month deployment to the Red Sea. Under attack from Houthi missiles in March 2025, it played a central role in Operation Rough Rider, launching numerous air sorties against the Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Yemen. It returned home in June, amid some embarrassment. In mid-February 2025 a collision between the Harry S. Truman and a Panamanian merchant ship near Port Said led to the dismissal of the Harry S. Truman’s commander Captain Dave Snowden, in late-April a Super Tornado fell into the sea while being towed inside the carrier hangar, and in early-May, a Super Hornet attempting to land plunged overboard when an arresting cable snapped.

The Carl Vinson had been deployed out from San Diego in November 2024 for a regular West Pacific tour, operating in the South China Sea from December-January 2025, including exercising with the Philippine navy in January. The Carl Vinson CSG participated in the Pacific Steller exercise in February, along with a French CSG and Japan’s carrier JS Kaga, inter-allied cooperation to the fore. March had the Carl Vinson CSG operating in the Sea of Japan, where it was buzzed by a Chinese reconnaissance plane, involving mutual signalling between the two sides, before the Chinese plane was in turn escorted away by two fighters from the aircraft carrier. Next, the Carl Vinson moved into the East China Sea for trilateral drills with Japan and South Korea, again representing Allied cooperation. In April the CSG was re-deployed from USINDOPACOM to CENTCOM, over to the Arabian Sea to join in the ongoing Operation Rough Rider, involving coercion against Iran. The Carl Vinson CSG left the Arabian Sea in mid-July, returning to the Pacific via the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. Its final exercising was in Northern Edge, along with USS Abraham Lincoln.

The Nimitz’s departure in March from San Diego followed the reassignment of the USS Carl Vinson to the Middle East. The Nimitz’s first port of call was Guam in April. Drills were conducted with the Japanese navy in the Philippine Sea, and around the Malacca Strait in May. However, amidst the escalating air war between Israel and Iran, a planned visit to Vietnam by the Nimitz in June was cancelled. Instead the CSG was re-deployed to the Arabian Sea, arriving the same day that the US struck three Iranian nuclear sites as part of Operation Midnight Hammer. In August the Nimitz Carrier Group visited Bahrain, home of the US Naval Support Activity base. After three months deployment in the Arabian Sea, the Nimitz returned to the South China Sea, albeit accidently losing a fighter jet and a helicopter in October. US teams were sent to recover the sensitive technology from the seabed before China could get to it, and they successfully concluded their recovery operations in early-December [Tiwari 2025, 9 December]. In November the Nimitz departed the South China Sea for its home port, after a trilateral exercise near Scarborough Shoal with Japanese and Philippine warships, which attracted overflights by Chinese bombers and protests from Beijing, with mutual signalling in play again. The Nimitz left Pearl Harbor at the start of December, reaching Seattle on 16 December; it is now set for decommissioning, originally set for April 2025 but subsequently extended by 12 months until May 2026.

The George Washington had returned to Japan in November 2024, after a lengthy mid-cycle refitting as the permanently forward-deployed carrier (replacing USS Ronald Reagan). This was the first operational deployment for the F-35C with the embarked Carrier Air Wing 5, signalling a «new era of Navy fifth-generation air power permanently stationed» [Wilson 2025, 11 December], showing capabilities signalling to the region. A lengthy six-month deployment took place from June-December 2025. Having called at Guam, patrol duties in the South China Sea were followed by a friendly port call in the Philippine in July, which was immediately denounced by China [Feng 2025, 4 July]. Allied cooperation was on show during the year as the George Washington carried out carrier-to-carrier exercises with the UK’s Prince of Wales CSG in the Timor Sea in July, followed by participation in the large multilateral exercises Talisman Sabre in early-August. From Northern Australia, the George Washington CSG then went to Guam later in August. Trilateral carrier exercising was on show in the Philippine Sea in August as the George Washington exercised with the UK’s Prince of Wales and Japan’s JS Kaga. In the fall of 2025, the George Washington participated in U.S. Indo-Pacific Command joint exercise Northern Edge, in the Gulf of Alaska, now equipped with the new AIM-1174B missile. In November it conducted a four-day Carrier Strike Group Exercise (CSGEX) with the South Korean navy. The George Washington then entered the South China Sea by the Luzon Strait, replacing the Nimitz. The start of December saw the George Washington’s second visit to Guam. Next, the aircraft carrier conducted an information-sharing drill off the Kanto coast with the Japanese destroyer, JS Akizuki. By mid-December it was back in Yokosuka.

Homeported at San Diego, the Abraham Lincoln CSG participated in the Northern Edge exercise in August in the Gulf of Alaska. It was quietly deployed from San Diego in November. Reaching Guam in mid-December, it then operated in the Philippine Sea.

On the LPD front, USS America participated in the Talisman Sabre exercise, including launching F-35Bs, in the Coral Sea. It then joined the triple carrier (USS George Washington, HMS Prince of Wales, JS Kaga) exercise in the Philippine Sea in August, with F-35B cross-decking flying from the America to the Prince of Wales. Having been deployed for six years in the region, the America was replaced by the USS Tripoli, which arrived at Sasebo in June. The Tripoli visited Da Nang in December, having carried out F-35B flight operations over the South China Sea [Chan 2025, 10 December], signalling operations to China.

4. India

India’s carrier profile entered 2025 with a two-carrier Navy, based on INS Vikramaditya, the refurbished and modernized ex-Soviet ship the Admiral Gorshkov, and its own indigenously-built carrier INS Vikrant. These two carriers, with battle groups, are indeed the «backbone of India’s Blue Water Strategy» [Mann 2025, 26 May]. However, following its carrier-to-carrier exercise with Italy’s ITS Cavour in October 2024, the Vikramaditya retired for the duration of 2025 for a scheduled modernization refit. India’s carrier operations in 2025 thus centered on INS Vikrant, India’s indigenously-built aircraft carrier, and very much a national prestige vessel.

Cooperation with allies (and tacit counter-balancing signalling to China) was on show in February, when INS Vikrant engaged in a carrier-to-carrier Varuna Exercise with Frances Charles de Gaulle CSG, which is useful as the Charles de Gaulle is equipped with Rafale M aircraft that India is seeking for its aircraft carriers. Indeed, in April, India signed a deal with France for 26 Rafale-Marine 4.5 Generation fighters, made by Dassault, to be deployed on its two carriers by 2030. The Ministry of Defence announced it as an «addition of a potent force multiplier to the Indian Navy’s aircraft carriers, substantially boosting the nation’s air power at sea» [Government of India. Ministry of Defence 2025, 28 April; Asthana 2025, 30 April]. The official Press Information Bureau emphasized «the strategic importance for India» of the deal, in which «the introduction of the Rafale-Marine will significantly bolster the Indian Navy’s operational capabilities, particularly in the Indian Ocean region» [Government of India. Press Information Bureau, 2025, 29 April]. The deal was considered in India as one which «targets China, Pakistan maritime challenges» (Kathju 2025, 29 April; Vinod 2025, 10 April]. It was also seen, in India, as superior to the J-15s carried on Chinese aircraft carriers [Kunde 2025, 10 January].

INS Vikrant played a leading role in India’s confrontation with Pakistan in the Spring. Following the Pahalgam massacres in April 22, India launched air strikes from land during May under Operation Sindoor. However, the Navy had already been dispatched to the Arabian Sea during April for coercive deterrence. Vice-Admiral Pramod, Director Naval Operations, described how:

The Indian Navy’s Carrier battle group, surface forces, submarines and aviation assets were immediately deployed at sea with full combat readiness. We tested and refined tactics and procedures at sea during multiple weapons firing in the Arabian Sea within 96 hours of the terrorist attack. Our forces remained forward deployed in the Northern Arabian Sea in a decisive and deterrent posture with full readiness and capacity to strike select targets at sea and on land, including Karachi, at a time of our choosing. As we speak, the Indian Navy remains deployed at sea in a credible deterrent posture to respond decisively to any inimical action by Pakistan [Times of India 2025, 12 May]

The Indian media was certainly satisfied with headlines like «INS Vikrant: A floating fortress that gives India decisive edge against Pakistan navy» [Zee Media Bureau 2025, 9 May]; and «Silent but supreme: How INS Vikrant caged Pakistani Jets during Operation Sindoor and reaffirmed Indian Navy’s dominance in Arabian Sea» [OpIndia Staff 2025, 12 May].

Six months later and Prime Minister Modi celebrated Diwali, and national prestige, on INS Vikrant in October, ready to extol the prowess of the aircraft carrier:

I have this giant, INS Vikrant, embodying infinite powers. Vikrant is vast, grand, awe-inspiring…. Our INS Vikrant today is a powerful symbol of ‘Aatmanirbhar Bharat’ (self-reliant India) and ‘Made in India’. Cutting through the ocean, the indigenous INS Vikrant reflects Bharat’s military strength. Just a few months ago, we saw how even the very name of Vikrant sent shockwaves through Pakistan, stealing their sleep at night. Such is INS Vikrant, a name that alone can crush the enemy’s courage. That is INS Vikrant! That is INS Vikrant! That is INS Vikrant! [Government of India. Prime Minister of India 2025, 20 October]

The Government argued, looking back on the year, that the Vikrant CSG played «a key role in strategy of compellence, thereby forcing Pakistan Navy to be in defensive posture and requesting for urgent ceasefire» [Government of India. Press Information Bureau 2025, 24 October].

India is seeking to increase its surface fleet. Contracts were agreed in October for Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders and Swan Defence and Heavy Industries Limited to partner for the LPD project of the Indian Navy. The agreement includes both design and construction of four 30,000-ton vessels. The first vessel built should be ready for delivery within 60 months of the contract being signed, while the remaining three should be delivered at one-year intervals. The role of the vessels includes the operating bases for fixed-wing naval drones, in effect drone-carriers [Admin 2025, 24 September]. However, commissioning of China’s third aircraft carrier, the Fujian was greeted with palpable concern in India over an emerging «carrier gap» [Bedi 2025, 10 November; Kumar 2025, 7 November; Singh 2025, 11 November]. Now overtaken by China in aircraft carrier numbers, India sought to further strengthen its two carriers’ assets and punch power. In November, it was confirmed that Abhimanyu drones would be joining the air-wings on both of the carriers, a force multiplier [Baidya 2025, 5 November]; and that India was «accelerating» plans to equip its existing MiG-29 and new Rafale M fighters with 160km+ range Astra Mk2 Air-to-Air Missiles to combat China’s PL-15 long-range missile used by Pakistan [Patel 2025, 13 November].

5. China

China entered the year as a two-carrier navy, in which the old ex-Soviet Admiral Gorshkov, modified as the Liaoning, had been joined by the Shandong, China’s first indigenously-designed aircraft carrier. Both carry the J-15s, reverse-engineered copies of the old Soviet-period SU-33, first unveiled in 1987. What was significant during 2025 were their blue water operations beyond Japan and participation in Taiwan-blockade exercises, preparation, threat and coercion on show. By the end of the year, as a matter of great national prestige, they had been joined by a third aircraft carrier, the Fujian.

The Shangdong was deployed east of Taiwan in March, as part of the Strait Thunder 2025 exercise. The significant was two-fold. First, it was blue water power projection beyond the so-called «first island chain». Second, it was coercive, testing «cutting communications» between Taiwan and the outside world, especially its allies, in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan [Guo and Liu 2025, 2 April]. The Shandong then carried out drills in the South China Sea in early April.

The next significant moment was the simultaneous two-carrier deployment of the Laioning and the Shandong, and CSGs, east of Japan – a first time event for them in those waters. This was described in the Chinese media as a «‘train-as-you-fight’ test beyond island chains» [Zheng 2025, 17 November]. The Liaoning passed through the Miyako Strait (Ryukyu/«first island chain»), and engaged in drills south-east of Japan. The Shandong went further east, south of the Bonin Islands, beyond the «second island chain» to approach the Japan’s easternmost island of Minamitori/Marcus Island from the south-west on 7 June. An element of coercive signalling to Japan was present. This eastern outreach by the Shandong was considered in the Chinese media as «a bridge to a blue-water future» and very much «an instrument of Beijing’s long-range power projection past the first island chain» [Choi 2025, 3 July]

The Shandong’s arrival, with supporting fleet (the guided missile destroyers Yan’an and Zhanjiang, and the guided missile frigate Yuncheng), in Hong Kong in early July was a deliberate internal [Global Times 2025, 4 July] and external [Liu and Guo 2025, 3 July] show of might.

A further notch up in Chinese carrier-strength was seen in August with the commissioning of its fourth Type 075 amphibious assault ship (LPD), the Hubei (c. 36,000 ton displacement), operating as a helicopter carrier, which was immediately deployed with its sister-ship the Hainan in the South China Sea. A further carrier was unveiled in November with the successful sea-trials of China’s new Type 076 assault ship the Sichuan. The vessel includes electromagnetic catapult and arrestor technology for mixed fixed-wing operations (drones and manned fighters], its 40-50,000 ton displacement «granting it the capabilities of a light aircraft carrier» [Cao and Liu 2025, 12 December].

Much anticipation had surrounded the progress of China’s third aircraft carrier, the Fujian, highly anticipated as a national prestige achievement of the first order taking China «into the deep-blue era» in «a pivotal milestone in the history of Chinese aircraft carriers» [Song 2025, 25 September]. China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, was Soviet made and its second, the Shandong, was built in China but based on the Soviet model. Both use older-style ski-jump type systems to help planes take flight. At the end of the year, the Chinese state media made a point of parading the «burst power» employed on the Fujian skips past the steam catapult technology used on most American carriers to employ an electromagnetic launch system (EMAL) found only on the latest US Navy Ford-class nuclear super carriers, with planes able to launch at faster speeds and carry heavier payloads [Liu 2025, 25 December]. In its sea trials in September, China simultaneously debuted its J-35 stealth fighter, improved J-15T fighter and KJ-600 radar plane operating from the Fujian, a «stunning leap forward» in China’s aircraft carrier capability [Newdick 2025, 22 September].

China’s state media was jubilant in November, with the commissioning of the Fujian at Sanya, Hainan Island, the headquarters of the Southern Command, facing down into the South China Sea:

The arrival of the «three-carrier era» signifies that the PLA Navy possesses an all-weather, long-range strike and defense combat system that can be deployed in rotation. It also marks a shift in the PLA Navy’s strategy from coastal defense to far seas defense, which has a profound impact on reshaping the world’s maritime power structure. No hegemony or pressure can stop China’s march toward becoming a maritime power. [Global Times 2025, 8 November]

The Fujian’s threat was immediately noted, with concerns, in the US [Shepheres and Valino 2025, 14 November], Japan [Arimoto 2025, 17 December] and India [Kumar 2025, 7 November].

Very quickly, the Fujian was then deployed into the South China Sea, in mid-November, along with the guided missile destroyer Yan’an, and the guided missile frigate Tongliao for «live force» training. The Shandong was reported nearby. This was regional signalling to other littoral states. Varied types of aircraft, including the J-35 stealth fighter jets, J-15T heavy fighter jets, J-15DT electronic warfare aircraft, and KJ-600 early warning aircraft, completed multiple takeoff and landing training sessions on the Fujian.

By then, a week after Fujian’s commissioning, firm news had emerged on China’s start of construction of a new supercarrier, another milestone in national prestige and potential power projection capabilities, a «100,000-ton game-changer» for Indo-Pacific operations, with a reactor containment structure being installed for a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier [Defence Security Asia 2025, 13 November; Weichert 2025, 27 December].

In early-December, the Liaoning (accompanied by the cruiser Nanchang, destroyers CNS Xining and Kaifeng and fast combat support ship CNS Hulunhu) deployed through the Miyako Strait, with Chinese analysts noting that «training in new locations can further boost its capabilities in the far seas» [Liu and Liang 2025, 8 December]. Immediate friction was present as Japan accused Chinese planes of dangerous «radar illumination» carried out on monitoring Japanese plans. The CSG went over north and eastwards reaching 136 degrees east longitude, midway between the two island chains. The Fujian then transited the Taiwan Strait, to join the Liaoning at Qingdao, nestled side by side at the end of the year.

China ended the year with heavy coercive drill practices, Justice Mission 2025, through 29 and 30 December in five blocks of seawater, closely surrounding Taiwan. Twenty ships participated, including the Hainan Type 75 amphibious carrier «the PLA ‘light carrier’ key to Taiwan strategy» [Wang 2026, 19 January].

6. Japan

2025 was an important year for Japan, following the decision in 2018 to convert JS Izumo and JS Kaga from helicopter carrier status to full aircraft carrier status, in order to carry Fifth Generation F-35B attack jets. The increasing presence of China’s aircraft carriers, particularly the simultaneous appearance of the Liaoning and Shandong in July, and the pace of China’s carrier-building programme, has made Japan’s own aircraft carrier conversion programme all the more pressing. It represents counter-balancing, or at least mitigation of China’s emerging carrier programme.

JS Izumo, having completed the first part of its structural conversion, commenced the second part of the conversion, changing the trapezoidal shape of the bow to rectangular to make it easier for F-35 Bs to launch. This commenced in March 2025, with all modifications expected to be completed by early 2027. Attention focussed in 2025 upon JS Kaga. Its conversion and sea trials were completed with three months deployment to the US, from October-December 2024, where training flights of US F-35Bs were made from the Kaga. The JS Kaga, now 27,000 ton displacement, having completed its conversion and sea trials during 2024, has spent 2025 exercising with other F-35B-operating navies. All these exercises represent Allied cooperation, tacitly with China a common concern, and with interoperability sought with carrier-held F-35Bs operated by the US and UK.

The Kaga completed its first operational mission, sailing alongside US and French aircraft carriers in the Philippine Sea in February 2025 in the Pacific Steller exercises, signalling deterrence to China, and denounced in the Chinese state media [Chen 2025, 9 February]. In another powerful trilateral carrier operation, the Kaga (and JS Akebono) joined the USS George Washington and the HMS Prince of Wales CSGs in the North Philippine Sea in August, and was duly denounced in the Chinese state media [Liu and Liang 2025, 6 August]. Both US and UK F-35Bs took the opportunity to practice cross-deck flights to and from JS Kaga. The Kaga linked up again with the Prince of Wales CSG in the East China Sea in September. Bilateral exercising and cross-deck activities from the Prince of Wales’ F-35Bs and also Marines were on show. JS Kaga also helpfully refuelled HMS Richmond on 9 September, ahead of the Richmond’s transit of the Taiwan Strait. By end-September, the Kaga was in the Nichi-Gou Trident exercise with HMAS Brisbane in the West Pacific. JS Kaga passed another threshold in October in the Annualex with the US. First, the exercise was led by JS Kaga. Second, it was a broad-based exercise involving a range of US ships, namely the guided-missile destroyer USS Shoup, the guided missile cruiser USS Robert Smalls, dry cargo ships USNS Amelia Earhart and USNS Wally Schirra, and fleet replenishment oiler USNS Tippecanoe (T-AO 199). It also included aircraft from Australia, Canada, France and New Zealand, multilateral messaging and tacit counter-balancing to China. Thirdly, four US F-38bs practiced landing/taking off from JS Kaga, cementing its role as a functioning aircraft carrier [Atlamazoglou 2025, 21 November].

On the plane front, Japan envisages ordering 42 F-35Bs, 21 for each carrier. Three F-35B arrived in August, delayed from FY2024 due to software issues, which makes Japan the only US ally in the Indo-Pacific with fixed-wing carrier-based stealth aircraft. Their arrival was promptly denounced in the Chinese state media [Guo 2025, 8 August]. Training operations started in November, at Nyutabaru Air Base, which is also the headquarters of the 5th Air Force. Japan’s decision to base its first F-35Bs at Nyutabaru Air Base was no accident. Located in Miyazaki Prefecture on Kyushu, it sits close to the Nansei (Southwest) Islands, a chain stretching toward Taiwan and including the disputed Senkaku Islands. Nearby, Mageshima Island, currently being developed as a dedicated F-35B training site, will support short takeoff and vertical landing drills. Once operational, it will host both Japanese and US forces for joint exercises. The significance of the F-35B’s is they are superior to the J-15’s carried on China’s Liaoning and Shandong. A further five are expected by the end of Fiscal Year 2025, i.e. by March 2026. Equipping its warships with a 5th-generation stealth fighter is «a strategic leap for Japan, sliding the narrative in Tokyo from defence to offence. This isn’t just a delivery; it’s a turning point in how Japan projects military power» [Bailey 2025, 7 August]. Importantly, F-35B acquisition ensures full interoperability with the US Navy and Marine Corps, allowing for joint training and enhanced alliance coordination, as well as with the UK and Italian navies which also operate F-35Bs.

Japan continues to operate its two Hyuga-class helicopter carriers, the 19,000-ton displacement JS Hyuga and JS Ise with full flight decks, each able to carry 18 helicopters, as well as drones, and missile batteries. For Indo-Pacific Deployment (IPD25) from April to November, JS Ise led a powerful CSG, the destroyers JS Suzunami and JS Akebono, the amphibious ship JS Ohsumi, the frigate JS Yahagi, and supported by a submarine. The Ise participated in Talisman Sabre 2025 in July, in Pacific Vanguard 2025 from August-September followed by bilateral exercises with the USS Higgins around Guam. JS Hyuga participated in Talisman Sabre 2025 in July, in Freedom Edge with South Korea and the US in September. November witnessed JS Hyuga leading the US, Australian and US ships in the Malabar exercise off Guam, which was denounced in the Chinese state media [Feng 2025, 7 November].

Japan was particularly concerned about dual-carrier deployment by China. This was first on show in June when with the deployment of China’s Liaoning and Shandong was tracked through Japan’s EEZ. Japan complained about Chinese carrier planes having come unusually close, to which the China’s Ministry of Defence lodged a «stern protest» over how Japanese ships and aircraft «repeatedly approached and interfered, deliberately creating maritime and air safety risks» [Global Times 2025, 13 June].

The Chinese double deployment of the Liaoning and Shandong again to waters east of Japan in December, created further friction. The context was deterioration in Japan-China relations as China took offence over Japan’s comments about possibly coming to Taiwan’s aid in the event of invasion. The Chinese carriers were shadowed by JS Teruzuki and Japanese airforce planes, Tokyo complaining that «radar illumination» by aircraft from the Liaoning as «a dangerous act» [Government of Japan. Ministry of Defence 2025, 7 December]. Japan’s justification was that:

The scramble conducted by the Self-Defence Forces was both appropriate and necessary. Okinawa Island, Kitadaito Island, Minamidaito Island, and Okidaito Island are located near the waters in which Liaoning was operating. It is natural and imperative for the Ministry of Defence and JSDF, which are responsible for safeguarding Japan’s territorial airspace and protecting the lives and property of the Japanese people, to appropriately conduct airspace intrusion countermeasures against carrier-based aircraft launched from Liaoning. [Government of Japan. Ministry of Defence 2025, 10 December]

China rejected the claims and instead complained of Japanese provocation and «harassment» [Global Times 2025, 7 December; Wang Qiang 2025, 8 December].

7. Looking Forward

As demonstrated, during 2025 issues of national prestige, power projection, and strategic messaging – be it of cooperation and support, or deterrence and coercion – were all in play with aircraft carrier constructions, augmentations and deployments. The biggest maritime issues remain around the response by the US, Japan and India to China’s maritime carrier-led surge. In this vein, the Pentagon report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China pinpointed China’s intent to introduce six more aircraft carriers during the next decade. How does this impact on the US, India and Japan?

With regard to the US, the John F. Kennedy, the next more powerful Gerald Ford-class nuclear carrier, was originally envisaged for delivery by 2018. However, in June 2025, in the Fiscal Year 2026 Budget Estimates on the Carrier Replacement Program, the John F. Kennedy’s delivery date was shifted from July 2025 to March 2027 to support completion of its Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) certification and continuing Advanced Weapons Elevator (AWE) work. This will result in a drop in carrier numbers during 2026. Put it another way, the 11-2 US carrier superiority over China at the start of 2025 will be replaced by a 10-3 superiority during 2026. More worryingly for the US, the annual Pentagon China Military Power Report, released in December, judged that China intended to build six more aircraft carriers during the next decade, a carrier every 20 months, giving it a force of nine aircraft carriers, facing between 11 and 12 US carriers, by 2035. Indeed, given US commitment elsewhere this would leave China with carrier superiority in the Pacific by 2035 [Moriyasu 2025, 30 December]. On the light aircraft carrier front, the Budget Estimates also announced that the next two America-class ships, the Bougainville and Fallujah, would be facing a one-year delay in construction and delivery due to shipyard labour challenges. Bougainville is currently being fitted out with decks specially strengthened for F-35B operations, but with its previous completion date of December 2025 now extended to August 2026.

With regard to India, uncertainties remained over its aircraft carrier program. The year started with its Ministry of Defence considering the approval given in September 2024 by the Defence Procurement Board for a conventional third aircraft carrier, an IAC-II that would be in the Vikrant-style, giving India a three-carrier fleet. By February 2025 there were reports this had been dropped. Instead the Technology Vision and Capability Roadmap, released in September 2025, outlined the next 15 years of modernizations. Carrier highlights included the construction of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier with electromagnetic EMAL launch technology. On the one hand, this would replace INS Vikramaditya, whose notional life service runs to 2037 – leaving India still with a two-carrier fleet. On the other hand, this replacement will be bigger tonnage and size (carrying more planes) and more advanced (nuclear propulsion and EMAL launch systems) than the Vikramaditya. As such, it will jump past the China’s Fujian (conventional propulsion plus EMAL launch system) to match both the US Gerald Ford-class aircraft carriers and China’s envisaged 004 carrier which are/will be nuclear propulsion plus EMALs launch-fitted [Litnarovych 2025, 9 September]. Post-Roadmap, the Indian Navy renewed its push, for a conventional third aircraft carrier, an IAC-II that would be in the Vikrant-style but with UAV focus and design overhauls [Kunde 2025, 30 October]. In December, the year finished with the Navy Day Conference where the future of India’s aircraft carrier fleet emerged as a major theme. Navy chief argued there that «our vision is still to have a three-carrier Navy – one on each coast and one in reserve for maintenance and contingencies», and remained confident that the «requisite answers» would eventually align with India’s strategic needs [Saxena 2025, 2 December].

In a final look forward, two sets of nested confrontations were evident at the end of 2025. One was the China-Japan, China-India and China-US naval rivalries. Second was China’s increasing readiness to take out Taiwan, publicly announced for by 2027. Its aircraft carriers (Liaoning, Shandong, and Fujian) and LPD carriers (Hainan and Hubei) are already in position for 2026.

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ISSN 2385-2526

The year 2025 marked the consolidation of a conjuncture that expanded Azerbaijan’s capacity for autonomous action within an evolving regional order. Emerging from the interaction between systemic shifts and domestic consolidation, this context enabled Baku to recalibrate its foreign policy posture and reassert its agency across multiple and interconnected regional scenarios. These span the Middle East, the wider Near Eastern space, the Black Sea region, and Central Asia, where Azerbaijan occupies a position of both geographic and civilizational relevance.

The article examines how Azerbaijan has translated renewed agency into observable foreign policy practices and evaluates how this translates into enhanced decision-making autonomy and expanding multiregional influence. It argues that Azerbaijan exemplifies a wider pattern in small-state behaviour whereby agency is leveraged to mitigate structural constraints and project influence beyond material capabilities, adopting role conceptions commonly associated with middle powers. However, while such behaviour is not unprecedented in Azerbaijani foreign policy, recent trends point to a shift away from the cooperative and status quo-oriented practices typically associated with established middle powers. Instead, Baku increasingly exhibits traits commonly associated with evolving forms of middle-power behaviour, including a more assertive, domestic-driven, and selectively revisionist posture toward shaping regional dynamics. Overall, the case illustrates an emerging hybridization of middle-power behaviour, combining cooperative brokerage with selective contestation in pursuit of greater strategic autonomy and multiregional influence.

Keywords – Azerbaijan; middle-power behaviour; foreign policy-making; revisionism.

1. Introduction

By 2025, building upon trajectories that had progressively taken shape over the previous decade, Azerbaijan found itself operating within an exceptionally favourable context at both the domestic and international levels. This altered opportunity structure significantly widened Baku’s diplomatic latitude, enabling a shift from a largely reactive posture to a more proactive and agenda-setting foreign policy. At the core of this reconfigured conjuncture lay the restoration of full control over Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding districts, which had remained outside Baku’s effective authority since the 1991-1994 war with Armenia. The reassertion of territorial integrity after the 2020-2023 conflict represented not only a material shift in control over a contested territory but also a powerful source of domestic legitimacy and symbolic capital. It consolidated state authority, redefined the parameters of national sovereignty, and, crucially, reduced the structural constraints that had long circumscribed Baku’s external action. By restoring full effective control over Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding districts, Baku decisively overcame what had been described as a «mutilated sovereignty syndrome» [Ceccorulli et al. 2016] – a structural condition in which incomplete territorial control constrained both state consolidation and strategic agency. For nearly three decades, the imperative of restoring territorial integrity functioned simultaneously as both the primary driver and the principal constraint of foreign policy, structuring diplomatic priorities, and limiting strategic flexibility. The reassertion of sovereignty did not merely alter the regional balance of power. It reduced the existential salience of the territorial question and enabled a partial reorientation of Azerbaijan’s external posture beyond a single-issue agenda, thereby expanding the range of policy options within the evolving regional environment.

The expansion of Baku’s policy options cannot, however, be explained solely by domestic consolidation and sub-regional power shifts. It must also be situated within the broader Eurasian context generated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The war has reconfigured patterns of great-power interaction across the post-Soviet space, transforming what had been described as a contested in-between region into a far more fluid and volatile strategic environment [Tyushka & German 2025a; 2025b]. In particular, the escalation from structured competition to open conflict between Russia and the collective West weakened Moscow’s capacity to project uncontested dominance in its near abroad. At the same time, it intensified Western engagement with local actors, widening the manoeuvring space of states located between the two poles. Consequently, «geostrategic in-betweenness» in the post-Soviet space emerged not only as a condition of constraint but also as a potential resource, enabling states to leverage their positionality in pursuit of compensatory or opportunistic strategies [Tyushka 2025]. For several post-Soviet in-between states, this has translated into a recalibration of foreign policy options, a diversification of external partnerships, and a more assertive articulation of agency within an increasingly fragmented regional order [German 2024].

Building upon the favourable conditions outlined above, Azerbaijan has pursued a more assertive foreign policy posture, reflecting a deliberate activation of agency combining enhanced strategic autonomy with an increasing capacity to shape agendas and broker alignments across adjoining strategic perimeters. In turn, this renewed activism has reinvigorated debates within national academic and policy-oriented circles alike around Azerbaijan’s standing as a middle power. Across this literature, the attribution of middle-power status to Azerbaijan rests on three interrelated and often intertwined arguments. First, a material-strategic argument links this status to enhanced energy leverage and military capabilities, as well as to the reconfiguration of the regional status quo after 2020 [Ibrahimov 2024]. Second, a behavioural argument emphasizes activism in multilateral and minilateral settings, diversified institutional engagement, and the bridge-building role across geopolitical divides and regional chessboards as markers of middle-power conduct [Jafarova 2024; Ibrahimov 2024; Castro 2026]. Third, an ideational and reputational argument foregrounds soft power, norm entrepreneurship, and multicultural diplomacy as instruments through which Azerbaijan projects both legitimacy and influence beyond its material weight [Asgarov 2024; Jafarova 2024].

The present article builds upon, but also moves beyond, this emerging narrative. On the one hand, it starts from the assumption that Baku, maximizing limited material resources and leveraging targeted policy instruments to «punch above its weight», conforms to a long-standing pattern among small states in the post-Cold War order, behaving in ways typically associated with middle powers. On the other hand, the article examines the extent and patterns of Azerbaijan’s middle-power-like conduct in 2025, situating the case within the evolving spectrum of behavioural repertoires observable across this composite category. The objective is not classificatory, and the purpose is not theory-building but theory-informed empirical analysis. The objective is therefore primarily empirical: the middle-power framework is employed here as an analytical and heuristic lens to assess how observable patterns of Azerbaijan’s diplomatic conduct align with, adapt, or diverge from behavioural repertoires identified in the literature.

The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the conceptual evolution of the middle-power debate and introduce the analytical framework adopted. Section 3 examines those strands of Azerbaijan’s external engagement that display continuity with a long-standing strategy of maximizing limited material resources through targeted diplomatic activism, a behaviour commonly associated with traditional and emerging middle powers. Section 4 turns to more recent foreign policy patterns that suggest an ongoing hybridization of Azerbaijan’s middle-power behaviour, combining repertoires associated with different variants within this heterogeneous category.

2. Middle-Power Behaviour in a Changing International Order

The diffusion of material power, the regionalization of the international system, and the waning of great powers’ influence have reactivated debates on middle powers, whose number increased significantly over the last two decades [Institute for Economics & Peace 2026]. Yet, few concepts in International Relations remain as elusive as that of middle-powerness [Robertson 2017], not least because of the persistent difficulty in establishing clear categorical boundaries. Attempts to define middle powers through aggregate quantitative indicators have failed to produce stable thresholds, thereby exposing the conceptual limitations of purely rank-based approaches [Cooper et al. 1993]. As a result, the debate took a behavioural turn: a middle-power came to be defined not by what it possesses, but by what it does. This qualitative shift placed emphasis on a diplomatic style characterized by a propensity «to promote cohesion and stability in the world system» [Jordaan 2003, p. 165]. Middle powers were commonly portrayed as internationalist in orientation, multilateral in method, and normatively committed to «good international citizenship», thereby contributing to the stability of the liberal international order [Cooper et al. 1993]. Their behaviour is also typically associated with the practice of niche diplomacy, defined as «concentrating resources in specific areas best able to generate returns» [Evans & Grant 1991, p. 323].

Derived from historically contingent models and affected by tautological vulnerabilities [Robertson 2017], the behavioural approach has come under sustained pressure since the beginning of the century. This trend resulted from the emergence of new middle powers, whose foreign policy conduct departs significantly from the institutional and normative patterns associated with traditional cases. In a seminal work introducing a distinction between «traditional» and «emerging» middle powers, Jordaan [2003] highlighted both constitutive and behavioural differences. Emerging middle powers differ from their traditional counterparts in that they tend to occupy a semi-peripheral position in the global political economy, combine recent or incomplete democratic consolidation with pronounced domestic inequality, and exercise significant – sometimes dominant – regional influence. At the behavioural level, the key distinction lies in their orientation toward global order: whereas traditional middle-powers typically pursue an appeasing and system-reinforcing internationalism, emerging ones adopt a reformist posture, while remaining broadly committed to the stability of the existing order.

The distinction between traditional and emerging middle powers only temporarily restored analytical clarity to a concept strained by empirical expansion, as the subsequent proliferation of behavioural repertoires further destabilized the model. As foreign policy practices expanded to include assertive regional activism, coercive diplomacy, selective multilateralism, and norm contestation, the assumption of a coherent middle-power behavioural core became progressively unteneable.1

In response, the literature coined new labels and concepts aimed at capturing «heterodox» behavioural repertoires. A first strain of the literature frames behavioural discrepancy in terms of status quo versus revisionist middle powers [Moeini et al. 2022], arguing that the latter engage in rule-contesting or order-revising strategies rather than system legitimizing practices. Revisionism is understood here in terms of targeted challenges to Western dominance, governance asymmetries, or liberal normative hierarchies. Aydın [2021] further enriches this picture by showing that emerging middle powers often adopt a dual strategy toward the liberal international order: they are neither outright revisionist nor fully status quo, but instead pursue selective engagement combined with normative contestation. While benefiting from institutional embeddedness within the liberal order, they simultaneously criticize its distributive injustices and governance asymmetries. In this sense, they operate as «internal critics» of the order.

A related but analytically distinct category is that of «unusual middle power» developed by Öniş and Kutlay [2021]. In this formulation, emphasis lies on hybridity of foreign policy behaviour. On the one hand, unusual middle powers combine multilateral engagement with unilateral assertiveness, oscillating between cooperative brokerage and hard-power projection; on the other hand, this behavioural pattern is linked to domestic dynamics, as foreign policy activism becomes intertwined with regime consolidation and internal legitimacy-building. Assertive external postures, strategic autonomy narratives, and selective institutional engagement are not only systemic strategies but also tools for regime strengthening. Building on this line of inquiry, Aydın-Düzgit [2023] introduces the category of «authoritarian middle powers» to capture cases in which regime survival strategies reshape the external orientation toward the liberal order. In such instances, contestation is not only strategic but also ideational: authoritarian-leaning middle powers increasingly reject the liberal normative core while remaining functionally embedded within the institutional architecture of the order.

These classifications do not appear mutually exclusive types of middle powers. Rather, they represent analytically distinct but overlapping dimensions of heterodox deviation from the classical middle-power script. Taken together, they point to three core variables along which contemporary middle-power behaviour varies and may be analyzed under a coherent analytical framework. First, systemic orientation, namely the state’s attitude toward the liberal international order – ranging from status quo legitimation to selective contestation and internal revisionism. Second, strategic repertoire, or the instruments and modalities of international action – ranging from classical multilateral brokerage, bridge-building, and coalition management to coercive diplomacy, minilateralism, and autonomy-seeking activism. Third, the domestic-external nexus, capturing the extent to which foreign policy activism is linked to regime consolidation, status-seeking narratives, and domestic legitimacy dynamics. Recast in these terms, the evolving middle-power debate offers a practical analytical grid rather than a purely classificatory exercise. The three dimensions identified above serve here as an interpretative framework to examine Azerbaijan’s foreign policy in 2025 – highlighting patterns of continuity, adaptation, and emerging inflection points.

3. Continuities in Baku’s middle-power behavior

Over the course of 2025, Azerbaijan intensified its efforts to project a form of good international citizenship primarily through the deliberate cultivation of strategic «niches». This vector of foreign policy unfolded along two principal tracks: mediation diplomacy and aid diplomacy. The former constitutes a classical hallmark of traditional middle-power behavioural repertoires and represents a particularly noteworthy niche through which such states project influence beyond their material weight. In the Azerbaijani case, the recent activation of this vector of foreign policy should be interpreted against the backdrop of a broader «polycrisis» affecting its adjoining strategic perimeters. Rather than constraining Baku’s agency, this environment of overlapping tensions expanded its diplomatic room for manoeuvre. It enabled the country to consolidate a bridge-building role that leverages its in-between condition, understood not merely in geographic terms but also in cultural and strategic ones. Situated at the intersection of Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian, and Middle Eastern arenas, Baku sought to capitalize more systematically on this liminal condition and its balanced ties with rival actors to position itself as a credible mediator and facilitator of dialogue. Mediation diplomacy therefore emerges not as episodic activism but as a deliberate niche strategy [Yagubova 2025] consistent with established middle-power repertoires.

In 2025 Azerbaijan’s mediation diplomacy unfolded along two principal tracks. The first concerns relations between Turkey and Israel, a particularly significant vector insofar as the sharp deterioration of bilateral relations over the past decade – recently intensified by tensions linked to Syria – placed two pillars of Azerbaijan’s balanced foreign policy on a potential collision course. Close security ties with Ankara and dense defence and energy cooperation with Tel Aviv enabled Baku to initiate a calibrated «quiet diplomacy» [Al Arabiya 2025, 3 June] and to act as a discreet facilitator of dialogue in a high-mistrust environment. This triangular dynamic resulted in the opening of a «Baku Process», whereby Azerbaijan acted as a potential stabilizing intermediary limiting escalation risks [Khanin 2025, 21 November]. In early 2025, amid concerns over potential military incidents in Syria, Baku hosted technical talks aimed at establishing a deconfliction mechanism between the parties [Reuters 2025, 10 April; Times of Israel 2025, 10 April], inaugurating multiple rounds of discussions conducted under Azerbaijan’s auspices [Al Arabiya 2025, 3 June; Times of Israel 2025, 3 June]. This mediation vector is particularly significant not only because it leverages Azerbaijan’s strategic in-betweenness, but also because it mobilizes its cultural and civilizational positioning.2 The mediation effort also draws on Azerbaijan’s cultivated image as an interfaith bridge, with commentary framing its role as consistent with a narrative of Muslim-Jewish coexistence and dialogue [Eichner 2025, 14 April].

The second track of mediation diplomacy concerns the Russia-Ukraine conflict. In mid-2024, at the request of Ukraine and the European Union, Azerbaijan sought to facilitate negotiations between Kyiv and Moscow over a Russian gas transit agreement set to expire at the end of the year [Reuters 2024, 13 June]. Azerbaijani authorities subsequently signalled their readiness to host broader rounds of negotiations in Baku, presenting the country as a neutral venue for dialogue aimed at de-escalation [Report 2025, 26 July]. While the mediation of gas transit proved unsuccessful and the proposal to host negotiations did not materialize into concrete follow-up initiatives – due in part to the subsequent deterioration of bilateral relations between Baku and Moscow – this track remains analytically significant. On the one hand, it illustrates the extent to which Azerbaijan’s calibrated positioning creates a perception of relative balance and the potential to act as an intermediary on a strategically sensitive issue at the intersection of energy security and wartime diplomacy; on the other hand, it demonstrates the diplomatic capital generated by Azerbaijan’s in-between posture and to the explicit willingness of its leadership to translate that positionality into mediation initiatives.

Alongside mediation diplomacy, aid diplomacy constitutes a second pillar of Azerbaijan’s niche-building strategy. Institutionalized in 2011 through the creation of the Azerbaijan International Development Agency (AIDA) within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this policy instrument has, for over a decade, served as a structured and multiregional channel of external action [Frappi 2019]. The most recent OECD data confirm a sustained upward trend in Azerbaijan’s external assistance, which increased from approximately US$ 16 million in 2014 to around US$ 60 million in 2024 [OECD 2025, 11 June]. While Azerbaijan remains far from the international commitment to achieve a 0.7% ODA/GNI ratio by 2030, the steady expansion of its aid envelope has nonetheless positioned the country, in OECD formulation, as an «emerging provider of development co-operation, sharing its experience of economic transformation to an upper middle-income country» [OECD 2025, 11 June]. Aid diplomacy has thus become both a pillar of Azerbaijan’s projection of good international citizenship and a manifestation of status-seeking behaviour: through the selective provision of development and humanitarian assistance, Baku signals responsibility, competence, and upward mobility within the hierarchy of international actors.

In 2025, humanitarian diplomacy also functioned as an instrument embedded within broader foreign policy calculations. This was particularly visible in Azerbaijan’s calibrated posture toward the Russia-Ukraine war, built upon a cautious balancing strategy: avoiding open condemnation of Russia in international forumsand refraining from joining Western sanctions regimes, while reiterating its steadfast commitment to Ukraine’s territorial integrity. This posture was complemented by tangible humanitarian support to Kyiv. By early 2026, Azerbaijan’s cumulative assistance to Ukraine was estimated at over US$ 45 million [Butun 2026, 27 January]. Such support was channelled both through AIDA and through the active involvement of the state oil company SOCAR. Significantly, SOCAR directed part of its assistance toward strengthening the resilience of Ukraine’s energy sector at a time when energy infrastructure had become a primary target of Russian military strikes, affecting also Azerbaijani-linked assets in the country [Kennedy 2025, 11 August].

The diversification of spatial and sectoral areas of intervention has traditionally characterized Azerbaijani aid diplomacy [Frappi 2019]. Nevertheless, the African continent – and particularly Sub-Saharan Africa – has remained a consistent priority of engagement. This orientation has been corroborated by the most recent trends in the provision of development assistance, which – although limited in absolute terms – remain concentrated in a restricted yet strategically coherent set of domains.3 Still, aid diplomacy toward Africa is less about scale than about status and positioning, further illustrating how this niche is embedded within broader foreign policy strategies. It reflects a strategic prioritization of partnerships with the Global South, an established feature of emerging middle-power activism in Jordaan’s [2003] understanding. It also reflects a model of South-South cooperation grounded in knowledge transfer and institutional capacity-building, through which Baku leverages its own experience of economic transformation [Frappi 2019; Mahammadova & Guliyev 2025].

Thus, while mediation and aid diplomacy illustrate Baku’s niche-building strategy, they also point toward a broader behavioural orientation, namely a preference for multilateral engagement anchored in the Global South. This preference does not disclose disengagement from Euro-Atlantic institutions. On the contrary, by strengthening ties within Global South networks while maintaining dense economic and institutional connections with the Global North, Azerbaijan explicitly aims at positioning itself as a relational intermediary [PRA 2024, 18 December] – yet another demonstration of the attempt to leverage the country’s multidimensional in-betweenness. Strengthening participation in Global South multilateral frameworks provides Azerbaijan with opportunities to «enhance its diplomatic visibility, bolster international legitimacy, and increase the market competitiveness of its non-oil sectors» [Garayeva et al. 2025, p. 2]. This strategy has been pursued primarily through the engagement with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Serving as Chair from 2019 to 2023 – an unprecedented one-year term extension endorsed by member states – Baku consolidated its position within one of the largest multilateral groupings of the Global South contributing to the enhancement of its institutional and operational profile. Crucially, cooperative mechanisms launched and institutionalized under Azerbaijan’s chairmanship – most notably the Parliamentary Network and the Youth platform – provided the structural avenues through which this engagement was also sustained beyond the formal conclusion of its mandate.4

Rather than privileging a single institutional axis, Azerbaijan’s multilateral activism and engagement with the Global South are pursued across heterogeneous institutional frameworks, including BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). While Baku formally applied for BRICS membership in mid-2024, it also signalled interest in upgrading its current dialogue partner status within the SCO [Huseynov 2024, 16 October; Mammadov 2024, 18 July]. Both paths – and particularly the latter – gained traction also as a result of the growing entente between Azerbaijan and China. This process culminated in April 2025 with the signing, on the occasion of a visit to Beijing of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, of a Joint Statement establishing a comprehensive strategic partnership that included support for Azerbaijan’s enhanced legal status within the SCO [APA 2025, 23 April] – potentially extending to full membership, according to President Xi Jinping [Report 2025, 1 September].5

A further illustration of Azerbaijan’s multiregional agency is its formal accession to the consultative framework of Central Asian states [Cutler 2025, 17 November], transforming the so-called C5 format into a broader C6 mechanism and anchoring Baku more structurally within Central Asian evolving regional diplomacy. While Azerbaijan’s participation in the C5 format builds on a long-standing path of cooperation sustained by ethno-linguistic bonds, it also reflects Baku’s capacity to capitalize on opportunities created by the current regional context. On the one hand, these opportunities derive from the growing need among Central Asian states to diversify their external relations amid heightened uncertainty in regional power balances [Drost et al. 2025]. On the other, they stem from the economic and strategic prospects generated by growing international interest in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), an overland corridor linking East Asia and Europe bypassing Russia to the north and Iran to the south. Now central to the regional strategies of both the EU and China [Drost et al. 2025; Sahakyan 2026], the TITR consolidates Azerbaijan’s role as key a Caspian transit hub – a position in which Baku has long invested through sustained diplomatic and economic efforts [Frappi 2022].

Azerbaijan’s bridging role and regional positioning were further reinforced by the recent «diplomatic breakthrough» [Gurbanov 2026, 8 January] in Azerbaijani-US relations, after several years of lingering tensions. Regional connectivity occupies a central place in the «Charter on Strategic Partnership» that the two countries committed to elaborate through a memorandum signed during the trilateral Washington summit of August 2025 [DoS 2025a, 8 August], attended by Donald Trump, Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. In the same context, linking regional connectivity to the broader peace process over Nagorno-Karabakh, the three leaders endorsed a preliminary agreement for the construction of a transport corridor connecting Azerbaijan with the Nakhchivan exclave through southern Armenia [DoS 2025b, 8 August] – the so-called Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity. In addition to enabling Armenia to comply with one of the provisions of the 2020 ceasefire agreement, the project would strengthen the development of the TITR while signalling renewed US engagement in addressing the regional transit dimension within the peace process and in supporting wider Eurasian connectivity initiatives.

Against this backdrop, Azerbaijan’s participation in the C6 format further consolidates its bridge-building role across overlapping regional arenas. It also illustrates a layered pattern of institutional embeddedness, combining regional consolidation within Central Asia, strengthened trans-Caspian connectivity toward Europe, and alignment with renewed US-backed connectivity initiatives.

4. The hybridization of Baku’s middle-power behaviour

Alongside the behavioural repertoire discussed above, Azerbaijan’s foreign policy in recent years has also displayed patterns commonly associated with heterodox middle powers, notably the selective use of coercion and the renegotiation of asymmetric relationships in pursuit of greater strategic autonomy.

Azerbaijan’s use of coercive instruments is most evident in the negotiations with Armenia over a peace treaty following the 2020-2023 war. The process culminated in March 2025 with the signing of a 17-point Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations, later initialled in a non-legally binding form at the August 2025 Washington summit. Leveraging a marked asymmetry in military, diplomatic, and negotiating power, Azerbaijan deployed a broad repertoire of incentives and disincentives to steer Armenia toward acceptance of its proposed peace terms. Consequently, diplomatic engagement and gestures of cooperation have coexisted with elements of coercive bargaining and more or less explicit signals of military pressure.6 This approach is reflected both in the conduct and in the partial outcomes of the negotiations, as well as in the issues that remain unresolved. Chief among these is the demand that Armenia amend its Constitution to remove references to the 1990 Declaration of Independence and the territorial claims over Karabakh contained therein. In a post-war bargaining environment marked by clear asymmetries, such a request amounts to an exercise in «coercive diplomacy, with effects that are not insignificant in their detrimental impact on [Armenian] sovereignty» [Della Malva 2025, p. 249].

Turning to the conduct of the negotiations and their outcomes, Azerbaijan’s coercive approach was accompanied by lawfare tactics and generated effects extending well beyond the bilateral relationship between the parties. The recourse to lawfare – understood as the strategy of using or misusing legal instruments to achieve warfighting objectives [Dunlap 2008] – is reflected not only in the reciprocal resort to international courts after 2020 [Uraz 2025], but also in the fact that «the mutual withdrawal of claims and the commitment not to take actions against each other» constituted one of the conditions imposed on – and accepted by – Yerevan for the signing of the March agreement [Armenpress 2025, 13 March]. A further condition accepted by Armenia concerned the commitment not to allow the deployment of foreign forces along the interstate border. This requirement directly affects the presence of the EU civilian monitoring mission in Armenia (EUMA): a «so-called observation mission» that was extended violating previous agreements without Azerbaijan’s consent which, in President Aliyev’s words, «did not strengthen trust but, on the contrary, undermined it», demonstrating in turn how the EU «unequivocally took Armenia’s side in the normalization process» [PRA 2025, 7 Jan]. The negotiating conditions advanced by Baku illustrate how the coercive management of the peace process also served to constrain the involvement of third parties, shaping not only the bilateral settlement but the broader regional diplomatic environment.

Azerbaijan’s insistence on excluding third-party deployments along the interstate border reflects a broader preference for a strictly bilateral negotiation framework. Consistent with this approach, Baku has also sought to reshape the institutional setting of negotiations by advocating the dissolution of the largely ineffective OSCE Minsk Group, which had been entrusted with mediating the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict since the early 1990s. Azerbaijan therefore introduced an additional negotiating condition vis-à-vis Armenia, requesting that Yerevan align with Baku in formally calling for the termination of the Minsk process. Armenia’s eventual acceptance of this demand led to the issuance of a Joint Appeal in Washington, based on which the OSCE Ministerial Council formally dissolved the mechanism in early September [OSCE 2025, 1 September].

Azerbaijan’s increasingly assertive pursuit of autonomy-maximizing strategies also translated into attempts to expand its room for manoeuvre by recalibrating asymmetric relationships with larger partners. This trajectory is particularly visible in Baku’s recent interactions with major actors such as Russia, France, and the EU, where growing capabilities and shifting regional dynamics have encouraged a more self-confident renegotiation of established patterns of engagement.

The restoration of full sovereignty over Karabakh – symbolically marked by the early withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers deployed after 2020 [Reuters 2024, 17 April] – combined with Moscow’s «Ukraine distraction», reduced structural asymmetry in Russian-Azerbaijani relations and formed the backdrop to the most serious bilateral crisis since the early 2000s. The confrontation was triggered by the the Russia accidental shooting down of an Azerbaijan Airlines aircraft flying toward Grozny in December 2024, which sparked Baku’s demands for accountability and compensation from Moscow in what national outlets portrayed as a matter of «national dignity» [Guliyev 2025, 30 July]. Tensions escalated during the first half of 2025 as Baku restricted the activities of several Russian media outlets and peaked in summer, after a Russian police operation in Ekaterinburg targeting Azerbaijani diaspora, followed by a wave of arrests in Azerbaijan targeting employees of the news agency Sputnik [Rahimli 2025, 7 July]. A process of gradual de-escalation began in autumn, when Presidents Aliyev and Vladimir Putin met on the margins of the CIS summit in Dushanbe, signalling a willingness to «bury the hatchet» [Ostiller 2025, 10 October] after Russia publicly acknowledged responsibility for the aircraft incident. The crisis illustrates Baku’s attempt «to impose new rules on Moscow» [Kitachaev 2025, 7 July], a renegotiation dynamic aimed at asserting greater autonomy in a shifting regional order where Azerbaijan retains growing bargaining chips vis-à-vis Russia.7

A similar renegotiating rationale emerges in the recent deterioration of Azerbaijan’s relations with France, reflecting not only a degree of self-confidence comparable to that displayed in its dealings with Russia, but also the hybridization of its middle-power-like behaviour. The accusations levelled by Baku against Paris revolved around two main strands. First, in response to the intensification of diplomatic ties and military cooperation between France and Armenia, Azerbaijani officials accused Paris of providing Yerevan with «offensive, lethal weapons that present a real threat to Azerbaijan» [PRA 2024, 18 December]. Second, reacting to repeated French calls for the protection of the rights of Karabakh Armenians and guarantees for the return of refugees who fled the enclave following the September 2023 military operation, Baku framed Paris’s position as unacceptable interference in the country’s internal affairs [PRA 2023, 5 July]. More broadly, France was accused of pursuing an «anti-Azerbaijan policy within various international organizations and at the parliamentary levels» aimed at «strengthening its influence in the South Caucasus» [PRA 2024, 1 February].

In Baku’s response to French pressure, the dispute was framed not merely as a bilateral disagreement but as part of a broader struggle against lingering colonial practices in international politics. Accordingly, the response was articulated primarily through forums in which it had cultivated engagement with the Global South – and particularly through NAM, a privileged platform to level accusations against Paris of pursuing «neo-colonial policies» [PRA 2023, 5 July]. Moreover, from late 2023 onwards, Baku also sought to mobilize partners across the Global South through a series of initiatives centred on decolonization. The government supported the creation of the Baku Initiative Group (BIG), an international platform bringing together activists, scholars and political representatives from territories still associated with various forms of colonial governance, with particular attention to French overseas territories.8 Through publications, public events, and conferences organized in prominent international venues – including meetings associated with the UN Special Committee on Decolonization – the initiative promoted debates on colonialism and neo-colonialism while drawing particular attention to France’s policies. By internationalizing the dispute, Azerbaijan reframed its confrontation with France within a broader Global South discourse, leveraging multilateral arenas and transnational networks to contest Paris’ normative claims while projecting itself as a defender of sovereign equality and post-colonial justice. The BIG activities also testifies to the recurring instrumental use of legal and normative discourse in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. For instance, its stated commitment to the «promotion and protection of all human rights […] in countries under the control of other states» [BIG n.d.], sits somewhat uneasily alongside Baku’s longstanding practice of rejecting allegations of human-rights violations, illustrating how legal and normative arguments may be selectively mobilized as part of a broader strategy of diplomatic contestation.

An analogous effort to renegotiate the terms of engagement and expand Baku’s room for manoeuvre can also be observed in relations with the EU. The dynamics triggered by the war in Ukraine and the ensuing rupture in EU-Russia relations have significantly enhanced Azerbaijan’s strategic relevance in both energy security and transcontinental transport connectivity, thereby strengthening its bargaining position vis-à-vis Brussels. This trend has consolidated the parameters of an interest-based relationship marked by selective engagement, whereby Baku actively cooperates with the EU in areas of strategic relevance while simultaneously resisting normative conditionality [Simão 2018; Van Gils 2017; Delcour & Wolczuk 2021]. Although Baku has long responded to European criticism through counter-narratives framed around allegations of double standards and anti-Azerbaijani bias [Van Gils 2017], recent reactions suggest a qualitative shift in tone. Baku’s rhetoric has become markedly more assertive following a series of European Parliament (EP) resolutions condemning Azerbaijan for violations of human rights and civil liberties,9 as well as the EU’s increasingly active involvement in South Caucasus security dynamics – developments widely interpreted in Baku as reflecting a pro-Armenian bias, as already seen. These reactions can be analytically grouped into two partially overlapping yet distinct strands. The first strand is primarily politico-diplomatic in nature. Azerbaijani officials have consistently framed EU criticism and initiatives as infringements upon the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs, while EU security cooperation with Armenia has been portrayed as a threat to the country’s territorial integrity and as undermining peace and stability in the region [MFA 2024. 25 October]. At the same time, Baku’s rhetoric has increasingly invoked the language of sovereign equality and reciprocity. This framing has been reinforced by claims that Azerbaijan «does not depend on» and does not «expect anything from» the EU [PRA 2025, 7 January].

Alongside this framing, Azerbaijani discourse has increasingly incorporated a second, more explicitly ideational and value-based dimension. European criticism is not only rejected as politically biased but also portrayed as reflecting broader patterns of double standards, hypocrisy, and – particularly in the case of the EP – even «political corruption» [PRA 2024, 13 November]. Within this narrative, EU policies and its normative agenda are depicted as selectively applied, imbued with anti-Muslim sentiment and instrumentalized for political purposes. This framing aligns with what Azerbaijani officials describe as a broader tendency among some Western countries «to interfere in the internal affairs of Azerbaijan by using the issue of human rights as a pretext» [PRA 2024, 2 April]. Moreover, by intervening in the domestic processes of sovereign states, the EU is portrayed as displaying forms of colonial behaviour [PRA 2025, 9 April].

The sovereignty-first approach to international relations functions not only – as previously observed in the literature [Van Gils 2018] – as a defensive shield protecting the regime from external pressure, but also as a source of domestic legitimacy. In official rhetoric, imperial tendencies and the resulting propensity to interfere in the internal affairs of third countries are portrayed as being enabled by weak national leaderships: «If the leaders are weak, then the country is considered weak», which in turn opens the door to «foreign intervention, which actually undermines the moral and genetic fabric of those nations» [PRA ٢٠٢٥, 7 January]. Within this narrative, only strong leadership is portrayed as capable of upholding the principle of sovereignty by resisting imperial or neo-colonial interference and safeguarding national values from external attempts at corruption. A condition that Azerbaijani officials claim to have achieved.

5. Conclusions

This article has examined Azerbaijan’s foreign policy through the analytical lens of middle-power behaviour, assessing how Baku mobilizes diplomatic instruments and strategic positioning in order to project influence beyond its material capabilities. Interpreted through an analytical framework centred on systemic orientation, strategic repertoire, and the domestic-external nexus, the observed patterns of conduct reveal an increasingly hybrid foreign policy configuration combining elements associated with traditional, emerging, and heterodox middle-power repertoires.

From the perspective of strategic repertoire, Azerbaijan continues to rely on instruments commonly associated with traditional and emerging middle-power diplomacy. Mediation initiatives, humanitarian assistance, and diversified multilateral engagement illustrate how Baku cultivates diplomatic niches that amplify its international presence. These initiatives leverage the country’s multidimensional in-betweenness to sustain a bridge-building role across multiple regional arenas. This is further reflected in Baku’s activism within established and emerging Global South platforms, as part of a broader strategy of institutional diversification aimed at strengthening diplomatic visibility and influence. At the same time, the coercive dimension of its negotiations with Armenia points to a hybridization of the country’s strategic repertoire. Baku has leveraged its strengthened post-war position to shape both the terms of the peace process and the broader regional diplomatic environment: through a calibrated combination of incentives, legal pressures, and political demands, Azerbaijan has sought not only to secure a favourable bilateral settlement but also to redefine the institutional parameters of regional order in the South Caucasus.

In terms of systemic orientation, Azerbaijan’s external conduct increasingly departs from the cooperative script traditionally associated with middle powers. Relations with the EU illustrate a gradual shift from normative misalignment to a broader value divergence. While Azerbaijan has long resisted EU political conditionality, recent rhetoric suggests that contestation now extends beyond specific policies to the legitimacy of the value framework underpinning European engagement. Thus, Baku’s contestation increasingly extends beyond defensive rebuttal toward a more explicit ideational challenge to the normative authority claimed by the liberal order. In this sense, Azerbaijan increasingly approximates patterns associated with revisionist middle powers, insofar as revisionism is performed not as systemic opposition to the liberal international order, but as selective contestation of its normative hierarchies. Rather than disengaging from the institutional structures of the order, Baku challenges specific asymmetries and claims of normative authority, particularly where these are perceived to conflict with sovereignty-centred conceptions of international legitimacy. This shift is closely connected to the renewed centrality of sovereignty in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy narrative. For nearly three decades, the principle of sovereignty had been primarily invoked to reaffirm Azerbaijan’s claim to territorial integrity in the context of the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Following the restoration of full territorial control after the 2020-2023 war, however, its meaning and function have partially evolved. It now functions primarily as a normative shield against perceived external interference, providing the conceptual foundation for rejecting international criticism and resisting external pressure. Sovereignty-first rhetoric has therefore become a central pillar of Azerbaijan’s broader autonomy-maximizing strategy.

The domestic-external nexus provides the third key dimension through which Azerbaijan’s evolving behaviour can be understood and aligned with the heterodox middle-power repertoire. The sovereignty-centred rhetoric accompanying Baku’s external activism together with the renegotiation of asymmetric relations with key external interlocutors also functions as an important component of regime legitimation. In this sense, foreign policy activism is not only a response to systemic opportunities but also an integral component of political narratives emphasizing strength, independence from external pressure, and resistance to perceived foreign interference. This dynamic aligns with recent scholarship on «unusual» and «authoritarian» middle powers, where external assertiveness and internal legitimacy become mutually reinforcing.

Taken together, these developments indicate the progressive hybridization of Azerbaijan’s middle-power behaviour. Rather than abandoning cooperative practices, Baku has layered them with a more assertive and autonomy-driven repertoire that includes selective norm contestation, coercive bargaining, and the renegotiation of asymmetric relationships. Azerbaijan’s foreign policy in 2025 thus illustrates how states positioned in geopolitical in-between spaces may increasingly combine cooperative and revisionist strategies in order to maximize both autonomy and influence. In this sense, Azerbaijan does not conform to a single middle-power model. Instead, it strategically blends multiple behavioural repertoires in pursuit of a proactive foreign policy that enables it to punch above its weight and to expand its agency within an increasingly fragmented Eurasian order.

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ISSN 2385-2526

The years 2024-2025 marked a pivotal phase for the Islamic Republic of Iran, defined by converging and overlapping internal fragility and external pressures. The death of President Ebrahim Raisi in May 2024 disrupted elite continuity, while low turnout in the subsequent presidential election underscored deepening legitimacy deficits. Meanwhile, persistent inflation, currency depreciation, and rising living costs intensified labour unrest and widened the state-society divide, culminating in renewed public protests in late 2025 as the sharp decline of the rial and escalating prices rendered large segments of the population unable to meet basic living costs. Regionally, Israeli military operations against Iran-aligned actors, the collapse of the Assad regime, stalled nuclear diplomacy, renewed UN sanctions, and the June 2025 direct confrontation with the United States significantly narrowed Tehran’s strategic space. While pursuing its «Look East» strategy, Iran institutionalized partnerships with Russia and China and sought broader ties across Asia. Yet limited reciprocal support from both powers following the June war and sanctions reimposition exposed the constraints of eastward alignment. Rather than achieving strategic insulation, Iran’s external posture increasingly reflected managed interdependence under conditions of asymmetry and sustained pressure.

Keywords – Labour protests; state-society rupture; look east strategy; regional strategic recalibration; nuclear negotiations.

1. Introduction

Following Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attack on Israel (Al-Aqsa Storm), and throughout 2024-2025, Iran confronted a convergence of internal and external pressures that constrained both strategic choice and domestic governance. On the domestic front, social discontent persisted and found expression in recurrent protests and labour strikes, reflecting unresolved economic grievances and a widening state-society divide. These overlapping pressures compelled reassessments in regional policy, nuclear diplomacy, and economic management, while simultaneously deepening political polarization within the system.

A major internal shock occurred in May 2024 with the death of President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian in a helicopter crash, disrupting elite continuity at a moment of heightened instability. The subsequent presidential election, which brought Masoud Pezeshkian to office, unfolded amid low voter turnout and widespread political disengagement, underscoring enduring deficits in the state legitimacy. The new administration inherited severe structural constraints and proved unable to implement effective measures to curb persistently high inflation and the rising cost of living, including escalating housing, asset, and food prices.

These domestic challenges were compounded by a tightening external environment. At the regional level, Israel’s sustained military campaign between April and September 2024 against Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran-aligned forces in Syria significantly weakened the operational capacity of the so-called «Axis of Resistance». High-profile assassinations, including the killing of senior Hezbollah leadership, together with extensive losses among allied militias, eroded Iran’s deterrent posture and curtailed its regional reach. The subsequent collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024 further reduced Iran’s strategic depth, sharply constraining its leverage across the Levant.

External pressure intensified throughout 2025 as nuclear negotiations remained stalled and diplomatic engagement narrowed. In September 2025, European parties reactivated the UN snapback mechanism, reinforcing Iran’s economic and diplomatic isolation and further limiting its room for manoeuvre. These developments unfolded alongside growing expectations of renewed direct confrontation with Israel, particularly following the June 2025 Iran-Israel escalation, during which coordinated Israeli and U.S. strikes targeted Iranian military, missile, and nuclear-related infrastructure and eliminated senior security and military officials. Collectively, these dynamics left Iran facing a markedly constrained strategic environment, in which external pressure interacted with domestic fragility to produce an increasingly securitized policy posture, extending beyond foreign and security policy to intensified political control over public spaces and individual freedoms. By the final months of 2025, mounting economic strain – marked by high inflation, currency depreciation, and declining purchasing power – began to trigger renewed social unrest, further tightening the regime’s reliance on coercive and securitized governance.

Against this backdrop, this article conceptualizes these developments through the lens of «strategic retrenchment». Rather than implying simple withdrawal or decline, strategic retrenchment is understood as a constrained and adaptive recalibration of Iranian state behaviour under intensifying systemic pressures. It captures a shift in policy orientation away from the long-standing logic of regional expansion associated with the «forward defence» doctrine, toward a more defensive posture centred on regime preservation, deterrence management, and the containment of accumulated vulnerabilities. This retrenchment is reflected in the weakening of Iran’s regional network of partners, growing constraints on military power projection, the narrowing of diplomatic space amid stalled nuclear negotiations and renewed international pressure, and increasing economic fragility under sanctions and domestic strain. Accordingly, strategic retrenchment in this article refers not only to military or regional contraction, but also to the diplomatic, economic, and deterrence-related recalibration of Iranian state behaviour under cumulative systemic pressure. In this sense, it does not denote absolute retreat, but a reorientation shaped by the convergence of external setbacks and domestic fragility, which has progressively narrowed Iran’s strategic options across 2024-2025.

2. Domestic Policy

During 2024-2025, domestic dynamics in Iran were marked by persistent social discontent and recurring labour mobilisation, reflecting deepening state-society tensions. Economic hardship, rising living costs, and continued political repression drove sustained protest activity among workers, retirees, and other social groups, while restrictions on personal freedoms further eroded regime legitimacy. Rather than pursuing structural reform, the state increasingly relied on coercive and securitised responses, contributing to the intensification and continuity of dissent during the period.

2.1. Protest Dynamics and Social Contestation

Despite extensive repression in previous years, social discontent remained evident during 2024-2025 through continuing acts of civil disobedience and resistance to compulsory hijab regulations. The authorities responded with intensified enforcement measures, including arrests, fines, and business closures, underscoring the persistence of tensions between state authority and society [Abbasi 2025]. According to reporting by Human Rights Activists News Agency [HRANA 2024], authorities reportedly took action against more than 30,000 women in 2024 for alleged non-compliance with compulsory hijab regulations. Of these, 644 were arrested – 618 under the so-called «Noor Project» – and at least ten detainees received a combined 57 months in prison alongside 14 million tomans in fines. In the same period, 365 businesses were reportedly sealed by the Public Places Supervision Department for alleged violations. These figures illustrate the breadth of enforcement efforts aimed at reasserting control amid continuing civil disobedience.

They also sit alongside intensifying elite-level tensions: while President Massoud Pezeshkian has publicly questioned compulsory veiling, telling NBC News that «human beings have a right to choose», Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has dismissed the hijab debate as an «imposed challenge», insisting that «hijab is a law, and those who believe in Sharia and those who do not must observe it», thereby framing compulsory veiling as a non-negotiable pillar of ideological order [The Guardian 2025, 7 December; Khodadadi 2025, 8 December]. Aligning with his position, conservative institutions have moved to reinforce enforcement mechanisms: 155 members of parliament signed a letter urging the implementation of the Hijab and Chastity regulation, and Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf announced that the December 14 law would be formally communicated to the government for execution [Khabar Online 2025, 2 December].

2.1.1. Labour Protests 2024

Alongside women’s rights mobilizations, labour protests in Iran remained intense and widespread throughout 2024, echoing patterns of contention observed since 2018 and underscoring the state’s persistent failure to address workers’ grievances. According to Workers Rights Watch, between July and December 2024 mobilization spanned oil and gas, industrial production, road construction and heavy machinery, trucking, healthcare, education, and retail. Pensioners – constituting the largest and most consistently mobilized group in 2024 – played a central role, particularly those affiliated with major publicsector pension funds. Participation was not confined to bluecollar workers: nurses, teachers (including nonpermanent and retired educators), school service staff, and gold retailers featured prominently, underscoring the broad social base of labour discontent [Workers Right Watch 2024, December].

It was notable that these protests were geographically dispersed, extending far beyond Tehran to an average of at least 74 cities nationwide, and they employed diverse repertoires of contention.

Workers and retirees expressed demands through strikes, workplace stoppages, and public gatherings – often staged outside government institutions or management offices – while coordinated online campaigns and public statements amplified mobilization. The diversity of sectors involved, the nationwide spread of activity, and the combination of physical and digital tactics underscore the sustained and multifaceted character of labour activism during this period [Deutsche Welle 2024, 13 May].

Death of a 34-year-old nurse at Imam Hossein Hospital in Sepidan due to severe work-related stress has sparked widespread protests among nurses and became a powerful mobilizing symbol, accelerating nationwide protests. Nurses demanded improved pay, an end to mandatory overtime, adequate staffing, and implementation of the nursing services tariff law. Slogans such as: «A nurse will die but will not accept humiliation» and «Expenses in dollars, our wages in rials» captured the fusion of economic precarity and political frustration. While some actions emerged spontaneously, the newly formed « Coordinating Council of Nurses’ Protest » played a key role in issuing calls for collective action [Qanbarpour 2024, 4 September]. The scale and coordination of these strikes disrupted medical services nationwide, including suspension of nonemergency procedures, underscoring nurses’ strategic position within Iran’s broader labour unrest.

Therefore, structurally and in analytical terms, labour and tradeunion mobilization across 2024 increasingly took the form of coordinated campaigns that can be grouped into four overlapping categories. First were livelihoodoriented campaigns focused on wage erosion, inflation adjustment, and pension security, including nurses’ mobilizations and retirees’ demands for pension parity. Second were campaigns centred on workplace safety and job security, which gained momentum following fatal mining accidents – most notably the Tabas incident – and called for stricter safety standards and greater state accountability. A third set targeted the approval and implementation of stalled labour legislation, particularly efforts to eliminate subcontracting in government employment. Finally, defensive campaigns sought to protect labour representatives and associations from repression, alongside antidiscrimination initiatives by female workers especially in the oil and petrochemical sectors challenging genderbased exclusion [Tehran Times 2017, 6 November]. Many of these campaigns combined street-level protest with digitally mediated tools, reflecting labour activists’ strategic adaptation to legal and political constraints [Workers Right Watch 2024, December].

2.1.2. Labour Protests 2025

Against the backdrop of worsening inflation, sanctions pressure, and declining living standards, labour unrest intensified across multiple sectors in 2025. Economic disruption following the June conflict, recurrent blackouts, rising food and fuel prices, and deteriorating public services fuelled growing anger over state mismanagement and corruption. According to Workers Rights Watch, nurses, farmers, bakers, industrial workers, truckers, and drivers staged coordinated strikes across more than 155 cities during the first half of 2025 in response to rising insurance premiums, fuel costs, low freight rates, and deepening energy and food crises. These protests increasingly coalesced into more organised nationwide strikes (E’tesabat Sarasari), signalling a shift from episodic unrest toward sustained economic disruption. Complementing these findings, an analysis of 455 labour protests recorded during this period showed that demonstrations spread across at least 83 cities amid accelerating inflation and currency depreciation, which intensified pressure on labour groups [Rasanh 2026, January; Workers’ Right Watch 2025, June].

Although labour unrest spanned multiple sectors, retirees, teachers, farmers in Isfahan, and bakers emerged as particularly visible focal points of collective mobilization around shared socio-economic grievances. Their demands centred on delayed wages, salary increases aligned with living costs, pension equalization, improved healthcare and social services, and resistance to layoffs and exploitative contracting practices. Among these actions, the nationwide truckers’ strike in May 2025 – involving approximately 365,000 drivers – became one of the most prominent labour mobilizations, receiving widespread domestic support and international attention. The International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) condemned judicial threats against the drivers and urged Iranian authorities to address their economic demands. [Workers’ Right Watch 2025, June] The strike also inspired further labour actions, including renewed protests by bakers and teachers. As Hadi Ghaemi of the Centre for Human Rights in Iran observed, the mobilization resonated widely because truck drivers were seen not only as defending their own rights but also exposing broader systemic injustices affecting millions [Centre for Human Rights in Iran 2025, 4 June].

2.1.3. Occupational Safety and Workplace Fatalities (2024-2025)

Among the various major issues confronting Iranian labour, unsafe working conditions – caused by systematic non-compliance with safety regulations and weak state oversight – stand out as one of the most serious and worsening grievances. Official reporting and human-rights monitors document a sustained rise in workplace fatalities: more than 125 workers were killed in work-related accidents between late December 2023 and June 2024, and over 2,100 deaths were recorded during the 1402 Persian year (March 2023-March 2024), predominantly among construction workers, miners, and industrial labourers – many employed informally. A stark example occurred in June 2024, when a landslide at the Shazand Arak sand and gravel mine killed four informal workers who lacked accident insurance, highlighting the erosion of safety standards in privatized extractive sectors.

These patterns persisted into 2025 and helped catalyze labour mobilization. The trend of structural insecurity was further underscored in 2025 by the Shahid Rajaee Port explosion in Bandar Abbas (April), caused by improperly registered hazardous materials and resulting in dozens of fatalities and widespread disruption to trade infrastructure, and by the Mehman-Douyeh mine suffocation incident near Damghan, where seven miners died from gas asphyxiation. The port blast was particularly consequential because Shahid Rajaee is Iran’s largest commercial gateway; the incident exposed regulatory lapses in hazardous-materials handling, disrupted supply chains and local livelihoods, and made safety failures highly visible – thereby intensifying public outrage and lending symbolic weight to the truckers’ strike that originated in Bandar Abbas. Taken together, these cases indicate that workplace insecurity in Iran is not episodic but structural, reflecting enduring deficiencies in labour protection, regulatory oversight, and state accountability – factors that feed into the broader cycle of protest and labour contention. These structural failures and highly visible workplace disasters not only fuelled labour mobilization but also shaped the state’s subsequent responses, revealing a pattern of containment rather than substantive reform [Workers’ Right Watch 2025, 2024].

2.1.4. Government Responses to Labour Mobilization

Even the most authoritarian regimes periodically project a degree of socio-economic responsiveness to sustain minimal legitimacy. In Iran, however, this logic has been only weakly reflected in state responses to longstanding labour demands. While authorities occasionally offered selective concessions – sometimes through legislative or administrative measures – these were accompanied by intensified repression of labour activists, including surveillance, crackdowns, arbitrary detentions, and harsh judicial sentences.

Beyond overt coercion, the government’s response to labour mobilization in 2024 and 2025, particularly until June 2025, followed two additional patterns. First, authorities often adopted a passive stance, refraining from forcefully dispersing protests or breaking strikes. This inaction suggests a tacit acknowledgment of the protests’ social legitimacy, yet it simultaneously resulted in the continued neglect of workers’ demands, even when legally grounded or previously promised. Second, although most mobilizations yielded few tangible gains, a limited number secured partial and tightly circumscribed concessions.

For example, during the truck drivers’ protests, Parliament publicly discussed grievances related to fuel quotas, insurance premiums, tire costs, and transport rates, leading in June 2025 to modest policy adjustments, including moderated insurance fees and revised fuel allocations [Pakzad 2025, 24 May]. Similarly, sustained mobilization by municipal workers contributed to the parliamentary approval of special income bonuses (fouqol‘adeh khas) in April 2025, marginally narrowing wage disparities within the public sector. These cases illustrate a broader state strategy of containment rather than resolution, in which selective concessions functioned to defuse pressure without addressing the structural roots of labour discontent [Workers’ Right Watch 2025, June].

2.2. Internal Fragmentation and Instabilities

During 2024-2025, Iran’s political system faced intensifying internal fragmentation. Elite rivalries sharpened across executive, parliamentary, and unelected institutions, revealing growing tensions within the governing coalition. These divisions unfolded alongside mounting economic strain and sustained social mobilization, deepening pressures on regime cohesion. Rather than presenting a unified front, the political establishment displayed signs of strategic incoherence and institutional competition. At the same time, the regime’s long-standing revolutionary legitimacy came under heightened scrutiny. Corruption scandals, governance failures, and the persistence of political repression eroded public trust, while labour, women, and ethnic rights movements continued to articulate demands that challenged not only policy performance but the foundations of the political order itself. Together, these dynamics exposed structural vulnerabilities within the state and amplified the risk of systemic instability.

These pressures became especially visible at the outset of 2024, when the regime’s efforts to mobilize mass participation for the 11 February anniversary of the «1979 Islamic Revolution» failed to generate the expected public turnout. The muted response to what has long been a core ritual of regime legitimacy signalled a widening disconnect (gap) between state and society and marked an early indicator of the political and symbolic challenges that would continue to confront the Islamic Republic throughout the year. This disconnect was further laid bare when, despite the Supreme Leader’s early-2024 campaign urging participation in the parliamentary elections as a means of confronting «the enemies» [Reuters 2024, 3 July], the March vote was met with widespread boycotts – official turnout reached only around 30% nationwide and just 15% in Tehran, while independent estimates suggested participation as low as 8.2% – underscoring the depth of public disillusionment with electoral politics and the regime’s mechanisms of consent [Mazaheri 2024, 26 March; Hafezi 2024, 4 March].

The sudden death of President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian in a helicopter crash on 19 May 2024 further destabilized Iran’s already fragile domestic political landscape [Hafezi and Ehab 2024, 21 May]. Occurring shortly after the March parliamentary elections – marked by one of the lowest voter-turnout rates in the Islamic Republic’s history – the incident forced the regime to organize an early presidential election within the constitutionally mandated 50-day window. The 28 June presidential election, culminating in the contested victory of Masoud Pezeshkian, unfolded amid severe economic strain, intensifying regional and international pressures (which will be discussed later in the foreign policy section), and a profound crisis of public legitimacy. Voter participation remained historically low: the first round was boycotted by at least 60% of eligible voters – the lowest turnout since 1979 – while the second round on 5 July saw only a modest increase to 49.6% by the regime’s own figures, still reflecting widespread disengagement. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s subsequent attribution of low turnout to an externally orchestrated campaign of «despair» underscored the regime’s growing reliance on externalization narratives to deflect responsibility for deepening governance failures [Foundation for Defense of Democracies 2024, 6 July].

Raisi’s death was politically consequential not merely because he was the sitting president, but because he was one of the Islamic Republic’s most strategically groomed figures. His rise to the presidency in 2021 was widely realized as a managed process: the electoral field was effectively engineered to ensure his near-uncontested victory, reflecting elite consensus around his role as a loyal custodian of the regime’s revolutionary ideology. Unlike his predecessor, the moderate Hassan Rouhani, Raisi demonstrated an ideological and political alignment with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, reinforcing widespread perceptions that he was being positioned as a potential successor to the 85-year-old leader [Glinski 2024, 30 May]. During his tenure, power became increasingly centralized across both domestic and foreign policy domains. Raisi presided over an intensified authoritarian turn, most notably through the brutal suppression of the youth-led «Woman, Life, Freedom» uprising, triggered by repressive social controls such as compulsory hijab laws [Human Rights Watch 2023, 15 September]. The state’s reliance on lethal force, mass arrests, and sustained surveillance continued well beyond the peak of the protests, further eroding societal trust. Against this backdrop of economic deterioration, political repression, and legitimacy decline, Raisi’s sudden death represented fresh uncertainty into a political system already under acute strain.

3. Economic Crisis and Governance Failure

Throughout 2024-2025, Iran’s economy deteriorated under the combined pressures of structural inefficiencies, sustained sanctions, and escalating regional confrontation. Despite political transition following President Ebrahim Raisi’s death, underlying fiscal and monetary distortions persisted, contributing to inflation, currency depreciation, and declining industrial output.

3.1. Structural Mismanagement and Internal Economic Failures

Iran’s contemporary economic crisis reflects long-standing structural dysfunction, later intensified by external sanctions pressures. The 2018 United States withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action marked an important inflection point by reimposing sanctions and exacerbating currency instability, but the underlying vulnerabilities predated this shift. Decades of systemic corruption, chronic fiscal mismanagement, persistent budget deficits financed through Central Bank support, and the dominance of state-linked monopolies – including entities affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – had already weakened productive capacity and constrained domestic growth [Sahit 2025, 9 May].

By 2024, these structural weaknesses were fully manifest in macroeconomic performance. International Monetary Fund [2024, October] and World Bank [World Bank Group 2024, 3 April] estimates placed annual inflation at approximately 32.5-35.8%, with GDP growth projected at around 3.7%. Domestic sources reported higher inflation exceeding 37% and weaker growth closer to 3%, reflecting tighter fiscal conditions and reduced policy flexibility [Statista 2026, 21 January; Donyaye-Eghtesad 2025, 22 October]. Across international and domestic sources, Iran’s macroeconomic performance in 2024 reflected persistently weak growth, underscoring ongoing monetary and fiscal instability and indicating a deeper structural deterioration rather than a cyclical slowdown.

Economic conditions deteriorated further in 2025 amid escalating regional tensions, including the June confrontation with Israel, and the reactivation of pre-2015 United Nations «snapback» sanctions in late September. In its October 2025 assessment, the World Bank projected a contraction of -1.7% in 2025 and -2.8% in 2026, driven by declining export revenues, weakening non-oil activity, and the disruptive effects of intensifying geopolitical tensions and risks [World Bank Group 2025a, October]. These shocks accelerated capital flight, reignited inflation expectations, and precipitated a steep decline in domestic financial markets: the Tehran Stock Exchange fell by approximately 26% from its May 2025 peak, while the Iranian rial reached historic lows by December, having lost nearly half its value between mid-2024 and early 2025 [International Crisis Group, 2025, October].

Inflationary pressures intensified throughout 2025, particularly in food and essential goods markets. Food inflation rose from earlier stabilisation in 2024 to 58% by September 2025 and approximately 72% by November. Prices of basic commodities increased sharply, including legumes (over 250%), rice (over 150%), and meat (25-30%), indicating severe volatility in household consumption costs [Donyaye-Eghtesad 2025, 22 October]. Independent estimates suggest that overall inflation likely exceeded official figures, approaching or surpassing 40% by late 2025.

These dynamics produced a sharp deterioration in living standards and a rapid expansion of poverty. By 2024, independent and domestic estimates indicated that approximately 36% of Iran’s population – nearly 30 million people – were living below the poverty line, a figure confirmed by Iran’s Parliament Research Center and domestic economic reporting and representing the highest level recorded in more than a decade [Khabar Online 2025, 29 November]. Official acknowledgements were broadly consistent with these findings: in September 2024, former welfare minister Ahmad Meydari conceded that at least 30% of the population (approximately 25 million people) were living in poverty, while around 6% (roughly five million individuals) were in extreme poverty [Donyaye-Eghtesad 2025, 22 October; Khajehpour 2024, 31 October].

Beyond official and semi-official estimates, alternative projections suggested a significantly deeper crisis. Government-affiliated economists, including Hossein Raghfar, and international-facing domestic reporting indicated that up to half of the population – over 40 million people – may already be living below the poverty line [Khabar Online, 2025, 10 November]. The government’s upward revision of the official poverty line in October 2025 – by nearly 70% within a single year – further underscored the extent of purchasing-power compression and implicitly acknowledged the scale of income erosion [World Bank 2025b, October].1

By late 2025, labour mobilisation intensified, with coordinated workplace action and bazaar strikes following sharp currency depreciation. The participation of the merchant class, given its historical significance, was particularly notable [Adib-Moghaddam 2018, 3 July; Jonoobi 2016].

3.2. Sanctions, Geopolitics, and External Constraints

These internally generated vulnerabilities did not operate in isolation but were significantly intensified by a tightening external environment shaped by sanctions, geopolitical escalation, and growing international economic isolation. Since 2018, Iran has confronted increasingly severe external economic pressures, most notably the expansion of international sanctions that curtailed foreign investment, deepened banking and financial isolation, and sharply restricted access to global markets. Beyond formal sanctions, the Islamic Republic faced persistent constraints in terms of limited investable resources, weak institutional transparency, and the absence of a credible and internationally integrated banking system, all of which undermined its attractiveness to foreign investors and constrained access to external finance. In response to these constraints, Tehran pursued a strategic eastward reorientation – commonly framed as the «Look East» policy – seeking long-term cooperation arrangements with China and Russia [Snegovaya, Fenton and Dolbaia 2025, 4 September].

Slowing GDP growth to 3.7% in 2024/25 (the Iranian calendar year) marked the weakest performance in five years and reflected a sharp deceleration in the hydrocarbon sector. According to the World Bank, oil GDP growth fell to 4.6% from 18.8% a year earlier, underscoring the combined effects of weaker demand, sanctions-related constraints, and chronic underinvestment [World Bank Group 2025b, October]. Given that hydrocarbons remain the state’s principal source of fiscal revenue and foreign exchange, this slowdown exposed the structural fragility of Iran’s growth model.

Within this context of oil-sector vulnerability, Iran-China economic relations deepened under the 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership [Salmiati and Kumar 2024]. As sanctions tightened and export channels narrowed, China absorbed the overwhelming share of Iranian crude – typically at discounted prices – while bilateral non-oil trade exceeded $26 billion in early 2025 [Tehran Times 2025, 8 February]. Although expanded sales to China partially stabilized export volumes in 2023-2024, this reliance did not produce durable fiscal consolidation; instead, it entrenched asymmetric dependence and tied Iran’s macroeconomic stability to a single external buyer. By 2025, China reportedly absorbed over 90% of Iranian crude exports (approximately 1.3-1.4 million barrels per day), while bilateral trade remained structurally imbalanced, with Chinese exports significantly exceeding Iranian non-oil exports [Reuters 2026, 13 January]. Despite the headline 25-year cooperation framework, major Chinese state-owned enterprises continued to exercise caution under U.S. secondary sanctions, limiting large-scale investment and often resorting to discounted pricing, barter mechanisms, or Renminbi settlements. As US «maximum pressure» intensified, Beijing calibrated its engagement to safeguard its broader regional and global interests – particularly vis-à-vis Washington – thereby constraining the structural economic gains available to Iran.

Alongside expanded energy cooperation, Iran sought deeper integration into China’s Belt and Road Initiative, including the establishment of the Qom-Yiwu-Europe rail corridor in 2024 and a 2025-2027 connectivity roadmap. Tehran’s accession to BRICS in 2024 and its enhanced role within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization further signalled a strategic eastward pivot. Yet these developments did not fundamentally alter the asymmetrical structure of the relationship [Mazaheri 2025, 4 July]. Sanctions, limited capital inflows, and continued reliance on discounted oil exports constrained tangible economic gains. The partnership faced practical tests during the June 2025 Israel-Iran crisis, when Beijing offered diplomatic backing but avoided security commitments that might escalate tensions with the United States. President Masoud Pezeshkian’s September 2025 visit to Beijing aimed to consolidate cooperation, but China maintained a pragmatic, interest-driven approach rather than entering into a formal defence arrangement.

While China functions as Iran’s primary economic lifeline amid tightening Western sanctions, Russia has concurrently emerged as a strategic partner, providing targeted investment and infrastructural support. Leveraging Tehran’s eastward reorientation, Moscow has sought to deepen its role across key sectors – including energy, mining, industry, and transport – complementing Iran’s dependence on China while navigating the constraints of sanctions and limited access to global financial markets [Azizi 2025; Belov and Ranjbar 2024].

Since 2024, Russia has consolidated its position as Iran’s most significant foreign investor, with projected commitments of up to $8 billion for 2024-2025, of which approximately $5 billion had reportedly been formalized by mid-2025. This represented a sharp increase from the estimated $2.76 billion invested during 2022-2023, which nonetheless accounted for nearly two-thirds of Iran’s total foreign direct investment in that period [TASS 2025, Eghtesadonline 2025, 5 June]. Crucially, this quantitative expansion of economic cooperation did not occur in isolation but was institutionalized politically in January 2025, when President Masoud Pezeshkian and President Vladimir Putin signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement in Moscow [Rasanah 2025, 25 February]. This accord translated earlier economic coordination into a formal long-term framework aimed explicitly at sustaining bilateral integration under conditions of continued Western sanctions. Subsequent engagement at the 19th Iran-Russia Joint Economic Commission later in 2025 further consolidated this trajectory, with senior officials concluding additional agreements in energy, transit infrastructure, and trade facilitation, thereby operationalising the institutional commitments established earlier in the year. [Joint Economic Cooperation Commission 2026, 16 February; Tehran Times2026, 16 February].

Energy and infrastructure cooperation have been central to this rapprochement. In early 2025, Tehran and Moscow agreed on the route of a major gas pipeline, initially delivering 2 billion cubic metres (bcm) per year, with long-term potential up to 55 bcm annually; concurrently, a Russian consortium led by Zarubezhneft and Lukoil signed a $4 billion agreement to develop seven southern Iranian oilfields, collectively aiming to increase output by an estimated 200,000 barrels per day [Bramston & Associates 2025, 1 May]. Transit infrastructure has also expanded under the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC): a 2025 transit roadmap for the Rasht-Astara railway was adopted, and cargo throughput along the corridor grew by 19% in 2024, reaching 26.9 million tons [Hussain, Malik and Mahmood 2024; Avdaliani 2025, 26 August]. Complementing these developments, a fullscale Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) entered into force on 15 May 2025, significantly reducing tariffs on over 90% of goods and creating conditions for expanded preferential trade with Russia and other EAEU members. This agreement, alongside enhanced financial linkages and reciprocal payment mechanisms, is expected to support mutual trade turnover exceeding $10 billion annually [Eurasian Economic Commission, 2025, 15 May; International Information Group 2025, 17 March].

4. Iran’s Foreign Policy

Iran’s foreign policy was significantly reshaped in 2024-2025 by a combination of regional, diplomatic, and domestic developments. The weakening of Tehran’s regional network – marked by setbacks to key allied actors and the collapse of the Assad government in late 2024 – reduced its strategic depth and altered its deterrence environment. At the same time, direct confrontation with Israel, renewed nuclear escalation, and the reimposition of UN sanctions intensified external pressure. While Iran continued to pursue eastward alignment with Russia and China and maintained cautious engagement with Gulf states, its foreign policy increasingly reflected constraint and adjustment rather than expansion.

4.1. Collapse and Recalibration of the ‘Axis of Resistance’

By 2024, the shifting strategic landscape of the Middle East had begun to exert significant pressure on Iran’s regional posture, forcing Tehran toward increasingly consequential choices in 2025. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the weakening of the «Axis of Resistance» – a network designed to project deterrence through allied non-state actors while keeping conflict away from Iran’s borders. Built on strategic depth, delegated deterrence, and hybrid warfare capabilities in Syria and Lebanon, this model had long underpinned Iran’s regional strategy, but between 2023 and 2025 it proved increasingly unsustainable both politically and militarily.

The immediate catalyst for this shift was the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, which triggered a cycle of escalation that Tehran was unable to control. Israel’s subsequent military campaign in Gaza not only led to the effective decimation of Hamas’s military capabilities but also exposed the limitations of Iran’s regional alliance. Despite expectations of multi-front escalation, key partners – most notably Hezbollah – remained constrained, engaging only in calibrated exchanges. This revealed a growing gap between Iran’s strategic ambitions and the willingness or capacity of its allies to absorb escalating costs [Mansour and Al-Shakeri 2025, 6 March].

Israel further intensified pressure through a series of strikes targeting Iranian and allied assets across the region. Beginning with the April 2024 attack on Iran’s consulate in Damascus and expanding through 2025, these operations focused on degrading leadership structures and strategic infrastructure across Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria [Carl 2024, 10 December]. The killing of senior Hezbollah figures, including Hassan Nasrallah, and the destruction of key military assets significantly weakened Iran’s reliance on proxy forces. This position was further undermined by the collapse of the Assad regime in late 2024, which eliminated a key state ally and disrupted Iran’s regional depth and logistical corridors [Hamdach 2025, 7 May; ITIC 2024, 12 December].

4.2. Direct Confrontation, Nuclear Escalation, and Sanctions

The transition from managed indirect conflict to direct confrontation in 2024-2025 fundamentally reshaped the strategic role of Iran’s nuclear programme. As Tehran’s regional deterrence architecture weakened, the nuclear file shifted from a calibrated bargaining instrument to a central component of deterrence, regime security, and strategic hedging. In this context, the nuclear programme was no longer merely a source of external pressure or diplomatic contention, but a compensatory strategic asset within Iran’s evolving security framework. For over a decade, Tehran had sought to compartmentalize the nuclear issue from regional escalation, relying on proxy deterrence to maintain strategic distance; by 2025, this separation had largely collapsed.

Following the re-imposition of «maximum pressure» in early 2025, Iran’s nuclear diplomacy entered a volatile phase shaped by coercive deadlines and limited engagement. In March 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump issued a 60-day deadline for a new agreement while intensifying sanctions and signalling escalation risks tied to Iran’s regional policies. Subsequent Omani-mediated talks between April and May produced a temporary diplomatic opening but failed to resolve core disputes, particularly over uranium enrichment. Iran’s insistence on maintaining enrichment capacity, in contrast to U.S. demands for its elimination, underscored the growing strategic value Tehran attached to the programme. At the same time, Israeli’s signalling of potential military action further constrained diplomatic space and heightened escalation risks [Lob 2025, 5 November].

This strategic shift was reflected in a January 2025 International Atomic Energy Agency report warning of a «very worrisome» acceleration in enrichment activity, highlighting Iran’s increasing reliance on its nuclear programme as a deterrent amid mounting military vulnerability. Diplomatic stalemate ultimately culminated in June 2025, when Israel, joined by the United States, launched direct strikes against Iranian targets. This marked the first large-scale direct interstate confrontation between the two sides, breaking the long-standing pattern of indirect conflict. Rather than restoring deterrence, the confrontation reinforced the securitization of the nuclear file and intensified internal debates within Iran regarding nuclear escalation as a response to strategic exposure [Gramer, Schwartz, and Bazail-Eimil 2025, 11 April].

In the aftermath of the conflict, the limited space for diplomacy narrowed further. In August 2025, the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) triggered the UN «snapback» mechanism, leading to the restoration of pre-2015 sanctions by September. This move reflected growing concern that Iran’s nuclear posture had shifted beyond tactical bargaining toward longer-term strategic hedging. Tehran, supported diplomatically by Russia and China, rejected the sanctions, underscoring both its increasing isolation and the limits of alternative alignments in compensating for lost engagement with the West.

The crisis deepened in November 2025 when the IAEA Board of Governors called on Iran to clarify outstanding safeguards issues and restore inspections, prompting a sharp rejection from Tehran and further entrenching positions on all sides [International Crisis Group 2025, December].

4.3. Strategic Retrenchment and the «Look East» Turn

Building on its long-standing «Look East» doctrine, Iran’s relations with Russia and China evolved from symbolic alignment to institutional consolidation centred on economic integration, energy security, and coordinated resistance to Western pressure. At the same time, the depth and durability of these bilateral partnerships were put to a renewed test following Iran’s regional setbacks in 2024-2025, prompting a recalibration in the trajectory of the relationship. Tehran’s accession to BRICS in 2024 and its active participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) formalized its integration into China-centred multilateral frameworks and enhanced its diplomatic visibility while offering only limited economic insulation under sustained sanctions. The 25-Year Comprehensive Cooperation Plan continued to serve as the principal bilateral framework, structuring cooperation in energy, infrastructure, and trade. Yet the partnership increasingly reflected pragmatic coordination as China remains Iran’s primary economic outlet under sanctions, while Tehran occupies a secondary but functional role within Beijing’s broader strategy of regional stability and energy diversification.

The June 2025 Israel-Iran war subjected this eastward strategy to a critical test. Although Beijing provided diplomatic backing, emphasized Iranian sovereignty, and opposed escalation, it refrained from offering security guarantees or material military support that could risk confrontation with the United States or Israel. This calibrated response still exposed long structural asymmetry: Iran relies heavily on China for economic and diplomatic cover, whereas China approaches Iran primarily through the lens of stability management and great-power competition. Even in the security domain, cooperation has remained carefully bounded. Participation in joint naval drills such as the Maritime Security Belt 2025 exercise in the Gulf of Oman signalled operational coordination, but these activities were confined to maritime security scenarios rather than comprehensive military integration [The Arab Weekly 2025, 1 September]. Post-war defence assessments indicate no confirmed major Chinese arms transfers to Tehran, underscoring Beijing’s continued caution [Kasapoğlu 2025, 9 September]. Although multilateral inclusion enhanced Tehran’s diplomatic visibility and opened alternative financial channels, it proved insufficient to offset the structural constraints imposed by sanctions, conflict exposure, and Beijing’s broader geopolitical risk calculations. Within this context, Iran’s expectations of deeper strategic reciprocity remained limited by China’s regional balancing strategy and sensitivity to secondary sanctions. Yet despite evident disappointment, Tehran continues to deepen engagement and preserve the partnership even in the absence of robust reciprocal support, recognizing that the «Look East» turn has evolved less into bloc consolidation.

In the case of Russia, bilateral relations in 2024-2025 moved beyond predominantly economic and energy cooperation toward a more politically institutionalized partnership marked by strategic coordination. The 17 January 2025 signing of a 20-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty by President Masoud Pezeshkian and President Vladimir Putin formalized cooperation across defence, energy, trade, and multilateral diplomacy, superseding earlier agreements from 1993 and 2001 [Siddiqa 2025, 4 March]. Although the treaty signalled deeper alignment, it deliberately avoided binding mutual-defence commitments, reflecting both sides’ preference for strategic flexibility in managing third-party relations [The Sentinel 2025, 9 June].

Security coordination also intensified, albeit selectively. Iran’s provision of military assistance to Moscow during the Ukraine war – particularly in unmanned aerial systems – was accompanied by expanded defence-industrial cooperation, joint naval drills, cyber engagement, and satellite coordination. Yet, as with China, expectations of reciprocal strategic backing proved constrained. Following the June 2025 U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, Russia limited its response to diplomatic and political support, condemning the attacks in multilateral forums, raising the issue at the UN Security Council, and reaffirming the January 2025 partnership treaty. The absence of material or military backing exposed the asymmetry underlying the relationship and contributed to growing disappointment in Tehran, if not a gradual erosion of trust. This has not, however, produced rupture, but it has contributed to a more cautious and interest-driven reassessment of expectations [Azizi 2025; Rasanah 2025].

Overall, the warming of Iran’s relations with China has unfolded against a backdrop of growing disappointment with Moscow. While there is no indication that Tehran is abandoning Russia, it has clearly sought to diversify its strategic options – particularly in advanced weapons procurement, where Russian delivery has fallen short of expectations [Nadimi 2025, 30 December]. The performance of Iran’s air defence systems during the war with Israel exposed operational vulnerabilities, intensifying efforts to acquire more sophisticated platforms such as the S-400 and Su-35 from Russia or comparable systems from China. Competition over these systems may ultimately serve as a practical measure of each partner’s willingness to translate political alignment into material support [Davidi 2025, 12 November].

Within this context, Tehran appears intent on reshaping its external posture – not as a subordinate actor within an anti-Western bloc, but as a regional power cultivating differentiated partnerships with China, India, and Southeast Asian states. Looking ahead, Iran’s relations with both Russia and China are likely to operate along a spectrum between transactional cooperation and structured coordination – advancing where interests converge while preserving flexibility and strategic distance. The 2024-2025 period therefore underscores a central paradox of the «Look East» turn: sanctions and geopolitical isolation have accelerated partnership consolidation, but they have not eliminated asymmetry, limited reciprocity, or strategic caution. Rather than bloc formation, what has emerged is a pattern of calibrated interdependence shaped by mutual convenience and constrained trust.

5. Conclusion

During 2024-2025, the Islamic Republic of Iran encountered an acute convergence of domestic fragility and external constraint that exposed the cumulative limits of its governance and foreign policy model. These years marked a period in which long-standing structural weaknesses – economic mismanagement, institutional fragmentation, and declining state capacity – interacted with intensifying regional instability and a deteriorating international environment, placing the regime under sustained multidimensional strain.

Domestically, persistent economic hardship, soaring inflation, rising unemployment, and declining living standards pushed poverty to alarming levels. Social discontent, initially dispersed and sporadic, became a consistent feature of everyday life, with protests driven by demands for higher wages and basic economic relief. The state’s response remained predominantly coercive, relying on surveillance, arrests, dismissals, and legal sanctions rather than substantive policy adjustment. The political transition following President Raisi’s death in May 2024 and the subsequent formation of a reformist-led administration under Pezeshkian did not generate meaningful institutional recalibration. Instead, intensified parliamentary consolidation by conservative factions further entrenched intra-elite fragmentation, limiting executive capacity and reinforcing policy inertia.

Externally, Iran’s regional environment deteriorated significantly. The weakening of its traditional network of regional partners, alongside the collapse of key strategic footholds and sustained conflict dynamics in Gaza and Lebanon, constrained the operational effectiveness of the «Axis of Resistance» framework. At the same time, the transition from indirect confrontation with Israel to episodes of direct military escalation underscored a shift in the regional security architecture that reduced Iran’s strategic ambiguity and increased its exposure to direct deterrence pressures. In response, Tehran intensified efforts to consolidate its «Look East» orientation through closer engagement with China and Russia. However, these partnerships remained largely asymmetrical and insufficiently institutionalized to offset sanctions pressures or provide substantive security guarantees, thereby limiting their capacity to function as a durable strategic alternative.

Taken together, these dynamics indicate that Iran’s conduct during 2024-2025 was increasingly shaped by constraint-driven adaptation rather than expansionary strategy. Across regional, diplomatic, economic, and domestic domains, policy behaviour reflected a progressive narrowing of strategic options under cumulative systemic pressure, rather than the pursuit of a coherent agenda of influence maximization. Decision-making increasingly prioritized regime preservation, deterrence maintenance, and the mitigation of structural vulnerability, signalling a shift towards adaptive crisis management rather than long-term strategic redesign. Overall, Iran’s trajectory in this period reflects multidimensional strategic retrenchment driven by the mutual reinforcement of regional setbacks, economic strain, and domestic instability, resulting in a gradual erosion of policy autonomy and reduced strategic flexibility.

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Worker Rights Watch, 2025, ‘A semi-annual report on labor protests and legal development in Iran, January-June 2025’, Volunteer Activists Institute. https://workerrightswatch.org/publications/jan-to-june-2025

Worker Rights Watch, 2025, ‘A semi-annual report on labor issues, protests and evolving labour regulations in Iran: July-December 2024’, Volunteer Activists Institute. 68c84a2e5f13d74eb3690e0f_WRW_5.pdf

World Bank Group, 2024, 3 April, Brief No. 188937 (Iran, Islamic Republic of)

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World Bank Group, 2025b, October, ‘Macro Poverty Outlook (Iran, Islamic Republic of – Poverty and Shared Prosperity)’.

ISSN 2385-2526

Despite enjoying an absolute majority in the Parliament, overwhelming popular support, and weak opposition, the National People’s Power (NPP) administration’s first year in office was far from smooth. It confronted internal and external challenges that tested both its resolve and capability, as well as exposed the party’s inexperience in governing the country in challenging times. The government succeeded in changing the political culture and demonstrated its strong political will to bring structural reforms by enhancing governance in the country, but effective implementation is still pending. While it managed to sustain the economic recovery process, natural disasters imposed additional fiscal pressures. The government tried to pursue a balanced, pragmatic foreign policy, yet continued to face complex geopolitical and geostrategic challenges. Nevertheless, the NPP government could navigate through these obstacles and ensured political stability in 2025. People are, however, growing impatient for tangible economic results and the fulfilment of promises for systemic change beyond the initial measures.

Keywords – Sri Lanka; President Anura Kumara Dissanayake; foreign policy; governance; political development; economic development.

1. Introduction

The historic political shift marked by the victory of the National People’s Power (NPP), a centre-left coalition, in Sri Lanka’s 2024 presidential and parliamentary elections generated both optimism and apprehension regarding the prospect for meaningful reform and economic recovery. The year 2025 thus became a critical test for the ruling party to demonstrate its ability to meet public expectations and deliver on its ambitious election promises. Dispelling many of the doubts raised by its opponents, the NPP government succeeded in maintaining political stability, fostering communal harmony, sustaining economic growth momentum, and securing the goodwill of the international community. However, the outcome of the 2025 local council elections demonstrates that the wave of euphoria that brought the NPP to power has begun to ebb, even though President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s personal popularity endures. While there remains considerable confidence in Dissanayake administration’s political will to pursue long-awaited policy reforms, concerns persist about whether it possesses the strategic adroitness and the autonomy to realise its policy vision- «A Thriving Nation, A Beautiful Life» [NPP Manifesto 2024, August]. These concerns have been amplified by the government’s handling of climate vulnerabilities and the regional and global geostrategic challenges confronting the country over the past year.

In this background, the paper analyses the political, economic and foreign policy developments in Sri Lanka in the year 2025.

2. Political developments

The policy vision of the NPP government- «A Thriving Nation, A Beautiful Life», according to Prime Minister Haruni Amarasuriya, commits to building a country «where democracy is deepened, where economic justice is prioritised and where voices of the marginalised are not just heard but centred in decision making» [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Employment and Tourism- Sri Lanka 2025]. Guided by the policy vision, the government prioritised its focus on improving the governance and changing the political culture of the country. In this regard, the government launched the ‘Clean Sri Lanka’ programme on 1 January 2025. The ‘Clean Sri Lanka’ programme is a «holistic undertaking aimed at nation-wide efforts of environmental, social, and governance initiatives to bring about change, integration, and collaboration, in environmental, social and governance structures» [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Employment and Tourism-Sri Lanka 2025, 25 February].

2.1. Improving governance

To strengthen governance, the government launched a National Anti-Corruption Action Plan 2025-20291 on 9 April 2025, and enacted the Anti-Corruption and Asset Recovery Act [Office of the Cabinet of Ministers – Sri Lanka 2025, 24 March]. The passage of the long-pending Asset Recovery Act marks a significant milestone in the country’s anti-corruption framework, addressing a critical legal gap and empowering authorities to combat illicit enrichment, bribery, and money laundering more effectively.

In pursuit of justice and fairness, the authorities initiated independent investigations and prosecuted alleged perpetrators regardless of their social standing or professional background. Investigations into several longstanding cases have been resumed, including the Easter Sunday attacks, attacks against journalists, and instances of abuse of power by public officials. The government has granted full operational independence to the police, resulting in several landmark convictions [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Employment and Tourism – Sri Lanka 2025, 8 September]. Notably, for the first time in Sri Lanka’s history, a former president was arrested on allegations of misusing public funds while in office, and an Inspector General of Police (IGP) was dismissed on charges of torture, misconduct, and abuse of power.

The government has leveraged its digitalisation policy to address the issue of corruption and transparency. In this regard, the Digital Roadmap for Sri Lanka (2025-2035) outlines a phased approach to building a digitally competitive nation. Phase 1 (2025-2027) focuses on laying the foundation with a National Digital ID system, the launch of LK-UPI, full digitisation of government payments, 100 per cent smartphone and 4G/5G coverage, and the introduction of DigiLocker Sri Lanka [Muralithas 2025, 24 November].

In addition, to improve governance and transform political culture, the government has prioritised reducing unnecessary state expenditure by curtailing the perks and privileges traditionally enjoyed by politicians, including former presidents.

While these initiatives have earned public approval, they have also sparked criticism. Opposition parties argue that the anti-corruption drive has, at times, amounted to a political vendetta, with selective targeting of individuals while other significant cases remain unaddressed. This criticism intensified following the arrest of former President Ranil Wickremesinghe on charges of misusing public funds during an international tour in 2023. The backlash indicates that the government’s aggressive anti-corruption drive has unsettled the previously dominant political establishment long associated with systemic political and bureaucratic corruption. According to Prof. Jayadeva Uyangoda [Uyangoda 2026, 7 January], the ongoing transformation of the country’s political culture under the NPP government has given rise to an «open confrontation» between the erstwhile «traditional ruling elites and the new ruling party with non-elite social backgrounds».

2.2. Enhancing democratic space

Special attention has been given to expand the democratic space in the country, with a strong emphasis on national unity and the protection of minority rights, including those of women, children, and persons with disabilities. The government asserts that upholding the rights of all citizens – irrespective of gender, ethnicity or other grounds – is a top priority. In this regard, it takes pride in maintaining one of the most inclusive parliaments in the country’s history. Women’s empowerment, in particular, has received special focus. The current Parliament includes 22 female representatives from diverse social backgrounds, including members of the working class and marginalised communities. Notably, it also marks the first time that two women from the Malaiyaha community have been elected to Parliament [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Employment and Tourism-Sri Lanka 2025, 17 February]. Additionally, the cabinet includes specially abled ministers. However, the absence of a Muslim minister in the cabinet raised concerns, although Muslim representation is present at the level of deputy ministers within the NPP government.

According to the Global Democracy Index 2025, Sri Lanka has improved its ranking by 15 positions. Despite this progress, several loopholes remain that need to be addressed to achieve a more inclusive democracy. Public dissatisfaction has grown over the delay in holding provincial council elections, which the government has pledged to conduct in 2026. Furthermore, the government has faced increasing pressure to implement the devolution process as a means of ensuring political rights for the Tamils. Government, however, is non-committal on this issue, citing ongoing considerations of introducing a new constitution. Any such constitutional reform, if undertaken, is unlikely to materialise within the next three years.

2.3. Minority rights

To implement Sri Lanka’s commitment under the international mechanism, several legislative reforms have been introduced to advance the rights of children and women. Establishment of a National Women’s Commission under the Women Empowerment Act No 37 of 2024, Sri Lanka’s first National Action Plan for Women, Peace and Security for 2023 to 2027, the launch of the Multi-sectoral National Action Plan (NAP) to address Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) for the period 2024 – 2028 and actions taken to address the increasingly challenging issue of online gender-based violence are some of the key policy and legislative reforms introduced by the NPP government in the country [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Employment and Tourism-Sri Lanka 2025, 17 February]. The government has announced the drafting of new legislation, including a revised Domestic Violence Bill and a new Disability Rights Bill, to further advance women’s rights, children’s rights, and the rights of the specially abled person. To further enhance civic space and engagement, the government has announced its intention to bring the national secretariat for non-governmental organisations under the Ministry of Social Empowerment.

For the first time in history, the current government recognised the Malaiyaha community as a distinct community in Sri Lanka. The government is also formulating legislation to facilitate the increase in wages of the plantation sector workers, and it is taking measures to address the housing needs of the community [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Employment and Tourism-Sri Lanka 2025, 8 September].

2.4. Tamil reconciliation

One of the major promises of the NPP government was to focus on Sri Lankan nationalism instead of Sinhala nationalism. The NPP government, which secured overwhelming votes from the north and the east, has pledged to take tangible steps in the interest of further advancing national unity and reconciliation.

The government has initiated confidence-building measures towards reconciliation by addressing key concerns of the Tamil community. The NPP government has upheld the right to commemorate the death of loved ones who lost their lives during the armed ethnic conflict, provided such a right is not misused to glorify terrorism [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Employment and Tourism – Sri Lanka 2025, 8 September]. The Cabinet appointed a committee to address land issues faced by people, including conflict-affected people, living in areas identified as forest and other reserves and places of archaeological significance. Around 40.70 acres of land were handed over to the owners by the Sri Lankan Army in Jaffna [Ministry of Defence – Sri Lanka 2025, 8 May]. Several roads in the Northern Province, including the Palali-Achchuveli main road, were opened for public use after several decades, in addition to the launch of several development programmes. The President made an open invitation to Tamil-speaking youth to be part of Sri Lanka’s police service [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Employment and Tourism-Sri Lanka 2025, 25 February]. Local civil society organisations, community leaders, and youth groups are participating more actively in dialogue and advocacy than in previous years.

As part of its reconciliation efforts, the government has pledged to strengthen the domestic institutions – such as the Office on Missing Persons (OMP), Office for Reparations, and Office for National Unity and Reconciliation (ONUR) – to address challenges emanating from the conflict, while committing to ensure that these bodies continue to function independently and credibly within the constitutional framework [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Employment and Tourism-Sri Lanka 2025, 25 February]. In this regard, the Cabinet decided to allocate Sri Lankan Rs (LKR) 375 million of additional funds to the OMP for the purpose of expediting inquiries into complaints regarding missing persons. The ONUR is in the process of formulating an Action Plan on National Reconciliation with the support of the United Nations Country Office in Sri Lanka. A process has been set in motion to establish and empower a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to investigate acts of violence caused by racism and religious extremism that give rise to tensions within Sri Lankan society [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Employment and Tourism-Sri Lanka 2025, 25 February]. However, the government has rejected the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) Resolutions 46/1, 51/1, 57/1 and 60/L.1/Rev.1 and the external evidence gathering mechanism on Sri Lanka.

An important step taken by the NPP government in 2025 was the initiation of an investigation, conducted under judicial oversight and independent of any government interference, into the mass grave sites, including in Chemmani in northern Sri Lanka. To enhance the independence of the Sri Lankan judiciary and the delivery of justice, a decision has been taken to establish an independent public prosecutor’s office.

The UK-led Sri Lanka Core Group submitted a report to the UNHRC on 3 March 2025, assessing the country’s political and human rights progress. The report praised Sri Lanka’s peaceful elections and initial reconciliation efforts, including land returns and eased restrictions in the north and east. Another positive development, as far as reconciliation is concerned, is that there is not much opposition from the Sinhala community to the government’s reconciliation efforts. The Sri Lanka Barometer Initiative survey suggests that people are increasingly willing to join reconciliation-related activities. The research, however, finds that «the high public demand for reconciliation is not matched by comparatively modest perceptions of progress» [Sri Lanka Barometer 2025].

The government has not yet initiated groundwork on the commitments related to the OMP, ONUR and the establishment of the truth and reconciliation process. One of the long-pending demands – the repeal of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) – is yet to be fulfilled. The government has prepared a draft bill called the Protection of the State from Terrorism, aimed at repealing the controversial PTA. People are, however, completely disappointed with the draft.

Jehan Perera, the Executive Director of the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, has aptly explained the current status of the reconciliation process in Sri Lanka. In his words:

Sri Lanka stands today at a rare intersection of political will, social expectation, and international opportunity. The people voted for a system change. The government has both the power and the legitimacy to deliver. The UNHRC has extended a window for domestic action. Civil society is ready, as the Sri Lanka Barometer confirms, to participate in rebuilding trust. What remains is the political decision to move from intent to implementation. [Perera 2025, 28 October]

Various media analyses suggest that the implementation of many of the confidence-building measures and reconciliation efforts is mostly hindered due to the fragmented politics of the Tamil leaders in the north and east.

2.5. National security

Sri Lanka experienced a marked rise in organised crime and the proliferation of dangerous drugs throughout the country, while intelligence reports of extremist activities in Kalmunai in the Eastern Province heightened national security concerns [Tamil Guardian 2025, 5 March]. In 2025, the country also recorded a significant surge in cybercrime. The Sri Lanka Computer Emergency Readiness Team (Sri Lanka CERT) received more than 12,650 complaints related to cybersecurity incidents and social media misuse during the year [Newswire 2026, 1 January].

In response to the escalating drug problem, the NPP government launched the nationwide operation «A Nation United» [President’s Media Division, Sri Lanka 2025, 30 October].2 It allocated LKR 1.5 billion for drug control programmes and a further LKR 2 billion to address urgent requirements for more efficient prison management [The Sunday Times 2025a, 9 November]. Security agencies intensified surveillance in the Eastern Province to monitor the activities of a suspected religious extremist group. To combat cyber threats, the government introduced the «National Cyber Protection Strategy of Sri Lanka – 2025-2029» in July 2025, which emphasises: upgrading the legal/regulatory framework; enhancing public awareness and knowledge; improving readiness; strengthening incident response; and fostering national and international cooperation [UNODC 2025, 26 October].

Despite these measures, sections of the public have expressed concern that the issue of extremism has not received adequate attention. Similarly, while the government continues its anti-drug campaign, the controversial release of 320 containers from the Colombo Port in January 2025, without comprehensive customs inspection, despite a tip-off from the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) indicating that two containers in the consignment contained narcotics, has raised questions about the seriousness of its efforts. Further compounding these concerns are contradictory official statements regarding the discovery of alleged «ICE factories» in Nuwara Eliya and claims of selective arrests of individuals involved in the narcotics trade [The Sunday Times 2025b, 9 November].

2.6. Political challenges

The results of the local council elections held in May 2025, indicate that the NPP does not enjoy overwhelming popular support as it did during the presidential and parliamentary elections in September and November 2024, respectively. Although the NPP secured 266 out of 339 local government (LG) bodies, it failed to obtain an outright majority in 186 councils. Of these, it lacked a clear majority in 149 bodies and was on par with the combined opposition in 29. Consequently, the ruling coalition was able to form administrations in only 116 LG bodies. Collectively, opposition parties won more seats than the NPP. However, their failure to unite against the ruling NPP enabled the government to retain dominance in many local councils. Although efforts were made after the elections to establish a united opposition front, these initiatives failed to gain traction [The Sunday Times 2025a, 9 November].

On several occasions, the opposition attempted to move no-confidence motions in Parliament, but these efforts were unsuccessful. At present, the government does not face any significant political challenge. Nevertheless, public support for the NPP appears to be gradually declining. A key source of public dissatisfaction is the delay in tangible economic relief, with many citizens still waiting for meaningful improvements more than a year after the new government assumed office.

3. Economic developments

The resilience of the Sri Lankan economy improved in 2025, due to positive developments in the domestic macroeconomic conditions. The economy grew by 5.0 per cent during the first nine months of 2025 (4.8 per cent, 4.9 per cent and 5.4 per cent in the first, second and third quarters of 2025, respectively) [Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2026, 28 January; Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2025, December; Department of Census and Statistics 2025a]. All three major economic activities – agriculture, industry and service – positively contributed to this growth [Department of Census and Statistics 2025b]. The total government revenue, including tax and non-tax revenue and grants, increased by 24.7 per cent to LKR 2,325.1 billion in the first half of 2025 from LKR 1,864.6 billion in the same period of 2024, realising 46.6 per cent of the annual estimate of LKR 4,990.0 billion. Tax revenue increased by 25.9 per cent to LKR 2,152.1 billion (approximately US$ 6.95 billion) in the first half of 2025, compared to LKR 1,709.3 billion in the same period of 2024, achieving 46.9 per cent of the annual estimate of LKR 4,590.0 billion. This improvement was primarily driven by the full impact of continued implementation of policy-driven, revenue-based fiscal consolidation measures, enhanced revenue administration, the revival of economic activities, and the lifting of import restrictions, including the removal of the ban on vehicle imports.

Major revenue-earning sectors such as tourism and remittances improved significantly. Tourist arrivals in 2025 surpassed the level recorded in 2018, while recording a year-on-year growth of 15.1 per cent compared to 2024. However, tourist earnings remained below the 2018 level, due to the downward revision of estimates of average expenditure per day and the average duration of stay by Sri Lanka Tourism Development Authority, while recording a marginal growth of 1.6 per cent compared to 2024 [Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2026, 30 January]. The tourism earnings in 2025 were US$ 3.2 billion. Workers’ remittances during 2025 increased by 22.8 per cent on a year-on-year basis, surpassing US$ 8.0 billion to reach a historic high [Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2026, 30 January].

Total exports, including goods exports and trades in services in 2025, were US$ 20.6 billion, whereas goods imports were US$ 21.5 billion. The merchandise trade deficit widened to around US$ 7.9 billion in 2025, despite export earnings reaching a historically high level [Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2026, 30 January].

Gross official reserves (GOR), including the swap facility with the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), improved to around US$ 6.8 billion by the end of 2025, even amidst continuous external debt service payments, due to the receipts from multilateral institutions and net forex purchases by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka [Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2026, 30 January].

3.1. Debt profile

The first condition of the IMF to provide the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) was to restructure the debt to make it sustainable. The debt restructuring was finalised in June 2024 with the Official Creditors Committee (OCC), China EXIM Bank and the International sovereign bond holder by the Ranil Wickremesinghe administration. As per the debt treatment, Sri Lanka received capital grace periods until 2028, reduced interest, and progressive amortisation with final repayments in 2043. Debt restructuring required further efforts through signing mandatory bilateral agreements with key partners. The NPP government in 2025 almost completed the process by signing bilateral debt restructuring agreements with OCC member countries as well as with countries outside OCC. As of the end of June 2025, Sri Lanka concluded the signing of 36 amended agreements covering 194 loans and bonds, with respective development partners and bondholders, and has also shared debt treatment proposals with other bilateral development partners [Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development-Sri Lanka 2025, 31 October].

The external debt of the government as of the end of June 2025 amounted to US$ 37.1 billion (including multilateral 36 per cent, commercial 34 per cent and bilateral debt at 30 per cent of total government external debt). Total debt service payments during the first half of 2025 amounted to US$ 1.3 billion. As of the end of June 2025, there were no external payment arrears [Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development-Sri Lanka 2025, 31 October].

During the period from 1 January to 30 June 2025, total foreign loan disbursements amounted to US$ 547.5 million. The largest share of disbursements was recorded under the IMF’s EFF, accounting for 61 per cent of the total. This was followed by disbursements under loan agreements with the World Bank (16 per cent) and the Asian Development Bank (11 per cent). During the first half of 2025, no new commitments were entered into with bilateral, multilateral, or external commercial creditors [Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development-Sri Lanka 2025, 31 October].

The Debt Management Strategy for the period 2025-2029 focuses on a more domestic-oriented financing strategy, maintaining a 80:20 domestic-to-external financing ratio while increasing the issuance of medium-term to long-term treasury bonds to address refinancing and borrowing costs and gradually reducing the reliance on treasury bills. The upward movement in revenue collection has reduced the fiscal pressure and empowered the treasury to allocate a significant portion of the accumulated cash reserves towards debt servicing obligations, thereby reducing reliance on external borrowings and fostering a more sustainable fiscal environment in the first half of 2025, even though Sri Lanka continued to depend on external financial support to sustain external debt service commitments [Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development-Sri Lanka 2025, 31 October]. However, following Cyclone Ditwah, which struck the country on 28 November 2025, the government has faced a new fiscal pressure, leading to a greater reliance on external financing.

The positive macroeconomic conditions helped the government to provide immediate relief assistance to the victims of Cyclone Ditwah. However, the reconstruction needs have generated significant fiscal pressures and balance-of-payments needs. According to the World Bank, the loss due to the cyclone was about US$ 4 billion [Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2026, 28 January]. The government passed a LKR 500 billion supplementary estimate to restore the livelihoods of those affected by the disaster. To address urgent balance-of-payments and fiscal pressures arising from the catastrophic cyclone, the government received US$ 206 million emergency financing under the IMF’s Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) [Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2025, 19 December]. Sri Lanka has also achieved financial assistance from bilateral partners, some of which is in the form of loans. For example, India’s US$ 450 million Ditwah reconstruction package includes US$ 350 million in concessional lines of credit and US$ 100 million in grants, targeting restoration of roads, railways and bridges, housing reconstruction, health and education facilities, agriculture support and disaster preparedness [Akashvani News 2026, 8 January].

3.2. NPP’s economic reform policy

The NPP government is continuing the economic reform programme initiated under the Ranil Wickremesinghe administration in line with the IMF requirements. It has adopted a revenue-based fiscal consolidation approach, as prescribed by the IMF, and implemented several policy measures to fulfil these commitments. Consequently, Sri Lanka has received a total of US$ 1.7 billion so far out of the US$ 2.9 billion bailout package.

The NPP government, to boost tax compliance and refrain from tax exemptions to maintain support for economic reforms as mandated by the IMF, brought changes in the tax regime since 2025. Effective from April 2025, the exemption on foreign service and foreign source income and the value added tax (VAT) exemption on imported aircraft engines or spare parts was removed. Tax on gains and profits from betting and gaming has been increased from 40 per cent to 45 per cent. The advance income tax (AIT) rate on interest and discounts was increased from 5 per cent to 10 per cent to enhance tax collection on interest income. The tax-free allowance has been increased from LKR 1.2 million to LKR 1.8 million and the progressive income tax rates applicable to individuals were revised to reflect the revised personal relief. The main changes in the VAT included the abolition of the simplified VAT scheme and replacement by a risk-based refund scheme, and mandatory electronic filing. VAT exemptions were introduced for chemical naphtha supplied to the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) and for locally produced dairy products [Inland Revenue Department, Sri Lanka 2025, 17 April]. However, the government has decided to postpone the implementation of 18 per cent VAT on non-resident digital services and the property tax to 2026 and 2027, respectively [Newswire 2025, 5 December].

The loss-making state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are the major contributors to Sri Lanka’s fiscal problems. To address the issues faced by the SOEs, the previous government was making plans to privatise them. The NPP government, however, halted the process of privatising the SOEs such as Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC) and CEB. Instead, it is making efforts to restructure them by improving management practices, reducing operational costs, and enhancing efficiency within the existing state ownership structure by initiating cost-reflective pricing in the energy sector. Sri Lanka has a commitment to cost-reflective pricing of electricity not only under the IMF programme, but also under the Sri Lanka Electricity Act, No. 20 of 2009. The CEB is already following a cost-reflective pricing; however, it varies from the methodology used by the IMF to formulate the cost-reflective pricing. Therefore, CEB was not ready to follow the IMF methodology, which the government has already committed to, and thus is having a conflict of interest with the government and is urging the government to renegotiate it with the IMF.

As part of the social safety net, the government has expanded the Aswesuma programme by increasing monthly state sector salaries, wages, social welfare and healthcare allowances.3 The government is investing in digital transformation to modernise welfare distribution and ensure transparency, with plans to launch a digital identity system to track beneficiaries and eliminate corruption. The government allocated LKR 230 billion for welfare programmes, a significant increase from previous years [President’s Media Division, Sri Lanka 2025, 4 July]. To address the issue of rural poverty and to empower communities and ensure the fair distribution of economic benefits across society, the government launched the «Prajashakthi» National Programme in July 2025 [President’s Media Division, Sri Lanka 2025, 4 July].

The IMF believes, «Sri Lanka’s ambitious reform agenda is delivering commendable outcomes» [International Monetary Fund 2025, 6 February]. The fourth review of Sri Lanka’s four-year EFF program was completed on 1 July 2025. The IMF staff and the Sri Lankan authorities reached a staff-level agreement on the fifth review under the EFF in October 2025, with the expected disbursement of US$ 347 million by December 2025. However, the fifth review was postponed due to the Cyclone Ditwah disaster. The IMF has offered RFI to Sri Lanka to deal with the disaster crisis.

A section in Sri Lanka is breathing a sigh of relief that the NPP government did not derail the economic growth momentum by rejecting the IMF programme initiated under the previous government. The reform policy could bring macro-economic stability to Sri Lanka, but it did not provide economic relief to the poor. The opposition political parties, particularly the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), are critical of the view that the NPP government, instead of renegotiating some of the harmful provisions of the EFF, including the austerity measures (as promised during the elections), took over the IMF programme negotiated by the previous administration as it was [Hariharan 2025, 9 March]. It is argued that though the government has made some changes in the tax regime and expanded the social welfare programme as mentioned above, it could not provide relief to the marginalised sections effectively, with the IMF capping of primary expenditure at 13 per cent of GDP and maintaining a primary balance at 2.3 per cent of GDP to address social costs [The Morning 2025, 25 February].

3.3. No relief for the weaker section

Consequently, despite the macroeconomic development in 2025, household incomes, employment, and overall welfare were well below pre-2022 economic crisis levels. A large number of genuinely needy and deserving people are not able to benefit from the government’s safety net programmes, such as Aswesuma, due to its ineffective distribution. Research suggests that while Aswesuma transfers may help protect households against low-calorie intake, beneficiary households continue to have low-quality diets, particularly, under-consuming fruits, vegetables, dairy, and legumes [Hülsen et al. 2025]. Even though the government estimates that digitalisation can ensure the effective distribution of the Aswesuma programme, experts believe that the programme should enhance its ability to target individuals in both chronic and transient poverty, rather than focusing only on chronic poverty [Amarasinghe 2025, May].

The government’s price control policy, introduced with the objective of providing economic relief, appears to have generated unintended adverse consequences for consumers. In December 2024, price controls were imposed on rice, a staple commodity. However, the implementation of this price ceiling – combined with an import tariff of LKR 65 per kilogram – contributed to supply distortions in the domestic market. These measures, alongside weather-induced production shortfalls, resulted in significant rice shortages and exacerbated food insecurity and malnutrition in Sri Lanka. The price cap constrained market adjustments to reduced supply, while the import tariff increased the cost of imported rice by an estimated 50 per cent, further limiting affordability. The interaction of these policies fostered the emergence of black-market activities, as formal market channels struggled to meet demand at the regulated price [Seneviratne 2025, 6 February]. Similarly, a salt shortage – attributed to low domestic production and administrative inefficiencies – disproportionately affected low-income households. Collectively, these developments underscore the distributional impact of price controls and trade restrictions, particularly when implemented in the context of supply-side constraints.

To reduce the cost of medicines and to offer long-awaited financial relief to the public, Sri Lanka’s parliament approved a new pricing reform for pharmaceutical products, paving the way for the introduction of maximum retail prices (MRPs) and maximum ceiling prices (MCPs) for all medicine categories, excluding those manufactured domestically, in October 2025. The sustainability of the pharmaceutical supply under the new pricing formula has been suspected, leading to serious concern about its impact on the poor in the event of severe medicine shortages [Hasanzadeh 2025, 5 November].

Cyclone Ditwah further worsened the conditions of the poor in Sri Lanka. Around 1,118,929 people and 309,607 families were affected due to the cyclone in November 2025. About 55,747 families were displaced [Disaster Management Center, Sri Lanka 2025, 30 November]. An estimated 462,000 children are among those affected by the cyclone. 6097 houses were fully damaged, and 112,790 houses were partially damaged [Disaster Management Center, Sri Lanka 2025, 31 December]. Half of those cyclone-affected people have limited capacity to cope with disasters due to unstable incomes and high debt stemming from the 2022 economic crisis [Sultana 2026, 8 January].

3.4. Economic challenges

According to David Sislen, World Bank Division Director for Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, «to ensure that all Sri Lankans benefit from the recovery, Sri Lanka needs to shift to a higher growth trajectory through the successful implementation of reforms that enhance trade, investment, competition and female labour force participation, among others» [World Bank Group 2025, 23 April]. While the government continues to implement the IMF-mandated reform programmes, several developments in 2025 have created a discouraging outlook for trade growth, the labour market and the country’s investment profile.

The Trump administration’s tariff policy posed significant risks to Sri Lanka’s macroeconomic and social stability. In April 2025, the US imposed a 44 per cent reciprocal tariff, half of the 88 per cent duty Sri Lanka imposes on US imports. Later, it was reduced to 20 per cent with effect from 7 August 2025. The tariff would impact 86 per cent of the products in the country’s export basket, removing the competitiveness of those products in the US market. It is estimated that around 300,000 people directly and around 600,000 people indirectly would be affected due to the tariff imposed on Sri Lanka [Economynext 2025, 3 April]. Sri Lanka must therefore diversify its export basket. While the government is looking for trade and investment options in the Global South, no breakthrough was achieved in this regard in 2025.

Sri Lanka’s investment profile is still vulnerable. Sri Lanka surpassed the US$ 1 billion foreign direct investment (FDI) mark in 2025, describing it as an early indication of recovering investor interest and changes underway within the institution. However, this level of inflows remains well below the capital required to support sustained economic expansion [Daily FT 2026, 28 January]. According to a study by the Lanka Impact Investing Network, Sri Lanka’s annual investment demand is estimated at US$ 7-10 billion to meet sustainable development goals, US$ 3-5 billion for infrastructure development, and a further US$ 2-3 billion annually for climate finance. The study also estimates an additional US$ 695 million funding gap faced by women-led enterprises.

The government is trying hard to attract investors by addressing the governance issues and making the country investor-friendly. However, the government’s dealings with some of the existing investors are feared to be sending a negative message to the foreign investors. As part of its policy of transparency in procurement, the government has stopped all government-to-government project proposals. Under the new policy framework, all projects will be pursued through transparent tender procedures [Mohan 2025, 2 August]. As part of this new policy, the NPP government has reviewed foreign-funded projects in the energy sector signed by the previous government, including the LNG Infrastructure Development and LNG Supply for Power Plant in Kerawalapitiya by Petronet LNG Ltd., and wind farm projects in Mannar and Pooneryn by Adani Group of Energy Limited (AGEL).

The AGEL, which was facing environmental clearance and a case in Sri Lanka’s Supreme Court, decided to withdraw from the project when the NPP government appointed a negotiation committee to renegotiate the proposal. As far as the LNG infrastructure development project is concerned, the NPP government awarded the project to the China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) without officially cancelling the project with Petronet [Mohan 2025, 2 August]. US$ 3.5 billion in FDI by Sinopec, a Chinese company, to develop an oil refinery in Hambantota, which began through a tendering process, is also facing delays and risks of being stalled due to prolonged renegotiations on equity, land allocation and market access [Mohan 2025, 2 August]. There is a concern among the experts in Sri Lanka that these kinds of inconsistent, unpredictable, and confusing policies will discourage the investors, even if political and economic stability is achieved. Australian-based United Petroleum, which entered the Sri Lankan market in August 2023 and invested US$ 27.5 million to take over 150 existing fuel stations and gained the rights to build 50 new ones, decided to withdraw, citing a lack of profitability in the small market [Mudugamuwa 2025, 6 April].

4. Foreign policy developments

In 2025, Sri Lanka’s primary foreign policy focus was securing economic and diplomatic support from bilateral and multilateral partners to address the country’s economic challenges, while safeguarding its strategic autonomy. A key priority for the NPP government was completing the debt restructuring process initiated by the previous administration to sustain economic recovery. To restructure the external debt, Sri Lanka’s official sector creditors organised into the Official Creditor Committee, a group of 17 countries co-chaired by Japan, India, and France.4 The Exim Bank of China remained outside of the OCC, and therefore, Sri Lanka had to negotiate debt treatment terms with both groups in parallel, whilst ensuring comparability of treatment between the two groups [Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development-Sri Lanka 2025, 1 January]. Creditors are under no obligation to offer Sri Lanka debt relief; their willingness depends on the good faith demonstrated by both sides, and the presentation of a credible macroeconomic reform plan that realistically restores economic sustainability. Hence, the NPP administration sought to maintain cordial relations, tried to avoid confrontation with any country as much as possible, and proactively addressed creditor concerns. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)-led ruling coalition shed its anti-India approach, and moderated its stand on Sri Lanka’s bilateral engagements with the USA, while maintaining its strong relations with China. Continuing the Ranil Wickremesinghe administration’s foreign policy, the NPP administration positively engaged with other Asian countries, Australia, the EU and the multilateral institutions.

Special attention was given to pursuing a balanced policy towards its major competing partners, including India, Pakistan, China, and the USA, to mitigate strategic pulls and pressures. President Anura Dissanayake, however, claims that Sri Lanka is not balancing. In his words, «we don’t look at our relations with these important countries as balancing. Each of our relationships is important to us. We work with everyone, but always with a single purpose – a better world for Sri Lankans, in a better world for all» (The Sunday Times 2025, 14 December).

4.1. Relations with India and China

The commitment of «Fostering Partnerships for a Shared Future» adopted during President Anura’s maiden visit to India in December 2024 was sustained in 2025 by increased political, economic, developmental and security cooperation between India and Sri Lanka. Several India-funded projects were inaugurated, and new MoUs were signed to enhance defence, health, agriculture cooperation, and energy and digital connectivity. India once again emerged as the first responder to the crisis by providing humanitarian and disaster assistance in the aftermath of Cyclone Ditwah. Through a combination of investment-based and grant-oriented projects, and multifaceted engagement since 2022, India has positioned itself as a key partner in helping Sri Lanka ease its debt burden while fostering sustainable and long-term economic growth [Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India 2024, 16 December]. Hence, the JVP has notably recalibrated its approach towards India.

India accounted for over 20 per cent of Sri Lanka’s tourist arrivals in 2025 [Akashvani News 2026, 8 January]. Sri Lanka’s merchandise exports to India reached US$ 334 million during the first four months of 2025, which a nearly 40 per cent surge from the previous year. Overall exports from Sri Lanka rose 12 per cent year-on-year to US$ 983 million in April 2025. According to data released by Sri Lanka’s Export Development Board, India has been the second-largest destination for the Island’s exports after the United States, overtaking the United Kingdom [Akashvani News 2025, 28 May]. India also accounted for as much as 40-50 per cent of foreign direct investment when routed investments are accounted for [Akashvani News 2026, 8 January]. However, as mentioned above, Indian investors in Petronet LNG and AGEL faced issues. While AGEL withdrew on its own, the NPP Government has handed over the LNG project in Kerawalpitiya to a Chinese company without formally cancelling the project with Petronet LNG. The casual handling of issues with investors from the largest development partner conveys a confused foreign policy approach.

Traditional friendship between China and Sri Lanka deepened in 2025 by reinforcing economic ties through debt restructure, renewal of the currency swap agreement and committing the largest FDI project worth US$ 3.7 billion in Hambantota, as well as strengthening engagement at the party level between the JVP and the Communist Party of China. Nonetheless, the Chinese oil refinery project faced delays due to a lack of consensus on the issues of equity and market access.

The government justified its handling of investment-related engagements with Indian and Chinese investors by emphasising its commitment to promoting transparency and reducing corruption in the energy sector, while rejecting any notion of preferential treatment toward a particular investor. Amid the «progressive thaw» in India-China relations, Sri Lanka was able to navigate its strategic partnerships with both powers with relative ease, avoiding significant external pressures while maintaining balanced ties.

4.2. Navigating the India-Pakistan confrontation

India-Sri Lanka conflict following the Pahalgam attack in April 2025 and India’s Operation Sindoor in May 2025 created diplomatically challenging situations for Sri Lanka. However, Sri Lanka continued to maintain its non-aligned position. Following the Pahalgam attack, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake conveyed a condolence message to PM Modi and strongly condemned the terrorist attack, which claimed 26 lives [President’s Media Division, Sri Lanka 2025, 25 April]. Demonstrating Sri Lanka’s firm stance against terrorism in all its forms and cooperating with India, the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) conducted a «comprehensive security search» of an aircraft that arrived from Chennai at Bandaranaike International Airport on 3 May 2025 after a tip-off on a suspect connected with the Pahalgam attack being on board the flight. Even though the Government of India accused Pakistan of instigating cross-border terrorism, Sri Lanka refrained from taking any view on it and participated in the scheduled Defence Dialogue 2025 on 27 April 2025 between Sri Lanka and Pakistan in Karachi. No official communication was issued by the Sri Lankan government on the military operations carried out by India and Pakistan during 7-10 May 2025. It was only after India and Pakistan decided to stop all firing and military action on land and in the air and sea on 10 May 2025 that the Sri Lankan President’s office issued a «Message of Appreciation» for the leaders of India and Pakistan. During Operation Sindoor, Sri Lanka maintained its neutrality by maintaining its commitment not to allow its territory to be used by any party in the conflict. It is noteworthy to mention here that this policy of non-alignment was not followed by Sri Lanka during the India-Pakistan War in 1971.

4.3. Relations with the US

The JVP historically opposed Western and American influence in Sri Lanka. However, ahead of the 2024 Presidential elections, the party initiated engagement with the United States, and following its electoral victory, the government pursued a constructive dialogue, particularly on economic recovery and debt restructuring. Nonetheless, the suspension of USAID programmes and the implementation of US reciprocal tariffs negatively affected key initiatives in food security, economic reform, governance, anti-corruption, border security, and migration management [Alphonsus 2025, 30 March].

In 2024-2025, Sri Lanka was slated to receive US$ 53 million under USAID, representing 0.07 per cent of gross national income. A survey by the Civil Society Organisations Collective indicated that over 565,000 direct beneficiaries and 400 project staff would be impacted by the suspension [Alphonsus 2025, 30 March]. Reciprocal tariffs further strained Sri Lanka’s export sector and job opportunities, although negotiations successfully reduced the tariff from 44 per cent in April to 20 per cent by August 2025.

While seeking a favourable tariff agreement, Sri Lanka adopted a cautious approach to the US military action in Iran, reflecting a shift from the JVP’s traditional anti-US stance. Despite reduced collaboration on economic and social programmes, bilateral defence cooperation expanded. Under the Megaports Initiative, the US supplied radiation detection equipment at the Port of Colombo in March 2025. Additionally, a memorandum of understanding formalised defence partnerships between the Montana National Guard, US Coast Guard District 13, and the Sri Lanka Armed Forces through the State Partnership Programme (SPP), institutionalising cooperation in humanitarian assistance, disaster response, maritime security, anti-trafficking, and cyber defence [The Sunday Times 2025, 14 December]. Sri Lanka now participates in a global SPP network linking over 115 countries.

4.4. Expanding partnership

To continue the halted projects under the USAID programme and also to attract foreign investment, the Sri Lankan government is looking for alternative donors and development partners in the Global South and partnerships with multilateral institutes. The Sri Lankan government, in this regard, engaged with several Asian countries. Japan, which was once the largest development partner of Sri Lanka, has gradually re-intensified its engagement with Sri Lanka. In addition to enhancing their economic partnership, Sri Lanka and Japan have strengthened security and defence cooperation, with Sri Lanka becoming a partner in Japan’s official security assistance (OSA) programme in September 2025. Under the OSA programme, Japan offered unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Sri Lanka for enhancing maritime surveillance and disaster relief capabilities.

Sri Lanka aims to strengthen its partnership with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) by seeking the status of a Sectoral Dialogue Partner (SDP). The proposal was approved by the Cabinet of Ministers, following a 2019 letter of intent. This status, which allows non-Southeast Asian countries to engage with ASEAN, can enhance Sri Lanka’s economic progress and diplomatic relations with ASEAN nations.

As one of the promises of the NPP was to modernise the armed forces with new technology and enhance the country’s maritime security, the government in 2025 enhanced its defence engagement with Australia and the UK. Sri Lanka has received a state-of-the-art Shallow Water Multi-Beam Echo Sounder for the Sri Lanka Navy Hydrographic Service (SLNHS) from Australia to develop Sri Lanka’s hydrographic capabilities [Sri Lanka Navy 2025, 18 February]. A hydrographic cooperation agreement was also signed between Sri Lanka and the UK [Ministry of Defence-Sri Lanka 2025, 14 February].

4.5. Foreign policy limitations

Given the historical ideological baggage associated with the JVP, the NPP’s measured diplomacy has mitigated international apprehensions and preserved external goodwill. The government has navigated competing geopolitical pressures with caution, maintaining engagement across major powers. Despite positive engagements with its development partners, it avoided effective engagements with concerned countries on many of the crucial issues of national interest, such as the issue of its claim on the continental shelf and membership in BRICS. No action has been taken so far on the issue of allowing foreign marine scientific research vessels and thereby affecting marine scientific research in the country. An overly cautious, non-committal posture risks deferring substantive engagement on issues central to national interests, thereby limiting Sri Lanka’s ability to shape outcomes in its favour.

5. Conclusion

Governance in Sri Lanka in 2025 under the NPP administration reflects a mixed but noteworthy trajectory. The government entered office with a strong electoral mandate to transform Sri Lanka’s political culture and restore public trust in governance. In several respects, it has demonstrated intent to institutionalise financial discipline and recalibrate political norms. On issues such as national integration, the administration has moved beyond rhetoric toward concrete engagement, signalling an attempt to reframe state-society relations. However, while symbolic and procedural shifts are evident, the deeper structural reforms necessary for long-term systemic transformation remain largely uninitiated.

The NPP benefits from an absolute parliamentary majority and a fragmented opposition, conditions that theoretically reduce political constraints on reform implementation. Yet, the limited progress on structural transformation suggests that the principal impediments are not political. Institutional inexperience, limited technocratic depth, and an absence of long-term policy coherence appear to have constrained reform momentum. Moreover, policy inconsistency – particularly in balancing transformative rhetoric with pragmatic governance – has created tensions between electoral expectations and policy delivery. The government now faces the challenge of reconciling ambitious campaign promises with the realities of institutional reform.

Systemic transformation in Sri Lanka cannot be achieved through executive will alone. It requires coordinated action across state institutions and sustained societal support. Despite its anti-corruption emphasis, the administration has encountered institutional friction. This underscores the structural limits of reform efforts in the absence of alignment among key governance institutions.

In the economic domain, policy continuity rather than rupture has defined the year 2025. The NPP government has maintained its commitment to the recovery programme initiated under former President Ranil Wickremesinghe, signalling policy predictability to both domestic and international stakeholders. However, economic stabilisation alone does not guarantee resilience. In 2025, there were no significant structural initiatives aimed at strengthening shock absorption capacity, broadening the productive base, or advancing export diversification. Inconsistent signals on investment policy and limited progress in transforming the export structure raise concerns about the sustainability of growth and the country’s capacity to transition from stabilisation to structural transformation.

On the foreign policy front, the NPP government has performed relatively well in 2025. Through a pragmatic and calibrated approach, it earned external goodwill and managed to navigate strategic pressures from competing regional and global powers. However, in attempting to maintain friendly relations with all and avoid offending anyone, the government is avoiding necessary but difficult discussions with key partners. The concern, therefore, is that over time, such restraint could constrain Sri Lanka’s capacity to proactively shape outcomes in alignment with its strategic objectives.

Overall, the government’s approach has been cautious and incremental rather than disruptive. While economic and foreign policy continuity with the previous administration is evident, the political domain reflects a perceptible shift in governance style and discourse. Whether these incremental adjustments will culminate in structural transformation or remain confined to procedural reform will depend on the government’s ability to institutionalise change over the coming years.

Meanwhile, public perception in 2025 reflects both emerging frustration and guarded optimism. The local council election results suggest that while voters were hesitant to grant the NPP an unqualified endorsement, they have not consolidated around an alternative political force. Delays in implementing key reforms and concerns regarding appointments to important positions based on party loyalty are eroding the moral high ground upon which the NPP’s electoral success was built. Nonetheless, given that this was only one and a half years of governance, segments of the electorate remain willing to extend a conditional mandate, contingent upon visible progress in the near term. The year 2026 will therefore be crucial for the NPP’s political future, as citizens expect tangible progress on election promises.

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ISSN 2385-2526

In 2025, Pakistan faced significant political turmoil alongside enduring security and economic concerns, with foreign relations emerging as a pivotal factor. The 2024 general elections, which brought the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) to power under the leadership of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, had been marred by the exclusion of Pakistan TehreekeInsaf (PTI) and the imprisonment of its leader, former Prime Minister Imran Khan. This gave way to a legitimacy crisis, deepening polarisation and fuelling the rise of Tehreek-e-Tahaffuz-e-Ayeen Pakistan (TTAP), an opposition alliance demanding constitutional supremacy. Economically, amid persistent structural weaknesses, high debt repayments, sluggish exports, and limited fiscal space, short-term stabilisation and modest growth projections were achieved in 2025 with support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Still, government investment plans struggled to inspire confidence, with the fiscal year 2025-26 budget reflecting the dual challenge of reducing development spending while expanding defence outlays amid rising tensions with India. Militancy also escalated, with the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), among other groups, increasingly targeting China-funded projects. The April 2025 terrorist attack in Kashmir sparked a serious confrontation with India, marked by reciprocal missile and drone strikes, before the United States brokered a ceasefire. Relatedly, foreign policy was Pakistan’s standout focus in 2025. Its relations with the United States steadied, shifting toward a transactional partnership centred on security and targeted investment. Regionally, Pakistan kept channels open across both South and Central Asia while managing ongoing tensions with India and Afghanistan, and it continued to deepen its long-standing ties with Saudi Arabia.

Keywords – Economy; India; foreign affairs; militancy; United States.

1. Introduction

In 2025, Pakistan faced a convergence of internal political unrest, economic fragility, and escalating regional tensions, all while the United States was reasserting itself as a decisive player in its security and diplomatic calculus.

Still, the stage was set by the February 2024 general elections, which returned Shehbaz Sharif and the PML-N to power. That party’s accession was, however, overshadowed by the exclusion of the PTI and the imprisonment of former Prime Minister Imran Khan. These developments deepened polarisation, eroded public confidence in the democratic process, and sparked a wave of protests. Pakistan’s internal strife intensified with the formation of the TTAP, a multi-party opposition alliance advocating for constitutional supremacy and civilian oversight.

Civil liberties came under further strain with the passage of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes (Amendment) Act 2025, which expanded government control over digital content and introduced new means of mass surveillance. Further concerns about freedom of expression and judicial independence were raised following the approval of the 27th Constitutional Amendment, which restructured Pakistan’s judicial and military architecture, effectively sidelining the Supreme Court and consolidating military authority.

These political challenges unfolded amid a relatively stable macroeconomic environment: inflation had fallen to a nine-year low, though growth forecasts were revised downward to 3%, indicating fiscal pressure, structural inefficiencies, and significant external debt repayments amounting to more than US$ 22 billion [Reuters 2025, 7 February]. The government’s pursuit of an export-led recovery was met with scepticism, given the impact of recent US tariffs and aid suspensions under Executive Order 14169, issued by President Trump [GovInfo 2025, 20 January].

The year 2025 was marked by Pakistan’s particular focus on nurturing its international ties. Islamabad’s renewed engagement in global affairs was reflected in its recalibrated relations with Washington. With the new Trump administration, Washington was shifting its bilateral relationship with Islamabad to a commercial, interest-driven and narrowly defined strategic engagement, giving way to a transactional dynamic geared toward alignment with the «America First» doctrine. Pakistan-US relations appeared to be thawing despite years of mistrust, evidenced by high-level visits from both sides [Dawn 2025, 26 June]. Pakistan supported US counterterrorism operations, while Washington reached investment deals with Islamabad in trade, energy and minerals [Mustafa 2025, 5 August; United States Department of State 2025, 11 August]. Islamabad also consolidated its relations with partners across South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East despite persistent tensions with India and Afghanistan [Manning 2025, 23 October]. Both the April 2025 crisis with India (sparked by a terrorist attack in Kashmir) and the conflict with Afghanistan escalated into serious confrontations. US engagement proved crucial in brokering a ceasefire with New Delhi, underscoring Washington’s enduring leverage.

2. Confrontation in Pakistani politics and mounting concerns over the diminishing space for civilian liberties and institutions

The PTI first emerged as a significant political force with the 2013 general elections, which laid the groundwork for Imran Khan’s victory in the 2018 elections. His tenure was marked by alignment – and later tension – with the military, ultimately leading to his ouster in 2022. Since then, and despite disqualification, imprisonment, and allegations of military interference, Khan and the PTI have remained central to Pakistan’s polarised politics. Despite repression, the PTI continues to mobilise significant public support, positioning itself as the primary challenge to Pakistan’s political order [Corsi 2025, pp. 360-362].

In December 2024, Pakistan’s political scene shifted when the government and the PTI began discussions to ease tensions. These talks focused on key issues, most notably including the release of Imran Khan and other party members. The PTI also called for a judicial inquiry into the events of 9 May 2023, when violent protests targeted military facilities following Khan’s arrest, leading to large-scale arrests and military trials of PTI activists [Corsi 2024, pp. 358-362]. Despite initial hope, the PTI withdrew from these negotiations in January 2025, citing the government’s unwillingness to meet its demands, particularly the formation of judicial commissions to investigate the events of May 2023. The conflict escalated when, on 17 January 2025, an anti-corruption court convicted Imran Khan to 14 years of imprisonment, and his wife, Bushra Bibi, to seven years, on charges of obtaining real estate through an illegal transaction [Corsi 2025, pp. 340-342; Ellis-Petersen 2025, 17 January; Ewe 2025, 17 January; Sullivan 2025, 17 January]. These verdicts were serious setbacks in the reconciliation efforts between the PTI and the government, exacerbating political instability in the country. A third round of talks between Pakistani officials and the PTI was held in February 2025, but it faced a protracted impasse with uncertain prospects for resolution [Shehzad 2025, 15 January; Shehzad 2025, 1 February; Junaidi 2025, 6 February; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2025, 8 February].

In early 2025, tensions between the government and opposition escalated following the formation of a unified multi-party opposition bloc – the TTAP («Movement for the Protection of Pakistan’s Constitution») – led by seasoned Pashtun nationalist Mahmood Khan Achakzai. This bloc brought together several major parties, including the PTI, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, Jamaat-i-Islami, and Awaam Pakistan. Achakzai, who chairs the Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (a Pashtun nationalist party founded in 1989), has served multiple terms in the National Assembly and has long been recognised for his commitment to federalism and constitutionalism [Dawn 2025, 12 February; Aaj News 2025, 22 February]. The increasing involvement of military institutions in areas of civilian governance is a key point of concern for the TTAP, which asserts that they have overstepped their constitutional role by expanding their influence over policymaking processes [Corsi 2025, p. 361]. The TTAP alliance has also been critical of the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC), a public entity established in 2023 to attract investment in several key sectors, including defence. The prime minister chairs the SIFC, but military representatives work alongside civilian authorities on its various committees. Critics have argued that the SIFC has granted excessive powers to the military in civilian economic matters, enabling military interests – particularly those of a financial nature – to prevail. More specifically, concerns have been raised over the SIFC’s focus on attracting investment without fully addressing the underlying structural problems facing the Pakistani economy [Anwar 2023, 30 August; Ahmed 2024, 18 February; Haider 2024, 10 May]. The TTAP alliance has heightened public awareness of the importance of the rule of law, judicial independence, and constitutional supremacy while coordinating opposition efforts and putting pressure on the government through nationwide demonstrations calling for early elections and the release of imprisoned opposition leaders [Imran 2025, 26 February].

In January 2025, the upper house of the Parliament of Pakistan enacted a bill amending the nation’s cybercrime legislation, allowing the government to impose stricter penalties for the dissemination of disinformation. The Prevention of Electronic Crimes (Amendment) Act 2025 enhanced the government’s oversight powers over the content appearing on various digital platforms [Digital Rights Foundation 2025]. The act led to the establishment of the Social Media Protection and Regulatory Authority, which oversees social media platforms, addresses misinformation, and ensures regulatory compliance, including by removing or censoring unlawful content [Government of Pakistan, National Assembly 2025]. The act also made it a criminal offence to deliberately spread false information that could incite fear or public disorder – an offence punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment and monetary penalties. In addition, it compels social media platforms to register with the government and adhere to content-removal directives [Butt 2025, 24 January]. Critics have argued that the expanded governmental powers could undermine freedom of expression in the country. Moreover, the swift passage of the bill, which entailed limited public consultation, further intensified debates about its implications for civil liberties [Munir 2025, 23 January; Amnesty International 2025, 24 January; Reuters 2025, 28 January; AP News 2025, 29 January]. Amnesty International reported in 2025 that the Lawful Intercept Management System and the national internet firewall, collectively, enable authorities to monitor citizens’ phones and censor online content [Amnesty International 2025, 9 September].

On 13 November 2025, Pakistan’s 27th Constitutional Amendment was approved, introducing extensive changes to the country’s judicial and military architecture [Al Jazeera 2025, 11 November]. It established a Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) with exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional interpretation, federal-provincial disputes, and fundamental rights, taking over the Supreme Court’s prior constitutional role. The amendment also revised judicial transfers: High Court judges could now be reassigned between provinces at the recommendation of the Judicial Commission, with refusal to do so potentially triggering disciplinary action. In the military domain, the amendment abolished the post of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, effective 27 November 2025. The Chief of Army Staff was redesignated as Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), gaining constitutional authority over all three military services. Five-star officers were granted lifetime rank retention and immunity from criminal prosecution. The amendment also extended this lifetime criminal immunity to the president and expanded the protections for Governors. Additional provisions modified provincial cabinet requirements and federal-provincial fiscal arrangements [Chaudhry & Usama 2025, 8 November]. Scholars have argued that the amendment fundamentally restructured Pakistan’s constitutional balance. The FCC was widely considered to have weakened judicial independence by depriving the Supreme Court of its central constitutional role and introducing an appointment mechanism susceptible to executive influence. The revised transfer rules were criticised for undermining the judicial security of tenure. However, analysts have broadly contended that military provisions were the most consequential change. Elevating the Chief of Army Staff to CDF and granting lifelong immunity formally entrenched military exceptionalism and reduced civilian oversight, creating constitutional insulation for military leadership. Overall, scholarly analysis asserted that the amendment centralised power, weakened judicial autonomy, bolstered executive/military dominance, and challenged the democratic separation of powers [Shahid 2025, 15 November; Khan 2025, 19 November].

3. The militancy

Since 2024, Pakistan has seen a marked increase in terrorist attacks, particularly in Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This trend is primarily driven by the intensification of the insurgency by the BLA, a secular ethno-nationalist separatist group motivated by economic grievances, and the TTP, a coalition of Islamist militant groups primarily operating along the Afghan border and benefiting from safe havens in Afghanistan [Sabharwal 2025, 2 April].

Militant factions in Baluchistan allege that the federal government exploits the province’s natural resources while denying its people fair political and economic representation [Baluch 2025, July]. Tensions are further aggravated by Baluchistan’s geostrategic importance (see Section 5.1) and by China’s growing influence in the province. Accordingly, the BLA focuses its attacks on Pakistani security personnel and Chinese workers involved in initiatives funded by China and implemented under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the major development initiative launched in 2015 as part of the Belt and Road Initiative.

These tensions culminated on 11 March 2025 in the BLA’s seizure of the Jaffar Express passenger train in Baluchistan and its 450 passengers as hostages, including about 100 members of Pakistan’s security forces [Rehman 2025, 12 March]. The incident began when militants detonated explosives on the tracks, forcing the train to halt inside a tunnel during its journey from Quetta to Peshawar. The BLA then demanded that Pakistan release Baluch political prisoners, threatening to harm the hostages if Pakistan failed to comply. Pakistani security forces mounted a rescue operation, ultimately freeing the hostages after a 30-hour standoff, though not before the militants had killed 21 passengers and four paramilitary personnel. All 33 insurgents involved in the hijacking were killed over the course of the rescue operation [Shah 2025, 12 March].

Pakistan has focused much of its recent counterterrorism activities on confronting the TTP. In recent months, security forces have conducted operations in Northwest Pakistan, particularly the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa tribal areas, which have been increasingly targeted by TTP militants, especially since the Taliban regained power in Afghanistan in August 2021. Among the most violent attacks in 2025 was a suicide vehicle bombing on 28 June in Mir Ali, North Waziristan, near the border with Afghanistan, which killed 16 Pakistani soldiers and injured nearly 30 others. The attack was later claimed by a faction linked to the TTP [Khan 2025, 28 June]. On 2 July 2025, a bombing killed five officers and wounded 11 in Bajaur district; responsibility was later claimed by the Islamic State-Khorasan Province [Khan, 2025, 2 July]. Just days earlier, Pakistani troops had killed 30 TTP militants attempting to cross the border from Afghanistan near North Waziristan [Khan 2025, 4 July]. According to the Pakistani military, the TTP and allied factions have taken advantage of cross-border sanctuaries. Islamabad’s subsequent crackdown on TTP bases has further strained relations with the Taliban (see Section 5.3) [Jadoon 2025, 7 March]. In fact, contrary to Pakistan’s expectations, Kabul has seemingly not undertaken meaningful action against the group [Stacey 2025, 30 June].

4. The economy

In 2025, Pakistan’s economy sparked cautious optimism following a period of severe crisis in the preceding years. Although significant challenges persisted, indicators such as disinflation, bolstered foreign currency reserves, and higher export volumes reflected early signs of macroeconomic recovery and stabilisation [Corsi 2025, p. 363; Aurangzeb 2025, 12 January; Khan 2025, 4 March; State Bank of Pakistan 2025, 2 July]. Despite adjusting its forecast for Pakistan’s gross domestic product growth from 3.2% to 3% for 2025, the IMF anticipated that the country would reach 4% by 2026 [Express Tribune 2025, 18 January].

Pakistan has embarked on efforts to stabilise and revitalise its economy. Recent measures include large-scale support from the World Bank, the IMF, and the International Finance Corporation, as well as the launch of a plan to promote reforms, attract investment, and achieve sustainable, export-oriented growth. The World Bank approved a US$ 20 billion, 10-year lending package to support the country’s economic reforms and stabilise its economy by addressing various development challenges, including malnutrition, inadequate education quality, and insufficient climate change resilience [White 2025, January 15]. This initiative complements the US$ 7 billion IMF bailout that had commenced in July 2024 with a focus on economic reforms, including broadening the tax base and eliminating preferential investment incentives [Corsi 2025, pp. 334-344]. The International Finance Corporation also increased its investments, namely in large-scale infrastructure projects, up to US$ 2 billion annually in value over the next decade [Shahid 2025, 14 February; Shahid 2025, 17 February].

In December 2024, Pakistan introduced the «Uraan Pakistan» Five-Year Transformation Plan, a locally developed economic revival programme aimed at revitalising the economy.1 The plan seeks to position Pakistan as a US$ 1 trillion economy by 2035, reducing its reliance on external support and promoting sustainable economic growth. It centres on key reforms, including improved tax collection, export-driven expansion, the use of technology and renewable energy for diversification, and greater investment in human capital [Khan 2025, 17 March].

Despite concerted efforts to revitalise the Pakistani economy, achieving sustainable growth remains a complex task. Recent IMF infusions primarily drove stabilisation; thus, they did not indicate reduced economic vulnerability, as evidenced by Pakistan’s external debt repayments exceeding US$ 22 billion in fiscal year 2025 [Reuters 2025, 7 February].

In June 2025, Pakistan unveiled a US$ 62 billion federal budget for fiscal year 2025-26, which cut overall spending by about 7% from the previous year [AP News 2025, 11 June; Shah & Shahzad 2025, 10 June]. Still, the defence allocation increased by roughly 20% to about US$ 9 billion amid mounting tensions with India, bolstering Pakistan’s conventional deterrence and rapidresponse capacity. In comparison, the federal public-sector development budget retained only approximately US$ 3.5 billion to fund infrastructure, education, and health projects. This gap underscored the need to maintain critical investment while managing ongoing economic priorities amid geopolitical uncertainty, all while reassuring multilateral lenders of the country’s commitment to fiscal discipline [Khan 2025, 2 June; Dilawar 2025, 10 June].

5. Foreign affairs: momentum amid tensions in South Asia

5.1. US cooperation with Pakistan in the era of the «America First» doctrine

Under the administration of former US President Joe Biden, relations with Pakistan were primarily centred on Afghanistan and broader regional stability in the aftermath of the 2021 troop withdrawal. Counterterrorism cooperation was initiated and involved intelligence-sharing activities [Government of the United States, U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Pakistan 2023, 7 March; Corsi 2024, pp. 347-348 & 365].

In January 2025, newly elected US President Trump issued Executive Order 14169, titled «Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid», which mandated an initial 90-day suspension of all US foreign development assistance programmes to conduct a comprehensive review in pursuit of reduced global aid spending [White House 2025, 20 January]. The formal cancellation of aid packages that followed – part of President Trump’s broader «America First» doctrine, purportedly aimed at prioritising US interests over long-standing international commitments – affected US$ 845 million in key projects of the United States Agency for International Development in Pakistan [Riaz 2025, 23 January; Syed 2025a, 4 February; Seddon 2025, 5 February]. All US-funded development initiatives in Pakistan came to a halt, impacting the health, education, energy, agriculture, governance, and humanitarian sectors [Syed 2025b, 4 February].

In his speech to a joint session of Congress on 4 March 2025, President Trump addressed US-Pakistan relations [White House 2025, 4 March; Khan 2025, 19 March]. His remarks on global security stood out, particularly his acknowledgement of Pakistan’s role in counterterrorism efforts. He credited Pakistan for assisting in the arrest of Islamic State-Khorasan Province commander Mohammad Sharifullah, accused of involvement in the August 2021 attack near the Kabul airport that killed approximately 170 Afghan civilians and 13 US soldiers [United States Department of Defense 2024, 15 April]. That arrest operation underscored ongoing counterterrorism cooperation between Washington and Islamabad, including Washington’s agreement to a US$ 397 million payment to Pakistan for F-16 aircraft maintenance, signalling the possibility of renewed military collaboration [Yousaf 2025, 1 March; Siddique 2025, 5 March; Express Tribune 2025, 9 March].

In their first official discussion in April, Pakistani Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio addressed the need to strengthen counterterrorism collaboration. Secretary Rubio also expressed interest in expanding bilateral cooperation to include trade, investment, and access to critical minerals. In response, Minister Dar highlighted the need to address Pakistan’s concerns about US tariffs on Pakistani exports [News 2025, 7 April]. This issue stemmed from the US’s announcement of new reciprocal tariffs and the significant financial pressure that Pakistan faced after the initial steep 29% levy imposed by President Trump on 2 April 2025 [White House 2025, 2 April]. Recognising the potential damage to its key export sectors, especially textiles and garments, and the exacerbation of its economic struggles, Pakistan swiftly adopted a diplomatic approach. The government of Pakistan reached out to US officials, emphasising the need for equitable treatment, and dispatched a high-level delegation to Washington to identify a resolution. The 90-day pause in tariff enforcement granted by the Trump administration in April 2025 provided Pakistan with the opportunity to engage in dialogue and mitigate the economic fallout [Rana 2025, 6 April; Express Tribune 2025, 9 April]. The government’s outreach centred on a pledge to increase imports from the US and signalled an intention to explore potential adjustments [ProPakistani 2025, 8 April; News 2025, 10 April]. On 13 April 2025, Pakistan and the US reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening strategic relations during a visit by a US congressional delegation to Islamabad. In a meeting with Pakistan’s Minister for Planning, Development, and Special Initiatives, Ahsan Iqbal, discussions focused on fostering cooperation across technology, climate resilience, and education [Express Tribune 2025, 13 April].

In July 2025, the US and Pakistan finalised a trade and energy agreement that reshaped bilateral relations. This deal reduced US tariffs on Pakistani exports to 19%, in return for which Islamabad offered zero-tariff concessions for American imports, including the rollback of a 5% digital services tax and eased access for US firms. The «historic» agreement, as described by President Donald Trump, established new frameworks for cooperation in mining, information technology, and the exploration of Pakistan’s newly confirmed oil reserves in Baluchistan [Shahid et al. 2025, 31 July]. Critical minerals, which are essential to the development of various technologies (e.g., batteries, semiconductors), were included as a crucial element of the bilateral framework. Pakistan has untapped deposits of antimony, cobalt, nickel, and copper (also in Baluchistan), resources that Islamabad has utilised to attract foreign investment. In September 2025, US Strategic Metals (USSM), an American firm that specialises in producing and recycling critical minerals, signed a memorandum of understanding on a US$ 500 million investment with Pakistan’s Frontier Works Organization, a science and technology branch of the Pakistani military [Hussain & Dar 2025, 5 September; U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Pakistan 2025, 8 September].

The accord positions Pakistan as a prospective partner for Washington in mitigating China’s growing influence, while offering Islamabad options beyond the China-centric CPEC development framework [Urva 2025, 10 August]. However, experts have questioned the feasibility of this plan due to the speculative nature of Pakistan’s oil reserves, which have little evidence of commercially viable quantities, the security concerns in Baluchistan, and the region’s persistent infrastructural and institutional weaknesses [Ellis-Petersen & Baloch 2025, 27 September]. Beyond economic uncertainty, the deal carries certain political risks. Washington engaged directly with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir while avoiding public criticism of Pakistan’s increasingly authoritarian tendencies or the potentially destabilising long-term effects of the erosion of its civil institutions [Peltier 2025, 13 August; Andreopoulos 2025, 3 September].

5.2. The armed conflict between Pakistan and India

A terrorist attack took place in Pahalgam – in Indian-administered Kashmir – on 22 April 2025, killing 26 tourists and kickstarting a crisis with India [Sharp 2025, 22 April]. New Delhi attributed the attack to Pakistan-based militants, namely Lashkar-e-Taiba, through an affiliate group; in response to the attack, India expelled Pakistani diplomats, withdrew its diplomatic representatives from Islamabad, and shut the Attari-Wagah border crossing. Pakistani nationals were prompted to leave India by 27 April 2025, and all visa services for Pakistani citizens were halted. New Delhi also suspended the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, a water-sharing agreement with Pakistan that governs the allocation of water from the Indus River between the two countries. Citing national security concerns, India initiated the construction of diversion canals and hydropower projects on the Chenab, Jhelum, and Indus rivers to maximise its upstream water-use rights. The suspension, which harmed Pakistan’s economy and posed a risk to its national food security, heightened the risk of an escalation [Kugelman 2015, 29 June].

Pakistan rejected any notion that it played any role in the attack and condemned the suspension of the Indus Water Treaty, arguing that the suspension constituted a breach of international law aimed at weaponising water against a downstream country heavily reliant on these water resources. Islamabad sought to internationalise the issue, pursue arbitration under the World Bank’s oversight mechanisms and, simultaneously, fast-track dam construction in Gilgit-Baltistan. In retaliation for India’s measures, Pakistan suspended the 1972 Shimla Agreement signed after the 1971 war with New Delhi, which established the Line of Control (LoC) as both the military boundary between Indian- and Pakistani-administered Jammu and Kashmir and the de facto frontier in the disputed region. Pakistan also closed its airspace and trade routes to India, expelled Indian diplomats, and halted visa services for Indian citizens [Dhillon & Janjua 2025, 24 April; Economic Times 2025, 24 April; Samaa TV 2025, 24 April; Shahzad et al. 2025, 24 April; Khuldune 2025, 29 April; Indian Express 2025, 20 August; Mint 2025, 22 August; Travel and Tour World 2025, 24 August].

Tensions escalated following clashes along the LoC in Kashmir, and, on 7 May 2025, New Delhi launched Operation Sindoor, a long-range missile, drone, and artillery attack targeting sites of alleged terrorist infrastructure. Pakistan denounced the Indian strikes as an act of war, reporting that civilian facilities had been hit, incurring at least 26 civilian casualties [Iyengar & Haltiwanger 2025, 8 May]. It then staged shelling across the disputed border in Kashmir and claimed that it had downed five Indian jets and drones [Singh 2025, 27 April; Hussain et al. 2025, 7 May].

Global discourse rapidly centred on the need for international mediation [News 2025, 30 April]. The US urged restraint and sought de-escalation but seemed ambivalent about offering direct mediation [Roy 2025, 24 April; NDTV 2025, 26 April; Singh & Ismail 2025, 30 April; News 2025, 1 May; Shalvey et al. 2025, 7 May]. However, on 10 May 2025, the fourth day of the conflict – marked by missile strikes, drone incursions, and aerial combat – India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire [Vats 2025, 30 May]. Unexpectedly, President Trump announced a truce, with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stating that he and Vice President JD Vance had contacted high-level officials from both countries, including their prime ministers, over the preceding two days [Rehman et al. 2025, 10 May].

Following the cessation of hostilities, New Delhi and Islamabad accused each other of violating the agreement and announced that they had prevailed in the conflict. While India validated the neutralisation of military targets across the LoC, Pakistan celebrated their military defence system, which protected its territorial integrity and deterred escalation while retaining access to international diplomatic support. Pakistan’s military, especially Army Chief Asim Munir, received a public relations boost; the episode was widely seen as a demonstration of both national resilience and military capacity. Munir’s image as a leader was then bolstered by his promotion to field marshal on 20 May 2025. Pakistan undoubtedly benefited geo-strategically from US involvement. The Trump administration called for a resolution to the Kashmir dispute and resolved to internationalise an issue that the Pakistani military establishment had long championed. This marked a rare diplomatic victory for Islamabad, most notably a shift in focus from accusations of Pakistan-backed terrorism to concerns about nuclear escalation [Kugelman 2025, 21 May].

Pakistan dispatched two high-level delegations – one led by Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari, member of the National Assembly and son of late former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and President Asif Ali Zardari, and another by high-level diplomat Syed Tariq Fatemi – to Washington, New York, London, and Brussels in an effort to counter India’s narrative and accusations of Pakistan sponsoring terrorism [Klein 2025, 10 June; Economic Times 2025, 11 June]. The delegations engaged with lawmakers, institutions, think tanks, media outlets, diaspora groups, and UN officials to garner support for neutral mediation and an international investigation, showcasing Pakistan’s commitment to ceasefire and dialogue, particularly on Jammu and Kashmir and the suspended Indus Waters Treaty [Reed 2025, 11 June]. The visits reflected Islamabad’s pursuit of a high-level public diplomacy strategy aimed at shaping international perceptions by presenting itself as an actor committed to de-escalation and dialogue. This approach succeeded in securing public calls for peace from the European Union and the US.

5.3. Tensions between Islamabad and Kabul

Since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan have become increasingly strained, with rising cross-border hostilities and military operations conducted by Islamabad on Afghan soil, triggered by the Taliban’s reluctance to curb anti-Pakistan militants [Corsi 2025, pp. 346-347]. On 21 February 2025, the Torkham border crossing – a vital conduit for bilateral trade and transit – was closed by Pakistan due to a dispute over Taliban construction activities near the border. On 23 March 2025, tensions escalated when Pakistani and Afghan forces exchanged fire across the border [Al Jazeera 2025, 3 March; Al Jazeera, 22 January; Bariz 2025, 19 April]. Diplomatic channels remained active despite the ongoing tensions. Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar visited Kabul, and both countries pledged to cooperate on security, trade, transportation, and connectivity [Fazlullah 2025, 17 March]. Progress was made in the easing of bilateral tensions through diplomatic outreach and economic cooperation. The reopening of the Torkham border crossing in March 2025 marked a significant turning point, facilitating the resumption of trade and transit flows following a period of disruption [AP News 2025, 19 March]. High-level talks followed, centred on reviving the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement and enhancing connectivity by launching a feasibility study for the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan railway corridor, on which officials signed a tripartite framework agreement in Kabul in July 2025 [Saidov 2025, 17 July]. By mid-2025, bilateral trade had reached nearly US$ 1 billion in value, and Pakistan had established itself as a major supplier of industrial and food products to Afghanistan [Yousafzai 2025, 15 July].

Despite improvements in the trade ties between them, border violence escalated again in mid-October 2025 after Afghan Taliban troops fired on Pakistani posts in retaliation for Pakistani airstrikes launched into Afghan territory in September 2025. In response, Pakistan used artillery to destroy several Afghan border positions and, once again, closed all major crossings. Islamabad acknowledged having suffered 23 losses from the attack and claimed to have killed many militants in response. Both sides blamed each other: Pakistan accused Afghanistan of harbouring anti-state militants, while Afghanistan protested the violations of its airspace and territory [Arab News PK 2025, 12 October; Khan 2025, 12 October; Latif 2025, 12 October; Rehman et al. 2025, 12 October].

A fragile ceasefire mediated by Qatar and Turkey was brokered in Doha on 19 October 2025, thereby laying the foundation for the internationalisation of bilateral discussions. The agreement included pledges to stop supporting hostile groups, refrain from attacking civilians, and establish monitoring mechanisms [Shahzad et al. 2025, 18 October; Jilani 2025, 19 October; Regencia 2025, 19 October]. Peace talks were conducted in Istanbul in October and November 2025 between Pakistan and Afghanistan’s Taliban government, but failed to produce a workable solution [Khan 2025, 30 October]. Pakistani Information Minister Attaullah Tarar accused the Taliban of deflecting responsibility over cross-border terrorism [News 2025, 29 October]. These clashes along the border undoubtedly impacted bilateral trade, with the closure of major border crossings disrupting supply chains and halting transit trade. For Pakistan, border instability not only undermined the economy but also complicated Islamabad’s aspirations to become a significant transit hub following regional trade integration through initiatives like the CPEC, the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India natural gas pipeline, and the Central Asia-South Asia electricity transmission project (CASA-1000) [Afridi 2025, 19 October; Akhter 2025, 19 October].

Meanwhile, Islamabad was hit by a deadly attack on 11 November 2025 when a suicide bomber detonated himself near a district court complex, killing 12 people and injuring almost 30 others. The Taliban, which had previously threatened to attack Islamabad in retaliation for the airstrikes, was blamed by the Pakistani military as the culprit for the attack despite a TTP-affiliate militant group claiming responsibility [Ahmed & Mahsud 2025, 12 November; Shah & Shahzad 2025, 12 November].

5.4. Pakistan’s strengthened ties across Asia and the Middle East

Pakistan’s relationship with Bangladesh – historically strained due to the legacy of the 1971 independence war – has improved in recent years. In September 2024, Dhaka and Islamabad resumed high-level diplomacy when Muhammad Yunus, head of Bangladesh’s interim government, met with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif in New York, where they emphasised the importance of strengthening bilateral relations. Soon after the meeting, direct trade resumed, and various restrictions (e.g., stringent cargo inspections, visa requirements) were lifted [Moinuddin 2024, 26 September; Profit 2024, 15 November; Hasnain 2025, 12 January]. Pakistan and Bangladesh have also begun coordinating defence and intelligence exchanges, including visits by military delegations [Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2025, 12 January; Hassan 2025, 13 January; AP News 2025, 14 January; Malik 2025, 15 January; Hassan 2025, 3 February]. On 24 August 2025, Ishaq Dar’s visit to Dhaka pointed to efforts to shift strategic relations toward commercial cooperation and increased exchanges [Kugelman 2025, 27 August].

Pakistan-Sri Lanka relations remained warm and cooperative. At the February 2025 World Governments Summit in Dubai, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Sri Lankan President Anura Kumara Dissanayake agreed to deepen high-level exchanges in trade, defence, education, tourism, and sports [Radio Pakistan 2025, 11 February]. In April 2025, Islamabad hosted the fifth round of the Pakistan-Sri Lanka Armed Forces Defence Dialogue, during which the two sides reaffirmed strong collaboration across security domains, with defence training and military cooperation set to continue under long-standing partnerships [Government of Pakistan, Press Information Department 2025, 30 April].

Energy-deficient Pakistan has also recently expressed interest in deepening its ties and connectivity links with gas-rich Central Asian states [Corsi 2024, p. 366; Abdullaev 2024, 31 December]. These links include the above-mentioned transnational rail project connecting Pakistan to Uzbekistan via Afghanistan, with construction expected to begin soon [Afghanistan International 2025, 5 February]. Geopolitical factors have also underpinned Pakistan’s push into Central Asia, which limits India’s ability to secure direct land access and transit trade with the region. Accordingly, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif visited Azerbaijan in February 2025, meeting with President Ilham Aliyev and finalising accords in trade, energy, and connectivity. The subsequent visit of Sharif to Uzbekistan resulted in an additional trade deal [Abdullaev 2024, 31 December; Zaman 2025, 24 February; Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2025, 25 February; Dawn 2025, 26 February].

In September 2025, Pakistan signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia, marking a significant moment in its external relations. The pact stated that an attack on one would be considered an attack on both, placing Pakistan at the heart of a security arrangement that extended into the Gulf. While the two countries had been cooperating for several decades, this step formalised the partnership and gave Islamabad a stronger role in regional security affairs [Markey 2025, 23 September]. For Pakistan, the agreement reinforced its position as a partner actively sought out for defence cooperation, not only within South Asia but globally. The arrangement also laid avenues for closer military collaboration and deepened a relationship that had historically combined defence, political, and financial ties [Zeb 2025, 18 September]. References to Pakistan’s nuclear capability added dimension to the agreement, with Pakistani officials portraying the deterrent as linked to broader security cooperation [Varvelli 2025, 20 September; White 2025, 24 September; Waseem 2025, 25 September].

6. Conclusions

In 2025, Pakistan faced substantial internal political and security challenges while pursuing a policy agenda heavily focused on external relations. Politics were tense, carefully managed by the Sharif administration, leaving limited room for competitive political expression capable of challenging the governing authorities. Attempts at dialogue with the opposition were ongoing throughout the year, but mistrust among key actors meant that hopes for a more inclusive political environment could only advance slowly. The ongoing detention of Imran Khan and the PTI’s constrained status only reinforced this atmosphere of political friction. The emergence of the TTAP alliance further highlighted concerns over constitutional governance and the evolving balance between civilian authority and military influence.

Security developments continued to test the state. Militant violence intensified in Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, showcasing the ability of the BLA and TTP to disrupt internal stability and put sustained pressure on security institutions.

Economically, stabilisation efforts offered some relief by moderating inflation and securing external financial support. Nonetheless, Pakistan’s reliance on international partners to steady its economy underscored not only the country’s resilience but also its vulnerability. High external debt repayments, restricted fiscal space, and long-standing structural constraints remained central challenges. The fiscal year 2025-26 budget reflected these tensions, reducing development spending while raising defence allocations amid heightened regional tensions.

Foreign policy was the country’s most dynamic and outward-facing dimension in 2025. The government prioritised pragmatic diplomacy, seeking to maintain constructive relations with major partners, including the United States and Gulf states. Its confrontation with India illustrated the volatility of the regional environment and reaffirmed the importance of external mediation, particularly from Washington. Relations with Afghanistan deteriorated markedly, with border clashes and airstrikes giving way to an unpredictable security context despite intermittent diplomacy and a brief ceasefire. Meanwhile, new economic and security agreements – particularly those with the United States and Saudi Arabia – reflected Islamabad’s efforts to diversify its strategic options and bolster its international position.

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ISSN 2385-2526

The most momentous event that happened in Nepal during 2024-2025 was the youth protest and the violence that followed on 8-9 September 2025. The spark for the protest was the government ban on several social media platforms that had denied registering with Nepal’s competent authority. But the undercurrents were mass discontent and frustrations with the major political parties for their self-centric behaviours that had resulted in the lack of effective governance and service delivery. Earlier issues of this Journal have explained this dynamic in Nepal until 2023. This article covers the period 2024 and 2025, examining the turn of events in Nepal’s domestic politics, economics and international relations. This, besides providing an overview of the country’s major developments in those two years, also helps readers understand whether some of those events also fuelled the youth movement and how the movement shaped some of the long-overdue political changes.

Keywords – Nepal; political change; economic challenges; Gen-Z movement; international relations

1. Introduction

This article discusses Nepal’s major developments in 2024 and 2025, aligning with the aim and objectives of the current issue of this Journal. It explores issues in domestic politics, economics and international relations particularly in the context of the September 2025 youth movement in Nepal.

In September 2025, Nepal made global headlines. The reason was the fateful turn of events on 8 and 9 September sparked by a youth protest movement termed the Gen-Z protest. The protest, which started peacefully on 8 September, soon turned violent when the protestors attempted to storm the country’s Parliament building. The police shooting that followed resulted in the immediate loss of 19 young lives and several injuries within a span of a few hours. This caused a massive outrage on the streets the same day and the next.

On 9 September, residences of several political leaders, irrespective of their parties’ participation in the then coalition government, were set on fire. These included the houses of the three senior-most leaders, Sher Bahadur Deuba of the Nepali Congress, Pushpa Kamal Dahal (more popularly known as Prachanda) of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre), and K P Sharma Oli of the Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist and Leninist (CPN-UML), who was also the then-sitting Prime Minister. Sher Bahadur Deuba, a five-time ex-Prime Minister, and his wife Arzu Rana Deuba, the then-sitting Foreign Minister, were physically assaulted in their residences and had to be rescued before their house was set ablaze. The Prime Minister and his cabinet subsequently resigned and were rescued by the Nepal Army.

The assaults, however, were not limited to political leaders and their properties. There were arsons and lootings on several business people’s residences and business establishments. The most egregious of all were instances of arson on vital state institutions, including the central secretariat building (Singha Durbar), the Supreme Court, the Parliament building, and the office and official residence of the President. Seventy-six people (including three police personnel) lost their lives, and 2,522 people (including several security personnel) were injured in the two-day violence.

Perhaps it will be unfair to attribute the vandalism, riots and arson of 8 and 9 September to all the organizers of the Gen-Z protest. There are strong possibilities of infiltration, and some individuals and organizations might have used it as an opportunity to create mayhem to fulfil their vested interests. Nonetheless, the protest on 8 September provided the backdrop to what followed. Therefore, the fundamental question is, what caused the youth to take to the streets on 8 September?

The main reason was the ban on 26 social media platforms that had defied the Government of Nepal’s order to register with the communication ministry. But it was «only a spark in the pent-up frustration with corruption, bad governance, political instability, nepotism, unemployment and other problems in the country».1

Nepali people’s frustrations with and anger against the political leaders, particularly Deuba, Oli and Prachanda, was abundant on social media platforms. Occasionally, people had also resorted to sloganeering against them during public events [Bam 2024, 6 November; Karki 2024, 20 September; Republica 2023, 21 March].

The student protest, bloodshed and the fall of the Sheikh Hasina regime in Bangladesh in July 2024 should have been a wake-up call to Nepal’s political leaders. There had been assessments in Nepal that people’s rising frustrations could pose serious challenges to the country [Poudel 2024, 1 September]. Experts and some political leaders had been wary of people’s growing discontent [The Kathmandu Post 2025, 16 April]. But the senior leaders were under the illusion that the situation was under their effective control.

The decades of hard struggles of Nepal’s senior political leaders to achieve democracy in the country and their resolve and ability to address several challenging problems in unison should not be discounted [Thapa and Sharma 2009]. The country has also achieved progress in several socio-economic areas over the years [Hatlebakk 2017]. Nevertheless, political instability, elite capture of state institutions, corruption and lack of good governance are some of the factors that have overshadowed the leaders’ earlier contributions and the country’s progress, and fuelled people’s discontent.

As analysed in further detail in Section 2 under «Domestic Politics», collusions and divisions among the three septuagenarian leaders fomenting political instability had antagonised the Nepali people. Adding to this were cronyism and corruption scandals that made news headlines frequently. The youth movement dismantled several aspects of Nepal’s politics for the better, but at a high cost.

There were also some socio-economic factors that aided the emergence of the movement, which I discuss in Section 3. Although the country’s macro-economic fundamentals appeared strong enough with adequate foreign exchange reserves and low inflation, there was subdued economic growth and lack of employment opportunities. The building of foreign exchange reserves was a result of the remittances that Nepali migrant workers abroad sent home routinely. The narrative that Nepal’s political class enjoys life at home exporting the country’s youth had been firmly established.

While Nepal’s Gen-Z movement appears very much as a spontaneous revolt by the youth, K P Oli has also claimed that external forces were at play in the movement, but without concrete evidence [Khabarhub 2025, 15 October]. What could be true, however, is that the dislodgement of Nepal’s government under K P Oli might have been received positively by the external actors who had a longstanding antagonistic relationship with Oli.

I analyse Nepal’s foreign relations in 2024-2025 in Section 4, not from the perspective of the youth movement per se, but because the topic is important and deserves space in a review article of this nature. The three countries that are strategically the most important for Nepal are India, China and the United States. Hence, I review Nepal’s relations with these three countries.

As a review article covering Nepal’s contemporary developments in 2024-2025, the article largely relies on materials published in Nepal’s established media outlets although it also draws from academic and other sources where available.

2. Domestic Politics

One word that would describe Nepal’s domestic political scene during 2024-2025 is instability. There were frequent government changes, building of unholy coalitions and squabbles within the political parties. These were accompanied by several allegations of corruption. There were also unsuccessful attempts at restoring the monarchy and Nepal’s recognition of a Hindu state. Senior political leaders had been warned time and again, including by leaders within the political parties, of the storm that was in the making due to poor governance and service delivery. Efforts to compel the senior leaders to mend their ways had been routinely unsuccessful. The country had to wait for a violent Gen-Z movement to instigate the changes. I elaborate these developments in the following sections.

2.1. Business-as-usual politics

Before the Gen-Z movement, Nepal held its last general elections in November 2022. In the three years since then, there were four government changes. The first two were headed by Prachanda of the CPN (Maoist Centre) by shifting alliances, first with the Nepali Congress and then with the CPN(UML). Despite being the leader of the third largest party in the lower house of parliament, Prachanda was able to retain his Prime Ministerial berth with the «magic number», as he used to say with pride, he had in the lower house [Nepal Views 2024, 16 November].

Then, in July 2024, Deuba and Oli ditched Prachanda to forge a «grand coalition» between the Nepali Congress and the CPN(UML). A coalition of the two largest parties that were the main rivals in Nepali politics was unusual. The understanding between Oli and Deuba was that the former would become the Prime Minister for the first two years after which Deuba would take charge. For the Nepali people, such unholy coalitions, bereft of ideologies, were nothing more than the leaders’ efforts to consolidate power that they had been accustomed to for decades.

Deuba became a member of parliament for the first time in 1991 and was appointed Minister of Home Affairs [Deuba 2026]. He became the Prime Minister for the first time in 1995. Subsequently, he held the Prime Minister’s position four more times, the latest in 2021 [Aljazeera 2021, 13 July]. Had the 8-9 September 2025 event not taken place and Deuba had become the Prime Minister again as per his agreement with Oli, it would have been his 6th premiership.

Similarly, Oli first became a minister (also Home Affairs) in 1994, Deputy Prime Minister in 2006, and Prime Minister in 2015. In between 2015 and 2025, he held the Prime Ministerial berth four times, albeit for short periods in each term, as in the case of Deuba, because of the making and breaking of coalitions.

Regarding Prachanda, after the end of the 10-year Maoist insurgency that he had spearheaded, he became the Prime Minister for the first time when his party, the CPN (Maoist), became the largest party in the first Constituent Assembly elections in 2008. He again took that role in 2016 and 2022.

The three leaders had also been their respective party’s top brass for a very long time, indulging in all sorts of strategies to retain their leadership positions. Therefore, these three leaders’ grip on power, forging of unethical alliances, and political instability during the past 2 to 3 decades had utterly frustrated the Nepali people. This was reinforced by constantly changing coalitions and political instability, including at the provincial levels, which continued in 2024-2025 [Tiwari 2024, 23 January; Gautam & Shah 2024, 5 April].

Power consolidation by a few leaders, reinforced by a small group of cronies, distanced the leaders away from the general people and the real problems on the ground. The senior leaders resorted to the use of different strategies to hold on to power, thus rendering challenges to them from within their parties unsuccessful. For instance, in the CPN(UML), Bidhya Devi Bhandari, who used to be a CPN(UML) leader before serving as the country’s president for two full terms from 2015 to 2023, made efforts to return to her previous party a few years after completing her terms as the country’s president. This was driven by her desire to replace Oli and become the CPN(UML) chair. But considering the threat to his leadership, Oli applied all strategies to keep her from re-joining the party.

If the party’s statute was to be followed through, Oli would not consider Bhandari as his threat because, as per the statute, he would have to step down as the party chair soon after completing two terms in that role and crossing the age of 70. However, he had something else in the plan. In the party’s statute convention held in September 2025, right before the Gen-Z protest, he managed to garner enough support in the party to amend the statute and remove the provisions on two-term limits and the retirement age of 70. In the party convention held in December 2025, he re-emerged as the party chair once again, for a third term. This was broadly construed as the CPN(UML) ignoring the Gen-Z movement and its implicit calls for retirement of the old guard.

Bidhya Bhandari’s desire to return to active party politics was not welcomed by a large section of the Nepali people. As the country’s president, she had been the ceremonial head of the state and everyone’s guardian. At the same time, Oli’s strategy of consolidating power was also resented by many. Perhaps Oli honouring the party’s statute and effecting a leadership transition faithfully rather than strategizing to consolidate power might have discouraged the ex-president too from desiring to re-enter active politics.

Although a former president failed to re-enter party politics despite her desire and efforts, a former vice president made it through. Nanda Kishore Pun, vice president of Nepal from 2015 to 2022, was a leader of the CPN (Maoist) before his appointment as the country’s vice president. After the completion of his second term in 2022, he started engaging with his previous party informally in the beginning and was appointed the party’s vice chair in April 2025 [Nepal News 2025, 6 April]. This was not unconstitutional, but it was unethical. Activities such as these of the political party leaders had enraged the people.

Sensing people’s disenchantment with the political parties that had abolished the monarchy in Nepal, pro-monarchy forces attempted to regain their foothold with the aim of re-establishing the monarchy and a Hindu state. Efforts towards this had gained momentum after the former King, Gyanendra Shah, made an appeal in February 2025, although implicitly, for the same [P. Sharma 2025, 15 May]. The demonstration that was organized in March 2025 in response to the appeal turned violent and claimed two lives, including that of a journalist. However, the movement since then has remained weak, partly because of the feuds within and between the political parties and individuals that have spearheaded efforts for the restoration of the monarchy.

Nepali people’s frustration with the established old parties was rather capitalised by the newer parties that had appeared on the country’s political scene. The Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) in particular, that was established in 2022, had gained unprecedented ground in no time. However, the newer parties were also mired in problems and controversies since their emergence, which continued in 2024-2025.

The RSP, which had emerged as the fourth largest national party in the 2022 elections immediately after its establishment, expelled its General Secretary and Spokesperson, who was a prominent founding member of the party with immense influence, in August 2024 [The Kathmandu Post 2024, 27 August]. He was alleged to have publicised a report that he had authored by collecting people’s feedback in several places across the country before discussing it in the party. The report had highlighted the party’s weaknesses and its challenges, implicating several leaders, including the party chairman.

As if the intra-party intrigues within the RSP were not enough, the RSP Chairman, Rabi Lamichhane, was arrested in a cooperative fraud case in May 2024. This had followed the report of a probe committee consisting of members of parliament representing the four largest parties. The committee was formed to investigate the case after continuous obstructions of house proceedings by the opposition, Nepali Congress, for more than a month while Lamichhane was Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister in a coalition government [Giri 2024, 29 May]. The committee had found Lamichhane’s indirect involvement in the case. After the formation of a new coalition government in August 2024, a court case was filed against Lamichhane based on the committee report and further investigations by the police.

The case involved cooperative organizations based in several districts, and therefore Lamichhane faced trials in different district courts. Upon preliminary hearings in the case, the courts could not ascertain his innocence. Until they reached a final decision, which would take time, some of the district courts freed him on bail while the others sent him to custody. The Supreme Court also backed the lower courts’ rulings of keeping him behind bars until the final verdict [Khabarhub 2025, 24 May].

A significant amount of other RSP leaders’ time went into defending Lamichhane and engaging in several activities calling for his release. They were even alleged to have engaged in contempt of the court [The Kathmandu Post 2024, 13 November]. The RSP, organizing a signature campaign to demonstrate people’s support for Lamichhane, perhaps with an intent to influence the court’s decision, showed an act of desperation [The Kathmandu Post 2025, 22 July]. The RSP came under even sharper scrutiny when, amidst the Gen-Z protest, Lamichhane was broken free from jail by his supporters. This prompted several jailbreaks and the fleeing of thousands of inmates across the country [Republica 2025, 10 September].

Lamichhane’s arrest and his jailbreak dented his and the RSP’s image to some extent but not substantially. A large section of the people believed that Lamichhane’s arrest had been framed by the older parties. An important factor that gave Lamichhane and the RSP an edge over the older parties involved the various corruption scandals that were tagged with the older parties and their leaders.

2.2. Corruption scandals

Besides several petty-level instances of corruption, a few high-profile corruption cases emerged in 2024-2025. Prime Minister K P Oli had earlier made some amendments in the Lands Act in favour of a large tea estate, which the Supreme Court in February 2024 annulled, ruling it as against the law [Sah 2024, 8 February]. The Oli government’s action of making the amendments in the Lands Act in favour of a company was interpreted as an act of corruption [K.C. 2024, 22 May].

Then, on 5 June 2025, the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) filed a corruption case against a former Prime Minister, Madhav Kumar Nepal, again in a case related to land dealings [Baral 2025, 10 June]. He was charged with approving the sale of land by a private company against prevailing law.2 The same month, police arrested Bechan Jha, a prime suspect in the Bhutanese refugee scam, in which several high-profile arrests, including that of a former Minister, had been made in 2023 [Setopati 2024, 18 August]. Arzu Rana Deuba too was alleged to have been involved in this scam, but legal proceedings against her were not made due to the lack of evidence as reported. The arson at her residence on 9 September 2025 destroyed a large amount of cash, it was alleged, and visuals of this went viral on social media, strengthening people’s perceptions of her corrupt practices [Dahal & Dudraj 2025, 28 September].

Another major corruption case that surfaced in 2025 was the one involving Nepali immigration officials. They were found to be extorting money from ordinary people and sending them for jobs abroad on short-term temporary visas. The Home Minister, Ramesh Lekhak of the Nepali Congress party, was also alleged to have been involved in this graft. The opposition obstructed the house, calling for his resignation and investigating him in the case [Giri 2025, 27 May]. While the immigration officials were arrested, the CIAA was said to have not found evidence against Lekhak to indict him. But in May 2025, the CIAA filed a corruption case against a former minister and lawmaker from the Nepali Congress party, Mohan Basnet, and 15 other individuals and two companies in the purchase of the Telecommunications Traffic Monitoring and Fraud Control System (Teramocs) by the Nepal Telecommunications Authority [The Kathmandu Post 2025, 15 May].

After the formation of the interim government by the post-Gen-Z movement in September 2025, the CIAA appeared to be more active in investigating and charging high profile individuals in different corruption cases. In October, it filed a charge against a former Speaker of the House, Krishna Bahadur Mahara, alleging his involvement in gold smuggling and organized crime [Bhandari 2025, 13 October]. Another case, which stands out in terms of the number of former ministers charged in a single case, is related to the construction of Pokhara Regional International Airport. Alleging involvement in collusion to inflate the costs of airport construction, breaching procurement laws and compromising construction quality, the CIAA filed a corruption case against 55 senior officials, including five former ministers (one of whom is already deceased), and the contractor, China CMAC Engineering, in December 2025 [Bhandari 2025, 16 December].

Allegations of corruption against K P Oli and his party, CPN(UML), also surfaced when Min Bahadur Gurung, owner of the Bhatbhateni Supermarket chain, donated a large tract of land and committed to constructing the CPN(UML)’s office building at his personal expense. Several leaders of the CPN(UML) were unaware of this and came to know about it only when Oli and Gurung together laid the foundation stone of the building. Accepting such largesse from an individual businessman was severely condemned by the intelligentsia, media and even some of the CPN(UML) leaders [Poudel 2024, 16 October]. This became such a scandalous topic that on 9 September, protestors set ablaze and destroyed 12 stores and vandalised and looted nine others out of the total 28 Bhatbhateni stores throughout the country [Lamsal 2025, 18 September].

Therefore, in 2024-2025, corruption remained a major issue in Nepal, and the CIAA indicted several individuals, including high profile ones. It remains to be seen however, what the court decides in these different cases. The CIAA has often faced the wrath of favouring political leaders and turning a blind eye in many corruption cases against them. The CIAA also does not have a good track record of presenting strong evidence in court, resulting in a court ruling in favour of the accused [B. Sharma 2024, 14 January]. Whatever the legal outcomes of these high-profile corruption cases, they represent an important domestic political issue that has provided a fillip to a new political party.

2.3. Gen-Z protest instigated changes

Prior to the Gen-Z protest, some young leaders, particularly in the Nepali Congress and the CPN (Maoist Centre), had challenged Deuba and Prachanda, respectively, in internal party meetings and publicly, but they had not succeeded in enabling leadership transfer [Poudel 2024, 8 September; Rai 2025, 30 June]. The Gen-Z protest instigated changes in these parties, and in the CPN(UML), although in different ways.

Soon after the protests, Janardan Sharma, the Deputy General Secretary (DGS) of the CPN (Maoist Centre) asked Prachanda to resign as the party chair [Nepal News 2025, 16 September]. But he was unable to mobilise enough leaders to challenge Prachanda. As a result, Sharma himself resigned and joined another party. Prachanda, on the other hand, dismantled the party’s central committee and scrapped all positions, including his own as the party chair. But he alone remained at the helm as the coordinator [Khabarhub 2025, 26 September]. Later, in their pursuit of survival, nine smaller communist parties merged with the CPN (Maoist Centre) and formed a new party, the Nepali Communist Party, accepting Prachanda’s leadership [Reuters Connect 2025, 6 November].

In the CPN(UML) too, in the immediate aftermath of the Gen-Z movement, several party leaders suggested to Oli that he retire but to no avail [Karki 2025, 24 September]. Instead, Oli convened the party’s general convention and got re-elected as the chair. Instead of retiring, he further consolidated his hold on the party.

In the Nepali Congress party, a partner in the coalition government under Oli, the change was historic. And that was despite Deuba’s willingness. The relatively young party general secretaries and other cadres intervened in the party, and following due process organized and participated in the party’s special general convention. The convention elected one of the general secretaries, Gagan Thapa, an influential leader and Deuba’s longstanding challenger, as the party chair. The convention also made several changes in the party’s policies. It was a significant shift in the Nepali Congress party triggered mainly by the Gen-Z movement.

Another major change in Nepal’s political scene was the entry of Balendra Shah (Kathmandu’s independently elected mayor, popularly known as Balen) in the RSP as the party’s senior leader and the Prime Ministerial face in the general elections scheduled for 5 March 2026. Despite, or rather because of, the legal problems the RSP chair, Lamichhane, was embroiled in, RSP’s support base had expanded over the years. Balen also has a huge popular support base. Therefore, his membership in the RSP and projection as the future Prime Minister exerted a huge pressure on the erstwhile political parties.

Therefore, Nepal’s domestic political landscape of 2024-2025 can be described as one of rupture in a long-held business-as-usual politics. It is not that the coalition culture had all the pitfalls. Unlike in many other South Asian countries, coalition politics in Nepal was also the country’s strength in navigating several complexities. For example, the peace process in Nepal had remained incomplete mainly because the law on transitional justice had not been revised and made effective. This was rectified in August 2024 when the major political parties reached an understanding on revising it. Subsequently, the law was revised and endorsed [Ghimire 2024, 15 August]. Furthermore, there were concerns with the revisions not being conducive to conflict victims. Despite the revision of the law, transitional justice remains elusive in the country [Ghimire 2024, 19 September].

With the changes that have followed the Gen-Z movement, it remains to be seen how Nepal navigates the complex political realities, and what changes it will usher in the Nepali economy and society at large. Ultimately, once the political dust settles, people’s attention will immediately turn to socio-economic deliveries. And Nepal had a mixed performance on the socio-economic front in 2024-2025.

3. Economic performance

In the fiscal year (FY) 2023-2024, Nepal’s real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate was 3.67 per cent, a low figure for an economy with an already low GDP.3 The expected GDP growth in FY 2024-2025 was 4.61 per cent.4

The services sector occupies the largest share of Nepal’s GDP (around 60 per cent), followed by agriculture (around 25 per cent) and industry (around 15 per cent). Over the past few years, the share of services has been on an increasing trend and that of industry decreasing. This trend continued in FY 2023-2024 and FY 2024-2025 as well. The share of manufacturing (within industry) has hovered around a mere 5 per cent. In a country where unemployment has been one of the main reasons for the youths’ growing discontent and exodus, the underperformance of the manufacturing sector has been a major concern.

In the following sections, I analyse Nepal’s economic performance in 2024-2025 in two parts: 1) trade, investment and foreign reserves; and 2) economic challenges, attempted reforms and impacts of the Gen-Z movement.

3.1. Trade, investment and foreign reserves

Although agriculture contributes around a quarter of the GDP, and around 60 per cent of the Nepali people still depend on it for employment, the country lacks enough agriculture output to meet its domestic requirements. In addition, underperformance in the manufacturing sector has resulted in Nepal experiencing massive trade deficits, which continued in the past two years (see Table 1).

Nepal’s trade performance has seen fluctuations over the past few years, but it is mostly rising. The spike in its exports in FY 2024-2025 was significant. It was not, however, due to an enhancement of Nepal’s domestic economic strength. Rather, it was a result of a change in India’s import policy of some edible oil. When India imposed higher tariffs on imports of soybean and sunflower oil from other non-South Asian countries, Nepal benefited from the duty-free facility on these exports to India based on the Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA). Nepal imported the crude form of these oils from other countries, added some value in refinement and packaging and then exported them to India [P. Sharma 2025, 30 July].

Nepal’s rise in exports enabled by a change in India’s trade policy has raised questions on the sustainability of Nepal’s rising exports. Nepal also faced hurdles in exports of a few products such as cement, plywood and shoes, in which Nepal appears to have a competitive edge, to India in 2024 and 2025 [P. Sharma 2025, 21 March]. Because India is Nepal’s largest trade partner historically, disruptions in bilateral trade between the two countries have a quick and significant impact on Nepal.

Nepal’s exports to its another giant neighbour, China, is miniscule at 1-2 per cent of Nepal’s total exports, although Nepal’s imports from China are its second largest after India, at around 20 per cent. After India, Nepal’s major export markets are the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). However, Nepal’s exports to these economies pale in comparison with Nepal’s exports to India. Yet, the exports, which comprise around 10-15 per cent of Nepal’s total exports to each of these economies, are important for Nepal particularly because the major products that Nepal exports to these economies are labour-intensive items such as textiles, garments and handicraft products that engage many women.

The Trump administration’s imposition of reciprocal tariffs on imports of several countries after assuming the US presidency for the second time in January 2025 impacted these countries’ exports to the US. However, Nepal was spared by being slapped with only the minimum 10 per cent because Nepal has a trade deficit with the US. Since most of Nepal’s other South Asian neighbours faced higher tariffs, there were expectations that Nepal might even be able to benefit from the low tariffs its exports would face in the US. However, these expectations could not become a reality for several reasons.

An important milestone in Nepal’s development journey, of which trade is an important and integral part, is its upcoming graduation from the LDC group in November 2026. While this is a feat worth celebrating for sure, it also brings some challenges, particularly the loss of preferential market access in Nepal’s exports to some countries. Hence, in the aftermath of the Gen-Z protest, Nepal’s private sector was demanding the Nepali government request the United Nations for yet another deferral from graduation, which Nepal had once made successfully in 2018 because of the lingering effects of the 2015 earthquake. However, as I have argued elsewhere, Nepal might not have a strong case for the request this time [P. Sharma 2025, 10 November]. It would be in the country’s interest to move ahead and exit the LDC group.

An area where Nepal made encouraging progress in the past two years is hydropower generation and export By the end of 2025, Nepal’s installed hydropower generation capacity reached nearly 4,000 megawatts (MW). Although a small figure compared to Nepal’s potential estimated at 43,000-83,000 MW, it is impressive progress made in the past few years. There are efforts underway to meet Nepal’s expected generation of 28,000 MW by 2034.

In January 2024, Nepal and India signed a bilateral long-term power purchase agreement according to which Nepal would export 10,000 MW of electricity to India in the next 10 years. Nepal also became a net electricity exporter to India for the first time in FY 2023-2024. In addition to these encouraging developments, Nepal also started exporting 40 MW of electricity to Bangladesh via India under a tripartite agreement between the three countries [P. Sharma 2026].

To make further progress in its overall economic performance and exports, Nepal needs significant investments. As an LDC with limited financial resources and technological capacity, Nepal has been vying for foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows since the 1990s. However, for several reasons, Nepal has not been able to attract substantial FDI in the past three decades. This remained true in 2024 and 2025 as well. In FY 2023-2024 and FY 2024-2025, Nepal’s FDI receipts were US$ 63.8 million and US$ 88.4 million, respectively, which were less than 15 per cent of the committed FDI in those years [Nepal Rastra Bank 2025].

Amidst the gloom in the low level of actual FDI realisation, in July 2025, Nepal’s Department of Industry approved a Chinese investment of US$ 144 million to establish a buffalo meat processing industry in Nepal [Nepal Connect 2025, 22 August]. If successful, the project is expected to create more than 5,000 jobs in Nepal and export buffalo meat worth around US$ 1 billion to China [B. Sharma 2025, 29 July]. Groundwork for the industry’s establishment had commenced soon after the approval [People’s Review 2025, 25 November].

Nonetheless, Nepal’s cumulative FDI has remained extremely low. It has not contributed to enough job creation in Nepal and in attracting a large amount of foreign exchange and new technologies. For the necessary foreign exchange, Nepal’s main source has been the remittances it receives from its citizens working abroad.

Despite the huge trade deficit and low levels of FDI inflows, Nepal’s current account and balance of payment (BoP) remained in surplus in 2024 and 2025. Massive remittance inflows to the country, around a quarter of the country’s GDP, have been the chief contributors for these surpluses. In FY 2023-2024 and FY 2024-2025, Nepal’s net remittance receipts were US$ 10.8 billion and US$ 12.5 billion, respectively. Such remittance receipts have enabled Nepal to hold high levels of foreign exchange reserves that would be sufficient to import goods and services for more than 15 months. Therefore, Nepal’s external economy remained robust in 2024 and 2025.5

Had it not been for foreign employment opportunities for Nepali youths, Nepal’s political, economic and social conditions might be bleaker than they appear today. Lack of adequate employment opportunities at home might be a recipe for a bigger disaster. However, Nepali youths’ exodus from the country is also resented by a large section of the Nepali populace. The exodus is blamed for the increasing abandonment of agriculture, but conversely, Nepali youths are abandoning agriculture because of low/no returns from the sector despite the hard toil. Therefore, foreign employment and remittances have been a lifeline for many Nepali households. Remittances have also been a cause for higher imports and trade deficit since they have fuelled a consumption-based economy.

3.2. Economic challenges, attempted reforms and impacts of the Gen-Z movement

Although there were some promising developments in Nepal during 2024-2025, there were also problems, particularly with the domestic economy [P. Sharma 2024, 22 July]. Efforts aimed at controlling speculative land transactions, which were a main propeller of the domestic economy, resulted in overall subdued general demand. Banks saw a rise in their non-performing loans (NPLs). Credit disbursements from banks reduced significantly despite a substantial fall in interest rates. The banks were flush with liquidity, which the central bank had to manage by absorbing the excess liquidity from the market. More importantly, there were several cases of fraudulent activities in credit cooperatives, which hindered savers from accessing their savings, and hence causing a suppression in general demand [Dhakal 2025, 13 April].

After the formation of the «grand coalition» between the Nepali Congress and CPN(UML) in July 2024, some economic reforms were attempted, which were appreciated by the private sector. To implement the reforms, a few legal amendments were essential. Rather than take the parliamentary route to make the amendments, which certainly would be tortuous and time consuming, the government tried to amend them through ordinances. This was opposed by the opposition parties, and therefore the reforms could not progress further [P. Sharma 2025, 17 January; The Kathmandu Post 2025, 31 January].

The government also formed a high-level economic reform commission in October 2024 to provide recommendations for the improvement of domestic economic conditions. The commission submitted its report to the government in April 2025 [Dhakal 2025, 13 April]. But before the government could act on the recommendations (if it would), the 8-9 September movement upended everything in the country.

The mayhem of 8-9 September 2025 resulted in loss and damage to infrastructure and the economy, although not to the extent as was initially feared. There were apprehensions that the movement might have possibly impacted tourism significantly. The World Bank projected that Nepal’s economy might grow by only 2.1 per cent, which was a downward revision from its earlier projection of 4.6 per cent [The World Bank 2025, 13 November]. 

However, actual data on loss and damage collected from the affected sources showed that the total physical damage to public and private property was around US$ 586 million [G. Sharma 2025, 12 December], which was much less than the earlier assumptions [Parajuli et al. 2025, 17 September]. Similarly, there was an increase in tourist arrivals by 3.3 per cent in October 2025—the next month of the protests—compared to the arrivals in October 2024 [Fiscal Nepal 2025, 12 November]. Nevertheless, there were disruptions to the economy because of the unrest, which contributed to the already subdued economic activities.

Despite the losses and damages incurred by the private sector, their show of confidence and the pledge to rebuild was encouraging. The government, particularly through the Ministry of Finance, made efforts to boost their morale and drive economic activities forward. At the same time, however, reigniting the conflict over the payment of electricity dues by the Ministry of Energy, Water Resources and Irrigation against some industries at such testing times also invited controversy.6

4. International Relations

Nepal’s foreign policy lacks consistency [Bhattarai 2022]. Among the major political parties that have led Nepal’s governments for decades, the communist parties are alleged to be closer to China and the Nepali Congress to India. And Nepal’s relationships with these two giant neighbours, besides the United States (US), largely defines Nepal’s international relations. Therefore, formation of the «grand coalition» between the Nepali Congress and CPN(UML) in July 2024 was an important juncture in Nepal’s politics from the perspective of Nepal’s external affairs.

4.1. Nepal-India relations

K P Sharma Oli’s relations with New Delhi deteriorated significantly in 2015 when Oli took a hard stance against New Delhi opposing its unofficial trade blockade on Nepal [Bhattarai 2022]. The relationship did not improve substantially during his premiership in 2018-2021. When Oli assumed the Prime Ministerial role for the fourth time in July 2024 in a coalition with the Nepali Congress, it was expected that there could be an improvement in his relationship with India. However, unlike the usual practice of every new Nepali Prime Minister making his first foreign visit to India upon the latter’s invitation, New Delhi did not extend an invitation to Oli.

Arzu Rana Deuba, Nepal’s foreign minister in the grand coalition government visited India in August 2024. She was given a special welcome and treatment by India, which was seen as India’s signal to Oli about its preference [Ghimire 2024, 22 November; Wagle 2024, 26 August]. The foreign minister’s visit to India was also an effort to get an invitation for Oli’s India visit, which, however, did not materialize [Haidar 2024, 14 November].

Oli met India’s Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, in New York in September 2024 at the sidelines of the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly. The two leaders, however, did not discuss anything substantive. They merely agreed to reactivate the existing bilateral mechanisms between the two countries to resolve contentious issues and strengthen cooperation [Giri & Panday 2024, 24 September].

The two leaders then met in Bangkok in early April 2025 at the sidelines of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) Summit. The official statements by both sides about this meeting indicated that the meeting was held in a cordial manner and regular issues on bilateral cooperation were discussed [Embassy of Nepal in Bangkok 2025, 4 April; Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India 2025, 4 April]. However, there were readings in Nepal that the meeting between the two leaders might have been sour [The Kathmandu Post 2025, 8 April].

Despite the lack of a visible improvement in the relationship between Oli and Modi and New Delhi’s worsened relationship with Dhaka after the fall of the Sheikh Hasina regime in Bangladesh, Nepal, India and Bangladesh signed the tripartite agreement on exporting Nepal’s electricity to Bangladesh via India in early October 2024 [P. Sharma 2024, 8 October]. This, together with the signing of the bilateral long-term power purchase agreement between India and Nepal earlier in January 2024 was a significant development in India-Nepal relations during 2024-2025.

There are two other issues that deserve importance in a review of Nepal-India relations during 2024-2025. One is the suspicion in Nepal that India might have played a tacit role in Nepal’s pro-monarchy movements. The second (which also involves China) is Nepal’s reservations on the India-China deal on the Lipulekh pass.

Regarding the first, at the pro-monarchy rallies in Nepal in early 2025, protestors had carried placards with images of Yogi Adityanath, the Chief Minister of the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. Given Adityanath’s close relationship with Nepal’s former monarch, his endorsement of the monarchy during a public meeting in Kathmandu several months earlier, and frequent meetings between the two, there were suspicions in Nepal that Adityanath might be supporting Nepal’s pro-monarchy movements. Hence, in April 2025, Nepal’s Ambassador to India, Shankar Prasad Sharma, met Adityanath to seek clarification on whether he was providing the alleged support. It was reported that the Chief Minister rejected such claims [Republica 2025, 12 April]. Earlier, Nepal’s foreign minister, Arzu Rana Deuba, had also asked her Indian counterpart S. Jaishankar about the claims being made about India’s support for the pro-monarchy and pro-Hindu groups in Nepal, which he categorically denied [Giri 2025, 19 March]. This episode did not put a strain on India-Nepal relations.

But the second issue, that is the India-China deal on resuming their border trade through the Lipulekh pass, which Nepal claims as its own and has included in its official map, drew Nepal’s ire [Giri 2025, 22 August; P. Sharma 2025, 3 September]. As stated by Oli in the Nepali Parliament, he registered his objections to this deal with the Chinese President Xi Jinping during his visit to China in August 2025. As reported, the Chinese President said it was a bilateral issue between Nepal and India and so the two countries should resolve it bilaterally, further stating that China would welcome the outcome [P. Sharma 2025, 3 September].

It was reported that Oli had received an invitation for a meeting with Modi in Bodh Gaya in Bihar, India, in September 2025 and that he would discuss Lipulekh, among other things, with Modi during the meeting [Baral 2025, 22 August; People’s Review 2025, 5 September]. Questions abound on whether the meeting between the two leaders would eventually take place, and whether Oli would raise the issue of Lipulekh with Modi. This was being observed keenly in Nepal, but the 8-9 September movement compelled Oli to relinquish his premiership.

4.2. Nepal-China relations

Regarding Nepal-China relations, the visit by Chinese delegations to Nepal at various levels has increased significantly in the past few years. This continued in 2024-2025 as well, including after the formation of the «grand coalition» between the Nepali Congress and the CPN (UML) [Giri 2024, 19 January; The Kathmandu Post 2024, 27 January; Bhattarai 2024, 11 November]. There were also a few high-level visits from Nepal to China represented by all major political parties in Nepal, but most commonly the communist parties.

Of these few visits, two official visits in 2024 and 2025 produced some tangible outcomes. One was the visit by Narayan Kaji Shrestha, Nepal’s foreign minister in the Prachanda-led government, in late March 2024 before the formation of the «grand coalition». Upon Nepal’s request to China during this visit, China re-opened the 14 traditional border points between the two countries that China had closed since the COVID-19 pandemic. Beijing also agreed to waive the visa fees for Nepali visitors to China, reciprocating Nepal’s waiver of such fees for Chinese travellers since 2016 [P. Sharma 2024, 9 April].

The second was the visit by Prime Minister Oli in December 2024 when the two countries signed nine deals related to infrastructure, trade and development cooperation [The Kathmandu Post 2024, 3 December]. But the most significant was the breakthrough in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) implementation plan that had remained in limbo for a long time. There was a lack of consensus in Nepal on the financing modality of BRI projects. The Nepali Congress would agree to implement the projects only if China would provide grants for their execution, which China would not agree to [Adhikari & Acharya 2025]. After rigorous discussions and back-and-forth exchanges between the two sides, a deal was reached during Oli’s visit in December 2024 that the financing modality for the BRI projects would be «aid financing» [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Nepal 2024], which was interpreted as meaning both grants and concessional loans [P. Sharma 2024, 10 December].

Oli’s visit to China again in September 2025 to attend China’s victory parade after participating in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit also attracted widespread attention. There were divided opinions in Nepal on whether he should have attended the parade. This is particularly because the parade was organized to celebrate China’s victory over Japan, highlighting a diplomatic row between the two countries, whereas Japan has been Nepal’s important development partner for decades. Participating in the parade could be seen as Nepal taking sides with China against Japan, irking the latter that had asked countries to skip China’s World War II commemorative events in September 2025 [People’s Review 2025, 29 August].

It was soon after Oli’s return from China that the Gen-Z movement happened in Nepal. Therefore, how Nepal’s international relations might have unfolded under the «grand coalition» in the context of Oli’s uncomfortable relationship with New Delhi and his perceived cosy relationship with Beijing remained unclear.

4.3. Nepal-US relations

There was nothing significant in Nepal’s relationship with the US in 2024. The two countries maintained their usual cordial relationships, established a bilateral consultation mechanism, continued discussions on the bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), and had a few high-level visit exchanges.

But in 2025, Nepal felt the impacts of the US foreign policy changes. In particular, the Trump administration’s decision to shut down the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) impacted several projects on health, education, agriculture, infrastructure, economic growth, humanitarian aid and women and children empowerment in Nepal that were run with USAID support [Pradhan 2025, 26 January].

The US$ 500 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Nepal Compact was initially also frozen by the US [Ranjan 2025, 24 February]. However, it was only a temporary freeze. After a review, the US decided to continue the Compact. Hence, infrastructure building for electricity transmission and highway maintenance works—the two specific project areas under the Compact—continued after the temporary halt.

5. Conclusion

The Gen-Z movement of 8-9 September 2025 is a political watershed in Nepal’s history. It challenged the established political parties to make significant internal reforms. The collective strength of Balendra Shah and the RSP, both with huge support bases, has significantly added to the pressures facing the old parties.

To gain their lost ground, the older parties need to undergo massive transformations in leadership and governance. Without this, regaining the trust of the people could be an insurmountable challenge. The youth’s discontent with Nepal’s limited socio-economic progress in 2024-2025 indicates their high aspirations and demands for visible improvements in governance and service delivery.

The new government in Nepal will be faced with the several challenges discussed in this article in areas of politics, economics and international relations. The loss of some LDC-specific preferences upon Nepal’s scheduled LDC graduation in November 2026, growing climate impact, and above all the high expectations of the youth on governance, jobs and incomes are some of the important challenges that the new government must address. The government should be well prepared for an uphill task ahead.

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ISSN 2385-2526

New Delhi faced multiple complex challenges in 2025. Donald J. Trump’s return to the White House did not deliver an expected fillip to the US-India strategic partnership. Instead, the relationship markedly deteriorated, as the President imposed high tariffs on Indian goods and disregarded longstanding Indian positions concerning Pakistan and the Kashmir dispute. A terrorist attack in that region spurred New Delhi into a brief conflict that ended unexpectedly poorly for India, with the military even more dominant in Pakistan’s domestic politics and Islamabad’s relationships with China, the US and Saudi Arabia stronger than before. Cautiously, New Delhi continued to stabilise India’s relationship with China, recommencing flights and the issuing of visas, but Narendra Modi’s government faced criticism at home and abroad for its approach to managing Beijing’s ambition. This article analyses India’s foreign policy in all three of these areas. In the last part, it turns to New Delhi’s testy relationship with Southeast Asia, where more might be done to balance China’s power and develop mutually beneficial economic and security ties, but where neither side perceives value in those endeavours.

Keywords – Indian foreign policy; Trump; United States; Pakistan; China; South Asia.

1. Introduction

As 2025 approached, prominent Indian analysts and newspapers argued that New Delhi had good reasons to be confident about the year ahead [see Hall 2025, p. 296]. They welcomed Donald J. Trump’s imminent return to the White House and argued that the US-India strategic partnership had grown stronger during this first term in office (US) [Madhav 2024, 8 December]. They hoped that Trump would make good on his promises to end the Ukraine war and pursue a rapprochement with Vladimir Putin’s Russia [Observer Research Foundation 2024]. More cautiously, they welcomed the deal done with China in October 2024 to restore some normality to the troubled Sino-Indian frontier, hoping that the bilateral relationship would soon stabilise and economic opportunities would return [The Hindu 2024, 23 October]. Finally, they observed that Narendra Modi’s government would have more domestic breathing space to manage the demands of foreign policy, with only two state elections due in the next twelve months [Bajpaee 2025, 9 January].

These predictions were soon confounded. From early in the year, India was battered by global turbulence and the Modi government’s foreign policy was left in turmoil. President Trump proved far less amenable than many had hoped, as he launched a trade war against India and undercut Indian interests elsewhere. Putin rebuffed successive American proposals for ending the Ukraine war, leaving New Delhi exposed to criticism from European states about the Modi government’s ongoing unwillingness to condemn Russia’s aggression and vulnerable to US sanctions arising from its ongoing purchases of cheap Russian oil. Moreover, India was unable to extract new defence or investment deals from the Russian president, despite a high-profile visit to New Delhi [Rosenberg and Pandey 2025, 5 December]. Meanwhile, Beijing was no more tractable than it was prior to the conclusion of the border patrolling agreement. Nor for that matter was Bangladesh, whose interim government clashed repeatedly with New Delhi and demanded the return of former prime minister Sheikh Hasina [Mallinder 2025, 23 November]. Finally, the Kashmir dispute returned to the fore, with the worst terrorist attack to affect civilians in India since the assault on Mumbai in 2008 and a short but messy conflict with Pakistan that left India less able to exert pressure on Islamabad than before.

Here and there, New Delhi did have some wins. India’s relationship with Canada was patched up following the resignation of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and his replacement by Mark Carney, thanks to a fortuitously timed meeting of the Group of 7 (G7) in Alberta in mid-June to which Modi was invited [Choudhury, Dawar and Cheema 2025, 6 October]. In July, India signed an important trade deal with the United Kingdom (UK), renewed the bilateral Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and secured several other promising agreements [Jaybhay 2025, 16 September]. Modi was well received in Tokyo in August and Japan pledged some 10 trillion Yen (about US$ 68 billion) in new investment for India [Singh 2025, 7 September]. Throughout the year, the Indian prime minister and his foreign minister also took full advantage of the uncluttered domestic political calendar to travel widely. Modi went to twenty different countries and Subrahmanyam Jaishankar to more than thirty, including several that rarely see an Indian leader, like Ghana, Ireland, Namibia, and Trinidad and Tobago, and several regional states with sometimes troubled ties with India, like Maldives, Mauritius and Sri Lanka.

Nevertheless, the year was dominated by three foreign policy challenges: managing a strained relationship with the US; confronting threats from Pakistan; and recalibrating ties with China in ways that did not create new vulnerabilities. This article focuses on each of these challenges in turn, and in the final section, it looks at India’s relations with Southeast Asia, a strategically significant region where New Delhi might forge robust partnerships to offset China’s power and hedge against other risks, but where successive Indian governments have struggled to make headway. In the first part, the article analyses the causes and effects of New Delhi’s failure to assess the likely direction of the Trump administration’s India policy. In the second, it argues that India’s leaders mishandled the May conflict with Pakistan, exposing weaknesses in the coercive strategy they have employed for almost a decade to compel Islamabad to cease support for cross-border terrorism and insurgency. Concerning China, the article contends that the Modi government was more circumspect – and more successful as a result – despite ongoing tensions and deep mistrust in the Sino-Indian relationship. Finally, the article observes that New Delhi continued to underinvest in relationships with potential and established partners in Southeast Asia. Modi’s decision not to travel to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit and East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in late October 2025 highlighted India’s persistent reluctance seriously to engage that region, despite talk of the deep civilisational ties and assurances about upholding ‘ASEAN Centrality’.

2. Tariffs and turbulence

Many countries were nervous about Trump’s return, India’s foreign minister Jaishankar observed a few days after the Presidential election in early November 2024, but ‘India was not one of them’ [Sebastian 2024, 11 November]. In his view, a strong personal rapport between Trump and Modi and the President’s appreciation of India’s importance had strengthened US-India ties during his first term in office. Trump understood India’s growing diplomatic and economic weight, Jaishankar argued, and appreciated the need to work together to manage China’s ambition, bilaterally and in forums like the Quad [Seli 2024, 5 December]. Others aligned with the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) went further, predicting that with Trump back in the White House, the US and India would now combine forces to combat ‘radical liberals’ and ‘wokeness’, given what they saw as the ideological affinities between Trump’s Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement and the Hindu Right [Madhav 2024, 8 December]. Moreover, they looked forward to Trump’s promised assault on the so-called ‘Deep State’, which they believed had orchestrated an effort to tarnish the Modi government with accusations concerning human rights abuses, democratic backsliding, and corporate fraud [Dayal 2024, 7 December]. They acknowledged that Trump would likely cause New Delhi difficulties on trade, given India’s substantial US$ 45.8 billion goods trade surplus [Office of the United States Trade Representative 2025], immigration and perhaps climate change. And they recognised that the President’s transactionalism would require careful handling [Pathi and Sharma 2024]. But they assessed these challenges as manageable [Madan 2024, 5 December].

To lay the diplomatic groundwork for that management, Jaishankar went to Washington, DC, in late December 2024 for an unusually long six-day visit. He met with outgoing officials and with Mike Waltz, the Congressman whom Trump had recently nominated as National Security Advisor, and who was generally considered sympathetic to India [PTI 2024, 28 December]. The mission paid off: Jaishankar secured an invitation to Trump’s inauguration on 20 January 2025, which was interpreted as a positive sign for the future of the bilateral relationship [DD News 2025, 21 January]. A second invitation, this time for Modi to meet Trump in the Oval Office, was received soon afterwards, and the Indian prime minister became only the fourth leader to meet the newly sworn in President on 14 February [Bajpaee 2025, 11 February].

Yet by that point there were already indications that the relationship would soon encounter some turbulence. Just a few days before Modi arrived in Washington, DC, the new administration began a widely publicised series of deportations, flying illegal immigrants to their home countries, using the US air force [Hadda 2025, 10 February]. Some of the first flights went to India, including some to Modi’s home state of Gujarat, where the pictures of the chained and shackled detainees were met with a public outcry and ‘political uproar’ in parliament [Mishra 2025, 6 February]. In the meeting with Trump, the prime minister downplayed the issue, perhaps hoping that an emollient approach on immigration might assist with the effort to secure a good deal on tariffs, but to little avail. Modi came away from the Oval Office with big promises to boost bilateral trade and buy US arms, but no certainty about tariffs [Biswas and Inamdar 2025, 14 February]. The US and India continued to talk, but New Delhi was unable to head off the threat of punishment. On 2 April, Trump announced that the administration would impose a rate of 27% on Indian goods. Disappointed, New Delhi nevertheless persisted with diplomatic engagement, renewing a commitment to negotiate a trade deal in good faith [Ahmed, Kumar and Batra 2025, 4 April].

For a little while longer, the Modi government’s ongoing optimism about Trump’s return did not appear entirely unreasonable. On 22 April, Vice President J. D. Vance and his Indian-origin partner Usha Vance travelled to India, and some analysts interpreted the visit as a signal that the US remained equally committed to the bilateral strategic partnership [Chellaney 2025, 22 April]. Vance took the opportunity to encourage New Delhi to open India’s markets to US goods, but also argued that close cooperation was imperative, observing that ‘if we fail to work together successfully, the 21st century could be a very dark time for all of humanity’ [U.S. Embassy and Consulates in India 2025, 22 April]. The visit did not receive the coverage that it might, however, because on the same day Vance made these remarks, terrorists gunned down 26 civilians at a popular tourist destination at Pahalgam in Kashmir.

That attack is described in more detail in the next section, but it should be observed here that the crisis that followed had a significant impact on the Modi government’s relationship with the Trump administration. In the immediate aftermath, the US stood with India, as New Delhi has come to expect in recent years. Trump’s spokesperson pledged US support to India in its efforts to bring the perpetrators to justice [DD News, 2025, 23 April]. New Delhi likely took these remarks as a signal that the US would not stand in the way of military action targeting Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. At first, this assessment appeared accurate. When India retaliated on 7 May, the President said that it was a ‘shame’ that matters had reached that point but went no further [Holland and Singh 2025, 7 May], while Vice-President remarked that an India-Pakistan conflict was ‘fundamentally none of our business’ [Singh 2025, 9 May]. But as the conflict escalated, parts of the Trump administration grew increasingly alarmed about the possibility of a wider war or even a nuclear exchange. As Pakistan readied and launched a series of ballistic missiles, and India responded with strikes on significant military targets, Vice-President Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio intervened, pressing both sides for a ceasefire [Yusef 2025, p. 17].

On 9 May, a dialogue between Indian and Pakistani military commanders commenced on a dedicated hotline, and a deal was struck to end hostilities. Before New Delhi and Islamabad could announce the ceasefire, however, Trump broke the news on social media, claiming that the US had ‘mediated’ the ‘long night of talks’ [Ravid 2025, 10 May]. The State Department followed up with a statement that confirmed that the US had ‘brokered’ the deal, adding that ‘the Governments of India and Pakistan’ had also ‘agreed…to start talks on a broad set of issues at a neutral site’ [U.S. Department of State 2025, 10 May]. These issues, according to another social media post from the President, included the status of Kashmir. ‘I will work with you both’, Trump promised, ‘to see if, after a thousand years, a solution can be arrived at, concerning Kashmir’ [Ethirajan 2025, 13 May]. Claiming once more that his intervention had brought the conflict to a close, he suggested that ‘millions of people could have died’ and implied that potential trade deals had been used a leverage in the talks [Joshi 2025, 16 May].

These posts delighted Pakistan, which moved quickly to credit the President for brokering a ceasefire, welcome his pledge to meditate further talks over Kashmir, and eventually nominate him for a Nobel Peace Prize [Das and Greenfield, 2025, 13 May]. New Delhi was far less impressed. Trump’s comments appeared to jettison a tacit two decades-old commitment by the US not to challenge India’s long-standing position that the Kashmir dispute must be settled bilaterally, without third-party involvement [Congressional Research Service 2020, 13 January]. On 13 May, the Ministry of External Affairs reaffirmed that position but to little avail [Bhattacherjee and Haidar 2025, 14 May]. Trump persisted with his claim that he had brokered a ceasefire and his promise to convene talks to settle the Kashmir dispute. Matters came to a head in Canada in mid-June, where Modi and Trump were due to meet on the sidelines at the Group of 7 (G7) summit. The President’s decision to leave early and return to Washington, DC, led to the cancellation of that discussion, but Trump then called Modi and asked him to visit the White House on the way back to India. The President offered lunch and an opportunity to talk directly with Pakistan’s newly promoted Field Marshal, Asim Munir.

This gambit apparently angered Modi, who refused the invitation and further calls from Trump in the weeks that followed [Mashal, Das and Pager, 2025, 30 August]. New Delhi also released an unusually candid readout of the conversation, which included a point-by-point rebuttal of the President’s various claims:

Prime Minister Modi clearly conveyed to President Trump that at no point during this entire sequence of events was there any discussion, at any level, on an India-U.S. Trade Deal, or any proposal for a mediation by the U.S. between India and Pakistan. The discussion to cease military action took place directly between India and Pakistan through the existing channels of communication between the two armed forces, and it was initiated at Pakistan’s request. Prime Minister Modi firmly stated that India does not and will never accept mediation [Ministry of External Affairs 2025, 18 June].

In July and August, this rift between the two leaders and two countries widened still further. First, Trump announced that the US would levy an additional 25% tariff on Indian goods to penalise New Delhi for buying Russian oil and weapons [Yadav 2025, 31 July]. Second, the US unveiled a new deal to develop Pakistan’s oil reserves [Associated Press 2025, 1 August]. Third, the President said he would not travel to India for the Quad summit Modi had long been due to host [PTI 2025, 30 August]. Finally, the Trump administration issued an Executive Order imposing a US$ 100,000 price on the H-1B skilled worker visas that allow thousands of Indians to work in the US [Mogul and Liu 2025, 22 September]. These actions exposed the Modi government to further criticism at home and did little to encourage New Delhi to reconcile with Washington, DC, nor conclude a trade deal, despite repeated claims by Trump that one was imminent [Al Jazeera 2025, 1 September].

By the end of 2025, it was clear that the ‘Trump bump’ [Madan 2024, 5 December] to US-India relations that New Delhi had expected at the start of the year was unlikely to eventuate soon, leaving the future of the strategic partnership and initiatives like the Quad in doubt [Feigenbaum 2025, 4 August]. There was no sign that the Trump administration appreciated the logic or value of the strategic altruism that shaped the India policies of its predecessors, from George W. Bush onwards [see Vaishnav 2025, 16 July]. Instead, a coercive and transactional Trump used the strategic partnership as a source of leverage, to be used in pursuit of better terms of trade [Madan 2025, 24 September]. Worse still, the Trump administration appeared disinterested in engaging in full spectrum strategic competition with China and working with allies and partners like India to manage Beijing’s ambition. Its first National Security Strategy, issued in early December, made Asia a secondary strategic priority, focusing on economic competition with regional states more than on deterring military threats in the Indo-Pacific [White House 2025].

These statements, combined with Trump’s accommodating approach to Beijing and the language used by the President to describe US-China relations, were made with mounting concern in New Delhi. India has long feared a US-China entente or ‘Group of 2’ (G2) arrangement in which the US and China cut deals and set the rules without regard for others [Czin 2025, 25 November]. Such a ‘new model of great power relations’ [Zeng and Breslin 2016] would be welcome in Beijing but would likely relegate India to the status of a second-class regional power, with serious consequences for its political autonomy and economic trajectory [Madan 2022, p. 44]. Trump’s announcement on the eve of a meeting with President Xi Jinping in late November that the ‘G2 will be convening shortly’ was thus not well received in India [Mishra and Chaudhury 2025, 26 November]. It appeared to signal that the US was no longer interested in working with regional powers like India to compete with China and persuade Beijing to scale back its assertiveness. It raised yet more questions about the reliability of the US as a strategic partner and American commitment to India’s interests.

3. Strategic setbacks

The massacre at Pahalgam in Kashmir on 22 April was the deadliest terrorist attack targeting civilians in India in seventeen years. It was carefully planned to challenge New Delhi and to provoke a response. It took place at a popular tourist spot, undermining the Modi government’s arguments that Kashmir was now safe for visitors, thanks to controversial constitutional reforms and a hardline approach to security. The terrorists reportedly singled out non-Muslim men, in many cases sparing their partners and thereby ensuring that the details of the massacre were widely and graphically communicated to the media [Sharma 2025, 28 April].

In the immediate aftermath, India imposed various diplomatic sanctions on Pakistan, whom New Delhi blamed for sponsoring the terrorists. This included the unprecedented step of suspending the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty [Ministry of External Affairs 2025, 23 April]. But it was clear that military action would likely follow, given both the nature of the Pahalgam attack and past precedent, notably the 2016 Uri raid and the 2019 Balakot air strikes [see Sasikumar, 2019]. That action began on 7 May with a wave of strikes with artillery, drones, and precision-guided bombs on what India claimed were terrorist camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and Pakistan itself [Clary 2025, 28 May]. India labelled this attack ‘Operation Sindoor’ – referring to the vermillion paste applied to brides’ foreheads at Hindu marriage ceremonies and thus to those victims of Pahalgam recently married – and clearly conceived it as a standalone punitive measure, with no plans for further action. New Delhi made plain that Indian forces had been ordered to avoid military targets, signalling that it did not intend to engage Pakistan’s forces [Clary 2025, 28 May].

Within hours, however, Pakistan’s reaction forced India to abandon those self-imposed constraints. The Pakistani air force engaged its Indian counterparts at range and likely shot down two or three aircraft [Layton 2025, 17 November]. Their armies skirmished along the Line of Control in Kashmir and on 8 May, both sides attacked each other’s military facilities with various types of drones. Hundreds were launched on 9 May, while Pakistan readied and then used several missiles, firing at least one in the direction of Delhi. That weapon was intercepted by India’s air defences at Sirsa in Punjab, roughly 150km from the border and 250km from the capital, along with many others at other locations [Firstpost 2025, 10 May]. In response India escalated, attacking eleven Pakistani airbases with cruise missiles and air-launched ballistic missiles in the morning of 10 May [Layton 2025, 17 November]. The targets included one in Rawalpindi, near Pakistan’s army headquarters, and not far from Islamabad [Clary 2025, 28 May].

Seasoned analysts assess that India’s military prevailed in the conflict, despite the losses on the first day, demonstrating that it could quickly overwhelm Pakistan’s air defences while successfully defending Indian targets against Pakistani drone and missile attacks [Layton 2025, 17 November]. But this operational success was overshadowed by a series of strategic setbacks. The rapid and unpredictable development of this conflict from punitive strikes on non-military targets to large scale attacks using scores of drones and missiles alarmed foreign observers, prompted multiple diplomatic interventions by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom, among others, and finally by the US. Both sides would have anticipated such intervention – after all, both have developed conventional and nuclear warfighting doctrines on the assumption that it would occur within a few days of the start of hostilities [see Ladwig III 2007; Hall 2014, pp. 366-367]. But following the two earlier episodes where India has carried out cross-border strikes, in 2016 and 2019, New Delhi had likely come to believe that any American intervention would respect India’s positions and interests.

In 2025, as we have already discussed, this did not happen. Instead, Trump embarrassed New Delhi by pre-empting the ceasefire announcement, suggesting India had agreed to third-party mediation over Kashmir, re-hyphenating India and Pakistan at least rhetorically, if not in policy, and trying to cajole Modi into a meeting with Pakistan’s army chief at the White House. New Delhi was clearly surprised and disconcerted by these actions, which undermined India’s ability to coerce Pakistan. Worst still, the conflict strengthened the hand of the military in Pakistan’s domestic politics, despite its manifest operational failures. The shooting down of Indian aircraft in the first hours handed the Pakistani military a clear propaganda victory, which was exploited to the full at home and abroad [Nazar 2025, 11 May]. The high-profile roles played by Chinese and Turkish weapons systems – including Chengdu J-10 fighters – seemingly vindicated the military’s close partnerships with both states. Finally, the decision of Pakistan’s army leadership, headed by Asim Munir, to quickly escalate the conflict to strikes on military targets with missiles and drones drew in third party invention before India could unequivocally demonstrate its military superiority.

For all these reasons, Pakistan’s army was able to claim victory – and this verdict was widely accepted by the Pakistani public. A poll conducted a few days afterwards found that no fewer than 96% of those surveyed believed that Pakistan ‘had won the war’ and 97% rated the army’s performance as good or very good [Gallup Pakistan 2025, 21 May]. A conflict that began with the aim of coercing Islamabad into abandoning alleged support for cross-border terrorism thus ended with the principal alleged backer – Pakistan’s army – in an even stronger position than before. And Pakistan’s military chiefs took full advantage, tipping the domestic balance of power even further in its favour, and away from the civilian authorities. Munir was elevated to the rank of Field Marshal [Hussain 2025, 21 May] in only the second such promotion in Pakistan’s history, was feted by Trump at the White House [Hussain 2025, 19 June], was given lifelong immunity from prosecution [Davies 2025, 15 November], and was made the country’s first-ever Chief of Defence Forces [Raza and Asad 2025, 5 December].

Internationally, the Pahalgam attack and the May conflict did little if anything to stall Islamabad’s ongoing effort to break out of the relative isolation in which Pakistan found itself after the discovery that Osama bin Laden had found sanctuary there after 9/11, despite India’s attempts to label Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism. During the year, Islamabad was able to reengage two important erstwhile allies, with a view to reducing its recent dependence on China. With the US, Pakistan won favour early in Trump’s second term by passing on intelligence about the whereabouts of an Islamic State leader responsible for a deadly bombing at Kabul airport in 2021 and leveraged this into a broader rapprochement, including lower tariffs on Pakistani imports [Rahman, 2025, 1 October]. Islamabad also succeeded in revitalising relations with Saudi Arabia, despite sustained work by India over more than decade to construct a strategic partnership with the kingdom [see Quamar 2023]. In September, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia agreed a mutual defence pact that committed the parties to aid the other in the event of aggression [Siddiqui 2025, 17 September].

Together, these developments relieved at least some the pressure India had been able to apply to Islamabad in recent years. They left New Delhi with fewer options for coercing Pakistan into abandoning its alleged backing of cross-border terrorism. The May 2025 crisis put the Modi government in an invidious position, facing a resurgent Pakistan convinced that a strategy of rapid escalation in response to Indian military action won out against the odds and able to call on new friends in Washington and Riyadh, as well as old ones in Beijing, to undermine New Delhi’s diplomatic agenda.

4. Caution and calibration

The Modi government was far more cautious in dealing with China than with Pakistan. Earlier some international analysts had suggested that following the conclusion of the border patrolling deal in October 2024, New Delhi would move quickly to normalise relations with Beijing [see, for example, The Economist 2024, 24 October]. This assessment proved over-optimistic, despite a series of meetings between foreign and defence ministers, national security advisors, and top officials in late 2024 and early 2025 [Levesques and Solanki 2025, 16 May]. Instead, the Modi government moved slowly – when it moved at all – to wind back various sanctions imposed on China after the Galwan crisis in June 2020. It calibrated its diplomatic engagement of Beijing, reflecting deep-seated mistrust of India’s northern neighbour, intensifying domestic scrutiny of the administration’s approach to managing the various challenges posed by China, and concern about the lack of balance in the bilateral economic relationship [see Pant and Mankikar 2024, 14 November].

In the end, the patrolling agreement did lead to a swift normalisation of Sino-Indian relationship. More than six months passed before India began once more issuing visas to Chinese tourists and businesspeople, in July 2025 [Master 2025, 23 July]. It took even longer before New Delhi approved the resumption of direct flights between China and India, which had been cut off in 2020 due to Covid-19, as well as the border tensions [Mollan 2025, 3 October]. In parallel, the Modi government dragged its feet about relaxing the strict rules on inward investment from China, despite calls from business lobby groups and respected think tanks [Singh and Ohri 2025, 18 July]. By the end of 2025, the major restrictions – especially the rule that inward investment from China must be screened by government – remained in place, and lifting them continued to be politically controversial. The ever-expanding trade deficit in China’s favour did not help matters. In the 2024-25 financial year, India imported from China goods worth US$ 99.2bn more than it exported across the northern border – a figure even more striking when one considers that India’s goods exports to China totalled just US$ 14.3bn, less than 13% of the total value of bilateral trade [Joshi 2025, 4 December].

New Delhi was equally circumspect in bilateral diplomacy with Beijing. Senior ministers met their Chinese counterparts and made verbal commitments to find ways to reestablish trust, but few deals were done [see, for example, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2025, 21 February]. In August, Modi honoured a commitment to travel to China for a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit, despite domestic criticism of the visit [Times of India 2025, 1 September]. New Delhi likely calculated that non-attendance would have been interpreted as an unnecessary snub to Xi Jinping and would have ceded fellow member Pakistan diplomatic space to shape the narrative about the four-day conflict in May. Certainly, the Modi government saw the SCO meeting as not just a chance for the Indian prime minister to talk directly with Xi, but also as a timely opportunity for some broader signalling, which it seized.

First, Modi stopped off in Tokyo for talks with his Japanese counterpart on the way to the summit, reminding Beijing that improvements in Sino-Indian ties would not come at the expense of others [Berkshire Miller 2025, 3 September]. Second, Modi held an apparently convivial conversation with Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin in full view of the cameras, letting Washington know that India had options, should Trump persist with punitive tariffs and should the US-India strategic partnership falter [The Economic Times 2025, 1 September]. Third, after the SCO meeting, the Indian leader declined to stay on in China and attend a military parade commemorating of the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, indicating to Xi that while New Delhi sought a more stable relationship, it would not hand Beijing such an easy propaganda victory [Bartlett 2025, 4 September]. Finally, India refused to endorse Xi’s overtly anti-Western SCO agenda, pointedly highlighting the need for a ‘multipolar Asia’ as well as a multipolar world [Bajpaee 2025, 1 September].

These diplomatic calibrations showed how uncomfortable the Modi government was with normalising the relationship with China, even as problems emerged in India’s relationship with the US. Throughout the year, it remained the case that India did not ‘want to need China’, as Tanvi Madan observed [Madan 2025, 24 September]. To be sure, New Delhi sought greater stability and predictability, a lower level of tensions on the border, and economic interaction that benefited India. But as Madan [2025] argues, the Modi government view that Xi’s China is a rival, a bully, and an aspiring Asian hegemon was unchanged, and so New Delhi continued to proceed with caution in engaging Beijing. It opened the Indian economy to more trade, investment and technology transfer only where it perceived that the risks might be managed and where the authorities might minimise the threat of future Chinese coercion. New Delhi walked a careful diplomatic line with Beijing, indicating a willingness to cooperate on some initiatives of mutual interest, but not at the expense of national security.

Critics inside and outside China argued this caution was more a function of weakness than wisdom, placing further limits on what New Delhi might do. The veteran Congress Party politician Jairam Ramesh, for example, went so far as to accuse Modi of ‘capitulating’ to Beijing and ‘cowardly kowtowing’ to his Chinese counterpart by going to Tianjin [The Hindu 2025, 2 September]. These critics urged that a stronger line be taken, not just in response to Beijing’s ongoing bullying of India, but also in reaction to China’s overt backing of Pakistan during the May crisis. Some of them recognised, however, that decades-long underinvestment in defence had undermined India’s ability to deter threats to its territory, citizens and interests [The Economic Times 2025, 2 February].

In parallel, scholars continued to debate the character and causes of India’s persistent «underbalancing» of China, given the border dispute, the broader geostrategic rivalry between the two, and strategic shocks like the Galwan crisis in 2020 [see inter alia Paul 2024]. In a notable intervention, Christopher Clary argued that India had underbalanced China before Galwan and that despite the Modi government’s view of Beijing’s intentions, it would likely continue to do so. In his assessment, successive governments had failed to devote ‘sufficient national resources’ to defence, allocate what it had ‘optimally against potential threats’, used resources efficiently, and secured sufficient foreign assistance to fill the gaps [Clary 2025, p. 878]. Clary conceded that the Modi administration did seek to ‘correct the balance’ to some degree after Galwan, albeit by taking some ‘steps that entailed greater risks toward other dangers’ [Clary 2025, p. 893]. But India was still forced into making concessions to China, including in the 2024 patrolling agreement, which has still not been made public, due to its ongoing relative weakness [Clary 2025, p. 893].

All this said, New Delhi’s calibrated approach to managing the bilateral relationship during 2025 suggests that India was willing and able to withstand at least some pressure from China, even as the US-India strategic partnership came under strain and as India’s corporate sector pushed for more trade and investment. But domestic political necessity, rather than enhanced capabilities, likely explains this resistance. The Modi government remained vulnerable to domestic criticism of its China policy, including its handling of the Galwan crisis, and keen to avoid any impression of weakness. It pushed back strongly against those who suggested that its foreign policy was less than robust [see, for example, DD News 2025, 28 July]. It boosted India’s defence budget by a record 9.5% for the fiscal year 2025-26 and argued that such investment showed how serious it was about tackling the threats India faced [Ministry of Defence 2025, 24 March]. But even with this increase, defence expenditure remained below 2% of Gross Domestic Product, while inflation, wages and pensions limited what could be spent on modernising the armed forces [Hooda 2025, 12 February]. Moreover, after more than a decade of BJP-led governments, India’s military remains chronically short of advanced fighters and modern helicopters, ships and submarines, offensive and defensive cyber- and electronic warfare capabilities, missiles and much more [Desai 2025, 9 April].

5. Underbalancing

One way that New Delhi might reduce the imbalance of power with China would be to forge stronger strategic partnerships with like-minded states in East Asia, including in Southeast Asia. Successive Indian governments have toyed with this idea since the early 1990s, but despite rhetorical commitments to ‘Look East’ and ‘Act East’, none – including the current administration – have pursued such relationships in earnest [see Grare 2017]. Instead, enthusiasm has waxed and waned in New Delhi, with only some opportunities taken up, and there has been a general tendency to fall back on vague and cliched expressions of common interests, shared values, and historical linkages. As a result, thirty years on from the first efforts made by both sides to forge stronger strategic ties between India and states in Southeast Asia, even long-established partnerships, for example with Vietnam, remain underdeveloped, while local perceptions of India remain mixed at best.

This situation did not improve in 2025, despite the difficulties New Delhi faced with the US, Pakistan, and China, the potential inherent in deeper and broader economic, diplomatic and security ties between India and Southeast Asia, and shared scepticism about the prospect of a China-led regional order [see Ho and Lee 2025]. Indeed, in some ways, things deteriorated. The free trade agreement (FTA) between India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which came into force for goods in 2010 and for services in 2014, reemerged as a bone of contention. New Delhi has long been critical of the deal, pointing to the widening gap between ASEAN’s exports to India and the flow of goods and services in the other direction. While experts argue that the FTA is not to blame for this imbalance, since most bilateral trade is conducted outside its terms due to the onerous bureaucracy the agreement entails, it has become symbolic of what Indian governments have complained is an unequal economic relationship [Palit 2025, 21 July].

These tensions reemerged early in 2025, despite an effort by Malaysia, the incoming ASEAN chair, to reinvigorate ties with India, partly with a view to securing New Delhi’s support for a Malaysian application for membership of the BRICS grouping [Haidar 2024, 20 August]. This push had been signalled in August 2024, during Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s State Visit to New Delhi, which produced an agreement to elevate the Malaysia-India relationship to the level of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, as well as pledges to boost trade and develop stronger security ties [Ministry of External Affairs 2024, 20 August]. To further these aims, Kuala Lumpur also agreed to ‘support and expedite’ the pending review of the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, recognising New Delhi’s desire to see these talks proceed [Asia News Network 2024, 21 August].

Completing the review proved harder to achieve, however, despite several public pledges to finish the process by the end of 2025 [Times of India 2025, 26 October]. As the talks wore on, India grew more frustrated. A series of papers critical of the FTA were published by Indian think tanks, some calling the trade deal a ‘litmus test’ for the broader relationship between India and ASEAN [see, for example, Baruah 2025, 21 July]. Unnamed Indian officials briefed journalists that New Delhi was contemplating pulling out of the agreement altogether, in protest at what was characterised as ASEAN’s refusal to take India’s concerns seriously [Jayaswal 2025, 7 July]. This threat was not realised by the end of the year, despite the failure to finalise the review, but it highlighted a wider malaise in India’s relationship with Southeast Asia, as well as with ASEAN.

This malaise was laid bare in the latest State of Southeast Asia report produced by the Singapore-based Yusof Ishak Institute. Based on surveys of regional state elites, the report provides a useful annual snapshot of opinion. Year after year, however, it finds that India is not well-regarded in Southeast Asia as an economic or security actor. In 2025, India was ranked only the sixth most important strategic partner for ASEAN, after the European Union (fourth) and Australia (fifth) and just above South Korea. This score was admittedly higher than the one India attained in 2024, when it came ninth, but it must be noted that the improved ranking was a function of improved perceptions in the relatively marginal Southeast Asian states of Brunei, Laos, and Myanmar. In Indonesia, the region’s most populous state, Malaysia and the Philippines, India was ranked ninth, while in Vietnam, a long-established strategic partner, and in Thailand, it came eighth [Yusof Ishak 2025, pp. 36-37].

Indian politicians and analysts often argue that India’s lack of strategic clout in Southeast Asia is offset by ‘soft power’. They point to past cultural and religious ties between India and the region, observing the influence of writing systems, ancient epics like the Ramayana, and architectural traditions, as well as past trade in goods like cotton cloth [see Bajpaee 2022]. The evidence for this soft power is thin, however, and for its influence on foreign policy it is thinner still. The 2025 Yusof Ishak survey asked a couple of questions to try to gauge relative levels of soft power, and the results for India were not impressive. Only 1.6% of respondents said they wanted to live and work in India, compared to 17.6% for Japan and 5.5% for China. Only 3% said that India was their favourite holiday destination, compared to 33% for Japan and 6.7% for China [Yusof Ishak 2025, pp. 71, 73].

This lack of regard is mirrored in India, where there is a widespread view that most of the states of Southeast Asia and ASEAN itself are either geo-strategically irrelevant or under Beijing’s sway [Mohan 2025, 17 July]. Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal’s undiplomatic observation that some regional states belonged to ‘China’s B team’, made as tensions about the ASEAN-India FTA rose in July, neatly captured this view and did nothing to speed up the talks [Ganapathy 2025, 2 July]. In October, Modi’s decision to not to attend ASEAN and East Asia Summits in person, while likely motivated by domestic political issues and a desire to avoid an encounter with President Trump, reinforced the impression that New Delhi does not take the region as seriously as it does others [Joshi 2025, 4 November].

During the year, Modi played host to several key Southeast Asian leaders, including Indonesia’s Prabowo Subianto in January, the Philippines’ Ferdinand Marcos Jr. in August, and Singapore’s Lawrence Wong in September. India also reportedly moved closer to concluding a deal to sell BrahMos cruise missiles to Indonesia and Vietnam and talked more about the possibility of exporting the Akash air defence system to those states and the Philippines [Firstpost 2025, 23 December]. But tensions over the trade deal overshadowed India’s relations with the region and New Delhi was unable to overcome ingrained reservations about more substantive economic and security partnerships with Southeast Asian states, despite the troubles India was experiencing elsewhere.

6. Conclusion

There were few if any signs at the end of 2025 that the turbulence and turmoil that India encountered throughout the year were likely to abate in the foreseeable future. The US and India were still divided over trade [Nandi 2025, 24 December]. In Pakistan, the newly minted Chief of Defence Staff Asim Munir continued to consolidate the power of the fiercely anti-India military establishment [Ahmed 2025, 5 December]. Trust between Beijing and New Delhi remained fragile, at best, as a Pentagon report observed [U.S. Department of Defense 2025, p. 13], while India struggled to improve its standing in Southeast Asia.

In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that New Delhi looked to others, especially Europe. In December, it was announced that President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen and President of the European Council António Costa would be the guests of honour at the upcoming Republic Day celebrations and an EU-India summit would be held around the same time, with a view to signing a long-awaited free trade deal between the two [Trivedi and Haidar 2025, 21 December]. To some, the strategic logic of this move was compelling: ‘Europe is a reliable partner with strong technological capabilities, shared concerns about Chinese coercion, and a steadier foreign policy’ than the US [Crabtree and Chaudhuri 2025, 3 December]. But it is not yet clear that New Delhi will be willing to address longstanding European concerns about India’s relationship with Russia, democratic backsliding, labour laws, and what they see as inadequate protections for foreign investors and foreign intellectual property [Maddishetty 2025, 7 April].

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